De benedicta incarnacione

On the Blessed Incarnation

John Wyclif

Latin text of Harris's edition for the Wyclif Society (1886),
with a new English translation and notes

Translated by Wilson Pruitt

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De benedicta incarnacione: On the Blessed Incarnation. Latin and English.

John Wyclif's treatise on the incarnation, an early work of the schools and the nearest of his surviving writings to his lectures on the third book of the Sentences. Wyclif asks whether, and in what sense, the humanity the Word assumed is Christ, and so whether Christ is a creature; answers from the fathers that it is; and sets the "modern doctors", Scotus and Thomas among them, beside the ancients until he can bring them into accord. The Latin of Edward Harris's edition (1886), with a new English translation and notes: a prologue and 13 chapters in 60 parts,

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Prologue: The matter, its three demands, and the thirteen chapters

Harris pp. 1.3–2.32

Occasion. *The* Tractatus de benedicta incarnacione *is an early work: a treatise of the schools, with no word of pope, endowment or friars. Harris (preface §II) follows Shirley in placing it before 1367, in the first years of Wyclif's doctorate (c. 1363–67), since its position on the eucharist is the first of the three stages Woodford describes, and since five of the "heresies" said to have been noticed only when Wyclif became doctor are maintained here. It cross-refers to the* De universalibus*, and its opening presents it as the sequel to a* De anima *(1.3) "tasted beforehand". When Oriel College bought its manuscript in 1454, the treasurer entered it as Wyclif* super sententias*, and in that manuscript it stands among commentaries on the Lombard: it is the surviving text nearest to Wyclif's lectures on the third book of the* Sentences.

The text. *Edward Harris's edition for the Wyclif Society (1886) rests on five manuscripts: Vienna 384 (**A**, "Prologus magistri Johannis de Incarnacione" in red), Vienna 404 (**B**) and Vienna 387 (**C**), which Beer judged one recension from a common source; Oriel College, Oxford, xv (**O**, English, c. 1400, in Harris's view the best and probably the oldest, nearer to C than to A or B); and London, British Library Royal 7 B. iii (**M**), not a copy but a fifteenth-century summary, the course of the argument with the illustrations and authorities left out. Harris's text is eclectic, "the best reading" chosen in each case and the rejected readings of A, B, C, O set at the foot of the page, keyed by figures that stand in the text; he keeps the manuscripts' spelling "even when manifestly incorrect". The thirteen chapters are Wyclif's own division (1.14 below); the paragraphs are Harris's. Our copy-text is Harris's printed text, established by transcription and read against the plates. Where the manuscripts agree against the print, we follow them and give both readings in a note: all of A B C O, or O with any of A B C (A B C are one recension, so the three alone count as one witness), or a single manuscript backed by the text Wyclif quotes or by an argument that fails without its reading. Harris's own emendations against every manuscript are set aside on the same terms. Elsewhere the print stands. Harris prints a running English abstract of the treatise down the margin of every page: it is the editor's, not the text's, and is not reproduced here. At the head of each chapter he repeats, in square brackets, the prologue's sentence for that chapter, followed by his own English summary; the Latin sentence is translated, the summary is not. Wyclif cites scripture by book and chapter; the verse numbers given in the English are from Harris's margin where he prints one and ours where he does not, and psalms are numbered as in the Vulgate (Harris's margin uses the Hebrew numbering, Ps. cx for 109).*

The work's move. *The question is whether, and in what sense, the humanity that the Word assumed* is *Christ, and so whether Christ is a creature. Wyclif answers from the fathers that it is and that he is, as to the humanity; argues that Christ remained a man and, supposing that the Word did not lay aside the nature he assumed, that he could not, even in the three days in the tomb; holds Christ to be univocally a man with other men, of one species with them, and subject to change as a man; and sets beside this the teachings of the "modern doctors" (ch. 4), resolves their objections (chs. 9, 11), and at last brings their teachings into accord with the ancients (ch. 13).*

Where it is answered. *Harris notes that five of the propositions later listed among Wyclif's first "heresies" (*Fasciculi zizaniorum*, p. 2) are maintained in this treatise, among them that Christ is first matter and so the most abject of creatures (p. 25). A direct answer to the treatise has not been traced.*

¶1 1.3–1.13

[1]Prelibato[1] tractatu De Anima qui introductorius est propter incarnacionis misterium[2] cognoscendum, restat tractatum De Benedicta Incarnacione operosius aggredi cum diligencia,[3] reverencia, et timore. Cum diligencia,[3] quia nulla materia est intellectui difficilior, et per consequens oportet mentem dare operam plus attentam: cum reverencia, quia nulla[4] materia theologica est affectui preciosior, cum sub uno comprehendit involucro tocius creacionis[5] et recreacionis venerabile sacramentum: et cum timore, quia, sicut in nulla materia quis compendiosius promeretur, sic nullibi facilius aut periculosius aberratur.[6]

Now that the treatise *On the Soul*, which is introductory for the sake of knowing the mystery of the incarnation, has been tasted beforehand,[1] it remains to set about the treatise *On the Blessed Incarnation* more laboriously, with diligence, reverence and fear. With diligence, because no matter is harder for the understanding, and consequently the mind must give it a more attentive effort; with reverence, because no theological matter is more precious to the affection, since under one wrapping it comprehends the venerable sacrament[2] of the whole creation and re-creation; and with fear, because, as in no matter does a man earn merit more compendiously, so nowhere does he stray more easily or more perilously.

¶2 1.14–1.14

[1]Dividitur autem tractatus iste[7] in[8] 13 capitula.

And this treatise is divided into thirteen chapters.

¶3 1.15–1.18

[1]Quorum primum, declarando ex testimoniis sanctorum quod humanitas sit Christus et per consequens creatura, dat sensum dictorum[9] in scripturis et in[10] symbolo[11] que videntur huic opposita.

Of these the first, by making clear from the testimonies of the saints that the humanity is Christ, and consequently a creature, gives the sense of the sayings in the scriptures and in the creed that seem opposed to this.[3]

¶4 1.19–1.20

[1]Secundum capitulum[12] declarat quomodo ista sentencia discrepat ab heresi Arriana.

The second chapter makes clear how this teaching differs from the Arian heresy.

¶5 1.21–1.22

[1]Tertium capitulum ostendit quod Christus fuit homo in triduo et obicit multipliciter et dissolvit.

The third chapter shows that Christ was a man during the three days,[4] and raises objections in many ways and resolves them.

¶6 2.1–2.2

[2]Quartum capitulum iuxta ponit sentencias modernorum doctorum, ut veritas plus lucescat.

The fourth chapter sets beside [it] the teachings of the modern doctors, so that the truth may shine out the more.

¶7 2.3–2.5

[2]Quintum capitulum, supponendo quod Verbum non dimisit humanitatem pro triduo, probat[1] quod nec potuit dimittere naturam quam assumpsit.

The fifth chapter, supposing that the Word did not lay aside the humanity for the three days, proves that he could not lay aside the nature that he assumed either.

¶8 2.6–2.9

[2]Sextum capitulum ostendit quod Christus sit univoce homo cum aliis hominibus;[2] et respondendo objectibus[3] declarat quod Christus est, secundum multorum doctorum[4] testimonia,[5] creatura.

The sixth chapter shows that Christ is univocally a man with other men, and in replying to objections makes clear that Christ is, according to the testimonies of many doctors, a creature.

¶9 2.10–2.12

[2]Septimum capitulum declarando Christi mobilitatem explanat sensum scripture multis ambiguum,[6] quomodo sapiencia summe mobilis[7] sit habitu inventa ut homo.

The seventh chapter, by making clear Christ's mobility, explains the sense of scripture, ambiguous to many, how Wisdom, mobile in the highest degree, was "in habit found as a man".[5]

¶10 2.13–2.14

[2]Capitulum octavum obicit tripliciter contra ydemptitatem specificam[8] Christi cum aliis et[9] dissolvit.

The eighth chapter objects in three ways against the identity of species of Christ with others, and resolves the objections.

¶11 2.15–2.17

[2]Capitulum nonum epilogat posicionem de humanitate; et,[10] narrando tres radices causantes modernorum discrepancias, dissolvit tres objectus eorum per[11] ordinem.

The ninth chapter recapitulates the position on the humanity; and, by recounting three roots that cause the disagreements of the moderns, resolves their three objections in order.

¶12 2.18–2.20

[2]Capitulum decimum suadet[12] 12 evidenciis quod humanitas assumpta sit Christus; et hoc[13] roborat doctorum testimoniis et exemplis.

The tenth chapter makes the case by twelve evidences that the assumed humanity is Christ, and strengthens this by the testimonies and examples of the doctors.

¶13 2.21–2.24

[2]Capitulum undecimum solvit instancias quibus moderniores doctores videntur fulcire suam sentenciam, recitando decem ludicra que concedentes possibilitatem dimissionis annuunt consequenter.

The eleventh chapter resolves the objections by which the more modern doctors seem to prop up their teaching, rehearsing ten laughable things to which those who grant the possibility of the laying-aside assent in consequence.

¶14 2.25–2.28

[2]Capitulum duodecimum recitando opiniones varias de assumpcione creature declarat quod, si assumeret multas humanitates, foret[14] multi homines, sicut dictat sentencia sancti Thome.

The twelfth chapter, rehearsing the various opinions on the assumption of a creature, makes clear that, if he were to assume many humanities, he would be many men, as the teaching of Saint Thomas dictates.[6]

¶15 2.29–2.32

[2]Capitulum tredecimum confirmat[15] aliorum sentencias quod[15] tunc nec foret unus homo nec multi homines, sed[16] et unicus atque multi; et sic concordat modernorum sentencias cum antiquis.[17]

The thirteenth chapter confirms the teachings of others, that then he would be neither one man nor many men, but both one and many;[7] and so it brings the teachings of the moderns into accord with the ancients.

Notes

1. *Prelibato tractatu De Anima*: the treatise "tasted beforehand" is Wyclif's own *De anima*, which he calls introductory to this one. No work survives under that title; it is sometimes identified with the *De compositione hominis* (ed. Beer, Wyclif Society, 1884), but neither Beer nor Harris says so, and Harris's preface (1886) still counts the *De Anima* among the unedited treatises. Harris's apparatus records that A, B and C omit the initial letter (left for the rubricator).
2. *sacramentum*: the mystery, as in 1 Tim. 3:16 *magnum pietatis sacramentum* (Douay "mystery"), not one of the seven sacraments; kept as "sacrament" to stay apart from *misterium*, "mystery" (1.3).
3. *humanitas sit Christus*: the thesis of the whole treatise. *Humanitas*, "the humanity" (not "the human nature", which renders *natura humana*), is the nature that the Word assumed, body and soul; Wyclif's claim is that it *is* Christ, so that Christ, as to it, is a creature. *Sancti* here are the fathers (Augustine above all), as throughout.
4. *in triduo*: the three days between the death and the resurrection, when the body lay in the tomb and the soul was parted from it. The question whether Christ was then a man is the Lombard's (*Sent.* III d. 22, *Si Christus in morte fuit homo*, PL 192, 803; *verified*), and runs through chapters 3 and 5.
5. *sapiencia summe mobilis*: Wis. 7:24, *omnibus mobilibus mobilior est sapientia* (Douay "wisdom is more active than all active things"), which chapter 7 quotes (p. 107): Christ as the Wisdom of God, who in the humanity became subject to change (*mobilitas*, chapter 7). The phrase "in habit found as a man" is Phil. 2:7, Douay–Rheims "in habit found as a man"; Harris gives no reference here.
6. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 5, whether one person can assume two human natures: in ad 2 and 3 he says that such a person would be called *duo homines*, *plures homines, et non unus homo* (*verified*). The later *Summa theologiae* III q. 3 a. 7 ad 2 reverses this: *diceretur unus homo habens duas naturas humanas*.
7. *nec … unus homo nec multi homines, sed et unicus atque multi*: in the case supposed, Wyclif denies each horn taken alone ("neither one man nor many men") and grants them together ("both one and many"); by this he brings the moderns' teachings into accord with the ancients (*cum antiquis*).
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 1: *opposita.* (print as transcribed (word on next line)) [BT-ONLY]
  - 2: *homo cum aliis hominibus;* (print as transcribed) [SUB]

Chapter 1

Part 1: That Christ is a creature, from the testimonies of Augustine

Harris pp. 3.0–7.12

¶1 3.0–3.0

[3][Declarando ex testimoniis sanctorum quod humanitas sit Christus et per consequens creatura, dat sensum dictorum in scripturis et in symbolo que videntur huic opposita. Discussion as to the sense in which it is catholic truth to say: Christ is a creature.]

[By making clear from the testimonies of the saints that the humanity is Christ, and consequently a creature, it gives the sense of the sayings in the scriptures and in the creed that seem opposed to this.]

¶2 3.2–3.20

[3]Quia autem spiritualiter viantibus in discendo necesse est primo removere prohibens disciplinam; ac in scriptura sacra et sacris[1] doctoribus de Christo[1] sunt multa scripta[2] que videntur inperitis contraria; ideo pro solucione eorum in primis supponitur[3] quod Christus sit tres nature incommunicantes: scilicet, deitas, corpus, et anima. Patet sic. Christus est Deus et homo perfectus, ut ex fide supponitur: omnis Deus est deitas: omnis homo perfectus est tam corpus quam anima: ergo conclusio. Confirmatur per Augustinum super Ioh. Ome. 47.[4]' Si, inquit, caro animam posuit, quomodo Christus animam posuit? numquid[5] caro Christus?' Et respondet:' Ita plane et caro Christus et anima Christus et Verbum Christus: nec tamen hec tria[6] tres Christi, sed unus Christus. Hominem interroga et de eo fac gradum[7] ad ea que super te sunt, et[8] si nondum intelligenda, saltem credenda. Quomodo enim unus homo anima et corpus? sic unus Christus Verbum et homo.' Nec credo quod nos ignari ad tantum desipimus quod dicamus hunc sanctum tam crebro sentenciam hereticam inculcare.

And since for those on the road in the spirit it is necessary, in learning, first to remove what hinders instruction; and in holy scripture and in the holy doctors there are many things written of Christ that seem to the unskilled to be contrary; therefore, for their resolution, it is supposed in the first place that Christ is three natures that do not communicate with one another,[1] namely the Godhead, a body and a soul. It is clear thus. Christ is God and perfect man, as is supposed from faith; every God is Godhead; every perfect man is both body and soul; therefore the conclusion. This is confirmed by Augustine on John, homily 47:[2] "If," he says, "the flesh laid down its soul, how did Christ lay down his soul? Is the flesh, then, Christ?" And he answers: "Yes, plainly: the flesh is Christ, and the soul is Christ, and the Word is Christ; and yet these three are not three Christs, but one Christ. Question man, and from him make a step to the things that are above you, and if they are not yet to be understood, at least to be believed. For as one man is soul and body, so one Christ is Word and man."[3] Nor do I believe that we in our ignorance are so far out of our wits as to say that this saint so often presses a heretical teaching.

¶3 3.21–4.5

[3]Ex istis plane[9] sequitur quod Christus est creatura. Nam omnis natura corporea vel spiritus creatus est creatura: Christus est tam natura corporea quam spiritus creatus, cum sit homo perfectus: ergo Christus est creatura. Sed quia sunt multe scripture que videntur isti sentencie repugnare, ut recitat Magister 3° Sententiarum Dist. 2ª, ideo ut omnes communiter[10] dissolvantur[11] sub uno epilogo; dicitur quod omnes recte intelligentes Christum non esse creaturam [4]concipiunt quod Christus secundum deitatem non est creatura: sicut omnes recte concipientes[1] Christum esse creaturam concipiunt eum secundum

From these it follows plainly that Christ is a creature. For every corporeal nature or created spirit is a creature; Christ is both a corporeal nature and a created spirit, since he is perfect man; therefore Christ is a creature. But because there are many scriptures that seem to be incompatible with this teaching, as the Master rehearses in the third book of the *Sentences*, distinction 2,[4] therefore, so that they may all be resolved together under one recapitulation, the answer is that all who rightly understand "Christ is not a creature" [4]conceive that Christ as to the Godhead is not a creature, just as all who rightly conceive "Christ is a creature" conceive that he as to

humanitatem esse creaturam. Et ista[2] glosa, si non fallor, satisfacit sub communi involucro omnibus auctoribus in oppositum allegandis.

the humanity is a creature.[5] And this gloss, if I am not mistaken, satisfies under a common wrapping all the authors who are to be alleged on the opposite side.

¶4 4.6–4.27

[4]Sed ut illa[3] materia particularius denudetur, oportet primo fundare sentenciam huius glose. Et occurrit michi[4] primo disputacio Augustini ad Felicianum hereticum; ubi post duplicem nativitatem Christi et duplicem eius substanciam vel naturam declaratam tam ex scriptura sacra quam similitudine naturali, sic[5] ait inter cetera: 'Non[6] alius homo corpus, alius animus, quamvis aliud corpus, aliud animus; unus tamen atque idem homo et corpus dicitur et animus. Sic, inquit, in mediatore[7] Dei et hominum: aliud Dei filius, aliud hominis filius, unus tamen Christus Iesus ex utroque fit: aliud, inquam, pro discrecione[8] substancie, non[6] alius pro unitate persone.' Et per hoc solvit scripturas de Christo,[9] quarum alique locuntur de ipso secundum deitatem et alie secundum humanitatem. Et posiciones[10] secundum habitudinem[11] concedit simpliciter; unde subdit: 'nec ideo dicimus non pacientem quia ipse faciebat celos,[12] nec ideo non facientem quia non alius tollerabat. Nam si dominice incarnacionis misterium consideremus,[13] idem sibi in hac humilitate et auctor[14] et opus est.' Unde et post declaratur esse possibile quod eadem persona simul et semel sed secundum diversam naturam mortem paciatur et vivat, sicut idem sol secundum diversos situs simul tempore diem causat et noctem.

Now, so that that matter may be laid bare more particularly, it is necessary first to ground the teaching of this gloss. And there occurs to me first Augustine's disputation against Felician the heretic,[6] where, after the twofold birth of Christ and his twofold substance or nature have been made clear both from holy scripture and from a natural likeness, he says this among other things: "The body is not one man and the mind another, although the body is one thing and the mind another; yet one and the same man is called both body and mind. So," he says, "in the mediator of God and men: the Son of God is one thing, the son of man another, yet one Christ Jesus is made out of both: one [thing] and another, I say, for the distinction of substance, not one [person] and another, for the unity of the person."[7] And by this he resolves the scriptures about Christ, of which some speak of him as to the Godhead and others as to the humanity. And the positions according to their respect he grants without qualification;[8] hence he adds: "nor do we on that account say that he did not suffer, because he himself was making the heavens; nor that he was not making them, because it was no other who endured. For if we consider the mystery of the Lord's incarnation, in this humility the same one is to himself both author and work." Hence afterwards too it is made clear to be possible that the same person at one and the same time, but as to a different nature, should suffer death and live, as the same sun, as to different positions, causes day and night at the same time.

¶5 4.28–5.10

[4]Secundum testimonium Augustini est in Ep. 12[15] ad Pascencium et in Epistula 40 ad Dardanum ubi cap. 7° ita inquit: 'Cum enim Christus sit Deus et homo, Deus utique est; unde dicit: "Ego et Pater unum sumus" Ioh. 10: homo autem; unde dicit: "Pater maior me est," Ioh. 14: idemque Filius Dei unigenitus a Patre, et filius hominis ex semine David[16] secundum carnem est. Utrumque in illo considerandum [5] est cum loquimur vel cum scriptura de ipso loquitur: et quid et[1] secundum quid de illo dicitur intuendum est. Nam sicut unus homo est anima rationalis[2] et caro, sic unus Christus est Verbum et homo. Proinde quod ad Verbum attinet, creator est Christus; "omnia enim per ipsum facta sunt;" quod vero[3] ad hominem attinet, Christus creatus est; "factus enim est[4] ex semine David secundum carnem," et

The second testimony of Augustine is in Letter 12 to Pascentius and in Letter 40 to Dardanus, where in chapter 7 he says this:[9] "For since Christ is God and man, he is certainly God; hence he says, 'I and the Father are one' (John 10:30); and he is man; hence he says, 'the Father is greater than I' (John 14:28); and the same one is the only-begotten Son of God from the Father, and the son of man of the seed of David according to the flesh. Both are to be considered [5]in him when we speak, or when scripture speaks of him; and both what is said of him and in what respect it is said are to be looked to. For as one man is a rational soul and flesh, so one Christ is Word and man. Accordingly, as far as pertains to the Word, Christ is creator, 'for all things were made by him' (John 1:3); but as far as pertains to the man,

"in similitudinem hominum[5] factus est."' Et post diffuse prosequitur declarando que scripture sibi conveniunt secundum deitatem et que secundum humanitatem.

Christ was created; 'for he was made of the seed of David according to the flesh' (Rom. 1:3), and 'was made in the likeness of men' (Phil. 2:7)." And afterwards he goes on at length, making clear which scriptures befit him as to the Godhead and which as to the humanity.

¶6 5.11–5.26

[5]Nec est maior color quod sit creator quia secundum deitatem, quin per idem sit creatura quia secundum humanitatem, specialiter cum sit illa completa humanitas. Quia certum est ex testimonio[6] Augustini ad Felicianum quod totus homo assumptus passus est mortem, sicut sola caro iacuit in sepulcro, ut testatur Augustinus Ome. 47 ubi super: 'Confiteris,[7] inquit, in illum[7] Christum credere qui est mortuus et sepultus: ergo et sepultum esse Christum non negas. Et tamen sola caro sepulta est: si enim erat ibi anima, non erat mortuus: si autem vera mors erat, ut vera sit eius resurreccio,[8] sine anima erat in sepulcro, et tamen sepultus est Christus. Ergo Christus erat etiam sine anima caro, quia non erat sepulta nisi caro.' Unde paulo ante ipse Christus dictus est sola caro. 'Quomodo,[9] inquit, probas? Audeo dicere: sola caro[9] Christi dictus est Christus;' et probatur[10] per hoc, quod Christus iacuit in sepulcro.[11]

Nor is there greater colour[10] that he is creator because [he is so] as to the Godhead, than, by the same token, that he is a creature because [he is so] as to the humanity, especially since he is that complete humanity. For it is certain from the testimony of Augustine against Felician that the whole assumed man suffered death, just as the flesh alone lay in the tomb, as Augustine witnesses in homily 47, in the place cited above:[11] "You confess," he says, "that you believe in that Christ who died and was buried; therefore you do not deny that Christ was buried. And yet the flesh alone was buried; for if the soul was there, he was not dead; but if it was a true death, so that his resurrection may be true, he was in the tomb without the soul, and yet Christ was buried. Therefore Christ was flesh even without the soul, because nothing was buried but the flesh." Hence a little before, Christ himself is said to be flesh alone. "How," he says, "do you prove it? I dare to say: the flesh of Christ alone is called Christ;" and it is proved by this, that Christ lay in the tomb.

¶7 5.27–6.29

[5]Tercium testimonium Augustini est Ome. 8. super illud Ioh. 2°. 'Quid michi et tibi, mulier? nondum venit hora mea.' 'Dominus,[12] inquit, Iesus Christus Deus erat et homo: secundum quod Deus erat,[13] matrem non habebat: secundum quod homo erat, matrem habebat. Mater ergo erat carnis, mater humanitatis, mater infirmitatis quam suscepit propter nos. Miraculum autem quod facturus erat [6]secundum[1] deitatem facturus erat et[1] non secundum infirmitatem;[2] secundum quod Deus erat, non secundum quod infirmus natus erat: sed "infirmum[3] Dei forcius hominibus." Miraculum autem[4] exigebat mater: at[5] ille tanquam non cognosceret[6] viscera humana operaturus facta divina, tanquam diceret; "quod de me fecit miraculum non tu[7] genuisti: sed quia tu[8] genuisti infirmitatem meam, tunc te[9] cognoscam, cum ipsa infirmitas pendebit in cruce:" hoc est enim, "nondum venit hora mea." Unde et commemorans illam nominacionem extraneam "mulierem" qua[10] vocavit matrem in nupciis Galilee, pendens in cruce dixit matri: "Mulier, ecce filius tuus!" Ioh. 19. Non quod Christus aliquando non cognoscit matrem; in predestinacione, inquit Augustinus, noverat matrem, eciam[11] antequam ipse Deus eam crearet, de qua ipse homo crearetur: tunc tamen in effectu[12] agnovit, quando illud quod peperit

The third testimony of Augustine is homily 8, on that text of John 2, "Woman, what is that to me and to thee? my hour is not yet come."[12] "The Lord Jesus Christ," he says, "was God and man. Insofar as he was God, he had no mother; insofar as he was man, he had a mother. She was the mother, therefore, of the flesh, the mother of the humanity, the mother of the weakness that he took upon him for our sake. But the miracle that he was about to do [6]he was about to do as to the Godhead, and not as to the weakness; insofar as he was God, not insofar as he was born weak; but 'the weakness of God is stronger than men' (1 Cor. 1:25). And the mother was demanding a miracle; but he, as though he did not acknowledge[13] the human womb when about to work divine deeds, as though he were saying, 'What in me worked the miracle you did not beget; but because you begot my weakness, then shall I acknowledge you, when that very weakness shall hang on the cross'; for that is what 'my hour is not yet come' means. Hence too, recalling that strange name, 'woman', by which he had called his mother at the wedding in Galilee, hanging on the cross he said to his mother, 'Woman, behold thy son' (John 19:26). Not that Christ at any time

moriebatur.[13] Non[14] enim moriebatur per quod facta erat Maria, sed moriebatur[15] quod factum erat ex Maria: non[14] moriebatur eternitas divinitatis, sed moriebatur infirmitas carnis: filius itaque virginis secundum quod creator celi et terre et dominus mundi creator fuit Marie, Deus[16] fuit Marie; secundum autem quod dictum est "factum ex muliere, factum sub lege:" ipse enim[17] dominus Marie est filius Marie; ipse creator Marie creatus ex Maria. Noli mirari: nam ideo David est filius, quia Marie est filius. Audi apostolum dicentem "qui factus est ei[18] ex semine David secundum carnem": audi eum et dominum David, 'dixit dominus domino[19] meo: "sede a dextris meis." Unde[19] et ipse Iesus[20] hoc proposuit Iudeis et eos inde convicit.'

does not acknowledge his mother: in predestination, says Augustine, he knew his mother, even before he himself, God, created her from whom he himself, man, was to be created; yet then he acknowledged her in effect, when that which she bore was dying. For it was not that by which Mary was made that was dying, but that which was made of Mary that was dying; it was not the eternity of the divinity that was dying, but the weakness of the flesh. So the son of the virgin, insofar as he is creator of heaven and earth and lord of the world, was the creator of Mary, was the God of Mary; but insofar as [he is] what was said, 'made of a woman, made under the law' (Gal. 4:4), for he, the lord of Mary, is the son of Mary; he, the creator of Mary, was created of Mary. Do not wonder: for he is David's son for this reason, that he is Mary's son. Hear the apostle saying, 'who was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh' (Rom. 1:3); hear him also as David's lord: 'The Lord said to my Lord: Sit thou at my right hand' (Ps. 109:1). Hence Jesus himself too put this to the Jews, and from it convicted them (Matt. 22:42–45)."

¶8 6.30–7.12

[6]Et isti regule innititur Augustinus utrobique, ut in libris contra Maximinianum; sicut Ieronimus in Epistula ad Paulam [7] et Eustochium, et alii probabiles doctores. Unde libro primo contra Maximinianum sic loquitur Augustinus: 'Dicis Patrem infactum quasi Filius factus sit, per quem facta sunt omnia. Scito factum esse Filium sed in[1] forma servi, qui in forma[1] Dei usque adeo non est factus, ut per illum facta sunt omnia.' Unde et[2] infra 2° dicit quod Deus Pater non creatorem creavit, sed creatorem[3] constituit iuxta illud Ps[i]. 8[i]. quod[4] secundum apostolum et secundum Augustinum[4] ad litteram verificatur de Christo: 'minuisti eum[5] paulo minus ab angelis, gloria et honore coronasti eum, Domine,[6] et constituisti eum super opera manuum tuarum: omnia subiecisti sub pedibus.'[7]

And Augustine leans on this rule on both sides,[14] as in the books against Maximinus,[15] as does Jerome in the letter to Paula [7]and Eustochium,[16] and other reputable doctors. Hence in the first book against Maximinus Augustine speaks thus: "You say that the Father is unmade, as if the Son were made, through whom all things were made. Know that the Son was made, but in the form of a servant, he who in the form of God is so far from being made that through him all things were made." Hence also below, in the second book, he says that God the Father did not create a creator, but appointed a creature,[17][18] according to that text of Psalm 8, which according to the apostle and according to Augustine is true of Christ to the letter: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels; thou hast crowned him with glory and honour, O Lord, and hast set him over the works of thy hands; thou hast subjected all things under his feet."[19]

Notes

1. *tres nature incommunicantes*: three natures of which none is predicated of, or shared with, another: Godhead, body, soul. *Christus sit tres nature* keeps Wyclif's bare predication, "Christ is three natures", on which the whole argument that follows turns; it is not "has".
2. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 47.12 (on John 10:17–18), PL 35, 1737–38; *verified* against the PL: Wyclif's text differs in small points (*de eo* for *de teipso*; *hec tria* for *tria haec*) and omits *est*. "Homily" renders *omelia*, Wyclif's word for a tractate. The Latin prints a single quotation mark before *Si*.
3. *Quomodo enim unus homo anima et corpus? sic …*: Harris punctuates a question; the English reads the correlative *quomodo … sic*, "as … so", the form Augustine gives the same comparison to Dardanus (4.32, *sicut … sic*). Read as a question ("For how is one man soul and body? So too one Christ …"), the sense is the same.
4. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III d. 11, *Utrum Christus sit creatura, vel creatus, vel factus* (PL 192, 777–78), *verified*: that is where the Master rehearses the scriptures for and against. The print's "distinction 2" has no variant in the apparatus; it is the manuscripts' reading, kept.

5. *secundum deitatem … secundum humanitatem*: "as to the Godhead … as to the humanity". The rule of reduplication that governs the whole chapter: a predicate is true of Christ *as to* one of his natures.
6. The *De fide contra Felicianum Arianum*, printed among Augustine's works (PL 42, 1157–72) but the work of Vigilius of Thapsus; Wyclif takes it for Augustine's. The passage quoted (*Non alius homo corpus …*) is *verified* in the form quoted by Benedict of Aniane, *Disputatio adversus Felicianam impietatem* (PL 103, 1403), which cites it as Augustine's.
7. *aliud … non alius*: the neuter *aliud* marks a different thing (substance), the masculine *alius* a different person. Augustine's point is lost in English without the gloss "one [thing] and another … not one [person] and another", so it is supplied in brackets.
8. *posiciones secundum habitudinem concedit simpliciter*: he grants without qualification the positions [made] according to the respect proper to each, i.e. the paired statements "he suffered" and "he made the heavens" are each granted outright of the one Christ, as the quotation that follows shows; *habitudo* is the respect under which each is said. The glossary makes *habitudo* CONTEXTUAL: "condition" for a person's state, "respect" for the logical relation under which a predicate holds; here the second. The apparatus notes that A reads *ppcones* (*proposiciones*), B *pciones* (probably *predicaciones*), C *p°es*, and that O reads *predicaciones secundum humanitatem*, "the predications as to the humanity", for *posiciones secundum habitudinem* (p. 4 nn. 10–11); the print is kept.
9. The letter to Dardanus is Augustine, *Epistula* 187 (*De praesentia Dei*), §8, PL 33, 835 (*verified*; Wyclif's text has *considerandum* for Augustine's *observandum*; the *et* before *secundum quid* is M's alone, adopted by Harris, p. 5 n. 1); its old number 40 is of Wyclif's day. The letter "12 to Pascentius" (O and M read *125*, p. 4 n. 15) is one of the exchange with Pascentius the Arian, *Epistulae* 238–241 in the received numbering: *Ep.* 238.10, PL 33, 1042, *secundum formam Dei … Ego et Pater unum sumus: secundum formam servi, Quoniam Pater major me est* (*verified*).
10. *color*: a plausible ground (the period sense, as in "colour of title"), the the glossary's ruling; the first occurrence in the chunk.
11. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 47.13 (*ubi super*: the tractate already cited at 3.10; the passage stands a few lines after the one quoted there), PL 35, 1738; *verified* (*fuerat* for *erat*; *non est sepulta* for *non erat sepulta*). "A little before" (*paulo ante*) refers to §12, *caro Christus*.
12. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 8.9 (on John 2:1–4), PL 35, 1455–56; the opening *verified* (PL *et Deus erat et homo*; *secundum divinitatem* where Wyclif has *secundum deitatem*). The rest of the long quotation, to *convicit*, runs on from §9 and is not checked word for word.
13. *cognosceret* (6.5): A B C read *agnosceret*, O *cognoscit*; the print is kept.
14. *utrobique*: "on both sides" (or "in both places"), not *ubique*, "everywhere": most likely for both natures, the texts that make Christ creator and those that make him creature; the English keeps the pair.
15. *contra Maximinianum*: the print's spelling, in both places, of Augustine's *Contra Maximinum Arianorum episcopum* (PL 42, 743–814); the English gives the name. The quotation (*Scito factum esse Filium …*) is *verified*: it stands in *Contra Maximinum* at the chapter numbered 17, where Augustine recalls what he had said in the debate; whether the print's "first book" is right is left open.
16. Jerome, the letter to Paula and Eustochium: the pseudo-Jerome *Cogitis me* (Ep. 9, *De assumptione*, PL 30, 122 ff.), which Wyclif names in full at p. 109 (*Epist. de Assumpcione Beate Virginis ad Paulam et Eustochium*) and cites again at p. 53; no passage is quoted here.
17. Not Augustine's words, and not in *Contra Maximinum* II: *non creatorem creavit, sed creaturam constituit* is said by Maximinus the Arian, of the Son, in the *Collatio cum Maximino* 15.13 (PL 42, 729; *verified*). His *creaturam* bears out A B C (note 18). The quotation before it (*Dicis Patrem infectum … facta sunt omnia*) is Augustine's own, *Collatio* 14 (PL 42, 723), repeated in *Contra Maximinum* I.17 (PL 42, 756).
18. *creaturam*, with A B C, against the print's *creatorem* (O; p. 7 n. 3): the words are Maximinus's in the *Collatio* (15.13, PL 42, 729), which reads *creaturam*, so the manuscripts and the source agree against Harris's choice.
19. Ps. 8:6–8, Douay–Rheims; the print adds *Domine* (O omits it, p. 7 n. 6) and ends *sub pedibus* without *eius*. "According to the apostle": Heb. 2:7–8, which applies the psalm to Christ. Harris's margin gives Ps. viii. 5, 6 and Heb. ii. 7.
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference e.o. John x. 30, (4.31); reference 5 John i. 3. (5.5); reference l Cor. i. 25. (6.3); reference Jobn xix. 26. (6.12); reference Rom. i. [A75d] (6.26); reference Ps. cx. (6.27); reference Matt.xxii. 42-45. (6.29); reference Ps. vni. 5, 6. Heb. ii. 7. (7.7).

Part 2: That Christ is a creature: Augustine, the creeds and Jerome

Harris pp. 7.13–11.20

¶1 7.13–8.23

[7]Nec dubium quin ex principiis beati Augustini plane sequitur Christum esse creaturam. Quia iuxta suam infringibilem sentenciam Christus nedum est completa humanitas assumpta, sed tam corpus quam anima. Et quis dubitat de ista sequela? Christus est corpus creatum sicut et[8] spiritus creatus. Ergo Christus est creatura et secundum illam creatus. Nec aliter esset univoce homo nobiscum:[9] cum omnis alius homo sit duarum naturarum utraque. Nec credo

Nor is there any doubt that from the principles of blessed Augustine it plainly follows that Christ is a creature. For according to his unbreakable teaching Christ is not only the complete humanity assumed, but both body and soul. And who doubts of this, what follows? Christ is a created body, as he is also a created spirit. Therefore Christ is a creature, and created as to it.[1] Nor otherwise would he be univocally man with us, since every other man is both of two natures. Nor do I believe that without that [lofty][2]

sine [alta][10] illa philosophia De Anima nos posse recte concipere incarnacionem Verbi. Ideo Augustinus[11] Epistula 3ª ad Volusianum sic loquitur: 'Nunc vero inter Deum et homines mediator apparuit ut in unitate[12] persone[13] copulans utramque naturam et solita[13] sublimaret insolitis et insolita solitis temperaret.... Ille[14] ergo sine seminibus operatus est hominem, qui in rerum natura sine seminibus operatus est semina.[14] Ille in suo corpore numeros temporum mensurasque servavit etatum qui sine ulla[15] mutabilitate mutando ordinem contexuit seculorum.[16] Hoc[17] enim crevit in[18] [8]tempore quod cepit ex tempore: Verbum autem in principio, per quod facta sunt omnia tempora, tempus elegit quo susciperet carnem, non tempori[1] cessit ut verteretur in carnem: homo quippe Deo accessit, non Deus a se recessit.' Et sequitur ad propositum. 'Sic autem quidam[2] reddi sibi racionem flagitant, quomodo Deus homini permixtus sit, ut una fieret persona Christi, cum hoc[3] semel fieri oporteat. Sed quam racionem reddant ipsi de re quae cotidie[4] fit, quomodo anima misceatur corpori ut una persona fiat hominis? Nam sicut in unitate[5] persone anima unitur corpori ut homo sit, ita in unitate[5] persone Deus unitur[6] homini ut Christus[7] sit. In illa ergo persona mixtura est anime et corporis, in hac persona[8] mixtura est Dei et hominis. Si tamen recedat, auditor[9] a consuetudine corporum qua[9] solent duo liquores ita misceri ut neutrum servet suam integritatem.' Et sequitur. 'Quia ergo non oportebat ut in plenitudine temporis novum faceret[10] mundum, nova[11] fecit in mundo. Homo enim de virgine procreatus et a mortuis in eternam vitam resuscitatus et super celos exaltatus potencius[12] fortasse opus[13] est quam mundus.' Quotlibet[14] sunt talia dicta hujus boni hominis, ex quibus aperiri[15] potest sensus scripture loquentis varie de ipso[16] et controversia doctorum sequencium concordari.[17]

philosophy of the *De anima* we can rightly conceive the incarnation of the Word. So Augustine, in the third letter to Volusian, speaks thus: "But now a mediator between God and men has appeared, so that, joining both natures in the unity of person, he might both raise up the accustomed by the unaccustomed and temper the unaccustomed by the accustomed. ... He therefore wrought man without seeds, who in the nature of things wrought seeds without seeds. He kept in his body the numbers of the times and the measures of the ages, who without any changeableness, by changing, wove together the order of the ages. For that grew in [8]time which began from time; but the Word in the beginning, through whom all times were made, chose the time in which to take up flesh; he did not yield to time so as to be turned into flesh: for man drew near to God, God did not withdraw from himself."[3] And it goes on, to the purpose: "And some demand thus that an account be rendered them, how God was mingled with man so that the one person of Christ came to be, since this had to happen once. But what account do they themselves render of a thing that happens every day, how the soul is mingled with the body so that the one person of a man comes to be? For as in the unity of person the soul is united to the body that there may be a man, so in the unity of person God is united to man that there may be Christ. In that person, therefore, there is a mixture of soul and body; in this person a mixture of God and man. Provided, however, that the hearer withdraws from the habit of bodies, by which two liquids are wont to be so mixed that neither keeps its integrity."[4] And it goes on: "Since, therefore, it was not fitting that in the fullness of time he should make a new world, he made new things in the world. For a man procreated of a virgin, and raised from the dead into eternal life, and exalted above the heavens, is perhaps a mightier work than the world." There are any number of such sayings of this good man, from which the sense of scripture, which speaks variously of him, can be opened, and the controversy of the doctors who followed can be brought into agreement.

¶2 8.24–8.30

[8]Et patet quod in simbolo Athanasii quando dicitur 'Filius a Patre solo non est factus nec creatus sed genitus' loquitur de eo pure secundum deitatem.[18] Aliter enim contradiceret sibi ipsi, cum secundum humanitatem conceptus est a tota Trinitate ex substancia matris: ut dicit idem simbolum quando post introducit Christi incarnacionem secundum quam dicit verissime quod Christus est minor patre.

And it is clear that in the creed of Athanasius, when it is said "The Son, of the Father alone, is not made nor created, but begotten", it speaks of him purely as to the Godhead.[5] For otherwise it would contradict itself, since as to the humanity he was conceived by the whole Trinity from the substance of his mother; as the same creed says when it afterwards brings in the incarnation of Christ, according to which it says most truly that Christ is less than the Father.[6]

¶3 8.31–9.12

[8]Et idem patet in alio simbolo ecclesie; ubi primo loquens [9]de eo secundum quod Deus est vere dicit 'genitum non factum, consubstancialem Patri per quem omnia facta sunt.' Sed post loquendo de Christo ut homine dicit quod 'incarnatus est de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria virgine et homo factus est.' Ideo in talibus attendendum est ad regulam beati Augustini 'quid et secundum quam naturam de Christo dicitur:' et facile videtur quotquot auctoritates occurrerint[1] concordare. Cum enim sit Christus multorum singulum, sicut essencia divina, species humana, vel aliud universale; patet quia, sicut non repugnat Deum esse genitum et eundem Deum esse ingenitum, sic non repugnat eundem Christum esse creatorem et tamen ex tempore esse creatum.

And the same is clear in the other creed of the church, where, speaking first [9]of him insofar as he is God, it says truly "begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made." But afterwards, speaking of Christ as man, it says that he "was incarnate of the Holy Spirit from the virgin Mary, and was made man." Therefore in such [statements] attention must be paid to the rule of blessed Augustine, "what, and according to which nature, is said of Christ"; and it is easily seen that however many authorities occur agree.[7] For since Christ is a single [thing] of many, as the divine essence, the human species, or another universal [is],[8] it is clear that, just as it is not incompatible that God is begotten and that the same God is unbegotten, so it is not incompatible that the same Christ is creator and yet is created from time.

¶4 9.13–9.23

[9]Sed oportet in istis diversas[2] naturas subintelligere[3] cum ydemptitate persone. Unde in primitiva ecclesia quando Christi divinitas fuit minus cognita,[4] ordinaverunt apostoli quod fideles baptizarentur in nomine domini Iesu Christi, ut patet Actuum 8. ut vel sic Christiani elevarentur in animo[5] ad credendum Christum esse supremam naturam possibilem[6] scilicet deitatem. Sed postquam sancti doctores ecclesie ut Augustinus, Ieronimus et ceteri cultores assidui scripturarum intellexerunt quod Christus fuit gigas gemine substancie, scilicet[7] tam divina substancia quam humana, concesserunt copulative Christum esse tam creatorem quam[8] creaturam.

But in these [statements] one must understand as implied diverse natures together with identity of person. Hence in the primitive church, when the divinity of Christ was less known, the apostles ordained that the faithful be baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, as is clear from Acts 8, so that at least in this way Christians might be raised in mind to believing that Christ is the supreme possible nature, namely the Godhead. But after the holy doctors of the church, such as Augustine, Jerome and the other assiduous cultivators of the scriptures, understood that Christ was "a giant of twin substance", namely both divine substance and human,[9] they granted conjunctively "Christ is both creator and creature".

¶5 9.24–10.2

[9]Unde beatus Ieronimus in fine primi libri super Epistolam ad Galat,[9] 'Quia semel,[10] inquit, ad nomen creature venimus et sapiencia in Proverbiis Salomonis Dicit, "deus creavit me[11] in inicio viarum suarum antequam quidquam[12] faceret, a principio ab eterno ordinata sum,[13] et ab antiquis antequam terra fieret"; multique timore ne Christum creaturam dicere compellantur,[14] totum Christi misterium negant, ut dicant non Christum in hac sapiencia sed[15] mundi sapienciam significari:[15] nos libere proclamamus non esse periculum eum [10]dicere[1] creaturam, quem[2] verum esse hominem[2] et crucifixum et maledictum tota spei nostre reverencia profitemur."

Hence blessed Jerome, at the end of the first book on the Epistle to the Galatians: "Since once," he says, "we have come to the name 'creature', and Wisdom says in the Proverbs of Solomon, 'God created me in the beginning of his ways, before he made any thing; from the beginning I was set up from eternity, and of old, before the earth was made'; and many, for fear that they be compelled to call Christ a creature, deny the whole mystery of Christ, so as to say that not Christ but the wisdom of the world is signified in this wisdom: we freely proclaim that there is no danger in [10]calling him a creature whom, with the whole reverence of our hope, we profess to be true man, and crucified, and accursed."[10]

¶6 10.3–10.16

[10]Nec credo quod sanctus iste intellexit Christum esse creaturam sub racione qua eternaliter genitus; propter tria. Primo quia tunc concederet[3] Christum eciam secundum deitatem esse creaturam; et

Nor do I believe that this saint understood "Christ is a creature" under the aspect by which he is eternally begotten; for three [reasons]. First, because then he would grant "Christ, even as to the Godhead, is a creature"; and

cum creatura dicitur abstractive, sicut substancia vel essencia, tunc Christus esset alia substancia vel essencia quam Pater; quod est heresis Arriana. Et ad tantum non licet catholico laxare terminos, cum omnis creatura secundum Augustinum in Dialogo ad Felicianum et in De Questionibus[4] Veteris et Nove Legis 122, sit de nichilo facta essencia. Sed constat quod Christus secundum deitatem non est factus ex nichilo; ergo nec secundum deitatem est creatura. Non est ergo de intencione huius sancti et profundi doctoris baptizare et[5] tam extraneare[6] a scriptura significacionem huius nominis 'creatura.'

since "creature" is said abstractively, like "substance" or "essence", then Christ would be another substance or essence than the Father; which is the Arian heresy. And it is not permitted to a catholic to loose the terms so far, since every creature, according to Augustine in the *Dialogue to Felician* and in the *Questions of the Old and New Law* 122, is an essence made from nothing.[11] Now it is evident that Christ as to the Godhead is not made from nothing; therefore neither as to the Godhead is he a creature. It is not, therefore, the intention of this holy and profound doctor to baptize, and so far to estrange from scripture, the signification of this name "creature".[12]

¶7 10.17–11.1

[10]Secundo movet me causa quam beatus Ieronimus innuit. Videtur enim loqui de fidelibus sui temporis negantibus adverbia[7] scripturarum loquencium[7] de Christo secundum humanitatem. Sed quis queso fidelium trepidaret concedere[8] Christum esse genitum[9] eternaliter de Patre? cum puri philosophi diu ante incarnacionem hoc professi sunt, ut declaravi[10] in tractatu De Trinitate.[11] Non ergo timebat concedere Christum esse[12] genitum vel genitum[12] eternaliter adintra; sed non secundum hominem assumptum et[13] racione cuius concedimus de Christo predicata et gesta hominum ut sanctus doctor exemplificat et clarebit posterius.[14] Unde evidencia Ieronimi est quod concedendum est Christum esse creaturam eo quod concedimus ipsum verum[15] esse [11]hominem et cetera huiusmodi que humanitatem concernunt.

Second, the cause that blessed Jerome hints at moves me. For he seems to speak of the faithful of his time who denied the adverbs of the scriptures that speak of Christ as to the humanity.[13] Now who of the faithful, I ask, would tremble to grant "Christ is begotten eternally of the Father"? since mere philosophers professed this long before the incarnation, as I have made clear in the treatise *On the Trinity*. He did not, therefore, fear to grant "Christ is begotten, or begotten eternally, within";[14] but not as to the assumed man, by reason of whom we grant of Christ the predicates and deeds of men,[15] as the holy doctor gives instances, and as will be clear later. Hence Jerome's evidence is that "Christ is a creature" is to be granted because we grant "he is true [11]man", and other things of this kind that concern the humanity.[16]

¶8 11.3–11.20

[11]Tercio movet me quod nec iste sanctus sapiens nec scriptura alia canonica, si non fallor, alicubi[1] accipit creari[2] pro gignicione eterna. Supposito ergo quod scriptura tam Salomonis quam Ecclesiastica loquatur de sapiencia increata que est Verbum Dei, ut testatur Ieronimus, et beatus Augustinus Ep 31 declarat ex textu Proverbiorum 8 et 30 quod intencionis Salomonis est dicere, quod Deus habet Filium sapienciam increatam: patet quod de ipsa loquitur nunc secundum deitatem ut eternaliter adintra genita non creata, et nunc ut creata vel creanda: ut nunc dicit secundum deitatem, 'cum eo eram cuncta componens,' et nunc 'ab eterno ordinata sum:' primum ad deitatem sapiencie referens, et secundum ad eius humanitatem, ut patet Proverbiorum 8. Unde de eius humanitate dicit infra 30.[3] 'Quis ascendit in celum atque descendit etc?[4] Quod nomen eius aut quod nomen filii eius, si nosti?' Et isti sensui alludit Apostolus secundum exposicionem Augustini ad Eph.[5] 4, quando[6] dicit: 'qui descendit ipse est qui et ascendit super omnes celos.'

Third, it moves me that neither this wise saint nor any other canonical scripture, if I am not mistaken, anywhere takes "to be created" for eternal begetting. Supposing, therefore, that the scripture both of Solomon and of Ecclesiasticus speaks of the uncreated wisdom which is the Word of God, as Jerome testifies, and as blessed Augustine, letter 31, makes clear from the text of Proverbs 8 and 30, that it is Solomon's intention to say that God has a Son, the uncreated wisdom: it is clear that it speaks of that wisdom now as to the Godhead, as eternally begotten within, not created, and now as created or to be created. So it now says, as to the Godhead, "I was with him forming all things", and now "I was set up from eternity": referring the first to the Godhead of wisdom, and the second to its humanity, as is clear from Proverbs 8. Hence of its humanity it says below, in 30: "Who hath ascended up into heaven, and descended, etc.? What is his name, or what is the name of his son, if thou knowest?" And to this sense the Apostle

alludes, according to Augustine's exposition, in Ephesians 4, when he says: "He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens."[17]

Notes

1. *Christus est creatura et secundum illam creatus*: *illam* (feminine) takes up *creatura*, "created as to [that] creature", i.e. as to the created body and spirit just named. In the next sentence *omnis alius homo sit duarum naturarum utraque* keeps Wyclif's predication: every man *is* both natures (body and soul), not "has" them; the parity of Christ with "every other man" turns on it.
2. The square brackets are Harris's: *alta* stands in A's margin (A's first hand has *illa*); B reads *alta* 1^{a}, C and O 1^{a} (*prima*) without *alta*, and Harris asks whether *prima* should be read, "the first philosophy", i.e. metaphysics. The English follows the print.
3. Augustine, letter to Volusian, *Ep.* 137.9–11 and 14 (PL 33, 519–522; *verified*). *Ulla* (7.29) is Harris's reading from Augustine "as the sense requires"; A B C read *ista*, O *illa*. The four dots are the print's, marking a cut in the quotation.
4. *Si tamen recedat, auditor … integritatem*: a condition with no consequent of its own. It qualifies the sentence before (soul and body, God and man, are a "mixture" only if the hearer sets aside the mixing of liquids), and the English takes it so; Harris prints a full stop before *Si* and a comma after *recedat*. *Qua* is Augustine's reading; A and B have *quomodo*, O an abbreviation (8.15).
5. The Athanasian creed (*Quicumque*): *Filius a Patre solo est: non factus, nec creatus, sed genitus*; in Wyclif's form *est* stands after *non*, and the English follows his order. The creed's *ex substantia matris* and *minor Patre secundum humanitatem* are what he cites next (PL 88, 585; *verified*).
6. *secundum deitatem* (8.26): A B C read *divinitatem*. The print keeps *deitas* "the Godhead", which the the glossary keeps apart from *divinitas* "divinity".
7. "The other creed" is the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed of the mass (as in the Council of Friuli, PL 99, 293A; *verified*). Augustine's rule *quid et secundum quam naturam de Christo dicitur*: no source given by the editor. The rule is Augustine's *quid propter quid, et quid secundum quid dicatur* (*De Trinitate* I.13.28, PL 42, 840, which the Lombard cites on whether Christ is a creature, *Sent.* III d. 11 c. 1), and *Ep.* 187.8, quoted at 5.1, has *quid secundum quid dicatur intuendum. Secundum quam naturam* is Wyclif's gloss (*verified*).
8. *multorum singulum*: one single thing that is many, as the one divine essence is three persons and the one human species is many men; the comparison with "another universal" is Wyclif's realism about common things. The alternative, "one singular among many", does not fit the examples.
9. *gigas gemine substancie* echoes Ambrose's hymn *Intende qui regis Israel* (PL 16, 1411, *Geminae gigas substantiae*, after Ps. 18:6), a line Augustine himself uses of Christ in *Contra sermonem Arianorum* 8.6, PL 42, 689, *geminae gigas substantiae, secundum quid obediens, secundum quid aequalis Deo* (*verified*). Acts 8:16 reads "baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus"; "Christ" is Wyclif's addition.
10. Jerome, *Commentarii in epistolam ad Ephesios* I, on Eph. 2:10 (PL 26, 471A; *verified*), not *In Galatas* as Wyclif (O *galath.*, A B C *Gall.*) and the print give it; Jerome has *fiducia* for *reverencia*. Jerome only paraphrases the verse (*dicit se creatam initium viarum Dei*); Wyclif's fuller Proverbs 8:22–23 is not the Vulgate's: *creavit* for *possedit* ("possessed"), *Deus* for *Dominus*, *ab antiquis* for *ex antiquis*. On *quem verum esse hominem* (10.1) see note 16.
11. The *Dialogue to Felician* is the *Contra Felicianum Arianum* of Vigilius of Thapsus, current under Augustine's name; the *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* (here "of the Old and New Law"), question 122, are Ambrosiaster's. Both *verified*: Vigilius, *De unitate Trinitatis* 7, PL 42, 1162 (the creature is *ex eo quod non est, in id quod est*), and *Quaest.* 122, PL 35, 2365 (*Si enim coepit esse, creatura est … Quidquid enim est, aut Deus est, aut creatura est*). Neither has Wyclif's words *de nichilo facta essencia*, which sum them up.
12. *baptizare*: to give a new name, as at a christening: to re-name "creature" so that it covers eternal begetting. *Et* before *tam extraneare* is omitted in A B C, and *extraneare* is *extranee* in A B C, *extranie* O (10.15).
13. *negantibus adverbia scripturarum loquencium*: so the print, "denying the adverbs" (perhaps the scriptures' qualifying expressions, such as *ab eterno*). A B C read *ad verba scripturam loquentem*, O *adverbia scripturam loquentem*: "denying [it] at the words of scripture that speaks of Christ …". The print is translated; the sense is doubtful.
14. *Christum esse genitum vel genitum eternaliter adintra*: the print repeats *genitum*; A B C have *genituram vel genitum*, O *genitum vel genitura*. The English keeps the print, "begotten, or begotten eternally". The subject of *timebat* is the faithful man of the question before (or Jerome, who speaks for them).
15. The print has *et* before *racione cuius* (O *esse*, M *et*, A B C omit it). The English follows A B C, since with *et* the clause does not construe: "but not as to the assumed man, and by reason of whom …".
16. *ipsum verum esse hominem* (10.29): A B C read *vermem hominem*, O *ipsam esse* v^{m} *ē hominem*, "worm" (Ps. 21:7, "I am a worm, and no man"). At 10.1 too O has *verbum esse et hominem* for the print's *verum esse hominem*. Jerome wrote *quem vermem, et hominem, et crucifixum, et maledictionem* (PL 26, 471A), so A B C's *vermem* is his reading.
17. Augustine "letter 31" on Proverbs 8 and 30, with Eph. 4:10, is *Ep.* 102 (to Deogratias), q. 5, §§28–29, PL 33, 382: it reads Prov. 8:25 and 30:4 of the Son, and the *Quis ascendit … et descendit* of Prov. 30:4 by *Qui descendit, ipse est et qui ascendit super omnes coelos* (*verified*); Wyclif's number 31 is not the received one. The place in Wyclif's own *De Trinitate* (10.23) is untraced; that work is not in the Wyclif Society series. "Ecclesiastica" is the book of Ecclesiasticus. Prov. 30:4 is shortened (*etc.*) and has *aut* for the Vulgate's *et*, without *est*: "or what is the name of his son".

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Ps. vni. 5, 6. Heb. ii. 7. (7.7); reference Acts vffi. 16, 37. (9.17); reference Prov. vffi. 22. (9.26); reference Gall. ABC. quicquam 0. (9.35); reference . Proverbs and (11.9); reference Prov. xxx. 4, 5. (11.17); reference ad Hebre. (11.29).

Part 3: Wisdom created and uncreated, and three agreements

¶1 11.21–12.12

[11]Et istum sensum[7] declarat Ecclesiasticus 24 cap. loquens de eadem sapiencia: primo sic: 'ego ex ore altissimi prodii primogenita ante omnem creaturam,' et sic[8] de multis que conveniunt divinitati. Sed post prosequitur quoad eius humanitatem: 'tunc precepit et dixit mihi creator omnium, et qui creavit me requievit in tabernaculo[9] meo:' dixit, inquam, in plenitudine temporis quando misit me incarnandam; iuxta[10] illud Psalmi 31 iuxta exposicionem Apostoli ad Hebre. 10. 'holocaustum et propeccato non postulasti; tunc dixi, ecce venio' scilicet incarnandus; et sic deitas creavit me secundum essenciam corpoream ante omnia secula: que quidem essencia transivit honorata[11] a patribus veteris testamenti nunc in gentibus et nunc in patribus, ut patet [12]alibi. Sed in plenitudine temporis quando erectum est tabernaculum ex carne assumpta de beata virgine et forma humanitatis copulata ypostatice, tunc requievit tota Trinitas in assumpto corpore iuxta illud Colos. 2.[1] 'In ipso, inquit Apostolus, habitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter.' Nam tota Trinitas est eadem divina essencia que est Christus existens illud corpus. Unde et illud tabernaculum figuratum est per quelibet tabernacula veteris testamenti. Et ad istum sensum[2] loquitur apostolorum capitaneus de corpore quod est ipse: 'iustum, inquit, arbitror quamdiu sum[3] in hoc tabernaculo suscitare vos in commonicione, certus quod velox est deposicio tabernaculi mei.' 2 Petri 1° capitulo.

And Ecclesiasticus, chapter 24, makes clear this sense, speaking of the same wisdom: first thus: "I came out of the mouth of the most High, the firstborn before all creatures", and so with many things that befit the divinity. But afterwards it goes on with regard to its humanity: "Then the creator of all things commanded, and said to me: and he that made me, rested in my tabernacle":[1] he said, I say, in the fullness of time, when he sent me to be incarnate; according to that [text] of Psalm 31, according to the exposition of the Apostle in Hebrews 10: "Burnt offering and sin offering thou didst not require: then said I, Behold I come", that is, to be incarnate.[2] And so the Godhead created me as to the bodily essence before all ages; which essence indeed passed on, honoured by the fathers of the old testament, now among the gentiles and now among the fathers, as is clear [12]elsewhere.[3] But in the fullness of time, when the tabernacle was set up from the flesh assumed from the blessed virgin and the form of the humanity joined hypostatically, then the whole Trinity rested in the assumed body, according to that [text] of Colossians 2: "In him," says the Apostle, "dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally."[4] For the whole Trinity is the same divine essence which is Christ, existing [as] that body. Hence that tabernacle too was prefigured by every tabernacle of the old testament. And to this sense the captain of the apostles speaks of the body that is himself:[5] "I think it meet," he says, "as long as I am in this tabernacle, to stir you up by putting you in remembrance, being assured that the laying away of this my tabernacle is at hand." 2 Peter, chapter 1.

¶2 12.13–12.19

[12]Sic ergo, intelligendo[4] per sapienciam Verbum Dei quod est tam deitas[5] quam raciones quotlibet exemplares et per consequens veritates, quae terminant[6] creatam sapienciam[6] obiective, ac ultimo ipsa sapiencia incarnata; possunt[7] dicta in libris Sapienciae[8] optime verificari ad litteram de eadem sapiencia incarnata:[7] ut testantur Augustinus et Ieronimus duo[9] non parvi pugiles scripturarum.

So, therefore, understanding by wisdom the Word of God, who is both the Godhead and any number of exemplary reasons, and consequently truths, which terminate created wisdom as its object, and lastly the incarnate wisdom itself: the sayings in the books of Wisdom can very well be true, to the letter, of the same incarnate wisdom,[6] as Augustine and Jerome testify, two no small champions of the scriptures.[7]

¶3 12.20–12.27

[12]Tercio autem, declinante scola ab antiqua logica[10] de universalibus et a recta metaphisica[11] de formis substancialibus, negarunt doctores moderniores concorditer quod homo est anima, vel Christus humanitas, et[12] consequenter quod Christus est creatura, intelligentes autonomatice[13] Christum solum secundum excellentissimum quod est

And third, as the school declined from the old logic of universals and from the right metaphysics of substantial forms, the more modern doctors denied with one accord "man is the soul", or "Christ is the humanity", and consequently "Christ is a creature", understanding "Christ" by antonomasia only according to the most excellent [thing] that Christ is;

Christus; et sic licet verum concipiant, multum tamen degenerant a logica scripturarum.

and so, although they conceive something true, yet they greatly degenerate from the logic of the scriptures.

¶4 12.28–13.2

[12]Ego autem finaliter[14] concordo cum quocunque catholice loquente in illa materia, concedens cum fidelibus primitive ecclesie quod Christus est purissimus homo possibilis: verumtamen non pure[15] vel tantum est homo, cum sit assumpta [13]humanitas; et cum plene sit divinitas, patet quod est aliud sed non alius quam illa humanitas.

But I, finally, agree with whoever speaks in a catholic way on that matter, granting with the faithful of the primitive church that Christ is the purest man possible: nevertheless he is not purely or only man, since he is the assumed [13]humanity; and since he is fully the divinity, it is clear that he is something other, but not someone other, than that humanity.[8]

¶5 13.3–13.6

[13]Concordo 2° cum approbatis doctoribus ut Augustino Ieronimo et ceteris concedens quod Christus nedum est creator et essencia que nullo[1] modo creari poterit vel moveri, sed eciam[2] creatura.

Second, I agree with the approved doctors, such as Augustine, Jerome and the rest, granting that Christ is not only creator and an essence that can in no way be created or moved, but also a creature.[9]

¶6 13.7–13.12

[13]Concordo 3° cum novellis quod Christus secundum deitatem non est creatura, nec minor Patre, corporalis, mobilis, visibilis, subicibilis, et sic de quocunque quae scriptura ascribit sibi humanitus. Et[3] ad istum sensum concedo[4] affirmativas, modifico negativas.

Third, I agree with the newer [doctors] that Christ as to the Godhead is not a creature, nor less than the Father, bodily, movable, visible, subjectable, and so with whatever scripture ascribes to him humanly. And in this sense I grant the affirmatives, I qualify the negatives.

Notes

1. Ecclus. 24:5 and 24:12, as the Vulgate. The Douay-Rheims "he that made me" renders *qui creavit me*: the verb is the one the argument turns on, "created".
2. The words are Ps. 39:7–8, not "Psalm 31", and the print has no variant on the number; Heb. 10:5–7 expounds them of Christ's coming. Wyclif quotes the psalm's form (*holocaustum et pro peccato non postulasti*), not Hebrews' (*holocautomata pro peccato non tibi placuerunt*).
3. *essenciam corpoream*: the bodily essence, the matter of Christ's body, created before all ages and handed down through his forebears, gentile and Jewish. *Honorata*: O reads *onerata* "burdened" (11.32). "As is clear elsewhere": the place is not named (untraced); compare *De compositione hominis* 2 (ed. Beer, pp. 26–27), where every man's bodily essence is created at the beginning and every man *fuit in Adam*, as Levi was tithed *in lumbis Abrahe* (Heb. 7:9).
4. Col. 2:9: Wyclif has *habitat* for the Vulgate's *inhabitat*. The Douay-Rheims "Godhead" here renders *divinitatis*.
5. *Christus existens illud corpus*, *de corpore quod est ipse*: bare predication, as the argument needs (Christ *is* that body; Peter *is* his body); "as" and the reflexive are the English's only means of keeping it.
6. The main clause, *possunt … incarnata* (12.16–18), stands only in O; A B C omit it, leaving the sentence without a verb. *Deitas* (12.14): A B C *divinitas*.
7. *duo non parvi pugiles* (12.19): all four manuscripts read *non duo*, against the print's *duo*. The English keeps the print: *non duo non parvi pugiles* will not construe as praise ("not two no-small champions" denies the authority the sentence appeals to), and the doubled *non* looks like dittography.
8. *est aliud sed non alius*: neuter against masculine, the scholastic form: Christ is another *thing* (nature) than the humanity, not another *one* (person).
9. *Eciam* (13.6) is O and M; A B C read *est*.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference . Proverbs and (11.9); reference Prov. xxx. 4, 5. (11.17); reference ad Hebre. (11.29); reference Augustine, Je- (13.6); reference Ecclesiastica (13.6).

Chapter 2

Part 1: How this position differs from Arius: John 10 and Matthew 22

Harris pp. 13.0–17.19

¶1 *13.0–13.15*

[13][Declarat quomodo ista sentencia discrepat ab heresi Arriana. The assertion of the reality of Christ's humanity, by maintaining that as man he is a creature, gives no support to the errors of Arius, Sabellius, or Nestorius.] Ex istis per modum corollarii elucescit quomodo ista posicio[5] differt ab opinionibus[6] hereticorum de Christo heretice senciencium.

[It makes clear how this teaching is at variance with the Arian heresy.] From these [points] it shines out, by way of corollary, how this position differs from the opinions of the heretics who thought heretically about Christ.[1]

¶2 *13.16–14.7*

[13]Et primo de opinione[7] Arrii de quo narrat Eusebius in Ecclesiastica Historia li° 10° ca. 13. 'Arrius, inquit, pergens ad[8] ecclesiam episcoporum et populorum frequencia constipatus, humane necessitatis causa[9] ad locum publicum[10] declinavit; ubi cum sederet, intestina eius atque omnia viscera in secessu[11] cumulorum[12] defluxerunt, et ita in apto [14]loco dignam mortem blasfemie[1] et[2] fetide mentis[2] exsolvit.' Et quia secundum Magistrum Sentenciarum in 3°· Dist. 2ª. Arrii hec fuisse perfidia[3] legitur ut Christum esse[4] creaturam fateretur, ut capit a beato Ambrosio primo libro de Trinitate cap. 9°· 'Ideo, inquit Ambrosius, diffusa sunt Arrii viscera et crepuit medius prostratus in faciem ea, quibus Christum[5] negaverat, feda ora[6] pollutus.'

And first, of the opinion of Arius, of whom Eusebius tells in the *Ecclesiastical History*, book 10, chapter 13: "Arius," he says, "going to the church thronged by a crowd of bishops and peoples, turned aside to a public place for the sake of human necessity; where, as he sat, his intestines and all his bowels flowed down into the channels of the privy, and so in a fitting [14]place he paid the death his blasphemy and fetid mind deserved."[2] And because, according to the Master of the Sentences in III, distinction 2, the perfidy of Arius is read to have been this, that he confessed "Christ is a creature", as he takes it from blessed Ambrose, *On the Trinity*, book 1, chapter 9: "Therefore," says Ambrose, "the bowels of Arius were poured out, and he burst asunder in the midst, fallen headlong on his face, befouled in that foul mouth with which he had denied Christ."[3]

¶3 *14.8–14.17*

[14]Quando[7] ergo illa[8] opinio videtur Arrio in hoc consentire bonum videtur differenciam[9] declarare. Nam propterea videtur Magistro et ipsum sequentibus potissime quod non debet concedi simpliciter Christum esse creaturam vel factum sed cum determinacione[10] quod fuit factus secundum hominem. Primo ergo notandum quod nunquam fuit hereticus quin in aliquo dixit verum: omnes enim concesserunt Deum esse: et ideo valde inconsonum est doctori imponere alteri[11] heresim Arrianam, nisi prius diligenter notaverit in quibus et quomodo talis heresis est fundata.

Since, therefore, that opinion seems to agree with Arius in this, it seems good to make clear the difference.[4] For it is above all for this reason that it seems to the Master and those who follow him that "Christ is a creature" or "made" ought not to be granted without qualification, but with the determination that he was made as to the man. First, then, it must be noted that there was never a heretic who did not say something true in some point: for all granted "God is"; and so it is very discordant for a doctor to impute the Arian heresy to another unless he has first diligently noted in what and how such a heresy is founded.

¶4 *14.18–14.22*

[14]Stetit ergo heresis Arriana in his tribus precipue. Primo in hoc quod negavit Christum esse Deum deorum et magnum Deum, cum

The Arian heresy, then, stood chiefly in these three [points]. First, in this: that [Arius] denied "Christ is the God of gods and a great God", since he

posuit eum[12] esse non eiusdem substancie cum Patre, sed ipsos differre ab invicem eciam secundum deitatem substancialiter sicut[13] differunt personaliter.

held that he is not of the same substance with the Father, but that they differ from one another even as to the Godhead substantially, as they differ personally.

¶5 14.23–15.31

[14]Unde Augustinus Epa. 33 ad Bonifacium, 'Ut, inquit, breviter[14] insinuem dilectioni tue quid inter Arrianorum[15] et Donatistarum intersit errorem: Arriani Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti diversas esse substancias dicunt; Donatiste autem non hoc[16] dicunt, sed unam Trinitatis substanciam confitentur.' Dixit itaque[17] Arrius quod summa essencia que est Christus sit citra essenciam Dei Patris, ut est essencia angeli vel hominis quos scriptura sacra vocat deos pluraliter, ut allegat Salvator Iudeis Ioh. 10. 'Nonne scriptum est in lege vestra, 'Ego dixi dii estis?' Si igitur eos vocat deos, [15]ad quos sermo Dei factus est, et non potest solvi scriptura; quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum, quomodo et vos dicitis 'blasfemas,'[1] quia dixi 'Filius Dei sum[1]?' Et forte ex isto dicto capta est heresis Arriana. Unde dicit Augustinus Ome 48.[2] quod Iudei audientes illud Ioh. 10. 'Ego et Pater unum sumus,' et intelligentes Christum intendere quod sit eadem substancia cum Patre, 'Iudei, inquit, intellexerunt quod Arriani non intellexerunt; quoniam senserunt non posse dici ''ego et Pater unum sumus,'' nisi ubi equalitas est Patris et Filii. Sed Dominus videns Judeos pre ira non ferre splendorem veritatis, eum temperavit in verbis eis allegans illud Ps[i]· 81.[3] ''Ego dixi dii estis etc.''' Nec est putandum quod Veritas illuserit[4] Iudeis[5] sophistice in hoc dicto, sed dulciter manuduxit mitigando eorum rancorem ex[6] scriptura patriarche David plus eis autentica[7] inter omnes. Cum[8] enim non fuit in Christo EST et NON, et dixit[8] eis superius Ioh. 10. quod ipse est omnipotens et eadem substancia cum Patre: patet quod illam sentenciam postmodum non retractat. Minor patet notato textu illius cap[i]. Nam ibi dicitur: 'oves mee vocem meam audiunt et ego vitam eternam do eis, et non rapiet eas[9] quisquam de manu mea' et cetera que secuntur. Probatur illa trimembris conclusio ex ibi positis. Nam ibi[10] dicitur, 'Pater meus quod dedit michi maius omnibus est:' ergo Pater meus[11] est omnipotens, et per consequens 'nemo potest rapere de manu Patris mei,' et ultra sequitur[12] 'nemo potest rapere de manu Patris mei;[13] et 'Ego et Pater unum sumus;' ergo 'nemo potest rapere oves de manu mea.' Istam itaque connexionem subtilissimam Iudei conceperant quam ignorabant Arriani. Ex quo patet quod in deduccione sequenti eandem conclusionem intenderat sed medio plus occulto.

Hence Augustine, letter 33, to Boniface: "That I may briefly," he says, "convey to your Love what difference there is between the error of the Arians and of the Donatists: the Arians say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are diverse substances; but the Donatists do not say this, but confess one substance of the Trinity."[5] So Arius said that the highest essence which is Christ falls short of the essence of God the Father, as is the essence of an angel or of a man, whom holy scripture calls gods in the plural, as the Saviour alleges to the Jews, John 10: "Is it not written in your law: I said, you are gods? If therefore he calls them gods, [15]to whom the word of God was spoken, and the scripture cannot be broken; how do you also say of him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world: Thou blasphemest; because I said: I am the Son of God?"[6] And perhaps the Arian heresy was taken from this saying. Hence Augustine says, Homily 48, that the Jews, hearing that [text] of John 10, "I and the Father are one", and understanding Christ to maintain that he is the same substance with the Father: "the Jews," he says, "understood what the Arians did not understand; for they perceived that 'I and the Father are one' could not be said except where there is equality of the Father and the Son. But the Lord, seeing that the Jews for anger did not bear the splendour of the truth, tempered it in words, alleging to them that [text] of Psalm 81, 'I have said: You are gods, etc.'"[7] Nor is it to be thought that the Truth mocked the Jews sophistically in this saying; but he gently led them by the hand, mitigating their rancour from the scripture of the patriarch David, the most authentic to them of all. For since there was not in Christ "It is" and "It is not", and he said to them above, in John 10, that he is omnipotent and the same substance with the Father, it is clear that he does not afterwards retract that teaching.[8] The minor is clear when the text of that chapter is noted. For there it is said: "My sheep hear my voice; and I give them life everlasting, and no man shall pluck them out of my hand", and the rest that follows. That three-membered conclusion is proved from what is laid down there. For there it is said, "That which my Father hath given me is greater than all": therefore my Father is omnipotent, and consequently "no one can snatch them out of the hand of my Father"; and further it follows: "no one can snatch them out of the hand of my Father; and 'I and the

Father are one'; therefore 'no one can snatch the sheep out of my hand.'" So the Jews had grasped this most subtle conditional, of which the Arians were ignorant.[9] From which it is clear that in the deduction that follows he maintained the same conclusion, but by a more hidden middle term.

¶6 16.1–16.34

[16]Pro quo notandum quod sicut Judei multum appreciati[1] sunt prophetam[2] David, sic[3] ex eius textu cognoverant quod Messias venturus ex eis foret tam Deus quam homo. Hoc videtur evidens ex argumento Salvatoris facto Phariseis, Mt 22. ubi sic congregatis Phariseis interrogat ab eis[4] Jesus dicens,[5] 'Quid vobis videtur de Christo? cuius filius est? dicunt ei, 'David:'[6] ait illis, 'quomodo ergo David[7] in spiritu vocat eum dominum dicens: 'dixit Dominus Domino meo, 'sede a dextris, donec ponam inimicos tuos scabellum pedum tuorum.' Si ergo David vocat eum Dominum quomodo filius eius est? Et nemo poterat ei respondere verbum, nec ausus est quisquam ex illa die eum amplius interrogare.' Non enim contendebant[6] illi legis periti in ampliacione[8] verbi de presenti scientes ex sensu scripture quod apud Deum sunt cuncta[9] presencia. Ideo sciverunt Christum vel Messiam esse filium David pro quodam tempore. Sciverunt 2^do illud Psalmi 109 quod Veritas allegavit dictum esse de Christo. Sciverunt 3° quod propheta tam eximius non vocaret filium suum tam pauperem et abiectum Dominum suum secundum naturam ab[10] eo assumptam sed secundum naturam[10] superiorem. Ideo non affuit eis vel ullum[11] coloratum subterfugium evadendi. Unde pro 2° argumento Salvatoris supponitur quod Verbum vel Sermo Dei quod idem est, sit eternum idem substancialiter Deo Patri. Patet hoc per illud Psalmi 32[12] 'Verbo Domini celi firmati sunt.' 2^do supponitur quod dictum verbum fuit incarnandum. Patet hoc per illud Psalmi 106[13] 'misit verbum suum et sanavit eos.' Unde et dictum Verbum vocaverunt prophete concorditer Messiam vel Christum eis promissum. 3° supponitur quod dicti Verbi participacione sit multitudo hominum in[14] Christum directe[14] credencium deificanda participative, sicut carbo ex ignis participacione est ignitus. Patet hoc per illud Ps. 81.[15] 'Ego dixi dii estis.'

On which it must be noted that, as the Jews greatly prized the prophet David, so from his text they had come to know that the Messiah who was to come from them would be both God and man. This seems evident from the Saviour's argument made to the Pharisees, Matthew 22, where, the Pharisees being thus gathered together, Jesus asks of them, saying: "What think you of Christ? Whose son is he? They say to him: David's. He saith to them: How then doth David in spirit call him Lord, saying: The Lord said to my Lord: Sit on the right hand, until I make thy enemies thy footstool? If David then call him Lord, how is he his son? And no man was able to answer him a word: neither durst any man from that day forth ask him any more questions." For those learned in the law did not dispute over the ampliation of the verb in the present [tense], knowing from the sense of scripture that with God all things are present.[10] Therefore they knew that Christ or the Messiah is the son of David for a certain time. Second, they knew that [the text] of Psalm 109 which the Truth alleged was said of Christ. Third, they knew that so eminent a prophet would not call his son, so poor and abject, his Lord as to the nature assumed from him, but as to a higher nature. Therefore there was not available to them even any subterfuge given colour for escaping.[11] Hence for the Saviour's second argument it is supposed that the Word or Speech of God, which is the same, is eternal, substantially the same as God the Father.[12] This is clear from that [text] of Psalm 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established." Second, it is supposed that the said Word was to be incarnate. This is clear from that [text] of Psalm 106: "He sent his word, and healed them." Hence also the prophets with one accord called the said Word the Messiah or Christ promised to them. Third, it is supposed that by participation in the said Word a multitude of men who believe directly in Christ is to be deified participatively, as a coal is set on fire by participation in fire. This is clear from that [text] of Psalm 81: "I have said: You are gods."

¶7 17.1–17.19

[17]Istis suppositis formetur racio sic ex sentencia Salvatoris: Ille Sermo vel Verbum, in quo concordant omnes prophete de operibus miraculosis, de tempore et aliis circumstanciis, et illis quibus mittitur salvandis et deificandis, est verus Messias, et per consequens Deus

These being supposed, let the argument be formed thus from the Saviour's teaching: That Speech or Word, in whom all the prophets agree concerning the miraculous works, concerning the time and the other circumstances,

et homo iuxta textus propheticos: sed in me omnia ista conveniunt: ergo sum Deus[1] et homo: et per consequens non solum[1] participacione deificatus.[2] Ideo hic[3] dicit Augustinus; 'Si Sermone[4] Dei facto ad[5] homines fiunt ipsi dii, tunc[6] participando fiunt ipsi dii[6]; et per consequens Sermo ille, quo participant, erit Deus. Si lumine. luminati dii sunt, lumen quod illuminat non est Deus? si calefacti igne salutari[7] dii efficiuntur, ignis unde calefiunt non est Deus?' Oportet ergo quod[8] Sermo, quo[8] fontaliter deificantur homines ex unitate substancie cum suo eternaliter adintra dicente, sit eadem deitas cum dicente; et per consequens non blasfemat[9] dicendo se naturalem filium Dei esse. Et ex ignorancia huius sensus literalis scripture exciderant[10] Arriani, sicut et Sabelliani, ut recitat Augustinus Ome. 47.

and concerning those to whom he is sent, who are to be saved and deified, is the true Messiah, and consequently God and man according to the prophetic texts; now in me all these things come together; therefore I am God and man; and consequently not godlike only by participation.[13] So Augustine says here: "If by the Speech of God made to men they themselves become gods, then by participating they themselves become gods; and consequently that Speech in which they participate will be God. If those lit by light are gods, is the light that lights them not God? If those warmed by the saving fire are made gods, is the fire by which they are warmed not God?"[14] It must be, therefore, that the Speech by which men are fontally deified, from unity of substance with the one who speaks him eternally within, is the same Godhead as the speaker;[15] and consequently he does not blaspheme in saying that he is the natural son of God. And from ignorance of this literal sense of scripture the Arians had fallen away, as also the Sabellians, as Augustine recounts, Homily 47.[16]

Notes

1. *posicio* (13.15): A B C read *proposicio*; *opinionibus*: B *posicionibus*. The the glossary keeps the three terms apart; the print's *posicio* is the position this treatise defends.
2. Rufinus's continuation of Eusebius, *Historia ecclesiastica* X book X, chapter 13 (PL 21, 486C; *verified*); Rufinus reads *in secessus cuniculum*, bearing out Harris's *cuniculorum* and A B C's *secessus*. The print's *dignam mortem blasfemie et fetide mentis*: M has *debitam* for *et fetide mentis*. **T** *in secessu cumulorum* (13.22), "into the privy of heaps", does not construe; the English follows Harris's suggested *cuniculorum* "channels" (O *cuñulorum*, B *tumulorum*; A B C *secessus*).
3. Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III d. 2 as printed (the Master's chapter on whether Christ is a creature is d. 11), and Ambrose, *De fide* I.19 (called *De Trinitate*), with *crepuit medius* from Acts 1:18 (Judas): both *verified*: Lombard, *Sent.* III d. 11 c. 2, PL 192, 779 (*Arii haec fuisse perfidia legitur, ut Christum creaturam faceret*, then the Ambrose), and Ambrose, *De fide* I.19.124, PL 16, 557A (*Effusa sunt enim et Arii viscera … foeda ora pollutus*). **C** The *quia* clause has no main clause of its own; its consequence is carried by Ambrose's *Ideo* inside the quotation.
4. *illa opinio*: "that opinion" is the position defended here, which seems to agree with Arius in calling Christ a creature; O reads *ista* "this" (14.8). *Quando* is causal (A B C *Cum*).
5. Augustine, letter to Boniface, *Ep.* 185.1 (here "letter 33"), PL 33, 792 (*verified*). *Dilectioni tue*: "your Love", a form of address.
6. John 10:34–36, with Wyclif's departures from the Vulgate translated: *Si igitur eos vocat deos* for *Si illos dixit deos*, and *quomodo et vos dicitis* for *vos dicitis*.
7. *dicit Augustinus … quod Iudei audientes … et intelligentes …*: the *quod* clause breaks off and Augustine's own words take over. **S** Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 48 (here "Homily 48"; A B C *ep. 49*), on John 10:30–36: 48.8–9, PL 35, 1744 (*verified*).
8. 2 Cor. 1:19, "was not: It is and It is not". The argument is a syllogism whose minor ("he said above that he is omnipotent and the same substance") is proved next.
9. *connexionem*: the the glossary's "conditional" (*si … tunc*); here the whole chain just set out, which has that form: if the Father is omnipotent and he and the Son are one, no one snatches the sheep from the Son. John 10:27–28 is quoted with a cut (*et ego cognosco eas, et sequuntur me … et non peribunt in aeternum*).
10. *ampliacio verbi de presenti*: the logicians' extending of a present-tense verb to other times. *Cuius filius est?* is in the present; the lawyers did not quibble over it, since with God all times are present.
11. *coloratum subterfugium*: a subterfuge with a plausible ground (*color*, the period sense, not "pretext").
12. *Verbum vel Sermo*: *sermo* is "Speech", to keep it apart from *Verbum* "the Word", which Wyclif says is the same; in the scripture quoted (John 10:35) the Douay-Rheims "word" renders *sermo*. The pronoun is "he", as for the Word.
13. *deificus*, with A B C O, against the print's *deificatus* (Harris's emendation): "godlike", not "deified"; the claim is the same, that he is God by nature, not by participation. A B C have *Deus et per consequens homo non solum*.
14. Augustine, *Tract. in Ioh.* 48.9, PL 35, 1745, quoted freely (*verified*). The print has a full stop after *lumine*.
15. *ex unitate substancie cum suo … dicente* is read with *sit eadem deitas*: the Speech is the same Godhead as its speaker by unity of substance with him. It could instead go with *deificantur*: men are deified by the Speech because of its unity of substance with the speaker; the sense is close.
16. Augustine "Homily 47", on the Arians and Sabellians: *Tract. in Ioh.* 47.9, PL 35, 1737 (*verified*).
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 13: *Nestorius.] Ex* (print as transcribed (heading end, then Ex istis)) [SUB]
  - 13: *li°* (print as transcribed (Historia li° 10°; strip misaligned, checked full page)) [SUB]
  - 15: *Ps^{i}·* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  - 15: *NON,* (print as transcribed (small caps)) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Augustine, Je- (13.6); reference Ecclesiastica (13.6); reference Ps. lxxxu. 6. (14.33); reference 2 Cor. i. 18 Vuig. (15.16); reference PsSCcx Si°n °f (16.2); reference Matt. xxii. 4i. (16.5); reference Ps. cx. 1. (16.8); reference Ps. xxxiii. 6. (16.25).

Part 2: The second Arian error, Christ without a soul; Augustine against Pascentius

Harris pp. 17.20–21.22

¶1 17.20–18.5

[17]Secundo stetit[11] error Arrianorum in hoc quod dicunt Christum sine anima solam carnem suscepisse[12]; ut meminit Augustinus libro suo De Heresibus Heresi 49. ‘Arriani, inquit, dicti ab Arrio in eo sunt notissimi[13] errore, quo Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum nolunt esse eiusdem substancie vel nature; sed Filium dicunt creaturam, Spiritum vero creaturam creature; hoc est, ab ipso Filio creatum[14] volunt. In eo autem quod dicunt Christum sine anima solam carnem sumpsisse minus noti sunt. Sed hoc verum esse[15] Epifanius[16] non tacuit, et ego ex eorum scriptis et collocucionibus certissime comperi.’ Et in hoc conveniunt cum Appollinaristis[17]; de quibus scribit Augustinus Heresi 55 [18]quod de anima Christi ab ecclesia catholica[1] differunt[2] dicentes, sicut Arriani, Dominum[3] Jesum Christum sine anima carnem suscepisse,[3] et Verbum fuisse pro anima: et sic glosant scripturas loquentes de anima Christi et Verbum in carnem[4] fuisse conversum, non carnem sumpsisse de virgine.

Second, the error of the Arians stood in this, that they say “Christ took up flesh alone, without a soul”; as Augustine recalls in his book *On Heresies*, heresy 49: “The Arians,” he says, “named from Arius, are best known for that error by which they will not have the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit be of the same substance or nature; but they say the Son is a creature, and the Spirit a creature of a creature; that is, they will have him created by the Son himself. But in this, that they say Christ took flesh alone without a soul, they are less known. But Epiphanius did not keep silent that this is true, and I have learned it most certainly from their writings and conversations.”[1] And in this they agree with the Apollinarists, of whom Augustine writes, heresy 55, [18]that they differ from the catholic church concerning the soul of Christ, saying, like the Arians, that the Lord Jesus Christ took up flesh without a soul, and that the Word was in place of a soul: and so they gloss the scriptures that speak of the soul of Christ, and [say] that the Word was converted into flesh, not that he took flesh from the virgin.[2]

¶2 18.6–18.20

[18]Et illam heresim[5] elegantissime destruit Augustinus Ep. 127[6] et duabus sequentibus ad Pascencium episcopum Arrianum; cuius dicta utinam hodierni atttenderent! Scribit enim capcioso heretico, non puto[7] quidquam inprovide de quo calumpniam formidaret.[8] ‘Quia, inquit, Dei Patris unigenitus Filius Dominus et Deus noster Jesus Christus, postquam ‘’venit plenitudo temporis‘‘ opportune[9] ‘’formam servi suscepit’‘ ad diem salutis nostre[10]; de illo multa[10] in scripturis sacris[11] secundum ‘’formam Dei‘‘ dicuntur, multa secundum ‘’formam servi’‘: quorum exempli gracia duo commemoro,[12] ut singula ad singula referantur.[13] Secundum formam Dei ait ‘’ego et Pater unum sumus’‘: secundum autem[14] servi ipse de se ait ‘’Pater maior me est.’‘ Nescivit[15] enim ille[16] sanctus negare scripturas illas[17] de virtute sermonis, cum personam[17] Filii concedit[18] esse multorum quodlibet.

And Augustine most elegantly destroys that heresy in letter 127 and the two following, to Pascentius, the Arian bishop; would that those of today attended to his sayings! For he writes to a captious heretic, [and] I do not think [he wrote] anything unguardedly over which he would fear a challenge.[3] “Since,” he says, “the only-begotten Son of God the Father, our Lord and God Jesus Christ, after ‘the fulness of the time was come’, fittingly ‘took up the form of a servant’ for the day of our salvation; many things are said of him in the holy scriptures according to ‘the form of God’, many according to ‘the form of a servant’: of which, for example’s sake, I recall two, that each may be referred to each. According to the form of God he says, ‘I and the Father are one’; but according to [the form] of a servant he says of himself, ‘The Father is greater than I.’”[4] For that saint did not know

how to deny those scriptures in the proper sense of the words, since he grants that the person of the Son is any one of many [things].[5]

¶3 18.21–19.4

[18]Et ponit ad hoc consequenter duplicia exempla quibus Deus hucusque non[19] dignatus est ostendere hominibus meliora, per que tam in noticiam Trinitatis quam eciam incarnacionis posset[20] hereticus manuduci. Primum sic. ‘Cum corpus, inquit, et anima sunt unus homo, quamvis corpus et anima non sunt[21] unum; cur non multo magis Pater et Filius sunt unus Deus? cum Pater et Filius sunt unum secundum illam Veritatis vocem ‘’ego et Pater unum sumus.’‘ Cum, inquit, homo exterior et interior homo non sunt unum, neque eiusdem nature est exterior cuius [19]est interior[1]; quia exterior cum corpore nuncupato[1] dicitur homo; interior autem sola anima racionali[2] intelligitur; utrumque tamen illorum simul non[3] duo homines sed unus dicitur: quanto magis Pater et Filius unus Deus est?’

And to this he next lays down two examples, than which God has not hitherto deigned to show men better, by which the heretic might be led by the hand into knowledge as much of the Trinity as of the incarnation.[6] The first is thus. “Since,” he says, “body and soul are one man, although body and soul are not one, why are not the Father and the Son much more one God, since the Father and the Son are one, according to that voice of the Truth, ‘I and the Father are one’?” “Since,” he says, “the outer man and the inner man are not one, nor is the outer of the same nature as [19] the inner; for the outer, with the body so named, is called man, but the inner is understood as the rational soul alone; yet both of them together are called not two men but one: how much more are the Father and the Son one God?”[7]

¶4 19.5–19.25

[19]Secundum exemplum est de natura universali. ‘Homines, inquit, per consorcium et communionem[4] unius eiusdem nature qua omnes homines unum erant, et si aliquando secundum diversitates voluntatum et sentenciarum opinionum et morum dissimilitudines[5] non erant unum, erunt[6] tamen perfecte pleneque unum[6] cum perventum fuerit ad eum finem ut sit ‘’Deus omnia in omnibus.’‘ Et sic non est possibile homines esse unum in caritate vel alio accidente, nisi prius sint unum in substancia vel natura: ut declarat libro primo et[7] 3° contra Maximinianum 22° capitulo. Quod autem multi homines sint unum in substancia vel natura[8] probat[9] per illud Apostoli ad Cor. 3° dictum[10] de Paulo et Appollo ‘’qui plantat et qui rigat unum sunt.’‘ Unde Veritas Joh. 17.[11] ‘’Non[12] (dixit) rogo ut ipsi et nos unum simus;’‘[12] sed ‘’ut ipsi unum sint, sicut et nos unum sumus[13]:’‘ non solum natura quod iam erat verum, sed et perfecte[13] caritatis atque iusticie[14] pro sue[15] capacitate nature, quantum[16] in Dei regno esse poterit,[17] ut sic ipsi summe unum sint in natura sua, sicut Pater et Filius summe unum sunt incomparabiliter[18] meliori natura. Nunquam, inquit, de aliquibus rebus legimus quod unum sunt, nisi sint eiusdem substancie vel nature.’

The second example is about universal nature. “Men,” he says, “through the fellowship and communion of one and the same nature, by which all men were one, even if at some time, according to diversities of wills and of teachings, opinions and dissimilarities of manners, they were not one, will yet be perfectly and fully one when the end is reached, that ‘God may be all in all.’”[8] And so it is not possible for men to be one in charity or in another accident unless they are first one in substance or nature: as he makes clear in the first and third books against Maximinus, chapter 22. And that many men are one in substance or nature he proves by that [text] of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 3, said of Paul and Apollo: “he that planteth and he that watereth, are one.” Hence the Truth, John 17: “I do not pray (he said) that they and we may be one,” but “that they may be one, as we also are one”: not only in nature, which was already true, but also [one] of perfect charity and justice, according to the capacity of their nature, as far as can be in the kingdom of God; so that thus they may be supremely one in their nature, as the Father and the Son are supremely one in an incomparably better nature. “Never,” he says, “do we read of any things that they are one, unless they are of the same substance or nature.”[9]

¶5 19.26–20.13

[19]Et indubie[19] in illo errore de universalibus cecati sunt Arrius, Sabellius, et quam plures heretici. Ideo Anselmus De Incarnacione primo vocat[20] negantes universalia ex parte rei extra signa[21] dialectice hereticos. Unde Pascencius Arrianus postquam [20]

And without doubt Arius, Sabellius, and very many heretics were blinded in that error about universals. Therefore Anselm, *On the Incarnation*, [chapter] 1, calls those who deny universals on the part of the thing,

vocaverat[1] Augustinum succensum errore tanquam aqua cenosa se ingurgitantem et ut arborem curvam et nodosam que nichil rectitudinis in se habet, scribit quid moveat[2] eum ad depravandum sentenciam Augustini confitentis sibi in[3] scriptis fidem suam. Nam[4] inter alia beatus Augustinus scripsit sibi Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse unum Deum, 'Quis, inquit, Pascencius e[5] tribus personis est unus Deus? an forte una est persona triformis que hoc nomine nuncupetur?' Si iste hereticus cognovisset quomodo[6] unica[7] communis humanitas est quelibet persona hominis; vidisse potuisset[8] faciliter quomodo unica deitas, essencia, substancia, vel natura divina, est tres persone et quelibet earundem.

outside signs, heretics of dialectic.[10] Hence Pascentius the Arian, after [20] he had called Augustine one kindled with error, as one plunging himself into muddy water, and like a crooked and knotty tree that has nothing of straightness in it, writes what moves him to distort the teaching of Augustine, who confessed his faith to him in writing. For among other things blessed Augustine wrote to him that "the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God". "Which," says Pascentius, "of the three persons is the one God? Or is there perhaps one three-formed person who is called by this name?"[11] If this heretic had known how a single common humanity is each person of man, he could easily have seen how a single Godhead, essence, substance, or divine nature is three persons and each one of them.

¶6 20.14–20.20

[20]Sabellius eciam si vidisset quod cum unitate nature stat distinccio personarum, sic quoque[9] non fuisset cecatus[10] in isto turpissimo paralogismo—Petrus[11] est natura specifica: Paulus est eadem natura specifica: ergo Petrus est Paulus— vidisset quod non oportet quod Pater sit Filius, quamvis utrumque sit eadem simplicissima substancia. Et sic de aliis heresibus pullulantibus propter defectum logice scripturarum.

Sabellius too, if he had seen that distinction of persons stands with unity of nature, so that he would not have been blinded in that most foul paralogism (Peter is the nature of the species; Paul is the same nature of the species; therefore Peter is Paul), would have seen that it is not necessary that the Father be the Son, although each is the same most simple substance.[12] And so of the other heresies sprouting for lack of the logic of the scriptures.

¶7 20.22–21.22

[20]Multi enim[12] cupiunt autorizare novam logicam extraneam a scriptura et hinc dicunt[13] se ipsam corrigere tamquam impossibilem[14] de vi vocis. Et illud meminit Augustinus contra dictum Pascencium. Nam[15] contra[15] negantes scripturas de Christo sic loquitur: 'Homines, inquit, minus intelligentes quid propter quid dicatur precipites volunt habere sentencias: et scripturis non diligenter scrutatis arripiunt defensionem[16][17] cuiuscumque[18] opinionis[16] et ab ea vel[19] nunquam vel de difficili deflectuntur, dum docti atque sapientes magis putari quam esse cupiunt. Ea quippe, que propter formam[20] servi [21]dicta sunt, volunt transferre ad formam Dei. 'Hoc, inquit, nomen Jesus Christus ex dispensacione misericordie[1] suscepteque[2] humanitatis assumptum est, quia ipse Filius Dei factus est filius hominis, non mutando quod erat, sed[3] assumendo quod non erat.' Et probat diffuse ex scripturis[4] quod tam Christus quam Spiritus Sanctus[5] est idem Deus cum Patre et specialiter per illud Apostoli ad Cor. 8. 'Scimus quoniam nullus Deus nisi unus: nam etsi sunt qui dicantur dii[6] multi et domini multi, nobis tamen unus Deus Pater ex quo omnia et nos in illo: et unus Dominus[7] Jesus Christus per quem omnia et nos per illum.' Ex isto plane sequitur non protervo quod Christus sit idem Deus cum Patre. Unde dicunt periti scripture quod deus et dominus per se sumptus[8] dicitur authonomatice de Deo et Domino dominorum. Scio tamen

For many desire to authorize a new logic foreign to scripture, and hence they say that they correct it as impossible by the force of the words.[13] And Augustine recalls that against the said Pascentius. For against those who deny the scriptures about Christ he speaks thus: "Men," he says, "who understand too little what is said on account of what, headlong want to have their views; and, the scriptures not having been diligently searched, they seize on the defence of whatever opinion, and from it they are turned aside either never or with difficulty, while they desire to be thought learned and wise rather than to be so. For the things that were said on account of the form of a servant [21]they want to transfer to the form of God."[14] "This name," he says, "Jesus Christ, was assumed from the dispensation of mercy and of the humanity taken up, because the very Son of God was made son of man, not by changing what he was, but by assuming what he was not." And he proves at length from the scriptures that both Christ and the Holy Spirit are the same God with the Father, and specially by that [text] of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 8: "We know that there is no God but one. For although there be that are called gods many and lords many, yet to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him: and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him."[15]

quod protervus potest,[9] ut hodie, negare quamlibet partem scripture de virtute sermonis, et dicere quod Deus erat verbum nuncupative, et quod per Christum non sunt omnia facta sed omnia citra ipsum, et[10] sic est Deus ac animatus,[10] sed nec Deus deorum nec animatus[11] nobiscum univoce. Sed non sic sophisticati sunt eciam heretici, non sic negantes[12] scripturam ut hodie, quia melius fundati in logica et methaphisica quam nostrates.

From this it plainly follows, for one who is not obstinate, that Christ is the same God with the Father. Hence those skilled in scripture say that "god" and "lord", taken by itself, is said by antonomasia of God and of the Lord of lords.[16] Yet I know that the obstinate man can, as today, deny any part of scripture in the proper sense of the words, and say that "the Word was God" nuncupatively, and that all things were not made by Christ, but all things short of him; and so he is God and ensouled, but neither God of gods nor ensouled univocally with us.[17] But even the heretics did not so play the sophist, not so denying scripture as today, since they were better grounded in logic and metaphysics than our own people.

Notes

1. Augustine, *De haeresibus* 49 (the Arians), citing Epiphanius (PL 42, 39; *verified*), quoted closely but shortened: Augustine also glosses *substantia* as *essentia*, οὐσία. **T.** *stetit* (17.20): B M *stat*; *suscepisse*: O M *suscipere*.
2. Augustine, *De haeresibus* 55 (the Apollinarists), PL 42, 40 (*verified*), freely: in Augustine the Apollinarists, pressed by the Gospel, grant a soul and deny it only the *mens*, *pro hac ipsum Verbum in eo fuisse*; his verb is *dissenserunt*. **C.** *et Verbum in carnem fuisse conversum* still hangs on *dicentes*, across the clause *et sic glosant … Christi*; hence "[say]". **T.** *differunt* (18.2): A B C *discesserunt* "departed", O *disserunt*.
3. Augustine's letters to Pascentius ("letter 127 and the two following"; O *Ep. 21 vel 5*), in the Maurist numbering *Ep.* 238–241 (PL 33, 1038–1052; 240 is Pascentius's own letter); the quotation that follows is *Ep.* 238.10, PL 33, 1042, where Augustine has *accepit* for Wyclif's *suscepit* (*verified*). Wyclif's number 127 is not traced. **C.** *non puto … formidaret* is read as Wyclif's comment on Augustine's care; A B C, with *formidarem* and a stop before *Non*, make it first person, perhaps Augustine's own words: "I do not think [I wrote] anything unguardedly over which I should fear a challenge."
4. Gal. 4:4; Phil. 2:6–7 (*suscepit* for the Vulgate's *accipiens*); John 10:30; John 14:28. The opening *Quia* clause has no main clause: the period runs on into *de illo multa … dicuntur*.
5. *Nescivit … negare*: "did not know how to deny", that is, would not have it in him to deny. *Personam Filii … esse multorum quodlibet*: the person of the Son is each of the many things scripture says of him, God and servant alike. A B C *persona* would make the person the subject of *concedit*, which does not construe; O *concedat*.
6. *non* (18) is omitted by A B, which reverses the sense ("by which God has hitherto deigned to show men better things"); the print is kept.
7. *unus homo … non sunt unum*: the masculine *unus* (one man) is set against the neuter *unum* (one thing): body and soul are one man without being one thing, and the Father and the Son are *unum* (John 10:30). *Exterior cum corpore nuncupato*: "the outer, with what is named the body"; C reads *interior comunia … exterius*. **T.** *racionali* (19) is O's reading, printed against A B C *racionabiliter* "is reasonably understood as the soul alone".
8. *sentenciarum*: Augustine's plural, the differing views men hold; the row's "teaching". **T.** *erunt* (19): A B C *erant*, which loses the future the argument needs; O omits *erant … unum*. **S.** 1 Cor. 15:28.
9. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* (printed *Maximinianum*), "books 1 and 3, chapter 22" (A B C 23). Wyclif apparently counts the *Collatio cum Maximino* as book 1 and the two books *Contra Maximinum* as books 2 and 3. Book 1 is then the *Collatio*, PL 42, 722 (*Qui plantat et qui rigat unum sunt … sed ambo homines erant, ejusdem substantiae*; *Non dixit, Ut ipsi et nos unum*), and book 3, chapter 22 is *Contra Maximinum* II.22.1, PL 42, 792. That chapter gives the argument that men one in charity must first be one in nature, *non solum natura … meliori natura* nearly word for word (Augustine *potuerint*, as A B C), and the challenge that Wyclif condenses as *Nunquam … legimus* (*verified*). The *Homines … omnia in omnibus* before it is *Ep.* 238.13, PL 33, 1043; 1 Cor. 3:8; John 17:11, 22. *Non rogo ut ipsi et nos unum simus* is not in the Gospel: it is the exegete's negative gloss, set against *ut ipsi unum sint*. **T.** The print's quotation marks open at *Homines* (19.5) and close only at *nature* (19.25); the English closes Augustine's words at "all in all" and quotes the last sentence, which carries its own *inquit*. *Non solum natura … meliori natura* is Augustine's argument, unmarked. A B C read *sumus*. *Sumus enim non solum unum natura quod verum est iam*; *perfecte caritatis* is a genitive without its noun, hence "[one]".
10. Anselm, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi* 1, on the "heretics of dialectic" for whom universal substances are only a breath of the voice: c. 1 (Schmitt II, 9–10; PL 158, 265A, Migne's c. 2), *dialecticae haeretici, qui non nisi flatum vocis putant universales esse substantias* (*verified*). *Ex parte rei extra signa*: in reality, apart from the signs that signify them (O *signum*).
11. Pascentius's abuse of Augustine and his question, from Pascentius's own letter, *Ep.* 240 (PL 33, 1051): *sicut sitiens nimio calore accensus, si invenerit aquam coenosam et se inde ingurgitaverit … sicut arbor curva et nodosa*, and *Quis e tribus unus Deus? an forte est una persona triformis, quae hoc nomine nuncupetur?* (*verified*). Wyclif makes the heat that of error and adds *personis*. **C.** *Quis, inquit, Pascencius*: Pascentius is the subject of *inquit*, and the question his; it is the "what moves him" of the sentence before.
12. *quod* (20.15), with A B C O, against the print's *quoque* ("so also"): "so that he would not have been blinded"; the clause becomes the result of his seeing, and *vidisset* the main verb. **G.** *natura specifica*: the nature of the species, as in *ydemptitas specifica*; not "a particular nature". The paralogism treats the common nature, which each is, as if it were the person.
13. *se ipsam corrigere*: *ipsam* is taken as scripture, which they "correct" as impossible when taken by the force of its words; it could refer to the new logic, which makes no sense of *corrigere*. *De vi vocis* is kept apart from *de virtute sermonis* (17).

14. Augustine to Pascentius, on those who transfer to the form of God what is said of the form of a servant: *Ep.* 238.14, PL 33, 1043 (*verified*); the PL prints *patentes* where Wyclif has *precipites*. The print opens a quotation at *Homines* and a second at *Hoc, inquit* without closing the first; the English closes it at "form of God".
15. "This name Jesus Christ …": Augustine to Pascentius, *Ep.* 238.18, PL 33, 1045, joined to 238.21, PL 33, 1046 (*quia ipse Filius Dei factus est Filius hominis, non mutando quod erat, sed assumendo quod non erat*) (*verified*). Augustine's 1 Cor. 8:5–6 there has *sive in coelo, sive in terra* and *nos in ipso*, so A B C's addition and Wyclif's ablative are his. 1 Cor. 8:4–6, with Wyclif's departures translated: he omits *idolum nihil est in mundo*, and *sive in caelo sive in terra siquidem sunt* (which A B C add); *nos in illo* for the Vulgate's *nos in illum* (DR "we unto him").
16. *non protervo*: a dative, "for one who is not obstinate". *Authonomatice*: by antonomasia, the common noun used as the proper name of the one it fits par excellence.
17. *quod Deus erat verbum nuncupative* is John 1:1 (*Deus erat Verbum*) held to be true "nuncupatively", by naming only; *per Christum non sunt omnia facta sed omnia citra ipsum* turns John 1:3. **T.** *et sic … animatus* (21) is omitted by B; A lacks *ac*, with an erasure of two letters. O reads *anima* for the second *animatus*.
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 18: *de* (print as transcribed (de se ait, next line)) [SUB]
  - 19: *Maximinianum* (print as transcribed (next line)) [BT-ONLY]
  - 19: *verum, sed* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  - 19: *summe unum* (print as transcribed (next line)) [BT-ONLY]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Johnx. 30. (18.17); reference Johnxiv.28.de (18.18); reference Johnx. 30. (18.29); reference ad Cor. 3° (19.18).

Part 3: The third Arian error, Christ not truly a man; the thief in paradise and the descent into hell

Harris pp. 21.23–24.32

¶1 21.23–22.3

[21]Tercio antem stat opinio Arrii in his que ex predictis erroribus sequuntur[13]: ut puta[14] quod Christus nedum[15] est univoce homo cum aliis sed non est homo simpliciter, cum non potest esse homo si non sit anima intellectiva; et per consequens non est passus[16] mortuus aut sepultus, et sic de quibuscunque predicatis humanitatem Christi concernentibus.[17] Quamvis enim dici possit quod angelus, coniunctus nature corporee tanquam motrix, sit homo; verumtamen est alterius speciei quam totus vel completus homo, id est, [22]natura integra ex corpore et anima composita: homo enim est racione spiritus eiusdem speciei cum angelis et non racione nature corporee.

And third, the opinion of Arius stands in the things that follow from the aforesaid errors:[1] as, for example, that Christ, let alone being univocally a man with others, is not a man without qualification, since he cannot be a man if he is not an intellective soul; and consequently he did not suffer, die, or was buried, and so of whatever predicates concern the humanity of Christ.[2] For although it could be said that an angel, joined to a bodily nature as its mover, is a man, nevertheless it is of another species than the whole or complete man, that is, [22]the integral nature composed of body and soul: for [such a] man is, by reason of the spirit, of the same species with the angels, and not by reason of the bodily nature.[3]

¶2 22.4–24.3

[22]Et per hoc patet quod quidam minus intelligentes Augustinum putant ipsum contradicere sibi ipsi, quando dicit quod anima non completus aut totus[1] homo: nam[2] verum dicit ad sensum[3] expositum. Unde Epistola 40 ad Dardanum solvendo questionem de dicto Salvatoris[4] Luc. 23 quo[5] promisit latroni quod foret secum illo die in paradiso; 'antequam, inquit, sciatur utrum secundum deitatem[6] vel[7] secundum humanitatem intelligatur promissio Veritatis, oportet videre quomodo sit loquendum de homine. Non, inquit Augustinus, sicut quidam heretici dicunt, Verbum Dei[8] et carnem sine anima humana[9] suscepit, sic quod Verbum esset carni pro anima; vel Verbum Dei carnem et animam sine mente, ut Verbum Dei esset anime[10] pro mente. Sed accipis, inquit ad Dardanum, hominem Christum; sicut[11] superius aisti quod Christum Deum non crederes nisi perfectum

And by this it is clear that certain [people], understanding Augustine too little, think that he contradicts himself when he says that the soul is not the complete or whole man: for he says what is true in the sense expounded.[4] Hence in letter 40, to Dardanus, solving the question about the saying of the Saviour, Luke 23, by which he promised the thief that he would be with him that day in paradise: "Before," he says, "it is known whether the promise of the Truth is understood as to the Godhead or as to the humanity, it is necessary to see how one is to speak of man. Not," says Augustine, "as certain heretics say, [that] the Word of God took up flesh without a human soul, so that the Word was to the flesh in place of a soul; or [that] the Word of God [took up] flesh and soul without mind, so that the Word of God was to the soul in place of mind. But you accept," he says to Dardanus,

hominem credidisses. Profecto, inquit, cum dicis hominem, perfectam totam illic naturam humanam vis intelligere. Non est[12] autem homo perfectus si vel anima carni vel anime ipsi mens[13] humana defuerit.'[14] Et illam naturam complete ex anima et corpore compositam vocat super Joh. Ome. 47[15] totum hominem: quam[16] notum est ex dictis De Anima distingui tam a corpore quam anima[17] licet omnia ista tria sint eadem persona hominis. Sic ergo[18] intelligendus est Augustinus quandocunque videtur dicere quod corpus vel anima non est homo; id est, non est[19] tota vel completa natura ex corpore et anima composita. Sed pro solucione Dardani questionis videtur Augustino catholicum quod promissio facta latroni intelligatur secundum [23]humanitatem Christi:[1] sed cum corpus Christi[1] sepultum sit solum in orto, ut patet Ioh. 19,[2] relinquitur quod sue anime in parasceue erant simul; quia modicum felicitatis fuisset animam latronis fuisse cum solo corpore Christi mortuo in sepulcro. Et cum vera mors fuit in Christi corpore, cum aliter non fuisset vera resurreccio; querendum est—quo devenit anima[3] Christi in illo triduo? Quod cum evangelium non reserat, supplet[4] beatus Petrus Actuum 2° probans ex illo Psalmi 15 dicto de Christo 'quoniam non[5] derelinques animam meam in inferno, nec dabis sanctum tuum videre corrupcionem,' quod anima Christi descendit in illo triduo ad limbum patrum, quem Veritas Luc. 16. vocat 'sinum Abrahe,' ubi patres veteris testamenti feliciter quieverunt.[6] Quamvis enim dictum psalmiste sit negativum, impertinenter tamen menti prophetice diceretur, nisi intenderet Messiam secundum mentem visitare inferos et statim sine media incarceracione corpori reuniri.[6] Et hinc fundatus est de Christo articulus fidei, quod 'descendit ad inferos.' Cum ergo paradisus generale nomen est ubicunque feliciter[7] vivitur, quid obest animam latronis fuisse cum anima Christi in regione quiescencium congaudendo et non in regione inferiori dolencium,[8] inter quas est 'magnum chaos' secundum veritatem evangelicam interceptum?[9] Redeundo[10] ergo ad propositum patet ex dictis quantum differt ista posicio ab heresi Arriana. Ideo est michi verisimile quod doctores moderni[11] cum non ydemptificarent que minus intelligunt,[12] locuntur michi temptative, yronice, vel iocose. Yronice quidem, quia Arrius negavit Verbum Dei esse idem substancialiter Deo Patri, sed creatum esse secundum supremam substanciam, que est Christus. Ego autem dico [24]quod Christus absolute necessario[1] est eadem deitas que est Pater,[2] nec posse secundum supremam naturam, que est Christus, creari vel fieri.

"the man Christ; as you said above that you would not believe Christ God unless you had believed him perfect man. Truly," he says, "when you say man, you wish the whole perfect human nature to be understood there. And a man is not perfect if either soul is lacking to the flesh or a human mind to the soul itself."[5] And that nature, composed completely of soul and body, he calls, on John, homily 47, "the whole man": which, as is known from what is said in *On the Soul*, is distinguished both from the body and from the soul, although all these three are the same person of the man.[6] So, then, Augustine is to be understood whenever he seems to say that body or soul is not man: that is, it is not the whole or complete nature composed of body and soul. But for the solution of Dardanus's question it seems catholic to Augustine that the promise made to the thief be understood as to [23]the humanity of Christ; now since the body of Christ was buried only in the garden, as is clear from John 19, it remains that their souls were together on the Parasceve; for it would have been little felicity for the soul of the thief to have been with the dead body of Christ alone in the sepulchre.[7] And since there was true death in the body of Christ, since otherwise there would not have been a true resurrection, it must be asked: where did the soul of Christ go in the three days? Since the gospel does not disclose this, blessed Peter supplies it, Acts 2, proving from that [text] of Psalm 15, said of Christ, "Because thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; nor wilt thou give thy holy one to see corruption," that the soul of Christ descended in the three days to the limbo of the fathers, which the Truth, Luke 16, calls "Abraham's bosom", where the fathers of the old testament happily rested.[8] For although the psalmist's saying is negative, yet it would be said irrelevantly to the prophetic mind unless he meant that the Messiah, as to the mind, visits those below and at once, without intervening incarceration, is reunited to the body.[9] And hence the article of faith was founded concerning Christ, that "he descended into hell". Since, therefore, paradise is a general name for wherever there is happy living, what prevents the soul of the thief from having been with the soul of Christ in the region of those at rest, rejoicing with him, and not in the lower region of those in pain, between which there is "a great chaos" fixed, according to the gospel truth?[10] Returning, then, to the point, it is clear from what has been said how much this position differs from the Arian heresy. Therefore it seems likely to me that the modern doctors, since they would not identify the things they understand too little, speak to me tentatively, ironically, or jokingly.[11] Ironically indeed, because Arius

denied that the Word of God is substantially the same as God the Father, but [said] that he was created as to the supreme substance, which is Christ. But I say [24]that Christ is, absolutely of necessity, the same Godhead that is the Father, and that he cannot be created or made as to the supreme nature, which is Christ.

¶3 24.4–24.8

[24]2° autem dixit Arrius quod Christus non habet animam sed pure carnem; spiritu illo creato[3] supplente vicem anime non ypostatice, sed ut motrice, corpori copulato. Ego autem dico quod Christus nedum habet animam, sed est anima, nec posset[4] carni nisi mediante anima ypostatice copulari.

And second, Arius said that Christ has no soul but purely flesh, that created spirit supplying the place of the soul, joined to the body not hypostatically but as its mover.[12] But I say that Christ not only has a soul, but is a soul, and could not be joined hypostatically to the flesh except by means of the soul.

¶4 24.9–24.14

[24]3° ubi posuit[5] Christum non esse hominem nisi equivoce, nec proprie passum[6] esse, mortuum, et sic de aliis que fides evangelica de Christo predicat. Ego autem[7] dico Christum esse[8] verissime, completissime, et univoce hominem cum quolibet fratre suo; et vere de virtute sermonis conversatum esse in terris, ut canit processus evangelicus.

Third, where he held that Christ is not a man except equivocally, nor properly suffered, died, and so of the other things that the gospel faith predicates of Christ. But I say that Christ is most truly, most completely, and univocally a man with every brother of his; and that truly, in the proper sense of the words, he conversed on earth, as the course of the gospel sings.[13]

¶5 24.15–24.22

[24]Et sic, ubi Arrius peccavit in deitate Christi negando eum verum Deum[9] eundem cum Patre; ubi eciam peccavit in humanitate Christi negando ipsum esse verum hominem; ego utrumque[10] pleno corde confiteor non confundendo naturas nec[11] distinguendo personas in Christo. Et patet quod non, quia dixit Christum esse creaturam, censetur hereticus[12]; sed, quia dixit Christum esse puram[13] creaturam meliorem homine; et non hominem passum abiectum et ab hominibus reprobatum.

And so, where Arius sinned in the Godhead of Christ, denying him [to be] true God, the same with the Father, and where he also sinned in the humanity of Christ, denying him to be true man, I confess both with a full heart, not confounding the natures nor dividing the persons in Christ.[14] And it is clear that it is not because he said "Christ is a creature" that he is judged a heretic, but because he said "Christ is a pure creature better than man", and not a man who suffered, cast down and rejected by men.[15]

¶6 24.23–24.32

[24]Et utinam nostri loquentes attenderent ad regulam Augustini 'quid propter quid de Christo dicitur,' allegando complete scripturam vel determinaciones ecclesie non truncate. Ut primo libro contra Maximinianum ca° 11. 'Audi, inquit, Maximiniane, auctoritatem synodice[14] locucionis: Si quis ex nichilo Filium dicit non ex Deo Patre, anathema sit.' Quis ergo color, si dico—Christus est creatura—sed et Arrius dixit Christum esse creaturam, quod coincido in heresim Arrianam? Vere non plus quam sequitur, si uterque nostrum dicat Christum esse aliquid[15] sive Deum.

And would that our speakers attended to Augustine's rule, "what is said of Christ on account of what", alleging scripture or the determinations of the church completely, not truncated.[16] As in the first book against Maximinus, chapter 11: "Hear," he says, "Maximinus, the authority of a synodal utterance: If anyone says the Son is from nothing, not from God the Father, let him be anathema."[17] What colour is there, then, if I say "Christ is a creature", and Arius too said "Christ is a creature", [for saying] that I fall into the Arian heresy?[18] Truly, no more than it would follow if each of us said "Christ is something" or "God".

Notes

1. *antem* (21.23) is a misprint in Harris for *autem*; the English reads *autem* (continuative, "and").
2. *nedum est univoce homo … sed non est homo simpliciter*: the print's *nedum* is taken as "let alone": Christ is not even a man without qualification, still less univocally a man with others. **T.** A B C read *nedum non est*, "is not only not univocally a man … but is not a man without qualification"; the sense is the same. *Si non sit anima intellectiva*: "if he is not an intellective soul", the form Wyclif answers below (24, *est anima*).
3. *tanquam motrix*: as the moving power of the body, not as its form. *Homo enim est racione spiritus*: the "man" is the angel so joined, which is of the angels' species by its spirit, and so not of the species of the complete man.
4. *anima non completus aut totus homo*: the print has no verb; "is" is understood. O reads *non* for *nam* (22), and A B C *ad sermonem expositum* "in the expounded speech".
5. Augustine, letter to Dardanus, *Ep.* 187 (here "letter 40"), on Luke 23:43: §§3–4, PL 33, 833 (*verified*), quoted freely. Augustine's *Verbum Dei et carnem, hoc est sine anima humana* (the heretics' Christ is the Word and flesh) accounts for the stray *et*. **C.** *Verbum Dei et carnem … suscepit*: the *et* has no partner and is left untranslated. **T.** *humana* (22) is omitted by A B C.
6. Augustine, *Tract. in Ioh.* 47 (A B C 40), "the whole man": 47.9, PL 35, 1737, *constat ex carne et anima, totus autem homo in Christo*, and 1738, *id est totus homo, anima et caro* (*verified*). *De Anima*: Wyclif's own treatise, the *De Anima* that the prologue names as the introduction to this one, not Aristotle's. The doctrine, that one person is body, soul and the integral nature from both, is stated in *De compositione hominis* 1 (ed. Beer): *eadem persona corpus spiritus et connexio utriusque vel natura integra resultans ex ambobus*. **C.** *quam … distingui*: the whole man is distinguished from body and from soul, yet the three are one person; O *quanquam* for *quam*.
7. John 19:41–42 (the garden). **C.** *sue anime*: the souls of Christ and of the thief. *Sed cum corpus* brings the premiss from which *relinquitur* draws the conclusion, hence "now". **T.** O omits *sed … Christi* (23), the eye passing from *Christi* to *Christi*.
8. Acts 2:27 citing Ps. 15:10; the Latin is the psalm's (*nec dabis*), and the English is DR's psalm. Luke 16:22.
9. The sentence (23) is Harris's composite. A B C read *dictum psalmiste sit negatum … diceretur menti prophetice nisi intenderet Messiam visitare inferos ac statim sine mera incarnacione corpori uniri*, without *secundum mentem*; O has *incineracione corporis veniri* and otherwise the print. The print's *media incarceracione* "intervening imprisonment" and *reuniri* "be reunited" are given by no manuscript in the foot; the English follows the print. **C.** *menti prophetice*: "to the prophetic mind", what the prophet meant.
10. Luke 16:26. *Interceptum* in all the manuscripts; Harris queries *interseptum* "fenced between". The English keeps DR's "fixed".
11. *doctores moderni* (23): B C read *doctores mei* "my doctors", and O omits the adjective. **C.** *cum non ydemptificarent que minus intelligunt*: they would not make identical (in predication) the things they understand too little.
12. *creato* (24) is the reading of B C O; M A read *increato* "uncreated". The print fits Arius's created spirit supplying the soul. **C.** *ut motrice*: as a moving power, the same sense as *motrix* (21).
13. *conversatum esse in terris* echoes Baruch 3:38, "he was seen upon earth, and conversed with men". **T.** *autem* (24) is omitted by A B O.
14. *peccavit in deitate*: "sinned in [the matter of] the Godhead". *Non confundendo naturas nec distinguendo personas* recalls the Athanasian Creed's *neque confundentes personas neque substantiam separantes*, applied to the natures and the person of Christ, as the Creed itself does further on: *Unus omnino, non confusione substantiae, sed unitate personae* (PL 88, 585A and 586B; *verified*). B reads *non* for *nec*.
15. The propositions are given as quoted. *Abiectum et ab hominibus reprobatum*: cf. 1 Pet. 2:4 "rejected indeed by men". B reorders the clause (*esse Christum censetur creaturam hereticus*); O *pure*.
16. *determinaciones ecclesie*: the church's rulings, not the logician's *determinacio* (a qualifying addition), and so untagged. Augustine's rule is the one cited from the Pascentius letters (21).
17. Not Augustine's words: in the *Collatio cum Maximino* 15.13 (PL 42, 730) it is Maximinus the Arian who says to Augustine *audi auctoritatem synodicae lectionis*. The synod is Ariminum (359), not Nicaea: *Si quis ex nihilo Filium dicit, et non ex Deo Patre, anathema sit* (*verified*). Wyclif turns the address round (*Audi … Maximiniane*); his first book is the *Collatio*, as in chapter 2, part 2, note 9. Augustine refuses Ariminum's authority in *Contra Maximinum* II.14.3 (PL 42, 772).
18. *color*: a plausible ground (the period sense). The *quod* clause states what the "colour" would be for: that from the shared words Wyclif falls into Arius's heresy. C reads *aliud* for *aliquid* (24.32).
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 21: *antem* (plate: print = antem (Harris misprint for autem); the Latin keeps the print, the English notes it)
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Acts u. 31. xvi- 10- . . . . . Ps- (23.8); reference Luke xvi. 22, 26. (23.12).

Part 4: Christ the most abject creature and the best person; Nestorius; "if you loved me, you would be glad"

Harris pp. 25.1–28.15

¶1 25.1–26.3

[25]Sed obicitur quod dico horribilius Arrianis, quia ipsi dixerunt Christum esse primam et optimam creaturam; ego autem dico Christum esse materiam primam, et sic[1] abiectissimam creaturam. Hic dicitur quod non sequitur. Nam Christus est optimus homo possibilis, inter omnes creaturas particulares optima, in tantum quod est melior angelo[2]; et per consequens melior[2] illa creatura, si esset, quam[3] finxit

But it is objected that I say something more horrible than the Arians, since they said "Christ is the first and best creature", but I say "Christ is prime matter, and so the most abject creature". The answer here is that it does not follow. For Christ is the best man possible, the best among all particular creatures, so much so that he is better than an angel; and consequently

Arrius nimis stolide esse[4] primam creaturam Dei, mediante qua[5] Deus creavit Spiritum Sanctum et consequenter alias creaturas. Nam illa creatura non foret melior creato angelo: de Christo autem dicit Apostolus ad Hebr. 1° quod 'est tanto melior angelis effectus quanto differencius pre illis nomen hereditavit.' Et si obicitur per illud Ps. 8[6] dictum de Christo ad litteram[7] 'minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis'; dicitur quod Christus, sicut est natura increata et natura creata, sic secundum naturam creatam est simul[8] tam natura corporea quam natura incorporea;[9] secundum autem naturam corpoream[9] est 'paululum minoratus ab angelis,' sicut[10] sentenciat satis[11] psalmus; et secundum creatum spiritum per graciam unionis angelos[12] antecellit. Conceditur tamen[13] quod abiectissima creatura que est Christus Deus, licet sit natura inferior quam angelus vel anima humana, est tamen optima et suprema persona possibilis: cum omnis natura que est filius[14] Marie virginis hominis[15] est et[16] Filius Dei; et e contra omnis natura, que est Filius[14] Dei, est filius hominis; quia natura divina est filius hominis, ut patet ex confessione beati Petri Mat. 16. querente Veritate, 'Quem dicunt[17] homines esse filium hominis?' et respondente Petro de eadem humanitate que est Christus, de qua fit questio. 'Tu es, inquit, Filius Dei vivi,' intelligens indubie filium naturalem. Unde Veritas [26] approbando responsionem[1] adiunxit premium, et monet eum:[2] 'Beatus es, inquit, Symon Bariona, quia caro et sanguis non revelavit tibi, sed Pater meus.'

better than that creature, if there were one, which Arius exceedingly stupidly feigned to be the first creature of God, by means of which God created the Holy Spirit and consequently the other creatures.[1] For that creature would not be better than a created angel; but of Christ the Apostle says, Hebrews 1, that he "is made so much better than the angels as he hath inherited a more excellent name than they." And if it is objected, by appeal to that [text] of Psalm 8, said of Christ literally, "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels", the answer is that Christ, as he is uncreated nature and created nature, so as to the created nature he is at once both bodily nature and incorporeal nature; but as to the bodily nature he is "made a little lower than the angels", as the psalm sufficiently pronounces; and as to the created spirit, by the grace of union, he excels the angels.[2] Yet it is granted that the most abject creature which is Christ God, although it is a nature lower than an angel or a human soul, is yet the best and supreme person possible: since every nature that is the son of the virgin Mary, of man, is also the Son of God; and conversely every nature that is the Son of God is the son of man; for the divine nature is the son of man,[3] as is clear from the confession of blessed Peter, Matthew 16, when the Truth asked, "Whom do men say that the Son of man is?" and Peter answered about the same humanity which is Christ, about which the question is put: "Thou art," he says, "the Son of the living God," understanding without doubt the natural son. Hence the Truth, [26] approving the answer, added a reward, and admonishes him: "Blessed art thou," he says, "Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father."[4]

¶2 26.4–28.15

[26] Et per hoc destruitur heresis Nestoriana arguens ex diversitate naturarum in Christo quod sit diversitas personarum. Nesciunt enim quomodo humanitas assumpta et natura divina tam dispares sunt utraque[3] eadem persona cum Verbo Dei, ut ostendit Anselmus de Incarnacione Verbi cap. 6.[4] et sic posuit alium esse filium hominis et alium Filium Dei; sicut aliud est filius hominis et aliud Filius Dei; sicut dicit superius Augustinus. Et patet quantum differt ista posicio ab heresi Arriana et Nestoriana, cum quibus videretur minus intelligentibus maxime concordare. Et si obicitur quod non tollitur, quin Christus sit creatura[5] et abiectissima, quod[5] non posuit Arrius; concedo conclusionem. Unde inter alia, que accenderent[6] virtutes theologicas in nobis[7] viantibus, maxime videtur mihi debere gignere[8] illa summa minoracio, illa summa exinanicio, illa summa[9] obediencia vel humiliacio qua[10] Verbum, manens substancialiter complete et eternaliter quod erat, assumpsit ypostatice quod prius non erat.

And by this the Nestorian heresy is destroyed, which argues from the diversity of natures in Christ that there is a diversity of persons. For they do not know how the assumed humanity and the divine nature, so unlike, are each the same person with the Word of God, as Anselm shows, *On the Incarnation of the Word*, chapter 6; and so [Nestorius] held that the son of man is one [person] and the Son of God another, as the son of man is one thing and the Son of God another, as Augustine says above.[5] And it is clear how much this position differs from the Arian and the Nestorian heresy, with which to those who understand too little it would seem most to agree. And if it is objected that this does not rule out that Christ is a creature, and the most abject, which Arius did not hold, I grant the conclusion.[6] Hence among the other things that would kindle the theological virtues in us who are on the road, it seems to me that what ought most to engender them is

'Nusquam[11] enim angelos apprehendit' secundum Apostolum ad Hebr. 2°. sicut ficte garriunt Arriani; sed 'semen Abrahe'[12] tam secundum naturam corruptibilem quam secundum[13] naturam immortalem 'ut fieret per omnia fratribus similis': dicente Apostolo ubi supra, 'non confunditur[14] fratres eos vocare, dicens "narrabo nomen tuum fratribus meis"': et sequitur 'nusquam enim angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahe apprehendit: unde debuit per omnia fratribus similari, ut misericors fieret et fidelis pontifex ad Deum.' Ex quo textu patet quod fides nostra viresceret ex hoc quod naturam nostram fragilem non pure angelicam dignatur [27] suscipere. 2° cum non[1] potest frustrari, patet quod ex assumpcione nostre nature, quos vocat[1] fratres suos passus et temptatus[2] ad nobis auxiliandum, invalesceret spes[3] humana. Et 3° visa humiliacione qua Dei Patris primogenitus naturalis dignatus est naturam nostram fragilem et abiectam assumere fortificaretur caritas ad ipsum et fratres suos in ipso[4] carius diligendum. Non ergo iniuriatur nobis nec debet vilescere quod nos sic univit, non angelos; nec ab honore Patris degenerat, nec[5] fundatur in ipso[6] remissior nobis diligendi racio.[7] Sed per omnia e converso. Unde Ioh. 14. vere dicit, 'si diligeretis me, gauderetis utique quia vado ad Patrem.' Pro cuius declaracione suppono: primo quod Christus, hoc dicens[8] secundum humanitatem assumptam,[9] sit eiusdem nature nobiscum. 2° suppono[10] quod apostoli, quibus locutus est et alii sermones eius servantes sint nedum servi Domini sed amici. Patet per[11] illud Ioh. 15[12] 'Vos amici mei estis si feceritis que precipio vobis: iam non dicam vos servos etc.' 3° suppono quod de racione amicicie sit, cum amicus sit alter ipse, congratulari de prosperis coamici, specialiter si exinde[13] speratur amicicie fructus uberior. Patet per Aristotelem 8 Ethic 5.[14] Ex istis sic arguitur. Quilibet amicus debet gaudere de eventu prospero coamici amiciciam confirmante; sed Christo amico apostolorum ascendente in celum et collocato a dextra[15] Dei Patris advenit summa felicitas: ergo de eius transitu fuit apostolis congaudendum.[16] Et hinc dicit apostolus ad Hebr. 7 'quod[17] Iesus accedit per semet ipsum ad Deum, semper vivens ad interpellandum pro nobis.' Cui conformiter scribitur prima[18] Ioh. 2° 'sed et si quis peccaverit[19] advocatum habemus apud[20] Patrem, Iesum Christum.' Unde Augustinus super illo textu Omelia 78 sic scribit: 'humane nature congratulandum [28] est eo, quod assumpta est a Verbo ut immortalis[1] constitueretur in celo, atque ita fieret[2] terra sublimis, ut[3] incorruptibilis pulvis[4] sedeat ad dextram Patris; et sic Christum ire ad Patrem et recedere a nobis est mortale, quod ex nobis suscepit, levare in celum[5] et facere immortale. Quis ergo non hinc gaudeat ut et suam naturam iam immortalem gratuletur in Christo, ac[6] illud se speret esse futurum per Christum? Nec dubito, quin omnes moderni

that supreme lowering, that supreme emptying, that supreme obedience or humbling, by which the Word, remaining substantially, completely and eternally what he was, assumed hypostatically what before he was not. "For nowhere doth he take hold of the angels", according to the Apostle, Hebrews 2, as the Arians fictitiously prattle; but [he takes hold of] "the seed of Abraham", as much according to the corruptible nature as according to the immortal nature, "that he might become in all things like to his brethren"; the Apostle saying in the place cited above, "he is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying: I will declare thy name to my brethren"; and there follows: "For nowhere doth he take hold of the angels: but of the seed of Abraham he taketh hold. Wherefore it behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest before God."[7] From which text it is clear that our faith would grow green from this, that he deigns to take up our fragile nature, not a purely angelic one. [27] Second, since he cannot be frustrated, it is clear that from the assumption of our nature, whom he calls his brethren, having suffered and been tempted in order to help us, human hope would grow strong.[8] And third, seeing the humbling by which the natural firstborn of God the Father deigned to assume our fragile and abject nature, charity would be strengthened towards loving him, and his brethren in him, more dearly. Therefore it does no injury to us, nor ought it to grow cheap, that he so united us, not angels, to himself; nor does he fall away from the honour of the Father, nor is a slacker reason for loving us founded in him; but in all things the reverse.[9] Hence, John 14, he truly says: "If you loved me, you would indeed be glad, because I go to the Father." For the making clear of this I suppose, first, that Christ, saying this as to the assumed humanity, is of the same nature with us. Second, I suppose that the apostles to whom he spoke, and others keeping his words, are not only servants of the Lord but friends. This is clear by that [text] of John 15: "You are my friends, if you do the things that I command you. I will not now call you servants, etc." Third, I suppose that it belongs to the nature of friendship, since a friend is another self, to rejoice with a fellow-friend in his prosperity, especially if a richer fruit of friendship is hoped for from it. This is clear by Aristotle, *Ethics* 8.5.[10] From these it is argued thus. Every friend ought to rejoice at a prosperous event of a fellow-friend that confirms their friendship; now to Christ, the friend of the apostles, ascending into heaven and set at the right hand of God the Father, supreme felicity came; therefore the apostles ought to have rejoiced together at his passing. And hence the

scholastici nescirent impugnare istas logicas de vi vocis. Et sic intelligit Jeronimus et alii rectiloqui quod tota spes et consolacio nostra est in summa humiliacione Christi, qua naturam nostram assumendo et nobis exemplum conversacionis tribuendo fecit se non angelum vel naturam alienam ab homine, sicut fabulantur heretici, sed verissime et univoce fratrem nostrum, ut post[7] declarabitur.

Apostle says, Hebrews 7, "that Jesus goes by himself to God, always living to make intercession for us."[11] In conformity with which it is written, 1 John 2: "But if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ." Hence Augustine on that text, homily 78, writes thus: "Human nature is to be congratulated [28]in this, that it was assumed by the Word so as to be established immortal in heaven, and so earth became sublime, so that incorruptible dust sits at the right hand of the Father; and so for Christ to go to the Father and withdraw from us is to raise into heaven the mortal [thing] which he took from us, and to make it immortal. Who then would not rejoice at this, so as both to congratulate his own nature, already immortal in Christ, and to hope that he himself will be so through Christ?"[12] Nor do I doubt that all the modern scholastics would not know how to impugn these [pieces of] logic by the force of the words. And so Jerome and the other those who speak correctly, understand that all our hope and consolation is in the supreme humbling of Christ, by which, by assuming our nature and giving us an example of manner of life, he made himself not an angel or a nature foreign to man, as the heretics fable, but most truly and univocally our brother, as will be made clear later.[13]

Notes

1. *dico Christum esse materiam primam*: the objection's report of Wyclif's thesis, "Christ is prime matter", given as quoted; the answer grants the "most abject creature" below. *Si esset*: "if there were one", existential *esse*, since Arius's first creature is a fiction. **T.** *esse* (25): A B C *esset*; *qua*: B *quam*.
2. Heb. 1:4; Ps. 8:6; *paululum minoratus ab angelis* is Heb. 2:9 (Vulgate *modico quam angeli minoratus*), given in DR's wording of 2:7, 9. **T.** *satis* (25): O *sacer* "as the sacred psalm pronounces"; *secundum … corpoream* omitted by O. **C.** *per graciam unionis*: by the grace of the union, the hypostatic union.
3. *filius Marie virginis hominis* (25): O M omit *virginis*; Harris notes that either *virginis* or *hominis* should perhaps be omitted. The English keeps both: the son of the virgin Mary, [the son] of man. B omits *Marie … filius*. **C.** *Christus Deus* is bare apposition, kept as "Christ God".
4. Matt. 16:13, 16–17, with cuts: Peter's answer omits *Christus*, and the blessing stops at *Pater meus* (Vulgate *qui in caelis est*). **T.** *monet eum* (26.2): all the manuscripts read *et monentem*, against the print's *et monet eum*. The English keeps the print: *adiunxit premium et monentem* will not construe (the participle has no noun to agree with); *monentem* is likely a misread abbreviation of *monet eum*. B reads *confirmando questionem* for *approbando responsionem*.
5. Anselm, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi*, chapter 6 in all the manuscripts. In Schmitt's numbering this is c. 11 (II, 28–29): *ita in Christo una persona est plures naturae … Non enim est alius deus, alius homo in Christo, quamvis aliud sit deus, aliud homo*; cf. c. 9 (II, 24), *ut persona dei et hominis una eademque sit*. Schmitt's c. 6 is on another question, so Wyclif's 6 follows another division (*verified*). "As Augustine says above" points back to the Pascentius passages (chapter 2, part 2). **C.** *alium … alium* (masculine: another person) against *aliud … aliud* (neuter: another thing): the son of man and the Son of God are other and other as things, not as persons. The subject of *posuit* is Nestorius, the heresy's author.
6. The figure 5 stands twice (26): it marks one variant, *est abiectissima quomodo* in A B C for *et abiectissima, quod*.
7. Heb. 2:11–12, 16–17. *Ut fieret per omnia fratribus similis* is Wyclif's own paraphrase of 2:17; the second citation of 2:17 has *similari* for the Vulgate's *similare*. **T.** *Nusquam* (26): O *nunquam*; *confunditur* (26): O *confundetur*, A B C as the Vulgate.
8. *cum non potest frustrari*: "since he cannot be frustrated", or "since [this] cannot be frustrated"; the subject is not expressed. *Passus et temptatus ad nobis auxiliandum* takes up Heb. 2:18 ("he himself hath suffered and been tempted he is able to succour them"); the relative *quos* has *nature* (our nature, that is, men) for its antecedent. **T.** *spes* (27.2): B C O read *species* ("the human species would grow strong"), A *spes* with an erasure over it, as the print. The English keeps the print: a majority of three is not backed here by any source, and the argument wants *spes*, the second of the three theological virtues (*fides … viresceret, spes, caritas*) the paragraph promised; *spēs* is the usual abbreviation of *species*, an easy confusion. O omits *potest … vocat*.
9. *nec ab honore Patris degenerat*: the subject is taken as the Word; it could be the uniting, "nor does it fall short of the honour of the Father". *Remissior … diligendi racio*: a slacker ground for loving us. **T.** *in ipso* (27): A B C *in nobis*; O *potencia* for *racio*.

10. John 14:28; John 15:14–15; "keeping his words", cf. John 14:23. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (here "8.5"; A B C "11"), on the friend as "another self" (IX.4, 1166a31–32, with the friend who rejoices and grieves with his friend at 1166a7–8; cf. IX.9) (*verified*).
11. Heb. 7:25, paraphrased: the Vulgate has *accedentes per ipsum ad Deum* (DR "them that come to God by him"); Wyclif makes Jesus the one who goes to God by himself. 1 John 2:1 follows, stopping at "Jesus Christ" (DR adds "the just").
12. Augustine, *Tract. in Ioh.* 78.3 (on John 14:28), PL 35, 1837 (*verified*); Augustine has *immortalis* and *fieret*, with the print against A B C. The print opens the quotation at *humane* and does not close it; the English closes it at "through Christ". **T.** *immortalis* (28) omitted by A B C; *fieret*: A B C *in terra.*
13. Jerome, no work named. Most likely *In Ephesios* I, on Eph. 2:10 (PL 26, 471A), the passage quoted in chapter 1 (01-b n10), where Jerome confesses Christ as *vermem, et hominem, et crucifixum, et maledictionem* with *tota spei nostrae fiducia* (*verified* in sense only). **T.** *post* (28.15) omitted by A B C.
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Hebr. 1° (25.12); reference illud Ps. 8 (25.14); reference Matt. xvi. 13, 16. (25.28); reference Matt. xvi. 17. (26.2); reference and Augustine show. (26.11); reference Heb. ii. 11, 12. (26.25); reference Thus, as Augustine says, ‘ (28.1); reference 1 Cor. xv. 53. (28.4).

Chapter 3

Part 1: That Christ was a man in the three days

Harris pp. 28.0–32.24

¶1 *28.0–28.0*

[28] [Ostendit quod Christus fuit homo in triduo, et obicit multipliciter et dissolvit. Christ's humanity was not suspended during the three days' entombment.]

[It shows that Christ was a man in the three days, and raises objections in many ways and resolves them.]

¶2 *28.17–29.6*

[28] Ex[8] istis plane consequitur quod Christus fuit verus homo in triduo inter eius mortem et resurreccionem. Probatur sic. Cuiuslibet[9] hominis tam corpus quam anima est inseparabiliter idem homo: sed tam corpus Christi quam eius anima per dictum triduum manet: ergo Christus fuit per dictum triduum verus homo. Maior patet ex dictis. Nam quomodocunque scriptura vel alii doctores catholici hoc intellexerunt sive figurative sive aliter, suppono me intelligere; sic tamen quod maneat verum de virtute[10] sermonis: et sic oportet me concedere aliqua[11] que secuntur. Nam licet illud argumentum det michi plenam fidem ad conclusionem propositam, verumtamen pro intellectu scripture et veritatum annexarum huic [29] materie cum dictis doctorum oportet illam materiam ulterius triplici medio[1] dilatare. Veritas enim testatur omnimode sibi ipsi, nec aliquid ex veritate consequens offenderet pias aures. Quicquid ergo ex hoc principio perfectus[2] philosophus sciret deducere concedi debet tanquam catholicum, et oppositum abici[3] tanquam dissonum fidei Christiane.

From these things it plainly follows that Christ was a true man in the three days between his death and resurrection. It is proved thus. The body as well as the soul of any man whatever is inseparably the same man; now both the body of Christ and his soul remain through the said three days; therefore Christ was a true man through the said three days. The major is clear from what has been said. For however scripture or other catholic doctors understood this, whether figuratively or otherwise, I suppose that I understand it; yet in such a way that it remains true in the proper sense of the words:[1] and so I must grant some things that follow. For although that argument gives me full faith in the proposed conclusion, nevertheless, for the understanding of scripture and of the truths annexed to this [29] matter together with the sayings of the doctors, I must extend that matter further by a threefold middle term.[2] For truth bears witness to itself in every way, nor would anything that follows from truth offend pious ears. Whatever therefore a perfect philosopher would know how to deduce from this principle ought to be granted as catholic, and the opposite rejected as discordant with the Christian faith.

¶3 *29.7–29.24*

[29] Ut primo sequitur ex eius opposito quod Christus non descendisset ad inferos, nec iacuisset sepultus in sepulcro, sicut tamen[4] superius allegatur ex fide. Si enim descendit ad inferos, vel secundum deitatem vel secundum humanitatem. Non secundum[5] deitatem, cum non secundum illam sit mobilis; et si secundum humanitatem, tunc illa fuit servata[6] pro tunc descendens ad inferos. Nec sufficit hoc, nisi illa pro tunc fuerit sibi ypostatice copulata: quia persone non est attribuenda pars[7] denominacionis[8] pro tempore pro quo ipsa non est pars persone: cum tunc omne corpus racione materie foret perpetue,[9] et omnis homo racione anime eque post mortem viveret sicut ante. Quod negant illi, quibus non sapit, quod Christus vixit humanitus in dicto triduo: unde

As, first, it follows from its opposite that Christ would not have descended into hell, nor lain buried in the sepulchre, as is nevertheless alleged above from faith.[3] For if he descended into hell, [he did so] either as to the Godhead or as to the humanity. Not as to the Godhead, since as to that he is not movable; and if as to the humanity, then that [humanity] was preserved, at that time descending into hell.[4] Nor does this suffice, unless it was at that time joined to him hypostatically: because a part is not to be attributed to the person in naming[5] for a time for which it is not a part of the person: since then every body would be perpetual by reason of its matter, and every man by reason of his soul would live after death just

dicunt quod est impossibile de vi vocis quod Christus fuit mortuus aut sepultus vel quod descendit ad inferos: sed sic intelligitur: corpus, quod quondam fuit Christi, sepultum est, et anima, que quondam fuit Christi, descendit ad inferos, sed non Christus,[10] cum tunc non fuit ita quod Christus est.[10]

as before. This is denied by those to whom it does not make sense[6] that Christ lived humanly in the said three days: hence they say that "Christ was dead," or "buried," or "descended into hell" is impossible by the force of the words; but it is understood thus: the body that was once Christ's was buried, and the soul that was once Christ's descended into hell, but not Christ, since then it was not so that Christ is.

¶4 29.25–30.22

[29]Sed revera ista ficticia superaddit perfidiam Iudeorum. Nam turba Iudaica Ioh. 12. dixit Iesu: 'nos audivimus ex lege quod Christus manet in eternum': quia Iesaie[11] 9° scribitur: 'super solium David et super regnum eius sedebit, ut confirmet illud et corroboret a modo[12] et usque in sempiternum,' id est, a tempore quo 'puer natus est nobis.' Probatur sic. Iesus natus est rex humanitus, ut patet Ioh. 18[13] 'Tu dicis quia rex sum ego: nam ego[14] in hoc natus sum.' Cum ergo per mortem non fuit intercisio regni sui, cum fuit spirituale [30]a corpore independens; ergo mansit perpetuo. Confirmatur: quia Daniel 7 scribitur de humanitate Christi: 'potestas eius eterna que non auferetur,[1] et regnum eius quod non corrumpetur.' Non ergo potest ille Dominus eciam[2] secundum humanitatem perdere regnum suum: quia Michee 4^to. dicitur, 'regnabit super eos ex hoc[3] nunc et usque in seculum.' Et patet[4] ex hoc quod non est[5] alia regnacio hominis interioris[5] in Christo nisi que est[6] regnacio Christi Dei: sed anima regnavit a principio sue creacionis continue: ergo Christus. Non enim dictus rex Israel secundum humanitatem ut corporaliter regnet sed spiritualiter super illos: ut exponit Augustinus Ome. 50[7] exponens illud[7] Ioh. 12 'Benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini, rex Israel.' 'Non enim,[8] inquit Augustinus, rex Israel fuit Christus ad exigendum tributum vel ferro exercitum armandum hostesque[9] visibiliter debellandos; sed rex Israel, quod mentes regat, quod in eternum consulat, quod in regnum celorum credentes sperantes amantesque perducat.' Cum ergo illa[10] potestas spiritualis, existens subiective in anima independenter[11] a corpore, non fuit spoliata ab anima Christi in morte; videtur quod eciam[12] in morte fuit humanitas vel spiritus[13] Christi rex Israel[14] sicut ante.

But in truth this fiction outdoes the faithlessness of the Jews.[7] For the Jewish crowd, John 12, said to Jesus: "We have heard out of the law that Christ abideth for ever": because in Isaiah 9 it is written: "he shall sit upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom; to establish it and strengthen it from henceforth and for ever,"[8] that is, from the time at which "a child is born to us." It is proved thus. Jesus was born a king humanly, as is clear from John 18: "Thou sayest that I am a king: for I was born for this."[9] Since therefore through death there was no interruption of his kingdom, since it was spiritual, [30]independent of the body, therefore it remained perpetually. This is confirmed: for in Daniel 7 it is written of the humanity of Christ: "his power is eternal, which shall not be taken away: and his kingdom that shall not be destroyed." Therefore that Lord cannot, even as to the humanity, lose his kingdom: for in Micah 4 it is said, "he will reign over them from this time now and for ever."[10] And it is clear from this that there is no other reigning of the inner man in Christ but that which is the reigning of Christ God: now the soul reigned continuously from the beginning of its creation: therefore Christ [reigned]. For he is not called king of Israel as to the humanity so that he reigns bodily, but [so that he reigns] spiritually over them: as Augustine expounds in Homily 50,[11] expounding that [text] of John 12, "Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord, the king of Israel." "For Christ," says Augustine, "was not king of Israel for exacting tribute, or arming an army with the sword and subduing enemies visibly; but king of Israel because he rules minds, because he counsels for eternity, because he leads into the kingdom of heaven those who believe, hope and love." Since therefore that spiritual power, existing in the soul as in its subject[12] independently of the body, was not stripped from the soul of Christ in death, it seems that even in death the humanity or spirit of Christ was king of Israel as before.

¶5 30.23–31.1

[30]Unde et illud Psi. 23 'attollite portas etc.'[15] exponitur a beato Augustino et Ieronimo de anima Christi descendente ad inferos: ac si angeli preconizantes[16] Christi[17] descensum[18] ad inferos dicerent

Hence also that [verse] of Psalm 23, "Lift up your gates etc.," is expounded by blessed Augustine and Jerome of the soul of Christ descending into

principibus tenebrarum; 'O principes mundanorum! attollite[19] portas vestras, et introibit rex glorie cum captivitate ducta ab inferis, portas aperiens[20] eternales.' Et sic in scripturis dirigitur liberacio patrum ab inferis ad personam Christi, quod ipse humanitus immediate ipsam perficeret.[21] Ut Luce 1°. 'Illuminare his[22] qui in tenebris et in umbra mortis sedent.' Quod,[23] cum sequitur de [31]virtute sermonis ex dicto principio, est catholice concedendum.

hell:[13] as if the angels, heralding Christ's descent into hell, said to the princes of darkness: "O princes of worldly men! lift up your gates, and the king of glory shall enter in with the captivity led out of hell, opening the eternal gates." And so in the scriptures the delivering of the fathers from hell is directed to the person of Christ, [meaning] that he himself, humanly and without intermediary, would accomplish it.[14] As in Luke 1: "To enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death." Which, since it follows [31]in the proper sense of the words from the said principle, is to be granted catholicly.

¶6 31.3–32.2

[31]Item nemo sapiens et plene potens incipit opus laudabile in propria persona perficere; et, dum perfecerit[1] in propria persona rudimenta[2] operis,[3] committit suo subdito operis complementum. Cum ergo edificacio ecclesie et liberacio patrum[4] ab inferis sit opus summe laudabile; sequitur quod Christus in propria persona non perficiet imperfectam disposicionem, et committet spiritui creato ypostatice separato belli victoriam, que est operis complementum. Indignius namque[5] est temptari a dyabolo, pati, et corporaliter disponere ad edificacionem ecclesie, quam[6] potenter spoliare Tartara[7] a dyabolo devicto. Si ergo Christus in propria persona passus fuerat et temptatus, quia in carne et[8] anima ypostatice copulata: per idem in propria persona spoliavit infernum[9] extrahendo patriarchas ab inferis, specialiter cum non reliquit unionem anime vel corporis quod assumpsit: dicente Augustino Ome. 47. 'Si enim dixerimus quod Verbum Dei posuit animam suam et iterum sumpsit eam, metuendum est, ne subintret[10] prava cogitacio et dicatur :—Ergo[11] aliquando anima illa separata est a Verbo, et aliquando Verbum illud, ex quo suscepit illam animam[12] fuit sine anima.—Video enim fuisse sine anima humana Verbum cum "in principio erat Verbum;"[13] sed ex quo "Verbum[13] caro factum est et habitavit in nobis;" et susceptus est[14] a Verbo totus homo, id est,[15] anima et caro. Quid fecit passio, quid fecit mors, nisi corpus ab anima separavit, animam vero a Verbo non separavit?' Et sequitur. 'Fidelis latronis animam[16] non deserebat? et deserebat[17] suam? Absit.' Et quia minus intelligens potest[18] ex dictis intelligere quod Verbum solum per graciam affuit illi anime et non hypostatica[19] unione [32] subdit[1] differenciam: 'latronis vero[1] animam custodivit, suam vero inseparabiliter habuit.'[2]

Again, no one who is wise and fully able begins to accomplish a praiseworthy work in his own person and, when he has accomplished the rudiments of the work in his own person, commits the completion of the work to his subordinate. Since therefore the building of the church and the delivering of the fathers from hell is a supremely praiseworthy work, it follows that Christ will not accomplish the imperfect disposing [of it] in his own person and commit to a created spirit, hypostatically separated, the victory of the battle, which is the completion of the work. For it is more unworthy to be tempted by the devil, to suffer, and bodily to dispose [things] for the building of the church, than mightily to despoil Tartarus, the devil being vanquished.[15] If therefore Christ had suffered and been tempted in his own person, because [he did so] in flesh and soul hypostatically joined, by the same token in his own person he despoiled hell by drawing the patriarchs out of hell, especially since he did not relinquish the union of the soul or of the body that he assumed: as Augustine says in Homily 47:[16] "For if we say that the Word of God laid down his soul and took it again, it is to be feared lest a wicked thought creep in and it be said: Then at some time that soul was separated from the Word, and at some time that Word, after he took up that soul, was without a soul. For I see that the Word was without a human soul when 'in the beginning was the Word'; but from the time that 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us,' and the whole man was taken up by the Word, that is, soul and flesh, what did the passion do, what did death do, but separate the body from the soul? but the soul it did not separate from the Word." And it follows: "He did not forsake the soul of the faithful thief: and did he forsake his own? Far be it." And because one of less understanding can understand from what has been said that the Word was present to that

soul only by grace and not by hypostatic union, [32]he adds the difference: "the thief's soul he guarded, but his own he held inseparably."

¶7 *32.3–32.14*

[32]Et potest illud confirmari ex hoc, quod aliter patres in limbo[3] tantum tenerentur creature, que non est Deus, spoliando[3] eos de manu dyaboli, sicut Christo secundum humanitatem: quod est impossibile. Cum ergo persone debetur accio, anima fuit tunc anima persone agentis.[4] Unde sicut anima Christi non fuit[5] spoliata gracia per mortem, et per consequens non[6] gracia unionis; sic non fuit spoliata potestate spirituali regia, caractere,[7] vel sacerdocio, quod est qualitas indelebilis secundum doctores. Unde sanctus Thomas concedit[8] quod Christus fuit sacerdos secundum animam in triduo iuxta textum Apostoli ad Hebre 8. 'Iesus autem eo quod maneat[9] in eternum sempiternum habet sacerdocium.'

And this can be confirmed from this, that otherwise the fathers in limbo would be beholden only to a creature, which is not God, for despoiling them out of the hand of the devil, as [they are beholden] to Christ as to the humanity: which is impossible.[17] Since therefore action is owed to the person, the soul was then the soul of the person acting.[18] Hence, just as the soul of Christ was not stripped of grace by death, and consequently not of the grace of union, so it was not stripped of the spiritual royal power, the character, or the priesthood, which is an indelible quality according to the doctors. Hence saint Thomas grants that Christ was a priest as to the soul in the three days, according to the text of the Apostle to the Hebrews 8: "But Jesus, for that he continueth for ever, hath an everlasting priesthood."[19]

¶8 *32.15–32.24*

[32]Et revera non sapit[10] quod illa anima sit rex et sacerdos, nisi sit persona; quia actus huius officii sint signantissime personales. Et Doctor Subtilis vere dicit quod Christus mansit Christus in illo triduo. Sicut ergo nichil quod non est Deus sufficit genus humanum redimere, sic nichil quod non est Deus suffecit tam potenter de manu inimici patres eripere. Sed si hoc posset[11] in virtute Dei creatura ab eo ypostatice separata; per idem posset passio vel meritum cuiuscunque hominis a Deo personaliter seiuncti auctoritate Dei pro quocunque peccato hominis facere recompensam.

And in truth it makes no sense that that soul is king and priest unless it is a person; because the acts of this office are most markedly personal. And the Subtle Doctor truly says that Christ remained Christ in those three days.[20] Just as therefore nothing that is not God suffices to redeem the human race, so nothing that is not God sufficed so mightily to snatch the fathers out of the hand of the enemy. But if a creature hypostatically separated from him could do this by the power of God, by the same token the passion or merit of any man whatever, personally disjoined from God, could by the authority of God make recompense for any sin of man whatever.

Notes

1. 28.25 *de virtute sermonis*: A B read *de vi sermonis*, C *de Christo sermonis*. The print's formula is kept apart in this edition from *de vi vocis* "by the force of the words" (29.20 and below).
2. 29.2 *triplici medio*: so A B C O (*3ci*); Harris asks whether *modo* should be read for *medio* ("in a threefold way"). The print is rendered, *medium* as the middle term of an argument.
3. 29.9 *allegatur ex fide*: the verb governs *ex*, so "from faith", not the formula "as faith teaches".
4. 29.13 *servata*: A B C *incarnata* ("then it was incarnate at that time, descending into hell"). *Descendens* is in apposition: the humanity, kept in being, is what descended.
5. 29.15 *pars denominacionis*: all the manuscripts read *partis*, against the print's *pars* (Harris's), and O *denominandum* for *denominacionis*. The English keeps the print: with *partis* the gerundive *attribuenda* has no subject, so the manuscripts' text will not construe unless *denominacionis* is also changed (to *denominacio*, "the naming of a part"), which no manuscript gives; the sense is the same either way. Literally "a part of denomination": the person is not named from a part (body or soul) for a time when it is not his part.
6. 29.19 *quibus non sapit*: literally "to whom it does not savour"; so at 32.15 *non sapit*.
7. 29.25 *superaddit perfidiam Iudeorum*: literally "adds over and above to the faithlessness of the Jews". The Jews at least held that "Christ abideth for ever" (John 12:34).
8. Isa. 9:7, without the Vulgate's *in iudicio et iustitia* ("with judgment and with justice"). *A modo* is O's (*a m*˜); A B C *año*. "A child is born to us" is Isa. 9:6.
9. John 18:37: the Vulgate has no *nam* (DR "Thou sayest that I am a king. For this was I born").
10. Dan. 7:14: the Vulgate repeats *potestas* (DR "his power is an everlasting power that shall not be taken away"). Mic. 4:7: the Vulgate has *regnabit Dominus super eos in monte Sion ex hoc nunc et usque in aeternum* (DR "the Lord will reign over them in Mount Sion, from this time now and forever").
11. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 51.4, on John 12:13 (Wyclif's "Homily 50"), PL 35, 1765 (*verified*); Wyclif's number is one below the received one. Augustine has *exercitum ferro armandum* for Wyclif's *ferro exercitum armandum*.
12. 30.19 *existens subiective in anima*: the soul is the subject in which the power inheres, so the power does not depend on the body.

13. Ps. 23:7 (Hebrew 24:7). Augustine's *Enarratio* on Ps. 23 takes the verse otherwise (v. 7 of renouncing the world, v. 9 of the ascension); the descent reading is perhaps from the *Sermo* 377 printed among his doubtful works, In Ascensione Domini, PL 39, 1672, where the gates are opened twice, *portae inferorum et coeli*, and *Magnus ergo iste rex gloriae, etiam apud inferos* (Wyclif names no work). The Jerome is the pseudo-Jerome *Breviarium in Psalmos* on Ps. 23, PL 26, 887B–889A: *Vox angelorum bonorum, ad angelos malos*, and *Vox angelorum, qui cum Christo ad infernum descenderunt, ad subjectos diaboli dicunt* (*verified*); at 887D it has *cum spoliato Tartaro, reduxit secum multitudinem captivorum*, cf. 31.12 *spoliare Tartara*. The angels' cry is a paraphrase built on the verse, not its text.
14. 30.30 *immediate*: without an intermediary, not "at once": the work is the person's own, not a created agent's (the argument of the next paragraph). Luke 1:79 follows.
15. 31.12 *spoliare Tartara a dyabolo devicto*: taken as an ablative absolute; it may also be "to wrest Tartarus from the vanquished devil". A B C read *creaturam* for *Tartara*.
16. Augustine, *In Ioh. tract.* 47.10, on John 10:18 ("I have power to lay it down: and I have power to take it up again"), PL 35, 1738 (*verified*); the last clause is Wyclif's paraphrase of *illius ut Dominus custodivit, suam vero inseparabiliter habuit*. Within it, John 1:1 and 1:14.
17. 32 *tantum tenerentur creature … spoliando*: Harris marks the place *locus corruptus* and queries *tenerentur, tantum creatura … spoliante* ("would be beholden, a creature only … despoiling them"). The print is rendered; the sense is the same.
18. 32.7 *anima persone agentis*: A B C *persona agens* ("the soul was then the person acting"), which the next paragraph's argument (*nisi sit persona*) treats as absurd.
19. Saint Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* III d. 22 q. 1 a. 1 ad 4: *illud sacerdotium est etiam animae Christi separatae a corpore* (*verified*). In the same article Thomas holds that Christ was not a man in the three days. Thomas concludes against Wyclif's thesis; Wyclif takes only a concession from him. The text is Heb. 7:24 (Wyclif "8"); the Vulgate has *hic* for *Iesus* (DR "But this"). *Maneat* is the Vulgate's; A B C *manet*.
20. The Subtle Doctor is Duns Scotus; *Ordinatio* III d. 22 q. un. Scotus holds that Christ was not a man in the three days, but to the argument *Christus in triduo fuit Christus: igitur … homo* he answers *nego consequentiam*, letting the antecedent stand (*verified*). Scotus too concludes against Wyclif's thesis; Wyclif takes only the concession.
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 29: *intelligitur:* (print as transcribed (in | telligitur across MS-fold marker)) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Thus, as Augustine says, ‘ (28.1); reference 1 Cor. xv. 53. (28.4); reference Mic. iv. 7. (30.5); reference John xii. 13. (30.12); reference Ps. xxiv. (30.23); reference Luke i. 79. (30.31); reference Johni. h. (31.23); reference Ps. lxviii. 18. (32.27).

Part 2: The threefold descent and the despoiling of hell

Harris pp. 32.25–36.14

¶1 32.25–33.6

[32]Unde videtur michi scripturas insolubiles appropriate[12] tribuere persone Christi descensum[13] ad inferos et spoliacionem fidelium de potencia inimici. Nam Psalmo 67 dicitur ad litteram[14] de Christo dividente spolia ‘Ascendisti[14] in altum’ sed prius ‘cepisti captivitatem,’ et 3°. ‘dedisti dona hominibus.’ Cui[15] sensui alludit Apostolus ad Ephes. 4. [33]‘Ascendens,[1] inquit, Christus in altum,[2] captivam duxit captivitatem.’ Et sequitur: ‘quod autem ascendit, quid[3] est, nisi quia descendit primum ad partes inferiores terre?’ Et ut ostenderet nobis quod eadem sit persona, que hec cuncta perficiat, subiungit: ‘qui descendit ipse est et qui ascendit super omnes celos ut impleret omnia.’

Hence it seems to me that the scriptures, which cannot be loosed,[1] appropriately attribute to the person of Christ the descent into hell and the despoiling of the faithful out of the power[2] of the enemy. For in Psalm 67 it is said literally of Christ dividing the spoils, "Thou hast ascended on high," but first "thou hast led captivity captive," and third "thou hast given gifts to men."[3] To this sense the Apostle alludes in Ephesians 4: [33] "Christ ascending on high," he says, "led captivity captive." And it follows: "Now that he ascended, what is it, but because he descended first into the lower parts of the earth?" And to show us that it is the same person who accomplishes all these things, he adds: "He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things."[4]

¶2 33.7–33.16

[33]Ex istis verbis Apostoli patet primo quod loquitur de Christo secundum humanitatem, secundum quam solum ascendere et descendere sibi conveniunt.[4] 2°. probat illum hominem esse Deum, cum post ascensionem dedit spiritualia dona hominibus mittendo eis Spiritum Sanctum, ut testatur utrumque testamentum et rei eventus

From these words of the Apostle it is clear, first, that he speaks of Christ as to the humanity, as to which alone ascending and descending belong to him. Second, he proves that that man is God, since after the ascension he gave spiritual gifts to men by sending them the Holy Spirit, as both testaments testify and the outcome of the matter had proved in effect.

probaverat in effectu. 3°. intendit quod eadem persona secundum humanitatem eandem descendit et[5] taliter[5] ascendit. 'Qui descendit, inquit, ipse et non alius ascendit,' racionem autem subiungit 'ut impleret omnia.'

Third, he maintains that the same person, as to the same humanity, descended and in such a way ascended. "He that descended," he says, "is himself, and not another, that ascended"; and he adds the reason, "that he might fill all things."

¶3 33.17–34.13

[33]Cum enim tres sint[6] regiones mundi notabiles,[7] in quibus oportuit Christum humanitus possessionem accipere vel sesinam,[8] scilicet celestium, terrestrium, et infernorum; proporcionaliter[9] descendit tripliciter benefaciens et repetens omagium de[10] subiectis. Primo descendit per inanicionem secundum infirmitatem carnis, et[11] eum mundus infirmus sibi similis in carne[11] et anima eciam genus proprium non cognovit. 2°. Descendit ad patres in limbo qui erant tantum[12] in spiritu post triumphum sed proporcionaliter in anima,[12] et indubie fuit in illo triduo in sinu Abrahe per 36 horas, quibus passio[13] continuata fuerat, non parva exaltacio capite coniuncto membris cum multitudine angelorum. Sicut enim sexto die creatum est genus humanum,[14] sic sexto senario, qui est numerus perfectus ex ductu eius in se circulariter, [34]fuerat recreatum; ut[1] per tantum tempus clarere[2] posset veritas et excludi[3] ficticia mortis Chrsti. Resurrexit autem, ut confortaret ecclesiam de fide resurreccionis future, ut patet ad Cor. 15;[4] et ut 'primatum teneat' ut abbas ordinis Christiani aperiendo[5] patribus complete purgatis ianuam eternalem. Tempus autem continens purum integrum diem et duas seminoctes significat quod simpla mors Christi,[6] que integraliter fuit lucida proporcionaliter ad vitam, fuit medium sufficiens ad nostram duplicem mortem semiplenam. Tercius vero[7] fuit descensus[8] corporis in sepulchro,[9] qui nedum ostendit corpus vere mortuum anima ab eo[10] elongata, sed per omnia factus nobis consimilis sanctificavit subterraneas requies beandorum.

For since there are three notable regions of the world in which Christ had humanly to take possession or seisin, namely [the regions] of the heavenly, the earthly and the infernal, proportionally he descended in three ways, doing good and claiming homage from his subjects.[5] First he descended by emptying, according to the weakness of the flesh, and the weak world, like him in flesh and soul, even his own kind, did not know him.[6] Second, he descended to the fathers in limbo, who were only in spirit after the triumph but proportionally in soul;[7] and without doubt he was in those three days in the bosom of Abraham for 36 hours, through which the passion had continued,[8] no small exaltation, the head joined to the members, with a multitude of angels. For just as the human race was created on the sixth day, so in the sixth senary, which is a perfect number from its being multiplied into itself circularly, [34]it was re-created;[9] so that through so long a time the truth could shine forth and the fiction of the death of Christ be excluded. And he rose again to strengthen the church in the faith of the future resurrection, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 15; and so that "he may hold the primacy,"[10] as abbot of the Christian order, opening the eternal gate to the fathers fully purged. And the time, containing one pure whole day and two half-nights, signifies that the single death of Christ, which was wholly bright in proportion to life, was a sufficient means for our double, half-full death.[11] And the third was the descent of the body into the sepulchre, which not only showed the body truly dead, the soul withdrawn from it, but, made in all things like to us, sanctified the underground resting-places of those who are to be blessed.

¶4 34.14–34.19

[34]Et correspondenter tres maneries hominum eripuit, et tres[11] dimisit. Extraxit enim, quasi mordens infernum, patriarchas prophetas et fideles alios, quorum peccata sunt plene purgata, relictis purgandis in purgatorio et dampnatis in inferno; sive sint infantes solis originalibus, si sit possibile, irretiti; sive adulti peccatis actualibus maculati.

And correspondingly he snatched out three kinds of men, and left three. For he drew out, as if biting hell,[12] the patriarchs, the prophets and other faithful whose sins were fully purged, leaving those to be purged in purgatory and the damned in hell, whether they be infants entangled in original [sins] alone, if that is possible, or adults stained with actual sins.

¶5 34.20–35.5

[34]Sed 3°. post privatam instruccionem apostolorum 40 diebus, ut patet Actuum 1°, ascendit gloriose in celum secundum utramque naturam summe beatus, ducens secum numerum insensibilem suo

But third, after the private instruction of the apostles for 40 days, as is clear from Acts 1, he ascended gloriously into heaven as to both natures,

tempore captivorum; et sic tenendo primatum multiplicem inter omnia supposita humani generis, sicut est prior vel abbas omni dignitate: iuxta illud Baptiste: 'qui post me venit ante me[12] factus est,' Ioh. 1°. sic habuit primatum resurgencium, et virtute sui solius ascendentis omnia genera hominum ad se trahentis[13] fuit primus celum intrancium. Nemo enim sufficit[14] suo imperio portas huius[15] aperire[16] nisi filius hominis,[17] qui notus hostiariis prius descenderat.[17]. Et sic indubie sicut illuminavit istas tres [35]machinas sua humanitate impletas, ita suscepit omagium[1] vel obsequium utrobique: cum secundum Apostolum ad Philipp. 2°. 'oportet quod in nomine Iesu omne[2] genu flectatur celestium, quos restituit, terrestrium, quos redemit, et infernorum,' quos spoliavit.

supremely blessed, leading with him a number of captives imperceptible in his time;[13] and so holding a manifold primacy among all the supposits of the human race, as a prior or abbot [is first] in every dignity: according to that [word] of the Baptist, "He that cometh after me was made before me," John 1,[14] so he had the primacy of those who rise again, and by the power of himself alone, ascending and drawing all kinds of men to himself, he was the first of those entering heaven. For no one suffices by his own command to open the gates of this [place] but the Son of man, who, known to the doorkeepers, had first descended.[15] And so without doubt, just as he illuminated these three [35]frames, filled with his humanity, so he received homage or obeisance in both places:[16] since according to the Apostle in Philippians 2, "it behoves that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven," whom he restored, "on earth," whom he redeemed, "and under the earth," whom he despoiled.[17]

¶6 35.6–35.29

[35]Omnia quidem hec fecit humanitas Christi. Et ideo post tantum honorem triumphalem individui humane nature prohibuit nimirum Iohannem angelus seipsum vel[3] dulia adorare, ut[4] patet Apoc. ultimo capitulo: ante quidem satis permiserant,[5] ut patet Gen. 18 et Iosue 5. Omnia quidem hec fecit idem filius hominis secundum eandem humanitatem continue[6] ypostatice copulatum: qua unione habita patet quod oportet Christum esse continue creaturam et aliquid quod prius non fuerat. Sed quid, rogo, si non homo? Ipsa ergo humanitas fecit[7] hec omnia, id est, 'in opus ministerii, in edificacionem corporis Christi,' ut dicit Apostolus ad Ephes. 4°., quia Ioh. 4°. dicitur: 'meus cibus est ut faciam voluntatem eius, qui[8] misit me, ut perficiam opus eius,' id est,[8] ut perfecte usque ad consummacionem faciam: inter que hoc videtur principium,[9] descendere ad inferna et'extrahere patres captivos in limbo, sicut ante promiserat. Et huic consonat[10] illud Zacharie[11] 9°. ubi post propheciam Messie quod veniet salvator et ipse 'pauper et ascendens super asinam et super pullum asine' alloquitur eundem Messiam in hec verba: 'Tu quoque in sanguine testamenti tui emisisti vinctos tuos de lacu in quo non est aqua.' Quod[12] exponitur ad litteram de patribus incarceratis in limbo. Et[13] idem sonat illud Osee 13. verificatum ad litteram de Messia: 'ero[14] mors tua, o mors; ero morsus tuus, inferne.'[15]

All these things indeed the humanity of Christ did. And therefore, after so great a triumphal honour of the individual of human nature, the angel, no wonder, forbade John to adore him even with dulia,[18] as is clear from the Apocalypse, the last chapter; before, indeed, they had permitted it readily enough,[19] as is clear from Genesis 18 and Joshua 5. All these things indeed the same Son of man did as to the same humanity, continuously hypostatically joined: and with that union had, it is clear that Christ must continuously be a creature and something that he had not been before. Now what, I ask, if not man? The humanity itself therefore did all these things, that is, "for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ," as the Apostle says in Ephesians 4,[20] for in John 4 it is said: "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, that I may perfect his work," that is, that I may do it perfectly unto consummation: among which this seems the beginning, to descend into hell and draw out the fathers captive in limbo, as he had promised before. And with this agrees that [word] of Zechariah 9, where, after the prophecy of the Messiah, that the saviour will come, and he "poor, and riding upon an ass, and upon the foal of an ass," he addresses the same Messiah in these words: "Thou also by the blood of thy testament hast sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein is no water."[21] Which is expounded literally of the fathers imprisoned in limbo. And that [word] of Hosea 13 sounds the same, true literally of the Messiah: "O death, I will be thy death; O hell, I will be thy bite."

¶7 35.30–36.5

[35]Qui ergo sumus,[16] ut impugnemus tenorem[17] verborum fidei vel scripture,[17] specialiter cum sanctioribus et approbatioribus [36] doctoribus visa sit illa logica[2] subtilis et de virtute sermonis verissima? [2] Pro certo per idem possemus innovando falsificare reputacione totum corpus biblie[3] scripture. Ideo expedit obstare principiis erroris[4] ne error intollerabilis[5] consequatur.

Who then are we, that we should impugn the tenor of the words of the faith or of scripture, especially since to holier and more approved [36]doctors that logic has seemed subtle and most true in the proper sense of the words?[22] For certain, by the same token we could, by innovating, falsify in [men's] estimation the whole body of the scripture of the Bible. Therefore it is expedient to withstand the beginnings of error, lest an intolerable error follow.[23]

¶8 36.6–36.14

[36]Item iuxta sic loquentes sequitur quod Christus bis factus fuit homo, bis eciam incarnatus. Nam semel fuit incarnatus et humiliatus[6] in utero virginis et in morte desiit[7] esse homo et caro, et post pro instanti[8] resurreccionis incepit esse homo corporeus: ergo conclusio. Si enim[9] homo pro quacunque modica[10] morula reticens post loquelam reloquatur,[11] bis loquitur; multo evidencius persona, que 33 annis[12] est homo et post per[13] intercisum triduum non est homo ac tercio post est homo, bis evidenter est homo.

Again, according to those who speak thus, it follows that Christ was made man twice, twice also incarnate. For once he was incarnate and humbled in the womb of the virgin, and in death he ceased to be man and flesh, and afterwards, at the instant of the resurrection, he began to be a bodily man: therefore the conclusion. For if a man, keeping silent after speech for however small a pause, speaks again, he speaks twice; much more evidently a person who for 33 years is a man, and afterwards for an interrupted three days is not a man, and third, afterwards, is a man, is evidently twice a man.

Notes

1. 32.25 *scripturas insolubiles*: "the scriptures, which cannot be loosed" (cf. John 10:35, *non potest solvi scriptura*), not the logicians' *insolubilia*.
2. 32.27 *potencia inimici*: the enemy's might, so "power", not "potency".
3. Ps. 67:19 (Hebrew 68:18): the Vulgate has *accepisti dona in hominibus* (DR "thou hast received gifts in men"); Wyclif's *dedisti dona hominibus* follows Eph. 4:8 *dedit dona hominibus*.
4. Eph. 4:8–10. Wyclif adds *Christus*; Harris prints *Ascendens* with O and the Vulgate, A B C *ascendit*. In 4:9 he lacks the Vulgate's *et* ("also") and reads *ad partes inferiores* for *in inferiores partes*. The words quoted in the next paragraph, *ipse et non alius ascendit*, paraphrase 4:10.
5. 33.20 *proporcionaliter descendit tripliciter*: the three descents answer to the three regions (cf. Phil. 2:10, quoted at 35.3–5). *Repetens omagium* is the lord's claim on his tenants, with *sesinam* above.
6. *et eum mundus infirmus sibi similis in carne et anima eciam genus proprium non cognovit*: *genus proprium* is taken in apposition to *mundus* (cf. John 1:10–11). A B C read *et tunc eum mundus infernus similis in carne*.
7. *qui erant tantum in spiritu post triumphum sed proporcionaliter in anima*: the print hardly construes. O omits *tamen post triumphum*; Harris asks whether to read *qui erant tunc tantum in spiritu sed post triumphum proporcionaliter in anima* ("who were then only in spirit, but after the triumph proportionally in soul"). The print is rendered.
8. 33.27 *passio*: A B C *possessio* ("the possession had continued").
9. 33.30 *sexto senario*: the sixth six, the 36 hours. Six is a perfect number, and its square, 36, ends again in 6 (multiplied "circularly").
10. Col. 1:18.
11. The single death of Christ set against our double death (of body and of soul) is Augustine's, *De Trinitate* IV.3.5–6, PL 42, 889–891, *Huic ergo duplae morti nostrae Salvator noster impendit simplam suam*; the thirty-six hours and the squared *senarius* are IV.6.10, PL 42, 895, *triginta sex horae sunt, qui est quadratus senarius* (*verified*).
12. 34.15 *quasi mordens infernum*: after Hos. 13:14, "O hell, I will be thy bite" (quoted at the end of the next paragraph but one).
13. 34.23 *numerum insensibilem suo tempore captivorum*: "imperceptible in his time", that is, the captives were not seen to ascend with him; or "a number past perceiving".
14. John 1:30 (cf. 1:15): the Vulgate reads *post me venit vir qui ante me factus est* (DR "After me there cometh a man, who is preferred before me").
15. 34.31 *notus hostiariis*: O *notis hostiariis*; A B C *hostiarius prius descenderet* ("unless the Son of man, as doorkeeper, first descend").
16. 35.1–2 *machinas … utrobique*: the "frames" are the three regions of the world (*machina mundi*). *Utrobique* "in both places" stands, though three are named.
17. Phil. 2:10, with *oportet quod* added ("it behoves that"); the three relative clauses are Wyclif's.
18. *Dulia*: the veneration due to a creature, below *latria*, due to God alone. Rev. 22:9: "See thou do it not … Adore God."
19. *permiserant*: so Harris (*sc. angeli*, the angels); A B C *permiserat*, O *promisserant*. The angels received adoration at Gen. 18:2 and Josh. 5:15.
20. Eph. 4:12: *in opus ministerii* (the DR text used here prints "for the word of the ministry"; the Vulgate's *opus* is "work").

21. Zech. 9:9, 9:11. Wyclif reads *super pullum asine* for the Vulgate's *super pullum filium asinae* (DR "upon a colt, the foal of an ass").
22. 36.1 *illa logica subtilis et de virtute sermonis verissima*: A B C read *lingua subtilis et de vi verbi sit vera* ("the language [is] subtle and true by the force of the word"). *Approbatioribus*: A B C *approbatis*, O *approbatoribus*.
23. *Obstare principiis*: Ovid, *Remedia amoris* 91 (*principiis obsta*), *Principiis obsta; sero medicina paratur*, proverbial (*verified*).
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Ps. lxviii. 18. (32.27); reference Eph. iv. 8-10. (33.1); reference Jonn1, n* (33.24); reference l Cor. xv. 12. (34.4); reference Johni. 30. (34.26); reference Rev. xxii. 9. thereby exalled (35.8); reference Gen. xviii. 2. Josh. v. 14. . . (35.10); reference Hos. xiii. 14. (35.28); reference John iii. 6. (36.27).

Part 3: Against a second incarnation: the pierced side and the bride

Harris pp. 36.15–40.15

¶1 36.15–37.4

[36]Sed consequens videtur[14] falsum tripliciter.[15] Primo ex hoc quod tunc resurreccio Christi foret eius nativitas vel generacio. Et sic Christus haberet triplicem nativitatem et generacionem multiplicem: nativitatem unam eternam et duas alias temporales.[16] Nam generacio Christi prima[17] in utero ideo est generacio quia est produccio a non esse hominem ad esse hominem. Cum ergo sic sit pro instanti[18] resurreccionis, sequitur quod illa sit generacio, et per idem nativitas ex[19] sepulcro, sicut foret posito quod semen virginis esset per se positum[20] in sepulcro, et[21] successive vel subito lineatum,[22] ac creata anima copulata.[22] Nec est locus nativitati corporali pertinens, nisi forte racione conservacionis, sicut nec est pertinens nativitati ex spiritu, de qua Ioh. 3°., sed utrobique habita generacione renati consequitur proporcionaliter[23] [37]nativitas. Oportet ergo ad resurreccionem persone quod eadem persona, que cecidit sopore mortis sive[1] intercisione humanitatis, resurgat; cum spiritus racionalis persone[2] sit humanitas et sic homo.

But the consequent seems false in three ways. First from this, that then the resurrection of Christ would be his nativity or generation. And so Christ would have a threefold nativity and a manifold generation: one nativity eternal and two others temporal. For the first generation of Christ, in the womb, is a generation for this reason, that it is a production from not being a man to being a man. Since therefore it is so at the instant of the resurrection, it follows that that is a generation, and by the same token a nativity out of the sepulchre, as it would be if it were posited that the seed of the virgin had been placed by itself in the sepulchre, and successively or suddenly given its lineaments, and a created soul joined [to it].[1] Nor is place relevant to bodily nativity, except perhaps by reason of preservation, just as it is not relevant to the nativity from the spirit, of which John 3 [speaks]; but on both sides, once the generation is had, the nativity of the one reborn follows proportionally.[2] [37]It is necessary therefore, for the resurrection of a person, that the same person who fell in the sleep of death, or by the interruption of the humanity, rise again; since the rational spirit of the person is the humanity and so man.[3]

¶2 37.5–37.19

[37]Secundo obicitur contra dictum consequens per hoc, quod mundus per mortem Christi esset quantumlibet imperfectus: quod est impossible, cum illa fuit mors iustissima preciosissima et utilissima perficiens[3] totum mundum: et consequencia probatur. Christus, in quantum homo, est pars mundi, ut patet eciam modernis loquentibus, qui concedunt Christum, in quantum homo est, esse creaturam: et mundus est universitas creaturarum. Cum ergo Christum esse hominem plus perficit mundum quam totum usque[4] celum vel quecunque alia pars mundi; videtur quod, hoc ablato, plus proporcionaliter imperficitur ille mundus: quod est impossibile; cum tanta perfeccio, quanta ad humanitatem Christi attinet, servatur in

Second, it is objected against the said consequent by this, that the world through the death of Christ would be imperfect to any degree you please:[4] which is impossible, since that was a most just, most precious and most useful death, perfecting the whole world: and the inference is proved. Christ, insofar as man, is a part of the world, as is clear even to modern speakers, who grant "Christ, insofar as he is man, is a creature": and the world is the totality of creatures. Since therefore "Christ is man" perfects the world more than even the whole heaven[5] or any other part of the world whatever, it seems that, this being taken away, that world is made proportionally more imperfect: which is impossible, since as much perfection as pertains to the humanity of Christ is preserved in the soul

anima et corpore incorrupto. Ideo cum totum[5] sit sue partes, patet quod mansit idem homo in triduo.

¶3 37.20–39.9

[37]Tercio confirmatur illud ex[6] testimonio scripture. Nam Ioh. 19 scribitur: 'ad Iesum autem cum venissent,[7] ut[8] viderunt eum iam mortuum, non fregerunt eius[9] crura; sed unus militum lancea[10] latus eius[11] apperuit,[12] et exivit sanguis[12] et aqua: et qui vidit, inquit Iohannes, testimonium perhibuit;[13] et verum est testimonium eius.' Rogo, quomodo venissent ad Iesum mortuum,[14] nisi ille homo mortuus esset Iesus? aut quomodo miles lancea latus eius Iesu aperiret,[15] si non tunc fuerat latus Jesu? Numquid credimus quod evangelista, tam signanter asserens[16] se ista vidisse ultra omnia alia[16] gesta Christi, finxit mendacium? Et si dicatur quod littera occidit, sensus autem spiritualis et rectus vivificat, [38]cuiusmodi est talis ?—cum venissent ad illud corpus mortuum, quod non[1] potuit esse Iesus, sed[1] prius, non tunc fuit corpus Iesu; tunc unus militum, non latus eius, nec univoce latus alicuius aperuit, sed partem unius corporis mortui, quod non tunc fuit Christus vel pars eius[2]; et exivit, non sanguis redempcionis et aqua baptismatis de latere Christi, quia tunc non fuit Christus. Et sic spiritus, aqua,[3] et sanguis non sunt nec fuerunt testes humanitatis Christi, quia non simul fuerunt, sicut videtur Iohannes dicere I Ioh 4°. Nec est verum ad verba illud quod dicit Apostolus ad Ephes. 5°. quod 'Christus sic dilexit ecclesiam quod tradidit semetipsum pro illa, ut sanctificaret[4] mundans eam lavacro aque in verbo vite;' cum ecclesia per totum triduum fuit cum sponso vel capite Christo.[5] Nec est illud Apostoli ad Ephes 5°. verum ad verba, quando illud Gen. 2.[6] dictum[7] ad sensum litteralem de primo Adam et de uxore[7] sua, exponit ad sensum misticum de Christo et ecclesia: 'hoc, inquit textus, nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro de carne mea: propter hoc relinquet[8] homo patrem et matrem suam et adherebit uxori sue, et erunt duo in carne una.' 'Sacramentum,[8] inquit Apostolus, hoc magnum est: ego autem dico in Christo et in ecclesia.' Illa autem exposicio Apostoli est impossibilis, scilicet quod,[9] sicut ex costa Adam resoluti[10] in soporem[11] edificata est sponsa eius secundum membra ossea solida et tenera, sic ex apertura[12] lateris secundi Adami edificata est ecclesia sponsa Christi secundum varietatem[13] membrorum ecclesie. Nec reliquit[14] Christus Patrem semetipsum[15] exinaniendo[16] et exeundo a[17] Patre, ut dicitur Ioh. 16°.; et 'matrem synagogam in qua natus' est Isa. 50;[18] et adherebit uxori sue scilicet ecclesie, ut dicitur Osee 2°. Nec erant duo coniugata in eadem natura communi tam secundum carnem[19] quam [39]spiritum ac[1] affeccione tam sensitiva quam intellectiva concordes; ut exponit Augustinus et alii sequentes Apostolum. Sed quelibet

and in the incorrupt body. Therefore, since the whole is its parts, it is clear that he remained the same man in the three days.

Third, this is confirmed from the testimony of scripture. For in John 19 it is written: "But after they were come to Jesus, and saw that he was already dead, they did not break his legs. But one of the soldiers with a spear opened his side: and there came out blood and water. And he that saw it," says John, "hath given testimony: and his testimony is true."[6] I ask, how would they have come to Jesus dead, unless that dead man was Jesus? Or how would the soldier with a spear have opened his side, Jesus' side, if it was not then the side of Jesus? Do we believe that the evangelist, so markedly asserting that he saw these things beyond all the other deeds of Christ, made up a lie? And if it is said that the letter kills, but the spiritual and right sense quickens,[7] [38]of what sort is such [a sense]? — "When they were come to that dead body, which could not be Jesus, but before, not then, was the body of Jesus,[8] then one of the soldiers opened, not his side, nor univocally the side of anyone, but a part of one dead body, which was not then Christ or a part of him; and there came out, not the blood of redemption and the water of baptism from the side of Christ, since then it was not Christ." And so the spirit, the water and the blood are not and were not witnesses of the humanity of Christ, since they were not together, as John seems to say, 1 John 4.[9] Nor is that which the Apostle says in Ephesians 5 true to the words, that "Christ so loved the church that he delivered himself up for it: that he might sanctify, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life";[10] since the church through the whole three days was with [her] bridegroom or head, Christ. Nor is that [word] of the Apostle in Ephesians 5 true to the words, when he expounds that [word] of Genesis 2, said in the literal sense of the first Adam and his wife, in the mystical sense of Christ and the church: "This now," says the text, "is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: for this cause shall a man leave his father and mother: and shall cleave to his wife. And they shall be two in one flesh." "This," says the Apostle, "is a great sacrament:[11] but I speak in Christ and in the church." And that exposition of the Apostle is impossible,[12] namely that, as from the rib of Adam, dissolved in sleep, his bride was built according to the bony members, solid and tender, so from the opening of the side of the second Adam the church, the bride of Christ, was built according to the variety of the members of the church. Nor did Christ leave the Father, emptying himself and going out from the Father,

illarum particularum est impossibilis de vi vocis cum Christus non passus est mortem in cruce; quia pro[2] instanti mortis Christus non est Christus, nec fuit illud sacramentum in Christo et ecclesia: cum pro toto triduo non fuit Christus, sed sponsa exspectavit usque ad instans resurreccionis sponsalia. Deliramenta sunt ista et verbis puerorum similia.[3]

as is said in John 16; and "his mother the synagogue, in which he was born," Isaiah 50;[13] and [nor] will he cleave to his wife, namely the church, as is said in Hosea 2. Nor were the two joined in wedlock in the same common nature, as to the flesh as well as [39]the spirit, and concordant in affection both sensitive and intellective, as Augustine and others following the Apostle expound.[14] But each of those clauses is impossible by the force of the words, since Christ did not suffer death on the cross; for at the instant of death Christ is not Christ; nor was that sacrament in Christ and the church, since for the whole three days there was no Christ, but the bride waited for the espousals until the instant of the resurrection.[15] These are ravings, and like the words of children.

¶4 39.10–39.21

[39]Unde omnes moderniores doctores, quorum scripta memini me legisse, dicunt concorditer quod in triduo corpus illud fuit corpus Christi sicut et anima fuit tunc anima Christi: quia manentibus extremis unionis[4] Verbi ad naturam assumptam, manet eadem unio. Unde dicunt, quod est synecdochica[5] locucio, sepelierunt Iesum, id est, corpus Iesu. Sed[6] ego non video, quomodo foret tunc corpus Iesu,[6] nisi Iesus tunc foret Iesus corporeus, habens omnes partes illius corporis partes suas, iuxta illam[7] Veritatis vocem Mt 26°. 'mittens hec unguentum[8] hoc in corpus meum ad sepeliendum me fecit.' Pro certo ego credo quod ipse Christus sicut et[9] quelibet pars corporis sui sepultus est.

Hence all the more modern doctors whose writings I remember having read say concordantly that in the three days that body was the body of Christ, just as the soul also was then the soul of Christ: because, while the extremes of the union of the Word to the assumed nature remain, the same union remains. Hence they say that "they buried Jesus," that is, the body of Jesus, is a synecdochic locution.[16] But I do not see how it would then be the body of Jesus, unless Jesus then were a bodily Jesus, having all the parts of that body as his parts, according to that voice of the Truth, Matthew 26: "She in pouring this ointment on my body hath done it for my burial."[17] For certain I believe that Christ himself, as well as every part of his body, was buried.

¶5 39.22–40.15

[39]Ideo hoc[10] concedo cum istis doctoribus in prima parte, cum sit de fide, et concedo de summa virtute sermonis Christum iacuisse in sepulcro; cum illud corpus mortuum fuit persona[11] Verbi: non quod[12] quelibet pars quantitativa illius corporis generaretur[13] pro instanti mortis, sic quod Christus tunc generaretur assumendo novam naturam: sed manens continue idem[14] corpus prius vivum et[15] post mortuum subiectum est perpetuo[16] eidem ypostatice unioni. Nam per totum triduum Christus mansit homo tam secundum corpus quam secundum[17] animam; et vere passus est mortem pro [40]instanti separacionis; cum caro mortua, que tunc[1] fuit Christus, passa est privacionem vite: et vere de latere Christi exierunt aqua et sanguis Christi pro mora exitus; quia Christus pro toto triduo est idem corpus mortuum, cuius sanguine et spiritibus effluentibus, ut anima naturaliter separetur, reservata est miraculose subtilior pars sanguinis cum ichore[2] ad sponsalia celebranda inter sponsum viventem gloriose in triduo post triumphum et corpus suum misticum, quod est

Therefore I grant this with these doctors in the first part, since it is of faith; and I grant in the fullest proper sense of the words that Christ lay in the sepulchre, since that dead body was the person of the Word:[18] not that every quantitative part of that body was generated at the instant of death, so that Christ was then generated by assuming a new nature, but, remaining continuously the same body, before living and afterwards dead, it is subject perpetually to the same hypostatic union. For through the whole three days Christ remained man, as to the body as well as as to the soul; and he truly suffered death at the [40]instant of separation, since the dead flesh, which then was Christ, suffered privation of life; and truly from the side of Christ there came out water and blood of Christ, for the duration of its issuing;[19] for Christ for the whole three days is the same dead body, from which, as its blood and spirits flowed out so that the soul might naturally be separated, the subtler part of the blood was miraculously reserved, with

ecclesia. Nam Isae 11°.[3] scribitur: 'radix Iesse[4] in signum populorum, ipsum gentes deprecabuntur; erit sepulcrum eius gloriosum.' Et sic intelliguntur alie scripture de Christo ad litteram tam novi quam veteris testamenti. Oportet enim interpretari[5] scripturas de Christi humanitate secundum sensum, quem in eis sancti doctores sunt sedule scrutati.

the ichor,[20] for celebrating the espousals between the bridegroom, living gloriously in the three days after the triumph, and his mystical body, which is the church. For in Isaiah 11 it is written: "The root of Jesse for an ensign of the people, him the Gentiles shall beseech, and his sepulchre shall be glorious."[21] And so the other scriptures of both the new and the old testament are understood literally of Christ. For the scriptures must be fulfilled concerning Christ's humanity according to the sense which the holy doctors have diligently searched out in them.[22]

Notes

1. 36.24 *lineatum*: A reads *creatum* (*lineatum* in the margin), B *creatum*, C *lineatum*; A and C double *anima*. *Lineatum*: given its lineaments, formed in outline.
2. 36.27–28 *utrobique habita generacione renati*: *renati* is taken with *nativitas* ("the nativity of the one reborn"); it may hang on *generacione* ("once the generation of the one reborn is had"). *Utrobique*: bodily and spiritual birth (John 3:6).
3. 37.3 *spiritus racionalis persone*: O reads *species racionalis per se*. *Sive* above: A B C *sine* ("without interruption of the humanity").
4. 37.6 *quantumlibet imperfectus*: "imperfect to any degree you please": losing Christ's manhood would cost the world more than losing the whole heaven (below).
5. 37.13 *totum usque celum*: *usque* is taken as intensive ("even"); A B C omit it.
6. John 19:33–35, without the Vulgate's *continuo* ("immediately"), and with *inquit Iohannes* added. **T.** *et* (37.21), with A B C O, against the print's *ut* ("when"), which is the Vulgate's: "and saw". The source backs Harris, but the "majority backed by the source" clause weighs a split; here all four agree and *et* construes, so they win. Wyclif may have quoted from memory or from a text with *et*.
7. 2 Cor. 3:6: "the letter killeth: but the spirit quickeneth."
8. 38 *quod non potuit esse Iesus, sed*: om. A B C.
9. 1 John 5:8 (Wyclif "4"): "there are three that give testimony on earth: the spirit and the water and the blood. And these three are one." On the moderns' view the three were never together.
10. Eph. 5:25–26: the Vulgate has *sicut et Christus dilexit ecclesiam et seipsum tradidit pro ea, ut illam sanctificaret* (DR "as Christ also loved the church and delivered himself up for it: That he might sanctify it"). A B C add *eam* after *sanctificaret*.
11. *Sacramentum*: "sacrament" in the Augustinian sense, a mystery (Eph. 5:32). Gen. 2:23–24 is quoted in the form of Eph. 5:31 (*propter hoc*).
12. *est impossibilis*: impossible on the moderns' position; this paragraph sets out its consequences, as again at 39.3 (*quelibet illarum particularum*).
13. John 16:28: "I came forth from the Father." "His mother the synagogue, in which he was born" is not the text of Isaiah (50:1 speaks of "the bill of the divorce of your mother"); A B C cite *Isa. 7*. The phrase is Augustine's, *In Ioh. tract.* 9.10, PL 35, 1462, *Relinquendo synagogam Judaeorum, de qua secundum carnem natus est* (*verified*); the Isaiah reference perhaps points to the mother of Isa. 50:1. Hosea 2:19: "I will espouse thee to me for ever."
14. Augustine on Gen. 2:24 and Eph. 5:31–32 (Christ leaving the Father and the synagogue his mother), *In Ioh. tract.* 9.10, PL 35, 1462: *Reliquit Patrem, quia … semetipsum exinanivit*; *Relinquendo synagogam Judaeorum … et inhaerendo Ecclesiae*; *Dormit Adam ut fiat Eva: moritur Christus ut fiat Ecclesia* (*verified*).
15. 39.3–5 *cum Christus non passus est mortem in cruce …*: these clauses state what follows on the moderns' position, not Wyclif's assertions.
16. 39.14 *synecdochica*: Harris's correction (*pro synecdochica, i.e. per synecdochen*) of A *synochica*, B *sinodochia*, C *syndochica*, O *synodogica*: the figure that names the whole (Jesus) for the part (his body).
17. Matt. 26:12, without the Vulgate's *enim* (DR "For she"); A B C omit *hec*.
18. 39.25 *persona Verbi*: O adds *Christi*.
19. 40.3 *pro mora exitus*: "for the duration of its issuing": the water and blood were Christ's while they flowed from him.
20. 40.7 *ichore*: A B C *iecore* ("liver"), O *ycore*. *Ichor*: the watery humour of the blood.
21. Isa. 11:10, without the Vulgate's *in die illa* ("in that day") and *qui stat* ("who standeth"), which A B C add; A B C cite *Isa. 7*.
22. 40.13 *impleri*, with A B C O, against the print's *interpretari*, which is Harris's alone, against every manuscript.

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference John iii. 6. (36.27); reference Eph. v. 26. (38.10); reference Eph. v. 31, 32. (38.14); reference Gen. ii. 24. (38.15); reference Johnxvi.27. (38.28); reference Hos. ii. 16, 19. (38.30); reference Matt. xxvi. 12. (39.17); reference John xii. 35. (40.21).

Part 4: The common speech of the faithful and the body in the tomb

¶1 40.16–42.2

[40]Et si[6] obiciatur,[7] quod ista posicio, vocando 'hominem' corpus mortuum et animam separatam, sequitur sentenciam plebeiorum,[8] et per consequens est erronea, ut multa alia dicta vulgaria; dicitur quod non est color in consequencia; cum dicta vulgaria a prima veritate communitati[9] hominum inspirata non possunt in toto esse falsa. Unde Salvator Ioh. 12°. approbat turbe[10] sentenciam, que dixit: 'Nos audivimus ex lege quod Christus manet in eternum. Adhuc, inquit, modicum lumen in vobis est; ambulate dum lucem habetis, ut[11] non tenebre vos comprehendant; dum lucem habetis,[11] credite in lucem, ut filii lucis[12] sitis.' Quasi diceret[12] iuxta exposicionem beati Augustini Ome. 52. 'Verum est principium quod de Christo concipitis, scilicet quod ipse eternaliter manet humanitus cognoscendo. Sed oportet ultra procedere, quod non obest eundem hominem[13] esse mortuum corporaliter et cum hoc mente vivere. Ambulate, inquit Augustinus, attendite et totum intelligite tam moriturum[14] Christum quam [41]victurum in eternum. Cum aliquid, inquit, verum habetis, non sitis comprehensi tenebris ignorancie[1] contempnendo mortuum et occisum[2] hinc trahentem ad se omnia, et sic offendatis in lapidem offensionis et petram scandali.' Unde Ome. 78[3] super istud[4] Ioh. 14. 'non turbetur cor vestrum:[5] declarando Christum esse duplicem formam, scilicet humanitatem et deitatem, subdit de eius humanitate. 'Non, inquit, homo Christus, non dixit[6] ''Filius Dei,'' quod eciam sola caro eius in sepulcro meruit appellari?' Probat. 'Cum,[7] inquit, credimus in Dei Filium qui sepultus est, profecto et Filium Dei dicimus carnem que sola sepulta est.' Et post declarando quomodo ad verba est[8] verum, 'Pater[8] maior me est,' per hoc quod est duarum formarum utraque, ita subdit: 'Quid ergo, heretice?[9] cum Christus sit Deus et homo, loquitur ut homo; et tu calumpniaris Deo?[10] Ille in se commendat naturam humanam; et tu in illo audes deformare divinam? Infidelis, ingrate,[11] nonne tu minuis eum qui te fecit, quia ille dicitur factus[12] sic[12] propter te? Equalis enim Patri est Filius per quem factus est homo; ut minor esset Patre, factus est homo; quod[13] nisi fieret, quid esset homo?[13] agnoscamus, inquit, geminam substanciam Christi: divinam[14] scilicet, qua equalis est Patri; et humanam, qua minor est Patre. Utrumque autem simul; non duo, sed unus est Christus, ne sit quaternitas non Trinitas Deus.[15] Sicut enim unus est homo, anima racionalis et caro, Christum, inquit, in omnibus istis et[16] singulis confitemur. Probat hoc. Quis est ergo, per quem factus est mundus? Christus Iesus; sed in forma Dei. Quis est sub Poncio Pilato crucifixus? Iesus Christus; sed in forma servi. Item de singulis ex quibus[17] homo constat. Quis non[18] derelictus

And if it is objected that this position, by calling a dead body and a separated soul "man", follows the teaching of the common folk, and consequently is erroneous, like many other popular sayings, the answer is that there is no colour in the inference;[1] since popular sayings inspired by the first truth in the community of men cannot be wholly false. Hence the Saviour in John 12 approves the teaching of the multitude, which said: "We have heard out of the law that Christ abideth for ever. Yet a little while, he says, the light is among you. Walk whilst you have the light, that the darkness overtake you not; whilst you have the light, believe in the light, that you may be the children of light."[2] As if he said, according to the exposition of blessed Augustine, Homily 52:[3] "The principle that you conceive of Christ is true, namely that he abides eternally, knowing humanly.[4] But you must go further: that nothing prevents the same man being dead bodily and with this living in mind. Walk, says Augustine, attend, and understand the whole: Christ as much about to die as [41]about to live for ever. Since you have something true, he says, be not overtaken by the darkness of ignorance, despising the one dead and slain who from there draws all things to himself, and so stumble against the stone of stumbling and the rock of scandal."[5] Hence in Homily 78, on that [verse] of John 14, "Let not your heart be troubled",[6] making clear that Christ is a twofold form, namely the humanity and the Godhead, he adds about his humanity: "Is not, he says, the man Christ [the] 'Son of God', which even his flesh alone in the sepulchre deserved to be called?"[7] He proves it: "When, he says, we believe in the Son of God who was buried, surely we call the flesh too, which alone was buried, the Son of God." And afterwards, making clear how it is true to the words "the Father is greater than I",[8] through this, that he is each of two forms, he adds thus: "What then, heretic? Since Christ is God and man, he speaks as man; and do you slander God? He commends human nature in himself; and do you dare in him to disfigure the divine? Unbeliever, ungrateful one, do you not diminish him who made you, because he is said to have been made thus for your sake? For the Son, through whom man was made, is equal to the Father; that he might be less than the Father, he was made man; and if this were not done, what would man be? Let us acknowledge, he says, the twin substance of Christ: the divine, namely, by which he is equal to the Father; and the human, by which he is less than the Father. And both together; not two, but one is Christ, lest God be a quaternity, not a Trinity. For as man is one, rational

est in inferno? Christus [42]Iesus; sed in anima sola. Quis resurrecturus in triduo iacuit in sepulcro? Christus Iesus; sed in carne sola.'

soul and flesh, [so] we confess Christ, he says, in all these and in each.[9] He proves this. Who then is he through whom the world was made? Christ Jesus; but in the form of God. Who was crucified under Pontius Pilate? Jesus Christ; but in the form of a servant. Again, of each of the things of which man consists. Who was not left in hell? Christ [42]Jesus; but in the soul alone. Who, to rise again, lay in the sepulchre in the three days? Christ Jesus; but in the flesh alone."

¶2 42.3–42.15

[42]Hec sentencia huius sancti que, sicut non potest dissolvi, sic non cognosci, nisi viso quod Christus est trium naturarum incommunicancium quelibet. Qui ergo voluerit illam materiam[1] verissimam de virtute sermonis infringere, incipiat communicacionem persone[2] Christi multis naturis, non multis personis, ut deitas, improbare. Parcant igitur emuli huic vie quod naturali instinctu a vulgo sit cognita; quod a scriptura sacra et sanctis doctoribus sit tam assidue declarata; et quod mentes fidelium substrata sentencia non fallaci sed veridica excitat pro cura mortuorum, ut sepultura cum aliis exequiis devocius peragenda. Eadem enim persona hominis, que heri viva conversata est cum proximis, deportatur hodie mortua ad ecclesiam, et deponitur in sepulcro.

This is the teaching of this saint, which, just as it cannot be dissolved, so cannot be known, except once it is seen that Christ is each of three natures that do not communicate.[10] Whoever therefore would break down that most true matter in the proper sense of the words, let him begin by disproving the communication of the person of Christ to many natures, not to many persons, as the Godhead [is communicated].[11] Let the rivals therefore spare this way, because it is known to the common people by natural instinct; because it is so assiduously made clear by holy scripture and the holy doctors; and because, the teaching laid beneath it being not deceptive but truthful, it stirs the minds of the faithful to the care of the dead, so that burial with the other exequies is to be performed more devoutly. For the same person of a man who yesterday, living, kept company with his neighbours, is carried today dead to the church, and laid in the sepulchre.

¶3 42.16–42.27

[42]Nec oportet timere ampullosas[3] instancias sophisticas quibus nituntur istam sentenciam impugnare dicendo, quod frivolum est credere racione corporum mortuorum vel personarum sanctarum in celo Deum facere miracula: cum, ut false garriunt, non est corpus sancti mortuum,[4] nec sunt reliquie sanctorum, nec est possibile Petrum Iacobum vel Iohannem ante resurreccionem orare, sicut in letaniis[5] canit illusa ecclesia per ignoranciam logice[6] minus caute. Quicunque ergo sophista logicus[7] vel naturalis vel methaphisicus vere voluerit ista defendere vel probare, si dicta factis compensat,[8] est simul excellencior[9] philosophus et objector[10] quam Deus hucusque dignatus est sensibus mortalium propalare.[9]

Nor need one fear the bombastic sophistical objections with which they strive to attack this teaching, saying that it is frivolous to believe that God works miracles by reason of dead bodies or of holy persons in heaven: since, as they falsely prattle, there is no dead body of a saint, nor are there relics of the saints, nor is it possible that Peter, James or John pray before the resurrection, as the deluded church sings in the litanies, through ignorance of logic, too incautiously.[12] Whoever therefore, a sophist, whether logician or natural philosopher or metaphysician, would truly defend or prove these things, if he squares his deeds with his words, is at once a more excellent and a more abject philosopher than God has hitherto deigned to disclose to the senses of mortals.[13]

¶4 42.29–43.16

[42]Nec credo sophistam ad tantum desipere quod credat, si sola caro Christi fuit Christus in sepulcro et sola anima fuit Christus in inferno, quod[11] tunc sola caro vel sola anima fuit [43]Christus. Ac si sic[1] argueretur solus Petrus est homo[2] in domo ista: ergo solus

Nor do I believe that a sophist is so far foolish as to believe, if the flesh of Christ alone was Christ in the sepulchre and the soul alone was Christ in hell, that then the flesh alone or the soul alone was [43]Christ. As if it

Petrus est homo[2] alicubi tenendo quidem diccionem exclusive, sicut facit Augustinus quando dicit[3] quod nec sola caro nec sola anima fuit Christus, sed humanitas completa, que differt a parte qualitativa: patet decepcio sophistica introducta; et sicut dixi superius, quando Augustinus dicit quod pars qualitativa non est homo, exponit se ipsum quod non est completus homo, id est, natura composita[4] ex corpore et anima: et sic intelligit 17[5] de Trinitate ca. 7. exponens se ipsum quod intelligit 'hominem' ut veteres diffinierunt[6] per 'animal racionale mortale,' vel iuxta descripcionem suam 'substanciam racionalem constantem ex corpore et anima.' Et[7] per hoc distinguit inter triplicitatem naturarum in homine et trinitatem anime ac Trinitatem increatam. Affirmative itaque sue sunt concedende et negative modificande.

were argued thus: "Peter alone is a man in this house: therefore Peter alone is a man anywhere", holding the word indeed exclusively, as Augustine does when he says that neither the flesh alone nor the soul alone was Christ, but the complete humanity, which differs from a qualitative part: the sophistical deception introduced is clear.[14] And as I said above, when Augustine says that a qualitative part is not a man, he explains himself, that it is not a complete man, that is, a nature composed of body and soul: and so he understands [it in] *De Trinitate* 17, c. 7, explaining himself, that he understands "man" as the ancients defined [it], by "rational mortal animal", or according to his own definition, "a rational substance consisting of body and soul".[15] And by this he distinguishes between the threeness of natures in man and the trinity of the soul and the uncreated Trinity. His affirmatives therefore are to be granted and his negatives qualified.

¶5 *43.17–44.6*

[43]Ulterius si queratur, utrum verum sit in triduo quod hoc est corpus Christi et hec anima Christi pro nunc; dicitur[8] quod sic: cum[9] Christus vere sit tam corpus quam anima pro triduo, quo simul iacet mortuus et descendit vivus ad inferos, et sic persona viva est mortua secundum diversas naturas. Et movent me tria. Primo auctoritas scripture et exposicio beati Augustini superius recitata.[10] Secundo quod aliter non esset concedendum quod Christus sit homo per illud triduum, quod nimis invaderet fidem meam. Et tercio quod doctores tam priores sapienciores quam moderniores capaciores[11] dicunt concorditer quod Christus nichil de humana natura dimisit quod[12] assumpsit, sed mansit per triduum unitus tam carni[13] quam anime sicut ante. Cum igitur unione ypostatica, que non est per accidens unio ypostatica, fuerat antea copulatus;[14] sequitur quod per illud triduum manet tam caro quam anima sicut prius. Unde [44]dicunt loquentes nostri temporis concorditer quod sacerdos conficiens pro illo triduo conficeret dicendo verba sacramentalia corpus mortuum. Sed quomodo, queso, per verba falsissima[1] quibus diceret 'hoc est corpus meum' vere conficeret, nisi corpus confectum pro tunc fuerit corpus Christi?

Further, if it is asked whether it is true in the three days that this is the body of Christ and this the soul of Christ for now, the answer is that it is: since Christ truly is both body and soul for the three days, in which he at once lies dead and descends living into hell, and so a living person is dead as to diverse natures. And three things move me. First, the authority of scripture and the exposition of blessed Augustine recited above. Second, that otherwise it would not have to be granted that Christ is man through that three days' space, which would exceedingly assail my faith. And third, that the doctors, the earlier and wiser as much as the more modern and more capable, say in concord that Christ laid aside nothing of the human nature that he assumed, but remained through the three days united as much to the flesh as to the soul, as before.[16] Since therefore he had been joined before by a hypostatic union, which is not a hypostatic union by accident, it follows that through that three days' space he remains both flesh and soul, as before.[17] Hence [44]those who speak in our time say in concord that a priest consecrating during those three days would, by saying the sacramental words, consecrate the dead body. But how, I ask, by most false words, in which he would say "This is my body", would he truly consecrate, unless the body consecrated were at that time the body of Christ?

¶6 *44.7–44.26*

[44]Unde sanctus Thomas de Christo ca°. 50 videtur dicere[2] quod idem sit corpus Christi mortuum[3] pro illo triduo quod[4] fuit corpus Christi post et ante; et hoc racione unionis ad Verbum; licet quelibet pars quantitativa[5] illius corporis racione forme substancialis substancialiter

Hence Saint Thomas, *On Christ*, c. 50, seems to say that the dead body of Christ for those three days is the same as was the body of Christ after and before; and this by reason of the union to the Word; although each

variatur. Teneo igitur[6] primam partem huius sentencie et vario in 2ª.; cum oportet formas substanciales esse subordinatas anime, ut patet ex dictis De Anima. Nec video quin, si ad omnem punctum corporis Christi generata sit nova forma[7] substancialis preter quamcunque formam substancialem que infuit Christo vivo, foret aliud novum corpus mortuum secundum quamlibet eius partem quantitativam quam fuerat corpus vivum. Nec video 2°. quomodo illud esset tunc corpus Christi, nisi[8] tunc Christus esset Christus, et[8] esset illi novo[9] corpori nova unione ypostatice copulatus.[10] Nec video 3°. quomodo illud corpus sit mortuum, cum sit per totum noviter generatum, et nunquam antea fuit vivum. Dico ergo quod idem corpus in numero tam secundum materiam quam secundum[11] formam corporis, quod prius participative vixit, est in triduo corpus mortuum et cum hoc Christus Deus noster.

quantitative part of that body is varied substantially by reason of the substantial form.[18] I hold therefore the first part of this teaching and differ in the second; since the substantial forms must be subordinated to the soul, as is clear from what is said in *De anima*.[19] Nor do I see but that, if at every point of the body of Christ a new substantial form were generated beyond whatever substantial form was in Christ living, there would be another new dead body, as to each quantitative part of it, than the living body had been. Nor do I see, second, how that would then be the body of Christ, unless then Christ were Christ, and were joined hypostatically to that new body by a new union.[20] Nor do I see, third, how that body is dead, since it is newly generated through the whole, and never before was alive. I say therefore that the same body in number, as to the matter as much as to the form of the body, which before lived participatively, is in the three days a dead body and with this Christ our God.

Notes

1. 40.19 *non est color*: "colour" in the period sense, a plausible ground: the inference from "the common folk say it" to "it is erroneous" has none. *Sentencia* (40.17) is "teaching" throughout this chunk, a position held, not a sentence passed.
2. John 12:34–36. Wyclif runs the multitude's words (12:34) into Jesus' reply (12:35–36) with *inquit*, leaving out the Vulgate's *Dixit ergo eis Jesus* ("Jesus therefore said to them") and 12:35b ("and he that walketh in darkness knoweth not whither he goeth"); *quod* for the Vulgate's *quia*. A B C shorten 40.24–25 to *etc. et.*
3. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 52 (on John 12:31–36), given as a paraphrase, not a quotation, of 52.13, PL 35, 1774: *Ambulate, accedite, totum intelligite, et moriturum Christum, et victurum in aeternum*, with *contempsit mortuum, risit occisum* and *Cum aliquid veri auditum habetis* (*verified*). Here Wyclif's number is the received one.
4. 40.29 *manet humanitus cognoscendo*: the gerund is taken with *ipse* ("he abides, knowing humanly"); it may instead qualify the hearers' grasp of *manet* ("abides, if one understands it humanly").
5. 41.3 *trahentem ad se omnia*: John 12:32, "will draw all things to myself". 41.4: Rom. 9:33 and 1 Pet. 2:8 (Isa. 8:14), "a stumbling-stone and a rock of scandal".
6. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 78 (on John 14:28); "Let not your heart be troubled" stands at John 14:27 as well as 14:1. Wyclif quotes 78.2–3, PL 35, 1836 (*verified*).
7. 41.8 *non "Filius Dei"*, with A B C, against the print's *non dixit "Filius Dei"* (O); the print (*Non, inquit, homo Christus, non dixit "Filius Dei"* …) does not construe ("Not, he says, the man Christ, did he not say 'Son of God' …"). Augustine's own text (78.2, PL 35, 1836) reads *Neque enim homo Christus non dicitur Filius Dei*, so the print's *non dixit* is probably a corruption of *dicitur*; A B C's bare *non* is not Augustine's either, but it gives the same sense, and the English stands.
8. John 14:28, "the Father is greater than I".
9. 41.24–26 *Sicut enim unus est homo, anima racionalis et caro, Christum … confitemur*: the comparison has no second limb, because a clause was lost here by eye-skip, from the first *caro* to the second. Augustine's tractate (78.3, PL 35, 1836) reads: *Sicut enim unus est homo anima rationalis et caro, sic unus est Christus Deus et homo: ac per hoc Christus est Deus anima rationalis et caro* (*verified*). Harris's foot records no variant, so all the manuscripts seem to lack it. The clause is not supplied in the English; the bracketed "[so]" only carries the comparison, in the sense of the lost words, "so one is Christ, God and man".
10. 42.3 *Hec sentencia huius sancti que …*: the period has no main verb; "This is" is supplied, taking *hec* as the subject and *sentencia* as the predicate. The three natures are the Godhead, the soul and the body.
11. 42.7–8 *ut deitas*: the Godhead is communicated to many persons (the Trinity); Christ's person is communicated to many natures, not to many persons.
12. 42.19–23 *cum, ut false garriunt …*: the opponents' claims, with their gibe at the church. On their view a saint is a man and a man is body and soul together, so before the resurrection there is no saint's dead body and no Peter to pray, as the litanies ask (*Sancte Petre, ora pro nobis*).
13. 42.26 *abiectior*, with A B C O (O abbreviated *abic'or*), against the print's *objector* ("a more excellent philosopher and objector"). A B C have the whole clause otherwise: *excellencior vel abiectior philosophia* (C *philosophus*) *quam deus unquam hucusque sensibus mortalium voluit propalare*, "a more excellent or more abject philosophy than God has ever yet willed to disclose"; the English follows O's wording, the print's but for that word. 42.25 *si dicta factis compensat*: if he lives as he talks (shunning the relics); O *dictis facta compenset.*
14. 43.1–3 *tenendo quidem diccionem exclusive*: *diccio* is the word *sola*/*solus*, taken as an exclusive. "The flesh alone was Christ in the sepulchre" no more yields "the flesh alone was Christ" than "Peter alone is a man in this house" yields "Peter alone is a man anywhere". O omits 43.1–2 *in domo … homo.*

15. 43.9 *17 de Trinitate ca. 7*: O reads *19*; *De Trinitate* has fifteen books. Both definitions stand in book 15, c. 7 (15.7.11). PL 42, 1065: *Homo est enim, sicut veteres definierunt, animal rationale mortale*, and *Homo est substantia rationalis constans ex anima et corpore* (*verified*), so neither the print's 17 nor O's 19 is right. *Diffinierunt* and *descripcionem* stand together here: both are "define / definition".
16. 43.27 *moderniores capaciores*: A B C read *capciosiores*, "the more modern and more captious".
17. 43.31–32 *manet tam caro quam anima*: the subject is Christ, carried on from *copulatus*: he remains both flesh and soul, as he was both before.
18. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III q. 50 a. 5 (whether Christ's dead body was the same in number), the part of the *Summa* on Christ (*verified*): the body was the same in number *simpliciter* by the identity of the supposit, but not *totaliter*, not *secundum formam* (co. and ad 1). B omits *dicere*; A B C omit *quantitativa*.
19. 44.13 *ut patet ex dictis De Anima*: Harris italicises *De Anima* as a title; it is Wyclif's own treatise, not Aristotle's: Harris's index lists *De Anima* (pp. 1, 7, 22, 44 …) among Wyclif's other works referred to. The doctrine is that of *De compositione hominis* c. 3 (ed. Beer, p. 41): *eadem forma substancialis, que mansit in corpore vivo, manet ad tempus in corpore mortuo*, which *consonat fidei nostre de corpore Cristi, quod iacuit in sepulcro* (*verified*; whether that work is the *De Anima* is untraced).
20. 44.19–20 *nisi tunc Christus esset Christus*: A reads *nisi Christus tunc esset christo*; C *nisi illud tunc esset christus*, "unless that [body] were then Christ", which fits the argument better. The print is rendered: Christ would have to be Christ over again, by a new union.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference John xii. 35. (40.21); reference Augustine explains thig . . ….. . , (41.1); reference 5 John xiv. l. (41.5); reference John xiv.28. (41.12); reference Augustinus (43.7).

Part 5: Three objections: the living and dead body, the parts of Christ, mortal and immortal

Harris pp. 44.27–48.33

¶1 44.27–45.13

[44]Sed contra illud obicitur. Videtur primo quod corpus mortuum[12] sit corpus vivum; quia Christus, qui est corpus mortuum[12] in dicto triduo, est corpus vivum post et ante: et sic, cum corpus animatum et corpus inanimatum distinguuntur in specie, videtur quod illa non sunt idem corpus in numero, cum differencia specifica presupponit differenciam [45]numeralem.[1] Hic dicitur quod corpus vivum et animatum est idem corpus in numero mortuum et inanimatum, licet non simul et semel; nec differt corpus in quantum[2] animatum specifice ab inanimato[2] corpore. Pro quo notandum quod dupliciter[3] dicitur corpus animatum, scilicet, ab extrinseco participative, vel ab intrinseco qualitative[4]; ut corpus compositum ex corpore et anima est animatum anima, que est eius forma et quiditas, et illud non potest esse inanimatum: sed corpus, quod est altera pars qualitativa hominis, est animatum participacione anime; que, cum non sit forma eius intrinseca, potest abesse a corpore manente eodem in numero; sicut homines, qui participative dicuntur dii possunt manere iidem[5] Deo absente ab eis per graciam.

But against this it is objected. It seems, first, that a dead body is a living body; because Christ, who is a dead body in the said three days, is a living body after and before: and so, since an animate body and an inanimate body are distinguished in species, it seems that they are not the same body in number, since a specific difference presupposes a numerical [45] difference. Here the answer is that the living and animate body is the same body in number as the dead and inanimate, though not at one and the same time; nor does the body insofar as animate differ in species from the inanimate body. For which it is to be noted that a body is called animate in two ways, namely from outside, participatively, or from within, qualitatively; as the body composed of body and soul is animated by the soul, which is its form and quiddity, and that cannot be inanimate: but the body which is the other qualitative part of man is animated by participation of the soul; and the soul, since it is not its intrinsic form, can be absent from the body while the body remains the same in number;[1] as men, who are participatively called gods, can remain the same while God is absent from them by grace.[2]

¶2 45.14–45.18

[45]2°. obicitur sic. Si Christus in dicto triduo habet corpus et animam,[6] tunc Christus est animatus; et per consequens tam corpus quam anima[6] est pars[7] Christi; et per consequens Christus in illo triduo componitur ex corpore et anima; et per consequens non iacet mortuus in sepulcro.

Second, it is objected thus. If Christ in the said three days has body and soul, then Christ is animate; and consequently both body and soul is a part of Christ; and consequently Christ in that three days is composed of body and soul; and consequently he does not lie dead in the sepulchre.

¶3 45.19–46.5

[45]Hic dupliciter[8] dicitur. Primo quod tam[9] corpus quam anima[9] eius[10] est pars Christi, sed non in dicto triduo; quia non tunc qualitative componunt Christum, sed alias pro suo tempore. Unde posito quod essemus in dicto triduo, vere sciremus quod hec[11] anima que nunc est anima Christi, sed non nunc pars Christi, est pars Christi optima post et ante; et correspondenter de corpore. Ex quo patet quod hec non est synecdochica[12] locucio: 'hoc corpus' vel 'hec anima est nunc Christus:' sed, sicut homo est essencia substancia vel quiditas sua intransitive intelligendo, sic Christus est tunc hoc corpus et hec anima, que sunt sua ad[13] sensum intransitivum, ut supra. Unde hec anima, licet non nunc animat corpus illud quod iacet mortuum, animat tamen Filium Dei; [46] sicut caput[1] denominat hominem capitatum: et patet quod[2] animare est equivocum ad corpus subiectum vivificare et ad denominare personam cui copulatur ypostatice habentem[3] animam, quam[4] per se animat, cum ad invicem[5] consequuntur[6] vires inferiores sicut passio ad subiectum.

Here the answer is twofold. First, that both his body and his soul is a part of Christ, but not in the said three days; because they do not then qualitatively compose Christ, but at other times, for their own time. Hence, supposing that we were in the said three days, we would truly know that this soul, which now is the soul of Christ but not now a part of Christ, is the best part of Christ after and before; and correspondingly of the body. From which it is clear that this is not a synecdochic locution: "this body", or "this soul is now Christ":[3] but, just as man is his essence, substance or quiddity, understanding it intransitively, so Christ is then this body and this soul, which are his in the intransitive sense, as above.[4] Hence this soul, although it does not now animate that body which lies dead, yet animates the Son of God; [46]as a head names a man "headed":[5] and it is clear that "to animate" is equivocal between vivifying a body that is its subject and naming the person to whom it is joined hypostatically as having a soul, which it animates through itself, since the lower powers follow upon one another as an attribute upon a subject.[6]

¶4 46.6–46.16

[46]Secunda responsio dicit quod tam corpus quam anima Christi est in triduo vere pars Christi, sed nec qualitativa nec quantitativa, cum non tunc[7] componuntur ad idem,[7] sed est pars discretiva. Et sic intelligit Damascenus, quod Christus descendit totus ad inferos, sicut totus iacuit in sepulcro, sed non totum; quia persona fuit homo in utroque loco, sed non secundum ambas naturas; et sic in triduo habuit omnes partes[8] quas habuit[8] post resurreccionem, sed[9] tunc defecit unio vel[10] composicio. Sed nullum absolutum[11]: nec pono vim in illa variacione, quia utraque sentencia est satis[12] catholica ad sensus equivocos.[13]

The second response says that both the body and the soul of Christ is truly in the three days a part of Christ, but neither qualitative nor quantitative, since they are not then composed into the same thing, but it is a discrete part. And so Damascene understands that Christ descended whole into hell, as he lay whole in the sepulchre, but not the whole; because the person was man in each place, but not as to both natures; and so in the three days he had all the parts he had after the resurrection, but then the union or composition was lacking.[7] But nothing absolute [was lacking]: nor do I lay weight on that variation, because each teaching is catholic enough in the equivocal senses.[8]

¶5 46.17–46.25

[46]Sed 3°. obicitur ex hoc, quod Christus in illo triduo nec est homo immortalis nec homo[14] mortalis; et omnis homo est mortalis vel immortalis: ergo Christus pro illo triduo non est homo. Maior patet eo quod Christus tunc passus est mortem: ergo iuxta Apostolum 'mors illi ultra[15] non dominabitur.' Et quod non sit homo immortalis videtur ex hoc quod iacet mortuus in sepulcro et nondum consecutus est dotem[16] immortalitatis, sed primo in resurreccione sequente iuxta communem doctorum sentenciam.[17]

But third, it is objected from this, that Christ in that three days is neither an immortal man nor a mortal man; and every man is mortal or immortal: therefore Christ for that three days is not a man. The major is clear from this, that Christ then suffered death: therefore, according to the Apostle, "death shall no more have dominion over him."[9] And that he is not an immortal man appears from this, that he lies dead in the sepulchre and has not yet obtained the dower of immortality, but first in the resurrection that follows, according to the common teaching of the doctors.[10]

¶6 46.26–47.13

[46]Hic dicitur quod Christus pro hoc[18] triduo est tam homo mortalis quam eciam[19] homo immortalis. Est homo mortalis quia corpus, quod moritur et[20] iacet mortuum in sepulcro. Pro quo notandum quod mori, cum sit privari vita, vel potest intelligi ut dicit subitum actum privacionis vite a corpore, vel ut dicit absolute[21] carenciam vite a corpore prius[22] vivificato. [47]Primo modo[1] est mors Christi subita non possibilis iterari licet Christus eternaliter potest mori. 2°. modo est[2] mors triduana, sicut corpus incorruptibile per triduum caret vita, sicut aer habet tenebram triduanam, et sicut pater semper gignit[3] filium, sol semper producit lumen et medium per tempus privatur lumine, licet quodlibet istorum complete continue sit[4] productum. Sic Christus ad sensum expositum[5] continue moritur per istud triduum et habet simplam mortem triduanam, sicut dampnati habent mortem perpetuam. Est ergo Christus mortalis pro illo triduo cum moritur in effectu: non potest tamen nisi solummodo semel mori. Est eciam immortalis pro illo triduo[6] quia est spiritus Iesus,[7] qui nec potest mori corporaliter nec spiritualiter.

Here the answer is that Christ for this three days is both a mortal man and also an immortal man. He is a mortal man because [he is] the body, which dies and lies dead in the sepulchre. For which it is to be noted that "to die", since it is to be deprived of life, can be understood either as it signifies the sudden act of the privation of life from the body, or as it signifies, absolutely, the lack of life in a body previously vivified. [47]In the first way the death of Christ is sudden, not possible to be repeated, although Christ eternally can die.[11] In the second way there is a three days' death, as the incorruptible body lacks life through the three days, as the air has a three days' darkness, and as the father always begets the son, the sun always produces light, and the medium is deprived of light through a time, although each of these is completely, continuously produced.[12] So Christ, in the sense set out, continuously dies through that three days and has a single three days' death, as the damned have perpetual death. Christ is therefore mortal for that three days, since he dies in actual fact: yet he cannot die except only once. He is also immortal for that three days because he is the spirit Jesus, which can die neither bodily nor spiritually.[13]

¶7 47.14–48.2

[47]Et si obicitur quod hic predicatur oppositum de opposito; homo mortalis pro hoc instanti[8] est homo immortalis; dicitur quod verum est. Ideo conclusio est impossibilis. Nec est color in isto paralogismo :— ergo homo mortalis est homo immortalis— iste homo Dominus Iesus est nunc homo mortalis, et iste idem homo est nunc homo immortalis; — Non enim sequitur, si persona que est commune ad ambas naturas illas est utraque illarum, quod ex hoc una sit reliqua; sicut non oportet, licet tantum sit unus Deus et ille sit copulative[9] tam Deus genitus quam Deus ingenitus, quia tam Pater quam Filius, quod exinde Pater sit Filius vel Deus genitus sit Deus ingenitus, quod est idem. Nec sequitur, si Petrus sapiens et salvatus sit natura humana specifica, et Paulus insipiens et dampnatus sit eadem natura specifica, quod Petrus sapiens et salvatus sit Paulus insipiens[10] et dampnatus. Et patet[11] ex simili modo[11] nutritis in rectis principiis. Sicut enim natura divina est trium personarum quelibet, et species humana personarum hominum quelibet; et tamen tantum est una natura divina sive [48]species[1] humana:[1] sic persona Verbi Dei est trium naturarum quelibet et tamen una persona Verbi.

And if it is objected that here an opposite is predicated of an opposite, "a mortal man at this instant is an immortal man", the answer is that it is true. Therefore the conclusion is impossible. Nor is there colour in this paralogism: "therefore a mortal man is an immortal man", [from] "this man, the Lord Jesus, is now a mortal man, and this same man is now an immortal man".[14] For it does not follow, if the person who is common to both those natures is each of them, that from this the one is the other; just as it is not necessary, although there is only one God and he is conjunctively both God begotten and God unbegotten, because both Father and Son, that thence the Father is the Son, or God begotten is God unbegotten, which is the same. Nor does it follow, if Peter wise and saved is the human nature of the species, and Paul foolish and damned is the same nature of the species, that Peter wise and saved is Paul foolish and damned. And it is clear in a like way to those nourished in right principles.[15] For just as the divine nature is each of the three persons, and the human species each of the persons of men; and yet there is only one divine nature, or [48] human species: so the person of the Word of God is each of three natures, and yet one person of the Word.

¶8 48.3–48.28

[48] Quod autem Magister Distinctione 22 aliter loquitur cum modernis est propter equivocacionem, cum non admittit aliquid pro quacunque mensura esse hominem, nisi tunc componatur ex corpore et anima. Nos autem sequentes[2] scripturam non ficte sed philosophice[3] dicimus quod eadem persona Petri vel cuiuscunque sancti prioris, que conversata est hic corporaliter in terris, manet iam beata in celis; et ubicunque est spiritus ille creatus sive in corpore sive extra corpus est idem homo in numero, et solum, ubi est corpus vel anima, est persona humanitus. Ut patet Ep. 40 ad Dardanum. Et cum certum sit quod Christus pro illo triduo non componitur qualitative[4] ex corpore et anima, eo quod unio illorum dissolvitur; patet quod tunc nec est sic homo mortalis nec homo immortalis, quia non ad illum[5] sensum tunc est homo. Si autem vocatur[6] vere corpus et anima separata utrumque homo, sicut vocat Hugo de sancto Victore sequendo Augustinum, scripturas, et philosophicas raciones; tunc respondendum est sicut superius ad obiectus. Nam anima est per se homo et corpus nuncupative; et sic utrumque non duo homines, sed unus tantum. Si autem Magister intelligit hominem collective pro[7] duabus naturis ad[8] invicem et Verbo ypostatice copulatis, non est color quod tunc sit homo nisi utraque natura sit homo: et sic esset homo immortalis sicut anima fuit a sua[9] origine immortalis; et per consequens partim mortalis, quia mortuus, et partim immortalis, quia anima. Hoc autem concedendum est de quolibet alio homine.

And that the Master, in Distinction 22, speaks otherwise, along with the moderns, is because of equivocation, since he does not admit that anything is a man for any measure [of time] unless it is then composed of body and soul.[16] But we, following scripture not feignedly but philosophically, say that the same person of Peter or of any earlier saint, who lived here bodily on earth, remains now blessed in heaven; and wherever that created spirit is, whether in the body or out of the body, it is the same man in number, and only where the body or the soul is, is the person there humanly.[17] As is clear from Letter 40, to Dardanus.[18] And since it is certain that Christ for that three days is not composed qualitatively of body and soul, in that their union is dissolved, it is clear that then he is neither a mortal man nor an immortal man in this way, because he is not then man in that sense. But if the body and the separated soul are truly each called man, as Hugh of Saint Victor calls them, following Augustine, the scriptures, and philosophical reasons, then the reply must be as above to the objections.[19] For the soul is man through itself and the body nuncupatively; and so the two are not two men, but one only. But if the Master understands "man" collectively, for the two natures joined to one another and to the Word hypostatically, there is no colour [for saying] that he is then man unless each nature is man: and so he would be an immortal man, as the soul was immortal from its origin; and consequently partly mortal, because dead, and partly immortal, because soul. And this is to be granted of any other man.

¶9 48.29–48.33

[48] Mansit ergo Christus pro triduo minor patre quidquid fuit ante et sic suppositum humane speciei licet non tunc componebatur qualitative ex anima et corpore. Unde tunc complevit obedienciam Trinitati[10] ministrando secundum naturam assumptam.

Christ therefore remained for the three days less than the Father, whatever he was before, and so a supposit of the human species, although he was not then composed qualitatively of soul and body.[20] Hence he then fulfilled obedience to the Trinity, ministering as to the nature assumed.

Notes

1. 45.6 *qualitative*: O reads *quiditative*, "quidditatively", from within as its quiddity. A "qualitative part" (45.9) is Wyclif's term for body or soul as the parts that compose a man by kind, against the quantitative parts of the body.
2. 45.12–13 *qui participative dicuntur dii*: Ps. 81:6, "I have said: You are gods" (John 10:34). *Deo absente ab eis per graciam*: God absent from them in respect of grace, that is, his grace withdrawn; the men remain the same men.
3. 45.26 *synecdochica*: A B C *sinodica*, O *synodogica*, as at 39.14 (where Harris notes his correction). Harris's emendation is kept against every manuscript because their readings do not construe. The proposition is not a figure naming the whole for the part: the body is Christ in the proper sense.
4. 45.28–30 *intransitive intelligendo … ad sensum intransitivum*: "intransitively": the predication does not pass from the subject to another thing, as "man is his essence" says nothing other than the man. *Ut supra*: the earlier treatment in this chapter.
5. 46.1 *sicut caput denominat hominem capitatum*: the head gives the man the name "headed" (denominative naming, as "white" from whiteness); so the soul makes the Son of God "animate" without animating the dead body.

6. 46.3–5 *habentem animam, quam per se animat, cum ad invicem consequuntur vires inferiores*: the construal is doubtful. *Habentem* is taken with *personam* ("naming the person as having a soul") and the subject of *animat* as the soul; O reads *quomodo* for *quam* and *mentem* for *invicem*, A B C *consequitur*.
7. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III.7: Christ whole (*totus*, the person) in the tomb and in hell, but not the whole (*totum*, not every nature). III.7 has the distinction: Christ is wholly (ὅλος) God and wholly man, but not the whole (ὅλον), the masculine going with the hypostasis, the neuter with the nature (*verified* in the Greek division; Burgundio's Latin not seen). III.27 says only that the one hypostasis stayed with body and soul in death. The tomb and hell are the Lombard's, *Sent.* III d. 22 c. 3, PL 192, 804: *totus erat in sepulcro, totus in inferno, totus ubique … sed non totum.*
8. 46.14 *Sed nullum absolutum*: the verb is understood from *defecit*: only the union, a relation, was lacking, no absolute thing. A B C write *abtū*. *Sentencia* is "teaching" here: the first and second responses.
9. Rom. 6:9, said in the Vulgate of Christ "rising again from the dead". A B omit *ultra*.
10. 46.24 *dotem immortalitatis*: the dower (*dos*) of immortality, one of the endowments of the glorified body, given at the resurrection.
11. 47.2 *licet Christus eternaliter potest mori*: taken literally ("eternally can die"); in the first sense it is the death, not the power of dying, that cannot be repeated.
12. 47.4–7 *sicut pater semper gignit filium …*: comparisons of something produced continuously, though complete at every point: begetting, the sun's light, the medium's darkness. *Pater* and *filium* are lower case in the print; the eternal generation of the Son may be meant.
13. 47.12 *spiritus Iesus*: A B C *Iesu*, "the spirit of Jesus". The print makes the soul Jesus, as Wyclif's position requires; C O omit *pro illo triduo*.
14. 47.16–19 *Nec est color in isto paralogismo*: "colour", a plausible ground. The conclusion is printed first, then the premisses; "[from]" is supplied. 47.15: A B C read *per hoc instans*.
15. 47.29 *ex simili modo*: A B C *similitudo*, O *ex silido*. "Paul foolish and damned" is a schoolroom case, not the Apostle.
16. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III d. 22 (whether Christ was a man in the three days). Chapter 1, PL 192, 802–803 (*verified*): the Master holds that Christ was truly man in death, *nec mortalis quidem, nec immortalis*, but *non … sic … ut ex anima et carne simul junctis subsisteret*, the sense in which Wyclif says he denies it. **C.** Wyclif narrows the Master: Lombard, *Sent.* III d. 22 c. 1, grants that Christ *vere erat homo* in death and denies only that he subsisted as man from soul and flesh joined, not, as Wyclif puts it, that he was man at all (Bonaventure, Quaracchi III, 452, reads the Master the same way).
17. 48.7 *philosophice*: B reads *sophistice*, "sophistically". 48.10–11 *sive in corpore sive extra corpus* echoes 2 Cor. 12:2, "whether in the body … or out of the body".
18. Augustine's letter to Dardanus, Ep. 187 in the Maurist numbering, on Christ whole everywhere, in the tomb and in hell; "40" is Wyclif's numbering. *Ep.* 187.5, PL 33, 833, *in inferno secundum animum, in sepulcro autem secundum carnem*, with 187.13, PL 33, 836, *in seipso ubique totus* (*verified*).
19. Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis* II.1.11 (whether Christ was a man in the three days), place not given: PL 176, 407D, *Quid enim magis est homo quam anima? … Ergo, inquis, homo est anima? Quidni?*, with Cicero's *Mens cujusque, is est quisque* (*verified*).
20. 48.29 *minor patre quidquid fuit ante*: Christ remained, for the three days, all that he was before, and so less than the Father as to the humanity. *Patre* is lower case in the print.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Rom. vi. 9. (46.21).

Chapter 4

Part 1: The moderns on predication in the three days: Bonaventure and the Subtle Doctor

Harris pp. 49.0–53.27

¶1 49.0–49.0

[49][Iuxta ponit sentencias modernorum doctorum ut veritas plus lucescat. The opinions of Bonaventura, Duns Scotus, and St. Anselm, as to the nature of Christ during the three days' entombment, examined.]

[It sets beside them the teachings of the modern doctors, so that the truth may shine out the more.]

¶2 49.1–49.3

[49]Sed ut magis appareat, quomodo communicacio ydiomatum pro triduo Christo conveniat, iuxta posite sunt sentencie modernorum.

But that it may appear more fully how the communication of idioms befits Christ for the three days, the teachings of the moderns are set beside [ours].[1]

¶3 49.4–49.23

[49]Scribit enim Bonaventura super Distinccionem 12.[1] 3[ii] Sentenciarum, quod triplex[2] est predicacio, scilicet actualis, aptitudinalis,[3] et mixtim. Actualis, quando subiectum est ens actu et forma predicati sibi inest; ut cum dicitur homine existente 'homo est animal.' Predicacio secundum puram aptitudinem est, quando nec subiectum nec forma predicati est in actu, sed necessaria[4] est ordinacio unius ad alterum fundata super principia nature; sicut nulla rosa existente 'rosa est flos.' Quando subiectum autem est in actu, et forma predicati non inest sibi actualiter sed secundum necessariam ordinacionem fundatam super principia nature, tunc est predicacio mixtim, id est, partim actualis et partim aptitudinalis. Et sic concedit quod Christus fuit homo in triduo, quia subiectum, quod est Verbum Dei, tunc fuit in actu, et forma humanitatis servata fuit in aptitudine coniunccionis anime ad corpus. Nec vidi planiorem sentenciam alicuius doctoris in illa materia; quia indubie, quicunque concedit quod corpus et anima fuerunt partes Christi in triduo, habet concedere consequenter quod Christus habet correspondenter esse hominis ex eisdem.

For Bonaventure writes on Distinction 22 of the third [book] of the *Sentences* that predication is threefold, namely actual, habitudinal, and mixed.[2] Actual, when the subject is a being in act and the form of the predicate is in it; as when it is said, a man existing, "man is an animal". Predication according to pure aptitude is when neither the subject nor the form of the predicate is in act, but there is a necessary ordering of the one to the other founded on the principles of nature; as, no rose existing, "a rose is a flower".[3] And when the subject is in act, and the form of the predicate is not in it actually but according to a necessary ordering founded on the principles of nature, then the predication is mixed, that is, partly actual and partly aptitudinal. And so he grants that Christ was man in the three days, because the subject, which is the Word of God, was then in act, and the form of the humanity was preserved in the aptitude of the conjunction of the soul to the body. Nor have I seen a plainer teaching of any doctor in that matter; because undoubtedly whoever grants that the body and soul were parts of Christ in the three days has to grant consequently that Christ correspondingly has the being of a man from the same.[4]

¶4 49.24–50.21

[49]Sed Doctor Subtilis dilatat[5] ibidem[6] amplius istam materiam. Dicit enim quod in triduo fuit ita; quod 'Christus est Christus, et quod Verbum habet tam corpus quam animam [50]sibi unitam, et tamen non tunc fuit ita quod Christus est homo; quia humanitas dicit ultra naturas imperfectas et ultra unionem respectivam unitatem[1] absolutam, sicut est in numeris. Et illa unitas non componit cum aliis; quia tunc esset[2] processus in infinitum. Et sic in triduo corruptum est aliquid

But the Subtle Doctor widens this matter more amply in the same place.[5] For he says that in the three days it was so that "Christ is Christ" and that "the Word has both body and soul [50]united to him", "and yet it was not then so that Christ is man; because the humanity signifies, beyond the imperfect natures and beyond the relational union, an absolute unity, as is the case in numbers. And that unity does not compose with other things;

absolutum, quia humanitas; sic quod nulla pars eius remanserat, cum sit[3] forma totalitatis[3] non habens partes quantitativas vel qualitativas. Racio autem quare non sequitur—Christus est Christus: ergo Christus est homo—est ista. Christus secundum Damascenum ca°. 49 est nomen ypostaticum[4] duarum naturarum[5] completarum singulatim,[6] scilicet humanitatis et deitatis. Cum ergo oportet racionem subiecti talis esse in se veram, antequam aliquid de eo enuncietur; quia aliter esset hec vera—maius Deo[7] est— quod est falsum,[8] cum subiectum includit repugnanciam: patet quod hec—Christus est homo—[9] formata pro triduo[9] foret falsa; quia humanitas non tunc infuit Verbo Dei. Ideo, sicut,[10] nullo homine existente, homo albus[11] est homo albus,[12] nec ex hoc sequitur quod homo sit homo albus[12]: sic pro triduo Christus est Christus; sicut Deus-homo est[13] Deus-homo, et tamen Deus non est tunc homo.'

because then there would be a process to infinity. And so in the three days something absolute was corrupted, namely the humanity; so that no part of it had remained, since it is a form of totality, not having quantitative or qualitative parts.[6] And the reason why it does not follow, 'Christ is Christ: therefore Christ is man', is this. Christ, according to Damascene, c. 49, is a hypostatic name signifying two complete natures, namely the humanity and the Godhead.[7] Since therefore the notion of such a subject must be true in itself before anything is enunciated of it (because otherwise this would be true, 'something greater than God is', which is false, since the subject includes an incompatibility),[8] it is clear that this, 'Christ is man', formed for the three days, would be false; because the humanity was not then in the Word of God. Therefore, just as, no man existing, a white man is a white man, and yet it does not follow from this that a man is a white man: so for the three days Christ is Christ; as God-man is God-man, and yet God is not then man."

¶5 50.22–51.5

[50]Ulterius quo ad denominacionem Verbi ab illis partibus ita scribit: 'Verbum, inquit, quamvis in triduo habuit[14] corpus et animam sibi unitam a quibus potuit denominari: non placuit tamen doctoribus quod denominetur ab eis, et forte non sine causa: cum partes non denominant, nisi ut subsistunt naturaliter in suo toto. Sed tunc defuit humanitas: ideo non denominavit eum carneum vel carnalem.[15] Verumptamen si essent[15] nomina imposita, posset denominari ab illis; sed[16] oporteret quod essent denominativa, que non saperent vicium.[17] Unde sicut substancia[17] non sufficit denominari[18] alba ab albedine,[18] nisi mediante subiecto: sic [51]nec Christus denominari carnalis, nisi mediante humanitate: ut, si Christus assumpsisset solum quantitatem, adhuc[1] non esset quantus propter defectum subiecti materialis.' Hoc Latinum huius doctoris est michi[2] et forte aliis difficilius quam[3] sentencia Augustini.[3]

Further, as to the naming of the Word from those parts, he writes thus: "The Word, he says, although in the three days he had body and soul united to him, from which he could be named, yet it did not please the doctors that he be named from them, and perhaps not without cause: since parts do not name except as they subsist naturally in their whole. Now at that time the humanity was lacking: therefore it did not name him fleshy or carnal.[9] Nevertheless, if names were imposed, he could be named from them; but they would have to be denominatives that did not savour of vice. Hence, just as a substance does not suffice to be named white from whiteness except by means of a subject, so [51]neither [does] Christ [suffice] to be named carnal except by means of the humanity: so that, if Christ had assumed quantity alone, he would still not be of a quantity, for lack of a material subject." This Latin of this doctor is to me, and perhaps to others, more difficult than the teaching of Augustine.[10]

¶6 51.6–51.15

[51]Sed pro eius intellectu notandum quod ipse admisit predicacionem secundum habitudinem[4] sicut Doctor alius.[5] Et illud antiquitus est famosum,[6] ut: 'Quandocunque predicatur idem de se vel per se superius[7] de suo per se[8] inferiori[9] est predicacio vera,[9] licet neutrum extremum sit in actu. Ut verum est, dicit Doctor, quod—Cesar est homo—eciam nullo homine existente.' Sed quando predicatur formaliter res alterius generis, tunc limitat ad predicacionem actualem; ut, 'si homo est qualis,[10] quantus, pater, agens, et cetera; tunc est actu.'

But for understanding him it is to be noted that he admitted predication according to respect, as the other Doctor [did].[11] And that is famous of old, thus: "Whenever the same is predicated of itself, or what is per se higher of its per se lower, the predication is true, although neither extreme is in act. As it is true, says the Doctor, that 'Caesar is a man', even no man existing." But when a thing of another genus is predicated formally, then he limits

¶7 *51.16–51.26*

[51]Et cum illo concordat Anselmus in De Concordia 5° ca°. ita dicens: 'Quippe non idem est, rem esse preteritam, et, rem preteritam esse preteritam; aut,[11] rem esse presentem, et, rem presentem esse presentem; aut,[11] rem esse futuram, et, rem futuram esse futuram: sicut non est idem, rem esse albam, et, rem albam esse albam: lignum enim non[12] de necessitate semper est album, quia[13] aliquando antequam fieret album, potuit non fieri album; et[14] postquam fieret album,[14] potest fieri non album: sed lignum album de necessitate semper est album, quia non potest[15] fieri, ut album simul sit non album.'

[it] to actual predication; as, "if a man is of a quality, of a quantity, a father, acting, and so on, then he is in act."

And with that Anselm agrees in *De concordia*, c. 5, saying thus: "For indeed it is not the same, 'the thing is past' and 'the past thing is past'; or 'the thing is present' and 'the present thing is present'; or 'the thing is future' and 'the future thing is future': just as it is not the same, 'the thing is white' and 'the white thing is white'. For wood is not of necessity always white, because at some time, before it became white, it could have not become white; and after it became white, it can become not white: but white wood is of necessity always white, because it cannot come about that white at the same time is not white."[12]

¶8 *51.27–52.12*

[51]Volunt ergo isti doctores quod necessaria sit predicacio aptitudinalis secundum esse possibile in causis secundis, quandocunque predicatur idem de se vel per se superius de suo per se inferiori. Nec ex hoc concluditur existencia talis rei. Nec contendo multum circa hanc logicam, cum nescio[16] [52]eam efficaciter impugnare. Sed considero quod si moderni dignarentur[1] attendere ad scripturas patrum priorum, non tantum mirarentur de hoc quod dico: Omne preteritum vel futurum esse pro suo tempore: quia ex illo dicto sequitur nedum omne preteritum vel futurum sed eciam omne possibile esse[2] pro semper. Et sic videtur quod infiniti homines, sicut quelibet signanda individua, sunt ubique; nam mille homines sunt mille homines, et sic infinitum,[3] nullo homine existente. Nec videtur racio quare semper, quin[4] per idem ubique et sic quilibet[5] infinitum bonus foret infinitum bonus, et sic de quacunque denominacione possibili.

These doctors therefore hold that aptitudinal predication according to possible being in second causes is necessary, whenever the same is predicated of itself, or what is per se higher of its per se lower. Nor is the existence of such a thing inferred from this. Nor do I contend much about this logic, since I do not know how [52]to attack it effectively. But I consider that if the moderns deigned to attend to the writings of the earlier fathers, they would not wonder so much at what I say, "Every past or future thing is for its own time": because from that saying it follows not only that every past or future thing but also that every possible thing is for always.[13] And so it seems that infinite men, like any individuals one might designate, are everywhere; for a thousand men are a thousand men, and so to infinity, no man existing. Nor does there seem to be a reason why [this holds] always without, by the same token, [holding] everywhere; and so anyone infinitely good would be infinitely good, and so of any possible naming.[14]

¶9 *52.13–52.27*

[52]Sed dimittendo istud argumentum, ad propositum quod sequitur: Christum fuisse[6] hominem in triduo. Nam Christus est per se in specie humana, ut patet posterius: ergo est per se homo: et per consequens, si est Christus, tunc est homo. Confirmatur. Sicut conceditur quod Christus est Christus, sic concedi debet quod iste homo est iste homo, demonstrando Iesum.[7] Sed impossibile est istum hominem esse istum hominem, nisi iste homo sit[8] homo. Ergo concesso quod Christus est Christus pro triduo, concedendum est ipsum esse hominem pro eodem. Unde dicit Doctor quod,†[9] 'si hec esset per se Christus est homo et sufficiens quod causet inherenciam predicati ad subiectum, sine hoc

But leaving that argument, [I come] to the matter in hand, which follows: "Christ was man in the three days". For Christ is per se in the human species, as is clear later: therefore he is per se man: and consequently, if he is Christ, then he is man. This is confirmed. Just as it is granted that Christ is Christ, so it ought to be granted that this man is this man, pointing to Jesus. Now it is impossible that this man be this man unless this man is man. Therefore, granted that Christ is Christ for the three days, it must be granted that he is man for the same [time]. Hence the Doctor says that "if this were per se, 'Christ is man', and sufficient that it cause the inherence of the predicate in the subject, without the subject's signifying one concept,

quod subiectum dicat compositum unum hoc Christus est homo fuisset semper vera. Sed magis, inquit, credo quod requiritur hoc et plus.'[9]†

this, 'Christ is man', would always have been true. But rather, he says, I believe that this is required, and more."[15]

¶10 52.28–53.14

[52]Item sicut conceditur quod pro triduo ille homo est ille homo, ita concedi debet ut convertibile per se, quod ille [53]homo componitur ex hoc corpore et hac anima. Ex quo plane sequitur quod ille homo sit homo, sicut ille homo est Deus-homo. Nam Christus et Deus-homo convertuntur[1] simpliciter et ex equo:[1] et per consequens, sicut conceditur quod Christus est Christus, sic concedi debet quod Deus-homo est Deus-homo. Sicut ergo conceditur quod rosa est flos propter possibilitatem[2] licet nulla existat; sic evidencius videtur concedendum quod hec persona est homo, posito quod essemus in triduo cum sit nedum remota potencia, sed disposicio propinqua et necessaria, ut resurgat. Unde propter essenciam materialem perpetuam videtur Ieronimus[3] in Ep. ad Paulam et Eustochium concedere quod Christus a principio seculi erat Christus: sed Doctor ille concedit ad sensum alium.

Again, just as it is granted that for the three days that man is that man, so it ought to be granted, as convertible per se, that that [53]man is composed of this body and this soul. From which it plainly follows that that man is man, just as that man is God-man. For "Christ" and "God-man" are convertible without qualification and on equal terms: and consequently, just as it is granted that Christ is Christ, so it ought to be granted that God-man is God-man.[16] Just as therefore it is granted that a rose is a flower on account of possibility, though none exists, so it seems more evidently to be granted that this person is man, supposing that we were in the three days, since there is not only a remote potency but a proximate and necessary disposition that he rise again.[17] Hence on account of the perpetual material essence Jerome seems, in the Letter to Paula and Eustochium, to grant that Christ was Christ from the beginning of the world: but that Doctor grants it in another sense.[18]

¶11 53.15–53.27

[53]Item cum Christus secundum illum doctorem habet omnes partes[4] quas habet post resurreccionem, non deficit ad hoc quod tunc[5] sit homo nisi unio respectiva: sed nullum tale respectivum est de essencia substancie ut patet alibi De Continuacione: ergo corpus et anima unita Verbo pro triduo sufficiunt[6] denominare ipsum esse hominem. Minor patet ex hoc: quod addita unione illa ad alia principia existencia[7] pro illo triduo,[7] foret consequens formaliter, quod Christus sit homo: ergo tunc non deficit[8] nisi[9] dicta unio; nec valet dicere quod humanitas deficit;[8] quia humanitas est quod ipse est homo: ergo non est previe requisita[10] ad hoc quod ipse sit homo, quia tunc idem esset previe requisitum ad se ipsum.

Again, since Christ, according to that doctor, has all the parts which he has after the resurrection, nothing is lacking for his being man then except the relational union: now no such relational thing is of the essence of substance, as is clear elsewhere, in *De continuacione*:[19] therefore the body and soul united to the Word for the three days suffice to name him as being man. The minor is clear from this: that, that union being added to the other principles existing for that three days, it would be consequent formally that Christ is man: therefore nothing is then lacking but the said union; nor does it avail to say that the humanity is lacking; because the humanity is that he is man: therefore it is not required beforehand for his being man, because then the same thing would be required beforehand for itself.[20]

Notes

1. 49.1 *communicacio ydiomatum*: the communication of idioms, the exchange of predicates between the natures in the one person. *Sentencie* is "teachings", positions held (as in the bracket); "[ours]" is supplied for the bare *iuxta posite sunt*.
2. 49.4 *22*, with O and Bonaventure's text, against the print's *12* (A B C): d. 22 is the distinction on Christ in the three days. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.* d. 22 a. un. q. 1, *Utrum Christus in triduo fuerit homo* (Quaracchi III, 451), where the threefold predication, the rose, and the Word in act with the form of humanity *servata in aptitudine coniunctionis animae et carnis* all stand (*verified*). 49.6 *habitudinalis*, with A B C O, against the print's *aptitudinalis*, Harris's emendation from the definitions that follow (*secundum puram aptitudinem*, 49.8; *partim aptitudinalis*, 49.15–16), which he says confirm it. The manuscripts' word construes, a predication by relation (cf. *secundum habitudinem*, 51.7). Bonaventure's own text has *esse aptitudinale* (*aut secundum esse actuale, aut secundum esse aptitudinale, aut partim*), which may be what Harris's emendation follows. O *duplex* for *triplex*.
3. 49.10 *ordinacio unius ad alterum*: "ordering", the necessary relation of predicate to subject, not "ordinance" (the political works' sense). O reads *nata* for *necessaria*.
4. 49.23 *esse hominis*: "the being of a man", that he is a man, not existence as such.

5. The Subtle Doctor is Duns Scotus; *ibidem*, on the same distinction of book III, d. 22 (q. un.), in his *Ordinatio* or *Lectura*. The quotations are *Ordinatio* III d. 22 q. un. (Wadding VII/1, 451–456), closely paraphrased: humanity as an *entitas absoluta* destroyed in the triduum, *maius Deo est, homo albus est homo albus* with no man existing, and the reply to the third argument on *carnalis* and whiteness (*verified*).
6. 50.3 *unitatem absolutam*: A B C *humanitatem*; 50.7 *forma totalitatis*: A B C *totalitas* ("since it is a totality"). The print is rendered at both.
7. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* (c. 49 in Burgundio's numbering, book III), on "Christ" as the name of the hypostasis; *De fide* III.3 in the Greek division; Wyclif has the number from Scotus, who quotes *Christus autem, ait, nomen hypostaseos dicimus non unimode dictum, sed duarum naturarum existens significativum* (*verified*). **T.** 50.11 *significancium*, with A B C, against the print's *singulatim* ("complete each singly"): Scotus's *duarum naturarum existens significativum* bears it out. The participle is taken with *nomen*, attracted into the genitive of *naturarum*: "a hypostatic name signifying two complete natures". O *ypostasis* for *ypostaticum*.
8. 50.14 *maius Deo est*: "something greater than God is (exists)": a subject whose notion is impossible makes nothing true of it; A B C read *maius de eo*.
9. 50.28 *ideo non denominavit eum*: the subject is taken as the humanity, lacking; it may be the parts ("[they] did not name him"). *Ideo* is read on the plate. *Carneus* "fleshy" names from the matter; *carnalis* "carnal" savours of vice (50.31).
10. 51.3–5 *Hoc Latinum huius doctoris*: Wyclif's remark on Scotus's wording, harder than Augustine's teaching; B adds *michi* in the margin.
11. 51.7 *secundum habitudinem*: *habitudo* in its logical sense, "respect", the relation under which a predicate holds. Harris asks at the foot whether *aptitudinem* should be read (cf. p. 49). *Doctor alius*: Bonaventure.
12. Anselm, *De concordia praescientiae … cum libero arbitrio*, given as c. 5, but the passage is q. 1 c. 2 (Schmitt II, 249.12–19; PL 158, 510A); *verified*: Anselm has *Lignum enim non est semper necessitate album* and, with A B C, *postquam est album*. O omits 51.18–19 *rem … aut*; at 51.23 A B C read *postquam est album*.
13. 52.4–6 *ex illo dicto sequitur*: *illo dicto* is taken as the doctors' rule (the same predicated of itself is true without existence), which commits them to more than Wyclif's thesis on past and future; it could be read as Wyclif's own saying.
14. 52.9–12 *Nec videtur racio quare semper, quin per idem ubique*: the rule has no reason to hold for all time and not, by the same token, for all places. *Quilibet infinitum bonus*: A (first hand) B C read *cuilibet*.
15. 52.26 *conceptum unum*, with O and Scotus's text, against the print's *compositum unum* (A B C). 52.23–27: Harris's daggers mark the passage as corrupt: "a most difficult place, much corrupted, as the frequent erasures and varied readings of the manuscripts show". He prints A B C; O reads *si hic esset per se Christus est homo et sufficiat quod causet inherenciam predicati ad subiectum cum hoc quod subiectum dicat conceptum unum hic Christus est homo fuisset semper vera …*, "with the subject signifying one concept". The print is rendered but for *compositum*. Scotus, *Ordinatio* III d. 22 q. un.: *si ad perseitatem propositionis sufficit quod subiectum includat in suo intellectu causam inhaerentiae praedicati ad subiectum, et non requiratur quod subiectum dicat conceptum unum; posset concedi quod haec, Christus est homo, semper fuit vera. Sed magis credo, quod requiritur hoc, et plus* (*verified*). Scotus bears out O's *conceptum* against the print's *compositum*, and the print's *sine hoc* against O's *cum hoc*. With *conceptum* the passage construes and follows Scotus's argument (one concept in the subject, not inherence alone, makes the proposition per se), so the English drops Harris's daggers.
16. 53.4 *simpliciter et ex equo*: B *ex equo simpliciter*; O *simpliciter et e contrario*, "without qualification and conversely".
17. 53.9 *remota potencia*: "potency" in Aristotle's sense, set against the proximate disposition to rise again; not "power".
18. Jerome, letter to Paula and Eustochium, place not given; on what Christ was "from the beginning of the world", ps.-Jerome, *Cogitis me* 10, PL 30, 132C: *ita ut jam esset in illo per unitatem personae ab initio saeculi, qui nondum erat natus de Maria Virgine* (*verified*). A B C *Ieronimum*.
19. *De continuacione*: a treatise of Wyclif's own, cited "elsewhere"; Harris's index lists it, with a query, among Wyclif's works referred to (*De Continuatione ? 53*); no work of that title is in the Wyclif Society series, and the place is untraced. Compare p. 61, *continuacio non est de essencia substancie materialis*.
20. 53.20 *Minor patet*: the proof given supports the first premiss (nothing lacking but the union); Wyclif calls it the minor. 53.25 *non est previe requisita*: the subject is taken as the humanity; Harris's foot ("*requisita* in all the manuscripts, that is, *unio*") takes it as the union. C omits 53.23–24 *nisi … deficit*.
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 50: *ideo* (print as transcribed) [SUB]

Part 2: The union neither causes the humanity nor follows it; the namings of the three days

Harris pp. 53.28–57.6

¶1 53.28–54.16

[53]Item vel est dicta unio causa humanitatis vel e contra; cum distinguuntur ut absolutum et respectivum, et non sunt impertinencia. Si humanitas sit causa dicte unionis tanquam[11] passionis que consequitur ad subiectum: tunc [54]unio non requiritur ad humanitatem, et e contra pro[1] dicto triduo sunt omnes cause posite,

Again, either the said union is the cause of the humanity or the reverse, since they are distinguished as absolute and relational, and are not irrelevant [to each other].[1] If the humanity is the cause of the said union, as of an attribute that follows upon its subject, then the [54]union is not

que requiruntur ad humanitatem Christi;[1] et per consequens tunc est homo. Si e contra unio sit causa dicte humanitatis, hoc[2] videtur tripliciter esse falsum. Primo per[3] hoc quod continuacio per idem foret causa corporis; quod improbatum est alibi. 2°. per hoc quod unio illa, cum dependeat ab extremis, non est essenciale principium hominis, eo quod posset manere idem homo variato corpore vel ablata eius parte quantitativa. Non ergo est illa unio causa beatitudinis, sciencie et aliorum[4] accidencium[4] hominis que insunt racione anime;. et multo minus est causa[5] humanitatis, que est prior illis accidentibus. 3°. per hoc quod illa unio nedum dependet ab illis extremis absolute, sed ut copulantur qualitative ad invicem; et per consequens presupponit perfectum hominem: et sic non est previe requisita sed accessoria.

required for the humanity; and, on the other side, for the said three days all the causes are posited that are required for the humanity of Christ;[2] and in consequence he is then a man. If, conversely, the union is the cause of the said humanity, this seems false in three ways. First, by this: that continuity would by the same token be the cause of the body, which has been disproved elsewhere. Second, by this: that that union, since it depends on its extremes, is not an essential principle of man, because the same man could remain with his body varied or a quantitative part of it taken away. So that union is not the cause of blessedness, of knowledge, and of the other accidents of a man that are in him by reason of the soul; and much less is it the cause of the humanity, which is prior to those accidents. Third, by this: that that union not only depends on those extremes absolutely, but as they are joined qualitatively to each other; and in consequence it presupposes a complete man: and so it is not required beforehand but accessory.[3]

¶2 54.17–54.24

[54]Tales multas evidencias feci alias cum testimoniis sanctorum, quod tota humanitas et personalitas servatur in anima; aliter enim nimis esset mundus peioratus per deperdicionem absolute humanitatis Christi succedente[6] loco illius iocalis[7] preciosissimi sola morte. Oportet ergo plenam perfeccionem humanitatis Christi servari[8] in composito discretive ex corpore et anima, quod plus sic perficit mundum quam prius perficit qualitative compositum, sicut contingit de Sampsone.

I have elsewhere made many such evidences, with testimonies of the saints, that the whole humanity and personality is preserved in the soul; for otherwise the world would have been exceedingly worsened by the loss outright of the humanity of Christ, death alone succeeding in the place of that most precious jewel.[4] Therefore the full perfection of the humanity of Christ must be preserved in the composite made discretely of body and soul, which in this way perfects the world more than the qualitatively composite perfected it before, as happens in the case of Samson.[5]

¶3 54.25–55.6

[54]Ulterius quoad denominacionem Verbi pro illo triduo ex corpore et anima resultantem, videtur responsio multum literalis, quando dicit quod' non placuit doctoribus ipsum denominari ab illis.' Nam semper[9] Spiritui sancto auctori[10] scripture placuit quod denominetur pro illo triduo' descendens ad inferos'[11] secundum animam, et' iacens in sepulcro' secundum corpus: et sic de sepultura et aliis ministeriis[12] ad sepulturam pertinentibus, ut condimento mixture mirre et aloes, involucione in sindone, posicione in monumento. [55]Et racione anime denominatus est' rex spolians tartara,'[1] regens spiritualiter suum exercitum pacificando rebelles tam intraneos quam extraneos:[2] et sic de omnibus actibus regiminis, que ad regem spiritualem pertinent, longe efficacius quam antea fecit vivus[3]: tunc enim habuit exercitum plus unitum.

Further, as to the naming of the Word for those three days resulting from the body and the soul, the reply seems very literal-minded when it says that "it did not please the doctors that he be named from them."[6] For it has always pleased the Holy Spirit, the author of scripture, that he be named for those three days "descending into hell" as to the soul, and "lying in the sepulchre" as to the body; and so of the burial and the other ministrations belonging to burial, such as the embalming with a mixture of myrrh and aloes, the wrapping in the linen cloth, the laying in the monument.[7] [55]And by reason of the soul he has been named "king despoiling Tartarus", ruling his army spiritually by pacifying rebels both within and without; and so of all the acts of rule that belong to a spiritual king, far more effectively than he did before while alive: for then he had a more united army.[8]

¶4 55.7–55.16

[55]Item cum tam corpus Christi quam anima fuerunt secundum Doctorem tunc partes Christi, et nichil dicitur pars, nisi in comparacione ad aliquod totum: videtur quod fuit unum totum continuum vel discretum, cuius erant partes, ut dictum est superius: et illud discretum, cum non deficit in aliquo substanciali quod fuit in humanitate, quando affuit qualitativa composicio: videtur quod tunc,[4] sicut mediante[5] illo toto et unione sufficiunt partes ille[6] denominari partes Christi, sic sufficiunt denominare Christum denominacionibus naturaliter[7] consequentibus ex eodem.

Again, since both the body of Christ and the soul were, according to the Doctor, then parts of Christ, and nothing is called a part except in comparison to some whole, it seems that there was one whole, continuous or discrete, of which they were the parts, as was said above; and since that discrete [whole] lacks nothing substantial that was in the humanity when the qualitative composition was present, it seems that then, just as by means of that whole and the union those parts suffice to be named parts of Christ, so they suffice to name Christ with the namings that follow naturally from the same.

¶5 55.17–55.24

[55]Et quantum ad[8] exemplum Doctoris de albedine dependente a subiecto ut causante et non substantivante[9]: patet quod ymaginacio[10] est ficta ex falso principio, scilicet quod albedo potest primo[11] esse ad omnem[12] punctum subiecti sui informans;[13] 2°. conservata[13] ab eo sine hoc, quod informat; et 3°. nec informans nec conservata ab eodem. Albedo enim, cum sit subiectum esse album, non potest esse sine subiecto.

And as to the Doctor's example of whiteness depending on its subject as causing and not as substantiving [it]: it is clear that the imagined case is feigned from a false principle, namely that whiteness can, first, be informing its subject at every point; second, be conserved by it without this, that it informs; and third, be neither informing nor conserved by the same.[9] For whiteness, since it is the subject's being white, cannot be without a subject.[10]

¶6 55.25–56.12

[55]Item de hoc quod dicit Christum posse denominari ab illis partibus ut sic' Si essent nomina imposita;' miror de istis verbis tam realis philosophi et subtilis, cum constat[14] quod denominacio rei extra est impertinens imposicioni[15] nostrorum nominum, ut albedo eque denominaret[16] simplum[17] album, nullo signo artificiali hominum[18] existente; sicut quotlibet talibus positis secundum varia ydiomata. Unde denominaciones, quas Augustinus, Hugo de Sancto Victore, [56] et alii precedentes Magistrum Sentenciarum imposuerunt Verbo Dei secundum illas[1] partes pro illo triduo, scilicet quod est caro, quod est anima, et sic de ceteris, non sonuerunt in vicium. Nec valet dicere quod ille denominaciones sunt synecdochice[2]; quia, ut patet alibi, construccio synecdochica[3] est, quando parti quantitative attribuitur primo denominacio accidentalis, et consequentur toti secundum illam partem ut ;—homo est[4] albus faciem et sanus thoracem.[5] Cum ergo nec corpus nec anima Christi sit pars eius quantitativa; sequitur quod hic non est construccio synecdochica—Christus[6] est anima—sicut nec—Hic homo est tibia.

Again, as to his saying that Christ can be named from those parts in this way, "if names were imposed": I wonder at these words of so realist and subtle a philosopher, since it is evident that the naming of a thing outside [the mind] is irrelevant to the imposition of our names, as whiteness would equally name the simple [thing] white with no artificial sign of men existing, just as with any number of such [signs] posited according to various languages.[11] Hence the namings which Augustine, Hugh of St Victor, [56]and others before the Master of the *Sentences* imposed on the Word of God as to those parts for those three days, namely that he is flesh, that he is soul, and so of the rest, did not sound amiss.[12] Nor is it valid to say that those namings are synecdochic; for, as is clear elsewhere, a synecdochic construction is when an accidental naming is attributed first to a quantitative part, and consequently to the whole as to that part, as "a man is white as to his face and healthy as to his chest."[13] Since, therefore, neither the body nor the soul of Christ is a quantitative part of him, it follows that here, "Christ is soul", there is no synecdochic construction, as neither in "This man is a shin."

¶7 56.13–57.6

[56]Item si pro dicto triduo corpus et anima sunt partes Christi, tunc denominant[7] ipsum habere partes illas tanquam partes suas: quia

Again, if for the said three days the body and soul are parts of Christ, then they name him as having those parts as his parts: for it is evident

constat quod non sequitur —Hec[89] res est mea et est pars; ergo est pars mea—quia quelibet pars creature esset pars Trinitatis increate; et, ut sophiste[10] arguunt, homo[11] monstruose haberet multa capita asinina. Ideo concedit doctor[12] quod Christus potest vere denominari pro illo triduo habens partes illas ut partes suas, sed non carneus vel carnalis: ut si solum[13] assumpsisset[14] quantitatem, adhuc[15] non[16] esset quantus propter defectum subiecti materialis: sic licet habeat carneam partem suam, adhuc[17] non est carneus, eo quod deest humanitas. Sed miror de ista similitudine propter tria. Primo cum impossibile sit quantitatem per se esse. 2°. cum hoc posito per impossibile Verbum esset quantum per ypostaticam unionem. Non enim est unio vel assumpcio personalis sine communicacione ydiomatum nature specifice assumpte[18] Verbo vel persone assumenti: assumptum enim ypostatice oportet terminari suppositacione[19] aliena et non esse suppositum proprie speciei, [57]ut eciam[1] dicit doctor. 3°. videtur similitudo[2] impertinens; cum natura illa non dependet ab humanitate, cum manet naturaliter sine illa, et posset fuisse assumpta sine assumpcione humanitatis. Si enim Verbum posset pure assumere quantitatem, multo evidencius carnem mortuam per se de natura possibilem.

that it does not follow, "This thing is mine and is a part; therefore it is a part of mine", since [then] any part of a creature would be a part of the uncreated Trinity; and, as the sophists argue, a man would monstrously have many asses' heads.[14] Therefore the Doctor grants that Christ can truly be named for those three days "having those parts as his parts", but not "fleshy" or "carnal": as, if he had assumed quantity alone, he would still not be quantified, for lack of a material subject; so, although he has his fleshy part, he is still not fleshy, because the humanity is lacking.[15] But I wonder at that comparison, for three reasons. First, since it is impossible for quantity to be by itself. Second, since, this being posited *per impossibile*, the Word would be quantified by the hypostatic union. For there is no personal union or assumption without the communication of idioms of the assumed nature of the species to the Word, or to the person assuming: for what is assumed hypostatically must be terminated by an alien supposition, and not be a supposit of its own species, [57]as the Doctor also says.[16] Third, the comparison seems irrelevant, since that nature does not depend on the humanity, since it remains naturally without it, and could have been assumed without the assumption of the humanity. For if the Word could purely assume quantity, much more evidently [could he assume] dead flesh, which is possible by itself by nature.[17]

Notes

1. 53.29–30 *cum distinguuntur … et non sunt impertinencia*: the disjunction is exhaustive because the humanity (absolute) and the union (relational) are distinct and bear on each other. *Et e contra* (54.1) is taken as "and, on the other side", the second half of the first case; the converse case begins at 54.3 (*Si e contra*).
2. 54.1–3 *pro dicto triduo … humanitatem Christi*: omitted by A B C; the print follows O and is rendered. 54.10–11 *aliorum accidencium*: A B C *rerum accedencium*, "of the things that accrue"; the print is rendered.
3. 54.13–16: *qualitative* "qualitatively", as body and soul are the qualitative parts that make up a man. *Accessoria* "accessory", supervening on the complete man, against *previe requisita*.
4. 54.20 *iocalis* "jewel", the print (O): A B C *vitalis*, "that most precious vital [thing]"; O *sic sedente* for *succedente*. 54.22 *servari*: A B C *servare*. The print is rendered.
5. Judges 16:30 (Harris's margin): "and he killed many more at his death, than he had killed before in his life." So the body and soul, joined discretely after death, perfect the world more than the living composite did.
6. The reply and the words quoted here and at 55.26 are the Doctor's: Duns Scotus (the Subtle Doctor of 49.24; "so realist and subtle a philosopher", 55.27), *Ordinatio* III d. 22 q. un., ad 3 (Wadding VII/1, 454–455, the pages Harris's notes give): *non placuit Doctoribus vt denominaretur ab illis*, the examples of whiteness and of quantity, and *Dico quod sic, si essent nomina imposita … Ita Christus in triduo, vel Verbum, potuit dici habere animam et corpus* (*verified*). *Multum literalis*: "very literal-minded", keeping to the letter of the doctors. 54.28 *semper* is omitted by A B C.
7. The creed's "descended into hell"; the burial: John 19:39–40, Matt. 27:59–60. The two quoted titles are not scripture's wording; their source is untraced (not in the PL, nor in Harris's notes; perhaps liturgical). 54.31 *ministeriis*: O *misteriis*, "mysteries".
8. 55.5 *vivus*: A B C omit it; O has *vn?*, which Harris reads as *vivus*. The print is rendered. "King despoiling Tartarus" is a quoted title, its source untraced. 55.3 A B C *externos*.
9. 55.18 *substantivante*: O M *subiectante*, "as being its subject"; O adds *secundum* at 55.17, "the Doctor's second example". 55.19 O *ymago* for *ymaginacio*. The print is rendered.
10. 55.23 *cum sit subiectum esse album*: "the subject's being white": the accident is the subject's being so, and so cannot stand apart from it; *esse* is the infinitive taken as a noun, not existence.
11. 55.29 *simplum*, the print (O): A B C *ipsum*, "would equally name it white"; 55.27 A B C *cum stat. Rei extra*: a thing outside the mind; *ydiomata* (55.31) are here languages, not the idioms of the communication of idioms.
12. Augustine and Hugh of St Victor (*De sacramentis* II.1.11), writers before the Master, on the Word called "flesh" and "soul" in the three days: Augustine, *In Ioh.* 78.3, PL 35, 1836, *ac per hoc Christus est Deus anima rationalis et caro*; Hugh, PL 176, 401A–B and 407D, *Christus persona in sepulcro jacuit … secundum solam carnem* and *Ergo, inquis, homo est anima? Quidni?* (*verified*). The Lombard (*Sent.* III d. 22 c. 2, PL 192, 803) quotes only Augustine's tractate 78 and does not name Hugh.

13. 56.8–9 *sanus thoracem*: the print's reading stands in no manuscript: A B C *serenus thoracem*, O *sanus secundum thoracem*. The English, "healthy as to his chest", follows O, which differs from the print only by the explicit *secundum*. 56.8 *est*: A by a second hand, omitted by B.
14. 56.15–16: what is mine and is a part is not thereby a part of me; so the parts must be Christ's by naming, not by that inference. The asses' heads are the sophism of the man who owns an ass. 56.17 A B C *sophistice*, "as they argue sophistically".
15. 56.21–24 *carneus vel carnalis*: "fleshy" names from the matter, "carnal" savours of vice (as 50.28–31). *Quantus* "quantified", having quantity. 56.22 O omits *non*, against the sense.
16. 56.28–31: the idioms of the assumed nature are communicated to the Word or the assuming person. *Assumptum* is here the assumed nature, not the logician's "assumption"; *suppositacione aliena* "by an alien suppositation": it stands in another's supposit (A B C *supposicione*, "supposition").
17. 57.4–6 *multo evidencius carnem mortuam*: elliptical; "[could he assume]" is supplied from *posset … assumere*. *Per se de natura possibilem*: dead flesh can by nature be by itself, as quantity cannot.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Judges xvi. 30. (54.24).

Part 3: The body and the soul as Christ's parts in the three days

Harris pp. 57.7–61.20

¶1 57.7–58.12

[57]Item pari[3] evidencia, qua Christus habet corpus mortuum tanquam partem suam pro illo triduo, habet quamlibet partem illius corporis partem suam, ut latus, caput,[4] et pedes,[4] sicut scriptura sacra patenter asserit. Sed concesso consequente, cum non possunt poni nisi partes quantitive Christi, cum sint partes quantitative corporis, sequitur quod sunt partes quantitative Christi. Et cum omnis pars quantitativa rei componit ut sic quantitative[5] omne totum cuius est pars, sequitur quod dicte partes quantitative componunt Christum quantitative,[6] et per consequens sic componunt,[7] ut sit maius[8] sua parte quantitativa. Sequitur quod Christus sit[9] pro triduo mole magnus, ut puta septipedalis, in tumulo, cum ibi habeat partes extra partes: et cum nichil sit quantum nisi substancia materialis, sequitur quod Christus fuit pro dicto triduo substancia corporea; et per hoc est verisimile[10] Doctorem debere concedere, cum dicit quod Christus potest denominari pro illo triduo homo mortuus a tota natura, cui discrete copulatur. Et abreviator suus Cowtonus[11] dicit quod fuit pro illo triduo homo mortuus[12] sed[13] non homo. Sed videtur michi quod si quis est homo mortuus,[12] tunc est animal et corpus mortuum[14] et sic corpus, quamvis enim mortuum[14] per se circumlocutum cum verbo equivaleat verbo ampliativo. Ita[15] quod non sequitur—ista bestia nunc est mortua; ergo illa nunc est—Tamen si ista bestia nunc sit[16] bestia mortua, ista nunc est bestia, que moritur [58]aut[1] moriebatur. Si ergo res sit mortua secundum partem quantitativam ut[2] manum aridam[3] vivente residuo, quanto magis erit mortua per totum, si quelibet pars quantitativa sui sit mortua? Patet ergo quod si Christus unquam[4] fuit mortuus,[5] hoc fuit in triduo, et indubie tunc fuit persona mortua: et cum oportet dare[6] naturam unitam, secundum quam passus est mortem, que natura subiectet mortem; patet quod tunc fuit corpus sibi unitum sicut subtiliter[7] dicit Doctor. Non enim fuisset mortuus, si pro primo instanti

Again, by the equal evidence by which Christ has the dead body as his part for those three days, he has any part of that body as his part, as the side, the head, and the feet, as holy scripture plainly asserts.[1] Now, the consequent granted, since they cannot be posited as anything but quantitative parts of Christ, since they are quantitative parts of the body, it follows that they are quantitative parts of Christ. And since every quantitative part of a thing, as such, composes quantitatively every whole of which it is a part, it follows that the said quantitative parts compose Christ quantitatively, and in consequence so compose [him] that he is greater than his quantitative part. It follows that Christ is for the three days great in bulk, say seven feet long, in the tomb, since there he has parts outside parts: and since nothing is quantified but a material substance, it follows that Christ was for the said three days a corporeal substance; and by this it is likely that the Doctor must grant [it], since he says that Christ can be named for those three days "a dead man" from the whole nature to which he is discretely joined. And his abbreviator Cowton says that he was for those three days a dead man but not a man.[2] But it seems to me that if anyone is a dead man, then he is an animal and a dead body, and so a body; for although "dead", circumlocuted by itself with a verb, is equivalent to an ampliative verb, so that it does not follow, "this beast is now dead; therefore it now is", yet if this beast now is a dead beast, this now is a beast which is dying [58]or was dying.[3] If, therefore, a thing is dead as to a quantitative part or a withered hand, the rest living, how much more will it be dead throughout, if every quantitative part of it is dead?[4] It is clear, therefore, that if Christ was ever dead, this was in the three days, and without doubt he was then a dead person: and since one must posit a united nature as to which he

non-actuacionis corporis post vitam Christi tam corpus quam anima adnichilata[8] fuerunt; quia tunc omnis mors esset adnichilacio.[8]

suffered death, a nature that is the subject of death, it is clear that the body was then united to him, as the Doctor subtly says. For he would not have been dead if, for the first instant of the body's non-actuation after Christ's life, both body and soul had been annihilated; for then every death would be annihilation.[5]

¶2 58.13–59.20

[58]Item omnis anima, in quantum huiusmodi,[9] animat, ut patet 2° De Anima. Si ergo ille spiritus creatus fuit pro illo triduo anima Christi, tunc animavit; et, cum non animavit tunc corpus, relinquitur[10] quod tunc animavit Christum[11]; et per consequens ipse fuit tunc animatus ad sensum expositum. Et cum[12] non secundum naturam divinam pocius quam[13] in mundi principio: ergo servata est unio nature create precedens animam, que non potest fingi nisi humanitas. Non enim sortiretur[14] animacionem cum illo creato spiritu, nisi ypostatice uniretur; sicut habet denominacionem humanitatis propter ypostaticam unionem. Confirmatur. Si Christus uniretur ypostatice primo illi spiritui separato tunc esset aliquid quod prius non fuerat, cum fieret alicuius speciei in genere substancie, cum aliter non esset unio personalis. sed modo unitus est eadem unione qua tunc uniebatur[15]: ergo manet Christus illud pro triduo. Minor patet ex hoc, quod alterius racionis fuit unio, qua[16] Christus uniebatur spiritui suo pro triduo, quam[17] unio non ypostatica[18] solum per graciam: eo quod aliter non denominaretur Christus tunc habere animam, descendere ad[19] infernum, [59]et ministrare Patri ut sibi subditus, pocius quam Spiritus Sanctus dicitur minor Patre secundum columbam; quod est contra Augustinum primo Contra Simplicianum. Sicut ergo Christus fuisset tunc spiritus create speciei, ita est modo propter consimilem unionem: et cum ille spiritus non esse[1] potest nisi humane speciei, quia tunc posset transire de specie ad speciem, et sic species solum per accidens sibi inexistens foret sibi non species: nam[2] corrupto omni corpore et servatis spiritibus illis, qui quondam erant anime, forent ipsi individua racionalis nature; quia per se denominati agere acciones personales; et per consequens individua speciei non alterius quam humane, ut olim fuerant: ergo relinquitur quod forent homines: haberent enim unam[3] naturam communem, in qua convenirent pari evidencia qua[4] alia supposita speciei, et talis communis natura, cum sit prima quiditas[5] illorum individuorum, foret illis species specialissima. Et illud facit michi evidenciam quod humanitas servatur in anima; cum individuum non potest exuere formam specificam, et olim fuit in specie humana non solum indirecte,[6] sed habuit propriam quiditatem.

Again, every soul, insofar as it is such, animates, as is clear from *De anima* II.[6] If, therefore, that created spirit was for those three days the soul of Christ, then it animated; and, since it did not then animate the body, it remains that it then animated Christ; and in consequence he was then animated in the sense set out. And since [he was] not [animated] as to the divine nature, any more than in the beginning of the world, therefore the union of a created nature preceding the soul was preserved, which cannot be feigned to be anything but the humanity.[7] For he would not obtain animation with that created spirit unless he were hypostatically united [to it]; as he has the naming of humanity because of the hypostatic union. This is confirmed. If Christ were hypostatically united first to that separated spirit, then he would be something that he had not been before, since he would become [a thing] of some species in the genus of substance, since otherwise it would not be a personal union. Now he is at present united by the same union by which he was then united: therefore Christ remains that [thing] for the three days.[8] The minor is clear from this, that the union by which Christ was united to his spirit for the three days was of another kind than a non-hypostatic union by grace alone: because otherwise Christ would not be named as then having a soul, descending into [59]hell, and ministering to the Father as subject to him, any more than the Holy Spirit is said to be less than the Father as to the dove; which is against Augustine, in the first [book] *Against Simplicianus*.[9] As, therefore, Christ would then have been a spirit of a created species, so he is now, because of a like union: and since that spirit cannot be of any but the human species (for then it could pass from species to species, and so a species existing in it only by accident would be no species for it: for, every body being corrupted and those spirits which were once souls being preserved, they would be individuals of a rational nature, because they are named by themselves as performing personal actions; and in consequence individuals of no species other than the human, as they had once been: therefore it remains that they would be men: for they would have one common nature, in which they would agree by equal evidence as other supposits of a species, and such

a common nature, since it is the first quiddity of those individuals, would be for them the most special species).[10] And this gives me evidence that the humanity is preserved in the soul: since an individual cannot put off its specific form, and it was once in the human species not only indirectly, but had its own quiddity.

¶3 59.21–59.30

[59]Propter tales evidencias declinant moderniores loquentes[7] superficialiter more[7] legis ab istis principiis dicentes quod Christus non habuit in dicto triduo corpus vel animam; et sic nec fuit mortuus nec mortem passus, cum nulla fuit mors Christi; nec iacuit sepultus, nec descendit ad inferos; et per consequens, cum tunc non fuit unio ypostatica Christi ad naturam creatam, Christus non liberavit in persona propria patres de limbo, sicut nec Pater; cum tunc fuit secundum[8] omnem naturam[8] tunc habitam equalis[9] Patri et non minister.

Because of such evidences the more modern speakers, speaking superficially after the manner of the law, turn aside from these principles, saying that Christ did not have in the said three days a body or a soul; and so he was neither dead nor suffered death, since there was no death of Christ; nor did he lie buried, nor descend into hell; and in consequence, since there was then no hypostatic union of Christ to a created nature, Christ did not free the fathers from limbo in his own person, any more than the Father did; since he was then, as to every nature then had, equal to the Father and not a minister.[11]

¶4 59.31–60.21

[59]Nec intelligende sunt dicte[10] locuciones[10] synecdochice,[11] cum Christus tunc non habuit partem: et non est synecdochica[12] [60] locucio tocius per partem nisi pro mensura pro qua[1] est pars propter inconsequencia,[2] que secuntur. Sed hos deliros a scriptura a fide et a sanctis doctoribus vocat Magister Sentenciarum Distinccione 21′ hostes veritatis.‘ Nec inveni in scriptis[3] alicuius doctoris probabilis istam[4] sentenciam; sed fingunt eam recentissimi correctores. Unde doctor Bonaventura[5] putat super Distinccione 21. 3[ii] Sentenciarum quod sit de substancia fidei credere quod tam corpus quam anima fuerunt in triduo partes Christi; et allegat[6] ad hoc tam Augustinum quam Iohannem Damascenum dicentes[7]:’ Anathema sit, qui dicit Verbum deposuisse quod semel assumpsit.‘ Unde consequenter declarando quod triplex[8] est unio, scilicet accio agentis, passio uniti vel unitorum, et 3°. unitorum relacio, dicit quod eadem[9] unione activa continue unitum est[9] Verbum carni et anime sicut eadem tencione tenemus equum et frenum. Unde et sanctus Thomas super D[e]. 21 dicit quod deitas fuit coniuncta in dicto triduo tam corpori quam anime; non quod Verbum fuit tunc corpus vel anima, sed quod tunc fuit corpus Christi [corpus][10] et anima eius anima, et solum[11] talis fuit unio ypostatica post et ante.

Nor are the said locutions to be understood synecdochically, since Christ then had no part: and there is no synecdochic locution of the whole through the part [60]except for the measure [of time] for which it is a part, because of the inconsistencies that follow.[12] But these men, raving away from scripture, from faith, and from the holy doctors, the Master of the *Sentences*, Distinction 21, calls “enemies of the truth.”[13] Nor have I found this teaching in the writings of any reputable doctor; but the most recent correctors feign it.[14] Hence the doctor Bonaventure holds, on Distinction 21 of the third [book] of the *Sentences*, that it is of the substance of faith to believe that both the body and the soul were in the three days parts of Christ; and he alleges for this both Augustine and John Damascene, who say: “Anathema be he who says that the Word laid down what he once assumed.”[15] Hence, consequently making clear that union is threefold, namely the action of the agent, the being-acted-on of the united [thing] or [things], and third the relation of the united things, he says that by the same active union the Word is continuously united to the flesh and the soul, as by the same pull we hold the horse and the bridle.[16] Hence also Saint Thomas, on Distinction 21, says that the Godhead was conjoined in the said three days both to the body and to the soul; not that the Word was then body or soul, but that the body was then Christ’s, and his soul [his] soul; and such alone was the hypostatic union after and before.[17]

¶5 60.22–60.30

[60]Arguitur[12] autem de racione supposita fide catholica ad probandum propositum. Nam, supposito quod essemus in triduo, patet quod corpus Christi iacet in sepulcro et anima descendit ad inferos: nam hoc iacet in sepulcro et hoc est corpus Christi post et ante hoc triduum; ut patet ampliantibus presens tempus: ergo corpus Christi iacet in sepulcro. Et idem est argumentum de anima. Ex quo videtur quod[13] dicte partes sunt partes Verbi in triduo, quia[14] Verbum habet in triduo illas partes.

And it is argued from reason, the catholic faith being supposed, to prove what is proposed. For, supposing that we were in the three days, it is clear that the body of Christ lies in the sepulchre and the soul descends into hell: for this lies in the sepulchre, and this is the body of Christ after and before this three days, as is clear to those who ampliate the present tense: therefore the body of Christ lies in the sepulchre. And the same is the argument for the soul. From which it seems that the said parts are parts of the Word in the three days, because the Word has those parts in the three days.[18]

¶6 60.31–61.20

[60]Sed quia non omnes conveniunt in illo principio, ideo [61]arguitur 3° sic. Eo ipso quod persona manet[1] per tempus et[2] habet per idem tempus omnes[3] subiectas partes[3] sibi proprie servatas, que erunt postmodum[4] partes[5] sue, habet pro illo tempore partes illas: sed sic fuit de corpore et anima Christi pro dicto triduo: ergo tunc fuerunt[6] partes sue. Maior patet eo quod aliter manus arida vel membrum mortuum non esset pars persone: quod est contra scripturam et communem modum loquendi. Imo, ut patet in De Anima, partes extreme[7] longe cicius moriuntur ipso corde: et sic in[8] media vita est dare aliquas partes mortuas mixtas cum vivis.[9] Ad cuius conformitatem locuntur Morales, quod[10] membrum corporis Christi mistici[11] per privacionem gracie mortuum, non exinde desinit esse membrum, cum tunc omnis[12] expers gracie foret ut sic[13] infidelis. Et confirmacio illius est, quod tunc continuacio non est de essencia substancie materialis. Ex quo videtur quod manus abscisa ab homine supervivente remanet quodammodo manus sua. Et per idem, cum persona Filii Dei mansit per totum triduum habens a proprietate[14] et specialiter idem corpus aliter quam alia, videtur quod[15] tunc fuerat corpus suum.

But because not all agree on that principle, therefore [61]it is argued, third, thus. By the very fact that a person remains through a time and has through the same time all the subject parts properly preserved for him that will afterwards be his parts, he has those parts for that time: now so it was with the body and soul of Christ for the said three days: therefore they were then his parts.[19] The major is clear from this, that otherwise a withered hand or a dead member would not be a part of the person: which is against scripture and the common manner of speaking. Indeed, as is clear in *De anima*, the extreme parts die far sooner than the heart itself: and so in the middle of life one may posit some dead parts mixed with living ones.[20] In conformity with this the moralists say that a member of the mystical body of Christ, dead by privation of grace, does not thereby cease to be a member, since then everyone without grace would as such be an unbeliever.[21] And the confirmation of this is that then continuity is not of the essence of material substance. From which it seems that a hand cut off from a man who survives remains in a certain way his hand. And by the same token, since the person of the Son of God remained through the whole three days having, by ownership and specially, the same body otherwise than the others, it seems that it was then his body.[22]

Notes

1. The side (John 19:34), the head (John 19:30), the feet (Luke 24:39). 57.7 *pari*: C *per*; 57.9 B *pedes et capud*.
2. *Cowtonus* (so O; A *colton*, B *carton*, C *cantori*): perhaps Robert Cowton OFM, *Sentences* commentator, whom Wyclif calls the Doctor's (Scotus's) abbreviator; the identification is not Harris's: he found *no certain trace* of him and guessed John Colton, archbishop of Armagh. Cowton's Book III is unedited, and the place is untraced. O omits 57.25–26 *sed … mortuus* (eye-skip on *mortuus*) and 57.27–28 *et … mortuum*; at 57.16 A B C omit the second *quantitative*, O reads *componit* without *ut*, B *magis* (O *mag*˜) for *maius*.
3. 57.27–58.1: "dead", put by itself with the verb (*est mortuus*), works as an ampliative verb, extending the subject to what was; so "this beast is dead" does not yield "this beast is", but "this beast is a dead beast" makes it a beast that is dying or was dying. 57.29 *Ita*: O *ampleatiō ī*. 58.1 *aut*, the print (O): A B C *ac*, "and"; the print is rendered.
4. 58.2 *aut manum aridam*, with A B C O (*aut codd. omn.*, Harris's foot), against the print's *ut*, Harris's emendation: "as to a quantitative part or a withered hand". The manuscripts' reading construes. O *aridum*.

5. 58.6–7 *oportet dare*: "one must posit" (cf. *est dare*); *subiectet mortem*: the nature is the subject in which the death is. 58.10 *non-actuacionis*: the instant at which the soul no longer actuates the body. The Doctor is Scotus (as 55.8), *Ordinatio* III d. 22 q. un., ad 3 (Wadding VII/1, 455): Christ *potest etiam denominari a toto illo, quod resultat ex partibus illis … cum determinatione distrahente, scilicet, quod fuit homo mortuus* (57.20–22); and he grants that the Word *habuit corpus et animam sibi unitam* (58.8–9) (*verified*). 58.8 O *subiecti* for *subtiliter*.
6. Aristotle, *De anima* II.1 (412b4–6), the definition common to every soul, *actus primus corporis physici organici* (*verified* in sense, read in Thomas, *Sentencia De anima* II l. 1 n. 23). Harris's Index II lists this place under Aristotle. 58.13 O C omit *modi* (*huius* for *huiusmodi*).
7. 58.18–19 *Et cum non secundum naturam divinam pocius quam in mundi principio*: elliptical; "[he was] not [animated]" is supplied: as to the divine nature he is no more animated now than at the world's beginning. O C omit *cum*; A C *quoniam* for *quam*.
8. 58.28 *uniebatur*, the print (O): A B C *uniretur*, "by which he would then be united", keeping the hypothetical. The print, setting the present union beside that of the three days as the minor's proof does (58.30), is rendered. *Modo* "at present" is kept apart from the "now" of the minor premiss.
9. Wyclif's *Contra Simplicianum* I: the *Ad Simplicianum* never mentions the dove. The place is Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* I.19, PL 42, 756: the Spirit took no creature *ad unitatem personae suae*, and though shown *per columbae speciem, nunquam dictus est minor Patre* (from *Collatio cum Maximino* 14, PL 42, 723). Wyclif's title is perhaps a slip for *Contra Maximinum* (*verified*). 58.32 A B C *in infernum*.
10. 59.5–17: the *cum* clause (*et cum ille spiritus non esse potest nisi humane speciei*) is proved by the *quia* and *nam* clauses, set off here in parentheses; the period has no main clause of its own, and its conclusion is drawn in the next sentence (*Et illud facit michi evidenciam*). 59.16 *quiditas*: B *deitas*, C *quantitas*.
11. 59.22 *superficialiter more legis*: "after the manner of the law", reading words by their surface as the lawyers do; O *superficienter nostre legis*, "superficially [in the matter] of our law". 59.28–29 *secundum omnem naturam*: O *semē m̄n̄*, which Harris queries as *semen et naturam*; C *essencialis* for *equalis*.
12. 60.2 *inconsequencia*, the print: O *inconveniencia*, "the absurdities that follow", the usual formula; the print is rendered. 59.31 A B *de vi locucionis* (C *de esse locucionis*) for *dicte locuciones*, which leaves *intelligende sunt* without a subject. 59.32–60.1 *nisi pro mensura pro qua est pars*: a whole is named from its part only for the time during which that is its part.
13. The Lombard, *Sent.* III d. 21 (Wyclif's reference), "enemies of the truth": d. 21 c. 2, PL 192, 801, *Sed quis, nisi hostis veritatis, dicat animam a Verbo depositam?* (*verified*). The Master's words are aimed at those who would have the Word lay down the soul. *Deliros*: those who leave the furrow (*lira*), here astray from scripture, faith and the doctors.
14. *Sentencia* is the CONTEXTUAL row: "teaching", the position held. 60.5 A B C *illam scienciam*, "that knowledge"; O *scripturis* for *scriptis*. *Correctores*: those who "correct" the received teaching.
15. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.* d. 21 a. 1 q. 1 (Quaracchi III, 437), sed contra 1: *Augustinus et Damascenus: Anathema sit qui dicit, Verbum deposuisse quod semel assumsit* (*verified*). *De substancia fidei* is Wyclif's gloss: Bonaventure argues that neither the soul (q. 1) nor the flesh (q. 2) was separated. The words are neither father's. Quaracchi gives Augustine *sententialiter*, *In Ioh.* 47.10 (PL 35, 1738: *A Verbo autem animam separatam esse non dico*), and calls the axiom one ascribed to Gregory of Nyssa or to the Damascene (*De fide* III.27, IV.1). Harris cites *De fide* IV.1, PG 94, 1105, *οὐδὲν τῶν τῆς φύσεως μερῶν ἀπέθετο, οὐ σῶμα, οὐ ψυχήν*. Harris's margin names Augustine and John of Damascus. *Deposuisse* "laid down" is kept apart from *dimittere* "lay aside". O omits *dicentes*.
16. 60.13 *passio uniti*: *passio* is here the passive correlate of *accio*, "the being-acted-on", not the attribute of the *Posterior Analytics*. The threefold union (*actio unientis … passio unibilis … relatio unitorum*) and the horse and the bridle (*si teneam equum per frenum … non tamen duplici tentione teneo utrumque, sed unica*) are Bonaventure's, d. 21 a. 1 q. 3 and ad 3 (Quaracchi III, 440–441) (*verified*). 60.14–15 *unione activa*: A has *activa* barely legible in an erasure, B *anima quo*, C *activa conclusio*; B *duplex* for *triplex*.
17. 60.19 *[corpus]*: supplied by Harris against every manuscript (*corpus in codd. omnibus omissum restitui*). The manuscripts' text construes, *quod tunc fuit corpus Christi et anima eius anima*, "that the body was then Christ's, and his soul [his] soul", and the English follows it. Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sent.* III d. 21 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 1–2: neither the body nor the soul was separated from the Godhead in death, but *non potest dici quod filius Dei sit anima* (qc. 2 ad 3), *neutrum illorum de Christo praedicatur* (ad 6) (*verified*).
18. 60.26–27 *ut patet ampliantibus presens tempus*: for those who extend the present tense to what was and will be, "this is the body of Christ" holds of the corpse before and after. 60.22 O *aliter* for *Arguitur*; 60.29 A B C *et quod* for *quia*, "and that the Word has".
19. 61.1 *manet*: O *nmq3*, which Harris queries as *naturam habet*. 61.2 *subiectas partes*: O *substancias*; A B C *ut* for *et*.
20. The withered hand: Matt. 12:10. The extremities dying before the heart: Wyclif cites *De anima*, and Harris's Index II lists the place under Aristotle. The doctrine is Aristotle, *De generatione animalium* II.5, 741b15–24: the heart, formed first, is where life fails last, and what is formed last fails first, the medieval *cor primum vivens, ultimum moriens* (*verified*, locus corrected).
21. 61.12 *mistici*, the print with O (*i.e. mystici*, Harris): A B C *mixti*, "mixed", which loses the figure of the mystical body. 61.11 A B C *quia* for *quod*. *Morales*: the moral theologians, unnamed.
22. 61.19 *a proprietate*: A B C *appropriate*, "having appropriately and specially the same body"; the print is rendered, "by ownership". 61.20 O *fuerant*, O *quantum* for *quod*.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference AugusSne68 band John of Damas- (60.10).

Part 4: The Son of God a dead person; the willing soul; the dead body that is God

Harris pp. 61.21–65.17

¶1 61.21–62.11

[61]Item logice[16] potest deduci illud, posito quod solum[17] Christus[18] sit[19] mortuus de specie humana: tunc Filius Dei est mortuus, licet non sit homo ut conceditur[19]: ergo Filius Dei est persona mortua.

Again, this can be deduced logically, supposing that, of the human species, only Christ is dead, although, as is granted, he is not a man: then the Son of God is a dead man: therefore the Son of God is a dead person.[1] The

Consequencia videtur tenere,[20] eo quod persona est superius ad hominem secundum tenentes istam sentenciam, et in talibus eodem distrahente addito conformiter utrobique tenet consequencia, ut: Si Petrus est homo mortuus, tunc est animal mortuum et corpus mortuum. Si ergo Christus sit persona mortua, cum non superest que persona nisi persona Verbi, sequitur quod sit persona Verbi [62]mortua; et per consequens est persona Verbi, que moriebatnr; et sic persona Verbi est Christus. Si enim caput pedes et alia derelicta pro triduo sint partes hominis mortui, et solum Filius Dei sit homo mortuus; sequitur quod sunt[1] partes Filii Dei. Unde propter istam unionem ypostaticam Verbi ad[2] illud sanctum corpus sepultum in triduo dicit Doctor Solempnis 12° Quodlibeto: quod illud servatum est nedum incorruptum sed incorruptibile iuxta illud Psalmi 15′ Non dabis sanctum tuum videre corrupcionem.' Nec video quomodo esset naturaliter inditum[3] homini timere mortem, nisi poterit pati mortem. Non enim ordinat natura hominem timere eventum, qui[4] non potest sibi accidere.

inference seems to hold, because person is superior to man according to those who hold this teaching, and in such [cases], the same diminishing qualifier being added in conformity on both sides, the inference holds; as: If Peter is a dead man, then he is a dead animal and a dead body.[2] If, therefore, Christ is a dead person, since no person remains but the person of the Word, it follows that he is the person of the Word, [62]dead; and in consequence he is the person of the Word that was dying; and so the person of the Word is Christ.[3] For if the head, the feet, and the other [parts] left behind for the three days are parts of a dead man, and only the Son of God is a dead man, it follows that they are parts of the Son of God. Hence, because of this hypostatic union of the Word to that holy body buried in the three days, the Solemn Doctor says in his twelfth *Quodlibet* that it was preserved not only uncorrupted but incorruptible, according to that of Psalm 15: "Thou wilt not give thy holy one to see corruption."[4] Nor do I see how it would be naturally implanted in man to fear death, unless he could suffer death. For nature does not ordain a man to fear an event that cannot befall him.

¶2 62.12–63.4

[62]Item si anima Christi desiit esse anima Verbi Dei, cum tunc et ante scivit omnia, sequitur quod hoc scivit continue. Queritur[5] utrum voluntarie[6] reliquit corpus in morte vel non. Quod sic patet: quia fuit obediens usque ad mortem inclusive et post perpetuo. Nec illud debet verti in dubium[7] cum scivit hoc esse de necessario Dei beneplacito ad exaltacionem sui et sui generis. Unde Augustinus Ome. 119.[8]′ Quis, inquit, ita dormivit quando voluit sicut Christus?[8] Oblatus est enim, quia voluit, ut dicitur Is[e]. 52. Si volens[9] fuerit ypostatice[9] separata, cum ex hoc perdidit graciam unionis; sequitur quod sic volendo peccavit, quia voluntarie defecit a gracia; quod nephas[10] est dicere. Et consequencia videtur ex hoc[10]: quod anima propior[11] est Deo, cum est anima Dei, quam foret ab eo ypostatice separata: quia aliter esset possibile Deo[13] plus vel tantum diligere ipsam animam alterius sicut suam: quod non puto. Cum ergo anima Iesu gratis elongavit se a Verbo postquam fuit sibi carior ypostatice copulata: sequitur quod de tanto graciam perdidit et per consequens sic peccavit. Nam nulli dubium, quin maxima gracia possibilis creature est quod sit pars qualitativa [63]vel humanitas Dei sui. Si enim magna gracia est quod Deus velit[1] adoptare hominem in filium et heredem, longe maior est quod velit creaturam eternaliter predestinare in suam propriam animam vel humanitatem.

Again, if the soul of Christ ceased to be the soul of the Word of God, since then and before it knew all things, it follows that it knew this continuously. It is asked whether it left the body in death willingly or not. That it did is clear: because he was obedient unto death inclusively, and afterwards perpetually.[5] Nor ought this to be called into doubt, since it knew this to be of God's necessary good pleasure, for the exaltation of himself and of his kind. Hence Augustine, Homily 119: "Who," he says, "so slept when he willed as Christ?" For he was offered because he willed, as is said in Isaiah 52.[6] If, willing, it was hypostatically separated, since by this it lost the grace of union, it follows that by so willing it sinned, because it willingly fell away from grace; which it is impious to say. And the inference seems [to hold] from this: that the soul is nearer to God when it is the soul of God than it would be hypostatically separated from him: because otherwise it would be possible for God to love the soul of another more than or as much as his own: which I do not think.[7] Since, therefore, the soul of Jesus freely distanced itself from the Word after it had been dearer to him hypostatically joined, it follows that to that extent it lost grace and in consequence so sinned. For no one doubts that the greatest grace possible to a creature is that it be a qualitative part [63]or the humanity of its God. For if it is a great grace that God should will to adopt a man as son and

heir, far greater is it that he should will to predestine a creature eternally to be his own soul or humanity.

¶3 63.5–64.15

[63]Item iuxta sepe dicta et diffusius declarata impossibile est aliquam substanciam esse[2] materiam vel[3] formam vel ex eis compositam, nisi sit singularis essencia vel persona per se supposita speciei: sed tam corpus Christi quam eius anima fuit pro illo[4] triduo individua substancia: igitur[5] fuit essencia vel persona per se supposita speciei: et cum nullum suppositum potest manere aliud[6] suppositum, sequitur quod utraque illarum naturarum manet idem suppositum quod fuit,[7] anima et corpore, copulatum:[7] sed[8] tunc fuit suppositum hominis,[8] cum cuiuslibet hominis personalitas sit supposicio utriusque partis qualitative: igitur[5] utraque natura manet adhuc idem[9] suppositum hominis, et per consequens eadem persona Verbi. Et illa racio foret evidens cuicumque cui assumptum principium est famosum: 'Unde quia de virtute sermonis': sequitur ex hoc principio cum veritate fidei quod tam corpus Christi quam eius anima quantumlibet a se invicem[10] separata sint, utrumque[11] eadem persona hominis, que fuerant,[12] copulata. Ideo concedendum est quod pro triduo ypostatice sint unita et patet quomodo Verbum non potest assumere corpus mortuum, nisi mediante assumcione anime naturaliter precedente. Nec alteram illarum naturarum potest assumere,[13] nisi faciat se esse[14] illam naturam, cum nulla tali distinguit[15] essencialiter vel specialiter suppositacio a natura. Et patet 3°. quod Verbum non posset assumere corpus et animam separata, nisi faceret se esse[14] eandem personam que fuerunt tam corpus [64]quam anima copulata. Ideo non sollicitor quid sequeretur,[1] si Verbum assumeret unione[2] ypostatica tam corpus quam animam proditoris et dimitteret ipsa[3] suppositacioni proprie in finali resurreccione. Nam certum videtur michi[4] quod peccatum inde foret penitus deletum, eo quod ypostatica assumcio esset[5] efficacius medium ad tergendum peccatum quam lavacrum baptismale: sed istud delet omne peccatum suppositi vel nature: ergo multo magis personalis assumcio. Et ex alio latere puto me esse securum quod peccatum finalis impenitencie[6] subiectatum in anima proditoris[7] non potest deleri, vel[8] post eius incorrupcionem[8] redire. Ideo non superest nisi fugere tales casus. Nec est negandum, quin illud corpus mortuum[9] sit suppositum, sicut et spiritus; cum utrumque[10] habet supposibilem operacionem secundum idem suppositum;[9] quia persona Filii est utrumque.[10]

Again, according to what has often been said and more fully made clear, it is impossible that any substance be matter or form or composed of them, unless it is a singular essence or person supposited by itself under a species: now both the body of Christ and his soul were for those three days an individual substance: therefore [each] was an essence or person supposited by itself under a species: and since no supposit can remain another supposit, it follows that each of those natures remains the same supposit that it was, soul and body, when joined: now it was then the supposit of a man, since the personality of any man is the supposition of both qualitative parts: therefore each nature remains still the same supposit of a man, and in consequence the same person of the Word.[8] And that argument would be evident to anyone to whom the assumed principle is well known: "Hence because in the proper sense of the words": it follows from this principle, with the truth of faith, that both the body of Christ and his soul, however far separated from each other they may be, are each the same person of a man that they had been, joined.[9] Therefore it must be granted that for the three days they are hypostatically united; and it is clear how the Word cannot assume a dead body except by means of the assumption of the soul naturally preceding. Nor can he assume either of those natures unless he makes himself to be that nature, since in no such [case] is supposition distinguished essentially or specifically from nature. And it is clear, third, that the Word could not assume body and soul separated unless he made himself to be the same person that both body [64]and soul, joined, were.[10] Therefore I am not anxious about what would follow if the Word assumed by hypostatic union both the body and the soul of the traitor and laid them aside to their own suppositation at the final resurrection.[11] For it seems certain to me that the sin would thereby be wholly deleted, because hypostatic assumption would be a more effective means for wiping away sin than the baptismal washing: now that deletes every sin of the supposit or of the nature: therefore much more the personal assumption. And on the other side I think I am secure that the sin of final impenitence, subjected in the soul of the traitor, cannot be deleted, or return after its incorruption.[12] Therefore nothing remains but to flee such cases. Nor is it to be denied that that dead body is a supposit, as is the spirit too; since each has an operation

¶4 *64.16–65.17*

[64]Et si obiciatur quod pie aures abhorrent quod Deus universitatis[11] sit corpus vel cadaver mortuum; dicitur quod Deus non est cadaver, cum non sit mortuum corpus et putidum[12] sed ad sensum proprium incorruptum. Quamvis enim laceratum sit lancea et flagellis causantibus solucionem[13] continuitatis, non tamen crura eius fracta per milites, nec carnes eius canibus[14] aut avibus[14] laniate; quia Exod. 12 mistice est preceptum; 'os non comminuetis ex eo.' Nec horreret, sed accenderet pias mentes[15] quod Dominus celi et terre, qui[16] dignatus est nasci parvulus, vagiens in cunabulis,[17] ac reponi coram bestiis in presepe, dignatus[18] est idem et non alius iacere mortuus in sepulcro. Sed quia putrefaccio et incineracio corporis mortui non profuisset suo generi, cum corpus mortuum non mereretur[19] sibi vel aliis: ideo inconsonum et superfluum fuisset quod dictas infirmitates [65]post completam victoriam assumpsisset. Nec auderem[1] dicere quod corpus mortuum foret Deus, nisi scriptura sacra tam patenter illud assereret, Ioh. 19: nec crederem[2] capiti meo de exposicione sensus litteralis eius scripture, nisi Augustinus, Hugo de Sancto Victore, et ceteri superiores doctores illud patenter assererent: nec diligerem Verbum Dei pro tunc ut Deum meum, nisi pro tunc esset spiritus descendens ad inferos et cum hoc natura divina gubernans omnia.[3] Nec video quomodo posset sumpsisse naturam[4] porci, serpentis,[4] vel alterius creature quam hominis, ut patet posterius. Nam si aliquid potuisset[5] esse monstrum, potissime fuisset[6] chimera vel tragelaphus habens caput asininum, caudam equinam, pectus leoninum.[7] Et sic[8] esset veracissime[8] de Iesu nostro in casu, quo omnem naturam aliam[9] assumeret et post assumpcionem continuaret. Vacuum ergo[10] et periculosum est raciones tales asserere.

that can be supposited as to the same supposit; because the person of the Son is each.[13]

And if it is objected that pious ears shrink from [hearing] that the God of the universe is a body or a dead corpse, the answer is that God is not a corpse, since he is not a dead and putrid body but, in the proper sense, incorrupt.[14] For although it was torn by the lance and by scourges causing a dissolution of continuity, yet his legs were not broken by the soldiers, nor his flesh torn by dogs or birds; because in Exodus 12 it is mystically commanded: "You shall not break a bone of him."[15] Nor should it horrify, but kindle, pious minds that the Lord of heaven and earth, who deigned to be born a little child, wailing in the cradle, and to be laid before beasts in a manger, deigned, the same and no other, to lie dead in the sepulchre. But because the putrefaction and reduction to ashes of the dead body would not have profited his kind, since a dead body does not merit for itself or for others, therefore it would have been unfitting and superfluous that he should have assumed the said weaknesses [65]after the complete victory.[16] Nor would I dare to say that a dead body was God, unless holy scripture so plainly asserted it, John 19; nor would I trust my own head about the exposition of the literal sense of that scripture, unless Augustine, Hugh of St Victor, and the other higher doctors plainly asserted it; nor would I love the Word of God for that time as my God, unless for that time he were a spirit descending into hell and with this the divine nature governing all things.[17] Nor do I see how he could have taken the nature of a pig, of a serpent, or of any creature other than man, as is clear later. For if anything can be a monster, it would most of all be a chimera or a tragelaphus, having an ass's head, a horse's tail, a lion's breast.[18] And so it would most truly be with our Jesus in the case in which he assumed every other nature and after the assumption continued [it]. It is therefore empty and dangerous to assert such arguments.

Notes

1. 61.22–23 *mortuus licet non sit homo ut conceditur de specie humana tunc filius dei est homo mortuus ergo*, O's reading, against the print's *mortuus de specie humana: tunc Filius Dei est mortuus, licet non sit homo ut conceditur: ergo* (A B C), "then the Son of God is dead, although he is not a man, as is granted". O is followed because the argument requires it: its antecedent, "a dead man", is what the proof of the inference needs (person superior to man, the same qualifier added on both sides, 61.24–28) and what p. 62 assumes (*solum Filius Dei sit homo mortuus*); from the print's bare "dead" the inference to "a dead person" by that rule does not go through. A C *solus* for *solum*; B adds *sic*.
2. *Distrahente*: *mortuus* is the diminishing qualifier, which takes away from what it qualifies; added on both sides of "man, therefore animal" it keeps the inference. *Superius ad hominem*: "superior to man", the higher term. *Sentencia* is the CONTEXTUAL row, "teaching". O C omit *tenere* (61.24).
3. 61.29 *cum non superest que persona*: *que* for *aliqua*, "no person remains". *Moriebatnr* is a misprint for *moriebatur*, "was dying".

4. The Solemn Doctor is Henry of Ghent; *Quodlibet* XII q. 12 (Paris 1518, fol. 491): the body would not have putrefied even in a death from old age, because God, *eodem miraculo quo tunc corpus Christi assumpsit cum anima sibi coniuncta, ipsum conservavit a corruptione ipsa anima separata*, citing *Non dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem* (*verified*). Henry's words are *integrum custodisset. Nedum incorruptum sed incorruptibile* is Wyclif's. Ps. 15:10 (Harris's margin, Ps. xvi): Vulgate *nec dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem*, DR "nor wilt thou give thy holy one to see corruption"; Wyclif's *Non dabis* is rendered. 62.9 B *ruditum* for *inditum*.
5. Phil. 2:8, "becoming obedient unto death"; *inclusive*: death itself included. 62.14 O adds *ergo* after *Queritur*; O *volupta^e* for *voluntarie*.
6. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 119 (on John 19:30), Wyclif's "Homily 119"; 119.6, PL 35, 1952: *Quis ita dormit quando voluerit, sicut Jesus mortuus est quando voluit?* (*verified*). The number is the received one, and Augustine's *Quis ita* bears out the print (O) against A B C *quod … ideo*. A B C read *quod, inquit, ideo dormivit*; the print is O's. Isa. 53:7 (Wyclif: ch. 52): Vulgate *Oblatus est quia ipse voluit*, DR "He was offered because it was his own will"; Wyclif's *quia voluit* is rendered.
7. 62.24 *propior*, the print (A C): B O *prior*, "prior to God", which does not answer *elongavit se* (62.28); the print is rendered. The foot's entry 12, *deum* O, seems to belong to the text's figure 13 at *Deo* (62.26): O *Deum*.
8. 63.7–8 *persona per se supposita speciei*: a singular that stands under its species in its own right; *supposita* is the participle, agreeing with *persona*. 63.13 *quod fuit, anima et corpore, copulatum*: O *anima in corpore copulantis*; 63.13–14 *sed … hominis* is supplied in A's margin.
9. 63.18 *assumptum principium*: the logician's *assumptum*, the principle taken as premiss, not the assumption of a nature. The words Harris prints as its statement, *Unde quia de virtute sermonis*, do not construe as a principle and may be defective; they are rendered as printed.
10. 63.27 *distinguit*: rendered as *distinguitur*, "is distinguished", as Harris asks at the foot (*An distinguitur legendum?*); the active has no object. A departure from the print. 63.26–30 *illam naturam … faceret se esse*: omitted by A B C, an eye-skip from *se esse* to *se esse*; the print (O) is rendered.
11. 64.1–4: *proditor* is Judas; *dimitteret ipsa suppositacioni proprie*, "laid them aside to their own suppositation": let his body and soul stand again in their own supposit. A B C *sequitur* for *sequeretur*, *ipsam* for *ipsa*.
12. 64.11 *post eius incorrupcionem*: A B C *post eius corrupcionem*, "or return after its destruction"; the foot adds *post eius om.* with no siglum. The print is rendered ("after its incorruption", the soul made incorruptible). A B C *impunie* for *impenitencie*.
13. 64.14 *supposibilem operacionem*: "an operation that can be supposited", referred to a supposit. A B C omit 64.13–15 *sit suppositum … suppositum*, an eye-skip; O *utraque*.
14. *Ad sensum proprium*: in the proper sense of *cadaver*, which implies the putrid. A B C add *pietatis* after *universitatis* and read *putridum*.
15. The lance, the legs: John 19:33–34. The bone: Exod. 12:46 (Harris's margin), DR "neither shall you break a bone thereof", quoted in the words of John 19:36 (*Os non comminuetis ex eo*, DR "You shall not break a bone of him"); *mistice*: the paschal lamb as figure. A B C omit *aut avibus*.
16. 64.29 *non meretur*, with O, against the print's *non mereretur*, which stands in no manuscript: A B C *mereretur* without *non*, which reverses the argument. The manger: Luke 2:7. A B C omit *qui* (64.25) and add *quia* after the second *dignatus*.
17. John 19:40–42: the body laid in the sepulchre is called Jesus. Augustine and Hugh of St Victor on the dead body as God (Harris's margin names Augustine); Augustine, *In Ioh.* 78.2, PL 35, 1836, *Filium Dei dicimus et carnem quae sola sepulta est*; Hugh, *De sacramentis* II.1.11, PL 176, 401A–B, *mortuus est etiam Deus, quia Deus homo fuit … Christus persona in sepulcro jacuit … secundum solam carnem* (*verified* in sense). B *auderunt*, O *audire* for *auderem*; O *credissem*.
18. 65.11–12 *poterit … foret*, with A C O, against the print's *potuisset … fuisset* (B): A C and O are both families of the manuscripts, and together they outrank the print. 65.13 A B C *bovinum*, "an ox's breast", for *leoninum*; *tragelaphus*: the goat-stag. 65.13–14 O *essent variatissime*, *animalis* for *aliam*; 65.16 O *Vanum igitur*.
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 62: *moriebatnr;* (plate: print = moriebatnr (turned u; misprint for moriebatur); kept as printed)
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Ps. xvi. n. (62.8); reference Exod. xii. 46. (64.23); reference 5 Augustinus, (65.5).

Chapter 5

Part 1: That God could not lay aside the assumed nature: the argument from damage

Harris pp. 65.0–68.4

¶1 65.0–65.0

[65][Supponendo quod Verbum non dimisit humanitatem pro triduo, probat quod nec potuit dimittere naturam quam assumpsit. Assuming as already proved that the Word did not as a matter of fact in the three days lay aside the human nature which he had taken up; it is here proved to be impossible that he should so lay it aside.]

[Supposing that the Word did not lay aside the humanity for the three days, it proves that he could not lay aside the nature that he assumed either.]

¶2 65.18–65.20

[65]Viso[11] quod Verbum non dimisit de facto in sancto triduo corpus vel animam: restat ostendere quod Deus non potuit dimittere naturam hominis quam assumpsit.

Since it has been seen that the Word did not in fact, in the holy three days, lay aside body or soul, it remains to show that God could not lay aside the nature of man that he assumed.

¶3 65.21–68.4

[65]Probatur tripliciter. Primo sic. Deus non potest dampnificare naturam aliquam sine suo demerito[12] precedente: sed [66]si dimitteret naturam assumptam, eam sic dampnificaret: ergo et cetera.[1] Maior patet ex hoc, quod dampnificacio est creature racionali[2] mali illacio inutilis,[2] que non potest sibi inexistere nisi oriatur principaliter a se ipsa, iuxta sentenciam beati Iohannis Chrisostomi et aliorum doctorum communiter. Confirmatur. Si Deus aufert creature racionali bonum aliquod, iustum et pulcrum est illud auferri et per consequens non sonat[3] in malum inutile: et sic[4] servata immunitate peccati non est dampnum. Nam si Deus dampnificat hominem, quia facit eum iuste carere bono possibili; tunc infinitum multum dampnificaret quamlibet beatificabilem creaturam; et, ut communiter deducitur, infinitum impediret quodlibet opus suum. 2°. Confirmatur[5] ex hoc, quod infliccio[6] pene perpetue pro peccato non dampnificat sed meliorat dampnatum in tantum quod, si esset in eleccione[7] sua sic dampnari post peccatum vel vacare[8] impunem,[9] eligeret racionabiliter sic dampnari: ergo a maiori vel pari, si Deus aufert ab aliquo[10] sine suo demerito[10] quodvis bonum, cum sit pulcrum et bonum quod ita faciat nedum toti universitati[11] sed persone, que aliter frustratorie[12] occuparet; sequitur quod talis ablacio non sit dampnificacio; cum nec pro illa ablacione nec pro eius causa racionabiliter[13] sit dolendum. Ex quo[14] videtur 3°. quod innocens hoc videns eligeret[15] racionabiliter sic privari: et cum nemo[16] potest racionabiliter eligere[16] dampnificari, sequitur quod Deus non dampnificat creaturam, sed solum ipsamet[17] seipsam[18] vel aliud

It is proved in three ways. First thus. God cannot damage any nature without its own preceding demerit: now, [66]if he were to lay aside the assumed nature, he would thus damage it: therefore etc.[1] The major is clear from this, that damaging is, for a rational creature, the useless bringing-on of evil, which cannot be present in it unless it arises principally from itself, according to the teaching of blessed John Chrysostom and of the other doctors commonly.[2] This is confirmed. If God takes away some good from a rational creature, it is just and beautiful that it be taken away, and consequently it does not amount to useless evil: and so, immunity from sin being preserved, it is no loss. For if God damages a man because he makes him justly lack a possible good, then he would damage every beatifiable creature infinitely much; and, as is commonly deduced, he would infinitely hinder each of his works. Second, this is confirmed from this, that the infliction of perpetual punishment for sin does not damage but betters the damned man, to such a degree that, if it were in his choice to be thus damned after sin or to remain unpunished, he would reasonably choose to be thus damned: therefore, from the greater or from the equal, if God takes away any good whatever from anyone without his demerit, since it is beautiful and good that he so act, not only for the whole universe but for the person, who otherwise would hold [it] to no purpose, it follows that such a taking-away is not damaging, since neither for that taking-away nor for its cause is one reasonably to grieve.[3] From which, third, it seems

alliciens ad peccandum. Ymo si bene consideretur, omnis dampnificacio sapit iniuriacionem, que non potest per se bono et iusto competere, quin pocius bonificare et corrigere. Minor autem argumenti sic [67] probatur. Humanitas assumpta a Verbo non potest demereri previe suam dimissionem: ergo, illa dimissa, hoc sibi contingeret sine suo demerito. Antecedens patet per hoc, quod non potest demereri stante unione, quia tunc Verbum peccaret: et si pro instanti dissolucionis vel post peccaret, patet quod demeritum [dimissionem] sequetur;[1] et per consequens non dampnificaretur ex suo demerito precedente. Quod autem dimissio[2] foret dampnosa humanitati Christi ex hoc evidet, quod deperdicio gracie unionis foret deperdicio maximi boni possibilis intrinseci creature:[3] et per consequens tum[4] loco illius non succederet tantum bonum: sequitur quod humanitas ipsam perdens foret notabiliter peiorata, et per consequens dampnificata. Valorem autem ypostatice unionis suppono[5] ex dictis et dicendis: per illam enim fuit homo assumptus idem personaliter Verbo Dei. Magna ergo peioracio sua foret quod dimitteretur sine suo demerito tanquam extranea. Non enim pertinet ad dictum Cesarem semper Augustum[6] sic peiorare sine suo demerito carissimam[7] creaturam: quia indubie creatura dimissa pro instanti dimissionis posset racionabiliter conqueri de ingratitudine Dei sui, cum continue ante fecit quidquid debuit, et finaliter reciperet pro 'retribucione[8] mercedis' tantum dampnum.[8] Non ergo foret spes[9] in tali Deo. Et hinc nimirum[10] dicit Augustinus Ome. 47: 'Absit[11] quod Christus pro triduo animam suam dimiserit:[12] ipsam enim inseparabiliter habuit:' unde indubie, si post peccaret, dimissio gracie unionis preservantis ne peccet foret causa principalis peccati: quia si affirmacio sit causa affirmacionis, negacio est causa negacionis, ut absencia naute est causa periclitacionis navis ex 2° Physicorum. Illud ergo peccatum, ex dimissione originatum, esset Deo principaliter imputandum, cum non ex parte creature, sed Dei, causatur talis absencia: talis[13] ergo [68]Deus excederet in malicia deum Manicheorum,[1] qui sine[2] demerito servi sui absentaret se pro temptacionis tempore non iuvando. Unde et illam racionem tangit sanctus Thomas De Christo,[3] articulo 70.[4]

that an innocent seeing this would reasonably choose to be thus deprived: and since no one can reasonably choose to be damaged, it follows that God does not damage a creature, but only [the creature] itself [damages] itself, or another enticing [it] to sin.[4] Indeed, if it is well considered, all damaging savours of wronging, which cannot of itself belong to one who is good and just, but rather to make good and to correct. Now the minor of the argument is [67]proved thus. The humanity assumed by the Word cannot demerit its laying-aside beforehand: therefore, were it laid aside, this would befall it without its demerit. The antecedent is clear by this, that it cannot demerit while the union stands, for then the Word would sin: and if it sinned at the instant of the dissolution or after, it is clear that the demerit will follow [the laying-aside]; and consequently it would not be damaged from its own preceding demerit.[5] And that the laying-aside would be damaging to the humanity of Christ is evident from this, that the loss of the grace of union would be the loss of the greatest possible good intrinsic to a creature: and consequently no so great a good would then succeed in its place: it follows that the humanity losing it would be notably made worse, and consequently damaged.[6] And the worth of the hypostatic union I suppose from what has been said and is to be said: for through it the assumed man was personally the same as the Word of God. Great, therefore, would be its worsening, that it should be laid aside without its demerit as a stranger. For it does not belong to the said Caesar ever August thus to make worse, without its demerit, his dearest creature: for undoubtedly the creature laid aside could, at the instant of the laying-aside, reasonably complain of the ingratitude of its God, since continually before it did whatever it ought, and at the last would receive, for "recompense of reward", so great a loss.[7] There would therefore be no beauty in such a God.[8] And hence, no wonder, Augustine says, Homily 47: "Far be it that Christ for the three days laid aside his soul: for he had it inseparably":[9] hence undoubtedly, if it sinned afterward, the laying-aside of the grace of union, which preserves [it] from sinning, would be the principal cause of the sin: for if an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation, a negation is the cause of a negation, as the absence of the first draft is the cause of the ship's peril, from the second [book] of the *Physics*.[10] That sin, therefore, originating from the laying-aside, would be principally imputable to God, since such an absence is caused not on the creature's side but on God's: such a [68]God, therefore, would exceed in malice the god of the Manichees, who without the demerit of his servant would absent himself for the time

of temptation, not helping. Hence St Thomas also touches that argument, *On Christ*, article 50.[11]

Notes

1. 65.21–22 *dampnificare*: "damage", to do harm to; kept apart from *dampnum* "loss" (66.9), *dampnosa* "damaging" (67.8) and *dampnari* "be damned" (66.16). The argument: God harms no nature without its prior demerit; laying aside the assumed nature would harm it; so he cannot lay it aside. B *merito* for *demerito* (65.22).
2. Chrysostom: the teaching that no one is harmed except by himself, the treatise *Quod nemo laeditur nisi a seipso*, whose thesis (§1, restated in §17) is that no one who is wronged is wronged by another, only by himself (*verified* in sense, in the NPNF translation; the work circulated in Latin). At 66.3 O reads *inutilis illacio* and omits *mali*.
3. 66.17–23: *a maiori vel pari*, the topic from the greater or the equal: if punishment betters even the damned man, who deserved it, the taking-away of a good from one who did not deserve it is still less a damaging. *Frustratorie occuparet*: the person would hold the good to no purpose; "[it]" is supplied. *Sine suo demerito* (66.18–19) is wanting in A B C; O *universo* for *universitati* (66.20).
4. 66.27 *ipsamet seipsam*: the creature itself is the only one that harms itself, or another (the devil, or a fellow) who entices it to sin. A B C *ipsam* for *ipsamet*; O omits *seipsam*. At 66.25 A B C read *sic (sit B) racionabiliter eligeret* for *potest racionabiliter eligere*.
5. 67.6 "[the laying-aside]": Harris's own bracket *[dimissionem]*, from A's margin (*suple dimissione*); O *sequitur* for *sequetur*. A sin at or after the dissolution would follow the laying-aside, and so could not be the demerit that preceded it.
6. 67.9 *evidet*, as printed, "is evident". 67.11 *tum*, wanting in O, is taken as "then"; it may stand for *cum*, which would make the clause a reason ("since no so great a good would succeed"); the sense is the same. O *a creatura* for *creature* (67.10).
7. 67.22 "recompense of reward": Heb. 2:2 (DR "received a just recompense of reward"), Harris's margin. A B C read *mercedis tantum premium* ("so great a prize") and O *mercedem*; the foot does not make plain whether O keeps *tantum dampnum*, and the print is kept. 67.17–18 *Cesarem semper Augustum*, the imperial style "Caesar ever August", is given to God; O *augustutum*. *Carissimam*: B and O abbreviate, O's read by Harris as *beatissimam* (67.18).
8. 67.23 *species* "beauty", with B O, against the print's *spes* "hope": "there would be no hope in such a God". B and O agree across the families, and their reading construes: such a God would lack the beauty claimed for his acts (*pulcrum*, 66.7, 66.19). The two words share an abbreviation, so the print's word may be Harris's expansion.
9. Augustine, "Homily 47": *Tract. in Ioh.* 47 (on John 10:17–18), the place Wyclif cites by homily throughout; 47.10, PL 35, 1738: *Fidelem latronis animam non deserebat, et deserebat suam? Absit: sed illius ut Dominus custodivit, suam vero inseparabiliter habuit* (*verified*). Here Wyclif's number is the received one; *pro triduo* is his. A *mimirum*; O omits *absit* and reads *dimiseret*.
10. Aristotle, *Physics* II.3 (195a11–14): the same thing is cause of contraries, the first draft's presence of the ship's safety and his absence of its wreck (*verified*; Harris quotes the Greek).
11. 68.3–4 Thomas, "*De Christo*, article 50", with O and the source, against the print's *70*. The question whether the Godhead was parted from Christ's flesh and soul in death is *ST* III q. 50 aa. 2–3, which bears out O's number: a. 2 co., *id quod per gratiam Dei conceditur, nunquam absque culpa revocatur … Cum igitur in Christo nullum fuerit peccatum, impossibile fuit quod solveretur unio divinitatis a carne ipsius* (*verified*). Harris quotes the same sentence in his note but prints *70*. C *Aquino* for *Christo*.

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 67: *'retribucione mercedis'* (bt ran the words together; print has two words (footnote 8 between)) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference 5 Augustinus, (65.5); reference Heb. ii. 2. (67.22); reference Augustine shud- (67.23).

Part 2: That the blessed cannot cease to be blessed, and the Word would sin with the humanity

Harris pp. 68.5–72.18

¶1 68.5–70.3

[68]Item quilibet beatus in celo est tam insolubiliter Deo connexus quod repugnat illi statui miseriam peccati in anima succedere vel[5] coesse: sed Christus ab instanti unionis fuit perfeccius beatus secundum animam quam alius, cum fuerit sanctus sanctorum: ergo multo magis repugnat anime sue peccatum succedere vel[6] coesse: sed si[6] dimissio foret possibilis,[7] hoc potuit contigisse:[8] ergo illa[9] dimissio non fuit possibilis. Maior probatur ex hoc. Omnes beati sunt immortales et impeccabiles, sicut omnes rectiloqui[10] confitentur: non quia non possunt peccare, quia multi prius tempore suo peccant; sed sunt in gracia confirmacionis

Again, every blessed one in heaven is so inextricably joined to God that it is incompatible with that state that the misery of sin should succeed or coexist in the soul: now Christ from the instant of the union was more perfectly blessed as to the soul than any other, since he was the holy of holies: therefore much more is it incompatible with his soul that sin should succeed or coexist: now if the laying-aside were possible, this could have happened: therefore that laying-aside was not possible.[1] The major is proved from this. All the blessed are immortal and impeccable, as all who speak correctly confess: not because they cannot sin, for many sin earlier,

et glorie, cui repugnat peccatum vel miseriam coexistere, vel post illam succedere: patet ergo quod beatitudo est qualitas implicans securitatem perpetuitatis pleni gaudii et exclusionis miserie. [Eciam[1112] securitas perpetuitatis pleni gaudii[12] et exclusionis miserie est per seipsum securitas talis, cum sit deveniendum ad ultimum formale, quo formaliter et non alio est quis securus de perpetuitate pleni gaudii et exclusionis miserie. Sed contradiccionem implicat tali coexistere in subiecto suo vel post illam in ipso subiecto suo miseriam succedere: igitur etcetera.][11] Unde omnes theologi concorditer confitentur, quod[13] contradiccionem claudit aliquem esse[13] vel fuisse beatum cum hoc quod fiat postmodum non beatus. Nec valet dicere quod beatitudo per accidens sit beatitudo, quia ipsa est ultima forma abstracta, qua quis est beatus formaliter. Ideo, si illa non sit per se beatitudo, non superest quid aliud per se foret. [69]Sicut ergo iusticia non potest esse non iusticia et de formis similibus;[1] sic status beatitudinis non potest esse non huiusmodi[2] status. Unde notum est methaphisicis quod tales forme abstracte non suscipiunt sic[3] predicacionem per accidens ut concreta: si enim beatitudo sit per accidens beatitudo—cum non sit processus in infinitum; sed, cum omne per accidens sit reducibile ad aliquid[4] per se, est devenire ad ultimum formale, quo quis est beatus —et illud per se et non per accidens est beatitudo: et de tali est michi sermo. Confirmatur. Si A qualitas[5] sit nunc beatitudo et potest manere et[6] desinere esse beatitudo; per idem post esse potest reincipere esse beatitudo. Quo concesso, patet quod preter A, quod non sufficit denominare hominem beatum, requiritur forma superaddita; et sic non A, sed forma sibi adveniens,[7] foret beatitudo. Patet ergo, quod cum beatitudo et confirmacio non possunt esse, nisi sint perpetue; nec possunt esse nisi huiusmodi quod, eo ipso quod insunt, reponunt hominem in statu cui repugnat miseriam succedere vel coesse; nec dependet beatitudo pocius a futuro, quam qualitates alie absolute;[8] tunc enim non forent beati de sua beatitudine securati. Minor ergo argumenti patet generaliter omni professori fidei incarnacionis: cum anima Christi ab instanti sue creacionis fuit plena omni genere carismatum, habens clariorem[9] visionem divine essencie quam alia creatura, et per consequens plenam fruicionem ad tantam noticiam naturaliter[10] consequentem. Cum ergo 'vita eterna sit[11] sic cognoscere Deum Patrem ac Dominum Iesum Christum,' ut testatur Veritas Ioh. 17; patet quod anima Christi ab instanti sue creacionis perpetue est beata.[12] Nec audivi hoc negatum ab aliquo, cum palam sequitur ex incarnacione. Si enim homo solum[13] intelligit quod intelligit mens[13] [70]ypostatice copulata; per locum a sufficienti similitudine spiritus

in their own time; but they are in the grace of confirmation and of glory, with which it is incompatible that sin or misery should coexist, or succeed after it: it is clear, therefore, that blessedness is a quality implying security of the perpetuity of full joy and of the exclusion of misery.[2] Hence all theologians confess in concord that "someone is or was blessed, together with his afterwards being made not blessed" implies a contradiction. Nor does it avail to say that blessedness is blessedness by accident, for it is the ultimate abstract form by which someone is formally blessed. So, if it is not blessedness of itself, nothing else remains that would be [so] of itself.[3] [69]As, therefore, justice cannot be not-justice, and so of similar forms, so the state of blessedness cannot be not such a state. Hence it is known to metaphysicians that such abstract forms do not admit predication by accident in the way that concretes do: for if blessedness is blessedness by accident (since there is no process to infinity, but, since everything by accident is reducible to something of itself, one must come to an ultimate formal [principle] by which someone is blessed), that too is blessedness of itself and not by accident: and it is of such that I am speaking.[4] This is confirmed. If the quality A is now blessedness, and can remain and cease to be blessedness, by the same token, after its being [so], it can begin again to be blessedness.[5] Which being granted, it is clear that besides A, which does not suffice to name a man blessed, a superadded form is required; and so not A, but a form coming to it, would be blessedness. It is clear, therefore, that since blessedness and confirmation cannot be unless they are perpetual, neither can they be except of such a kind that, by the very fact that they are present, they set a man in a state with which it is incompatible that misery should succeed or coexist; nor does blessedness depend on the future any more than other absolute qualities do; for then the blessed would not be made secure of their blessedness.[6] The minor of the argument, therefore, is clear generally to every professor of the faith of the incarnation: since the soul of Christ from the instant of its creation was full of every kind of charisms, having a clearer vision of the divine essence than any other creature, and consequently full enjoyment following naturally on so great a knowledge.[7] Since, therefore, "eternal life is thus to know God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ", as the Truth testifies, John 17, it is clear that the soul of Christ from the instant of its creation is perpetually blessed.[8] Nor have I heard this denied by anyone, since it follows openly from the incarnation. For if a man understands only what the mind [70]hypostatically joined understands, by the topic from

Iesu cognoscit quidquid cognoverat[1] ipse Iesus specialiter cum sit personaliter Verbum Dei.

sufficient likeness the spirit of Jesus knows whatever Jesus himself had known, especially since he is personally the Word of God.[9]

¶2 70.4–70.32

[70]Ex istis colligitur talis racio. Tam determinatum et necessarium est ipsum hominem fuisse assumptum, quam necessarium est mundum vel aliquid aliud prefuisse: sed non potuit fuisse assumptus nisi fuisset exinde beatus: ergo tam necessarium est ipsum fuisse beatum quam necessarium est aliquid prefuisse: sed pretericiones huiusmodi non possunt solvi: ergo nec beatitudo vel assumpcio Domini nostri Iesu Christi. 2°. confirmatur ex hoc; quod anima Christi actu elicito vidit clare in Verbo omnia preterita vel futura; et per consequens clare vidit perpetuitatem sue beatitudinis; et ultra, cum illa visio[2] non potuit defuisse vel verti in ignoranciam aut[3] aliud genus entis; sequitur quod illa anima non potuit desinere esse beata vel Verbo ypostatice copulata. 3°. confirmatur ex testimonio Leonis Pape in quodam sermone dicentis: 'tanta fuit unicio[4] Dei et hominis ut nec supplicio posset[5] dirimi nec morte distingui.' Nec obest isti sentencie divina dispensacio, qua voluit Verbum suum ad tempus esse corpus, non plene sed quasi arraliter tunc[6] beatum, et per consequens esse animam secundum actuacionem corporis et racionem, qua[7] ipsam respicit, quantumlibet dolorosam.[8] Nam ille homo est multarum naturarum quelibet,[9] secundum quarum unam[10] fuit ad tempus abiectus viator, et simul secundum aliam perfectissimus comprehensor: et sic simul summe gaudens et summe tristis secundum vires et raciones dispares, ut[11] ostenditur consequenter: et dico[11] quod arraliter habuit in via dotes corporis, cum dote subtilitatis exivit sponsus de clauso utero,[12] dote agilitatis ambulavit super aquas, dote incorruptibilitatis et claritatis in transfiguracione emicuit.[13]

From these such an argument is gathered. It is as determined and necessary that "this man has been assumed" as it is necessary that "the world, or something else, has been before": now he could not have been assumed unless he had thereupon been blessed: therefore it is as necessary that "he has been blessed" as it is necessary that "something has been before": now pasts of this kind cannot be loosed: therefore neither [can] the blessedness or the assumption of our Lord Jesus Christ.[10] Second, this is confirmed from this, that the soul of Christ by an elicited act saw clearly in the Word all things past or future; and consequently saw clearly the perpetuity of its blessedness; and further, since that vision could not have been lacking, or be turned into ignorance or another genus of being, it follows that that soul could not cease to be blessed or hypostatically joined to the Word. Third, this is confirmed from the testimony of Pope Leo in a certain sermon, saying: "So great was the uniting of God and man that it could neither be severed by punishment nor divided by death."[11] Nor does the divine dispensation stand against this teaching, by which he willed his Word for a time to be a body not fully but, as it were, by way of earnest then blessed, and consequently to be a soul, as to the actuation of the body and the aspect under which it regards it, however sorrowful.[12] For that man is each of many natures, as to one of which he was for a time a cast-down wayfarer, and at the same time as to another a most perfect comprehensor: and so at the same time supremely rejoicing and supremely sorrowful as to diverse powers and aspects, as is shown in what follows: and I say that he had by way of earnest on the way the dowries of the body: with the dowry of subtlety the bridegroom went out from the closed womb, with the dowry of agility he walked upon the waters, with the dowry of incorruptibility and of brightness he shone out in the transfiguration.[13]

¶3 70.33–71.15

[70]3°. per deducens ad impossibile patet idem.[14] Nam si [71]humanitas ypostatice copulata posset dimitti et sic dampnari pro peccato, et tam caro quam anima est personaliter ipsum Verbum; sequitur quod Verbum Dei peccare[1] poterit et dampnari; quod nephas[2] est dicere. Patet consequencia supposito fundamento, cum arguitur ab inferiori ad suum superius personale, cui per se competit accio personalis. Sequitur ergo—hec humanitas potest peccare: hec humanitas est persona Verbi: ergo persona Verbi potest peccare—. Nam persona Verbi nedum est

Third, the same is clear through [one] leading to the impossible.[14] For if [71] the humanity hypostatically joined could be laid aside and so be damned for sin, and both the flesh and the soul are personally the Word himself, it follows that the Word of God could sin and be damned; which it is impious to say. The inference is clear, the foundation being supposed, since it is argued from an inferior to its personal superior, to which personal action belongs of itself. It follows, therefore: "This humanity can sin: this

hec[3] humanitas, sed aliquid aliud[3] quia divinitas; ideo est superior[4] vel communior quam[4] est hec[5] humanitas. Unde, sicut sequitur quod Filius Dei fuit natus humanitus, conversatus,[6] passus, mortuus, et sepultus, et ascendit, eo quod humanitas, que fuit dictus Filius, sic se habuit; ita eciam sequeretur quod Verbum peccaret, si humanitas, que fuit dictum Verbum, peccaret.

humanity is the person of the Word: therefore the person of the Word can sin." For the person of the Word is not only this humanity but something else, since [it is] the divinity; so it is superior to, or more common than, this humanity.[15] Hence, as it follows that the Son of God was born humanly, lived among [men], suffered, died, and was buried, and ascended, because the humanity, which was the said Son, was so, so also it would follow that the Word sinned, if the humanity, which was the said Word, sinned.

¶4 71.16–72.18

[71]Confirmatur ex testimonio moderniorum[7] dicencium quod hec humanitas non posset[8] ypostatice copulari peccando nisi Verbum exinde peccaret;[9] et, quod plus est,[10] racione unionis prioris Verbum denominatum est secundum moderniores jacuisse pro triduo in sepulcro, et ad sensum consimilem peccasse in casu, quo[11] natura dimissa pro tunc peccaverit. Que, rogo, causa diversitatis sensus Spiritus[12] Sancti in isto articulo fidei 'Christus descendit ad inferos, fuit mortuus et sepultus;' hoc est, non illa persona, sed pars eius pro tempore quo[13] non fuit pars vel ypostatice copulata,[14] sic se habuit; quin ad sensum simillimum concederet, quod natura dimissa et postmodum reassumpta, si peccaret interim, denominaret Filium sic peccare?[15] Ponatur ergo quod in die parasceues anima Christi[16] perfecerit liberacionem patrum a limbo,[16] et pro tunc agitetur[17] corpus a demone multos homines conquassando et quod in [72]sancto[1] sabbato †reuniatur[2] anima corpori suspensa ypostatica unione, et peccet ante nonam adulterio, homicidio, blasfemia, et omni genere peccatorum; et post nonam peniteat, et procreet legitime, ac juste condempnet multos ad mortem, assumpta humanitate in prima sabbati in unitatem suppositi Verbi Dei: quem casum moderni admittunt et magis mirabiles tanquam necessario possibiles; in quo casu videtur juxta glosam quam dant[3] articulis fidei quod[4] omnes dicte operaciones in triduo redundarent in Christum vel aliter fingeret[5] ex instinctu Spiritus Sancti sensum impossibilem et insolitum. Certum est itaque Christum non istos homines suffocasse,[6] virginitatis laureolam[7] ex procreacione seminis perdidisse, irregularitatem incurrisse, vel remansisse in eo vestigia peccatorum. Et conformi racione nec iacuit sepultus nec descendit ad inferos, nisi conformi racione denominaciones predicte in casu[8] posito sibi insint,[8] vel aliter dicatur sentencia supradicta, quod mansit pro dicto triduo unio ypostatica ad utrumque.

This is confirmed from the testimony of the more modern [doctors], who say that this humanity could not be hypostatically joined while sinning unless the Word thereupon sinned; and, what is more, by reason of the prior union the Word is named, according to the more modern, as having lain for the three days in the tomb, and in a quite similar sense as having sinned, in the case in which the nature laid aside had sinned at that time.[16] What, I ask, is the cause of the difference, that the sense of the Holy Spirit in this article of faith, "Christ descended into hell, was dead and buried", is "not that person, but a part of him, for the time in which it was not a part or hypostatically joined, was so", and that one would not grant, in a most similar sense, that the nature laid aside and afterwards reassumed, if it sinned in the meantime, would name the Son as so sinning?[17] Let it be posited, then, that on the day of the Parasceve the soul of Christ completed the freeing of the fathers from limbo, and at that time the body is driven by a demon, battering many men, and that on [72]the holy sabbath the soul is reunited to the body, the hypostatic union being suspended, and sins before none by adultery, homicide, blasphemy, and every kind of sin; and after none repents, and begets lawfully, and justly condemns many to death, the humanity being assumed on the first [day] of the week into the unity of the supposit of the Word of God:[18] a case which the modern [doctors] admit, and more marvellous ones, as necessarily possible; in which case it seems, according to the gloss they give to the articles of faith, that all the said operations in the three days would redound upon Christ, or else one would be feigning, from the prompting of the Holy Spirit, an impossible and unaccustomed sense.[19] It is certain, therefore, that Christ did not stifle these men, lose the aureole of virginity by the begetting of seed, incur irregularity, or that traces of sins remained in him. And by a conformable reason he neither lay buried nor descended into hell, unless by a conformable reason the aforesaid namings in the case posited belong

to him; or else the teaching stated above must be said: that the hypostatic union remained for the said three days to both.[20]

Notes

1. 68.10 *sed si*: A B C read *coesse. Secundo Christus si*, opening a new step ("Second: Christ …"); the print, with O, keeps a single argument. A B C *alia* for *illa* (68.11); O *possibiliter*, *contingisse* (68.11), and *vel* added by a second hand (68.7).
2. 68.19–25: the passage Harris prints in square brackets, *Eciam securitas … igitur etcetera*, is wanting in C and in O and stands only in A B (in B partly in the margin). C and O agree across the families against the print, and the sentence construes without it (*patet ergo … miserie. Unde omnes theologi …*), so it is left out of the English above. It runs: "Also, the security of the perpetuity of full joy and of the exclusion of misery is of itself such a security, since one must come to an ultimate formal [principle], by which formally and by no other someone is secure of the perpetuity of full joy and of the exclusion of misery. Now it implies a contradiction that [misery] should coexist with such [a security] in its subject, or that after it misery should succeed in that same subject: therefore etc." At 68.14 *non quia non possunt peccare*: the blessed are "impeccable" not in that they never could sin, for they sinned on the way. A B C *reliquie* for *rectiloqui* (68.13).
3. 68.29–31 *per accidens / per se*: "by accident / of itself", the two kinds of predication (Harris italicises them as terms). An abstract form such as blessedness is what it is of itself; only a concrete subject is blessed by accident. At 68.26–27 C reads *contradiccionem anime esse*.
4. 69.5–9: the conditional *si enim … beatitudo* is interrupted by the parenthesis, and *et illud … est beatitudo* is taken as its apodosis: whatever is blessedness by accident leads back to a form that is blessedness of itself. B *substancialibus* for *similibus* (69.2).
5. 69.11 *post esse*: taken as "after its being [so]", i.e. after having ceased; the phrase is bare, and a word may be lost (*post [desinere] esse*?). O omits *manere et*. The argument: a quality that could stop and start being blessedness would need a further form to make it blessedness, and that form, not it, would be blessedness.
6. 69.20 *absolute*: Harris suggests *abstracte* ("abstract", cf. *forme abstracte*, 69.4); the print is kept.
7. 69.23 *carismatum*: the CONTEXTUAL row, here "charisms", gifts, not chrism. A C *generaliter* for *naturaliter* (69.26); O *cariorem* for *clariorem* (69.24).
8. John 17:3 (DR "Now this is eternal life: That they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent"): Wyclif gives the verse's sense in his own words. *Veritas*, "the Truth", is Christ. A B C *beatificata* for *beata* (69.29).
9. 69.31–70.3: *homo* is taken as any man, whose understanding is his mind's; so, by likeness, the spirit of Jesus, a mind hypostatically joined, knows what Jesus knows, who is personally the Word. Alternatively *homo* is "the man" Jesus himself. *Per locum a sufficienti similitudine*: "by the topic from sufficient likeness", an argument from a like case. A *intelligit (rasura) mens*, C *intelligit quod mens*; O *cognoverit*.
10. 70.4–11: what has been cannot not have been: if the assumption is a past as necessary as any past, so is the blessedness bound up with it. *Pretericiones*: "pasts", truths about the past. *Solvi*: "be loosed", the verb of the John text in 05-c.
11. Leo, "in a certain sermon": *Sermo* 68 (*De passione* 17) c. 1, PL 54, 373A: *cum in tantam unitatem Dei et hominis natura convenerit, ut nec supplicio potuerit dirimi, nec morte disjungi* (*verified*). *Distingui* for *disjungi* is Wyclif's or his exemplar's. A B C *unio* for *unicio*, *potest* for *posset* (70.18–19).
12. 70.21 *arraliter*: "by way of earnest" (*arra*, the pledge paid ahead of the whole sum): the body's blessedness given in part beforehand. A B C add *esse* after *tunc. Racionem, qua ipsam respicit*: the aspect under which the soul regards the body; O *quam*, *dolosam. Sentencia* is the CONTEXTUAL row, here "teaching".
13. 70.24–25 *multarum naturarum quelibet*: "each of many natures" (Godhead, body, soul; cf. the three natures of 01-a). *Comprehensor*: one who has attained the end, against *viator*. The dowries are the gifts of the glorified body, here shown beforehand in the virgin birth, the walking on the water, and the transfiguration. A B C *ut ostenditur ut dico* (70.28–29); O *enituit* for *emicuit*.
14. 70.33 *per deducens ad impossibile*: *per* with a bare participle, as printed, "through [one] leading to the impossible", the *reductio ad impossibile*; a noun (*argumentum*?) may be lost. A B C *illud* for *idem*.
15. 71.5–10 *ab inferiori ad suum superius personale*: from the lower term (this humanity) to the higher (the person of the Word): the person is both the humanity and the Godhead, so it is the wider, "more common" term. B omits *humanitas … aliud* (71.9) and reads *quam communior quam* (71.10); O *ista*, omitting *est* (71.11).
16. 71.16–22: the more modern doctors grant that the Word is named from the prior union as having lain in the tomb; Wyclif turns the admission against them: the same naming would make the Word a sinner in the case put. O *modernorum* (71.16); B C *potest* (71.17); O *peccaverit* (71.18).
17. 71.22–28 *Que … causa diversitatis … quin … concederet*: taken as one question: why read the article of the part (the body buried, the soul in hell), yet refuse the like reading for a sin of the nature laid aside. O *peccaret* for *peccare*; O *qui* (71.25), *copulativa* (71.26).
18. 72.1 *†reuniatur*: Harris's dagger. A C *reniatur*, B *revivatur*, C in the margin *revinatur*, O *reunciatur*; Harris says read *revinciatur* ("be bound again") or *reuniatur*. The manuscripts do not agree, and the print is translated. The case runs from Good Friday (*parasceve*, the day of preparation) through the sabbath to *prima sabbati*, the first day of the week; *nonam*, "none", is the ninth hour. O *perfeceret libacionem patrum a libo* (71.29–30).
19. 72.10 *fingeret*: its subject is not expressed, and is taken as "one"; C *finge (lacuna)*, O *fig*^{t}. A B *dant autores*, C *dat autores*, "the authors give" (72.8); O omits *quod*.
20. 72.18 *ad utrumque*: to both, body and soul. *Sentencia supradicta*: Wyclif's own teaching, argued in the chapters before, that the union remained in the three days. A B C *aureolam* for *laureolam* (72.12); O *suffocare* (72.12); A B *sibi posito insunt* (72.16).

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):

- 71: *hec humanitas,* (bt ran together; print hec ³ humanitas (two words)) [SUB]

- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference s. John xvii. 3. (69.28); reference l Cor. i. 25. (72.30).

Part 3: "the scripture cannot be broken"; the objection from annihilation

Harris pp. 72.19–76.31

¶1 72.19–73.3

[72]Ex istis colligitur quod, si beatus alius tantum adheret Deo quod non potest post beatitudinem dissolvi unio, qua est unus spiritus cum eo;[9] multo magis natura Christi, que ultra hoc ypostatice est unita: ut si homo, qui potest peccare, habet per graciam quod sit impeccabilis, immortalis, et sic de aliis que peioracionem sapiunt: quanto magis natura humana in fine bonitatis possibilis exaltata, que omnino peccare non poterit, ab illa gracia dimitti non poterit. Unde, quamvis Mt. 27 secundum naturam completam creatam clamet Christus; 'Deus meus, Deus meus, utquid me dereliquisti?' non tamen dimisit ypostaticam unionem, sed dereliquit illud 'infirmum Dei,' quod est suppositum 'forcius' ad tempus, inconservatum a[10] persecucionibus et flagellacionibus Iudeorum; sed[10] nunquam [73]dimisit vel simpliciter dereliquit, quia dimissio dicit existenciam dimissi et separacionem ypostaticam ab eodem, quod non fuit in triduo.

From these it is gathered that, if another blessed one so cleaves to God that after blessedness the union by which he is one spirit with him cannot be dissolved, much more [so] the nature of Christ, which beyond this is hypostatically united: as, if a man, who can sin, has by grace that he is impeccable, immortal, and so of the other things that savour of worsening, how much more the human nature, exalted to the limit of possible goodness, which can in no way sin, cannot be laid aside from that grace.[1] Hence, although in Matthew 27, as to the complete created nature, Christ cries: "My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?", yet he did not lay aside the hypostatic union, but forsook that "weakness of God", which is the "stronger" supposit, for a time unprotected from the persecutions and scourgings of the Jews;[2] but he never [73]laid [it] aside or forsook [it] without qualification, because laying-aside signifies the existence of what is laid aside and its hypostatic separation from the same, which was not [so] in the three days.

¶2 73.4–75.5

[73]Quod si quis in evidenciam huius veritatis olim famose expectat testimonium scripture, ecce Veritas Ioh. 10. alloquitur Phariseos: 'non potest, inquit, solvi scriptura, quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum.' Pro cuius intellectu sunt tria notanda per ordinem.[1] Primo quod Veritas non loquitur de scriptura nostra artificiali aggregata ex ficturis[2] atramenti et pellibus mortuorum; tum quia talis scriptura cottidie per artifices potest solvi; tum eciam quia illi non competit sanctificacio et missio in mundum: sed illa scriptura est 'liber vite' cui inscribuntur omnia, cum sit intrinsecus Sermo Dei. Et ad illum sensum exponit Augustitinus Ome. 44.[3] 'Forte, inquit, aliquis dicit[4]: Si pater eum sanctificavit, ergo[5] aliquando non erat sanctus; sed si sic eum sanctificavit,[5] quomodo genuit? ut enim sanctus esset, gignendo ei[6] dedit, quia sanctum eum genuit.' Et respondet posterius ad obiectum. 'Si, inquit, quod sanctificatur aliquando, non erat sanctum; quomodo dicimus Deo Patri —"sanctificetur nomen tuum"—?' Ille ergo, qui est absolute necessario in se sanctus, fit sanctus[7] in nobis per prevenientem graciam, noticiam, et operacionem, et confessionem meritoriam.[8] Unde Spiritus Sanctus ad relinquendum nobis exemplar,

And if anyone, for evidence of this truth, once famous, awaits the testimony of scripture, behold, the Truth, John 10, addresses the Pharisees: "the scripture," he says, "cannot be broken, whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world."[3] For the understanding of this, three things are to be noted in order. First, that the Truth does not speak of our artificial scripture, put together out of the shapings of ink and the skins of the dead; both because such scripture can daily be loosed by craftsmen, and also because sanctification and sending into the world do not belong to it: but that scripture is the "book of life", in which all things are written, since it is the inward Speech of God.[4] And in that sense Augustine expounds, Homily 48: "Perhaps," he says, "someone says: If the Father sanctified him, then at some time he was not holy; but if he so sanctified him, how did he beget him? For that he should be holy, he gave it him in begetting, because he begot him holy." And he answers the objection afterwards: "If," he says, "what is sanctified was at some time not holy, how do we say to God the Father, 'hallowed be thy name'?"[5] He, therefore,

quod loquitur de scriptura vitali, subdit in genere masculino— 'quem Pater sanctificavit'— innuendo nobis relacionem faciendam ad Filium. Mos[9] enim est scripture et Augustini per adiectivos[10] masculinos personas concipere et per neutros[10] naturas. Et isti modo[11] loquendi alludit Apostolus ad Gall. 3°; 'non, inquit,[12] dicit seminibus quasi in multis, sed semini tuo, qui est Christus.' Indubie, sicut sanctus Apostolus notavit[13] numerum, sic et genus. [74]2°. supponitur quod Veritas non loquitur de solucione mentis a corpore vel Patris a Filio in hoc dicto: de prima non, quia supra Ioh. 2°. dicit Veritas Iudeis prophetice quod solverent templum corporis sui ab anima et ipse in tribus diebus excitaret illud. Cum ergo 'non fuit in eo EST et NON,' patet quod hic non intellexit corpus non posse solvi ab anima. Nec alius sensus est pertinens; tum quia ligacio[1] et solucio est duarum naturarum ad invicem et non personarum eiusdem summe indivisibilis essencie; tum eciam, quia ille sensus fuisset dictis impertinens, non eis ambiguus. Ideo relinquitur 3°. per locum a sufficienti divisione quod intellexit insolubilitatem deitatis ab humanitate, quas expressit nomine 'scripture,' ut vel sic scrutarentur scripturas, que testimonium perhibent[2] de istis duabus naturis sic ypostatice copulatis. Unde et Ioh. 5. dicitur[3] 'scrutamini[4] scripturas in quibus vos putatis vitam eternam habere, et ille sunt que testimonium perhibent[2] de me.' Non enim haberent evidenciam dicere quod blasfemat dicendo se esse Dei Filium naturalem apposito sufficienti scrutinio scripturarum. Nam si in lege scriptum sit de Messia vel Christo futuro in duabus naturis et una ypostasi—quod[5] vinculum propter unionem[6] ypostaticam ad infinitam personam non potest includi[7] fine temporis, sicut potest unio participative deificatorum per Sermonem Dei[8] factum ad eos et non eis personaliter copulatum—quomodo est color concludendi blasfemiam[9] ex assercione filiacionis naturalis? Medium autem per quod tenet ista inveccio est veritas quod 'non potest solvi' hec 'scriptura' ad sensum expositum. Nam ex illo[10] sequitur quod sit natura increata in supposito Verbi, et cum[11] hoc natura creata temporaliter sed[12] insolubiliter copulata. Unde signantissime Veritas dicit negativam quod 'non potest solvi scriptura;' quia, licet sancti in patria sint Deo inseparabiliter copulati, tamen contingentissime possunt solvi, cum sint pro [75] tempore suo viantes[1] peccabiles. Homo autem assumptus a Verbo Dominus Iesus Christus pro nullo tempore peccare poterit. Et[2] patet conclusio.[2] Nec[3] aliter haberent sancti doctores evidenciam imprecandi anathema eis qui concedunt dimissionem vel solucionem huiusmodi naturarum.

who is absolutely necessarily holy in himself becomes holy in us through prevenient grace, knowledge, and working, and meritorious confession. Hence the Holy Spirit, to leave us a pattern [showing] that he speaks of the living scripture, adds in the masculine gender, "whom the Father hath sanctified", intimating to us that the reference is to be made to the Son. For it is the custom of scripture and of Augustine to conceive persons through masculine adjectives, and natures through neuters.[6] And to this manner of speaking the Apostle alludes, Galatians 3: "He saith not," he says, "to seeds, as of many: but to thy seed, which is Christ."[7] Undoubtedly, as the holy Apostle noted the number, so also the gender. [74]Second, it is supposed that the Truth does not speak in this saying of the loosing of the mind from the body, or of the Father from the Son: not of the first, because above, John 2, the Truth says to the Jews prophetically that they would loose the temple of his body from the soul, and he in three days would raise it up. Since, therefore, "there was not in him, It is and It is not", it is clear that here he did not mean "the body cannot be loosed from the soul".[8] Nor is the other sense pertinent; both because binding and loosing is of two natures to one another, and not of persons of the same supremely indivisible essence; and also because that sense would have been irrelevant to those addressed, not a matter of doubt to them.[9] So it remains, third, by the topic from sufficient division, that he meant the inextricability of the Godhead from the humanity, which he expressed by the name "scripture", so that at least thus they might search the scriptures, which give testimony of these two natures thus hypostatically joined. Hence in John 5 too it is said: "Search the scriptures, in which you think to have life everlasting. And the same are they that give testimony of me."[10] For they would not have had evidence to say "he blasphemes in saying he is the natural Son of God", had a sufficient searching of the scriptures been applied. For if it is written in the law of the Messiah or Christ to come in two natures and one hypostasis (which bond, because of the hypostatic union to an infinite person, cannot be closed by an end of time, as can the union of those participatively deified through the Speech of God made to them and not joined to them personally), what colour is there for inferring blasphemy from the assertion of natural sonship?[11] And the middle [term] through which this invective holds is the truth that this "scripture" "cannot be broken", in the sense expounded. For from it it follows that there is an uncreated nature in the supposit of the Word, and together with this a created nature joined in time but inextricably. Hence most pointedly the Truth speaks the negative, "the

scripture cannot be broken"; because, although the saints in the homeland are inseparably joined to God, yet most contingently they can be loosed, since for [75]their time they are those on the road, able to sin. But the man assumed by the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ, could at no time sin. And the conclusion is clear.[12] Nor otherwise would the holy doctors have evidence for invoking anathema on those who grant the laying-aside or loosing of such natures.

¶3 75.6–75.10

[75]Sed contra illud obicitur. Quicquid Deus contingenter et libere contradictorie facit, potest alias eciam adnichilando[4] destruere: sed libere contradictorie assumpsit hominem: ergo potest nedum ipsum dimittere sed adnichilando[4] destruere.

But against this it is objected. Whatever God does contingently and freely, as between contradictories, he can at another time also destroy by annihilating: now he freely, as between contradictories, assumed the man: therefore he can not only lay him aside but destroy [him] by annihilating.[13]

¶4 75.11–75.22

[75]Confirmatur tripliciter. Primo ex hoc, quod idem est iudicium de una creatura et qualibet, cum tanta sit utrobique divina libertas: sed aliquam creaturam Deus potest adnichilare: ergo[5] quamlibet. 2°. per hoc quod aliter Deus esset necessitatus ad conservandam dictam unionem, et sic non libere contradictorie eam servat. 3°. ex hoc quod Deus non esset omnipotens, nisi posset tam contingentem et fragilem[6] nedum dissolvere,[7] sed et adnichilare.[7] Tales[8] sunt multe[8] instancie, que omnes currunt sub uno circulo quod Deus non esset omnipotens nisi posset in talia. Vel taliter[9] arguunt per locum a simili;— Si Deus creare poterit et utrobique tanta[10] est[10] distancia; ergo per idem[11] adnichilare poterit.

This is confirmed in three ways. First from this, that the judgement is the same of one creature and of any, since the divine freedom is as great on both sides: now God can annihilate some creature: therefore any. Second, by this, that otherwise God would be necessitated to conserve the said union, and so he does not keep it freely, as between contradictories. Third, from this, that God would not be omnipotent unless he could not only dissolve [a union] so contingent and frail, but also annihilate [it].[14] Such are many objections, which all run within one circle: that God would not be omnipotent unless he had power over such things. Or thus they argue by the topic from likeness: If God can create, and on both sides the distance is as great; therefore by the same token he can annihilate.[15]

¶5 75.23–76.2

[75]Pro isto dico sicut alias sepe dixi quod ad omnipotenciam Dei consequitur perficere construere et non destruere, creare[12] et non adnichilare; et sic de actibus positivis privacionibus repugnantibus separatis. Unde sicut repugnat[13] pure creaturam esse et non posse deficere, sic repugnat omnipotencie Creatoris posse adnichilare peiorare dampnificare vel de[14] se destruere creaturam. Peccatum autem[15] quod non est creatura Deus destruit, peccantes solum per accidens racione peccati punit vel meliorando consumit.[16] [76]Et sic ex omnipotencia Dei sequitur oppositum predictorum et patet quod assumptum est inpossibile.

To this I say, as I have often said elsewhere, that upon the omnipotence of God there follows [the power] to perfect, to build and not to destroy, to create and not to annihilate; and so of positive acts set apart from the privations incompatible [with them].[16] Hence, as it is incompatible [for a thing] to be purely a creature and not to be able to fail, so it is incompatible with the omnipotence of the Creator to be able to annihilate, make worse, damage, or of itself destroy a creature. But sin, which is not a creature, God destroys; sinners he punishes only by accident, by reason of the sin, or consumes [them] by bettering [them].[17] [76]And so from the omnipotence of God there follows the opposite of the aforesaid, and it is clear that the assumption is impossible.[18]

¶6 *76.3–76.14*

[76]Pro cuius[1] intellectu pono triplex exemplum ut alias posui. Primum logicum. Nam Deus produxit tempus perpetuum, sicut testatur scriptura et sepe meminit Augustinus. Nam Ps. 73.[2] dicitur 'estatem et ver tu plasmasti ea.'[3] Et idem est iudicium de toto[4] tempore,[4] et signanter dicit Veritas Marc. 2[c]· quod 'Filius hominis est dominus sabbati' et sic Deus. Et tamen notum est quod Deus de potencia absoluta non potest tempus perpetuum[5] adnichilare sive destruere, ymo, quod plus est, tempus vel motum finire ante finem sue periodi naturalis. Modicus ergo color est concludere, si Deus libere contradictorie datum effectum produxerit, quod potest ipsum destruere.

For the understanding of this I set out a threefold example, as I have set out elsewhere. The first, logical. For God produced perpetual time, as scripture testifies and Augustine often recalls. For in Psalm 73 it is said: "the summer and the spring were formed by thee."[19] And the judgement is the same of the whole of time; and pointedly the Truth says, Mark 2, that "the Son of man is Lord of the sabbath", and so God [is].[20] And yet it is known that God by absolute power cannot annihilate or destroy perpetual time; indeed, what is more, [he cannot] end time or motion before the end of its natural period. Small colour, therefore, is there for inferring, if God freely, as between contradictories, produced a given effect, that he can destroy it.

¶7 *76.15–76.19*

[76]2[m] exemplum naturale[6] est de hoc[6] quod Deus libere condictorie produxit mundum ex nichilo et tamen non potest ipsum destruere nec aliam substancialem essenciam ut patet in materia De Adnichilacione, ne fiat vacuum vel defectus in Deo formaliter.

The second example, natural, is of this: that God freely, as between contradictories, produced the world from nothing, and yet cannot destroy it, or any other substantial essence, as is clear in the matter *On Annihilation*, lest there be a void or a defect in God formally.[21]

¶8 *76.20–76.23*

[76]3[m] exemplum est methaphisicum. Nam Deus produxit veritatem talem, de preterito me fuisse, et hoc liberrime contingenter; et tamen notum[7] est quod[7] de potencia sua absoluta non potest ipsam destruere vel eius desicionem[8] permittere.

The third example is metaphysical. For God produced such a truth about the past, "I have been", and this most freely, contingently; and yet it is known that by his absolute power he cannot destroy it or permit its ceasing.[22]

¶9 *76.24–76.31*

[76]Talia quotlibet exempla reliquit nobis Deus, ut consideremus eius bonitatem et naturalem condicionem ad positive posse bene agere et non male. Sicut enim est actus purus non admixtus[9] potencia ante[9] actum, sic potest per se proficiendo tendere in esse positivum, et non deficiendo per se tendere in[10] non esse, ut, licet modicum sit, mentiri vel aliter peccando male agere; Deus tamen ex omnipotencia hoc non potest.

Any number of such examples God has left us, that we may consider his goodness and his natural condition toward being able positively to act well and not ill. For as he is pure act, not mixed with potency before act, so he can of himself, by advancing, tend into positive being, and not, by failing, tend of himself into non-being, as, though it be a small thing, to lie or otherwise to act ill by sinning: God, nevertheless, from omnipotence cannot do this.[23]

Notes

1. 72.20–21 *unus spiritus cum eo*: 1 Cor. 6:17 (DR "But he who is joined to the Lord is one spirit"); O omits *cum eo. Et sic de aliis que peioracionem sapiunt*: the "other things" are the like privileges, each the negation of something that savours of worsening (sin, death).
2. Matt. 27:46 (DR "My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?"); "weakness of God" and "stronger": 1 Cor. 1:25 (DR "the weakness of God is stronger than men"), Harris's margin. *Quod est suppositum 'forcius'* is construed with *suppositum* as the noun, the person who is "stronger"; it may instead be the participle, "which is supposed 'stronger'". 72.31: the print takes *persecucionibus* and *Iudeorum* from O, *et* from A B C (A B C *a persecutoribus et flagellacionibus*, without *Iudeorum*; O *a persecucionibus in flagellacionibus iudeorum*).
3. John 10:35–36, two verses run together (DR "and the scripture cannot be broken: Do you say of him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world"); Wyclif construes *quem* with *scriptura*, which is his point. *Solvi* is DR's "be broken"; in Wyclif's own argument the same verb is rendered "be loosed" (74.1–6, 74.33). O *pro ordine* (73.8).
4. 73.9–10 *ex ficturis atramenti et pellibus mortuorum*: the written book, strokes of ink on the skins of dead beasts; A B C *figuris* "figures". The "book of life" is the Apocalypse's phrase (Apoc. 20:12, DR "the book of life").

5. "Homily 48", with O and the source, against the print's *44*: the words on John 10:36 and Matt. 6:9 (DR "hallowed be thy name") belong to *Tract. in Ioh.* 48.9, PL 35, 1745, the number O reads (*verified*; Harris's index gives the same place). Augustine has *Sic sanctificavit, quomodo genuit* as a statement and *ante non erat sanctum* for *aliquando, non erat sanctum.* A B C *diceret* (73.15), omit *ergo … sanctificavit* (73.16–17), *et* for *ei* (73.18); O *firmius* for *sanctus* (73.22). *Augustitinus* (73.14–15) as printed.
6. 73.24–29: *quem* is masculine where *scriptura* is feminine: the relative points to a person, the Son. *Relacionem*: the grammatical reference of the relative. A B C *adiecciones masculinas … neutras* (73.28–29); O *mous.*
7. Gal. 3:16 (DR "He saith not: And to his seeds as of many. But as of one: And to thy seed, which is Christ"): Wyclif's text drops the Vulgate's *Et* and *sed quasi in uno.* A B C *enim* for *inquit*; C M *numeravit* for *notavit* (73.32).
8. John 2:19 (DR "Destroy this temple; and in three days I will raise it up"): the Vulgate's verb is *solvite*, which Wyclif's "loose" keeps; and 2 Cor. 1:19 (DR "was not: It is and It is not. But, It is, was in him").
9. 74.9–10 *dictis*: those to whom the words were said; *ambiguus*: in doubt, open to question. O *ligamentum* for *ligacio* (74.7).
10. John 5:39 (DR "Search the scriptures: for you think in them to have life everlasting. And the same are they that give testimony of me"): Wyclif reads *in quibus* for the Vulgate's *quia … in ipsis.* A B C *dicit* (74.15); O *prohibent* for *perhibent* (74.14, 74.17).
11. 74.20–26: *Sermonem Dei factum ad eos* takes up John 10:35, "to whom the word of God was spoken": the "gods" of that verse, deified by participation, whose union can end. *Color* is the row's "colour", a plausible ground. A B C *concludi* for *includi* (74.22), *domini* for *Dei* (74.24), *blasfemia* (74.25); B *ypostasis* (74.21).
12. 74.31–75.3: even the blessed can be "loosed" in that their union was given to wayfarers who could sin; the assumed man never could. A B C *ut patet oculo* for *Et patet conclusio*; O *euantes* (75.1); C *nam* for *nec.*
13. 75.7 *libere contradictorie*: free with the freedom of contradiction, able to do a thing or not do it; rendered "freely, as between contradictories". *Adnichilare*: "annihilate" (A B C *anichilando*, as often below).
14. 75.17–18: "[a union]" is supplied as Harris advises (*unionem subaudiendum*, from *dictam unionem*, 75.15), or *creaturam* (so M, *nisi posset creaturam tam contingentem dissolvere*). For *nedum* (O, A C first hand) B and A C second hand read *nodum*, "so contingent and frail a knot", which gives the sense without a supplement but leaves *sed et* without its *nedum*; the families are split, so the print stands. O M omit *sed et adnichilare*; B omits *et*; A B C omit *sunt multe* (75.18).
15. 75.21–22 *utrobique tanta est distancia*: the distance from nothing to being is as great as from being to nothing. O *aliter* (75.20), *perinde* for *per idem* (75.22).
16. 75.23–26: *consequitur* governs the infinitives, so "[the power]" is supplied. *De actibus positivis privacionibus repugnantibus separatis*: positive acts taken apart from the privations opposed to them (destroying, annihilating). O omits *creare* (75.25) and reads *repugnant.*
17. p. 75, *consumit*: C *consumat*; the foot prints this entry with a second figure 14 for the text's 16. O *per* for *de*, omits *autem.*
18. 76.2 *assumptum*: the logician's "assumption", the objection's premiss (75.7–8), not *assumpcio*, the assuming of the nature.
19. Ps. 73:17 (DR "the summer and the spring were formed by thee"). The print's psalm number is the Vulgate's; A B C read *25*, O *72*: the manuscripts disagree, and the print stands. B *eam* for *ea*; C *protinus* for *cuius* (76.3).
20. Mark 2:28 (DR "Therefore the Son of man is Lord of the sabbath also"): Wyclif's words, not the Vulgate's order. *Et sic Deus*: the Son of man is lord of time, and so God is. *Toto tempore* is O's; A B C *causa creature* (76.7).
21. *De adnichilacione*: Wyclif's own treatise on annihilation (Harris's index, *De Adnichilacione, 76, 78*): *De potencia productiva Dei ad extra* cc. 12–14, ed. Dziewicki, *De ente* (1909), pp. 287ff., where God cannot annihilate any substance without the whole created universe (p. 289), nor time or motion before their natural end (p. 293) (*verified*). 76.15–16 *condictorie* as printed, for *contradictorie.* A B C *est naturale hoc.*
22. 76.23 *desicionem*, "ceasing" (A B C M); O *designacionem*; Harris asks whether *destruccionem* should be read. The print is kept. A B omit *notum … quod* (76.22).
23. 76.26–31: *potencia* is the CONTEXTUAL row, here "potency", Aristotle's pair with act; A B C *potencia ad actum* "potency toward act". God can of himself tend into being, and cannot by failing tend into non-being: lying or other sin are instances of that failing. O *et* for *in* (76.29).
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 76: *2ᶜ·* (plate: print as transcribed (raised mark after 2))
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference l Cor. i. 25. (72.30); reference Matth. vi. 9. (73.21); reference 3® Gal. m. 16. (73.30); reference fr° £? John n° 19′ [A 84c] (74.3); reference s. John v. 35. (74.25); reference Mark ii. 28. (76.9).

Part 4: The impossible cases set aside, and why the Word assumed this man

Harris pp. 76.32–80.12

¶1 76.32–77.27

[76]Et utinam nos[11] scolastici, nescientes probare vel [77]sophistice secundum vivacem[1] scintillam evidencie tales casus, insisteremus circa noticiam et deteccionem[2] substrate necessarie veritatis a nobis hodie

Would that we schoolmen, who do not know how to prove such cases even sophistically[1] by a lively spark of evidence, would apply ourselves

plurimum occultate propter inanem occupacionem circa conclusiones impossibiles, que ex principiis impossibilibus consecuntur[3]: ut patet specialiter de casibus quibus ponitur Deum creaturam suam adnichilare, vel Verbum naturas prius assumptas dimittere ac alias personas in eisdem naturis assumendo communicare. Conceditur ergo quod, sicut libere contradictorie et per consequens contingentissime assumpsit hominem, sic potest absolute necessario nunc et semper facere vel[4] causare quod neminem assumpsit, et quod non est vel[5] fuit vel erit aliqua crcatura, ymo quod ipsummet non fuit vel[6] erit amplius Verbum Dei. Patet hoc, posito quod non sit tempus. Sed absit ex isto concludere quod Deus potest quidquam adnichilare, vel facere tempus aut unionem predictam cessare. Talis enim non foret potencia contradiccionis ut ad affirmacionem et negacionem, sed potencia adnichilacionis,[7] destruccionis, sive privacionis. Et patet solucio ad primam confirmacionem cum secunda. Deus enim necessitat se volicionibus[8] eternis ad omne quod efficit, et tamen non potest efficere nisi summe libere contingenter, cum necessitas illa non sit coaccionis a causa superiori limitante; et per consequens nec pure naturalis inclinacionis, sed necessitas supposicionis, ut alias diffuse exposui. Et patet ad terciam quod Deus non est omnipotens, si posset vinculum dicte corrigie denodare.

to the knowledge and uncovering of the underlying necessary truth, which is today very much hidden from us on account of idle occupation with impossible conclusions that follow from impossible principles: as is clear especially of the cases in which it is posited that God annihilates his creature, or that the Word lays aside natures earlier assumed and, by assuming, communicates other persons in the same natures.[2] It is granted, therefore, that just as he assumed a man freely, as between contradictories, and consequently most contingently, so he can, absolutely, necessarily, now and always, make or cause that he assumed no one, and that there is not, was not, or will not be any creature; indeed, that he himself was not, or will no longer be, the Word of God.[3] This is clear on the supposition that there is no time. But far be it to infer from this that God can annihilate anything, or make time or the aforesaid union cease. For such a power would not be a power of contradiction, as to affirmation and negation, but a power of annihilation, destruction, or privation.[4] And the answer to the first confirmation, together with the second, is clear. For God necessitates himself by eternal volitions to everything that he effects, and yet he cannot effect anything except in the highest degree freely [and] contingently, since that necessity is not one of coercion by a superior cause that limits [him]; and consequently not of purely natural inclination either, but necessity of supposition, as I have set out at length elsewhere. And it is clear, as to the third, that God is not omnipotent if he could untie the bond of the said thong.[5]

¶2 77.28–78.6

[77]Et quoad argumenta fundata in loco a simili, vellem quod sic arguentes attenderent et stabilirent sufficientem similitudinem argumentis,[9] et non quererent questiones novas induendo habitum responsalis vel dicendo negativas, quod ipsi nesciunt racionem diversitatis et alia multa verba preter [78]scolastica. Unde quando assumitur quod tanta est distancia inter terminos creacionis sicut inter terminos adnichilacionis, pure petitur quod antea probaretur. Oporteret[1] ergo primo fundare existenciam adnichilacionis vel eius possibilitatem, et post sollicitari de eius terminis. Sed hoc non probabitur antequam humanitas Christi sit soluta.[2]

And as for the arguments founded on the topic from likeness, I would wish that those who argue so would attend to and establish a sufficient likeness for the arguments, and not seek new questions by putting on the habit of the respondent, or by saying in the negative that they do not know the reason for the difference, and many other words beside the [78] scholastic ones. Hence, when it is assumed[6] that the distance between the terms of creation is as great as that between the terms of annihilation, what ought first to have been proved is simply begged. It would therefore be necessary first to ground the existence of annihilation, or its possibility, and afterwards to be concerned about its terms. But this will not be proved before the humanity of Christ is loosed.

¶3 78.7–78.15

[78]Ex istis videtur corelarie[3] sequi primo quod neutra natura creata in Christo posset esse humanitas, nisi a Verbo ypostatice sit[4] assumpta. Patet ex hoc quod aliter natura, que est Christus, dampnificari[5] poterit;

From these things it seems to follow, as a corollary, first, that neither created nature in Christ could be the humanity unless it were

et sic Christus: si enim humanitas Christi posset fuisse[6] individuum speciei hominis et non Christus, tunc posset peccasse ut unus homo fuisse[7] alius. Quorum opposita hic suppono, ponendo quod assumpcio ypostatica a Verbo Dei consequitur[8] ad hominem Iesum, sicut passio consequitur[9] ad subiectum.

hypostatically assumed by the Word.[7] This is clear from the fact that otherwise the nature which is Christ could be damaged, and so [could] Christ:[8] for if the humanity of Christ could have been an individual of the species man and not Christ, then it could have sinned as a single man, [and] have been another.[9] The opposites of these I here suppose, positing that hypostatic assumption by the Word of God follows on the man Jesus as an attribute follows on its subject.

¶4 78.16–78.20

[78]2°. sequitur quod nullam humanitatem aliam Verbum potuit ypostatice assumpsisse. Patet ex hoc, quod aliter Christus posset[10] fuisse alius et[11] per consequens alia persona, ut post ostendetur.[12] Cum ergo[13] consequens sit impossibile, patet quod antecedens inferius.[14]

Second, it follows that the Word could not have hypostatically assumed any other humanity. This is clear from the fact that otherwise Christ could have been another, and consequently another person, as will be shown later. Since, therefore, the consequent is impossible, it is clear that the antecedent that infers it [is impossible too].[10]

¶5 78.21–78.28

[78]3°.[15] sequitur quod nec Pater nec Donum incarnari potuit,[16] quia aliter Filius posset[17] esse humanitus pater patris. Cum ergo minimum inconsequens[18] sit Deo impossibile absolute, ut capit Anselmus de Incarnacione Verbi cap 6°, patet intentum. Ista tamen dicta erunt magis evidencia postmodum, cum iuxta posite fuerint sentencie modernorum. Nam iste sunt conclusiones Anselmi Cur Deus Homo 6°. et de Incarnacione 7°. et 9°.

Third, it follows that neither the Father nor the Gift could be incarnate, since otherwise the Son could be humanly father of the father. Since, therefore, the least absurdity[11] is absolutely impossible to God, as Anselm takes it in *On the Incarnation of the Word*, ch. 6, what was intended is clear. Yet these sayings will be more evident later, when the teachings of the moderns have been set beside them. For these are the conclusions of Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* 6 and *On the Incarnation* 7 and 9.[12]

¶6 78.29–79.17

[78]Ad omnes[19] auctoritates vel dicta auctorum in oppositum alleganda dicitur, sicut in materia De Adnichilacione, quod intelligenda sunt condicionaliter, quod Deus ex se habet [79]potenciam sufficientem: unde potest in talia si voluerit, vel si illa possint[1] fieri. Sic enim dicit Augustinus contra Maximinianum, quod Deus potuit alium filium produxisse. Et isto modo loquendi sepe utitur venerabilis Anselmus, ut patet 2°. Cur Deus Homo cap. 5. Et ex hoc processerunt omnes sollicitaciones inanes[2] quid illo posito sequeretur.[2] Verumptamen magna consideracio est et nobis inscrutabilis,[3] unde Deus voluit illum hominem pre ceteris assumpsisse, quod rememorat Augustinus Enchiridion 3°. Profecto modus iste, quo natus est Christus de Spiritu Sancto non ut eius filius de Maria virgine, sic[4] insinuat[4] nobis graciam Dei, qua homo, nullis precedentibus meritis in ipso exordio nature sue, quo esse cepit, Verbo Dei copularetur in tantam persone unitatem ut idem ipse esset Filius Dei qui filius hominis; ac sic nature humane suscepcione fieret quodammodo ipsa gracia illi homini naturalis que nullum peccatum posset admittere.

To all the authorities, or sayings of authors, to be alleged to the contrary, the answer is, as in the matter *On Annihilation*,[13] that they are to be understood conditionally: that God of himself has [79]sufficient power, so that he can do such things if he wills, or if they could be done. For so Augustine says, *Against Maximinus*, that God could have produced another Son.[14] And the venerable Anselm often uses this manner of speaking, as is clear in *Cur Deus homo* 2, ch. 5.[15] And from this have proceeded all the idle anxieties as to what would follow if that were posited. Nevertheless it is a great consideration, and unsearchable to us, why God willed to have assumed that man before others, which Augustine recalls, *Enchiridion* 3:[16] "Truly this manner in which Christ was born of the Holy Spirit not as his son, [and] of the Virgin Mary as son,[17] intimates to us the grace of God, by which a man, with no merits going before, in the very beginning of his nature, in which he began to be, should be joined to the Word of God in so great a unity of person that the same one should be Son of God who was son of man; and so, by the taking-up of human nature, that grace itself

should become in a certain way natural to that man, which could admit no sin."

¶7 *79.18–80.12*

[79]Oportet ergo theologum capere tanquam principium quod Deus libere[5] contradictorie[6] assumpsit illum hominem sicut libere contradictorie[6] produxit fabricam huius[7] mundi, et huiusmodi effectuum[7] causa est eterna[8] Dei volicio,[9] et per consequens essencia ac bonitas Dei nostri cuius non est querenda causa ulterior. Et sicut respondetur querenti,[10] 'Quare Deus produxit mundum in illo loco vel in illo tempore pocius quam quocunque alio?'— quod[11] hoc est necessarium ex supposicione, eo quod non posset illum mundum producere nisi ipsum produceret in illo loco et in illo tempore[11]; ita respondetur querenti—' Quare Deus assumpsit illum hominem? '—quod hoc est quia Deus voluit assumere hominem ad complecionem sue fabrice, et non potuit [80]assumpsisse hominem, nisi illum hominem[1] assumpsisset. Sicut enim ille locus et illud tempus individuatur ab illo mundo, sic quod ubicunque vel quandocunque Deus[2] produxerit[3] illum mundum, hoc fecisset in illo loco et in illo tempore. Sic illa humanitas, que est Iesus,[4] sufficienter individuatur a Verbo, sic quod posita illa consequitur suppositacio sui a Verbo; et quamcumque aliam humanitatem per impossibile Verbum assumpsisset[5] illa humanitas foret Iesus. Dimissis ergo casibus et conclusionibus ex illis inaniter coniecturatis,[6] teneamus confessionem quod dicta 'scriptura solvi non potest[7]'; quia, si non fallor, maior pars heresum circa incarnacionem Christi in isto devio titubavit.[8]

The theologian must therefore take as a principle that God, freely, as between contradictories, assumed that man, just as, freely, as between contradictories, he produced the fabric of this world; and the cause of this effect[18] is the eternal volition of God, and consequently the essence and goodness of our God, of which no further cause is to be sought. And just as the reply to one who asks, "Why did God produce the world in that place or at that time rather than in any other?" is that this is necessary on supposition, because he could not produce that world unless he produced it in that place and at that time: so the reply to one who asks, "Why did God assume that man?" is that this is because God willed to assume a man for the completion of his fabric, and could not [80]have assumed a man unless he had assumed that man. For just as that place and that time are individuated by that world, so that wherever or whenever God should produce that world, he would have done it in that place and at that time: so that humanity which is Jesus is sufficiently individuated by the Word, so that, it being posited, its suppositation by the Word follows; and whatever other humanity the Word had, per impossibile, assumed, that humanity would be Jesus. Leaving aside, therefore, the cases and the conclusions idly conjectured from them, let us hold the confession that the said "scripture cannot be broken";[19] for, unless I am mistaken, the greater part of the heresies about the incarnation of Christ have stumbled on this byway.

Notes

1. *vel sophistice*: *vel* taken as intensive, "even sophistically"; it could also open a second way of proving ("to prove, or [to prove] sophistically").
2. *alias personas in eisdem naturis assumendo communicare*: the case that the Word, having laid aside the natures, should by assuming bring other persons to share in the same natures; the Latin leaves the construction of *communicare* loose.
3. *absolute necessario*: the two adverbs stand unjoined and are both taken with *potest*. The power granted is the freedom of the eternal will "as between contradictories"; the next sentences deny that it is a power to annihilate.
4. *potencia* here is God's power (the CONTEXTUAL row): a "power of contradiction" is a power over either of two contradictories, set against a power to destroy what is.
5. *vinculum dicte corrigie*: the bond of the thong named in the third argument, earlier in the chapter; *denodare* "untie".
6. *assumitur*: the logician's sense, "is taken as a premiss" (cf. *assumptum*), not the assumption of a nature.
7. *neutra* "neither [of two]": the pair is not named (perhaps this humanity and any other, as in the second corollary); it may stand loosely for *nulla* "no created nature".
8. *dampnificari* "be damaged", the print with O (*dąpni^ra*); A B C read *dampnari* "be damned". The argument of 65–68 turns on *dampnificare*.
9. *ut unus homo fuisse alius*: taken as two consequents, "could have sinned as one man [does], and have been another [than Christ]", which *Quorum opposita* ("the opposites of these") requires. A B C omit *fuisse* ("could have sinned like one man or another").
10. *inferens*, with A B C, against the print's *inferius* ("lower"), which does not construe: from an impossible consequent the antecedent that infers it is impossible. O is not reported and so agrees with the print; the departure rests on the argument.

11. *inconveniens*, with O and M and Anselm's text, against the print's *inconsequens* (A B C), the word of Anselm's maxim in the work Wyclif cites, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi* 10 (Schmitt II, 26.3–5; PL 158, 276C, Migne's c. 5), on this same question: *Quoniam ergo quamlibet parvum inconveniens in deo est impossibile, non debuit alia dei persona incarnari quam filius.* The maxim recurs in *Cur Deus homo* I.10 (*verified*). Harris, in his note, says *inconveniens* should have been in the text.
12. Anselm, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi* 6, 7 and 9, and *Cur Deus homo* "6" (the book not given), by Wyclif's count; in Schmitt's division the impossibility of the other persons' being incarnate with the Son is c. 9, and why the Son rather than the Father or the Spirit was incarnate is c. 10 and *Cur Deus homo* II.9, which refers back to the letter (*verified*). Wyclif's numbers fit neither Schmitt's chapters nor Migne's (PL 158, where cc. 6–9 are c. 4 and c. 10 is c. 5).
13. Wyclif's own *De adnichilacione* (the title in the print's italics); Harris's index, *De Adnichilacione, 76, 78*: *De potencia productiva Dei ad extra* cc. 12–14, ed. Dziewicki, *De ente* (1909), pp. 287ff., as at 76 above (*verified* as identification).
14. Augustine against Maximinus (Wyclif's three books "contra Maximinianum"); the place is not given. Perhaps *Contra Maximinum* II.12.3 (PL 42, 768), where Augustine himself says the Son did not beget a creator, *Neque enim non potuit, sed non oportuit.*
15. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II.5, where God is said to do nothing by necessity, and the necessity said of him *improprie dicitur necessitas* (*verified*).
16. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 40 (c. 12) in the modern division, Wyclif's "3"; PL 40, 252; the quotation follows the text closely, with *non ut eius filius* for *non sicut filius* and without *et filius hominis qui filius Dei* (*verified*). Harris cites instead the related *Enchiridion* 36. The print does not mark the quotation; the quotation marks are ours.
17. *sicut filius insinuat*, with O, against the print's *sic insinuat*, which leaves *de Maria virgine* without its predicate; Augustine's sentence has *et de Maria virgine sicut filius, insinuat* (PL 40, 252; *verified*).
18. *huius* "this", with A B C O (A B C *huius effectus*, O *huius effectuum*), against the print's *huiusmodi effectuum* "effects of this kind"; rendered with A B C's singular.
19. John 10:35 (Vulgate *et non potest solvi Scriptura*, in another order); Douay–Rheims. The bounds follow the print's italics.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Mark ii. 28. (76.9); reference so Augrustine "» passage quoted. (79.9).

Part 5: The heresies about Christ, from the Ebionites to the Eutychians

Harris pp. 80.13–84.29

¶1 80.13–81.26

[80]Nam aliqui ponebant Christum esse purum hominem et non Deum: aliqui autem e contra dixerunt ipsum esse purum spiritum et non substanciam corpoream ex corpore et anima compositam. In prima parte erant Ebionite tempore beati Iohannis evangeliste dicentes Christum esse purum hominem et non Deum; et ista est heresis 10 quam recitat Augustinus in libro suo de Heresibus. Post eos consecuti sunt Theodosiani heretici, qui divinitatem Christi conformiter negaverunt; et hec est Heresis 33. Post eos consecuti sunt Pauliniani, qui negaverunt Christum semper fuisse,[9] quia non antequam fuit natus de virgine, et, ut verbis utar Augustini, 'Christum non aliquid amplius quam hominem putaverunt'; et illa est Heresis 44. Et post eos consecuti sunt Photinus[10] et Philaster[10] cum suis discipulis eadem heresi dampnati, ut recitat Augustinus Heresi 49. Postea consecuti sunt Arriani et Appollinariste negantes tam Christi divinitatem quam eius[11] humanitatem ut[11] recitat Augustinus Heresi 49 et 55. Meicagismonite[12] negant cum Arrianis eandem esse substanciam Patris et Filii,[13] ut recitat Augustinus Heresi 58. Proclianiste[14] et Patriciani[14] negaverunt Christi humanitatem, [81]ut patet Heresibus 60 et 61. Et postea consecuti sunt Priscillianiste[1] dicentes cum Manicheis[2] quod nulla caro est a Deo bono sed a Deo malo, et per consequens Christus non est Deus[3] et homo. Hi autem secundum Augustinum Heresi 70 apocrifa sumpserunt

For some held "Christ is a mere man and not God"; others, on the contrary, said that he was a pure spirit and not a bodily substance composed of body and soul. On the first side were the Ebionites, in the time of blessed John the evangelist, saying "Christ is a mere man and not God"; and this is heresy 10, which Augustine recounts in his book *On Heresies.*[1] After them came the heretics the Theodotians,[2] who in like manner denied the divinity of Christ; and this is heresy 33. After them came the Paulianists, who denied that Christ always was, since [he was] not before he was born of the virgin, and, to use Augustine's words, "thought Christ nothing more than a man"; and that is heresy 44. And after them came Photinus and Philaster[3] with their disciples, condemned for the same heresy, as Augustine recounts, heresy 49. Afterwards came the Arians and the Apollinarists, denying both the divinity of Christ and his humanity, as Augustine recounts, heresies 49 and 55. The Metangismonites deny with the Arians that the substance of the Father and of the Son is the same, as Augustine recounts, heresy 58. The Proclianites and the Patricians denied the humanity of Christ, [81]as is clear in heresies 60 and 61. And afterwards came the Priscillianists, saying with the Manichees that no flesh is from the good God but from an evil god, and consequently "Christ is not God and man". And these, according

tanquam autentica,[4] scripturam sacram vertentes ut hodie ad suam heresim confirmandam.[5] Sed et Sabelliani erraverunt[6] in divinitate Christi concedentes confuse Patrem esse Filium et Spiritum Sanctum,[7] seducti paralogismo vocato expositorio, ut ibi recitat Augustinus. Nona heresis,[8] quam Augustinus recitat 73, posuit divinitatem doluisse[99] cum figeretur[10] caro Christi in cruce: et isti, sicut Patripassiani, haberent hodie fautores plurimos. Nam ut asserunt negantes formas universales, ista foret racio insolubilis lumini[11] naturali—Filius Dei patitur, et ipse est deitas; ergo deitas patitur sive dolet—.Et eadem deduccio valeret Sabellianis—Si Verbum patitur, et ipsum est eadem essencia vel substancia in numero, que[12] Pater vel Donum; ergo uterque[13] eorum[13] patitur; et per idem quelibet persona divina indifferenter fuit homo, nascitur de virgine et suscepit omnem predicacionem temporalem, quam Verbum suscepit—.Et[14] confirmacio illius est quod maior est unio Verbi ad naturam divinam ac personarum ad invicem[15] quam est corporis ad animam; sed anima naturaliter compatitur corpori; ergo multo magis tam deitas quam utraque persona compatitur Christo passo.

to Augustine, heresy 70, took up apocrypha as authentic, turning holy scripture, as [men do] today, to confirm their heresy. But the Sabellians too erred about the divinity of Christ, granting indistinctly "the Father is the Son and the Holy Spirit", led astray by the paralogism called expository,[4] as Augustine recounts there. A ninth heresy,[5] which Augustine recounts as 73, held "the divinity suffered pain when the flesh of Christ was fixed to the cross"; and these, like the Patripassians, would have very many supporters today. For, as those who deny universal forms assert, this would be an argument insoluble to the natural light: "The Son of God suffers, and he is the Godhead; therefore the Godhead suffers, or feels pain." And the same deduction would hold good for the Sabellians: "If the Word suffers, and he is the same essence or substance in number as the Father or the Gift, then each of them suffers; and by the same token any divine person indifferently was man, is born of the virgin, and took up every temporal predication which the Word took up." And the confirmation of it is that the union of the Word to the divine nature, and of the persons to one another, is greater than that of the body to the soul; now the soul naturally suffers with the body; therefore much more do both the Godhead and each [other] person suffer with Christ in his passion.

¶2 81.27–82.30

[81]Sed constat nutritis in materia De Universalibus quod substancia, essencia, vel natura divina, quod idem est,[16] non potest pati ab aliquo vel moveri. Nec est color—si persona, que est communis humanitas, patitur, tunc et illa—cum natura communis abstracta non recipit formaliter predicaciones huiusmodi personales. Et multo evidencius non [82]oportet Patrem pati, etsi Filius, qui est alia persona et eadem essencia paciatur. Nec esset possibile Verbum pati, Patre non passo; nisi Verbum esset tam aliquid quod non est[1] Pater, quam persona alia quam est Pater. Unde, cum, Verbum sit assumpta humanitas plus distans a Patre quam corpus ab anima, patet quod nec est color concludere—Si anima compatitur corpori, cum utraque sit eadem persona hominis; quod[2] per idem Pater compatitur Filio—cum inter eos sit distinccio personalis. Unde tales paralogismi heretici plus placent hodie tam iuvenibus quam adultis quam argumenta solida scripturarum. Unde ignorantibus naturam universalium videtur ista deduccio sophistica insolubile argumentum—Si Petrus ridet, Paulus comedit,[3] et sic de aliis actibus personalibus; et omnis homo est natura specifica; ergo illa natura specifica sic ridet[4] aut aliter personaliter operatur—.Et tales argucie, locum et tempus occupantes, ponunt placentes[5] plurimis in numerum evidenciarum probabilium, sed indubie ut Tharsites.[6]

But it is evident to those nourished in the matter *On Universals*[6] that the divine substance, essence, or nature, which is the same thing, cannot suffer from anything or be moved. Nor is there colour[7] for this: "If a person, who is the common humanity, suffers, then that [humanity] does too"; since the common nature, abstracted, does not formally receive personal predications of this kind. And much more evidently it is not [82]necessary that the Father suffer, even if the Son, who is another person and the same essence, suffers. Nor would it be possible for the Word to suffer, the Father not suffering, unless the Word were both something that the Father is not and a person other than the Father is.[8] Hence, since the Word is the assumed humanity, more distant from the Father than the body from the soul, it is clear that there is no colour for inferring: "If the soul suffers with the body, since each is the same person of the man, then by the same token the Father suffers with the Son"; since between them there is a personal distinction. Hence such heretical paralogisms please both young and grown men more today than the solid arguments of the scriptures. Hence to those ignorant of the nature of universals this sophistical deduction seems an insoluble argument: "If Peter laughs, Paul eats, and so

Alias autem declaravi in materia De Universalibus, quod communis humanitas non ridet vel comedit, quamvis sit quelibet persona hominis, que sic facit. Correspondenter communis deitas non gignit nec gignitur, nec gaudet humanitus nec tristatur; quamvis sit Pater qui gignit, Verbum quod gignitur et secundum assumptum hominem[7] supra alios mortales patitur et tristatur. Tales intricaciones sophisticas decet theologis[8] evitando cognoscere, cum sint superficiales colores venenosas hereses palliantes et incautos in logica in errores plurimos inducentes. Et hec est racio quare Augustinus tam sedule recitat hereses de Christo cum suis evidenciis ut caucius caveantur.[9]

of other personal acts, and every man is the nature of the species, then that nature of the species so laughs, or otherwise acts personally." And such quibbles, occupying place and time, rank themselves, pleasing very many, among probable evidences,[9] but undoubtedly as Thersites [does].[10] And I have made clear elsewhere, in the matter *On Universals*, that the common humanity does not laugh or eat, although it is each person of man, who does so.[11] Correspondingly the common Godhead does not beget nor is begotten, nor does it rejoice humanly nor grieve; although it is the Father who begets, [and] the Word who is begotten and, as to the assumed man, suffers and grieves above other mortals. It befits theologians to know such sophistical entanglements in order to avoid them, since they are superficial colours cloaking poisonous heresies and leading those unwary in logic into very many errors. And this is the reason why Augustine so diligently recounts the heresies about Christ with their evidences: that they may be the more cautiously guarded against.

¶3 82.31–84.9

[82]Sed inter omnes hereses Nestoriana et Eutichiana sunt hodie eo diligencius precavende, quo theologi eciam 'qui videntur aliquid' sunt iam ad sapiendum predictas hereses [83]proniores. Scribit enim Augustinus de Heresi 89 et 90 in fine libri sui De Heresibus, quod Nestorius episcopus contra fidem catholicam dogmatizare ausus est, Christum Dominum Deum nostrum hominem esse tantum; nec illud, quod 'mediator Dei et hominum' effectus est, in utero virginis de Spiritu Sancto fuisse conceptum; sed postea Deum homini[1] fuisse permixtum, nec Deum-hominem fuisse passum sepultumque[2] dicebat; evacuare[3] contendens omne nostrum remedium, quo Verbum Dei hominem sic suscipere dignatus est in utero virginis, ut una persona fieret Dei et hominis; propter quod sic signanter natus, passus, mortuus, et pro nostris peccatis resurgens, ascendit in celum. Vidit enim iste[4] Nestorius quod humanitas assumpta non fuit divinitas,[5] et hinc paralogisatus credidit[6] quod non fuit Verbum Dei, concedens cum heresi 73 quod Verbum non patitur nisi divinitas[5] paciatur; et sic, cum illam[7] esse personam sit suppositum,[7] dixit quod in Christo fuerunt due persone; et per consequens Christus vel[8] esset aggregatum ex his, vel persona Verbi non passionata humanitus, ut nec passa, mortua, nec sepulta; quia non vidit quomodo due tam distantes nature possent[9] esse utraque eadem persona. Quidquid autem moderni dixerunt, illo modo intelligunt eum Augustinus, Boecius, Anselmus, et alii capitales doctores concorditer ante Petrum Lombardum.[10] Aliter enim non tam crebro dicerent,[11] quod utraque natura tam corpus quam anima est eadem persona hominis; et

But among all the heresies the Nestorian and the Eutychian are today to be guarded against the more diligently, as theologians too "who seem [to be] something"[12] are now the more prone to savour the aforesaid heresies. [83]For Augustine writes of heresies 89 and 90, at the end of his book *On Heresies*,[13] that Nestorius, a bishop, dared to teach as dogma, against the catholic faith, "Christ, our Lord God, is only a man"; nor [did he say] that that which was made "mediator of God and men" was conceived in the womb of the virgin from the Holy Spirit, but that afterwards God was mingled with the man; nor did he say that the God-man suffered and was buried: striving to empty out all our remedy, by which the Word of God deigned so to take up a man in the womb of the virgin that one person should come to be of God and of man; on account of which, so signally born, having suffered, died, and risen for our sins, he ascended into heaven. For this Nestorius saw that the assumed humanity was not the divinity,[14] and hence, misled by a paralogism, believed that it was not the Word of God, granting with heresy 73 "the Word does not suffer unless the divinity suffers"; and so, since it had been supposed that it is a person,[15] he said that in Christ there were two persons; and consequently Christ would either be an aggregate of these, or the person of the Word not humanly subject to passion, so as neither to have suffered, died, nor been buried: because he did not see how two natures so distant could each be the same person. But whatever the moderns have said, Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and the

quod in Christo tam divinitas[5] quam humanitas est eadem persona Verbi[12]; et quod aliquid,[13] quod nos sumus, recenter factum est[14] Verbum; ut dicit Augustinus super Ps. 80. Ome. 48, 2° de Visitacione Infirmorum et alibi. Euticiani autem[15] volentes declinare a Nestorianis cum Appollinaristis coinciderant in caribdim, negantes naturam [84] nostram cum proprietatibus et accidentibus ipsam consequentibus per veram humanitatis assumpcionem fuisse in Christo, et per consequens omnes acciones vel denominaciones humanas negant[1] esse in Christo[1] formaliter, nescientes exinde consequi quod[2] toti corpori Christi mistico auferri oporteat que capiti defuissent; ut, si Christus non patitur vel meretur, multo evidencius nullum[3] membrum; cum in capite exemplari oporteat quidquid perfeccionis fuerit[4] esse in posteriores derivatum.[4]

other chief doctors before Peter Lombard with one accord understand him in that way. For otherwise they would not so often say that each nature, both body and soul, is the same person of the man; and that in Christ both the divinity and the humanity are the same person of the Word; and that something which we are has newly been made the Word,[16] as Augustine says on Psalm 80, Homily 48, *On the Visitation of the Sick* 2, and elsewhere.[17] And the Eutychians, wishing to turn aside from the Nestorians, had fallen with the Apollinarists into Charybdis, denying that our [84]nature, with the properties and accidents that follow on it, was in Christ through a true assumption of the humanity; and consequently they deny that all human actions or namings are formally in Christ, not knowing that from this it follows that whatever had been lacking to the head must be taken away from the whole mystical body of Christ: so that, if Christ does not suffer or merit, much more evidently no member [does]; since in the exemplary head whatever there was of perfection must be derived into its posterity.[18]

¶4 84.10–84.15

[84]Unde Iudei tempore Christi laboraverunt in ista heresi negantes Christi divinitatem; ut patet Ioh. 10. 'Non, inquiunt, de bono opere lapidamus[5] te, sed de blasfemia; quia tu, homo cum sis, facis te ipsum Deum.' Sed in ista heresi exorbitant Sarraceni[6] dicentes Iesum prophetam eximium sed non Deum.

Hence the Jews in the time of Christ laboured in this heresy, denying the divinity of Christ, as is clear in John 10: "For a good work," they say, "we stone thee not, but for blasphemy; because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God."[19] But in this heresy the Saracens go astray, saying "Jesus is an eminent prophet, but not God".

¶5 84.16–84.29

[84]Iste sunt[7] hereses, quas cum similibus oportet cavere de Christo, confitendo cum ecclesia[8] duas plenas substancias esse Christum, deitatem[9] scilicet et humanitatem; ita quod eadem persona sit perfectus Deus et perfectus homo ex anima racionali et carne in persona Verbi[10] secundum ydemptitatem ypostaticam indissolubiliter coniunctis. Et hinc dicit sanctus evangelista 1 Ioh. 4.[11] 'Omnis, inquit, spiritus,[12] qui confitetur Iesum Christum in carne venisse, ex Deo est; et omnis spiritus, qui solvit Iesum, ex Deo non est; et hic est antichristus de quo audistis quoniam[13] venit, et nunc iam in mundo est.' Oportet ergo volentem infringere[14] latebras antichristi confiteri deitatem[9] et humanitatem[15] insolubiliter, personaliter, et formaliter inesse[15] Domino nostro[16] Iesu Christo.

These are the heresies which, with others like them, must be guarded against concerning Christ, confessing with the church that two full substances are Christ, namely the Godhead and the humanity; so that the same person is perfect God and perfect man, of a rational soul and flesh joined indissolubly in the person of the Word according to hypostatic identity.[20] And hence the holy evangelist says, 1 John 4: "Every spirit," he says, "which confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: and every spirit that dissolveth Jesus is not of God. And this is Antichrist, of whom you have heard that he cometh: and he is now already in the world."[21] He who would break into the hiding-places of antichrist must therefore confess "the Godhead and the humanity are inextricably, personally, and formally in our Lord Jesus Christ".[22]

Notes

1. Augustine, *De haeresibus*. Wyclif's numbers are kept as he gives them; in the modern numbering the Ebionites are 10, the Theodotians 33, the Paulianists 44, the Photinians 45 (Wyclif 49), the Arians 49, the Apollinarists 55, the Metangismonites 58, the Proclianites 60, the Patricians 61, the Priscillianists 70, the Sabellians 41. (*verified* in PL 42).

2. The print *Theodosiani*; Augustine's *Theodotiani*, followers of Theodotus. The English gives the modern forms of the names throughout (the print *Meicagismonite*, A B C *Meitangismonte*: Metangismonites).
3. Philaster (Filastrius of Brescia) was no heretic but the heresiologist on whom Augustine draws; the text joins him to Photinus (O *filaster*, A B C *siliaster*). Augustine names him at *De haeresibus* 41 and, beside Photinus, at 45 (PL 42, 34: *Philaster autem continuatim ponit ambos*), where Wyclif's slip probably arose; so too Harris, in his note (*verified*).
4. The expository syllogism has a singular middle term ("this Godhead is the Father; this Godhead is the Son; therefore the Father is the Son"): the "paralogism" is that form applied to the divine essence.
5. *Nona heresis* "a ninth heresy": the count is not Augustine's (he numbers it 73) and does not come out at nine on any plain reckoning of the heresies named above; the print is translated.
6. Wyclif's own *De universalibus* (named again below); Harris's index gives *De Universalibus, 81, 164*. The point made at 82 is in *De universalibus* c. 18 (ed. Dziewicki, *Miscellanea philosophica* II, 1905, pp. 120–121): a common form such as laughing is in its particulars only *sub disiunccione tantum* (*verified*).
7. *color*: a plausible ground, here for an inference.
8. *tam … quam* "both … and": the Word is something the Father is not (the assumed humanity, as the next sentence says) as well as another person. B C read *esset* for the first *est*.
9. *ponunt placentes*: the print gives *ponunt* no object; taken as reflexive. Harris at the foot suggests *ponuntur placentes* "are placed, pleasing very many"; O reads *placenter* "pleasingly".
10. Thersites, the railer of the Greek host (*Iliad* 2), proverbial for the worthless man who claims a place among his betters; the print's spelling *Tharsites* (O *tarlites*). Wyclif uses the name so again in *De apostasia* c. 15 (ed. Dziewicki, p. 195), of prelates set down *ad augendum numerum, ut tersites*, where Dziewicki takes it for a scholastic byword for the worthless; Harris (note on 82.18) took *Tharsites* for a logical fallacy. Wyclif's source not identified.
11. The subject of *sit* is the common humanity: it is each human person, and the person is what laughs.
12. Gal. 2:6 (Vulgate *qui videbantur esse aliquid*, Douay–Rheims "who seemed to be some thing"); Wyclif has the present tense and no *esse*.
13. The chapters on Nestorius and Eutyches are not Augustine's own (he died before either was condemned): they are later additions to *De haeresibus* in its medieval transmission. In PL 42 the work ends at 88, the Pelagians, and Harris (note on 83.1) calls the passage quoted the spurious appendix (*verified*). "Mediator of God and men": 1 Tim. 2:5.
14. *divinitas* here and twice below, the print with O; A B C read *deitas* "Godhead", which this edition keeps apart.
15. *cum illam esse personam sit suppositum*: taken as a perfect passive with an accusative and infinitive, "since it had been supposed that it [the humanity] is a person"; *suppositum* may also be the noun, "since for it to be a person is [for it to be] a supposit". O *illam humanitatem esse personam suppositum*; A B C mark *personam* for transposition.
16. Either term can be the subject: "something which we are has been made the Word" (Wyclif's order, with the humanity as subject) or "the Word has been made something which we are". O *esse* for *est*.
17. Augustine on Ps. 80 (*Enarrationes in Psalmos*); "Homily 48" (the collection not named); and the pseudo-Augustinian *De visitatione infirmorum* II. Wyclif's *recenter* answers *Enarr. in Ps.* 80.13 (PL 37, 1039): *Christus noster recens forte homo, sed sempiternus Deus*. Harris's index takes Homily 48 as *Tract. in Ioh.* 48 (perhaps 48.3, PL 35, 1741–42). *De visit. inf.* II.2 (PL 40, 1153) has *Quod tu es, fieri dignatus est Deus* (*verified*).
18. *posteros* "posterity", with A B C (O *postores*, the same word), against the print's *posteriores* "later [members]"; the sense hardly differs.
19. John 10:33 (Douay–Rheims). Wyclif places *non* before *de bono opere* and has no *et* before *quia*.
20. The words of the Athanasian creed, *perfectus Deus, perfectus homo, ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens*. Wyclif has *carne* without *humana* (*verified*).
21. 1 John 4:2–3 (Douay–Rheims); *solvit Iesum* "dissolveth Jesus" is the verb Wyclif uses of loosing the union.
22. A B C have *personaliter* alone of the three adverbs; for *infringere* O reads *añfugere* (Harris: *aufugere* "flee"?).

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 83: *humanitus,* (plate: print = humanitus; the transcription normalised it)
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Augustinus, (83.30).

Chapter 6

Part 1: That Christ is a man univocally with other men

Harris pp. 85.0–89.10

¶1 85.0–85.0

[85][Ostendit quod Christus sit univoce homo cum aliis hominibus; et respondendo obiectibus declarat quod Christus est, secundum multorum doctorum testimonia, creatura. This chapter (A) shows that Christ is a man literally and in the same sense as other men are men; and by the discussion of objections to this statement (B) illustrates further the thesis of Chap. I., that Christ is a creature, in accordance with the testimony of many weighty authorities.]

[It shows that Christ is univocally a man with other men; and, by answering objections, it makes clear that Christ is, according to the testimonies of many doctors, a creature.]

¶2 85.2–85.13

[85]Ex istis videtur consequi quod Christus sit univoce homo cum quolibet fratre suo. Probatur tripliciter. Primo sic. Christus est anima eiusdem racionis cum nostra, sicut et corpus eiusdem specifice racionis, que eciam univoce copulatur; ergo est univoce completa humanitas, et sic homo. Non enim est possibile aliquid complete principiari ex principiis omnino similibus cum adequatis principiis, ex quibus principiatur aliquid, nisi conveniat in natura. Cum ergo humanitas Christi et cuiuscunque alterius hominis sic se respiciunt, sequitur quod sunt idem in specie. Aliter enim Christus non esset pocius homo quam ydolum vel ymago; homo enim solum equivoce non est homo.

From these things it seems to follow that Christ is univocally a man with each of his brothers. This is proved in three ways. First thus. Christ is a soul of the same kind as ours, as [he is] also a body of the same specific kind, which also is univocally joined;[1] therefore he is univocally a complete humanity, and so a man. For it is not possible that anything be completely constituted from principles wholly like the adequate principles from which something [else] is constituted, unless it agrees [with it] in nature. Since, therefore, the humanity of Christ and that of any other man stand so to one another, it follows that they are the same in species. For otherwise Christ would no more be a man than an idol or an image; for what is a man only equivocally is not a man.

¶3 85.14–86.15

[85]Confirmatur primo ex hoc, quod nec corpus nec anima, cum sit pars qualitativa suppositi, est[1] per se in specie, sed ipsum suppositum, ad cuius[2] speciem partes[3] huiusmodi reducuntur. Cum ergo Christus secundum deitatem non sit in specie, nec humanitas eius est per se in specie, ut dicunt negantes ipsam esse suppositum; relinquitur quod Christus sit suppositum per se in specie. Sed in qua, rogo, si non fuerit[4] in humana.[4] Nec audebit catholicus dicere quod corpus et anima Christi erant solum fantastica non consimilis speciei cum partibus aliorum hominum. Quando autem [86]communicatur cum hominibus ponentibus—'omnia universalia esse signa,'—oportet aliter loqui: ut posito, quod[1] omnis natura[1] humana sit assumpta[2] a Verbo, et ipsum proferat voces et[3] scripta talia—'homo est animal racionale'—et[4] correspondenter eliciat conceptus ut nos facimus; tunc sicut non

This is confirmed, first, from the fact that neither the body nor the soul, since [each] is a qualitative part of the supposit, is of itself in a species, but the supposit itself, to whose species parts of this kind are reduced. Since, therefore, Christ as to the Godhead is not in a species, and his humanity is not of itself in a species, as those say who deny "it is a supposit", it remains that Christ is a supposit of itself in a species. But in which, I ask, if not in the human? Nor will a catholic dare to say that the body and soul of Christ were only imaginary, not of a like species with the parts of other men. But when one converses [86]with men who posit "all universals are signs", one must speak otherwise: for instance, supposing that every human nature were assumed by the Word, and he uttered such spoken and written words as "man is a rational animal", and correspondingly elicited

exinde deficeret species humana ex parte rei, sic[5] forent talia signa univoca vera ut prius, posito quod isti conceptus maneant post assumpciones significantes[6] naturaliter et univoce sicut ante. Aliter enim, solo Christo existente de specie humana, vere sciret ad sensum[7] univocum priorem nedum quod nemo est Deus, sed quod nemo est animal; cum species non esset, deficiente quocunque eius supposito.[8] Quod videtur mihi insanum dicere, cum Christus maxime perficeret genus suum; et per consequens si omnis homo sit Deus, non exinde tollitur species hominis.

concepts as we do; then, just as the human species would not on that account fail on the side of the thing, so such univocal signs would be true as before, supposing that those concepts remain after the assumptions, signifying naturally and univocally as before. For otherwise, with Christ alone existing of the human species, he would truly know, in the former univocal sense, not only "no man is God" but "no man is an animal";[2] since the species would not be, when any supposit of it whatever was lacking. Which seems to me mad to say, since Christ would most of all perfect his genus; and consequently, if every man be God, the species of man is not on that account taken away.

¶4 86.16–86.29

[86] 2°. confirmatur ex hoc quod Christus est formaliter homo humanitate consimilis racionis cum humanitate alterius: ergo est univoce homo cum alio. Patet consequencia eo quod, quantumcunque[9] subiecta variantur, dummodo[10] forme, a quibus recipiunt predicaciones huiusmodi, sunt consimilis racionis, predicaciones sunt univoce; ut, quantumcunque subiecta[11] corpora[11] variantur, dummodo habent per totum albedines consimilis racionis, sunt alba univoce.[12] Quod autem humanitates[13] Christi et aliorum essencialiter conveniunt exinde evidet, quod dimissa humanitate foret illa consimilis racionis cum alia; ergo cum unio sit sibi accidentalis, eo quod potest[14] manere eadem essencia denudata;[15] sequitur quod stante unione erit eiusdem racionis substancialis[16] cum alia.

Second, this is confirmed from the fact that Christ is formally a man by a humanity of like kind with the humanity of another; therefore he is univocally a man with another. The inference is clear, because, however much the subjects vary, provided the forms from which they receive predications of this kind are of like kind, the predications are univocal: as, however much the subject bodies vary, provided they have whitenesses of like kind throughout, they are white univocally. Now that the humanities of Christ and of others agree essentially is evident from this, that, the humanity being laid aside, it would be of like kind with another; therefore, since the union is accidental to it, because it can remain the same essence stripped [of it], it follows that while the union stands it will be of the same substantial kind with another.[3]

¶5 86.30–87.13

[86] 3°. confirmatur ex hoc quod Christus est homo, et non Pater neque[17] Donum; quod non esset, nisi Christus plus conveniret[18] cum homine quam Pater; ergo est maior conveniencia [87] Christi ad hominem quam Patris ad hominem, vel quam ante assumpcionem fuerat. Et cum non[1] sit pertinens conveniencia nisi vel in genere vel in specie, sequitur[1] quod Christus factus homo convenit in genere cum aliis hominibus, et per idem in specie;[2] quia aliter non foret humanitate nobis similior quam perante, cum conveniencia presupponit unionem.[3] Noto ergo gradu[4] similitudinis[5] vel conveniencie, tunc, cum omnis conveniencia accidentalis presupponit convenienciam substancie generalem, oportet quod secundum humanitatem, qua factus est nobis similis, conveniat nobiscum in[6] genere vel in[6] specie, cum conveniencia in humanitate sit alterius racionis[7] quam conveniencia in aliquo accidente[7] novem[8] generum.

Third, this is confirmed from the fact that Christ is man, and not the Father or the Gift; which would not be so unless Christ agreed more with man than the Father [does]; therefore there is a greater agreement [87] of Christ with man than of the Father with man, or than there had been before the assumption. And since there is no pertinent agreement except either in genus or in species, it follows that Christ, made man, agrees in genus with other men, and by the same token in species; for otherwise he would not be more like us by the humanity than before, since agreement presupposes union.[4] The degree of likeness or agreement being noted, therefore, then, since every accidental agreement presupposes a general agreement of substance, he must, as to the humanity, by which he was made like us, agree with us in genus or in species; since agreement in humanity is of another kind than agreement in some accident of the nine genera.

¶6 87.14–88.2

[87]Item omne suppositum speciei humane[9] est homo univoce; Christus est suppositum speciei humane,[9] cum sit filius hominis; ergo est homo univoce. Maior patet ex hoc, quod omne tale suppositum est illa species, et per consequens quiditas vel racio speciei. Et sic eadem est communis racio illi individuo et cuilibet[10] eidem sibi[10] in specie. Cum ergo illa descriptive dicuntur univoce predicata; quibus competit eadem racio predicati, patet quod non potest esse individuum speciei humane nisi sit homo univoce; aliter enim individuum esset homo, et non diffinicio vel quiditas hominis; et hoc esset ponere hominem non esse hominem. Minor[11] autem argumenti patet ex fide. Nam secundum Apostolum ed Hebre. 2. 'nusquam angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahe ut fieret per omnia fratribus consimilis[12];' quia tam secundum naturam corpoream quam[13] incorpoream,[13] et illa sunt omnia. Et consequenter[14] similatus est fratribus suis secundum omnia accidencia positiva[15] naturaliter consequencia[16] has naturas. Aliter enim non esset 'mediator [88]Dei et hominum homo Christus,'[1] ut dicit Apostolus prima ad[2] Thimo. 2.

Again, every supposit of the human species is univocally man; Christ is a supposit of the human species, since he is the son of man; therefore he is univocally man. The major is clear from this, that every such supposit is that species, and consequently the quiddity or account of the species. And so the account common to that individual and to each that is the same as it in species is the same. Since, therefore, those things are by definition said to be univocally predicated to which the same account of the predicate belongs,[5] it is clear that there cannot be an individual of the human species unless it is univocally man; for otherwise the individual would be man, and not the definition or quiddity of man; and this would be to posit "man is not man". Now the minor of the argument is clear from faith. For according to the Apostle, Hebrews 2, "nowhere doth he take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham, that he might be made in all things like unto his brethren";[6] for [he was made like them] both as to the bodily nature and as to the incorporeal, and those are all. And consequently he was made like his brothers as to all the positive accidents that naturally follow on these natures. For otherwise he would not be "mediator [88]of God and men, the man Christ",[7] as the Apostle says, 1 Timothy 2.

¶7 88.3–88.28

[88]Confirmatur primo ex testimonio Augustini. Nam in De Vera Religione 27; 'Ipsa, inquit, natura suscipienda erat que liberanda.' Et 2°. De Visitacione Infirmorum; 'Homo Deus participatus est nostre[3] humanitatis ut nos participemur sue divinitatis;' et sequitur; 'quod tu es, fieri dignatus est.' Et ad idem vadit processus Anselmi in libro suo Cur Deus Homo; et De Incarnacione Verbi; 'quod aliter non fuisset competens satisfaccio pro peccato primi hominis, nisi individuum eiusdem nature, et sic idem in specie, solveret debitum, quod natura debuit creatori[4] suo.' Nec memini me legisse in scripturis alicuius doctoris famosi oppositum. Unde Lincolniensis[5] in suo Exameron dicit quod Christus est homo eiusdem racionis cum[6] aliis. Et idem dicit sanctus Thomas et omnes ponentes universalia ex parte rei. Sed et multi non ponentes universalia preter signa; quia multi philosophi, sive fideles sive infideles, conversantes cum Christo et ipsum sencientes, ut apostoli,[7] haberent conceptum specificum in anima, qui signaret illis[8] univoce illum cum aliis; quia aliter fuisset Christus illusor maximus, qui ad hoc ostendit eius humanitatem humanis sensibus, et verbo docuit ipsum esse verum hominem. Philosophi ergo habentes terminos vel conceptus specificos, quos vere predicarent de pronominibus demonstrantibus[9] recto Christum[10] cum aliis, haberent[10] conceptus

This is confirmed, first, from the testimony of Augustine. For in *On True Religion* 27: "That very nature," he says, "was to be taken up which was to be set free."[8] And *On the Visitation of the Sick* 2: "The man-God partook of our humanity, that we might partake of his divinity"; and it follows: "what thou art, he deigned to become."[9] And to the same end goes the argument of Anselm in his book *Cur Deus homo*, and *On the Incarnation of the Word*: "that otherwise there would not have been fitting satisfaction for the sin of the first man, unless an individual of the same nature, and so the same in species, paid the debt which the nature owed to its creator."[10] Nor do I remember having read the opposite in the writings of any famous doctor. Hence Lincoln, in his *Hexaemeron*, says that Christ is a man of the same kind with others.[11] And the same is said by Saint Thomas and by all who posit universals on the side of the thing.[12] But many also who posit no universals besides signs [say it]; for many philosophers, whether faithful or unbelievers, conversing with Christ and perceiving him, as the apostles [did], would have a specific concept in the soul which would signify to them him univocally with others; for otherwise Christ would have been the greatest deceiver, who to this end showed his humanity to human senses, and taught by word that he was a true man. Philosophers, therefore,

univocos Christo et aliis: et hoc sufficit ad univocacionem ac ydemptitatem specificam iuxta sic loquentes. Ergo conclusio.

having specific terms or concepts which they would truly predicate of pronouns pointing out, in the direct case, Christ with others,[13] would have concepts univocal to Christ and others; and this suffices for univocation and identity of species according to those who speak so. Therefore the conclusion.

¶8 *88.29–89.10*

[88]Confirmatur tripliciter. Primo ex hoc quod peccatum est illudere communicantes per verba vel signa sophistica; sed sic fecisset Christus potissime, si non habuisset aliquam denominacionem univocam cum aliqua creatura; ergo peccasset maxime. Pro assumpto dicitur Ecclesiastici 37. 'Qui [89]sophistice loquitur, odibilis est.' Et Enchiridion 14. 'Verbis uti ad fallaciam, non ad quod instituta sunt, peccatum est.' Christus autem sepe[1] dixit se esse filium hominis et naturaliter ostendit se esse accidentatum[2] multipliciter; necnon et[2] passionem et mortem et resurreccionem predixit Apostolis ut patet Matth. 16, unde Petro dicenti sibi, 'Absit hoc a te, Domine;' respondit Veritas; 'Vade post me, Sathana: non sapis ea, que Dei sunt.' Et tamen eandem sentenciam Petri dicunt modo scolastici. Sequitur quod vel Christus fuit falsissimus[3] vel illi sunt racionabiliter arguendi.[3]

This is confirmed in three ways. First from this, that it is a sin to deceive those with whom one communicates by sophistical words or signs; now Christ would have done so most of all, if he had not had some univocal naming with some creature; therefore he would have sinned most greatly. For the assumption it is said, Ecclesiasticus 37: "He that [89]speaketh sophistically, is hateful."[14] And *Enchiridion* 14: "To use words for fallacy, not for what they were instituted for, is a sin."[15] Now Christ often said that he was the son of man, and naturally showed himself to be subject to accidents in many ways; and he also foretold his passion and death and resurrection to the apostles, as is clear in Matthew 16; hence, to Peter saying to him, "Be this far from thee, Lord," the Truth answered: "Go behind me, Satan: thou savourest not the things that are of God."[16] And yet the schoolmen now say the same teaching as Peter. It follows that either Christ was most false or those men are with reason to be reproved.[17]

Notes

1. *Christus est anima … sicut et corpus*: bare predication, kept: Christ is a soul, and a body, of one kind with ours. *Eiusdem racionis* "of the same kind": *racio* is the "account" of Aristotle's univocals, so rendered where it stands alone (p. 87).
2. *sciret* has no expressed subject: taken as the Word of the case just put ("he"); it may be impersonal, "one would know". *Nemo* "no man", as the argument needs.
3. *dimissa humanitate … foret illa*: the ablative absolute and *illa* name the same humanity, laid aside by the Word. O omits *denudata* (with a gap) and *substancialis*.
4. *unionem*, the print with O; A B C read *univocacionem* "univocation", on the word the step turns on. The print is kept.
5. *descriptive* "by definition" (cf. *descripcio*): the definition of univocals, things that share both the name and the same account (Aristotle, *Categories* 1, 1a6–7; in Boethius's Latin, PL 64, 167: *Univoca vero dicuntur quorum nomen commune est, et secundum nomen eadem ratio substantiae*; *verified*).
6. Heb. 2:16–17, joined: Vulgate *sed semen Abrahae apprehendit. Unde debuit per omnia fratribus similari*; Wyclif's *ut fieret … consimilis* (A B C *similis*) is translated, the Douay–Rheims wording kept where his Latin agrees.
7. 1 Tim. 2:5 (Douay–Rheims), without *Iesus* (O adds it).
8. Augustine, *De vera religione*, Wyclif's "27". The words are *De vera religione* 16.30, PL 34, 135, *ipsa enim natura suscipienda erat quae liberanda*, exactly (*verified*).
9. The pseudo-Augustinian *De visitatione infirmorum* II. II.2, PL 40, 1153: *Participatus est nostrae humanitatis, ut nos participaremur suae divinitatis* and *Quod tu es, fieri dignatus est Deus*; Wyclif's *Homo Deus* ends the sentence before (*verified*).
10. A summary of Anselm's argument (*Cur Deus homo* II.6–8; *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi*), not a quotation, though the print sets it in quotation marks. The points are *Cur Deus homo* II.6 (*nec facere illam debet nisi homo*) and II.8 (*necesse est, ut satisfaciens idem sit qui peccator aut eiusdem generis*) (*verified*). A B C read *Deo* for *creatori*.
11. Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, *Hexaemeron*; the place not found; Harris's index lists this page without a locus.
12. Thomas Aquinas; no place given; the doctrine is *ST* III q. 2 a. 5 co., *Christus dicitur homo univoce cum hominibus aliis, utpote eiusdem speciei existens* (*verified*).
13. *in recto*, with A B O, against the print's *recto*: pronouns that point to Christ in the direct (nominative) case, as against *in obliquo*.
14. Ecclus. 37:23 (Douay–Rheims).
15. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 22 (c. 7) in the modern division, Wyclif's "14"; *fallacia* here is deception. PL 40, 243, quoted exactly (*verified*).
16. Matt. 16:22–23 (Douay–Rheims), shortened: Wyclif adds *hoc* (Vulgate *Absit a te, Domine*) and omits *scandalum es mihi: quia*.

17. *arguendi*: gerundive, "to be reproved" (*arguere* in the biblical sense), or "to be argued against". O reads only *falsum vel arguendi.*

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 88: *ad* (print as transcribed (Et ad idem)) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference of™angeis? Heb! (87.29); reference I. Tim. ii. 5. (88.1).

Part 2: That Christ is man univocally: the gloss "insofar as man" fails

Harris pp. 89.11–92.16

¶1 89.11–90.5

[89]2°. per hoc quod Christus non foret mobilis, sensibilis, passibilis, subditus patri vel parentibus secundum quod homo: que tamen glosa est maximum refugium negantibus de virtute sermonis scripturam sacram de Christo enunciantem[4] talia. Et consequens[4] sic probatur. Christus non[5] secundum quod homo est univoce aliquid, nec aliqualiter accidentatus cum aliqua creatura: ergo non secundum quod homo est huiusmodi, ut predicitur. Patet consequencia[6] ex hoc quod non est color concedendi, quod Christus secundum quod homo est sic formatus, nisi vel quia homo est sic denominatus, vel quia illa humanitas est sic formata. Primum non valet, cum non[7] sit possibile Christum sic informari ut dicunt. Nec[8] secundum prodest,[8] cum illam humanitatem ponunt esse[9] non suppositum, cui soli debetur accio. Et sic nec illam ponunt concipi, nasci, conversari, pati, ascendere, vel quascumque tales predicaciones personales suscipere. Cum ergo non sit predicacio synecdochica, nisi[10] pars primo et principaliter recipit predicacionem,[11] que exinde secundario toti tribuitur; sequitur quod hec non est construccio synecdochica—Christus[10] secundum humanitatem fatigatur, sicut tristatur aut moritur —cum repugnat illam humanitatem sic denominari; ut [90]homo non est albus secundum faciem nisi facies sit alba. Et illa est acuta obex contra negantes scripturas cum glosa seipsam inficit[1] plus quam textus. Non ergo Christus secundum quod homo est alicuiusmodi,[2] nisi racio hominis univoce sibi conveniat; quia aliter, quid sibi et homini?[3]

Second, by this: that Christ would not be movable, perceptible, passible, subject to his father or parents insofar as man. Yet this gloss is the greatest refuge for those who deny that holy scripture, in the proper sense of the words, states such things of Christ. And the consequent is proved thus.[1] Christ is not, insofar as man, anything univocally, nor in any way subject to accidents along with any creature: therefore he is not, insofar as man, of this kind, as is said before. The inference is clear from this, that there is no colour[2] for granting "Christ insofar as man is so formed", except either because the man is so named, or because that humanity is so formed. The first does not hold, since it is not possible, as they say, for Christ to be so informed. Nor does the second avail, since they posit that humanity to be not a supposit, to which alone action is due. And so they do not posit that it is conceived, is born, lives its life among men, suffers, ascends, or takes up any such personal predications. Since, then, there is no synecdochic predication unless the part first and principally receives the predication, which is thereupon attributed secondarily to the whole, it follows that this is not a synecdochic construction: "Christ as to the humanity is wearied", as also "is saddened" or "dies", since it is incompatible for that humanity to be so named;[3] as [90]a man is not white as to his face unless the face is white. And that is a sharp bar against those who deny the scriptures, since the gloss taints itself more than the text does. Christ, therefore, is not of any kind insofar as man, unless the account of man belongs to him univocally; for otherwise, what has he to do with man?

¶2 90.6–90.32

[90]3°. confirmatur sic. Ad hoc quod satisfaciat[4] pro peccato nature vel generis,[5] oportet quod natura, que peccaverat, emerendo[6] restituat:[6] sed genus humanum peccavit in Adam et suis posteris: ergo oportet idem genus secundum aliquod eius suppositum ut satisfaciat[7] pro peccato; sed non potuit secundum pure[8] hominem: ergo relinquitur quod suppositum impeccabile satisfaciat assumendo eandem naturam in aliqua essencia singulari: quod et factum est per Verbum,[9] ut

Third, this is confirmed thus. In order that [one] make satisfaction for the sin of a nature or of a kind, the nature that had sinned must restore by making amends:[4] now the human kind sinned in Adam and his posterity: therefore the same kind must, as to some supposit of it, make satisfaction for the sin; now it could not as to a mere man: therefore it remains that a supposit unable to sin make satisfaction by assuming the same nature

superius dixerat Augustinus. Et illam[10] racionem tangit Anselmus 2°· Cur Deus Homo ca°. 8. que, licet non sapiat negantibus universalia, saperet tamen cuicunque pio theologo.[11] Aliter enim non conveniencius assumendo humanitatem redemisset Deus peccatum hominis, quam peccatum angeli; cum plus convenit Christus post incarnacionem[12] secundum humanitatem angelo quam homini.[12] Nam 'dii' solum participative non plus in natura cum Deo conveniunt quam ante participacionem: sed tam equivoce dicitur 'homo' de Deo et de angelis[13] quam equivoce 'deus' de creatura et natura divina dicitur: ergo tam equivoce disconveniunt Verbum et homo post incarnacionem sicut ante: sed ante plus conveniebat angelo quam homini: ergo[14] modo. Quid ergo pertinuit[15] Christi[15] meritum humano generi a quo tante distitit? Non ergo satisfecit illud genus hominum quod peccavit; et per consequens manet in pleno debito sicut ante; quod est contra Apostolum ad Colos. 2. dicentem quod 'in Christo Deus delevit cirographum decreti, quod erat nobis contrarium.'

in some singular essence; which was also done by the Word, as Augustine had said above. And Anselm touches on that argument, *Cur Deus homo* II, chapter 8;[5] which, although it has no savour for those who deny universals, would yet have savour for any pious theologian. For otherwise God would not more fittingly have redeemed the sin of man by assuming the humanity than the sin of an angel; since Christ after the incarnation agrees, as to the humanity, more with an angel than with a man.[6] For those who are "gods" only participatively agree with God in nature no more than before the participation: now "man" is said as equivocally of God and of the others as "god" is said equivocally of a creature and of the divine nature:[7] therefore the Word and man disagree as equivocally after the incarnation as before: now before, he agreed more with an angel than with a man: therefore [so he does] now. How, then, did Christ's merit pertain to the human kind, from which he stood so far apart?[8] Therefore that kind of men which sinned did not make satisfaction; and consequently it remains in full debt as before; which is against the Apostle, Colossians 2, saying that "in Christ God blotted out the handwriting of the decree, which was contrary to us."[9]

¶3 91.1–91.11

[91]Confirmatur. Vel est conveniencia maxima, qua Christiani cum Christo conveniunt tantum ex parte signorum, vel tantum ex parte naturarum[1] conveniencium, vel mixtim. Primum dictum est nimium[2] puerile, specialiter cum hoc signum 'homo' summe equivoce significat Christum et alios. Si ex parte signatorum, vel oportet dare eis naturam communem, vel aliter dicere quod in nullo conveniunt, nisi in quo differunt; et[3] sic, ut plus conveniunt, plus differunt[3]; et cum tanta sit conveniencia quanta differencia et e contra; si[4] igitur in infinitum differunt, in infinitum conveniunt, et e contra.[4]

[91]This is confirmed. Either the greatest agreement, by which Christians agree with Christ, is only on the side of the signs, or only on the side of the natures that agree, or mixed.[10] The first saying is too childish, especially since this sign "man" signifies Christ and the others most equivocally. If on the side of the things signified, either one must posit a common nature for them, or else say that they agree in nothing except in that in which they differ; and so, the more they agree, the more they differ; and since there is as much agreement as difference, and conversely: if therefore they differ infinitely, they agree infinitely, and conversely.[11]

¶4 91.12–92.16

[91]Item, si Christus non sit univoce homo cum aliis, tunc nullum accidens consequens eius humanitatem foret univoce accidens cum accidentibus correspondentibus in suis fratribus. Consequens interimeret totam fidem, spem, et caritatem de Christi incarnacione, et falsificaret scripturas eque nequiter velut Eutichiani et alii heretici supra dicti. Et consequencia patet ex hoc, quod omne accidens individuatur, specificatur, et habet totam essenciam suam a subiecto. Ergo, si subiecta in nullo univoco conveniunt, a maiori vel pari nec accidencia que secuntur; ut, si angelus non sit eiusdem speciei secundum copulatum corpus cum nostro corpore, tunc nec[5] accidencia, que appropriate[6] consecuntur nostra corpora, conveniunt eis nisi

Again, if Christ is not man univocally with the others, then no accident consequent on his humanity would be an accident univocally with the corresponding accidents in his brethren. The consequent would destroy the whole faith, hope, and charity concerning Christ's incarnation, and would falsify the scriptures as wickedly as the Eutychians and the other heretics spoken of above. And the inference is clear from this, that every accident is individuated, specified, and has its whole essence from its subject. Therefore, if the subjects agree in nothing univocal, then, by the argument from the greater or from the equal, neither do the accidents that follow them; as, if an angel is not of the same species with our body as

equivoce; ut, angelus non dormit, comedit, sentit, gignit, et sic de accidentibus competentibus toti homini: aliter enim essent procreati ab incubis et succubis filii diaboli naturales, et non filii hominum nec proximorum parentum; quod nemo dicit. Si ergo locucio animati[7] psittaci[8] vel[8] inanimati organi non est univoce[9] locucio cum humana, saltem secundum speciem specialissimam[10] propter diversitatem specificam[11] subiectorum; multo magis nullum accidens Christum consequens foret eiusdem [92]racionis cum accidente create substancie; cum subiecta nec specie, nec genere, nec in aliquo univoco convenirent. Non enim plus convenit Christus nobiscum quam deitas, ut sic opinantes concorditer confitentur; et per consequens, cum accidencia non sint nisi modi create substancie, sequitur quod nulla accidencia de genere[1] Iesu nostro[2] conveniant; ut non pocius conceptus est, vel natus humanitus, ambulavit, predicavit, paciebatur sitim, esuriem, opprobria vel flagella, quam deitas ipsa; et sic fuit obiectum maxime illusivum, cum nec fuit quantus, nec qualis, nec aliquod[3] aliorum[4] encium, cum non sit mobilis aut sensibilis eo quod omne tale accidens univocum cum aliis[5] requirit primum subiectum univocum quod informat. Sed Christus in nullo substanciali est nobis similis, ut dicitur; ergo nec in aliquo accidentali: non enim tantum conveniret sicut elementum, minera, bufo, bestia, vel quelibet[6] creatura.

to the body joined [to him], then neither do the accidents which follow our bodies as proper to them belong to them except equivocally; as, an angel does not sleep, eat, feel, beget, and so of the accidents that belong to the whole man: for otherwise there would be natural sons of the devil procreated by incubi and succubi, and not sons of men nor of their nearest parents; which no one says. If, then, the speech of an animate parrot or of an inanimate organ is not speech univocally with human [speech], at least as to the most special species, because of the specific diversity of the subjects,[12] much more would no accident consequent on Christ be of the same kind [92]with an accident of a created substance; since the subjects would agree neither in species, nor in genus, nor in anything univocal. For Christ agrees with us no more than the Godhead does, as those who so opine confess with one accord; and consequently, since accidents are nothing but modes of created substance, it follows that no accidents in kind belong to our Jesus;[13] so that he was no more conceived, or born humanly, walked, preached, suffered thirst, hunger, reproaches or scourges, than the Godhead itself; and so he was a most deceptive object, since he was neither quantified, nor qualified, nor any of the other beings, since he is not movable or perceptible, because every such accident univocal with others requires a first univocal subject which it informs. Now Christ is like us in nothing substantial, as is said; therefore not in anything accidental either: for he would not agree [with us] as much as an element, a mineral, a toad, a beast, or any creature whatever.

Notes

1. A B C read *enunciante talia et consequencia* (89.14–15): "stating such things; and the inference [is proved thus]". The print, with O, has the participle in the accusative and *consequens*, so that what is proved is the consequent ("Christ is not movable … insofar as man"), whose inference is then shown at 89.18.
2. *Color*: a plausible ground for granting the proposition, the period sense ("colour of title"), not a pretext.
3. The rule of synecdochic predication and the words "it follows that this is not a synecdochic construction" (89.28–30, *nisi … synecdochica*) are lacking in A B C; the print has them from O. Without them the sentence has no main clause, and the examples "is wearied … dies" are left hanging.
4. *Emendando* "by making amends" (90.8), with A B C (*emendando resipiscat*) and O (*emêdo restituat*, read as the abbreviation of *emendando*), against the print's *emerendo* "by meriting", which no manuscript reported at the foot gives; *restituat* is O's and the print's against A B C *resipiscat* "come to its senses".
5. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II.8: satisfaction must be made by one of Adam's race (PL 158, 405–406: *necesse est ut satisfaciens idem sit qui peccator aut ejusdem generis … ut de Adam assumatur homo, per quem restauretur genus Adae*; *verified*).
6. A B C read *post incarnacionem cum angelo quam cum homine* (90.19–20), without *secundum humanitatem*; the print has the qualification from O. The argument is the opponents' own consequence: even as to the humanity, their Christ would agree more with an angel.
7. *De aliis* "of the others" (90.23), with all the manuscripts (*aliis codd. omn.*), against the print's *de angelis* "of the angels", Harris's emendation. The comparison is between Christ and the other men, as the conclusion "the Word and man" shows.
8. A B C read *participavit Christus* (90.27) for *pertinuit Christi*: "how then did Christ share [his] merit with the human kind". The print follows O.
9. Col. 2:14, freely: Vulgate *delens quod adversus nos erat chirographum decreti, quod erat contrarium nobis* (DR "Blotting out the handwriting of the decree that was against us, which was contrary to us"); "in Christ God" comes from the context (2:13).

10. A B C read *signatorum* "of the things signified" (91.3) for *naturarum* "of the natures"; the next sentence takes up this member as *ex parte signatorum*, which agrees with A B C. The print follows O; the sense of the division is the same.
11. The words "and so, the more they agree, the more they differ" (91.8) are lacking in A B C, and "if therefore they differ infinitely … and conversely" (91.10–11) in O; the print joins the two families.
12. *Psittaci* "of a parrot" (91.29) is the print's spelling of O's *sithaci*; A B C have *siccati*, *secati*, *securati* (A, margin, *secati*). For *speciem specialissimam* and *specificam* (91.30–31) A B C have *sensitivam* and *factam*; the print follows O.
13. *Accidencia de genere*: accidents in kind, that is, belonging to a category of accident, as *esse accidentale in genere* (95.19); O adds a further *de* (92.6).
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 89: *ciantem* (print as transcribed (enun-/ciantem)) [SUB]
  - 91: *locucio* (plate (full page n0130 l. 28): print as transcribed)

Part 3: That Christ is movable and a creature: scripture and the saints

Harris pp. 92.17–96.29

¶1 92.17–94.22

[92]Ideo dicunt sic opinantes consequenter, sed minus catholice, quod Christus non est mobilis vel accidentatus humanitus. Quod si verum est, tunc indubie non est homo in aliquo fratribus suis consimilis. Quomodo, rogo, haberet fratres, si non sit univoce filius hominis habens eundem patrem et matrem remotos cum filiis[7] aliis, et sic temporaliter conceptus, genitus, atque natus, et sic consequenter, ut canit historia evangelica, conversatus? aut quomodo esset nedum in substancia vel natura vel in aliquo accidente fratribus suis consimilis, si nec[8] in genere,[8] nec in specie, nec in accidente univoco convenirent[9]? Pro certo dicat qui audet! quia ego non audeo tantum subvertere totum sensum historicum scripturarum, cum evangelium sicut et vetus testamentum expresse et absolute attribuit[10] sibi denominaciones accidentales creatas. Quomodo, queso, crederemus[11] aliquid de Christo, si non[12] assercionem propriam, [93]qua dicit, 'palpate et videte, quoniam spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere.' Ioh. ult°.? ex qua[1] doctrina hauserat ille celicus paranymphus,[2] quando in principio capituli sui dicit, 'Quod fuit ab inicio, quod audivimus, quod vidimus oculis nostris,[3] quod perspeximus, et manus nostre contrectaverunt de Verbo vite, anunciamus vobis'? Et Apostolus ad Hebre. 4°. 'habentes pontificem magnum, qui penetravit celos Iesum Filium Dei, teneamus spei nostre confessionem:[4] non enim habemus pontificem, qui non possit compati[5] infirmitatibus nostris; temptatum autem per omnia pro similitudine absque peccato.' Quod dictum Apostoli ego nescio aliter exponere quam expositum est a sanctis doctoribus. Per hoc ergo quod Iesus est filius Dei, est 'pontifex magnus[6] superior Aaronitis.'[6] Per hoc quod potestate propria 'penetravit celos,' solus ascendit[7] trahens alios secum. Per hoc quod potest compati nobis in natura communi assumpta, factus est nobis

Therefore those who so opine say, consistently but less catholicly, that Christ is not movable or subject to accidents humanly. And if this is true, then without doubt he is not a man like his brethren in anything. How, I ask, would he have brethren, if he is not univocally a son of man, having the same remote father and mother with the other sons, and so conceived, begotten, and born in time, and so, consequently, as the gospel history sings, living his life among men? Or how would he be like his brethren not only in substance or nature or in some accident, if they agreed neither in genus, nor in species, nor in a univocal accident? Let him who dares say it for certain! For I do not dare so far to overturn the whole historical sense of the scriptures, since the gospel, as also the old testament, expressly and absolutely attributes to him created accidental denominations. How, I beg, would we believe anything of Christ, if not his own assertion, [93]in which he says: "Handle, and see: for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have", John, the last chapter?[1] From which teaching that heavenly paranymph had drawn, when at the beginning of his chapter he says: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon and our hands have handled, of the word of life, we declare unto you"?[2] And the Apostle, Hebrews 4: "Having a great high priest that hath passed into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God: let us hold fast the confession of our hope. For we have not a high priest who cannot have compassion on our infirmities: but one tempted in all things like as we are, without sin."[3] That saying of the Apostle I do not know how to expound otherwise than it has been expounded by the holy doctors. By this, then, that Jesus is the Son of God, he is "a great high priest, higher than the Aaronites".[4] By this, that by his own power he "passed

propicius; quia ad Hebre. 5°. dicitur 'cum esset Filius Dei, didicit ex his, que passus est, obedienciam.' Experiencia enim temptacionis multimodis[8] didicit[9] humanitus, que aliter non sic sciret.[10] Temptatus[11] enim erat tripliciter a dyabolo, ut patet Matth 4°; et quadrupliciter[12] a Iudeis de potencia, sapiencia, misericordia, et iusticia, ut patet ex decursu evangelii. Non autem intrinsece a seipso. Quarto fuit illa temptacio nobis pro similitudine exemplari ad docendum nos gratis compati et vincere temptatores,[13] quia capitaneus apostolorum 1 Pet. 2°. vere testatur quod 'Christus passus est pro nobis,[14] vobis relinquens exemplum ut sequamini[14] vestigia eius.' Ista est exposicio sana, cui oportet nos insistere non superaddendo aliam[15] pre timore impugnacionis sophistice de vi vocis. Non quod fuit in capite nostro[16] ficta passio et non [94]vera, ut dixerunt heretici supradicti; sed veram conversacionem, veram passionem, veram mortem, et alias predicaciones sustinuit; ut meminit Augustinus esse de substancia fidei in De Vera Religione 29°. et Enchiridion 4°[1] ca°. 'Nos, inquit,[2] patimur egencias et dolores, sed[3] indubie magis ipse; nam "pro nobis egenus factus est."' 2 Cor. 8°. Et cum in perfecta etate, tenerrima complexione,[4] sensu vivacissimo,[5] non mortificato aliquo membro, in media etate, non supernatante humido[6] infantili[7] sit passus, patet quod in nullo alio est pena vel 'dolor tantus sicut fuerat dolor suus,' ut cecinit Isa. 53°. Secundo fratres sui fossi sunt sub terra vel lapide, sed ipse plus, cum Dominus mundi sepultus est sumptibus alienis, ut meminit Augustinus in De Questionibus Veteris et Nove Legis ca° 59:[8] et, ut breviter dicatur, quicquid debuit facere fecit ad summum, cum oporteat[9] principia exemplaria esse ultima[9]; et eo fecit hec omnia excellencius, quo ipse fuit humanitas copulata ypostatice deitati. Cum ergo omnes ille maneries accidencium creatorum infuerunt sibi formaliter, et omne tale accidens requirit subiectum sibi proporcionatum; sequitur quod Christus subiectus eis sit idem in specie cum subiectis accidencium consimilis speciei.

into the heavens", he alone ascended, drawing others with him. By this, that he can have compassion on us in the common nature assumed, he has become propitious to us; for in Hebrews 5 it is said: "whereas he was the Son of God, he learned obedience by the things which he suffered." For by experience of temptation, in its multitude, he learned humanly what he would not otherwise know in that way.[5] For he was tempted in three ways by the devil, as is clear from Matthew 4; and in four ways by the Jews, as to power, wisdom, mercy, and justice, as is clear from the course of the gospel. But not inwardly, from himself. Fourth, that temptation was "like as we are" for us, as an exemplary likeness, to teach us freely to have compassion and to conquer the tempters,[6] for the captain of the apostles, 1 Peter 2, truly testifies that "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow his steps." That is the sound exposition, on which we must insist, not adding another for fear of a sophistical attack by the force of the words. Not that there was in the head a feigned passion and not [94]a true one, as the heretics spoken of above said;[7] but he underwent a true manner of life, a true passion, a true death, and the other predications; as Augustine recalls is of the substance of the faith, in *De vera religione* 29 and *Enchiridion*, chapter 4: "We," he says, "suffer needs and pains, but without doubt he more; for 'for us he became needy.'" 2 Corinthians 8.[8] And since he suffered in perfect age, of most delicate complexion, with the liveliest sense, with no member mortified, in the middle of life, with no infant moisture floating above,[9] it is clear that in no other is there pain or "sorrow so great as his sorrow had been", as Isaiah 53 sang.[10] Second, his brethren were buried under earth or stone, but he more, since the Lord of the world was buried at the expense of others, as Augustine recalls in *De quaestionibus Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, chapter 59;[11] and, to say it briefly, whatever he ought to do he did to the utmost, since exemplary principles must be extremes; and he did all these things the more excellently in that he was the humanity joined hypostatically to the Godhead. Since, then, all those kinds of created accidents were in him formally, and every such accident requires a subject proportioned to it, it follows that Christ, the subject of them, is the same in species with the subjects of accidents of like species.

¶2 94.23–94.33

[94]Sed arguendo contra illud videtur primo tripliciter quod non debet concedi simpliciter quod Christus sit mobilis. Nam[10] non foret evidencia concludendi quod Christus sit mobilis,[10] nisi ex hoc quod secundum humanitatem est mobilis. Sed talis deduccio non procedit,

But arguing against that, it seems first, in three ways, that it ought not to be granted without qualification that Christ is movable. For there would be no evidence for inferring "Christ is movable" except from this, that as

cum arguitur a[11] secundum quid ad[11] simpliciter. Ergo non est medium concludendi[12] quod Christus sit mobilis. Sicut ergo non sequitur —Christus secundum humanitatem est creatura; ergo Christus est creatura—; ita non sequitur—Christus secundum humanitatem est mobilis; ergo Christus est mobilis.

to the humanity he is movable. Now such a deduction does not proceed, since it is argued from "in a certain respect" to "without qualification". Therefore there is no middle term for inferring "Christ is movable".[12] As, then, it does not follow, "Christ as to the humanity is a creature; therefore Christ is a creature", so it does not follow, "Christ as to the humanity is movable; therefore Christ is movable".

¶3 95.1–95.23

[95]Hic dicitur concedendo quod Christus est mobilis cum humanitas sua sit mobilis. Et dicant, qui sciunt, quia pro certo non puto aliam creaturam, sed neque Deum cognoscere quod Deus sit mobilis, nisi ex hoc quod creatura est mobilis que Deo ypostatice copulatur. Et per locum a sufficienti similitudine concedi debet simpliciter quod Christus est creatura, quia tota humanitas eius sibi copulata ypostatice est creatura.[1] Sicut enim negacio includitur in racione creature, que negacio non potest competere divinitati; sic in motu et qualibet forma substanciali vel accidentali in genere: et per consequens, negato quod Christus est creatura, negari debet quodlibet per se inferius; ut, quod est homo, animal, corpus, anima, sive substancia, et multo evidencius quod sit mole magnus, accidentaliter[2] qualis, filius hominis, predicans,[3] passus, locatus, temporaliter natus, sedens, vestitus; quia quodlibet istorum[4] est inferius, indignius, et humilius[5] quam esse substanciam, et[6] presupponit substanciam tanquam subiectum dans eis esse accidentale in genere. Omne itaque per se in genere dicit esse suum possibile esse pro aliqua mensura, pro qua non habet existenciam actualem; et per consequens omne per se in genere dicit se esse creaturam includendo neminem esse primitatis divine.

[95]The answer is here, by granting "Christ is movable", since his humanity is movable. And let those who know say it, for I certainly do not think that any other creature, nor even God, knows "God is movable" except from this, that a creature which is joined hypostatically to God is movable. And by the topic from sufficient likeness it ought to be granted without qualification that Christ is a creature, since his whole humanity joined to him hypostatically is a creature. For just as a negation is included in the account of a creature, which negation cannot belong to the divinity, so [it is] in motion and in any substantial or accidental form in a genus: and consequently, if "Christ is a creature" is denied, anything of itself inferior ought to be denied; as, that he is a man, an animal, a body, a soul, or a substance, and much more evidently that he is great in bulk, accidentally qualified, the son of man, preaching, having suffered, located, born in time, sitting, clothed; for each of these is inferior, less worthy, and humbler than being a substance, but presupposes substance as a subject giving them accidental being in a genus.[13] So everything of itself in a genus signifies its being to be possible being for some measure for which it does not have actual existence; and consequently everything of itself in a genus signifies itself to be a creature, by including that none of them is of the divine firstness.[14]

¶4 95.24–96.15

[95]Unde scriptura sacra[7] anunciat Christum simpliciter esse factum, ut ad Gal. 4°. 'misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere, factum sub lege.' 'Non[8] sunt audiendi, inquit Beda, qui legunt "natum ex muliere"'[9] Et credo quod nullus dicit hoc determinatum 'ex muliere' esse terminum distrahentem quin sequatur—factus ex muliere; ergo factus—; sicut sequitur—compositus ex corpore et anima; ergo compositus—. Et ideo dicit Augustinus Enchiridion 29, quod illam creaturam, quam virgo concepit et peperit, quamvis ad solam personam Filii pertinentem, tota Trinitas [96]fecit; et illam creaturam declarat esse Filium Dei tempore[1] immediate sequente. Et idem dicit in Sermone de Vigilia Epiphanie; 'magnum misterium fuit, quod creator creari voluit': et in Sermone

Hence holy scripture announces without qualification that Christ was made, as Galatians 4: "God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the law." "They are not to be heard," says Bede, "who read 'born of a woman', but 'made of a woman'."[15] And I believe that no one says that this determination "of a woman" is a diminishing term, so that it would not follow, "made of a woman; therefore made", just as it follows, "composed of body and soul; therefore composed". And therefore Augustine says, *Enchiridion* 29, that that creature which the virgin conceived and brought forth, though belonging to the person of the Son alone, the whole Trinity [96]made;[16] and he makes clear that that creature is the Son of God in the

Domini in Monte; ‘voluit esse creatura, qui est creator.’ Item ad Hebre. 3°. scribit Apostolus: ‘considerate apostolum et pontificem confessionis nostre[2] Iesum, qui fidelis est ei qui fecit illum.’ Ecce hic dicit absolute quod Deus fecit Iesum. Unde Leo Papa in quodam sermone; ‘nova et inaudita convencio, Deus qui eternaliter erat, fit creatura.’ Et Lincolniensis in sermone De Natali Domini; ‘in spectaculo[3] creacionis[4] conspicitur creator faciens creaturam; in isto spectaculo[3] conspicitur creator factus creatura.’ Et Johannes Damascenus ca°. 50. ‘Christus est creatus et increatus:’ unde et ca°. 92 concedit quod Christus est creatura.

time following without intermediary.[17] And he says the same in the Sermon on the Vigil of the Epiphany: “It was a great mystery that the creator willed to be created”; and in the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount: “He who is creator willed to be a creature.”[18] Again, in Hebrews 3 the Apostle writes: “consider the apostle and high priest of our confession, Jesus: who is faithful to him that made him.”[19] Behold, here he says absolutely that God made Jesus. Hence Pope Leo, in a certain sermon: “A new and unheard-of coming-together: God, who was eternally, becomes a creature.” And Lincoln, in the sermon On the Nativity of the Lord: “In the spectacle of creation the creator is seen making the creature; in this spectacle the creator is seen made a creature.” And John Damascene, chapter 50: “Christ is created and uncreated”; hence also in chapter 92 he grants “Christ is a creature”.[20]

¶5 96.16–96.29

[96]Item nichil habet Deum ut superiorem nisi creatura: Christus sic habet:[5] ergo est creatura. Minor[6] patet ex confessione Veritatis Matth. 27. ‘Deus meus’; et Ioh. 20. ‘vade ad fratres meos et dic eis: Ascendo ad Patrem meum et Patrem vestrum,[7] Deum meum et Deum vestrum’[7]; et ad Ephes. 1°. ‘Deus Domini nostri Iesu Christi, Pater glorie, det vobis spiritum sapiencie’; et 1ª ad Cor. 3°. ‘vos[8] estis Christi, Christus autem Dei’; et infra 11°, ‘caput vero Christi Deus.’ Et ad idem sonat tota scriptura de humanitate Christi; et specialiter illud Veritatis ‘Pater maior me est.’ Ioh. 14[9]; et illud ‘seipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens’ ad Phil. 2, ut exponit Augustinus primo libro Contra Maximinianum. Non enim audebant[10] sancti doctores inficere scripturam suspicione falsitatis, ut hodie.

Again, nothing has God as superior except a creature: Christ so has [him]: therefore he is a creature. The minor is clear from the confession of the Truth, Matthew 27: “My God”; and John 20: “go to my brethren and say to them: I ascend to my Father and to your Father, to my God and to your God”; and Ephesians 1: “the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, give unto you the spirit of wisdom”; and 1 Corinthians 3: “you are Christ’s. And Christ is God’s”; and below, 11: “the head of Christ is God.” And the whole of scripture concerning the humanity of Christ sounds to the same effect; and especially that [saying] of the Truth, “the Father is greater than I”, John 14; and that [saying], “emptied himself, taking the form of a servant”, Philippians 2, as Augustine expounds it in the first book Against Maximinianus.[21] For the holy doctors did not dare to taint scripture with suspicion of falsehood, as [men do] today.

Notes

1. The words are Luke 24:39 (Vulgate *quia spiritus*; Wyclif *quoniam*), not John; Wyclif’s “John, the last chapter” may have the touching of Thomas in view (John 20:27).
2. 1 John 1:1, with “we declare unto you” from 1:3 (DR). The *paranymphus* (the bridegroom’s friend) is here John the Evangelist; “his chapter” is the opening of the epistle.
3. Heb. 4:14–15. The Vulgate has *teneamus confessionem* (DR “let us hold fast our confession”); *spei nostre* comes from Heb. 10:23 (DR “Let us hold fast the confession of our hope”). A B C lack *confessionem* (93.9).
4. Not a Vulgate text but the exposition’s own phrase, with Heb. 7:11 (the priest “not … called according to the order of Aaron”) in view; C lacks *superior* and O *Aaronitis*, each leaving a gap (93.14).
5. *Multitudine* “in its multitude” (93.20), with A B C and O (*multi^do*), against the print’s *multimodis* “in manifold ways”, which no manuscript reported at the foot gives. For *didicit* and *sciret* A B C have *dicit* and *foret*; the print follows O.
6. *Pro similitudine* is Heb. 4:15’s phrase (DR “like as we are”), now expounded as a likeness given us for an example; “fourth” continues the three heads of the verse (Son of God, passed into the heavens, compassion).
7. *In capite* “in the head” (93.31), with A B C O, against the print’s *in capite nostro* “in our head”, which Harris inserted from M.
8. Augustine, *De vera religione* 29 and *Enchiridion* 4 (O “40”), as Wyclif cites them. *De vera religione* 29 is 16.30–31, PL 34, 134–135: *in vero homine apparuit … pauper esse voluit … flagellatus atque cruciatus est … morte multatus est* (*verified*). The print’s *Enchiridion* 4 fits *Ench.* 4–5, PL 40, 232–233: *certum propriumque fidei catholicae fundamentum Christus est*, which the heretics have *nomine*

tenus but not *re ipsa*. O's 40, on the grace of union, does not fit. The quoted words *Nos patimur egencias et dolores …* are not in the *Enchiridion*. Perhaps they are Wyclif's summary of *De vera religione* 16.31 (*untraced*). The inner text is 2 Cor. 8:9, freely: Vulgate *propter vos egenus factus est* (DR "he became poor for your sakes").
9. *Humidum infantile*: the physicians' moisture of infancy (cf. *humidum radicale*, "radical moisture"), abundant in the child; Christ suffered in the middle of life, when it no longer abounds.
10. The words echo Lam. 1:12 (Vulgate *si est dolor sicut dolor meus*, DR "if there be any sorrow like to my sorrow"), not Isaiah 53, which speaks of the servant's sorrows (53:3–4).
11. Ps.-Augustine (Ambrosiaster), *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, as cited: c. 59 (O "79"). The place is q. 75, PL 35, 2269: *nec enim Salvator aliquid possidebat in mundo, cum sit dominus mundi. Mortuus enim alienis impendiis sepelitur* (*verified*). Neither number is right, but O's 79 is nearer than the print's 59.
12. The first premiss, "For there would be no evidence … is movable" (94.25–26), is lacking in A B C; the print has it from O. At 94.28 O reads *a quo ad simpliciter* for *a secundum quid ad simpliciter* (A B C, print); cf. 98.12–13, where the print keeps *a quo*.
13. *Sed* "but" (95.17), with C O, against the print's *et* "and". For *humilius* "humbler" (95.17) A B C read *minus* "less", O *vmis*.
14. *Dicit*: signifies (the logical use). Whatever falls in a category signifies a being that is possible for some time at which it is not actual, and so signifies a creature; *neminem*, "none", excludes it from the divine firstness.
15. The words "but 'made of a woman'" (95.27, *sed factum ex muliere*) are added with C O against the print, which ends the quotation at *natum ex muliere*. Bede, on Gal. 4:4 as it stands in his exposition of Luke 11:27, *In Lucam* IV, PL 92, 480A (also *Hom.* on the same text, PL 94, 421D): *Neque enim audiendi sunt qui legendum putant, natum ex muliere, factum sub lege, sed, factum ex muliere*, which bears out C O (*verified*).
16. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 29 as cited (in the modern division c. 38), PL 40, 251: *illam creaturam quam Virgo concepit et peperit, quamvis ad solam personam Filii pertinentem, tota Trinitas fecerit* (*verified*).
17. *Tempore immediate sequente* "in the time following without intermediary" (96.1): the creature was the Son of God from the first moment of its being. O lacks *tempore*, which would give "he makes clear immediately after", of the next words in Augustine's text.
18. Augustine, a sermon on the vigil of the Epiphany (not found among Augustine's sermons in the PL; *untraced*), and *De sermone Domini in monte*. The line is not there, as Harris also found. Wyclif has it, with the attribution, from Scotus, *Ord.* III d. 11 q. 1 (Wadding VII/1, 240), where it is one of the authorities for the opinion Scotus reports: *per August. de sermone Domini in monte: voluit esse creatura, qui est creator* (*untraced* in Augustine).
19. C O read *confessionis vestre* "of your confession" (96.6); the print keeps *nostre* with A B and the Vulgate (Heb. 3:1).
20. not Leo but Ps.-Augustine, *Sermo* 128.2, PL 39, 1998: *o nova et inaudita commixtio! Deus qui est et qui erat, fit; creator, creatura.* Wyclif has it, under Leo's name and with *conventio*, from Bonaventure, *In III Sent.* d. 11 a. 2 q. 1 arg. 1 (Quaracchi III, 249), whose editors identify it (*verified*); Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, a sermon on the Nativity, not traced (Grosseteste's sermons are largely unedited); John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, cc. 50 and 92 in Wyclif's (Latin) numbering. These are III.4 (Christ is called *created and uncreated*, as Harris notes) and IV.18 (*God the Word … is called creature*) in the Greek division. Wyclif has both, with *creatus et increatus*, from Scotus, *Ord.* III d. 11 q. 1 (Wadding VII/1, 240), whose print reads *cap. 30* and *c. 97*.
21. Augustine on Phil. 2:7 in "the first book Against Maximinianus", which is the *Collatio cum Maximino*. Here Augustine is speaking, *Collatio* 14, PL 42, 720: *semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens: agnovisti aequalem, jam incipe agnoscere minorem … Ecce qua forma major est Pater.*
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 94: *in nullo alio est* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Heb. iii. i. (96.5); reference and by John of [C 66b] (96.13).

Part 4: That Christ is created: the doctors' sense, and the objection "from nothing"

Harris pp. 96.30–100.18

¶1 96.30–97.9

[96]Unde Doctor Subtilis super Distinccione 11. 3ii Sentenciarum dicit quod hec proposicio—Christus est creatura—est concedenda simpliciter, si bene intelligatur, sed negabatur propter hereses dicencium Christum esse pure creaturam: [97]et fingit postmodum responsiones ei, cui non placet sic dicere. Concedit autem consequenter simpliciter cum Augustino quod Christus incepit esse[1] sicut generabatur ex tempore. Unde Doctor Bonaventura super eadem Distinccione dicit quod doctores magis hoc[2] respiciunt, quod potest esse via in falsitatem vel errorem, quam quod ipsa de se sit falsa vel erronea. Unde concedit[3] consequenter quod Christus est homo creatus

Hence the Subtle Doctor, on distinction 11 of the third [book] of the *Sentences*, says that this proposition, "Christ is a creature", is to be granted without qualification, if it is well understood, but that it was denied because of the heresies of those who said "Christ is purely a creature":[1] [97] and afterwards he devises replies for one who is not pleased to speak so. And consequently he grants without qualification, with Augustine, "Christ began to be", as he was begotten in time.[2] Hence the doctor Bonaventure, on the same distinction, says that the doctors look rather to this, that it can be a way into falsity or error, than that it is of itself false or erroneous.

et non[4] homo eternus, cum sit secundus Adam habens multos homines seniores.

Hence he consequently grants that Christ is a created man and not an eternal man, since he is the second Adam, having many men older [than he].[3]

¶2 97.10–98.3

[97]Quandocunque ergo ego dico, quod Christus est creatus vel factus, intelligo catholice, sicut[5] scriptura sacra et sancti doctores me edocent, quod Christus secundum humanitatem est creatus[6] vel taliter temporaliter denominatus. Et illam regulam dat[6] sanctus Thomas 4°. Contra Gentiles 48. 'Nihil, inquit, Deo proprium enunciatur de Christo nisi racione humanitatis vel expressate vel subintellecte: nec[7] e contrario quoad denominaciones eternas, quas homo ille recipit secundum divinitatem.' Et sic eum gloso ac alios quosdam, quando dicunt quod Christus non est creatura; intelligunt enim quod Christus non est secundum divinitatem creatura: quod est necessarium, cum oppositum sit hereticum. Et quod ille sit sensus suus videtur, quia super 2[m]. Sententiarum Dist. 11. Quest. 4[8] dicit quod accidencia creata dicuntur de Filio Dei, non quod ipsa persona eterna his[9] informatur, sed quod natura assumpta[9] his[10] informatur. Quod dictum ego nescio sane concipere nisi intelligendo quod persona Verbi non informetur[11] accidentibus creatis secundum deitatem, sed quod ipsa principaliter informetur eis secundum humanitatem. Nam Verbum predicat et agit actos humanos, informatur virtutibus et beatitudine, sicut substancialiter informatur anima intellectiva et creata racionabilitate.[12] Ideo certum est quod persona Verbi informatur istis accidentibus ac formis creatis, nisi coincidatur in opinionem negantem [98]mobilitatem Christi simpliciter. Et illa glosa est evidencior et famosior quam glosa data a modernis ad scripturam sacram et dicta sanctorum.

Whenever, therefore, I say "Christ is created" or "made", I understand [it] catholicly, as holy scripture and the holy doctors teach me: that Christ as to the humanity is created, or is in such a way named temporally. And Saint Thomas gives that rule, *Contra Gentiles* IV, 48: "Nothing proper to God," he says, "is stated of Christ except by reason of the humanity, either expressed or understood as implied; and conversely as to the eternal denominations, which that man receives as to the divinity."[4] And so I gloss him and certain others, when they say "Christ is not a creature"; for they understand "Christ is not a creature as to the divinity": which is necessary, since the opposite is heretical. And that that is his sense appears, since on the second [book] of the *Sentences*, distinction 11, question 4, he says that created accidents are said of the Son of God, not because the eternal person itself is informed by them, but because the assumed nature is informed by them.[5] That saying I do not know how to conceive soundly except by understanding that the person of the Word is not informed by created accidents as to the Godhead, but that the person is principally informed by them as to the humanity. For the Word preaches and performs human acts, is informed with virtues and blessedness, just as he is substantially informed by an intellective soul and created rationality. Therefore it is certain that the person of the Word is informed by these accidents and created forms, unless one falls into the opinion denying [98]the movability of Christ without qualification. And that gloss is more evident and better known than the gloss given by the moderns to holy scripture and the sayings of the saints.

¶3 98.4–98.19

[98]Quidam enim dicunt quod talis modus loquendi transit[1] in abusum: alii quod doctores desipuerunt ignorantes logicam: tercii[2] quod dixerunt impossibilia et heretica propter devocionem[3] exhortacionis.[3] Sed quarti recte intelligunt quod dicta intelliguntur de Christo secundum humanitatem; et ipsi vere intelligunt, specialiter si ponant quod Christus est illa humanitas et non in construccione synecdochica; cum illa humanitas sit totus Christus, et non[4] pars eius[4] formaliter. Synecdochica enim locucio[5] vel evidencia est[5] a quo[6] ad simpliciter, quando parti principaliter attribuitur denominacio, et secundario suo toti; ut hic homo est racionalis vel quantus. Unde quantum ad priores

For some say that such a manner of speaking has passed into abuse; others, that the doctors were foolish, being ignorant of logic; a third [group], that they said impossible and heretical things out of the devotion of exhortation. But the fourth rightly understand that the sayings are understood of Christ as to the humanity; and these truly understand, especially if they posit "Christ is that humanity", and not in a synecdochic construction; since that humanity is the whole Christ, and not a part of him formally. For a synecdochic locution or evidence is from that in which [it holds] to [what holds] without qualification, when the denomination is

glosantes dicitur quod affeccione inordinata extraneandi in logica, postposita glorificacione scripture, 'dicentes se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt': in cuius signum vix duo concordant tam in sentencia quam in glosa.

attributed principally to a part, and secondarily to its whole; as "this man is rational" or "quantified".[6] Hence as to the former glossers the answer is that, by an inordinate affection for estrangement in logic, setting aside the glorifying of scripture, "professing themselves to be wise, they became fools":[7] as a sign of which hardly two agree, either in teaching or in gloss.

¶4 98.20–98.33

[98]Sed obicitur tripliciter contra illud. Primo per hoc quod, si Christus creatus est, tunc est productus ex nichilo, et per consequens aliquando non fuit: quod est impossibile, cum sit Deus. Sed rogo sic arguentes attendere quomodo per[7] idem non sequeretur[7] quod, si[8] Christus generatus est ex tempore, conceptus, et natus de virgine, ergo habuit esse post non esse: cum omnis generacio substancie sit produccio a non esse substancie ad esse secundum philosophos. Nec negandus est 'liber generacionis Iesu filii David, filii Abrahe,' ut patet Matth. 1°; vel conceptus[9] aut partus virginis, ut patet Luce 1° et 2°; duplicem enim nativitatem Christi catholici concorditer confitentur. Nec est racio quod creacio non competit[10] Christo secundum esse suum temporale, sicut competit sibi generacio aut incepcio.

But it is objected in three ways against that. First, by this: that if Christ is created, then he is produced from nothing, and consequently at some time he was not: which is impossible, since he is God. But I ask those who argue so to consider how, by the same token, it would not follow that, if Christ is begotten in time, conceived, and born of the virgin, therefore he had being after not-being: since every generation of a substance is a production from the not-being of the substance to being, according to the philosophers.[8] Nor is "the book of the generation of Jesus, the son of David, the son of Abraham" to be denied, as is clear from Matthew 1;[9] nor the conception or the childbearing of the virgin, as is clear from Luke 1 and 2; for catholics confess with one accord a twofold nativity of Christ. Nor is there a reason why creation should not belong to Christ as to his temporal being, just as generation or beginning belongs to him.

¶5 99.1–99.18

[99]Conceditur ergo quod Christus creatus est nedum secundum animam, que est Christus, sed secundum corpus. Nam generatus est secundum corpus, et hoc generacione univoca sicut univoce est homo. Sed omnis alia generacio substancie presupponit eius creacionem: ergo et Christi generacio temporalis. Omnis itaque temporalis nativitas, sicut et motus nature create sensibilis aut insensibilis, presupponit creacionem ut causam, cum prius naturaliter sit creacio simpliciter quam aliqua mocio naturalis. Ex quo plane sequitur, quod omne naturaliter motum prius naturaliter creatur quam naturaliter sic movetur. Cum ergo Christus naturaliter movetur, et per consequens accidens creatum inest sibi formaliter; sequitur quod prius naturaliter est creatus[1]: quia aliter[1] indubie non esset denominatus univoce cum ceteris creaturis. Conceditur ergo quod Christus productus est ex nichilo, et sic aliquando non fuit. Primum patet de anima et de corporea essencia in mundi principio; et secunda pars patet intelligendo Christum secundum illam naturam, qua creatus est.

[99]It is granted, therefore, that Christ is created not only as to the soul, which is Christ, but as to the body. For he was begotten as to the body, and that by a univocal generation, as he is univocally man. Now every other generation of a substance presupposes its creation: therefore so does the temporal generation of Christ. So every temporal nativity, as also every motion of created nature, perceptible or imperceptible,[10] presupposes creation as its cause, since creation without qualification is naturally prior to any natural motion. From which it plainly follows that everything naturally moved is naturally created before it is naturally so moved. Since, then, Christ is naturally moved, and consequently a created accident is in him formally, it follows that he is naturally created first: for otherwise without doubt he would not be named univocally with the other creatures. It is granted, therefore, that Christ was produced from nothing, and so at some time was not. The first is clear of the soul, and of the bodily essence at the beginning of the world; and the second part is clear by understanding Christ as to that nature by which he was created.

¶6 99.19–99.33

[99]Sed in istis[2] oportet cavere diligenter et excludere tres sensus erroneos quando dicitur Christum aliquando non fuisse. Primo cavendo ne credatur Christum[3] aliquando secundum deitatem non fuisse, cum Christus eternaliter fuit Deus. 2°· ne credatur Christum secundum esse intelligibile humanitatis ac predestinacionem Dei aliquando non fuisse, cum eternaliter habet esse intelligibile predestinatum esse Filius Dei. Et 3° ne credatur aliquando non habere esse[4] essencie materialis, cum[5] massa essencie materialis[5] et corporee, que est Christus, sit in mundi principio et non possit deficere. Exclusis ergo istis tribus sensibus erroneis, claret quartus,[6] verus sensus catholicus, quod Christus secundum existenciam humanitatis aliquando non fuit. Quod[7] cum sit verum[7] et implicans Christum aliquando non fuisse, eo quod ipse est illa humanitas, est catholice concedendum.

But in these [matters] one must take care diligently and exclude three erroneous senses when it is said "Christ at some time was not". First, by taking care that it is not believed "Christ at some time was not, as to the Godhead", since Christ was eternally God. Second, that it is not believed "Christ at some time was not, as to the intelligible being of the humanity and the predestination of God", since he eternally has intelligible being, predestined to be the Son of God.[11] And third, that it is not believed "[he] at some time did not have the being of material essence", since the mass of material and bodily essence which is Christ is [there] at the beginning of the world and cannot fail. These three erroneous senses, therefore, being excluded, the fourth, the true catholic sense, shines out: "Christ, as to the existence of the humanity, at some time was not". Which, since it is true and implies "Christ at some time was not", because he is that humanity, is to be granted catholicly.

¶7 99.34–100.18

[99]Quod si moveat quemquam quod Christus est creatus vel [100] factus ex nichilo; rogo, quomodo diceretur, si pro instanti incarnacionis corpus Christi subito per[1] totum creatum limitaretur,[1] et anima tunc[2] creata sibi pro eodem instanti uniretur, et pro eodem instanti natura completa ypostatice sumeretur? Numquid credimus quod Christus non tunc temporaliter produceretur? Baptisemus[3] ergo illam faccionem sive produccionem subitam. Et patet quod non superest nomen competens nisi 'creacio' cum tota humanitas a solo Deo[4] producitur ex puro[5] nichilo precedente temporaliter in effectum: et cum produccio per se et proprie terminatur ad suppositum, relinquitur, quod Christus in illo casu sit factus ex nichilo; et sic omnia argumenta, que viderentur[6] militare contra creacionem Christi in[7] faccione ex virgine, procederent contra illud preter hoc, quod essencia corporea, que est Christus, creata[8] est in mundi principio et interim per patriarchas ac demum per beatam virginem ministerialiter alterata; et revera hoc, licet sit[9] gloriosius,[9] est magis mirabile.

And if it troubles anyone that Christ is created or [100]made from nothing: I ask, how would it be put if at the instant of the incarnation the body of Christ were suddenly bounded, created throughout, and the soul, created then, were united to it at the same instant, and at the same instant the complete nature were taken hypostatically?[12] Do we believe that Christ would not then be produced in time? Let us baptise, then, that making or sudden production.[13] And it is clear that no fitting name remains but "creation", since the whole humanity is produced by God alone from pure nothing that precedes the effect in time;[14] and since production of itself and properly terminates at the supposit, it remains that Christ in that case is made from nothing; and so all the arguments that would seem to militate against the creation of Christ in the making from the virgin would proceed against that [case], except for this, that the bodily essence which is Christ was created at the beginning of the world, and meanwhile altered ministerially through the patriarchs and at last through the blessed virgin; and in truth this, though it is more glorious, is more wonderful.

Notes

1. Duns Scotus, on *Sent.* III d. 11, whether "Christ is a creature" is to be granted, *Ord.* III d. 11 q. 1 n. 6 (Wadding VII/1, 240): *propositio est simpliciter concedenda, si bene intelligatur: negabatur tamen communiter a Sanctis propter haereses haereticorum dicentium Christum esse puram creaturam*, and n. 7, *Cui ista opinio non placet, potest dicere ipsam esse falsam.* Scotus reports the opinion (*aliter dicitur*), and Wadding's margin gives it to William of Ware (*verified*).

2. Scotus's grant, with Augustine, of "Christ began to be"; *Ord.* III d. 11 q. 3 (Wadding VII/1, 249–250): *de vi sermonis posset concedi, quod Christus … incepit esse*, with the argument *quod generatur incipit esse simpliciter … Christus generabatur*. Scotus names no Augustine there. The Augustine is the one the Lombard gives, *Sent.* III d. 12 c. 1, from *In Ioh.* 105, PL 35, 1907: *priusquam mundus esset, nec nos eramus, nec ipse mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Jesus* (*verified*). *Esse* here is existence, as the clause "as he was begotten in time" shows; O lacks *esse* (97.3).
3. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.* d. 11 a. 2 q. 1 (Quaracchi III, 249–250): resp. *talis sermo est propinquus errori … male intelligibilis*, and ad 5, *ista admittatur et concedatur: Christus est homo creatus*. The second Adam with his *seniores* is Wyclif's own reason (*verified*). For *non homo eternus* (97.8) A B C read *unus homo eternus*; the print follows O.
4. *Et e contrario* "and conversely" (97.16), with A B C, against the print's *nec e contrario* "nor conversely" (O): the second clause states the converse rule (the eternal names are said of that man by reason of the divinity), and "nor" denies it. Thomas, *SCG* IV.48 (end): *Quod autem est personae proprium, de Christo non enuntiatur ratione humanae naturae nisi cum aliqua additione, vel expressa vel subintellecta*. Wyclif's *Deo proprium* is Thomas's *personae proprium* (being created without qualification), and his *nisi racione humanitatis* compresses Thomas's added determination. So the print has lost no negative. What is proper to the person is said of Christ, by reason of the humanity, only with that qualification expressed or understood. The converse clause is Wyclif's own (*verified*).
5. "On the second [book] … question 4" as printed; A B C give question 9 (97.23). The place is Thomas, *In III Sent.* d. 11 q. 1 a. 4 ad 1: *proprietates creatae dicuntur de filio Dei, non quasi ipsa persona aeterna his informetur, sed quia natura assumpta informatur eis*, as Harris saw. The print's 4 is the article, A B C's 9 does not fit, and the second book is an error for the third (*verified*).
6. *A quo ad simpliciter* (98.12–13): the print with O and A's second hand; B reads *a secundum*, C *a s'*, that is, "from 'in a certain respect' to 'without qualification'", the form the print gives at 94.28. All the manuscripts order the words *locucio est vel evidencia*, which changes nothing in the English.
7. Rom. 1:22 (DR).
8. Aristotle's account of generation as change from not-being to being in substance (*Physics* V.1, 225a12–17: change from not-being to being, its contradictory, is coming to be, and from unqualified not-being, coming to be without qualification; cf. *De generatione* I.3). Scotus uses the premiss on the same question, *Ord.* III d. 11 q. 3: *secundum Aristotelem 5. Physic. generatio est a non esse ad esse simpliciter* (*verified*).
9. Matt. 1:1, with *Iesu* for the Vulgate's *Jesu Christi* (DR "of Jesus Christ").
10. *Sensibilis aut insensibilis* may go with *nature* rather than with *motus*: "of created nature, whether it perceives or not".
11. *Predestinatum esse Filius Dei* echoes Rom. 1:4 (DR "who was predestinated the Son of God"). *Esse intelligibile* is being as known in God, set against the existence of the humanity (99.31).
12. *Per totum creatum limitaretur*: "were bounded, created throughout", that is, the whole body given its limits at once, without growth. M, a summary, has *crearetur et liniamentaretur* "were created and given its lineaments" (100.2–3).
13. *Baptisemus*: let us give it its name (O *baptizaremus*); the name follows in the next sentence.
14. *Precedente temporaliter in effectum*: the nothing precedes in time the thing produced; *in effectum* is taken with *precedente*, not as the formula *in effectu* "in actual fact".
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Heb. iii. i. (96.5); reference and by John of [C 66b] (96.13); reference Rom. i. 22. (98.19); reference Matth. i. (98.30).

Part 5: That Christ was and was not: the last objections, and contradiction among the natures

Harris pp. 100.19–105.9

¶1 100.19–101.30

[100]Quod si 2° obicitur quod 'Christus' dicens duas naturas dicit principaliter ac simpliciter naturam increatam, cum analogum[10] per se sumptum secundum famosius[11] debet intelligi; dicitur, quod si illa evidencia procederet, negandum[12] esset omne predicabile de[13] Christo humanitus,[13] et per consequens totum misterium et fides incarnacionis. Ideo, cum scriptura et sancti doctores concedunt simpliciter utramque maneriem predicatorum de Christo, qui nos sumus ut audeamus[14] tam consolatoriam fidem[15] infringere? Unde Augustinus 2° De Visitacione Infirmorum: 'Cum, inquit, credatur scripture sacre testimoniis sunt alia de Deo Filio nobis[16][17] propinqua et contigua, et[16] ex ipsa propinquitate sui et contiguitate nobis familiaria, et ex ipsa familiaritate nobis delectabilia. Delectabile quippe est homini et salutare [101]morienti loqui et saciari de humanitate Christi. Quod enim "Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis," hominis est; quod homo Deus factus est, hominis est: utrumque ergo hoc ineffabile sacramentum hominis est.

And if, secondly, it is objected that "Christ", which signifies two natures, signifies principally and without qualification the uncreated nature, since an analogous term taken of itself ought to be understood according to its best-known [sense]: the answer is that if that evidence held good, everything predicable of Christ humanly would have to be denied, and consequently the whole mystery and faith of the incarnation. Therefore, since scripture and the holy doctors grant without qualification both kinds of predicates of Christ, who are we, that we should dare to break so consoling a faith? Hence Augustine, in the second [book] On Visiting the Sick: "Since," he says, "it is believed on the testimonies of holy scripture, there are other things about God the Son that are near and adjoining to us, and from that very nearness and adjacency of theirs familiar to us, and from that very familiarity delightful to us.[1] For it is delightful to a man, and wholesome to one [101]dying, to speak of the humanity of Christ

Quoniam ergo infirmus hominis intellectus, ex sui ipsius humanitate ponderosa ebetatus, 'videns nunc per speculum in enigmate,' non potest Dei divinitatem, ut dignum est, comprehendere; ad illam, que sua est, Christi humanitatem oculum suum intellectualem reflectat, in illa delectetur, ex illa sacietur, ad illam faciem suam tanquam parietem cum Ezechia convertat.' Et sequitur consilium bonum morbis pestilencialibus fatigatis. 'De homine, inquit, tuo puro fac tibi participem,[1] quia prius fecit Deus de homine tuo puro sibi participem.[1] Ex divinitate processit salvacio et ex humanitate redempcio: utrumque tamen ex utroque:[2] sed,[3] quod unum est michi quadam cognacione et secreta quadam affeccione [et] conglutinio quodam,[3] proprio iure consanguinitatis vendico, tucius et iocundius loquor ad meum Iesum quam ad aliquem sanctorum spirituum[4]: plus debet Christus michi[5] quam cuilibet celestium spirituum[6] quia, quod tu es, fieri dignatus est Deus, non factus est angelus. Nollem, inquit, habere locum angeli, si possem habere locum debitum homini.' Nec dubito quin omnes logici nesciunt offendendo impingere in illam sentenciam de vi vocis, quia cum Christus sit frater noster, ut patet Ioh. 20. 'vade ad fratres meos et dic eis etc.'; et ad Hebre. 2° 'non confunditur eos fratres vocare dicens: "nunciabo nomen tuum fratribus meis"': consequens est quod sit eadem communis humanitas, que est quilibet frater suus; et per consequens debet lege proximitatis diligere fratres suos.

and be filled with it. For that 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us' is man's; that man was made God is man's: both, then, this ineffable sacrament is man's.[2] Since, then, man's weak understanding, dulled by its own heavy humanity, 'seeing now through a glass in a dark manner',[3] cannot comprehend the divinity of God as is fitting, let it turn back its intellectual eye to that humanity of Christ which is its own, let it delight in it, be filled from it, let it turn its face to it as to the wall, with Ezechias." And there follows good counsel for those worn out by pestilential diseases. "Of your own pure man," he says, "make for yourself a sharing, for God first made, of your own pure man, a sharing for himself.[4] From the divinity proceeded salvation and from the humanity redemption: yet each from both: but what is mine (mine because [it is] from me) by a certain thought and kinship, and a certain secret affection and a certain gluing-together, I claim for myself by the proper right of consanguinity;[5] more safely and more joyfully I speak to my Jesus than to any of the holy spirits: Christ owes more to me than to any of the heavenly spirits, because God deigned to be made what you are; he was not made an angel. I would not," he says, "have the place of an angel, if I could have the place due to a man." Nor do I doubt that all the logicians, stumbling, know not how to dash against that teaching by the force of the words,[6] because, since Christ is our brother, as is clear from John 20, "go to my brethren and say to them, etc.";[7] and from Hebrews 2, "he is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying: 'I will declare thy name to my brethren'": it is consequent that it is the same common humanity which is each brother of his; and consequently he ought to love his brothers by the law of neighbourhood.

¶2 101.31–102.4

[101]Sed 3° obicitur per hoc quod hereticum est credere Iesum Christum non fuisse ante concepcionem ex virgine, sicut[7] patet de Heresi 44ª. superius recitata. Ymo cum contradictoria [102]non verificantur de eodem, et Christus Deus est eternaliter post et ante; videtur quod, concesso[1] Christum semper fuisse, negandum est, ut contradictorium, eundem Christum aliquando non fuisse.

But thirdly it is objected, by appeal to this: that it is heretical to believe "Jesus Christ was not before the conception from the virgin", as is clear from the forty-fourth heresy, recited above.[8] Indeed, since contradictories [102]are not true of the same thing, and Christ is God eternally, after and before, it seems that, "Christ always was" being granted, "the same Christ at some time was not" must be denied, as its contradictory.

¶3 102.5–103.3

[102]Hic dico quod, si essem pure gentilis philosophus indifferens omni secte coram capciosissimis logicis intendentibus[2] michi[3] concludere; dum tamen admitterem gracia argumenti istam philosophicam[4] supposicionem et necessariam fidei Christiane, quod eadem persona Verbi est trium naturarum quelibet; ego concederem conclusionem tanquam[5] sine repugnancia[5] consequentem. Pro cuius declaracione

Here I say that, if I were purely a pagan philosopher, indifferent to every sect, before the most captious logicians intent on driving me to a conclusion;[9] provided only that I admitted, for the sake of argument, this philosophical supposition, and one necessary to the Christian faith, that the same person of the Word is each of three natures, I would grant the

primo[6] suppono quod in equivocis non sit contradiccio: 2° quod summa equivocacio sit inter deitatem et naturam creatam, cum in nullo universali univoco conveniunt: 3° quod persona Verbi sit corpus, anima, et deitas singillatim. Quibus suppositis patet ex posicione[7] tam quod iste Christus fuit in mundi principio. Affirmativa patet ex hoc quod illa deitas tunc fuit et ipsa est Christus: negativa autem patet ex hoc quod illa humanitas tunc non fuit, et ipsa est Christus. Sicut ergo non est contradiccio quod homo currit et homo non currit, cum multa sunt quorum[8] quodlibet est homo, pro quorum[8] uno verificatur affirmativa, et pro alio negativa; sic in proposito, cum multa sunt,[9] quorum quodlibet est Christus. Et hinc dicit beatus Ambrosius 3° libro De Spiritu Sancto quoad[10] logicam subtiliter[11] et profunde. 'Generalis, inquit, est fides ista[12] quod Christus est Dei filius[12] et[13] natus ex virgine, quem quasi gigantem propheta describit, eo quod biformis gemine nature unus consors divinitatis et corporis. Idem ergo paciebatur et non paciebatur, moriebatur et non moriebatur, sepeliebatur[14] et non sepeliebatur,[14] resurgebat et non resurgebat; resurgebat secundum carnem, que mortua [103]fuerat, non secundum Verbum, quod apud Deum semper manebat.' Et quando 'sapiebam ut[1] parvulus,' putabam[1] istum sanctum multum ignarum logice.

conclusion as following without incompatibility.[10] For making this clear I suppose, first, that in equivocals there is no contradiction; secondly, that the highest equivocation is between the Godhead and created nature, since they agree in no univocal universal; thirdly, that the person of the Word is body, soul, and Godhead, each singly. These being supposed, it is clear expositorily[11] as much that this Christ was at the beginning of the world [as that he was not].[12] The affirmative is clear from this, that that Godhead was then, and it is Christ; and the negative is clear from this, that that humanity was not then, and it is Christ. As, then, there is no contradiction in "a man runs" and "a man does not run", since there are many things each of which is a man, for one of which the affirmative is true and for another the negative, so in the case at hand, since there are many things each of which is Christ. And hence blessed Ambrose speaks in the third book On the Holy Spirit, subtly and profoundly as to logic: "This," he says, "is the general faith, that Christ is the Son of God and born of the virgin, whom the prophet describes as a giant,[13] because, two-formed, of a twin nature, he is one sharer of divinity and of body. The same one, then, suffered and did not suffer, died and did not die, was buried and was not buried, rose and did not rise; he rose as to the flesh, which [103]had been dead, not as to the Word, which always remained with God."[14] And when "I understood as a child", I thought this saint very ignorant of logic.

¶4 103.4–103.19

[103]Et patet quomodo intelligende sunt negative doctorum in materia de Incarnacione. Unde Ambrosius primo De Trinitate ca° 6 dicit quod Christus non est creatura: et tamen constat ipsum[2] expressissime dicere quod Christus suscepit predicaciones humanas univoce cum aliis, in tantum quod dicit eum ad litteram 'profecisse sapiencia et etate,' et ignorasse multa; ut probat, libro 3°· De Spiritu Sancto, auctoritate scripture. Et sic intelligendum est dictum Augustini in sermone De Fide: 'si quis, inquit, dixerit Dei Filium passum, anathema sit.' Exponit enim[3] seipsum ibidem, quod hoc intelligendum est secundum divinitatem, cum affirmativa sit de substancia fidei, scilicet, quod Dei Filius passus est, ut sepe meminit Augustinus. Et ita concordanda sunt alia dicta doctorum, non concedendo contradictoria, sed veritates nedum simul esse veras, sed a quocunque fideli catholice concedendas.[4]

And it is clear how the negatives of the doctors in the matter of the incarnation are to be understood. Hence Ambrose, in the first [book] On the Trinity, c. 6, says that "Christ is not a creature";[15] and yet it is evident that he says most expressly that Christ took up human predications univocally with others, so much so that he says he literally "advanced in wisdom and age", and was ignorant of many things; as he proves, in book 3 On the Holy Spirit, by the authority of scripture.[16] And so is to be understood the saying of Augustine in the sermon On the Faith: "If anyone," he says, "says the Son of God suffered, let him be anathema." For he expounds himself in the same place: that this is to be understood as to the divinity, since the affirmative is of the substance of the faith, namely "the Son of God suffered", as Augustine often recalls.[17] And so the other sayings of the doctors are to be brought into agreement: not by granting contradictories, but [by granting] that truths are not only true together, but to be granted catholicly by any of the faithful whatever.

¶5 103.20–103.28

[103]Quod si queritur quomodo dabimus contradiccionem in talibus cum negacio preposita toti non sufficit; dicitur[5] iuxta regulam Aristotelis primo Elenchorum ca° 4°, quod enunciando contradictoria de aliquo attendendum est quod illud sit idem ultimum singulare[6] et secundum idem simpliciter et in eodem tempore; ut, quod idem Christus in numero secundum[7] eandem naturam in numero[7] sit simul[8] vivus et mortuus, passus et non passus. Et ita de aliis oppositis est repugnancia.

And if it is asked how we shall assign a contradiction in such cases, since a negation placed before the whole does not suffice, the answer is, following the rule of Aristotle in the first [book] of the Elenchi, c. 4, that in enunciating contradictories of something one must attend that it be the same last singular, and in the same respect without qualification, and at the same time:[18] as, that the same Christ in number, as to the same nature in number, be at once living and dead, suffering and not suffering.[19] And so of the other opposites there is incompatibility.

¶6 103.29–104.13

[103]Unde concedentes quod Christus eciam[9] secundum altissimam naturam in eo non habuit existenciam ante conceptum ex virgine senserunt,[10] ut Augustinus recitat, nimis heretice. Non autem illi, qui concedunt ipsum non preextitisse subintelligendo secundum humanitatem ad sensum expositum. [104]Contradiccio enim non est nominis tantum, sed et[1] rei et nominis. Et indubie causa quare scola discessit ab illa logica fuit inanis[2] apparencia[2] sophistica, qua mavult vitare apparenciam redargucionis vel puerilis inconsequencie, quam pausare[3] in sensu reali scripture. Prima[4] ad Cor. 4° scribitur: 'nos stulti propter Christum.' Nam apostoli, predicantes Deum[5] crucifixum et mortuum, et[6] simul parem Deo et minorem Deo, reputati sunt nimirum stulti tam a philosophis quam a plebeis. Sed[7] 'siquis videtur inter vos sapiens esse in hoc seculo, sic stultus fiat ut sit sapiens' Deo:' ut precipit Apostolus prima ad Cor. 3°·, quia indubie gentiles philosophi ex ignorancia logice et methaphisice reputant sensum illum stulticiam esse.

Hence those who granted that Christ, even as to the highest nature in him, did not have existence before the conception from the virgin, thought, as Augustine recounts, exceedingly heretically.[20] But not those who grant "he did not pre-exist", understanding as implied "as to the humanity", in the sense expounded. [104]For contradiction is not of the name only, but of the thing and the name.[21] And without doubt the cause why the school departed from that logic was an empty sophistical appearance, by which it would rather avoid the appearance of refutation or of a childish inconsistency than rest in the real sense of scripture. In the first [epistle] to the Corinthians, 4, it is written: "We are fools for Christ's sake." For the apostles, preaching God crucified and dead, and at once equal to God and less than God, were, no wonder, reputed fools both by the philosophers and by the common people. But "if any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him so become a fool, that he may be wise" to God, as the Apostle commands in the first [epistle] to the Corinthians, 3;[22] for without doubt the pagan philosophers, from ignorance of logic and metaphysics, reckon that sense to be folly.

¶7 104.14–105.9

[104]Et si queratur, utrum concedi debet quod Deus aliquando non fuit, sicut generabatur temporaliter vel incepit;[8] videtur michi quod licet illud sane posset intelligi, tamen iste sensus non ministratur ex terminis. Ideo ego concedo negativas solum cum subiectis signantibus geminas substancias in Filio, ut Messias ille homo Iesus aliquando non fuit: quia in illis intelligo naturam que incepit[9] esse et aliquando non fuit. Non[10] sic autem in nominibus appropriate competentibus deitati. Conceditur tamen quod Deus fuit natus de virgine, passus et mortuus. Sed illud probabitur resolvendo predicacionem ad hominem sic formatum. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod Deus aliquando non fuit, sed[11] quod secundum hominem aliquando non fuit. Nec est incepcio vel generacio Deo conveniens, Deum esse et ipsum aliquando non

And if it is asked whether "God at some time was not" ought to be granted, as he was begotten in time, or began:[23] it seems to me that, though that could be soundly understood, yet that sense is not supplied by the terms. Therefore I grant the negatives only with subjects that signify the twin substances in the Son, as "the Messiah, that man Jesus, at some time was not": for in those I understand the nature that began and at some time was not.[24] But not so in names that belong appropriately to the Godhead. Yet it is granted that "God was born of the virgin, suffered and died". But that will be proved by resolving the predication to the man so formed.[25] And from this it does not follow that "God at some time was not", but that "as to the man, he at some time was not". Nor is the beginning or generation

fuisse: sed sic ex esse aliquando[12] humanitus et ex negacione, que est,[13] antea humanitus non fuisse, cum instanti et aliis principiantibus illum motum. Et patet quod non sequitur—Christus aliquando non fuit; et ipse est Deus: ergo Deus[14] aliquando non fuit—propter extraneacionem [105]supposicionis. Unde si concedimus quod Deus genuit Deum et Deus non genuit Deum, licet tantum sit unus Deus propter distinccionem personarum; quanto magis concederemus quod Christus est factus et Christus non est factus, licet tantum unus sit Christus: cum sicut Deus est tres persone, sic Christus est tres nature, longe nobis manifestius disparate.[1] Et patet exemplariter quomodo respondebitur ad[2] questiones et communes[2] obiectus in ista materia seminatos.

that befits God this, that God is and that he at some time was not; but thus: from being, at some time, humanly, and from the negation, which is, not to have been humanly before, together with the instant and the other things that are the principle of that motion.[26] And it is clear that it does not follow, "Christ at some time was not; and he is God: therefore God at some time was not",[27] because of the estrangement [105]of supposition. Hence if, because of the distinction of the persons, we grant that "God begot God and God did not beget God", though there is only one God, how much more should we grant that "Christ is made and Christ is not made", though there is only one Christ: since as God is three persons, so Christ is three natures, far more manifestly disparate to us.[28] And it is clear by example how the questions and the common objections sown in this matter will be answered.

Notes

1. *Cum … credatur … sunt alia*: the period does not construe as printed (*cum* with no verb of its own, and *alia* "other things" with nothing before it to be other than); nothing is lost, though. In the source, pseudo-Augustine, *De visitatione infirmorum* II.2 (PL 40, 1152–1153), *Enimvero credatur sacrae Scripturae testimoniis* is a sentence of its own, and *Sunt et alia de Deo Filio quasi nobis propinqua* sets these "other things" against the mystery of the Trinity in the sentence before, which is to be believed rather than expounded. Wyclif's *cum* joins the two. The English renders the words as they stand (*verified*).
2. *Sacramentum* here is the Augustinian "mystery" of the incarnation. **C.** *Quod homo Deus factus est*: "that man was made God", in the order of the Latin; "that God was made man" (*homo* predicate) is possible, the word order favours the first.
3. 1 Cor. 13:12, Vulgate *videmus*, made a participle in the sentence. "As to the wall … with Ezechias": Isa. 38:2.
4. "A sharing": *participium* (twice), with A B C and the source (*De visit. inf.* II.2, *quoddam participium … sibi participium*), against the print's *participem* "a sharer" with O (101.12, 101.13). **C.** *De homine tuo puro*: "your own pure man", the unmixed human nature that is the reader's own and Christ's.
5. "What is mine (mine because [it is] from me) by a certain thought and kinship": A B C *quod meum est meum quod ex me michi quadam cogitacione et cognacione*, with the source (*De visit. inf.* II.2: *quia meum est meum, quia et ex me mihi quadam cogitatione et cognatione, et secreta quadam affectione conglutino*), against the print's *quod unum est michi quadam cognacione* (101.15–17); O reads *quod unum est michi quadam cognacione et cognacione*. For the rest the print stands: its *et secreta quadam affeccione*, against the families' *cognacione secreta* with no *et*, is the source's grouping, and Harris's supplied *[et]*, in no manuscript, is the source's *et*; the English keeps both. The source has the verb *conglutino* "I glue together" where A B C and the print have the noun *conglutinio* (O *conclusio*).
6. *Nesciunt offendendo impingere*: "stumbling, know not how to dash against", that is, no logician can overturn the teaching by the force of the words, however he stumbles at it; *offendendo* may also be "by taking offence". *De vi vocis* may also go with *sentenciam*, "that teaching [taken] by the force of the words", which the *quia* clause (Christ our brother, one common humanity) then proves.
7. John 20:17, Vulgate *vade autem* (Douay "But go"). Hebrews 2:11–12, Vulgate *fratres eos vocare*.
8. Augustine, *De haeresibus* 44 (the Paulianists, who held that Christ did not exist before Mary), PL 42, 34 (*verified*); "recited above" refers to 80.22, where the Paulianists are heresy 44 (Harris, Note on 101.33). **T.** *Sicut*: A B C *et sic*.
9. *Intendentibus michi concludere*: "intent on driving me to a conclusion", *michi* as the one argued against; "intent on inferring to me" is possible.
10. *Tanquam sine repugnancia*: so O (*sine*, or *sive*, with *repugnanciam*); A B C omit *sine*, which would make the conclusion follow "as an incompatibility". The print follows O, and the argument (no contradiction among equivocals) needs *sine*.
11. *Expositorie*, with A B C O (O abbreviated *expoē*), against the print's *ex posicione*: the argument that follows is an expository syllogism (this Godhead was then, and it is Christ), which is what the manuscripts name.
12. *Tam* has no *quam*, and the next sentences prove an affirmative and a negative; a clause *quam quod non fuit* (ending like the one before it) seems lost. Supplied in brackets (our emendation).
13. Ps. 18:6 (Vulgate numbering): "Hath rejoiced as a giant to run the way".
14. Ambrose, cited as *De Spiritu Sancto* III, which is how the Lombard cites it (*Sent.* III d. 21 c. 4, PL 192, 802), and Wyclif follows the Lombard's wording. The passage is *De incarnationis dominicae sacramento* 5.35–36, PL 16, 827C–D (*verified*). "When I understood as a child": 1 Cor. 13:11.
15. Ambrose's *De fide*, which circulated as *De Trinitate*, book I; his "chapter 6" is the older division of I.14, PL 16, 548C: *probemus creaturam non esse Dei Filium* (*verified*).

16. Luke 2:52, "advanced in wisdom and age". Wyclif's *De Spiritu Sancto* III names the same work as at 102.24 (n. 13), under the title the Lombard gives it: not a slip. The place is Ambrose, *De incarnationis dominicae sacramento* 7.71–74, PL 16, 836C–837B: Christ advanced *sensu hominis*, and as an infant knew neither father nor mother (Isa. 8:4). The Lombard quotes it in *Sent.* III d. 13 c. 3, PL 192, 782 (*verified*).
17. The sermon *De fide* is pseudo-Augustine, *Sermo* 233 (App.), *De fide catholica*, PL 39, 2176: *Si quis dixerit atque crediderit Filium Dei Deum passum fuisse, anathema sit.* A later anathema in the same sermon explains it, against those who say *in passione crucis dolorem sentiebat Filius Dei Deus, et non caro cum anima.* Wyclif has the title and the gloss from the Lombard, *Sent.* III d. 21 c. 4, PL 192, 802 (*verified*). **T.** *Exponit enim*: A B C *sicut exponit.*
18. Aristotle, *Sophistici elenchi* 5, 167a23–27 (the conditions of a refutation: the same thing, not the name only, in the same respect and at the same time), "c. 4" in Wyclif's medieval division (not checked). The same chapter supplies *non nominis tantum, sed rei et nominis* at 104.1 (*verified*). **C.** *Secundum idem simpliciter*: "in the same respect without qualification", *simpliciter* qualifying *idem.*
19. *Secundum eandem naturam in numero* is omitted by A B C; the print follows O, and the argument needs it.
20. "As Augustine recounts": *De haeresibus* 44 again, PL 42, 34: *Christum non semper fuisse dicunt; sed ejus initium, ex quo de Maria natus est, asseverant* (*verified*).
21. *Sed rei et nominis*, with A C O (*et* omitted), against the print's *sed et rei et nominis* "but also of the thing and the name".
22. 1 Cor. 3:18; Wyclif adds *sic* "so" and *Deo* "to God", which the Vulgate lacks. The print closes the quotation twice, after *sapiens* and after *Deo*; the English closes it after "wise".
23. *Sicut generabatur temporaliter vel incepit*: read as the ground of the question (as he was begotten in time, so at some time he was not), or as the sense in which it is asked ("in the way that he was begotten in time").
24. *Que incepit et aliquando non fuit*, with C O (*esse* omitted; O *cepit*), against the print's *incepit esse* "began to be".
25. *Ad hominem sic formatum*: "to the man so formed", the predication resolved into one about the assumed nature (God *as to* the man); not the *argumentum ad hominem.*
26. The beginning is composed of a positive (being, now, humanly), a negation (not having been humanly before) and the instant that bounds the change; *principiantibus* are the things that make up that change, not causes outside it.
27. *Ergo Deus*: A B C read *ergo ipse* "therefore he"; the print follows O. The argument needs *Deus*: with *ipse* (Christ) the inference is sound and there is no estrangement of supposition to expose.
28. *Disparate* is O's; A B C omit it. The print follows O.
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 101: *sentenciam* (bt has sententiam; print has sentenciam (c)) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference 1 Cor- xv- 12- (101.6); reference 25 Johnxx. 17. (101.25); reference Heb. ii. 11-12. (101.26); reference Ps. xix. 5. … . (102.27); reference 1 Cor. iv. io. (104.5); reference l Cor. m. 18. (104.11).

Chapter 7

Part 1: That Christ is movable: wisdom more active than all active things

Harris pp. 105.0–109.20

¶1 *105.0–105.0*

[105][Declarando Christi mobilitatem explanat sensum scripture multis ambiguum, quomodo sapiencia summe mobilis sit habitu inventa ut homo. The sense in which Christ is subject to change (mobilis) is defined by discussing Wisdom vii. 24, 'Wisdom is more moving (mobilior) than any motion,' and Philipp. ii. 8, 'found in fashion (habitu) as a man.']

[In making clear Christ's movability it explains a sense of scripture that is ambiguous to many: how Wisdom, supremely movable, was "in habit found as a man".]

¶2 *105.11–107.7*

[105]Secundo principaliter arguitur non esse concedendum quod Christus sit mobilis. Nam si Christus sit mobilis, tunc Deus est mobilis: sed nullus Deus est mobilis:[3] ergo nec Christus. Minor sic arguitur.[4] Aliqua res est immobilis: sed[5] nulla, si non Deus: ergo Deus est immobilis:[5] et cum unus Deus sit omnis Deus, sequitur quod omnis Deus et per consequens omnis[6] persona divina sit simpliciter immobilis, et per consequens nulla est mobilis.[7] Si ergo Deus sit mobilis, et omne aliud a Deo sit[8] mobile, sequitur quod omne ens[9] sit mobile, et sic nullum immobile. Ex quo sequitur quod Christus non sit passus, mortuus, aut cum hominibus conversatus, cum tunc esset destructibilis[10] et adnichilabilis. [106]Hic dicitur quod necesse est aliquam rem esse omnino immobilem; quod patet tripliciter. Primo ex hoc quod omne motum oportet inniti alicui fixo immoto: universitas[1] creata est mota: ergo oportet illam inniti alicui fixo immoto:[1] sicut[2] ergo mixta terrestria innituntur orbi terre, qui non commovebitur secundum centrum fluctuans huc aut illuc, sic omne motum cum sit ordinatum sic moveri ab alio oportet stare in suis limitibus secundum[3] ordinacionem principaliter[4] ordinantis: quia cum moveri sit imperfeccionis et posse movere perfeccionis simpliciter, patet quod prius est pura perfeccio quam imperfeccio exemplata. 2°. patet idem ex hoc quod veritates multe eterne, tam affirmaciones quam negaciones, sunt omnino immobiles; ut 'quod nichil simul est et non est'; 'quod multa encia possunt esse,' etc.[5] Cum ergo omnem rem racionis oportet fundari in absoluta essencia, sequitur quod oportet dare essenciam vel naturam immobilem, cui innixe predicte[6] veritates immobilitatem suscipiunt. 3°. patet idem ex hoc quod illa prima natura est in fine perfeccionis possibilis, quia aliter non esset summe perfecta; sed si posset moveri, posset perfici: ergo moveri non poterit. Si autem[7] moveri posset,[8] hoc

Secondly, as a main head, it is argued that "Christ is movable" is not to be granted. For if Christ is movable, then God is movable: now no God is movable: therefore neither is Christ. The minor is argued thus. Some thing is immovable: now none is, if not God: therefore God is immovable: and since one God is every God, it follows that every God, and consequently every divine person, is immovable without qualification, and consequently none is movable. If, then, God is movable, and everything other than God is movable, it follows that every being is movable, and so none immovable. From which it follows that Christ did not suffer, die, or live his life among men, since he would then be destructible and annihilable. [106]Here the answer is that it is necessary that some thing be altogether immovable; which is clear in three ways. First from this, that everything moved must rest on something fixed and unmoved: the created totality is moved: therefore it must rest on something fixed and unmoved:[1] as, then, the mixed bodies of the earth rest on the globe of the earth, which "shall not be moved",[2] fluctuating about its centre this way or that, so everything moved, since it is ordered to be so moved by another, must stand within its limits according to the ordinance of him who orders principally: for since to be moved belongs to imperfection, and to be able to move to perfection without qualification, it is clear that pure perfection is prior to exemplified imperfection. Secondly, the same is clear from this, that many eternal truths, affirmations as well as negations, are altogether immovable; as "that nothing at once is and is not"; "that many beings can be", etc. Since, then, every thing of reason must be grounded in absolute essence, it follows that one must posit an immovable essence or nature, resting on

foret potissime obiective: sed eternaliter ordinat omnia, cum non capit suam speculacionem aut[9] praxim a rebus extra: ergo non movetur[10] a suis effectibus obiective; et multo minus localiter,[11] augmentative, vel alterative: aliter enim esset in eo[12] passiva potencia ante actum mixta cum potencia activa, cum aliud sit posse movere et aliud posse moveri: et sic varie posset[13] perfici et imperfici, quod non competit summe bono. Supposito ergo, quod sit aliqua res et aliquid omnino immobile; consequenter dicendum est quod necesse est quidquid, quod poterit[14] esse,[14] esse mobile. Patet sic. Non est possibile aliquid esse nisi illud sit[15] essencia creata [107]vel essencia[1] increata; omnis essencia creata est mobilis; omnis essencia increata est mobile: ergo conclusio. Minor patet ex hoc quod essencia increata est suppositum mobile:[2] ergo illa est mobile: consequencia patet, quia ipsa est res mobilis[3] eo quod est persona Verbi, que moveri poterit, et nedum hoc, sed habet naturam sibi[4] unitam secundum quam moveri sufficit.

which the aforesaid truths receive their immovability. Thirdly, the same is clear from this, that that first nature is at the end of possible perfection, for otherwise it would not be supremely perfect; now if it could be moved, it could be perfected: therefore it cannot be moved. And if it could be moved, this would be above all objectively: now it orders all things eternally, since it does not take its speculation or its practice from things outside: therefore it is not moved objectively by its effects; and much less locally, by augmentation, or by alteration: for otherwise there would be in it a passive potency[3] before the act, mixed with active potency, since to be able to move is one thing and to be able to be moved another: and so it could in various ways be perfected and made imperfect, which does not befit the supreme good. Supposing, then, that there is some thing, and something altogether immovable, it must next be said that it is necessary that whatever can be is movable. This is clear thus. It is not possible that anything be unless it is created essence [107]or uncreated essence; every created essence is movable; every uncreated essence is a movable:[4] therefore the conclusion. The minor is clear from this, that uncreated essence is a movable supposit: therefore it is a movable: the inference is clear, for it is a movable thing because it is the person of the Word, which can be moved; and not only this, but he has a nature united to him, as to which he is able to be moved.[5]

¶3 107.8–108.21

[107]Et sic intelligo illud[5] Sapiencie 7°, 'omnibus mobilibus est mobilior sapiencia': quod dictum, ut michi videtur, potest catholice intelligi et vere ad litteram de Sapiencia eterna[6] suo tempore incarnata; que, cum attrita[7] sit secundum humanitatem assumptam propter scelera nostra, bonificans et vivificans omnia ultra hoc quod sufficeret vel[8] poterit[8] alia creatura, habuit nimirum mocionem fontalem, qua principiat quasi vita omnem mocionem mundi sensibilis et cuiuslibet sue partis. Sicut ergo Aristoteles 8° Physicorum: 'Ymaginatur motum primi mobilis esse quasi vitam viventibus cum mediante[9] illo influitur perfeccio mundo supposito'; sic verissime sine ficticia illa Sapiencia est primum mobile efficacia et dignitate secundum assumptum hominem, mediante cuius motu primo omnium[10] totus mundus ante et post perficitur; cum quelibet alia creatura per Christi passionem ad perfeccionem primariam,[11] qua Deo serviret placato[12] et[12] homini, instauratur. Non quod propter devocionem finguntur falsa; sed quod verissime de[13] vi sermonis secundum seriem verborum primum[13] mobile sit sapiencia increata; et quod eius motus vel passio perficit *[hominem] plus quam motus celi[14] quamlibet creaturam[15] [aliam] post vel ante. Nam[16] quelibet creatura [108]citra hominem debet ex institucione

And so I understand that [text] of Wisdom 7, "wisdom is more active than all active things":[6] which saying, as it seems to me, can be understood in a catholic way and truly to the letter of the eternal Wisdom incarnate in his time; who, since he was "bruised" as to the assumed humanity "for our sins",[7] making good and quickening all things beyond what would suffice, or another creature could, had, no wonder, a fontal motion, by which he originates, as a kind of life, every motion of the perceptible world and of each of its parts. As, then, Aristotle in Physics 8: "He imagines the motion of the first movable to be as it were a life to living things, since by means of it perfection flows into the world set beneath";[8] so most truly, without fiction, that Wisdom is the first movable in efficacy and dignity as to the assumed man, by means of whose motion, the first of all,[9] the whole world before and after is perfected; since every other creature is restored through Christ's passion to the primary perfection, by which it would serve God, once appeased, and man.[10] Not that false things are feigned for devotion's sake; but that most truly, by the force of the words,[11] according to the order of the words, uncreated wisdom is the first movable; and that his motion or

primaria servire homini; et sic peccato primi hominis, a quo hodie[1] redundanter[2] haberet perfeccionem ipso stante in originali iusticia, quodammodo peioratur. Cum ergo, per passionem et per consequens per mocionem huius Sapiencie, facta plena satisfaccione,[3] sit natura humana gloriosius restituta; patet quod[4] ista passio rectificat omnem operacionem nature, que humano generi est subiecta: et cum omnis[5] servitus post et ante facta humano generi, non interveniente ista redempcione, foret quodammodo cassata, patet quod compendiosius motu celi vivificat[6] preterita[6] et futura: et cum exinde dolus et peccatum demonum mitigatur, lectum[7] angelorum consorcium augmentatur, patet quod ultra possibilitatem motus celi spiritualem bonificat creaturam. Nec mirum; quia motor[8] intrinsecus huius[9] motus fuit non intelligencia, motrix orbis, sed spiritus[10] preciosissimus[10] Filii hominis et Dei Filii naturalis, qui est 'tanto melior angelis effectus, quanto differencius pre illis nomen hereditavit;' ut dicit Apostolus ad Hebre. primo ca°, quando dicit quod 'Deus proposuit instaurare in Christo omnia, que in celis et que in terra sunt'; ut exponit Gregorius 31° Moralium ca° 38.

passion perfects any [other] creature, after or before, more than the motion of the heaven [does].[12] For every creature [108] short of man ought by its primary institution to serve man; and so by the sin of the first man, from whom it would have had perfection overflowingly had he stood in original justice, it is in a manner made worse.[13] Since, then, through the passion, and consequently through the motion, of this Wisdom, full satisfaction having been made, human nature has been more gloriously restored, it is clear that this passion sets right every operation of nature that is subject to the human race: and since all servitude rendered to the human race after and before would, had this redemption not intervened, have been in a manner made void, it is clear that he quickens things past and future more compendiously than the motion of the heaven: and since thereby the guile and sin of the demons is mitigated, [and] the chosen fellowship of the angels is increased, it is clear that beyond the possibility of the motion of the heaven he makes good the spiritual creature. Nor is it any wonder; for the intrinsic mover of this motion was not an intelligence, mover of an orb, but the most precious spirit of the Son of man and natural Son of God, who is "made so much better than the angels as he hath inherited a more excellent name than they", as the Apostle says in Hebrews, chapter 1, when he says that "God purposed to re-establish in Christ all things that are in heaven and on earth", as Gregory expounds in Moralia 31, chapter 38.[14]

¶4 108.22–109.20

[108]Sic ergo intelligendo per Sapienciam personaliter Verbum Dei, ut docent Augustinus et Ieronimus,[11] concedendum est quod ipsa sit summe mobilis; ymo plus attendendo ad litteram concedi potest quod dicta Sapiencia nedum fuit plus mobilis, sed plus effectualiter movebatur quam alia creatura quoad velocitatem, quoad compendiositatem, et quoad generalitatem. Quoad velocitatem, quia pro instanti sue generacionis plena carismatum; post verisimiliter in sua ascensione movebatur recte tam velociter ut primum mobile circulariter,[12] vel ut est possibile quod aliquid moveatur, quia causa tardacionis post[13] discipulorum intuitum non est [109] faciliter fingenda: Christus ergo ex se ascendendo a limbo ad celum ultimum pertransiit velocissime longissimum spacium transmeabile. Quoad compendiositatem patet quod eius brevis passio reduxit totum mundum post et ante ad maius temperamentum quam motus perpetuus primi mobilis suffecisset: prima enim secundum Aristotelem sunt quantitate minima. Quoad generalitatem patet, cum Christus sit creatura corporea et creatura incorporea, quarum utraque[1] multipliciter movebatur, quod sit ceteris plus mobilis: movebatur

So, then, understanding by Wisdom, personally, the Word of God, as Augustine and Jerome teach,[15] it is to be granted that he is supremely movable; indeed, attending more to the letter, it can be granted that the said Wisdom not only was more movable, but was more effectually moved than another creature, as to speed, as to compendiousness, and as to generality. As to speed, because at the instant of his generation [he was] full of charisms; afterwards, in all likelihood, in his ascension he was moved in a straight line as swiftly as the first movable [is moved] circularly, or as swiftly as it is possible that anything be moved, since a cause of delay after [he passed from] the disciples' sight is not [109] easily to be feigned: Christ, then, ascending of himself from limbo to the last heaven, passed most swiftly through the longest space that can be traversed. As to compendiousness, it is clear that his brief passion brought back the whole world, after and before, to a greater temperament than the perpetual motion of the first movable would have sufficed [to do]: for first things, according to Aristotle, are least in quantity.[16] As to generality, it

quidem[2] generacione et morte, augmentacione et alteracione, et demum motu locali multiplici super terram, aquam, et aerem[3] pulsione, traccione, veccione et vertigine, ut actu illo imperfecto reduceret suos ad quietem perpetuam. Unde sicut naturalis philosophus commendat motum tanquam signum efficax nedum ad philosophandum sed ad intentum nature perficiendum, sic nimirum commendat theologus voluntariam passionem. Et constat[4] ex 3° Physicorum quod passio vel est motus vel accidens multum cognatum motui. Sic ergo verissime de virtute sermonis dicitur 'Sapiencia' Dei Patris 'omnibus aliis creaturis mobilior.'

is clear, since Christ is a corporeal creature and an incorporeal creature, each of which was moved in many ways, that he is more movable than the rest: he was moved indeed by generation and death, by augmentation and alteration, and lastly by manifold local motion over land, water, and air, by pushing, pulling, carrying and whirling,[17] so that by that imperfect act he might bring his own back to perpetual rest. Hence, just as the natural philosopher commends motion as an efficacious sign, not only for philosophising but for accomplishing the intent of nature, so, no wonder, the theologian commends the voluntary passion. And it is evident from Physics 3 that passion either is motion or is an accident closely akin to motion.[18] So, then, most truly, in the proper sense of the words, the "Wisdom" of God the Father is said [to be] "more movable than all other creatures".

Notes

1. *Universitas creata … fixo immoto* (p. 106), the minor premiss and conclusion of this first proof, is O's alone; A B C omit it.
2. Ps. 92:1, *orbem terre, qui non commovebitur* (Douay "the world which shall not be moved"), applied to the globe of the earth.
3. *Potencia* inside Aristotle's analysis of active and passive potency, so "potency", the first sense of the contextual row.
4. *Mobile* (neuter) with a feminine subject, *essencia increata*, is a substantive: "a movable", a movable thing, against the adjective *mobilis* agreeing with *essencia creata*. The chapter returns to the difference (pp. 116–117: "taking 'movable' essentially, as a substantive").
5. A B C omit *essencia* before *increata*, *mobile* after *suppositum*, *mobilis* after *res*, and *sibi* (p. 107); the print follows O, without which the proof of the minor reads "uncreated essence is a supposit … it is a thing".
6. Douay's "active" renders *mobilis, mobilior*, which the rest of the chapter gives as "movable"; Wyclif omits the Vulgate's *enim* (Wis. 7:24). *Sapiencia* is here the Word in person (108.22), so the pronoun is "he", as for *Verbum*, though the Latin is feminine.
7. Isa. 53:5, *attritus est propter scelera nostra* (Douay "he was bruised for our sins").
8. Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.1 (250b14), motion "as a kind of life" to all things constituted by nature; Wyclif gives a paraphrase, not the text, joined to the first movable of *Physics* VIII.6–7 and *Metaphysics* XII.7, the places Harris cites (note on 107.17) (*verified*).
9. *Motu primo omnium*: taken as "whose motion, the first of all [motions]"; it can also be read adverbially, "by whose motion, first of all". A B C read *omni* for *omnium*.
10. The print's *placato et* (107.24) stands in no manuscript as printed: A B C read *et placito*, O *placato* without *et*. The witnesses do not agree against it, and it is kept.
11. *De vi sermonis* is neither *de virtute sermonis* "in the proper sense of the words" nor *de vi vocis*; rendered "by the force of the words". A has *aut* before *secundum seriem* (in an erasure), B *sermonis sed causacionem verborum*, and O omits *vi* (p. 107).
12. The print reads *perficit [hominem] plus quam motus celi quamlibet creaturam [aliam]* (107.28–29). *Hominem* is the editor's conjecture, in no manuscript; without it the sentence construes, and it is set aside. *Aliam* is O's, bracketed by the editor, and is kept. For *celi* O has an abbreviation the editor takes for *ceteri*; *celi* recurs at 108.11–14.
13. *Hodie* (108.2) is omitted by C and O, against A B; with C O, across the families, "today" is not rendered.
14. Heb. 1:4; the second quotation is Eph. 1:9–10 (Douay "to re-establish all things in Christ, that are in heaven and on earth"), given in Wyclif's word order. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXI.49.99 (PL 76, 627D–628A), where Christ restores the angels' losses by the redemption of mankind; Wyclif's chapter 38 matches no division (*verified*).
15. Augustine and Jerome on Wisdom as the Word in person; no work is named, and neither Father quotes Wis. 7:24 in the PL; perhaps a general appeal, as in Augustine, *De Trinitate* I.6.10, where Ecclus. 24 is read *voce Sapientiae* of the Son.
16. The maxim *principium est minimum quantitate, maximum virtute*: Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 34 (183b22) (*verified*).
17. The four kinds of motion by another, pushing, pulling, carrying and whirling: Aristotle, *Physics* VII.2 (243a16 ff.) (*verified*).
18. *Passio* is both Christ's passion and Aristotle's being-acted-on, which *Physics* III.3 makes one motion with action (*verified*); the sentence needs both, so "passion" carries both.

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 109: *multiplici* (bt truncated: print multiplici)
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Heb. i. (108.18); reference Eph. i. io. (108.20); reference 30 Heb- xiii- 8- (109.30).

Part 2: Wisdom movable before the incarnation: all times present to God

Harris pp. 109.21–113.29

¶1 109.21–110.17

[109]Sed obicitur contra hunc sensum per hoc, quod Christus non est ante incarnacionem; et per consequens scriba huius scripture non intendebat ad litteram mobilitatem Sapiencie incarnate. Hinc dicitur quod, quidquid fuerit de consequente, consequencia non valet; quia, cum apud Deum omnia que fuerunt sunt presencia, certum est quod auctor[5] huius scripture satis cognovit quomodo[6] 'Christus maneat in eternum' iuxta illam vocem vasis eleccionis sue ad Hebre. 13°. 'Iesus Christus hodie et cras ipse et in secula.' Et illud egregie declarat Ieronimus in Epist. De Assumpcione Beate Virginis ad Paulam et Eustochium: 'Christi quidem incarnacionem, hoc est quod Christus suo tempore incarnatur, cognovit patriarcha Abraham iuxta testimonium Veritatis Ioh. 8°. 'Abraham pater vester exultavit ut videret diem [110] meum," id est, tempus incarnacionis et non solum diem eternitatis; "vidit et gavisus est."' Cui Augustinus Ome. 43 adicit argumentum. 'Quando, inquit, Abraham, Gen. 24°., misit servum suum, ut peteret uxorem filio suo Ysaac, hoc eum iuramento obstrinxit, ut fideliter quod iubebatur impleret. Magna enim res agebatur, quando Abrahe semini coniugium querebatur. Sed, ut hoc cognosceret servus quod noverat Abraham, quod nepotes non carnaliter affectabat, nec de suo genere carnale aliquid sapiebat; ait servo quem mittebat: "pone manum sub femore meo et iura per Deum celi." Quid, inquit, sibi vult "Deus celi" ad femur Abrahe?' Et respondet. 'Cum per femur genus notatur, illa iuracione signabatur de genere Abrahe venturum in carne Deum celi. Stulti, inquit, reprehendunt prophetam Abraham tamquam pure puerile gesserit in hoc dicto; sed cum credidit benediccionem sui seminis Messiam credidit de suo semine incarnandum.'

But it is objected against this sense, by appeal to this: that Christ is not before the incarnation; and consequently the writer of this scripture did not intend, to the letter, the movability of Wisdom incarnate. Hence the answer is that, whatever may be the case with the consequent, the inference is not valid; for, since with God all things that have been are present, it is certain that the author of this scripture knew well enough how "Christ abideth for ever",[1] according to that saying of his vessel of election, Hebrews 13: "Jesus Christ, today and tomorrow: and the same for ever."[2] And this Jerome notably makes clear in the letter On the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, to Paula and Eustochium: "The incarnation of Christ indeed, that is, that Christ is incarnate in his time, the patriarch Abraham knew, according to the testimony of the Truth, John 8: 'Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see my [110]day', that is, the time of the incarnation and not only the day of eternity; 'he saw it and was glad.'"[3] To which Augustine, in Homily 43, adds an argument.[4] "When," he says, "Abraham, Gen. 24, sent his servant to seek a wife for his son Isaac, he bound him by this oath, that he should faithfully fulfil what he was bidden. For a great thing was being done when a marriage was sought for the seed of Abraham. But so that the servant might know what Abraham knew, that he did not desire grandsons carnally, nor savoured anything carnal concerning his own race, he said to the servant whom he was sending: 'Put thy hand under my thigh, and swear by the God of heaven.'[5] What," he says, "has 'the God of heaven' to do with Abraham's thigh?" And he answers: "Since by the thigh the race is denoted, by that oath it was signified that the God of heaven would come in the flesh from the race of Abraham. Fools," he says, "reproach the prophet Abraham, as though he had done something merely childish in this saying; but when he believed the blessing of his seed, he believed the Messiah was to be incarnate of his seed."

¶2 110.18–110.26

[110]Et idem 2°. declarat Ieronimus de prophetia[1] patriarche Ysaac sencientis Christum odore prophetico, Gen. 27. quando dixit, 'Ecce odor filii mei sicut odor agri pleni, quem benedixit Dominus.' Et ita de singulis patriarchis. Cum enim ipsi eadem fide salvati sunt nobiscum, patet quod ipsi crediderunt incarnacionem Domini sicut et nos; et per consequens Dominum suo tempore incarnari. 'Constat, inquit[2] Ieronimus, tempus non preiudicasse[3] sacramento uniti hominis ac Dei.'

And secondly Jerome makes the same clear from the prophecy of the patriarch Isaac, perceiving Christ by a prophetic scent, Gen. 27, when he said, "Behold, the smell of my son is as the smell of a plentiful field, which the Lord hath blessed." And so of each of the patriarchs. For since they were saved by the same faith with us, it is clear that they believed the incarnation of the Lord as we do; and consequently "the Lord is incarnate

¶3 110.27–111.25

[110]Et patet ad obiectus garulos sophistarum, quibus invehunt contra oraciones ecclesie quibus rogat[4] Dominum[4] ‘per[5] incarnacionem, nativitatem, circumcisionem, baptismum, ieiunium, passionem, mortem, resurreccionem et ascensionem a periculis liberari’; ‘Inanis, inquiunt, est oracio suggesta, cum omnia predicta nec sunt nec possunt esse.’ Sed constat quod unumquodque illorum, cum sit nobis preteritum, et futurum suo tempore patribus veteris testamenti, [quod][6] [111]vere est pro suo tempore et per consequens causa misericordiam impetrandi: non quod quidquam scrupulosum[1] in nostra lege celamus,[2] quod non audeamus disputacioni cuiuscunque philosophantis ostendere. Et illum modum loquendi docet Ieronimus ex illo dicto Iude. ‘Iesus, inquit, populum ex Egipto salvans secundo eos, qui non crediderunt, perdidit:’ et Apostolus 1ª ad Cor. 10°: ‘neque temptemus Christum sicut quidam eorum temptaverunt;’ non quod iam esset Iesus Christus natus ex Maria virgine, sed quia illa illa persona, que tempore suo est Christus, est eterna et sempiterno[3] Dei consilio incarnata et[4] materialis essencia semper presto. Sic ergo[5] sancti patres, in quocunque tempore fuerunt,[6] sciverunt vere Christum esse, fuisse, et fore; et[7] proposiciones formate ab eis fuissent vere—Christus est, fuit, vel erit incarnatus—quamvis tunc non fuisset ita[8] quod Christus est incarnatus. Nam, ut sepe dixi, sicut proposicio potest esse hic vera cum hoc, quod hic non sit suum primarie significatum, sed satis est quod ipsum sit alicubi[9]: correspondenter proposicio potest esse nunc vera cum hoc, quod nunc non sit suum primarie signatum, sed satis est quod ipsum sit aliquando. Et sic intelligendus est Augustinus cum aliis doctoribus quod eadem est fides patrum tam novi quam veteris testamenti. Nam incarnacio, mors Christi, et adventus ad iudicium sunt fides credita, a qua fide absit falsitas, sive ficticia etc.

in his time”. “It is evident,” says Jerome, “that time has not prejudiced the sacrament of man and God united.”[6]

And [from this] the answer is clear to the chattering objections of the sophists, with which they inveigh against the prayers of the church in which it asks the Lord “by the incarnation, nativity, circumcision, baptism, fasting, passion, death, resurrection and ascension to be freed from dangers”:[7] “Empty,” they say, “is the prayer put forward, since all the aforesaid neither are nor can be.” But it is evident that each one of these, since it is past for us, and future in its time for the fathers of the old testament, [111]truly is for its time,[8] and consequently is a cause of obtaining mercy: not that we hide anything doubtful in our law that we would not dare to show to the disputation of anyone who philosophises. And this mode of speaking Jerome teaches from that saying of Jude: “Jesus,” he says, “having saved the people out of Egypt, did afterwards destroy them that believed not”; and the Apostle, 1 Cor. 10: “Neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them tempted”;[9] not that Jesus Christ was then already born of the virgin Mary, but because that person, who in his time is Christ, is eternal, and incarnate by the everlasting counsel of God, and the material essence [was] always at hand. So, then, the holy fathers, in whatever time they were, knew truly “Christ is, was, and will be”; and the propositions formed by them would have been true, “Christ is, was, or will be incarnate”, although it was not then so that Christ is incarnate. For, as I have often said, just as a proposition can be true here together with this, that its primary significate is not here, but it is enough that it be somewhere: correspondingly a proposition can be true now together with this, that its primary thing signified is not now, but it is enough that it be at some time.[10] And so Augustine, with other doctors, is to be understood [when he says] that the faith of the fathers of the new as well as of the old testament is the same.[11] For the incarnation, the death of Christ, and the coming to judgement are the faith that is believed, from which faith let falsity, or fiction, be far, etc.

¶4 111.26–112.19

[111]Unde Gregorius 23° Moralium ca°. 15[10] exponens illud[11] Iob. 33°, ‘semel loquetur Deus, et secundo ad[12] ipsum non repetet,’ ita scribit: ‘In Deo ideo dicere quodlibet tempus audacter, licet quod in eo nullum proprie dici[13] licet.’ Unde[14] notat[14] causam eius 30°. Moralium ca°. 5° dicens quod Deus preteritorum[15] non reminiscitur, cum ipsa que in semetipsis[16] [112]pretereunt eius[1] intuitu semper presencia assistunt:

Hence Gregory, Moralia 23, chapter 15, expounding that [text] of Job 33, “God will speak once, and the second time will not repeat it”,[12] writes thus: “In God, therefore, [it is permitted] to speak boldly of any time, although it is permitted that none be properly said in him.”[13] Hence he notes the cause of this in Moralia 30, chapter 5, saying that God does not remember things

et exemplificat satis notabiliter 34°. Moralium ca°. 5°. tripliciter: unde 9°. Moralium 25 expresserat illud diffusius exponens illud Iob. 10. 'Numquid sicut dies hominis, dies tui?' 'Deo, inquit, nec transacta pretereunt, nec adhuc ventura, que non apparent, desunt; quia is, qui[2] semper esse habet cuncta sibi presencia, conspicit.' Et idem dicit Anselmus Monologion 19°. Ideo, ut sepe dixi, nisi omne tempus preteritum vel futurum fuerit Deo presens, paterentur theologi magnas angustias in exposicione[3] scripturarum ut Ps. 21°. tempore David dicit dicta Sapiencia: 'foderunt[4] manus meas et pedes meos:' et sic de multis scripturis, que pueriliter essent sine racione posite[5] sub ita disparatis temporibus nisi ad imprimendum in[6] nobis quod immensa Dei eternitas coassistit omni tempori preterito et[7] futuro. Unde ad istum sensum loquitur sapiencia Ecclesiastici 47°: 'Christus purgavit[8] peccata ipsius.' Et patet quod facta instancia non impugnat sensum datum ad istam scripturam, 'omnibus mobilior est Sapiencia.'

past, since the very things that in themselves [112]pass away are always present before his gaze: and he gives examples, quite notably, in Moralia 34, chapter 5, in three ways: so in Moralia 9, [chapter] 25, he had expressed it more diffusely, expounding that [text] of Job 10, "Are thy days as the days of man?": "To God," he says, "neither do things done pass away, nor are things yet to come, which do not appear, lacking; for he who always has being beholds all things as present to himself."[14] And Anselm says the same, Monologion 19.[15] Therefore, as I have often said, unless every time past or future were present to God, theologians would suffer great straits in the exposition of the scriptures, as [where], Ps. 21, in the time of David, the said Wisdom says: "They have dug my hands and feet": and so of many scriptures, which would childishly and without reason have been set down under times so disparate, were it not to impress on us that the immense eternity of God is present together with every time, past and future. Hence to this sense wisdom speaks, Ecclesiasticus 47: "Christ took away his sins."[16] And it is clear that the objection made does not impugn the sense given to this scripture, "wisdom is more active than all".

¶5 112.20–112.32

[112]Sunt autem multi alii sensus huic littere adaptati.[9] Ut hi dicunt quod extensive loquendo de motu Sapiencia increata movetur obiective a cognitis terminantibus eius actum. Hi dicunt cum tot sint motus genera quot et entes,[10] et Deus ad omnem punctum mundi continue adquirit dominia, est in illa manerie motus relacionis 'summe mobilis.' Tercii autem dicunt quod in omni motu est dare ordinem prioritatis et posterioritatis[11] secundum successivam denominacionem[12] subiecti in materia motus, et omne tale secundum esse intelligibile ordinatum et descriptum[13] est eternaliter in Sapiencia increata, et secundum illas raciones dicitur figurative 'summe mobilis.' Sed prior exposicio, cum sit literalior de virtute sermonis, verior, et fidei conformior, plus placeret.

And there are many other senses adapted to this text. Thus some say that, speaking of motion extensively, uncreated Wisdom is moved objectively by the things known that terminate his act. Others say that, since there are as many kinds of motion as there are beings, and God at every point of the world continually acquires lordships, he is, in that kind of motion, [the motion] of relation, "supremely movable".[17] And a third [group] say that in every motion one may posit an order of priority and posteriority according to the successive naming of the subject in the matter of the motion, and every such thing is, as to intelligible being, ordered and described eternally in uncreated Wisdom; and according to those reasons he is said figuratively [to be] "supremely movable". But the first exposition, since it is more literal, in the proper sense of the words, truer, and more conformed to the faith, would please more.

¶6 113.1–113.29

[113]Unde quamvis auctor scripture intenderit omnes istos sensus, primum tamen principalius, ut sit introitus ad alios consequentes. Et sic Augustinus de virtute sermonis salvat textus scripture plus imbrigabiles ut illud Ioh. 14,[1] 'Sermonem quem audistis non est meus, sed eius, qui misit me, Patris.' Dicit enim illud Ome. 76ª. esse verum de virtute sermonis: 'non, inquit, miremur, non paveamus:[2] non est minor Patre, vel impar sibi: non enim mentitus est; "qui me non

[113]Hence, although the author of scripture intended all these senses, yet [he intended] the first more principally, so that it might be an entrance to the others that follow. And so Augustine, in the proper sense of the words, saves the more troublesome texts of scripture, as that of John 14, "The word which you have heard is not mine; but the Father's who sent me." For he says in Homily 76 that it is true in the proper sense of the words: "Let us

diligit, sermones meos[3] non servat:" non est hic sibi contrarius, sed forte non[4] sine misterio ibi dixit pluraliter, hic singulariter; volens hic intelligere semetipsum, qui, cum sit Sermo vel Verbum Dei Patris non autem Sermo sui ipsius, verum dixit ad litteram.' Quod si grammaticus ex accusativo casu offenditur, potest dici quod facta construccione recta non sit[5] anthitesis. Nam qui non diligit Christum, non servat sermones suos, id est,[6] sentencias vel veritates, quas precepit observari. Sed ut manifestet quid ex hoc sequitur, subiungit 'et sermonem quem audistis' (supple[7] 'non servat'); per quam copulacionem docemur methaphisicam quod omnes huiusmodi veritates eterne sunt idem essencialiter Verbo Dei. Et 3°, ut doceat quod ille Sermo sit idem essencialiter Deo Patri, licet personaliter[8] distinguatur, subiungit 'non est meus sed eius, qui misit me, Patris.' Licet autem sensus catholicus posset esse quod sermo vocalis non sit Verbi ex se, modo quo Apostolus dicit solum Patrem habere immortalitatem;[9] ut exponit Augustinus primo De Trinitate et primo contra Maximinianum ca°. 10; tamen[10] prior sensus est subtilior et mihi[11] carior.

not," he says, "wonder, let us not be afraid: he is not less than the Father, or unequal to himself: for he did not lie: 'He that loveth me not keepeth not my words': he is not here contrary to himself, but perhaps not without a mystery he spoke there in the plural, here in the singular; wishing here to understand himself, who, since he is the Speech or Word of God the Father, but not the Speech of himself, said what is true to the letter."[18] And if the grammarian is offended by the accusative case, it can be said that, once the construction is made right, there is no antithesis.[19] For he who does not love Christ does not keep his words, that is, the teachings or truths which he commanded to be observed. Now, to make plain what follows from this, he adds, "and the word which you have heard" (supply "keepeth not"); by which conjunction we are taught the metaphysics that all such eternal truths are essentially the same as the Word of God. And thirdly, to teach that that Speech is essentially the same as God the Father, although personally distinguished, he adds, "is not mine; but the Father's who sent me." And although the catholic sense could be that the spoken word is not the Word's of himself, in the way in which the Apostle says that the Father alone has immortality, as Augustine expounds in De Trinitate 1 and in book 1 against Maximinus, chapter 10, yet the first sense is subtler and dearer to me.[20]

Notes

1. John 12:34, the crowd's words.
2. Heb. 13:8, Douay "Jesus Christ, yesterday, and today: and the same for ever"; Wyclif's *hodie et cras* ("today and tomorrow") is translated.
3. Pseudo-Jerome, *Ep.* 9, *ad Paulam et Eustochium de assumptione* (*Cogitis me*, by Paschasius Radbertus), §10, PL 30, 132C, which makes the point from John 8:58, *Antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum*; the words with John 8:56 given here are not in the letter, and the verse is the one Augustine expounds next (*verified* as to the letter).
4. Augustine, *Tract. in Ioh.* 43.16 (PL 35, 1712–13), on John 8:56, expounding Gen. 24:2–3; quoted closely to *Stulti … reprehendunt*, the last sentence being Wyclif's (*verified*).
5. Gen. 24:2–3, Douay "Put thy hand under my thigh, That I may make thee swear by the Lord, the God of heaven and earth"; Augustine's shorter form is translated.
6. The same pseudo-Jerome letter, §§9–10 (PL 30, 132B–C), Isaac's words and *Unde constat tempus non praejudicasse sacramento uniti hominis ac Dei* (*verified*). *Sacramentum* is the Augustinian "mystery" (1 Tim. 3:16), here the union of God and man.
7. The petitions of the litany, *per mysterium sanctae incarnationis tuae … per nativitatem tuam …*; a late-medieval litany (Burnet Psalter, f. 245r) has Wyclif's sequence with *Per circumcisionem tuam*, which the Roman form lacks (*verified*, Sarum text not seen). A B C read *orat deum* for *rogat Dominum*, O *pro* for *per* (p. 110).
8. The editor brackets the second *quod* (p. 110, last line) and asks whether it should be left out for the sense; the manuscripts have it. It resumes the first *quod* after the long clause, and the English needs neither.
9. Jude 1:5, Douay "out of the land of Egypt" (Wyclif *ex Egipto*); 1 Cor. 10:9. Both texts, in this order, are in the same pseudo-Jerome letter, §10 (PL 30, 132C–D), *Quod apostolus Judas volens apertius dilucidare: Jesus, inquit, populum ex Aegypto salvans* (*verified*).
10. *Significatum* and *signatum* name one thing, what the proposition primarily signifies; the two words are kept apart in English as in the Latin. A B C read *aliquando* for *alicubi* (p. 111), which spoils the parallel of place and time; the print stands.
11. Augustine on the one faith of the fathers of both testaments; perhaps *Tract. in Ioh.* 45.9 (PL 35, 1722–23), *eadem credebant … sed illi ventura esse, nos autem venisse.*
12. Job 33:14, Douay "God speaketh once, and repeateth not the selfsame thing the second time"; Wyclif's futures and *ad ipsum* are translated (A B C omit *ad*). Gregory, *Moralia* XXIII.19.35 (PL 76, 272B–C: *dici in Deo tempus audacter quoslibet licet, unde in eo dici proprie nullum licet*; PL c. 19, older numbering c. 11, matching neither the print's 15 nor A B C), where A B C give "c. 3" (*verified*).
13. No verb governs *dicere*, and *licet* stands twice (111.29); translated as printed, with "[it is permitted]" supplied from the second *licet*. A B C omit *dici*.

14. Gregory, *Moralia* XXXII.5 (PL 76, 638C–D, *Quomodo ergo Deus praeteritorum reminiscitur, cum ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt ejus nutui semper praesentia assistunt?*), not XXX.5; XXXIV.7 (PL 76, 724B–C), not XXXIV.5, where Scripture puts future for past and past for future, with Ps. 21 *foderunt manus meas*; and IX.47.72 (PL 75, 899A; older numbering c. 26) for the quotation, on Job 10:5 (*verified*, loci corrected).
15. Anselm, *Monologion* 20, *Quod illa sit in omni loco et tempore*, numbered 19 in the older division (PL 158, 169), as Harris's index gives it (*verified*).
16. Sir. 47:13, of David: the Clementine Vulgate has *Dominus purgavit* (Douay "The Lord took away his sins"); Wyclif's *Christus*, on which his point turns, is translated. O reads *pugnavit*.
17. The unexpressed subject of *est … 'summe mobilis'* is taken as God, who "acquires lordships" in time: a change of relation only.
18. John's *sermo* (Douay "the word") is read by Augustine, and by Wyclif, of the Word himself, the *Sermo* of the Father. Augustine, *Tract. in Ioh.* 76.5 (PL 35, 1832), abridged (*verified*).
19. *Anthitesis*: the grammarians' figure of one case put for another (*sermonem* for *sermo*, subject of *est*). Wyclif's right construction takes *sermonem* as object of an understood *non servat*.
20. 1 Tim. 6:16, "Who only hath immortality", said of God; "the Father alone" is the exposition's. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I, and *contra Maximinianum* I.10: Wyclif's book 1 is the *Collatio cum Maximino*, where the reading of the verse of the Father alone is Maximinus's (15.14, PL 42, 730–31, *Pater autem vere solus habet immortalitatem, qui ipsam immortalitatem aliunde non est consecutus*), answered by Augustine at 14 (PL 42, 720); in *De Trinitate* I.6.10 (PL 42, 825–26) Augustine reads it of the Trinity; Wyclif's chapter 10 matches neither (*verified*).

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 110: *carne* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference 30 Heb- xiii- 8- (109.30); reference Jude;s. (111.5); reference l Cor. x. 9. (111.7); reference Job xxxiii. 14. (111.27); reference Jobx. (112.4); reference Ps. xxii. 16. (112.11); reference ; as aiso John xiv. 24. 1 1 ° in (113.4); reference l Tim. vi. 16. (113.26).

Part 3: The form of a servant: the immovable nature and the movable supposit

Harris pp. 113.30–117.27

¶1 113.30–115.21

[113]Et sic intelligendus est sensus Apostoli ad Philipp. 2°. quod Christus,[12] 'cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se equalem Deo; sed semetipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens.' Pro cuius intellectu notandum quod sicut forma [114]Dei est deitas,[1] sic forma hominis est humanitas. Utraque enim est forma substancialis; cum quelibet persona divina sit illud quo[2] est Deus,[3] quia Deus formaliter deitate;[1] sicut quelibet persona hominis est illud quo[2] est homo, quia[4] est homo[4] formaliter humanitate. Utramque autem harum formarum habet ut subiectus eis formaliter; unam tamen habet absolute necessario; et aliam accepit[5] ex tempore. Et istam altissimam methaphisicam de formis vellem nostros theologos, etsi non in[6] methaphisica Aristotelis, saltem in verbis Apostoli compendiose addiscere. Ex quo patet, quod non ex propria reputacione vel arbitrio proprio sine veritate substrata vendicavit se esse equalem Patri, quasi[7] raperet sibi honorem Patri debitum, ut facit Sathanas; cum naturaliter et communiter inest sibi cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto[8] esse Deum. Quod co-inest[9] sibi et Patri, ostenderat quando[10] dixit,[10] 'Ego et Pater unum sumus.' Augustinus autem format talem racionem; 'Nichil quod est naturale[11] et essenciale[11] supposito est rapina: sed[12] Christum esse equalem Deo est naturale et per se inest Verbo: ergo hoc non est rapina.[12] Sed faciendo se esse naturam visibilem exinanivit misericorditer semetipsum: semetipsum dicit[13] propter ydemptitatem persone que est filius hominis[14] et Dei Filius:[14] exinanivit dicit,[15] quia fecit se ad[16] extra esse naturam corpoream, que,[17] [cum] in

And so the sense of the Apostle, Philippians 2, is to be understood: that Christ, "being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: But emptied himself, taking the form of a servant." For the understanding of which it is to be noted that as the form [114] of God is the Godhead,[1] so the form of man is the humanity. For each is a substantial form; since each divine person is that which is God, because [it is] God formally by the Godhead; as each person of man is that which is man, because he is man formally by the humanity.[2] And he has each of these forms as their subject, formally; yet the one he has absolutely, of necessity, and the other he received in time. And this most lofty metaphysics of forms I would wish our theologians to learn compendiously, if not in the Metaphysics of Aristotle, at least in the words of the Apostle. From which it is clear that it was not from his own estimation, or his own judgement, without truth beneath it, that he claimed himself to be equal to the Father, as if he were seizing for himself the honour due to the Father, as Satan does; since to be God belongs to him naturally and in common with the Father and the Holy Spirit. That it belongs jointly to him and to the Father he had shown when he said, "I and the Father are one." And Augustine frames such an argument:[3] "Nothing that is natural and essential to a supposit is robbery: now for Christ to be equal to God is natural and belongs of itself to the Word: therefore this is not robbery.[4] But by making himself to be a visible nature he mercifully emptied himself: 'himself', it says, on

mundi principio prius originem[17] quam formam habeat, est inanis.' Ad quem sensum, ut exponit Augustinus 12°. Confessionum, scriptura in principio Gen. dicit, 'terra erat inanis et vacua.' Nec video quomodo exinanicio[18] pocius[19] possit intelligi quam quod sit[20] res extra facta inanis[21] essencialiter sic ut sit[21] exinanita. Et hoc est verum de Christo ad litteram, cum sit trium naturarum [115]quelibet. Et hinc vere dicit Veritas, Ioh. 14°. 'Pater maior me est:' quia, cum[1] Christus sit tam equivoce divinitas et humanitas, potest respectu predicati absoluti intelligi secundum racionem divinitatis vel secundum racionem humanitatis, sicut exigit predicatum. Et patet ex dictis superius quod non est repugnancia—Pater est maior Christo—et—idem[2] Pater est[3] simpliciter equalis Christo—: ymo, intelligendo personam Christi secundum duas naturas equivoce, non est repugnancia inter ista—Pater est maior Christo—[4] et—idem Pater non est maior Christo—[4]: nec debent tales predicaciones abici de virtute sermonis quod sunt figurative, quia per idem[5] negaretur hoc—Ego et Pater unum sumus—Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unus Deus, etc :—cum in prima sit equivocacio, et in secunda concepcio personarum. Ymo, si non fallor, omnis locucio nostra de Deo est figurativa, ut quandocunque dicitur quod Deus est mobilis, natus, passus etc. est construccio non synecdochica sed figura que antropospatos dicitur, quando scilicet humana passio Deo attribuitur; ab antropos homo et patos passio. Non enim habemus nomina, que sine figura Deum signent.

account of the identity of the person who is the son of man and the Son of God: 'emptied', it says, because he made himself to be, outwardly, a corporeal nature, which in the beginning of the world, being prior in origin to its having form, is empty."[5] To which sense, as Augustine expounds in Confessions 12, scripture says in the beginning of Genesis, "the earth was void and empty".[6] Nor do I see how emptying can be better understood than as a thing made outwardly empty, essentially, so that it is emptied. And this is true of Christ to the letter, since he is each one of three [115] natures.[7] And hence the Truth truly says, John 14, "the Father is greater than I": for, since Christ is so equivocally the divinity and the humanity, he can, with respect to an absolute predicate, be understood according to the aspect of divinity or according to the aspect of humanity, as the predicate requires. And it is clear from what was said above that there is no incompatibility [between] "the Father is greater than Christ" and "the same Father is without qualification equal to Christ": indeed, understanding the person of Christ equivocally as to two natures, there is no incompatibility between these: "the Father is greater than Christ" and "the same Father is not greater than Christ"; nor ought such predications to be rejected, in the proper sense of the words, as being figurative,[8] for by the same token this would be denied, "I and the Father are one", [and] "the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God", etc., since in the first there is equivocation, and in the second a conception of persons. Indeed, if I am not mistaken, all our speech about God is figurative, as whenever it is said "God is movable, born, has suffered", etc., it is not a synecdochic construction but the figure that is called *antropospatos*, namely when a human passion is attributed to God; from *antropos*, man, and *patos*, passion.[9] For we have no names that signify God without figure.

¶2 115.22–116.6

[115]Redeundo ergo ad propositum conceditur quod aliqua res, quia natura divina, est omnino immobilis, sic quod nullo modo moveri poterit, licet sit suppositum mobile, ut puta, Christus passus. Patet ista logica in exemplo. Nam natura divina est Verbum tam eternaliter quam temporaliter genitum, et tamen ipsa non est genita, et talis[6] essencia materie prime est suppositum ignis compositum ex materia et forma: et tamen ipsa materia non potest sic componi. Petrus comedit, moritur, vel aliter transmutatur; et tamen natura specifica, que est Petrus, non potest taliter transmutari. Ideo in omnibus istis similibus oportet diligenter attendere ad predicacionem secundum essenciam et formalem. Et patet quod non sequitur—Deus est mobilis,[7] et omne

Returning, then, to the matter in hand, it is granted that some thing, because [it is] the divine nature, is altogether immovable, so that it can in no way be moved, although it is a movable supposit, as, for instance, Christ who suffered. This logic is clear in an example. For the divine nature is the Word, begotten both eternally and temporally, and yet it is not begotten; and such an essence of prime matter is the supposit of fire, composed of matter and form: and yet that matter cannot be so composed. Peter eats, dies, or is otherwise changed; and yet the nature of the species, which is Peter, cannot be so changed. Therefore in all these and like [cases] one must attend diligently to predication by essence and to formal

aliud [116]a Deo est mobile: ergo omnis res est mobilis—quia aliqua res non est mobilis. Et si queratur—Quid non est mobile ?—potest dici equivocando, quod nichil non est mobile, quia natura divina est mobile: et sic, intelligendo predicacionem secundum essenciam non formalem,[1] omne, quod[2] est, est mobile.[2]

[predication].[10] And it is clear that it does not follow, "God is movable, and everything other [116]than God is movable: therefore every thing is movable", because some thing is not movable. And if it is asked, "What is not movable?", it can be said, equivocating, that nothing is not movable, because the divine nature is a movable: and so, understanding predication by essence, not formal, everything that is, is a movable.[11]

¶3 116.7–117.9

[116]Quod si dicatur istam responsionem, cum sapiat contradiccionem, interimere disputaciones theologicas, cum incidit in redargucionem, que est[3] meta vilissima respondentis; dicitur quod multum proficeret modum disputandi sophisticum, principaliter propter apparenciam arguentis et redargucionem[4] patulam respondentis, ex peccato Luciferi introductum, esse[5] in scolis theologis pretermissum.[6] In cuius signum prima questio, quam scriptura meminit,[7] est a dyabolo[8] introducta. 'Cur,[8] inquit serpens, precipit vobis Deus ut non comederetis de omni ligno paradisi?' Gen. 3°. Unde omnis questio attestatur indubie super ignoranciam vel peccatum. Tamen non negandum est, quin questiones theologice possunt tractari meritorie, cum Veritas quesivit a peccatoribus plurimas questiones. Oportet tamen quod utrobique intendatur Dei gloria augmentanda, sophistarum superbia destruenda, et ignota veritas detegenda: omne[9] autem quod amplius est in disputacione theologica 'a malo est:' ideo questio, sicut et iuramentum, occasione vel pena peccati introducta est. Et ista est sentencia Augustini 2° De Doctrina Christiana 31°, ubi docet in disputacionibus cavere rixandi libidinem et ostentacionem frivolam puerilem. Nec[10] ducunt argucie sophistarum theologos[11] ad metam aliam, sed detegit eorum versuciam arundineam qua prius pompaverant; et hoc ex propriis eorum principiis. Unde frequenter, ut colores sapiencie sophistice minus appareant, obvio eis negando negativas, que ad sensum equivocum satis catholice concedi potuerunt[12]; ut, dando exclusivam huius [117]universalis—omnis res est mobilis,—formo sic exclusivam, ut apparencia[1] sophistica sit minus evidens—tantum res mobilis est res—quod est falsum pro rebus eternis. Concedi tamen posset quod nichil aliud quam mobile est res, accipiendo 'mobile' essencialiter substantive; et tamen aliud quam mobile est res, posito quod 'mobile' predicetur formaliter adiective. Sed Augustinus et alii sancti non curarunt de istis apparenciis sophistarum. Unde in Dialogo ad Felicianum, 'genuit, inquit, et non genuit Maria Filium Dei.'

And if it is said that this response, since it savours of contradiction, destroys theological disputations, since it falls into refutation, which is the vilest goal of the respondent, the answer is that it would profit much that the sophistical manner of disputing, introduced from the sin of Lucifer chiefly for the sake of the arguer's show and the respondent's open refutation, be left aside in the schools of theology.[12] In sign of which, the first question that scripture mentions was introduced by the devil: "Why," says the serpent, "hath God commanded you, that you should not eat of every tree of paradise?" Gen. 3. Hence every question bears witness, without doubt, to ignorance or sin. Yet it is not to be denied that theological questions can be treated meritoriously, since the Truth asked very many questions of sinners. Yet it is necessary that on both sides there be intended the glory of God, to be increased, the pride of the sophists, to be destroyed, and unknown truth, to be exposed: and whatever is more than this in theological disputation "is of evil":[13] therefore the question, like the oath, was introduced by occasion of sin or as its penalty. And this is the teaching of Augustine, De doctrina christiana 2, [chapter] 31, where he teaches that in disputations one should beware of the lust for wrangling and frivolous, childish display.[14] Nor do the quibbles of the sophists lead theologians to any other goal, but [the theologian] exposes their reedy cunning, in which they had before boasted;[15] and this from their own principles. Hence frequently, so that the colours[16] of sophistical wisdom may appear less, I meet them by denying negatives that, in an equivocal sense, could quite catholicly have been granted; as, in giving the exclusive of this [117]universal, "every thing is movable", I form the exclusive thus, so that the sophistical appearance may be less evident: "only a movable thing is a thing", which is false for eternal things. Yet it could be granted that nothing other than a movable is a thing, taking "movable" essentially, as a substantive; and yet that something other than a movable is a thing, supposing that "movable" is predicated formally, as an adjective. But Augustine and the other saints did not care about these appearances of the

sophists. Hence in the Dialogue to Felicianus: "Mary," he says, "bore and did not bear the Son of God."[17]

¶4 117.10–117.27

[117]Sed ulterius arguitur quod Verbum Dei non sit simpliciter mobile racione assumpti hominis. Nam nulla persona movetur propter habitum vel[2] accidens essencialiter separatum[2]: sed humanitas Christi est habitus Verbo Dei accidentaliter copulatus: ergo propter eius laceracionem[3] vel passionem non sequitur[4] passio Verbi Dei. Confirmatur triplici exemplo. Primo ex hoc quod homo non laceratur vel comburitur, etsi vestimenta eius taliter[5] paciantur. 2°. ex hoc quod humanitas conceditur per tempus notabile non fuisse: quando tamen non conceditur Verbum Dei conformiter non fuisse, non ergo sequitur—si ista humanitas movebatur post a non esse acquirendo essendi terminum,[6] tunc et Verbum—. 3°. confirmatur ex figura Abrahe patriarche, qui cum voluit Gen. 22°. immolare[7] filium suum Ysaac, non hunc occidit sed arietem, quem vidit post tergum[8] herentem[8] cornibus. Cum ergo passio Christi fuit per Ysaac allegorice figurata, videtur quod non persona Christi, sed eius humanitas, fuit passa.

But further it is argued that the Word of God is not movable without qualification by reason of the assumed man. For no person is moved on account of a habit or accident essentially separate: now the humanity of Christ is a habit accidentally joined to the Word of God: therefore on account of its laceration or passion the passion of the Word of God does not follow.[18] This is confirmed by a threefold example. First from this, that a man is not torn or burned, even if his garments suffer so. Secondly from this, that the humanity is granted not to have been for a notable time, while yet it is not granted, correspondingly, that the Word of God was not: it does not, then, follow, "if this humanity was moved afterwards from not-being, acquiring the term of being, then the Word [was moved] too". Thirdly, this is confirmed from the figure of the patriarch Abraham, who, when he willed, Gen. 22, to sacrifice his son Isaac, did not kill him but the ram which he saw behind his back, sticking fast by the horns.[19] Since, then, the passion of Christ was allegorically figured by Isaac, it seems that not the person of Christ, but his humanity, suffered.

Notes

1. O reads *divinitas* and *divinitate* for *deitas* and *deitate* (p. 114), against A B C; the print stands, and the two words are kept apart in English.
2. *Quod est Deus*, *quod est homo* ("that which is God", "that which is man") with O, against the print's *quo* ("that by which", 114.3, 114.4), with A B C. The print makes the person the form by which it is God, while the sentence goes on to make the person the subject that has both forms (114.5) and gives the Godhead as that by which it is God formally; the argument fails without O's reading.
3. Augustine on Phil. 2:6, *non rapinam*; the syllogism is not found in this form; perhaps Ep. 140.12 (PL 33, 543), *neque enim usurpationis erat, ut rapina diceretur, sed naturae inerat, ut esset aequalis*, recast, with *Tract. in Ioh.* 67.1 (*cui natura est, non rapina*) and, for matter prior *origine* to form, *Confessions* XII.29.40.
4. The minor premiss and conclusion, *sed Christum … non est rapina*, are O's alone (A B C omit them), as are *hominis et Dei Filius*; A B C also omit *semetipsum* and *dicit* (p. 114).
5. *Origine*, with C O, against the print's *originem* (A B); the editor's bracketed *[cum]* (114.24), his own supplement, falls with it. With *origine* the clause construes: matter is "prior in origin" to having form.
6. Gen. 1:2, where Douay's "void" renders *inanis*, the adjective in *exinanivit*. Augustine, *Confessions* XII, who reads the verse as *terra erat invisibilis et incomposita* (XII.3.3) and expounds it of formless matter, prior to form *origine* (XII.29.40, PL 32, 842–43) (*verified*).
7. *Trium naturarum quelibet*: "each one of three natures", predicated of Christ, as at the end of the preceding chapter, *Christus est tres nature* (105.6).
8. *De virtute sermonis* taken with *abici*: such predications are not to be shut out of the literal sense on the ground that they are figurative.
9. *Concepcio* is the grammarians' figure (syllepsis) by which one plural verb gathers several persons (*sunt unus Deus*), as *antropospatos* is the figure that ascribes a human passion to God; Wyclif's spelling of the Greek is kept.
10. The pair, predication by essence and formal predication, answers the argument of 105.11 ff.: "God is movable" holds by essence, since the divine nature is the movable supposit Christ, not formally.
11. *Mobile*, neuter with *natura divina* and *omne*, is substantive, "a movable", as on p. 107. O omits *quod est, est mobile*; C reads *quod est mobile* (p. 116).
12. *Redargucio* is the respondent's being brought to contradiction in the disputation, his defeat. The subject of *proficeret* is the accusative and infinitive *modum disputandi sophisticum … esse … pretermissum*.
13. Matt. 5:37, Douay "that which is over and above these, is of evil", the verse on oaths, hence "like the oath".
14. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* II.31.48 (PL 34, 58), *cavenda est libido rixandi, et puerilis quaedam ostentatio* (*verified*).
15. *Detegit* has no expressed subject; taken as the theologian (O reads *theologum* for *theologos*). *Versucia arundinea*: a cunning as frail as a reed.

16. *Color*: a plausible ground, as in "colour of title", here the sophists' semblance of wisdom.
17. Pseudo-Augustine (Vigilius of Thapsus), *Contra Felicianum Arianum* 12 (PL 42, 1167), *Genuit ergo Maria et non genuit Filium Dei* (*verified*).
18. *Habitus* is the "habit" of Phil. 2:7 (*habitu inventus*), a thing had as a garment is had; the objection treats the humanity so, as the Lombard's third opinion does, *Sent.* III d. 6 c. 6 (PL 192, 769–70), *velut indumento … secundum habitum* (*verified*). M reads *accionem* for *laceracionem* (p. 117).
19. Gen. 22:13, in Douay's words "behind his back … sticking fast by the horns".

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 115: *sumus—Pater* (print as transcribed (next line)) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference ; as aiso John xiv. 24. 1 1 ° in (113.4); reference l Tim. vi. 16. (113.26); reference John x. 30. (114.16); reference Gen. i. (114.27); reference 30 Petrus (115.29); reference Gen. iii. l. (116.15); reference Matth.v.37. (116.24); reference : 73b] Gen- xxii- 13- (117.26).

Part 4: The Word suffers, and the six senses of "habit"

Harris pp. 117.28–121.7

¶1 117.28–118.8

[117]Hic dicitur quod non esset concedendum Verbum pati propter passionem sue humanitatis, nisi Verbum esset personaliter illa humanitas. Sed quia Verbum ex integro est illa humanitas tam secundum corpus quam secundum animam, et acciones ac passiones sunt primo suppositorum; patet quod illa humanitas non pateretur vel ageret,[9] nisi [118]quia Verbum, quod est eadem ypostasis vel persona, sic agit vel patitur. Firmiter itaque est tenendum quod Verbum Dei et per consequens Deus ipse pendebat dolens et passus in cruce, et sic de ceteris humanis actibus quos evangelium de Iesu prosequitur. Et sic, licet humanitas Christi sit essencia, substancia, vel natura separata non conservative sed essencialiter a deitate, que Christus est; non tamen sic separatur quin sit persona Christi.

Here the answer is that it would not be granted that the Word suffers because of the suffering of his humanity, unless the Word were personally that humanity. Now since the Word is wholly that humanity, as much as to the body as as to the soul, and actions and being-acted-on belong first to supposits;[1] it is clear that that humanity would not suffer or act, unless [118]because the Word, who is the same hypostasis or person, so acts or suffers. So it must be firmly held that the Word of God, and in consequence God himself, hung grieving and suffering on the cross; and so of the other human acts which the gospel recounts of Jesus. And so, although the humanity of Christ is an essence, substance, or nature separate from the Godhead, which Christ is, not as to conservation but essentially, yet it is not so separated that it is not the person of Christ.[2]

¶2 118.9–118.30

[118]Sed pro nomine 'habitus' est notandum quod 'habitus' quadrupliciter sumitur, ut exponit Augustinus 83 Questionum Questione 73ª. exponendo illud Apostoli ad Philipp. 2°. 'habitu inventus est ut homo.' Primo pro sapiencia, que est veritas, quam addiscimus, que manens[1] non mota movet animam, quam informat. 2°. pro alimentis habitis mutantibus corpus, quod nutriunt, et digestione mutatis. Omne quidem substanciale nobis adiacens, quod mutat et mutatur adiacendo subiecto, dicitur 'habitus' huiusmodi[2]: 'habitus'[2] quidem, quia denominat subiectum habere quod sibi accidentaliter adiacet. 3ᵐ. genus est quando habituata formantur a subiectis habituatis[3] †perfeccius quam quando membris aptata induuntur.†[3] 4ᵐ. genus habitus, ut anulus in digito. Omnia autem hec quatuor, cum[4] denominant substanciam habituari vel habere, dicuntur in predicacione secundum essenciam esse[5] 'habitus;' ut 'motus' dicitur materialiter esse res, que est motu dicto formaliter acquisita, ut patet

But concerning the name "habit" it is to be noted that "habit" is taken in four ways, as Augustine expounds in the *Eighty-Three Questions*, question 73, expounding that word of the Apostle to the Philippians 2, "in habit he was found as a man" (Phil 2:7).[3] First, for wisdom, which is the truth that we learn, which, remaining unmoved, moves the soul that it informs. Second, for the foods we have, which change the body they nourish and are changed by digestion. Indeed every substantial thing lying beside us which changes and is changed by lying beside its subject is called a "habit" of this kind: a "habit", that is, because it names the subject as having what lies beside it accidentally. The third genus is when the things worn are formed by the subjects that wear them, †more perfectly than when, fitted to the limbs, they are put on.†[4] The fourth genus of habit, as a ring on the finger. And all these four, since they name a substance as being habited or

3°. Physicorum 9°· 4°. Sumitur autem sufficiencia illorum quatuor penes hoc, quod primus habitus mutat substanciam cui advenit et[6] non mutatur; secundus[7] mutat et mutatur[7]; tercius mutatur et non mutat; quartus nec mutat necessario nec mutatur.

as having, are said in predication by essence to be "habits"; as "motion" is said, taken materially, to be the thing which is acquired by motion taken formally, as is clear from *Physics* III, 9, 4.[5] And the sufficiency of those four is taken according to this: that the first habit changes the substance to which it comes and is not changed; the second changes and is changed; the third is changed and does not change; the fourth neither necessarily changes nor is changed.

¶3 118.31–119.10

[118]Sed preter hec quatuor, que[8] in se sunt[8] substancie, sumitur habitus apud philosophos formaliter ad duos[9] sensus [119]equivocos. Primo pro qualitate preternaturali[1] de prima specie qualitatis; sive[2] sit[2] corporis habitus, ut sanitas; sive habitus anime, ut virtus intellectualis aut moralis[3]; habitus autem spiritualis ex habitu primo modo dicto[3] materialiter generatur, sicut[4] habitus corporalis efficitur ex secundo. Sed secundo modo sumitur habitus pro forma respectiva de 10°. genere, quod est habere, possessio, vel habicio, et talis habitus causatur ab habitu tercio et quarto modis materialiter intellectis: 'divicie' enim denominant homines divites,[5] possessionatos, vel habentes formaliter.

But besides these four, which in themselves are substances, "habit" is taken among the philosophers formally in two [119]equivocal senses. First, for a preternatural quality of the first species of quality;[6] whether it is a habit of the body, as health, or a habit of the soul, as an intellectual or moral virtue; and the spiritual habit is generated materially from habit said in the first way, as the bodily habit is produced from the second. But in the second way "habit" is taken for a relational form of the tenth genus, which is having, possession, or holding;[7] and such a habit is caused by habit in the third and fourth ways, understood materially: for "riches" name men rich, possessioned, or having, formally.

¶4 119.11–119.27

[119]Et patet quod ille sex maneries habitus sunt satis equivoce. Dicitur ergo quod humanitas assumpta a Verbo est habitus tercii modi, cum accidit enti in actu, non mutans vel faciens ipsam aliam personam quam prefuit. Ideo dicunt sancti quod humanitas est quasi vestis detegens deitatem;[6] et religiosi, qui Christum induunt, habent habitus[7] corporis; hoc notantes, quod[8] accidit Deo humanitas, sed non[9] inseparabiliter. Ideo dicit Augustinus in Dialogo ad Felicianum quod humanitas est accidens Verbo, non quod sit res inherens ut accidencia novem generum, cum sit precipua creata substancia; nec quod sit coëva Verbo vel sicut passio naturaliter consequens[10] ad subiectum; sed contingenter ex tempore nobis ineffabiliter[11] inest Verbo non mutando naturam, cui advenit, sed formata[12] mirabiliter, quia Verbo Dei ydemptificata vel ypostatice copulata: cum secundum Augustinum primo De Trinitate, 'talis fuit unio[13] incarnacionis, que Deum faceret[14] hominem et hominem Deum.'

And it is clear that those six kinds of habit are quite equivocally so called. So the answer is that the humanity assumed by the Word is a habit of the third mode, since it befalls a being in act, not changing it or making it another person than it was before.[8] So the saints say that the humanity is as it were a garment exposing the Godhead; and the religious, who put on Christ, have habits of the body;[9] noting this: the humanity befalls God, but inseparably.[10] So Augustine says in the *Dialogue to Felicianus* that the humanity is an accident to the Word: not that it is a thing inhering like the accidents of the nine genera, since it is the foremost created substance; nor that it is coeval with the Word, or like an attribute naturally following on its subject;[11] but contingently, from time, in a way ineffable to us, it is in the Word, not by changing the nature to which it comes, but formed wonderfully, because identified with the Word of God or hypostatically joined to him: since, according to Augustine, *On the Trinity* book 1, "such was the union of the incarnation, that it would make God man and man God."[12]

¶5 119.28–120.18

[119]Et patet quod dicta humanitas est forma in tribus conveniens cum formis per se in genere accidentis. Primo in hoc quod presupponit naturam, cui contingenter advenit, longe priorem ipsa naturaliter,

And it is clear that the said humanity is a form agreeing in three things with forms that are of themselves in the genus of accident. First, in this,

quam accidens presupponit creatam substanciam, quam informat. 2°. in hoc quod non facit [120]naturam, cui advenit, esse[1] quid vel aliud[2] quam absolute necessario semper erat.[3] Et 3°. quod non potest esse sine supposito Verbi Dei, cui inseparabiliter sed contingenter adheret. Et constat quod proprietates proporcionales analogice conveniunt generi accidentis: assimilatur autem passionibus, que dicuntur per se egredi de propriis principiis[4] subiectorum; cum non potest abesse, postquam infuit, cum inseparabiliter consequitur[5] ad Verbum, sicut passio ad subiectum; sed, sicut accidentia separabilia, deesse poterit a subiecto. Convenit 2°. cum accidentibus absolutis per se in genere, cum sit per se substancia motiva et mobilis denominans subiectum proprie et per se moveri formaliter. 3°. convenit[6] cum accidentibus respectivis. Nam, sicut relaciones, habitaciones, et respectus consimiles non exinde movent naturam, cui inherenter adveniunt; sic indubie 'forma servi,' que est humanitas, non potest movere naturam divinam, cum deitas solum denominacione respectiva denominatur ex eius adiacencia summe mirabili.[7]

that it presupposes the nature to which it contingently comes, by nature far prior to it, [more] than an accident presupposes the created substance which it informs.[13] Second, in this, that it does not make [120]the nature to which it comes be something, or other than it absolutely necessarily always was. And third, that it cannot be without the supposit of the Word of God, to which it adheres inseparably but contingently. And it is evident that proportional properties agree analogically with the genus of accident: and it is likened to the attributes, which are said to issue of themselves from the proper principles of their subjects; since it cannot be absent after it has been present, since it follows inseparably on the Word, as an attribute on its subject; but, like separable accidents, it could be lacking from the subject.[14] It agrees, second, with absolute accidents that are of themselves in the genus, since it is of itself a substance motive and movable, naming the subject properly and of itself as moved formally. Third, it agrees with relational accidents. For, as relations, habitations, and like respects do not thereby move the nature to which they come by inhering; so without doubt "the form of a servant" (Phil 2:7), which is the humanity, cannot move the divine nature, since the Godhead is named only by a relational naming from its most wonderful lying-beside.

¶6 120.19–121.7

[120]Convenit autem cum ceteris formis substancialibus[8] in his tribus. Primo quod facit suppositum, cui advenit, esse aliud quam prefuit; quia, postquam Verbum fuit pure deitas, nunc est homo. 2°. in hoc quod est idem ypostatice cum subiecto, cui advenit. Sicut generaliter omnis forma substancialis est idem essencialiter vel personaliter[9] cum subiecto forme et composito ex eisdem; sic, inquam, ista humanitas; cum sit eiusdem racionis cum aliis et idem personaliter Verbo Dei, licet Verbum commune sit natura divina, que non potest esse illa humanitas; sed cum sit individuum humane nature homo Iesus Christus, suscipit saltem in predicacione et secundum essenciam predicata temporalia, que historia evangelica de Christo contexuit, ut post declarabitur. Et patet mira subtilitas in verbis Apostoli quando dicit 'habitu inventus ut homo': non enim video alium terminum, quo [121]posset apcius quoad auditorii intellecionem, copiosius quoad philosophicam consideracionem, aut expressius quoad fidei explanacionem, humanitatem Christi exprimere. Ideo respectu[1] sentencie Apostoli, qui fuit prudentissimus predicator, et Augustini sui discipuli, qui fuit scripture sacre subtilissimus explanator, oportet nos ignaros colla mentis submittere.

And it agrees with the other substantial forms in these three things. First, that it makes the supposit to which it comes be something other than it was before; since, after the Word was purely Godhead, now he is man. Second, in this, that it is the same hypostatically with the subject to which it comes. As in general every substantial form is the same essentially or personally with the subject of the form and with the composite of the two; so, I say, is this humanity; since it is of the same kind as the others and the same personally as the Word of God, although the Word [taken as] common is the divine nature, which cannot be that humanity;[15] but since the man Jesus Christ is an individual of human nature, he takes up, at least in predication and by essence, the temporal predicates which the gospel history has woven together about Christ, as will be made clear later. And a wonderful subtlety is clear in the words of the Apostle when he says "in habit found as a man" (Phil 2:7): for I do not see another term by which [121] he could express the humanity of Christ more aptly as to the understanding of his hearers, more copiously as to philosophical consideration, or more expressly as to the explanation of the faith. So, with respect to the teaching of the Apostle, who was the most prudent preacher, and of Augustine his

disciple, who was the subtlest explainer of holy scripture, we ignorant ones must bow the necks of the mind.

Notes

1. *Acciones ac passiones sunt primo suppositorum*: the schools' maxim that acting and being acted on belong to the supposit, not to its nature; cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* I.1, 981a16–17, and Aquinas, *ST* III q. 20 a. 1 ad 2, *actus enim suppositorum sunt et singularium*; FitzRalph, *De pauperie Salvatoris*, has *secundum philosophos, acciones sunt suppositorum … ita sunt similiter passiones* (*verified*). *Passio* here is the category set against *accio*; the "suffering" of 117.29 is the same word, of the passion.
2. *Non conservative sed essencialiter* (118.6–7): the humanity is distinct from the Godhead in essence, not in being kept in being apart from it. *Que Christus est* is taken with *deitate*, the nearer noun; with *humanitas* it would say the humanity is Christ, which Wyclif also holds (120.25–26).
3. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 73.1, on Phil 2:7, PL 40, 84–85, *Multis modis habitum dicimus* (*verified*). Wyclif adds *est* to the Vulgate's *habitu inventus ut homo* (DR "in habit found as a man"), which he quotes exactly at 120.32–33.
4. The words between daggers are Harris's conjecture, made "not without doubt": A B C read *habituatis quam quando membrum aptata induitur*, O *habituatis proficitur quam quando membris aptata induitur*. Neither construes (*quam* has no comparative), so the conjecture is translated. Augustine's third habit is the garment, which takes its form from the body it is put on (q. 73.1, PL 40, 84: *formantur ab eis quibus habitum faciunt, sicuti est vestis*). Of the incarnation he says (73.2, PL 40, 85) that the man was assumed *ut … ab eo formaretur ineffabiliter excellentius atque conjunctius quam vestis, cum ab homine induitur*, and this supports the sense of the conjecture's *perfeccius quam*. Harris quotes both passages in his note to 118.20 (*verified*).
5. *3°. Physicorum 9°· 4°*: Aristotle on motion, *Physics* III; the figures *9* and *4* are not identified (perhaps chapters or texts of a medieval division, or perhaps Averroes's comments on book III; Harris's index gives *3 Phys. 9, 4* with no locus) (untraced).
6. *Preternaturali* (119.1) is the print's, from O's abbreviation (*pr̈ ñli*); A B C read *passionali*, which would put habit in the third species of quality (passions and passible qualities) instead of the first (habit and disposition). At 119.3–4 A B C read *moralis aut habitus specialis. Et ille ex habitu primo dicto*; the print follows O.
7. *De 10°. genere, quod est habere*: the tenth category in the schools' order, which ends with *habitus* (eighth in Aristotle's own list, *Categories* 4, 2a3; its senses, from a habit of soul to a cloak and a ring, are *Categories* 15, 15b17–33): "having" (*verified*). *Habicio* is rendered "holding".
8. *Ipsam* is feminine with no feminine antecedent but *humanitas*; taken as the person of the Word implied in *aliam personam* ("making it another person").
9. *Detegens* is "exposing" (the glossary): the garment that shows the Godhead, not one that hides it. *Qui Christum induunt*: Gal 3:27, "have put on Christ"; the religious habit is read as the figure.
10. *Hoc notantes, accidit*: *quod* is omitted, with C O, against the print's *hoc notantes, quod accidit* (A B); the English is the same. *Sed inseparabiliter*, with A B C, against the print's *sed non inseparabiliter* (O): the argument requires it, since at 120.3 and 120.8 the humanity adheres to the Word *inseparabiliter*, and at 120.8 A B C have *non inseparabiliter* where the print and O have none: the two recensions carry the negative in opposite places.
11. The *Dialogue to Felicianus* is Vigilius of Thapsus, *Contra Felicianum Arianum*, transmitted among Augustine's works: c. 9, PL 42, 1163, where the Son's birth as man is not common to Father and Son but *accidens speciale*, what *per accidens uni noscitur evenisse personae*. Harris points to c. 12 and says Wyclif *gives the substance … but adds the logical technicalities*; the distinctions that follow are Wyclif's (*verified*). *Passio* here is the proper attribute that follows on a subject (*subiectum / passio*), not the category of 117.32.
12. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I.13.28, PL 42, 840, *Talis enim erat illa susceptio, quae Deum hominem faceret, et hominem Deum*: the word is *susceptio*, not *unio* (*verified*).
13. *Longe priorem … quam*: *quam* taken as the comparative after *priorem* (the divine nature is prior to the humanity by far more than substance is to accident); read as "as", it states a likeness instead.
14. *Abesse / deesse*: once present, the humanity cannot be absent from the Word, as an attribute from its subject; it is like a separable accident in that it could have been lacking, since it comes contingently.
15. *Verbum commune*: *commune* is taken with *Verbum*, the Word as what he has in common with the Father and the Spirit, the divine nature; it could be read "although what is common in the Word is the divine nature".
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference : 73b] Gen- xxii- 13- (117.26); reference Augustinum (119.29).

Part 5: The three confirmations answered, and the true passion

Harris pp. 121.8–122.29

¶1 121.8–122.24

[121]Quantum ad primam trium confirmacionum[2] patet quod similitudo non est sufficiens[3]; cum humanitas Christi non solum sit ut vestimentum Verbo, vel ignis[4] ferro,[4] sed vera Christi quiditas, idem personaliter cum subiecto. Ad 2[am] negatur consequencia quod mocio,

As to the first of the three confirmations, it is clear that the likeness is not sufficient; since the humanity of Christ is not only as a garment to the Word, or fire to iron, but the true quiddity of Christ, the same personally with the subject. To the second, the inference is denied, since motion,

passio, et similia positiva, cum sint predicata personalia, sunt[5] persone Verbi racione[6] forme assumpte[6] principaliter tribuenda. Non sic autem negaciones, que non sunt predicata personalia. Ideo dixi superius quod incepcio non est esse et prius non fuisse, sed causatur ex illis; cum stat illa esse eterna et incepcionem solum instantaneam, et faciens incepcionem non potest facere dictam negacionem. Ideo non oportet, si Deus temporaliter generatur, quod ante[7] non fuit; cum satis est quod sit illud ex vi generacionis, quod non effectualiter fuit ante. Ad 3^{am} patet quod non oportet in toto esse correspondenciam figurati cuiuslibet ad figuram. Unde satis est quod Abraham ducens filium significet Deum Patrem, qui de facto duxit et obtulit super montem Calvarie filium suum unigenitum, sicut Ysaac unigenitus imolatus[8] est super montem ubi templum constitutum est. Ipse quidem fuit forma risus domini nostri Iesu Christi: et satis est quod humanitas idem personaliter Ysaac nostro, sicut aries est idem genere cum Ysaac figurante,[9] sic passa et occisa persona Verbi secundum deitatem et animam semper salva; et sic de aliis, que huic loco non pertinet[10] applicare. Sed constat repugnare figure quod sit in toto conformitas; quia tunc evidenter [122]sequeretur[1] Christi mobilitas; cum Ysaac portavit ligna sicut Christus crucem, ligatus est super[2] struem, sicut Christus affixus est ad crucem. Igitur cum Ysaac noster ex partibus[3] quantitativis componitur, que tam[4] varie movebantur: et, mota parte tocius, movetur et totum, cuius est pars; sequitur quod Christus compositus ex illis partibus movebatur. Nec credo[5] philosophum dicere Deum esse hominem, nisi consequenter dicat eum componi ex partibus, et consequenter moveri ad motum progressivum parcium[6]; cum[7] impossibile sit aliquid non moveri, quod tamen subiective habeat in se motum.[7] Unde Ieronimus exponendo fidem catholicam: 'passus est, inquit, Dei Filius non putative sed vere.' Et idem docet Augustinus in Enchiridion 40: et Decretalis in Clementinis De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica: 'confitemur, inquit, Filium Dei, una cum Patre eternaliter subsistentem, partes nostre nature simul unitas, ex quibus ipse verus Deus in se existens fieret[8] verus homo, (humanum videlicet[9] corpus et animam intellectivam seu racionalem, ipsum corpus vere et per se et essencialiter informantem,) assumpsisse ex tempore in virginali thalamo ad unitatem sue ypostasis[10] seu persone: et quod in hac assumpta natura ipsum Dei Verbum pro omni operanda salute non solum affigi cruci et in ea mori voluit, sed eciam emisso iam spiritu perforari lancea sustinuit latus suum.'

passion, and like positive [predicates], being personal predicates, are to be attributed to the person of the Word principally by reason of the assumed form. But not so negations, which are not personal predicates.[1] So I said above that beginning is not to be and not to have been before, but is caused from those; since it is consistent that those be eternal and the beginning only instantaneous, and he who makes the beginning cannot make the said negation. So it is not necessary, if God is begotten in time, that he was not before; since it is enough that he be, by force of the generation, that which he was not effectually before. To the third, it is clear that there need not be, in the whole, a correspondence of every thing figured to the figure. Hence it is enough that Abraham leading his son signifies God the Father, who in fact led and offered upon Mount Calvary his only begotten son, as Isaac, the only begotten, was sacrificed upon the mountain where the temple was set up (Gen 22:2; II Chron 3:1). He indeed was the form of the laughter of our Lord Jesus Christ:[2] and it is enough that the humanity, the same personally with our Isaac (as the ram is the same in genus with the Isaac who figures him), suffered thus and was slain, the person of the Word, as to the Godhead and the soul, remaining ever safe;[3] and so of the other things, which it does not pertain to this place to apply. But it is evident that it is incompatible with a figure that there be conformity in the whole; for then evidently [122]the movability of Christ would follow; since Isaac carried the wood as Christ the cross, and was bound upon the pile as Christ was fixed to the cross (Gen 22:6, 9). Therefore, since our Isaac is composed of quantitative parts, which were moved so variously; and, when a part of a whole is moved, the whole of which it is the part is moved too; it follows that Christ, composed of those parts, was moved. Nor do I believe that a philosopher says God is man, unless he consequently says that he is composed of parts, and consequently is moved with the progressive motion of the parts; since it is impossible that anything not be moved which yet has motion subjectively in itself. Hence Jerome, expounding the catholic faith: "the Son of God," he says, "suffered, not in seeming but truly."[4] And Augustine teaches the same in the *Enchiridion*, 40;[5] and the Decretal in the Clementines, *On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith*: "we confess," it says, "that the Son of God, subsisting eternally together with the Father, assumed in time in the virginal chamber, to the unity of his hypostasis or person, parts of our nature united together, from which he, existing in himself true God, would become true man (namely a human body and an intellective or rational soul, truly and of itself and essentially

informing the body itself); and that in this assumed nature the very Word of God, for the working of all salvation, not only willed to be fixed to the cross and to die on it, but also, the spirit already sent forth, suffered his side to be pierced with a lance."[6]

¶2 *122.25–122.26*

[122]Ecce primo univocacio[11] Christi cum fratribus propter[12] convenienciam[12] in natura specifica.

Behold, first, the univocation of Christ with his brothers, because of agreement in the nature of the species.[7]

¶3 *122.27–122.27*

[122]Ecce 2°. vera passio Iesu Christi.

Behold, second, the true passion of Jesus Christ.

¶4 *122.28–122.29*

[122]Et 3°. cum passus sit et mortuus, sequitur quod fuit homo pro illo triduo.

And third, since he suffered and died, it follows that he was man for the three days.

Notes

1. *Negatur consequencia quod …*: the *quod* clause is taken as the ground of the denial, not as the inference denied. The second confirmation (117.17–21) argued from the humanity's not having been to the Word's; Wyclif answers that positive predicates pass from the assumed form to the person, negations do not.
2. Isaac's name is "laughter": Gen 21:6, "God hath made a laughter for me". The mountain of the sacrifice is the temple mount, Moria (II Chron 3:1).
3. *Satis est quod humanitas … sic passa et occisa*: the verb is understood ("suffered … and was slain"), and *persona Verbi … semper salva* is taken as an ablative absolute. Read as a nominative, it would make the person of the Word the subject of *passa et occisa*, which Wyclif also holds (117.28–118.4).
4. The *Libellus fidei* of Pelagius, transmitted under Jerome's name as an exposition of the creed: *Passus est enim Dei Filius non putative, sed vere*, PL 45, 1717; also among Augustine's spurious sermons, PL 39, 2182 (*verified*).
5. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 40 (PL 40, 252), not on the passion itself but on the unity of person that grounds it: *ut idem ipse esset filius Dei qui filius hominis, et filius hominis qui filius Dei* (*verified*).
6. Clement V, *Fidei catholicae fundamento* (Council of Vienne), *Clem.* 1.1.1. *Ypostasis* (122.21) is the print's, with O, against A B C *ypostatice*; the decretal reads *ad unitatem suae hypostasis et personae* (Friedberg II, 1133), which supports the print. *Pro omni operanda salute*: Friedberg prints *pro omnium*; Wyclif's *pro omni* is kept as his. He also omits *in his omnibus, in quibus Deus Pater exsistit* and *passibile*, and has *seu persone* for *et personae* (*verified*).
7. *Univocacio*: O reads *unico͡*, perhaps *unicio*. *Propter convenienciam*: A *propter convenienciam specificam*; O *propter pm convenienciam* (*propriam* or *primam*).

Chapter 8

Part 1: Against Christ's identity of species, the first two objections

Harris pp. 123.0–127.4

¶1 123.0–123.0

[123][Obicit tripliciter contra ydemptitatem specificam Christi cum aliis, et dissolvit. Examination of three objections to the statement that Christ is man in the same sense of the word as other men: i.e. that Christ is of the same species as other men.]

[It objects in three ways against the identity of species of Christ with others, and resolves the objections.]

¶2 123.2–123.12

[123]Ex istis patet solucio argumentorum factorum communiter ad probandum quod Christus non sit univoce homo cum aliis. Primo per hoc, quod nichil reponitur in specie per aliquod sibi accidentale: sed humanitas Christi est sibi accidentalis: ergo non est in nova specie propter illam: sed ante incarnacionem non fuit eiusdem speciei nobiscum: ergo nec[1] post propter[2] adventiciam unionem. Confirmatur per locum a simili. Nam si homo de novo acquirat albedinem vel quamcumque formam aliam accidentaliter[3] inherentem, non ex hoc[4] est disparis speciei: ergo per idem nec Christus propter humanitatem tam adventiciam.

From these things the solution is clear of the arguments commonly made to prove "Christ is not univocally man with others." First, by this: nothing is placed in a species through something accidental to it: now the humanity of Christ is accidental to him: therefore he is not in a new species because of it: now before the incarnation he was not of the same species with us: therefore neither after, because of an adventitious union. This is confirmed by the topic from likeness. For if a man newly acquires whiteness, or any other form inhering accidentally, he is not by this of a different species: therefore, by the same token, neither is Christ, because of a humanity so adventitious.

¶3 123.13–123.21

[123]Quantum ad illud patet ex dictis quod falsum assumitur. Nam Verbum, quod prius erat super omnem speciem, per assumpcionem humanitatis factum est in nostra specie et 'sub lege.' Et quantum ad similitudinem[5] patet ex dictis racionis diversitas. Si enim per impossibile albedo vel alia forma inherens esset illud, quo subiectum esset aliquid vel aliud quam prius fuerat, (sicut[6] humanitate fit Verbum aliquid aliud quam prius fuerat),[6] procederet racio per locum a simili: sed antecedens est impossibile.

As to that, it is clear from what has been said that something false is assumed.[1] For the Word, who before was above every species, by the assumption of the humanity was made in our species and "under the law" (Gal 4:4). And as to the likeness, the difference of the reasoning is clear from what has been said. For if, per impossibile, whiteness or another inhering form were that by which the subject would be something, or other than it had been before (as by the humanity the Word becomes something other than he had been before), the argument would proceed by the topic from likeness: but the antecedent is impossible.

¶4 123.22–124.16

[123]Et si multiplicentur argumenta sophistica ad probandum quod, quicquid est Verbum, eternaliter fuit Verbum; patet ex dictis de formis solucio. Nam aliquid, quia aliqua [124]forma substancialis vel natura,[1] nunc est Verbum, quod non in primo instanti temporis erat Verbum. Non enim antequam 'Verbum caro factum est' 'in plenitudine temporis,' erat homo; et certum[2] est quod esse hominem est esse aliquid: ideo quando fiebat homo, fiebat aliquid,[3] quod prius non

And if sophistical arguments are multiplied to prove "whatever is the Word was eternally the Word", the solution is clear from what has been said about forms. For something, since it is some [124]substantial form or nature, is now the Word which was not the Word in the first instant of time.[2] For before "the Word was made flesh" (John 1:14) "in the fulness of time" (Gal 4:4), he was not man;[3] and it is certain that to be a man is to be something:

fuerat. Verumptamen omne suppositum, ypostasis, vel persona, que est, vel que[4] fuit, Verbum, eternaliter erat[5] Verbum. Sed absit ex isto concludere—ergo quicquid.[6] Aliud enim, sed[7] non alius, est Verbum post incarnacionem quam prefuit.[8] Et sic querenti—Quis est[9] nunc Filius Dei, qui non semper erat ?—Idem—dicitur[10]: quod nullus[11] est vel esse potest Filius Dei naturalis, nisi[12] qui absolute necessario semper erat. Sed querenti—Quid est Filius Dei, quod ante incarnacionem ipse non fuerat ?—dicitur quod— Natura humana sive humanitas; et illa est quiditas suppositi vel persone—.

so when he was becoming man, he was becoming something which he had not been before. Nevertheless every supposit, hypostasis, or person which is, or which was, the Word, was eternally the Word. But far be it to conclude from this, "therefore whatever".[4] For the Word is something other, but not someone other, after the incarnation than he was before. And so to one asking, "Who is now the Son of God who was not always?", "The same", the answer is: [meaning] that no one is or can be the natural Son of God except one who absolutely necessarily always was.[5] But to one asking, "What is the Son of God that he had not been before the incarnation?", the answer is: "Human nature, or humanity; and that is the quiddity of the supposit or person."

¶5 124.17–124.23

[124]Et patet solucio ad tales argucias—Omnis[13] persona, que est Verbum, eternaliter erat Verbum: sed quicquid iam est[14] Verbum est persona, que est Verbum: ergo, quicquid iam est Verbum,[15] eternaliter erat Verbum. Omnes quidem deducciones tales sophistice sanantur[16] per noticiam fallacie accidentis. Nam persone Verbi accidentalis est quiditas in genere, sicut substancie create accidentalis est qualitas.

And the solution is clear to such quibbles as: "Every person which is the Word was eternally the Word: now whatever is now the Word is a person which is the Word: therefore whatever is now the Word was eternally the Word." Indeed all such deductions, [made] sophistically, are cured by knowledge of the fallacy of accident.[6] For quiddity in a genus is accidental to the person of the Word, as quality is accidental to created substance.

¶6 124.24–124.29

[124]Et si 3°. sic arguatur—Hoc[17] Verbum in principio erat Verbum, et hoc Verbum est hec humanitas; ergo hec humanitas in principio erat Verbum—patet quod idem est ac si sic argueretur—In principio fuit, quod hoc est Verbum; et hoc Verbum est ille homo; ergo tunc fuit, quod ipsum est homo; sic enim significat humanitas simpliciter abstractive.

And if, third, it is argued thus: "This Word in the beginning was the Word (John 1:1), and this Word is this humanity; therefore this humanity in the beginning was the Word", it is clear that it is the same as if it were argued thus: "In the beginning it was [so] that this is the Word; and this Word is that man; therefore it was then [so] that it is man"; for so "humanity" signifies, without qualification, abstractively.[7]

¶7 124.30–125.23

[124]Et si 4°. sophista replicet per conversionem ab exclusivis aut exceptivis—Tantum hoc nunc est Verbum—demonstrando personam Verbi—et hoc eternaliter erat Verbum; [125]ergo nichil iam est Verbum, nisi quod eternaliter erat Verbum—constat quod antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Licet enim tantum hoc sit Verbum, non tamen tantum ista humanitas est Verbum: cum deitas,[1] que est aliud quam illa humanitas, est Verbum et[2] eternaliter erat Verbum. Et patet quod, licet tantum homo et tantum Deus sit Verbum, non tantum humanitas, nec nichil preter deitatem est Verbum. Nam aliud quam deitas et aliud quam humanitas est Verbum; sed nec alius nec aliud quam Deus vel homo est Verbum. Si enim tantum deitas esset Iesus, tunc Pater in divinis non esset aliqualiter[3] maior Iesu. Et constat quomodo exclusive ac exceptive sint suis universalibus adaptande; ut sic dicto—omnis Iesus est humanitas—[4] licet correspondenter dare istam[4] exclusivam— tantum

And if, fourth, the sophist rejoins by conversion from exclusives or exceptives, "Only this is now the Word" (pointing to the person of the Word) "and this was eternally the Word; [125]therefore nothing now is the Word except what was eternally the Word",[8] it is evident that the antecedent is true and the consequent false. For although only this is the Word, yet not only this humanity is the Word: since the Godhead, which is something other than that humanity, is the Word and was eternally the Word. And it is clear that, although only man and only God is the Word, not only the humanity is the Word, nor is nothing besides the Godhead the Word.[9] For something other than the Godhead and something other than the humanity is the Word; but neither someone other nor something other than God or man is the Word. For if only the Godhead were Jesus,

persona, que est humanitas, est Iesus—et proporcionaliter exceptivam et non conformissimam[5] sophisticacionem contingit habere de quolibet alio homine, qui per se est homo, sed adventicie natura corporea.[6] Unde quilibet nostrum in finali resurreccione erit aliud quam erat[7] in morte, quia alia natura; cum in resurreccione erit tam natura corporea quam natura incorporea; in morte autem dumtaxat natura incorporea. Sed non erit alius: ymo solummodo idem ipse, cum non potest esse nisi eadem persona.

then the Father, in divine things, would not in any way be greater than Jesus (John 14:28). And it is evident how exclusives and exceptives are to be fitted to their universals; so that, this being said, "every Jesus is a humanity", it is permitted correspondingly to give this exclusive, "only a person which is a humanity is Jesus", and proportionally the exceptive; and a not wholly conformable sophistry may be had about any other man, who is man of himself, but adventitiously by bodily nature.[10] Hence each of us in the final resurrection will be something other than he was in death, because another nature; since in the resurrection he will be both bodily nature and incorporeal nature, but in death only incorporeal nature.[11] But he will not be someone other: rather, solely the same self, since he cannot be other than the same person.

¶8 125.24–126.6

[125]Et illam methaphisicam intexuit[8] ille magnus philosophus sanctus Iob 19 ca°. quando dixit; 'in carne mea videbo Deum salvatorem meum, ego ipse, inquit, et non alius.' Unde Gregorius 18 Moralium ca°. 32. 'Quamvis Christus sit aliud ex Patre aliud ex matre,[9] non tamen est alius ex Patre alius ex virgine: sed ipse eternus ex Patre, temporaliter ex matre[9]; ipse,[10] qui fecit, factus[10]; ipse auctor operis, ipse opus auctoris; manens unus ex utraque et in[11] utraque natura[12]; nec naturarum[11] copulacione confusus, [126]nec naturarum distinccione geminatus.'[1] Ecce aliud sancti doctoris testimonium de[2] sentencia supradicta.[2] Et sic intelligendus est Augustinus in Dialogo ad Felicianum circa medium et alibi crebrius, quando dicit: 'quamvis enim aliud corpus, aliud animus, unus tamen atque idem homo et corpus dicitur et animus.'

And that great philosopher, holy Job, wove that metaphysics in, in chapter 19, when he said: "in my flesh I shall see God my saviour: I myself," he says, "and not another."[12] Hence Gregory, *Morals* 18, chapter 32: "Although Christ is something from the Father, something other from the mother, yet he is not someone from the Father, someone other from the virgin: but he himself is eternal from the Father, temporally from the mother; he himself who made, he himself who was made; he himself the author of the work, he himself the work of the author; remaining one from both and in both natures; neither confused by the coupling of the natures, [126]nor doubled by the distinction of the natures."[13] Behold another testimony of a holy doctor on the teaching so often stated.[14] And so Augustine is to be understood in the *Dialogue to Felicianus*, about the middle, and more often elsewhere, when he says: "For although the body is one thing, the soul another, yet one and the same man is called both body and soul."[15]

¶9 126.7–127.4

[126]2°. principaliter arguitur contra ydemptitatem specificam Christi cum aliis ex hoc quod[3] ipse solum per accidens et quilibet alius per se est homo. Sed patet ex dictis quod non sequitur. Cum illud accidens, quo Christus est homo formaliter, quod Apostolus vocat humanitacionem[4] et habitum,[4] sit eiusdem racionis cum formis, quibus confratres Christi sunt homines formaliter, et non est accidens simpliciter. Sed quia Christus est gigas gemine substancie, scilicet, deitas et humanitas, quarum inferior contingenter inest superiori; ideo dicitur[5] humanitas ad sensum expositum accidens Verbo Dei. Et si queritur[6] utrum Christus[7] sit per se homo, videtur michi quod sic. Nam cum 'Christus' dicit duas formas, scilicet deitatem et humanitatem,[8]

Second, as a main head, it is argued against the identity of species of Christ with others from this, that he is man only by accident, and anyone else of himself. But it is clear from what has been said that it does not follow; since that accident by which Christ is formally man, which the Apostle calls "humanation" and "habit", is of the same kind as the forms by which Christ's brothers are formally men, and is not an accident without qualification.[16] But because Christ is a giant of twofold substance, namely Godhead and humanity, of which the lower is contingently in the higher,[17] therefore the humanity, in the sense set out, is said to be an accident to the Word of God. And if it is asked whether Christ is of himself man, it

ydemptificatas[9] in eadem persona, et potest supponere simpliciter pro utraque: patet quod, intelligendo eum secundum humanitatem, ipse eque per se est homo sicut aliquod[10] individuum sui generis; cum eque vere causatur[11] ex partibus qualitativis et quiditativis consimilis racionis, et eque dependet a corpore et anima a specie et genere cum suis differenciis, sicut Petrus. Nec est color, si Christus sit per accidens homo quia secundum deitatem, quod non sit per se homo: quia[12] extra deitatem est humanitas Christi, que est per se homo,[12] cum de sua essencia sit universalis[13] humanitas. Et ita sicut duplici nativitate nascitur Verbum Dei, sic videtur michi quod duplici [127] racionalitate[1] satis equivoce est ipsum[2] racionale. Nam[2] quoad creatam substanciam causatur[3] ab humanitate et racionalitate[1] communi sicut alie creature: et hinc competit sibi primus modus predicandi per se ex 2°. posteriorum.

seems to me that he is. For since "Christ" signifies two forms, namely the Godhead and the humanity, identified in the same person, and can stand without qualification for either:[18] it is clear that, understanding him as to the humanity, he is as much of himself man as any individual of his kind; since he is as truly caused from qualitative and quidditative parts of like kind, and depends as much on body and soul, on species and genus with their differences, as Peter. Nor is there colour, if Christ is man by accident because [he is so] as to the Godhead, [for saying] that he is not man of himself:[19] for apart from the Godhead there is the humanity of Christ, which is of itself man, since universal humanity is of its essence. And so, as the Word of God is born by a twofold birth, so it seems to me that by a twofold [127]rationality he is, quite equivocally, rational. For as to the created substance he is caused by humanity and common rationality, like other creatures: and hence the first mode of predicating of itself, from the *Posterior Analytics* 2, belongs to him.[20]

Notes

1. *Falsum assumitur*: the logician's *assumere*, "take as a premiss" (the minor, *humanitas Christi est sibi accidentalis*, 123.5–6), not the assumption of the nature at 123.15.
2. *Aliquid, quia aliqua forma substancialis vel natura*: *forma* and *natura* are nominative, "since it is some substantial form or nature", the humanity. Read loosely as a cause ("by some form"), the sentence would say the Word became the Word by a form.
3. *In plenitudine temporis* is Wyclif's form; Gal 4:4 Vulgate *ubi venit plenitudo temporis*, DR "when the fulness of the time was come". The two phrases are joined as one quotation in the print's punctuation.
4. *Ergo quicquid* is the print's, with O. A B read *quicquam* without *ergo* ("far be it to conclude anything from this"), C *quod quitquam*. The print is kept: the point is that the universal *quicquid* does not follow from *omne suppositum*.
5. *Idem* (124.11) is the print's, with O; A B C read *eidem* ("to him the answer is"), which makes the sentence run parallel to *Sed querenti … dicitur quod* below. The print is kept. "The same" answers the question: the Son of God now is none other than the one who always was.
6. *Sophistice* is taken with *deducciones tales*, "made sophistically"; with *sanantur* it would make the cure sophistical. The fallacy of accident: what holds of the person does not hold of whatever is now the person by an accidental form.
7. *Simpliciter abstractive*: the abstract *humanitas*, taken without qualification, signifies the fact "that it is man"; so "this Word is this humanity" amounts to "this Word is that man", and the conclusion only says that what is now man was the Word in the beginning (John 1:1).
8. *Per conversionem ab exclusivis aut exceptivis*: the logicians' rule that an exclusive ("only A is B") converts to a universal with the terms exchanged ("every B is A"), and an exceptive ("nothing except A is B") likewise.
9. *Nec nichil preter deitatem est Verbum*: a double negative, kept: it is false that nothing besides the Godhead is the Word, since the humanity is the Word too.
10. *Non conformissimam* (125.16) is the print's; A B C omit *non* ("and a most conformable sophistry"); O's abbreviation (*ɔformissia*l) leaves its reading uncertain. The print is kept: in other men the case is like Christ's but not the same, since their bodily nature is adventitious to a man who is man of himself.
11. *Alia natura … natura corporea … natura incorporea* are taken as nominatives (he will be another nature); they could be ablatives ("by another nature", "by bodily nature"), as *adventicie natura corporea* is just above.
12. Job 19:26–27, Vulgate *in carne mea videbo Deum meum: quem visurus sum ego ipse … et non alius*; DR "in my flesh I shall see my God. Whom I myself shall see … and not another". Wyclif's *Deum salvatorem meum* is not the Vulgate's.
13. Gregory, *Moralia* XVIII.52.85, PL 76, 90B (old division c. 35; Wyclif's 32 matches neither), abridged (*verified*). 125.30 *ipse qui fecit ipse qui factus est*, with A B C and Gregory's text, against the print's *ipse, qui fecit, factus* (O).
14. *Sepe dicta*, with A B C O, against the print's *supradicta*: A B C read *de s͡cia sepe dicta*, O *de sm͡a sepe dicta*. The noun is Harris's expansion, *sentencia*, kept.
15. Vigilius of Thapsus, *Contra Felicianum Arianum*, among Augustine's works, c. 11, PL 42, 1166: *quamvis aliud animus, aliud corpus, unus tamen atque idem homo et corpus docetur et animus*; Wyclif inverts the pair and has *dicitur* (*verified*).

16. *Humanitacionem et habitum* (126.12) is the print's, with O; A B C read *humanitatem et hominem*. The Apostle's word is *habitus* (Phil 2:7, "in habit found as a man"), which supports the print.
17. *Gigas gemine substancie*: Ambrose's hymn *Intende qui regis Israel* (*Veni redemptor gentium*), *geminae gigas substantiae*, on Ps 18:6, "hath rejoiced as a giant to run the way" (PL 16, 1411; *verified*).
18. *Ydemptificatas* is Harris's emendation; every manuscript reads *ydemptitas*, and A B C add *que sunt* before it ("which are identity in the same person"). Neither reading construes well, so the print is kept. *Christus* (126.18) is the print's, with O; A B C read *Iesus*: the argument turns on the name *Christus* (126.19). *Supponere simpliciter* may be the logicians' simple supposition; rendered by the glossary's "without qualification".
19. *Color*: a plausible ground. The construal is: if Christ is man by accident when taken as to the Godhead, that gives no ground for denying that he is man of himself.
20. The first mode of *per se* predication (the predicate in the definition of the subject), Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I.4, 73a34–37; Wyclif's "2°" is not explained, perhaps a slip; Harris's index has *2 Post. Anal.* without a locus (*verified* for I.4).

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 124: *argucias—Omnis* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  - 125: *dicto—omnis* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  - 125: *Iesus—et* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference John i. 14. (124.3); reference 25 Job xlx- 26″27- (125.25); reference So Gregory (125.27); reference Augustinus (127.11).

Part 2: That the definitions of man fit Christ univocally

Harris pp. 127.5–130.7

¶1 127.5–128.8

[127]Et quoad diffiniciones hominum dico quod nunquam inventa est a philosophis aliqua probabilis diffinicio sive descripcio hominis, quin illa univoce conveniat Iesu nostro. Est enim animal racionale mortale ante passionem, sicut veteres describebant hominem integrum[4] secundum noticiam imperfectam, quam de ipso habuerant,[5] quos[4] sequitur Augustinus in De Qualitate[6] Anime ca°.[7]: est iterum racionalis substancia ex corpore et anima composita tam post resurreccionem quam ante; sicut Augustinus describit hominem perfectum 15°. De Trinitate ca°. 7°.: est tercio anima racionalis habens corpus ab instanti sue concepcionis et ulterius in eternum. Et sic loquitur Augustinus de homine ut[8] ad personam attinet, Ome. 19,[9] exponens illud Ioh. 5. 'Potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere, quia filius hominis est.' 'Ex virgine, inquit, Maria homo factus est filius hominis; sed hanc potestatem temporalem faciendi iudicium non haberet, nisi acciperet[10] et esset homo prius sine hac potestate. Sed ipse filius hominis, qui et Filius Dei: herendo[11] enim ad unitatem persone filius hominis[12] Filius[12] Dei facta est una persona eadem Filius Dei et filius hominis. Quid autem propter[13] quid habeat,[13] dinoscendum est. Filius hominis habet animam, habet corpus: Filius Dei, quod est Verbum Dei, habet animam,[14] tanquam anima habens corpus; et sicut anima habens corpus non facit duas personas sed unum hominem, sic[15] Verbum habens hominem[15] non facit duas personas sed unum Christum.' Et sequitur. 'Quid est homo? anima racionalis habens [128]corpus. Quid est Christus? Verbum Dei habens hominem.' Ex istis[1] patet quod supradicta sentencia est[1] beati Augustini et Hugonis de Sancto Victore cum aliis; scilicet, quod omnis homo est anima vel spiritus habens corpus. Et

And as to the definitions of man, I say that the philosophers never found any reputable definition or definition[1] of man that does not belong univocally to our Jesus. For he is a rational mortal animal before the passion, as the ancients defined the whole man according to the imperfect knowledge which they had had of him, and Augustine follows them in *De quantitate animae*, chapter —.[2] Again, he is a rational substance composed of body and soul, after the resurrection as much as before; as Augustine defines the perfect man in *De Trinitate* 15, chapter 7.[3] Third, he is a rational soul having a body from the instant of its conception and onward for ever. And so Augustine speaks of man as it pertains to the person, Homily 19, expounding that of John 5:27: "He hath given him power to do judgment, because he is the Son of man." "Of the virgin Mary," he says, "the Son of man was made man; but he would not have this temporal power of doing judgment unless he received it and were first a man without this power. But he himself is the Son of man who is also the Son of God: for by the Son of man's cleaving to the Son of God in unity of person,[4] one and the same person was made Son of God and Son of man. But what he has on account of what must be discerned. The Son of man has a soul, has a body: the Son of God, who is the Word of God, has a soul,[5] as the soul has a body; and as the soul having a body does not make two persons but one man, so the Word having man does not make two persons but one Christ." And it goes on: "What is man? A rational soul having a [128]body. What is Christ? The Word of God having man." From these it is clear that the teaching given

credo quod non est possibile hominem completum esse, nisi habeat tempore suo corpus: quia nisi assit corpus organicum, anima non creatur. Unde et Christus habuit corpus in triduo.

above is that of blessed Augustine and of Hugh of St Victor with others;[6] namely, that every man is a soul or spirit having a body. And I believe that it is not possible for a man to be complete unless he has a body in his time: for unless an organic body is present, the soul is not created. Hence Christ too had a body in the three days.

¶2 128.9–129.12

[128]Quod si 4°. volumus[2] describere hominem in sua communitate maxima, patet quod Christus fuit univoce homo cum aliis: cum hec descripcio hominis communissima sit superior ad descripcionem triplicem supradictam. Pro quo notandus est Lincolniensis in suo Exameron de opere sexte diei, qui post exposicionem huius —'Faciamus[3] hominem ad ymaginem et similitudinem nostram'—sic[3] scribit: 'Quid autem sit homo, ex hic cognitis et auditis diffiniamus: non[4] enim egemus mutuari[4] diffiniciones alienas. 'Homo, inquit, est creatura racionalis, facta ad ymaginem conditoris.'[5] Unde exponens illud Gen. 2°. 'spiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vite,' ita scribit: 'Deus verbo[6] beneplaciti[7] spiraculum vite id est, animam racionalem formavit, et[7] in unitatem persone corpori formando infudit.' Et sequitur: 'per hoc, quod "homo factus est in animam viventem," notatur quod homo interior est homo, et corrupto homine exteriori nichilo minus manet veritas et personalitas uniuscuiusque hominis in subsistencia hominis interioris; quod ex verbis Domini satis insinuatur, cum dicit Matt. 22°. "Ego sum Deus Abraham, Deus Ysaac, et Deus Iacob: non est Deus mortuorum sed vivencium."' Hec Lincolniensis. Quamvis enim Christus sit Deus mortuorum prima morte, non tamen est Deus obiective beatificans mortuos secunda morte. Et hoc sonat theos in uno sensu. Cum autem Deus tempore Moysi particulariter dixit se esse Deum illorum patriarcharum [129]non solum pro lapso tempore cum hodie non daret Moysi evidenciam ad credendum Deum tunc velle iuvare semen eorum; non mirum si isto argumento Salvator imposuit silencium Saduceis de negacione resurreccionis mortuorum. Cum enim ipsi perpetuo vixerant in spiritu, nec desiderium naturale ad naturam corpoream extingui poterat[1]; sequitur quod sancti patriarche non ab hoc perpetuo finaliter sint frustrandi, licet secundum quid mortui sint ad tempus. Alii autem presciti mortui sunt simpliciter morte perpetua; et ista est exposicio beati Augustini Ome. 43. super illud Ioh. 8: 'Si quis sermonem meum servaverit, mortem non gustabit in eternum.'

But if, fourth, we wish to define man in his widest commonness, it is clear that Christ was univocally man with the others: since this most common definition of man is superior to the threefold definition given above. For this, Lincoln is to be noted in his *Hexaemeron*, on the work of the sixth day, who after the exposition of this — "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gen 1:26) — writes thus: "But what man is, let us define from what has been learned and heard here: for we have no need to borrow alien definitions. 'Man,' he says, 'is a rational creature, made to the image of the creator.'" Hence, expounding that of Gen 2:7, "breathed into his face the breath of life", he writes thus: "God by the word of his good pleasure formed the breath of life, that is, the rational soul, and poured it into the body he was forming, into unity of person." And it goes on: "By this, that 'man became a living soul', it is signified that the inner man is man, and when the outer man is corrupted the truth and personality of each man nonetheless remains in the subsistence of the inner man; which is sufficiently implied by the words of the Lord when he says, Matt 22:32, 'I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob: he is not the God of the dead but of the living.'" Thus Lincoln.[7] For although Christ is God of the dead by the first death, he is not God objectively beatifying the dead by the second death. And this is what *theos* means in one sense. And since God in the time of Moses said specifically that he was the God of those patriarchs [129]not only for time past — since [so] he would not that day give Moses evidence for believing that God then willed to help their seed —, no wonder if by this argument the Saviour imposed silence on the Sadducees about their denial of the resurrection of the dead.[8] For since they lived on perpetually in spirit, and the natural desire for bodily nature could not be extinguished, it follows that the holy patriarchs are not to be frustrated of this finally for ever, although they are dead in a certain respect for a time. But the others, the foreknown,[9] are dead without qualification by perpetual death; and this is the exposition of blessed Augustine, Homily 43, on that of John 8: "If any man keep my word, he shall not taste death for ever."[10]

¶3 129.13–129.26

[129]Nec est negandum a sic dicentibus quin angeli sint homines, iuxta testimonium scripturarum. Quod[2] si obicitur scripturam dicere[2] angelos esse viros, et per consequens pari auctoritate concedendum esset fore distinccionem sexuum angelorum. Sed sic arguens non recolit quod 'vir' notat etatem, formam, sexum,[3] probitatem. Concedendum est ergo sine distinccione sexuum omnem creaturam racionalem virentem virtutibus virum esse. Unde Ierem.[4] 31. dicitur significanter de beata virgine involvendo[5] Christum duplici matricula, 'femina circumdabit virum'; non quod tunc fuit vir forma corporis vel etate, sed quia omni genere carismatum tunc pollebat[6]; vel quia[7] boni angeli sic virtutibus semper virent,[8] non mirum[9] si[9] scriptura sine implicacione[10] distinccionis sexuum verissime tales angelos vocet 'viros.'

Nor is it to be denied by those who speak thus that angels are men, according to the testimony of the scriptures. And if it is objected that scripture says angels are "men" (*viri*), and consequently by equal authority it would have to be granted that there is a distinction of sexes among angels: but one who argues so does not remember that "man" (*vir*) signifies age, form, sex, probity.[11] It is to be granted, therefore, that without distinction of sexes every rational creature flourishing in virtues is a "man". Hence in Jeremiah 31:22 it is said significantly of the blessed virgin, enfolding Christ in a twofold womb, "A woman shall compass a man"; not that he was then a man in bodily form or in age, but because he then abounded in every kind of charisms;[12] or, since the good angels thus always live in virtues,[13] no wonder if scripture, without implying a distinction of sexes, most truly calls such angels "men".

¶4 129.27–130.7

[129]Sed ulterius non est negandum quin Christus habet racionem equivocam individuantem, secundum quam est Iesus, que non potest alteri individuo convenire. Aliter enim non esset essenciale principium generis[11] Christiani, nisi in eo quod esset proprietatum collacio addita nature specifice per [130]quam individualiter a singulis aliis distinguitur: ut dicit Anselmus in De Incarnacione 7°., 'Quis alius, queso, est Deus et homo, et[1] ex illis principiis individuantibus temporaliter procreatus,[2] ex quibus efficitur noster Iesus?' Sed[3] procul hoc ad inferendum[3] diversitatem specificam, quia per idem omnia que individualiter distinguuntur differrent[4] specifice.

But further, it is not to be denied that Christ has an equivocal individuating account, according to which he is Jesus, which cannot belong to another individual. For otherwise there would be no essential principle of the Christian kind, except in this, that there would be a collection of properties added to the nature of the species, through [130]which he is individually distinguished from each of the others;[14] as Anselm says in *De incarnatione* 7: "Who else, I ask, is God and man, and procreated in time from those individuating principles from which our Jesus is made?"[15] But this is far from inferring diversity of species, since by the same token all things that are individually distinguished would differ in species.

Notes

1. *Diffinicio sive descripcio*: both are "definition" (the glossary); the pair is the strict definition and the descriptive one. *Probabilis*: worthy of credence, "reputable". Below, *describere* is "define".
2. *Quantitate*, with A B C and the title of Augustine's work, against the print's *Qualitate* (A B C are one recension, but the source agrees with them). The chapter number is lacking in all the manuscripts (127.11 n. 7). The definition "rational mortal animal" is Augustine's example of a perfect definition in *De quantitate animae* 25.47, PL 32, 1062: *homo est animal mortale rationale … omne animal rationale mortale homo est* (*verified*).
3. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV.7.11, "man is a rational substance consisting of soul and body" (PL 42, 1065, *Homo est substantia rationalis constans ex anima et corpore*; *verified*). The same chapter gives the first definition too, *Homo est enim, sicut veteres definierunt, animal rationale mortale*, behind Wyclif's *sicut veteres describebant.*
4. *Filio Dei*, with A B C (*filio … filio*), against the print's *Filius Dei* (127.24), which leaves *herendo* "cleaving" with nothing to cleave to; Augustine reads *Haerendo enim ad unitatem personae filius hominis Filio Dei* (PL 35, 1553), which supports A B C. A B C's first *filio* is not followed. The homily is Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 19.15 (A B C "9"; PL 35, 1552–1553; *verified*).
5. The print and the manuscripts read *animam* "a soul" (127.27); Harris asks whether *hominem* "man" should be read, as the comparison and the closing "the Word of God having man" require. Translated as printed. Augustine reads *Filius Dei, quod est Verbum Dei, habet hominem, tanquam anima corpus* (*In Ioh.* 19.15, PL 35, 1553), and Harris's Notes (to 127.27) say so: *Since the text was printed I have found that hominem is the word in Aug.* (*verified*).
6. Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis* II.1.11, PL 176, 406A–411A, teaches it: the rational spirit is properly the person, and the body joined to it is added into the person (*Anima quippe in quantum est spiritus rationalis, ex se et per se habet esse personam*, 409B; *verified*). The formula "a rational soul having a body" is Augustine's (*In Ioh.* 19.15), not Hugh's. *Sentencia*: the position taught (CONTEXTUAL row, first sense).

7. Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, *Hexaemeron*, on the sixth day; the wording not checked, as Dales–Gieben is not in hand and Harris's index gives only *128. Exameron*
. Gen 2:7: Wyclif's *spiravit* for the Vulgate's *inspiravit* (DR "breathed into"); "man became a living soul" is the same verse. Matt 22:32: DR "I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob? He is not the God of the dead but of the living"; the English follows Wyclif's Latin, which lacks the Vulgate's *et* before *Deus Isaac*.
8. *Obiective beatificans*: God as the object whose possession makes the blessed blessed; that is the "one sense" of *theos* meant. *Cum hodie non daret* gives the reason the words cannot be about time past only: so understood, they would give Moses that day no ground to expect help for the patriarchs' seed (Exod 3:6). The silencing is Matt 22:34, "he had silenced the Sadducees".
9. *Presciti*: Wyclif's term for those whom God foreknows will be damned; not "the reprobate".
10. Wyclif's *mortem non gustabit* is the wording of John 8:52 (DR "he shall not taste death for ever"), where the Jews repeat the saying of 8:51 (*mortem non videbit*, "he shall not see death"). Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 43.10–11, PL 35, 1709–1710, where the death not seen is *mortem secundam, mortem aeternam* (*verified*).
11. Latin has two words that English renders "man": *homo* (the species) and *vir* (the male). Quotation marks mark *vir*; Wyclif plays on *vir*, *virens* "flourishing" and *virtus* "virtue".
12. *Duplici matricula*: *matricula*, diminutive of *matrix* "womb". *Carismata*: gifts (CONTEXTUAL row, first sense). The prophet is Jeremiah (Jer 31:22), as the print has it; A B C read *Ezech.*
13. *Vivunt* "live", with A B C O (A B C *vivunt super*, O *semper vivunt*), against the print's *virent* "flourish" (129.25), which Harris restored from *virentem* above (129.20) against every manuscript. The manuscripts' reading construes, so it is followed, at the cost of the play on *vir*.
14. *Racio*: "account", the species-sense (*racio speciei*), not the row's "aspect" (against *substancia*). *Collacio proprietatum*: the "collection of properties" that individuates, not the row's "conferral". Possibly the subject of *esset* is Christ: "he would not be the essential principle of the Christian kind". A B C read *ergo* for *generis* (129.30).
15. Anselm, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi* (Wyclif's "c. 7"), c. 11 in Schmitt (II, 29.6–9; PL 158, 278D–279A, Migne's c. VI): *personam designamus, quae cum natura collectionem habet proprietatum, quibus homo communis fit singulus et ab aliis singulis distinguitur*. The question *Quis alius … procreatus* is Wyclif's, built on it, not Anselm's words (*verified*). A B C omit *procreatus*.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Augustinus (127.11); reference Gen. i. 26. (128.15).

Part 3: Whether Christ is univocally a person with other men

Harris pp. 130.8–134.3

¶1 130.8–132.9

[130]Tercio principaliter arguitur quod Christus non sit univoce homo cum aliis eo quod non est univoce cum alio homine individuum vel persona. Nam solum personalitate[5] eterna est persona[6]; et illa in nullo univoce[7] convenit cum personalitate creata: ergo Christus non est univoce persona cum alia creatura. Maior patet ex hoc quod aliter, sicut dixit Nestorius, esset in ipso[8] duplicitas personarum, quia una personalitas eterna et alia temporalis: nec[9] dubium quin, si multiplicantur raciones personales multiplicabuntur et persone; quia unius persone una tantum est racio personalis.[10] Et patet minor[11] argumenti ex hoc quod non est maior[11] conveniencia, imo tanta differencia inter personalitatem eternam et quamlibet aliam temporalem sicut[12] et inter essenciam eternam et quamlibet aliam temporalem[12]: sed quelibet essencia eterna[13] non convenit eciam in esse univoco cum alia temporali: ergo per idem nec personalitas. Hic videtur michi probabile quod personalitas Christi sit equivoca vel analogica[14] cum personalitate cuiuscunque alterius fratris sui; et tamen conveniunt summe univoce in[15] specie vel natura. Ideo non sequitur, si Christus non sit univoce[15] cum alio homine individuum vel persona, quod exinde non sit cum isto univoce species vel natura: quia notum est quod univocacio in superiori non arguit univocacionem in inferiori; nec equivocacio inferioris arguit [131]equivocacionem

Third, as a main head, it is argued that Christ is not univocally man with the others, because he is not univocally an individual or person with another man. For he is a person only by the eternal personality; and that agrees in nothing univocally with created personality: therefore Christ is not univocally a person with another creature. The major is clear from this, that otherwise, as Nestorius said, there would be in him a doubleness of persons, since one personality [would be] eternal and the other temporal: nor is there doubt that, if personal accounts are multiplied, persons too will be multiplied; since of one person there is only one personal account.[1] And the minor of the argument is clear from this, that there is no greater agreement, indeed as great a difference, between the eternal personality and any other, temporal one as also between the eternal essence and any other, temporal one:[2] now any eternal essence does not agree even in univocal being with another, temporal one: therefore by the same token neither does personality. Here it seems probable to me that Christ's personality is equivocal or analogical with the personality of any other brother of his; and yet they agree supremely univocally in species or nature. So it does not follow, if Christ is not univocally an individual or person with another man, that he is not therefore univocally species or

communiorum,[1] ut evidet in exemplo.[2] Nam omnia creata per se[3] in genere diverso[4] per differencias oppositas univocantur in genere et non citra; ut substancia et accidens univocantur quodammodo in analogo transcendente, homo et asinus in genere animalis, et ita de aliis: ydiotes[5] eciam et Hercules equivocantur in signo hominis, et tamen univocantur in genere corporis sive[6] substancie: correspondenter Iesus et Petrus equivocantur in signo[7] personalitatis et tamen univocantur in specie hominis, et in quolibet creato genere plus communi: quia correspondenter, ut aliquid est communius, magis[8] univocat; et ut particularius, sic et minus: in tantum quod persona vel individuum non potest univocare secum personam aliam; ut persona Verbi non potest assumere quamlibet personam hominis, sicut nec aliquam, quia tunc persona esset summe communicabilis. Univocacio enim realis de qua nunc[9] [est] sermo, est quando aliqua secundum eandem racionem communicant vel conveniunt in communi; ut quelibet persona hominis est eadem communis species que est homo sub illa communi racione —creatura racionalis ad ymaginem Dei facta—persona autem hominis equivoce communicatur naturis[10] oppositis, cum alia sit racio vel individuandi condicio, que est hoc corpus, et alia racio vel individuandi condicio, que est hic spiritus. Et sic intelligunt illi qui dicunt personam descriptive esse[11] naturam racionalem[11] incommunicabilis[12] essencie vel[12] existencie. Nec[13] est negandum quin sub eisdem signis licet equivoce analogicatur tam increata personalitas quam creata; ut quelibet persona divina est racionalis nature individua substancia, et quelibet persona hominis est raciocionalis nature[14] individua substancia; sed nature[14] sunt multum equivoce tam racionales quam essencie[15] vel nature: [132]Petrus eciam est multum equivoce substancia vel individuum respectu persone alterius increate. Sed utrobique est racio creata exemplata analogice in racione superiori eiusdem nominis increata. Ideo laboraverunt priores doctores ad habendum in suis descripcionibus nomina significancia simul licet equivoce tam exemplaria eterna quam eciam exemplata; ut veritas, iusticia, liberum arbitrium; et persona analogicatur[1] secundum Anselmum[2] et Boecium sub istis nominibus.

nature with him: for it is known that univocation in the higher does not argue univocation in the lower; nor does equivocation of the lower argue [131]equivocation of the more common, as is evident in an example. For all created things that are of themselves in a genus divided[3] by opposite differences are univocal in the genus and not below it; as substance and accident are univocal in a certain way in a transcendent analogue, man and ass in the genus of animal, and so of the others: an image[4] and Hercules, too, are equivocal in the sign "man", and yet are univocal in the genus of body or substance: correspondingly Jesus and Peter are equivocal in the sign of personality and yet are univocal in the species of man, and in any created genus more common: since correspondingly, the more common something is, the more it makes univocal; and the more particular, so much the less: so much so that a person or individual cannot make another person univocal with itself; as the person of the Word cannot assume every person of a man, as it cannot any, since then the person would be supremely communicable. For real univocation, of which the discussion now is, is when some things communicate or agree according to the same account in something common; as each person of a man is the same common species that is man, under that common account — "a rational creature made to the image of God" —; but the person of a man is communicated equivocally to opposite natures, since one is the account or individuating condition which is this body, and another the account or individuating condition which is this spirit. And so those understand it who say that a person, by way of definition, is a rational nature of incommunicable essence or existence.[5] Nor is it to be denied that under the same signs, although equivocally, both increate and created personality are said analogically; as each divine person is an individual substance of rational nature, and each person of a man is an individual substance of rational nature;[6] but the natures are very equivocally both rational and essences or natures: [132]Peter too is very equivocally a substance or individual with respect to another, increate person. But on both sides there is a created account exemplified analogically in the higher, increate account of the same name. So the earlier doctors laboured to have in their definitions names signifying at once, though equivocally, both the eternal exemplars and the things exemplified; as truth, justice, free choice; and person is said analogically, according to Anselm and Boethius, under those names.[7]

¶2 132.10–132.12

[132]Sed obicitur primo per hoc quod Christus est individuum speciei humane, et preter hoc est individuum nature divine: ergo est duplex individuum sicut[3] est duplex[3] natura.[4]

But first it is objected, by appeal to this, that Christ is an individual of the human species, and besides this is an individual of the divine nature: therefore he is a twofold individual, as there is a twofold nature.

¶3 132.13–132.18

[132]Hic dicitur negando consequenciam sicut non sequitur, si Christus sit Filius Dei et filius hominis, quod sit duplex filius; idem enim est individuum nature humane et nature divine, sed per accidens individuum nature humane, quia secundum naturam assumptam, per se autem individuum, persona, vel suppositum nature divine.

Here the answer is: by denying the inference, as it does not follow, if Christ is the Son of God and the Son of man, that he is a twofold son; for the same is the individual of the human nature and of the divine nature, but an individual of the human nature by accident, since [it is] as to the assumed nature, but of itself the individual, person, or supposit of the divine nature.

¶4 132.19–132.23

[132]2°. obicitur per hoc quod universale et singulare dicuntur ad aliquid et per consequens sunt simul natura: sed Christus solum temporaliter est universale: ergo solum temporaliter est singulare; et per consequens aliqua individuatio solum temporaliter inest Christo.

Second, it is objected, by appeal to this, that universal and singular are said relatively and consequently are simultaneous by nature:[8] now Christ is universal only temporally: therefore he is singular only temporally; and consequently some individuation is in Christ only temporally.

¶5 132.24–133.5

[132]Hic conceditur prima conclusio. Nam singulare et[5] universale sunt res secunde intencionis que sese mutuo relative respiciunt ita, quod singulare, ut[6] sic, sit individuum vel suppositum speciei. Ideo nulla persona divina est ad illum sensum[7] quoad deitatem universalis vel singularis, ut patet in De Questionibus Veteris et Nove Legis. Questione 122; sed est[8] individuum suppositum vel persona, Cum ista sint nomina significancia analogice extra genus, ut patet de nomine individui in[9] descripcione Boecii De Persona. Nec est vis[10] quare philosophi sic varie utuntur [133]nominibus. Sicut ergo Christus solum ex tempore est singularis, sic quod singularitas a posteriori accidit sue[1] individuitati vel personalitati, sicut accidit sibi quod sit persona speciei humane: ideo individuitas vel personalitas in Christo non est singularitas que supponitur speciei.

Here the first conclusion is granted. For singular and universal are things of second intention which regard one another relatively, in such a way that the singular, as such, is an individual or supposit of a species. So no divine person is in that sense, as to the Godhead, universal or singular, as is clear in *De quaestionibus Veteris et Novae Legis*, question 122;[9] but he is an individual, supposit or person, since these are names signifying analogically outside the genus, as is clear of the name "individual" in Boethius's definition, *De persona*. Nor is there any weight in why the philosophers use the [133]names so variously. As, therefore, Christ is singular only from time, so that singularity befalls his individuality or personality a posteriori, as it befalls him that he is a person of the human species: so individuality or personality in Christ is not the singularity that stands as supposit under the species.[10]

¶6 133.6–133.12

[133]3°. instatur per hoc quod Christus, quia iste homo, vel in quantum iste homo, est suppositum, individuum vel[2] persona; ergo ista singularis humanitas est causa personalitatis in Christo, sicut est in suis fratribus, et non est causa personalitatis eterne: ergo est causa personalitatis temporalis: ergo in Christo est duplex personalitas, sicut[3] duplex nativitas.

Third, it is objected, by appeal to this, that Christ, because [he is] this man, or insofar as [he is] this man, is a supposit, individual or person; therefore this singular humanity is the cause of personality in Christ, as it is in his brothers, and it is not the cause of the eternal personality: therefore it is the cause of a temporal personality: therefore in Christ there is a twofold personality, as [there is] a twofold birth.

¶7 133.13–133.28

[133]Hic negatur causalis assumpta eo quod significat circumstanciam cause.[4] Conceditur tamen de Christo vel aliis quod, quia est iste

Here the causal [proposition] assumed is denied,[11] because it signifies the circumstance of a cause. It is granted, however, of Christ or of the others

homo, ideo est persona hominis: sed non, quia persona hominis, ideo est persona; cum habet personalitatem nature superioris quam est eius[5] humanitas, quod nulli alii homini potest competere; cum ipse solus[6] sit homo per accidens et cum hoc summe univoce. Est autem in Christi duplex nativitas, una eterna secundum naturam divinam, que eternaliter absolute necessario personaliter nascitur et est natus; et illi accidit alia temporalis non interpellatim[7] sed simul adveniens, secundum quam fuit natura alia et noviter persona hominis. Non enim sequitur —Christus solum temporaliter vel noviter est persona, individuum, vel suppositum humanum: ergo[8] sic est suppositum—cum[8] arguitur ab inferiori ad suum superius cum impedimento habente vim negacionis.

that, because he is this man, therefore he is a person of a man: but not that, because [he is] a person of a man, therefore he is a person; since he has the personality of a nature higher than his humanity is, which can belong to no other man; since he alone is man by accident and with this supremely univocally.[12] And there is in Christ a twofold birth, one eternal as to the divine nature, which eternally, absolutely, necessarily, personally is born and has been born; and to it there befalls another, temporal, not at an interval but coming at once,[13] according to which he was another nature and newly a person of a man. For it does not follow — "Christ only temporally or newly is a person, individual, or human supposit: therefore he is so a supposit" — since it is argued from the lower to its higher with an impediment having the force of negation.[14]

¶8 133.29–134.3

[133]4°. obicitur per hoc quod Christus recenter est tam corpus quam anima, et utrumque illorum est suppositum et persona: ergo Christus recenter est suppositum vel persona: sic[9] enim Christus[9] est corpus et spiritus creatus: [134]sed utrumque illorum est per se individuum et persona: ergo Christus est persona creata: et cum eciam sit persona increata, sequitur quod duplex personalitas inest Christo.

Fourth, it is objected, by appeal to this, that Christ recently is both body and soul, and each of them is a supposit and a person: therefore Christ recently is a supposit or person: for thus Christ is body and created spirit: [134]now each of those is of itself an individual and person: therefore Christ is a created person: and since he is also an increate person, it follows that a twofold personality is in Christ.

Notes

1. *Racio personalis*: "personal account"; *racio* through this chunk is the account (the species-sense of *racio speciei*), not the row's "aspect" (against *substancia*). A B C read *personalitas* for *personalitate* and add *Christi* (130.10–11): "only the eternal personality is Christ's person".
2. The comparison *sicut et … temporalem* (130.20–21) is in O alone (A B C omit it), and O omits *argumenti … maior* (130.18–19); the print joins the two.
3. *Diviso* "divided", with O, against the print's *diverso* "diverse" (131.2). With *diverso* the sentence says that things in a diverse genus are univocal in the genus; the example (man and ass in the genus animal) needs one genus divided by opposite differences.
4. *Ydolum* "an image", with A B O (C *ydioles*), against the print's *ydiotes* "the unlettered man" (131.6). The real man and the image of a man are the stock case of things equivocal in a name (Aristotle, *Categories* 1, 1a1–3, in Boethius's Latin *ut animal, homo et quod pingitur*, PL 64, 163C; *verified*), and they are one in genus as bodies; cf. *ydolum vel aliud artificiale* (138.22).
5. The definition by "incommunicable existence" is Richard of St Victor's, *De Trinitate* IV.22, PL 196, 945C–D, said there of the divine person only (*persona divina sit divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia*); IV.23, 945D–946A, sets it beside Boethius (*rationalis naturae individua existentia* for the uncreated person). The form with "rational nature" is not Richard's wording (*verified*). *Descriptive*: "by way of definition" (from *descripcio*). O reads *naturalem racionalem* and omits *essencie vel.*
6. Boethius's definition of person, "an individual substance of rational nature", *Contra Eutychen* 3, PL 64, 1343C–D: *Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia* (*verified*).
7. Anselm, *De veritate* and *De libertate arbitrii*, whose definitions of truth, justice and free choice hold of God and creature: truth is *rectitudo mente sola perceptibilis* (*De veritate* 11, Schmitt I, 191), justice *rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata* (12, I, 194), and the definition of free choice *in utrisque secundum hoc nomen eadem debet esse*, for God and the good angels and for men (*De libertate arbitrii* 1, I, 208; *verified*). *Anselmum*: the print, with O (*añs & boym*); A B C *Augustinum.*
8. *Dicuntur ad aliquid*: they are relatives, in the category of relation; relatives are "simultaneous by nature" (Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 7b15, in Boethius's Latin *Videntur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura*, PL 64, 228B; *verified*).
9. Pseudo-Augustine (Ambrosiaster), *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, q. 122, PL 35, 2367, where God is called one but not *solitarius*; q. 87, PL 35, 2280, has the word, *Unus quidem est Deus, sed non singularis est* (*verified*). "Boethius's definition, *De persona*" is the same *Contra Eutychen* 3, PL 64, 1343C–D, printed in Migne as *De persona et duabus naturis*; *individua* is in the definition because there is person only *in singularibus … atque in individuis* (*verified*).
10. *Prima conclusio*: the objection's first inference, "he is singular only temporally". *Nec est vis*: "it carries no weight". *Supponitur speciei*: stands as supposit under the species, not the formula "it is supposed".

11. *Causalis assumpta*: the causal proposition the objection took as premiss ("because he is this man, he is a person"); *assumpta* in the logician's sense, not the assumption of the nature. O omits *cause*.
12. *Eius humanitas*: the print, with A B C; O reads *communis*, "higher than the common humanity" (133.17). A B C read *solum* for *solus* (133.18).
13. *Non interpellatim* (A B C *interpolatim*): not after an interval; the temporal birth supervenes on the eternal without a gap. *In Christi* (133.19): the print's genitive after *in*, rendered "in Christ".
14. The impediment is the exclusive *solum* "only", which contains a negation; with it the step from the lower term ("human supposit") to the higher ("supposit") fails. A B C read *ergo sic* (A) or *ergo sit* (B C) *suppositum*.

Part 4: Christ a person from the Godhead; the matter of his conception

Harris pp. 134.4–138.22

¶1 134.4–135.15

[134]Hic dicitur quod antecedens primi argumenti est verum et consequens impossibile. Nec est verum quod aliqua creatura preter Christum est primo per se suppositum vel persona; quia in omni persona creata proprietates accidentales individuant ipsam; et sic idem est sibi personalitas et singularitas que ad ipsam consequitur, sicut passio ad subiectum: Christus autem solum personatur per se primo ex[1] divinitate,[1] et non ex proprietatibus accidentalibus ut alia singularia. Ideo non mirum, si sua personalitas recipit singularitates personarum,[2] ut sibi accidencia, et non ut personalitates. Due ergo nature create eciam in sancto sabato sunt simul utraque eadem persona Verbi. Si ergo persona esset per se superius ad istam naturam, sicut aliquid est ad hominem, tunc sequeretur—si[3] Christus est hoc singulare creatum, tunc[4] est ista persona creata—; sicut sequitur, quod Christus[5] sit aliquid creatum,[4] ex hoc quod est natura creata; et tunc foret duplex persona creata, sicut est duplex natura creata, quarum utraque est persona. Modo[6] autem ille ambe nature, et utraque illarum, sunt eciam pro triduo separate idem individuum, suppositum, et persona: licet enim sint due essencie singulares, tamen sunt unita individua substancia nature humane. Et sophista satis colorate concederet[7] quod illa persona, demonstrando humanitatem Christi, est persona et natura eterna. Ideo in talibus oportet ultra pronomina significancia pure essencias explicare res de quibus loquitur per terminos specificantes formas.* Quod[8] si arguitur eo ipso quo ponitur aliqua[9] per se [135] et completa causa causabilis, sequitur illud causabile: sed natura singularis in Christo cum communi creata substancia sufficit per se et complete causare creatum suppositum: ergo illis positis et unitis, sicut est in Christo, sequitur quod oportet ponere creatam personam ex illis principiis resultantem: nam eiusdem speciei specialissime est creata natura atque substancia in Christo, cuius est in quolibet fratre suo. Sicut ergo Christus est univoce cum Petro racionalis nature individua substancia, sic cum eo univoce est persona: cui enim univocatur diffinicio eciam competit univoce diffinitum. Confirmatur ex hoc

Here the answer is that the antecedent of the first argument is true and the consequent impossible.[1] Nor is it true that any creature besides Christ is first and of itself a supposit or person; since in every created person accidental properties individuate it; and so personality and the singularity which follows on it are the same for it, as an attribute [follows] on its subject: but Christ is made a person, first and of itself, only from the divinity, and not from accidental properties like other singulars. So no wonder if his personality receives the singularities of persons as accidents to it, and not as personalities.[2] Therefore the two created natures, even on the holy Sabbath, are, each of them together, the same person of the Word.[3] If, therefore, person were of itself superior to this nature, as something is to man, then it would follow — "if Christ is this created singular, then he is this created person" —; as it follows that Christ is something created from the fact that he is a created nature; and then there would be a twofold created person, as there is a twofold created nature, each of which is a person. But as it is, both those natures, and each of them, are, even when separated for the three days, the same individual, supposit, and person: for although they are two singular essences, yet they are a united individual substance of human nature. And a sophist would grant, with colour enough, that that person — pointing to Christ's humanity — is a person and an eternal nature. So in such matters one must, beyond pronouns signifying pure essences, make explicit the things one speaks of by terms specifying the forms. But if it is argued:[4] by the very fact that some cause, of itself and complete, of a causable thing is posited, [135]that causable thing follows: now the singular nature in Christ, with the common created substance, suffices of itself and completely to cause a created supposit: therefore, those being posited and united, as is the case in Christ, it follows that one must posit a created person resulting from those principles: for the created nature and substance in Christ is of the same most special species as that in each of his brothers. As, therefore, Christ is univocally with Peter an

quod tractantes pollitice[1] cum Christo acceptarent univoce cum aliis personam suam in testimonium et iudicium et quodlibet aliud opus sensibile vel quodlibet personale. Nec potest fingi quod deitas impedit ista principia ad causandum personam.

individual substance of rational nature, so he is univocally a person with him: for to whatever the definition belongs univocally, the thing defined also belongs univocally. This is confirmed from this, that those dealing civilly with Christ would accept his person, univocally with others, in testimony and judgment and in any other perceptible work or any personal one.[5] Nor can it be feigned that the Godhead impedes these principles from causing a person.

¶2 135.16–136.7

[135]Hic dicitur quod minor est falsa cum nulla creatura causat naturaliter nisi de quanto a posteriori subicitur voluntati divine prius causanti. Sed voluntas divina non potest ex istis causare creatam personam: nam assumpcio impedit, vel verius iuvat ut natura creata sit suppositum increatum. Cum enim omne recipiens denudatur a natura rei recepte, oporteret Verbum vel esse duas personas, ut dixit Nestorius; vel recipiendo personalitatem creatam personalitatem increatam dimittere; quorum utrumque cum sit summe impossibile, sequitur quod natura rei exaltantis naturam assumptam, ut quasi insorbendo, non permittat[2] eam habere personalitatem creatam. Et hoc intendunt loquentes de suppositacione aliena. Et dicitur quod ista natura est persona gloriosissima, sed illi non competit diffinicio persone create. Pro quo notandum quod substancia est commune in Greco ad ypostasim, usiosim, et usion: quando autem diffinitur persona per nomen substancie intelligitur ypostasis, quam alii differenter explicant per nomen subsistencie. Et sic Christus non est racionalis nature individua subsistencia vel suppositum, [136]nisi suppositum nature increate. Ideo natura assumpta non est formaliter persona sed ydemptice vel ypostatice. Non enim est formaliter ypostasis vel subsistencia, sed substancia vel usion. Ideo in Christo sunt formaliter tres substancie, sed unica subsistencia, sed ille due nature create faciunt unam naturam completam, que est humanitas, non autem personam, cum deest complementum ex parte cause finalis.

Here the answer is that the minor is false, since no creature causes naturally except insofar as it is subjected a posteriori to the divine will, which causes first. Now the divine will cannot cause a created person out of these: for the assumption impedes, or more truly helps [to bring it about] that the created nature be an increate supposit. For since every recipient is stripped of the nature of the thing received,[6] it would be necessary for the Word either to be two persons, as Nestorius said, or, by receiving created personality, to lay aside the increate personality; and since each of these is supremely impossible, it follows that the nature of the exalting thing, as it were absorbing the assumed nature, does not permit it to have a created personality. And this is what they maintain who speak of "alien suppositation". And it is said that this nature is a most glorious person, but the definition of a created person does not belong to it. For which it is to be noted that "substance" is common in Greek to *ypostasis*, *usiosis*, and *usion*: and when person is defined by the name "substance", hypostasis is understood, which others explain differently by the name "subsistence". And so Christ is not an individual subsistence of rational nature, or a supposit, [136]except the supposit of the increate nature. So the assumed nature is not formally a person but identically or hypostatically. For it is not formally hypostasis or subsistence, but substance or *usion*. So in Christ there are formally three substances, but a single subsistence; but those two created natures make one complete nature, which is the humanity, but not a person, since the completion on the part of the final cause is lacking.[7]

¶3 136.8–136.27

[136]Ulterius conceditur quod conversantes cum Christo putando eum esse univoce personam cum aliis hominibus ex ignorrancia sue divinitatis [acceptarent],[1] univoce personam suam in testimonium.[1] Ideo non potest iudicare[2] vel conversari civiliter, ut patet alibi, sed omne iudicium suum foret infinitum maioris auctoritatis quam iudicium persone create. Et ita videtur de omni actu personali quem fecit humanitus: auctoritas enim consequitur personam in dignitate

Further, it is granted that those living their life with Christ, thinking him to be univocally a person with other men out of ignorance of his divinity, [would accept] his person univocally in testimony.[8] So he cannot judge or live his life civilly, as is clear elsewhere, but all his judgment would be of infinitely greater authority than the judgment of a created person. And so it seems of every personal act that he did humanly:

et non naturam accionis pure. Et patet quod descripcio persone signata convertitur cum ista racionalis nature incommunicabilis existencia. Incommunicabilis dico quoad supposita, non naturas; et ita subsistencia est contractior quam substancia, ut sumitur ad hec tria. Et ita Trinitas commune principium et commune principatum non est persona vel subsistencia, sed persone vel subsistencie. Nec est color in illa equivocacione, quod divicie sunt substancia racionalis nature, sed substancia restricta ad subsistenciam est consequens ad omne suppositum substanciale. Tales*[3] sunt multe argucie quibus decipiuntur incauti, facte pro stabilienda opinione Nestorii.

for authority follows the person in dignity, and not the nature of the action purely. And it is clear that the definition of person here signified is convertible with this: "incommunicable existence of rational nature".[9] Incommunicable, I say, as to supposits, not natures; and so subsistence is narrower than substance, as [substance] is taken with respect to these three. And so the Trinity, common principle and common principality,[10] is not a person or subsistence, but persons or subsistences. Nor is there colour in that equivocation, that riches are "substance" of a rational nature,[11] but substance restricted to subsistence is consequent on every substantial supposit. Of this kind are many quibbles by which the unwary are deceived, made for establishing the opinion of Nestorius.

¶4 136.28–137.8

[136]Sed 4°. principaliter arguitur contra ydemptitatem specificam Christi cum aliis ex parte materie. Nam semen decisum[4] a diversis sexubus et commixtum est alterius speciei quam simplex semen sexus feminei: sed[5] Christus conceptus est pure ex semine sexus feminei,[5] omnes autem alii ex commixtis seminibus maris et feminei: ergo materia ex qua [137]factus[1] est Christus est alterius speciei quam materie proxime aliorum: et cum agens semper dat formam secundum condignitatem materie, ut patet philosophis, sequitur quod Christus sit alterius speciei quam alii secundum communem cursum nature univoce[2] procreati. Confirmatur per Commentatorem 8vo. Physicorum 9. 46. ponentem contra Avicennam quod si homo generaretur ex terra, ipse esset homo equivoce propter extraneacionem materie.

But fourth, as a main head, it is argued against Christ's identity of species with the others on the part of matter. For seed cut off from diverse sexes and mingled is of another species than the simple seed of the female sex: now Christ was conceived purely from the seed of the female sex,[12] but all the others from the mingled seeds of male and female: therefore the matter from which [137]Christ was made is of another species than the proximate matters of the others: and since an agent always gives a form according to the condignity of the matter, as is clear to the philosophers, it follows that Christ is of another species than the others, procreated univocally according to the common course of nature. This is confirmed by the Commentator, *Physics* 8, comment 46,[13] who holds against Avicenna that if a man were generated from earth, he would be a man equivocally on account of the estrangement of the matter.

¶5 137.9–137.21

[137]Hic dicitur quod illud argumentum deficit in pluribus. Primo in assumpto quod semen muliebre, quod differt a menstruo, non distat a virili semine nisi secundum maius et minus; sic quod semen virile de communi cursu nature sit in substancia spissius, complexione[3] calidius, et informacione virtuosius. Sed quale magisterium Deo de beata virgine complexione[3] mundissima descindere[4] semen vel sanguinem pro mensura delectationis sue humilime ex gaudio salutacionis[5] angelice, que excedat[6] in bonitate[7] complexionis[7] in proporcione multitudinis et in limitacione virtutis omnem aliam materiam, ex qua fuit persona hominis procreata? quod quia factum est, unde non daretur illi capaci[8] organo spiritus consimilis speciei?

Here the answer is that that argument fails in several respects. First in the assumption, since female seed, which differs from the menstrual blood, does not differ from male seed except according to more and less;[14] so that male seed, in the common course of nature, is thicker in substance, hotter in complexion, and more powerful in informing. But what feat of mastery [was it] for God to cut from the blessed virgin, of most pure complexion, seed or blood according to the measure of her most humble delight from the joy of the angelic salutation, such as would exceed in goodness of complexion, in proportion of quantity and in limitation of power, every other matter from which a person of a man was procreated?[15] And since this was done, why would a spirit of like species not be given to that head, the organ?[16]

¶6 137.22–137.32

[137]Deficit 2°. in sequela quando infert quod materia proxima, de qua factus est Christus, sit alterius speciei quam materie proxime aliorum. Nam[9] si, sicut est summe[9] possibile, Deus de lapidibus[10] vel quocumque alio mixto vel simplici descidisset[11] materiam, et commiscendo athomos[12] in utero virginali dedisset post[13] commixturam ydoneam formam complexionalem[14] humani seminis; adhuc proxima materia, ex qua talis homo fieret, foret eiusdem racionis cum aliis, licet remota materia sit diversa: aliter enim semina hominum generata ex distinctis cibariis in specie forent eo ipso disparium specierum.

It fails, second, in what follows,[17] when it infers that the proximate matter of which Christ was made is of another species than the proximate matters of the others. For if, as is supremely possible, God had cut matter from stones[18] or from any other mixed or simple body, and, by mingling atoms in the virgin's womb, had given, after a suitable mixture, the complexional form of human seed; still the proximate matter from which such a man would be made would be of the same kind as the others, although the remote matter is diverse: for otherwise the seeds of men generated from foods distinct in species would by that very fact be of disparate species.

¶7 137.33–138.22

[137]Ex istis 3°. colligitur quod non refert ex qua materia Deus [138] adaptet[1] materiam proximam ad hominem producendum; dum tamen reducat eam ad temperamentum complexionis seminee,[2] et limitet[3] successive vel subito infundendo humanum spiritum in corpus debite limitatum.[4] Nec refert quo agente Deus ad illud officium utatur pro organo: aliter enim primi parentes, qui sunt principia humani generis, non convenirent cum suis generacionibus in specie vel natura: talis tamen error auctoris in principio †caret[5] maximum in processu. Patet deduccio ex hoc quod Adam plasmatus est de limo terre forsitan sine[6] ministerio creature, et Eua de costa viri ab eodem opifice est formata. Sicut ergo non refert utrum ignis ab igne, vel immediate a lumine producatur ad hoc quod sit de natura ignis univoce, et sic de aliis effectibus cuiuscumque speciei vel generis; sic facta de quacumque materia prima complexione et limitacione sufficienti ad animam subiectandam, non refert ad unionem compositi[7] ministerio cuiuscumque agentis secundi hoc factum fuerit, ut[8] sive immediato a Deo, sive ministerio angelorum, sive per se a constellacione celesti, sive a quocumque agente secundo corpus humanum productum fuerit; non refert data anima adesse hominis sicut nec refert a quo artifice creato ydolum vel aliud artificiale fuerit[9] fabricatum.

From these, third, it is gathered that it does not matter from what matter God [138]adapts the proximate matter for producing a man; provided only that he brings it to the temperament of the complexion of seed, and limits [it],[19] infusing the human spirit, successively or suddenly, into a duly limited body. Nor does it matter what agent God uses as an instrument for that office: for otherwise the first parents, who are the principles of the human race, would not agree with their generations in species or nature: yet such an error of the author at the beginning †caret† [becomes] the greatest in the course.[20] The deduction is clear from this, that Adam was formed of the slime of the earth, perhaps without the ministry of a creature, and Eve was formed from the rib of the man by the same craftsman. As, therefore, it does not matter whether fire is produced by fire or without intermediary by light, for it to be univocally of the nature of fire, and so of other effects of whatever species or genus; so, [the body] having been made from any matter whatever with a first complexion and limitation sufficient to be the subject of a soul,[21] it does not matter for the union of the composite by the ministry of what secondary agent this was done — as whether without intermediary by God, or by the ministry of angels, or of itself by a heavenly constellation, or by whatever secondary agent the human body was produced; it does not matter, the soul being given, for the being of man, just as it does not matter by what created craftsman an image or other artefact was fabricated.

Notes

1. *Primi argumenti*: the first inference of the fourth objection (133.29–31). Its antecedent is true because body and soul are each the person of the Word (134.14–15); its consequent, "Christ recently is a supposit", is impossible.
2. *Divinitate* "the divinity" (134.11), the print, with O; A B C read *deitate* "the Godhead", a pair the the glossary keeps apart. *Personarum* "of persons" (134.13), the print, with O; A B C read *naturarum*, "the singularities of the natures".

3. *In sancto sabato*: Holy Saturday, in the three days when body and soul were separated; even then each is the person of the Word (*simul utraque*).
4. From *Quod si* (134.31) to *Tales* (136.25) O omits the passage, which Harris marks with asterisks; O reads *specificantes formas sunt multe argucie*, and a later hand in its margin noted *deficit multum* "much is lacking" (134 n. 8; 136 n. 3). Here A B C are the only witnesses.
5. *Pollitice*: A's spelling of *politice*, which Harris glosses *civiliter* "civilly" (cf. 136.12); B *pollce*, C *polletice*.
6. The principle that what receives lacks the nature of what it receives: the schools' maxim from Aristotle, *De anima* III.4, 429a13–24, where the mind, to receive all forms, must be none of them, since the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance (*verified*). A *permittant*, B *permittunt* (135.26).
7. Boethius, *Contra Eutychen* 3, PL 64, 1344C–1345B, on *ousia*, *ousiosis* and *hypostasis* (*essentiam quidem οὐσίαν, subsistentiam vero οὐσίωσιν, substantiam ὑπόστασιν*; *verified*); Wyclif's Latinised Greek is kept, in italic as Harris prints it. The "three substances" are the Godhead, the body and the soul.
8. *Acceptarent* "would accept" is Harris's supplement (cf. 135.12): A B leave a gap of twelve letters, C omits from *divinitatis* to *testimonium*, and O lacks the passage (n. 4).
9. The definition is Richard of St Victor's, as at 131.24–26; Richard says it of the divine person only, *divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia* (*De Trinitate* IV.22, PL 196, 945C–D; *verified*). *Signata*: the definition just signified.
10. *Commune principatum*: neuter after *commune*; translated as printed ("principality", rule). *Principiatum* "what proceeds from a principle" is a possible reading, not adopted.
11. *Substancia* also means a man's goods ("his substance"); no plausible ground (*color*, a plausible ground, the the glossary's period sense) comes from that equivocation. So too *satis colorate* (134.26), "with colour enough".
12. The minor premiss *sed … feminei* (136.31–32) is omitted by A B C; the print has it with O, and the syllogism needs it.
13. Averroes, *In Physicorum* VIII, comm. 46, against Avicenna on the generation of animals from earth (not read here; Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d. 2 p. 2 q. 4, cites the same comment against Avicenna as *VIII Physicorum commento 49*, so the number varies with the division). The print's "9." is probably the manuscripts' sign for *com-*, so "comment".
14. *In assumpto quod*: the *quod* clause is Wyclif's ground for rejecting the assumption, not its content; *assumptum* is the logician's sense, not the assumption of the nature. A B C read *commixione* "mixture" for *complexione* (137.13, 137.15).
15. *Quale magisterium*: a rhetorical question, implying that it is no great feat for God; *magisterium* here is neither "rule" nor "the teaching office".
16. *Capiti* "head", with C O, against the print's *capaci* "capable" (137.20): agreement across the families, and the reading construes (the head, as organ, receives the spirit). As printed: "to that capable organ".
17. *Sequela*: the logical sense of the CONTEXTUAL row, "what follows", the step from the premisses to the conclusion about the matter.
18. Cf. Matt 3:9, "God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham".
19. *Limitet … limitatum* (138.3–4), the print, with O; A B C read *liniet … liniatum*.
20. *Caret* is O's alone (A B C omit it); Harris daggers it and suggests *cresceret* "would grow" or *foret* "would be". The English supplies "becomes", after the saying that a small error at the beginning is great at the end (Aristotle, *De caelo* I.5, 271b8–9, "the least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold"; *verified*). *Auctoris*: the author of the argument.
21. *Prima* is taken with *complexione* ("a first complexion"), not as *materia prima* "prime matter"; *facta* is referred to the body. *Adesse* (138.21), one word in the print, is *ad esse* "for the being". A B C read *suppositi* for *compositi* (138.17).

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 136: *argucie* (bt arguncie; print argucie)

Part 5: The virgin birth, the reach of secondary agents, and the third objection

Harris pp. 138.23–142.9

¶1 138.23–140.21

[138]Et si dicatur quod Deus, non potest per se, nec cum tam disparibus secundis agentibus, tales effectus producere; tum,[10] quia nec est[11] auctenticum nec expertum; sed raciones seminales forent superflue limitate[12]: quoad illud videtur michi quod talis contencio de Dei persona sit satis superflua, ubi non evidenter scimus racionem pro vel contra producere: unde leve verbum multorum est et satis inevidens —'ego non sum expertus hoc, vel ego non inveni[13] hoc scriptum in historiis michi auctenticis: ergo non est verum'.—Et ex [139]alio latere sollicitando fingere quod agens secundum potest naturaliter in talia[1] inexperta excedit limites philosophi naturalis. Sed inter alia opera,

And if it is said that God cannot, of himself or with such disparate secondary agents, produce such effects after all,[1] because it is neither authentic nor experienced, but [otherwise] the seminal reasons would be limited superfluously:[2] as to that, it seems to me that such contention about the person of God is quite superfluous, where we do not evidently know how to produce a reason for or against. Hence it is a light word of many, and quite without evidence: "I have not experienced this, or I have not found this written in histories authentic to me: therefore it is not true." And on the [139]other side, to be anxious to feign that a secondary agent

que de Deo credimus, partus virginis tenet locum satis probabilem in lumine[2] naturali; cum in multis aliis speciebus animalium narrantur femelle sine commixtione[3] seminis vel tactu maris concipere. Sed admiracio ineffabiliter nobis mirabilis est quod post limitacionem[4] subitam corporis capti[5] de pura virgine copulatus sit Deus[6] pro instanti generacionis[6] nature complete, et hoc ypostatica unione. Ideo[7] hoc oportet nos ex fide supponere credendo quod nullum aliud tale novum potest fieri, licet hoc fuerit in natura creata analogice exemplatum de ypostatica unione[7] mentis cum corpore. Et hinc tam sepe exemplificat Augustinus cum simbolo Athanasii quod 'sicut anima racionalis et caro unus est homo, ita[8] Deus et homo unus est[8] Christus.' Decuit enim auctorem nature specialiter post peccatum hominis remissibile per talem assumpcionem viri[9] ex femina speciem hominis innovare: ut, sicut primo formatus est mas ex non-homine, secundo[10] femina ex homine[10] sed ex mare solummodo, tercio autem ex his sexubus commixtis sunt alii communiter procreati; sic quarto pro complemento iusticie[11] per se stantis in quatuor[11] compleat Deus virum celestem pure ex femina; cuius necessitas patet alibi. Nec sequitur ex illis superfluitas limitacionis racionis seminalis diversis mixtorum generibus, ut experiencia philosophorum testatur, quod multa genera animalium, in quibus est distinccio sexuum, tam ex putrefaccione quam ex semine procreantur. Et tamen, cum hoc dicunt philosophi quod nec sexuum distinccio, nec racionis seminalis limitacio est aliquo modo superflua; sic[12] latet in visceribus nature, quid Deus disposuit secundum potenciam obediencialem creature sue per se facere, et quid agens [140]creatum a seculis multis absconditum sufficit preter communem cursum nature producere. Et circa[1] possibilitatem talium sollicitantur multi superflue: ut illi, quod demones[2] possunt in aspectu placido celi, mediantibus virtutibus mixtorum sicut herbarum et lapidum, mirabilia vulgo inopinabilia per se efficere: illi quod celum secundum diversas figuras et aspectus astrorum per se[3] potest in talia: et hi quod homines possunt cum iuvamine demonum et constellacione celestium mirabilia inopinata producere. Et in speculacione talium theologizant speculativi inaniter. In practica vero mathematici consumunt tempus figuras celi superflue prestolantes, et demones periculosius consulentes. Sufficit ergo pio theologo quod sciat in genere talia mirabilia ab agente secundo posse fieri: 2° quod sciat istis agentibus secundis a Deo, a quo est omnis potencia, terminos secundum maximum et minimum limitari; nec[4] creaturam aliquam posse in aliquid, nisi secundum eius ordinacionem et benevolenciam limitantem: et 3°. quod Deus ex condicione omnipotencie[5] facit eo ipso quodlibet dandum opus quo

can naturally [act] on such untried things exceeds the limits of the natural philosopher. But among the other works which we believe of God, the virgin's childbearing holds a place quite probable in the natural light, since in many other species of animals females are related to conceive without mixture of seed or touch of the male.[3] Now the marvel, ineffably wonderful to us, is that after the sudden limiting of the body taken from the pure virgin, God was joined to the complete nature at the instant of generation,[4] and this by hypostatic union. Therefore we must suppose this from faith, believing that no other such new thing can be made, although it has been analogically exemplified in created nature by the hypostatic union of mind with body.[5] And hence Augustine, with the creed of Athanasius, so often gives the example that "as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ."[6] For it was fitting that the author of nature, especially after man's sin, which could be remitted, should renew the species of man through such an assumption of a man (*vir*) from a woman: so that, as first the male was formed from no man, second the female from man, but from the male only, and third the others have commonly been procreated from these sexes mingled; so fourth, for the completion of the justice that stands of itself in four, God should complete the heavenly man (*vir*) purely from a woman; the necessity of which is clear elsewhere.[7] Nor does it follow from these that the limiting of the seminal reason to the diverse kinds of mixed bodies is superfluous, as the experience of the philosophers testifies that many kinds of animals in which there is distinction of the sexes are procreated both from putrefaction and from seed.[8] And yet, although the philosophers say this, that neither the distinction of the sexes nor the limiting of the seminal reason is in any way superfluous, so it lies hidden in the bowels of nature what God has disposed to do of himself according to the obediential potency of his creature,[9] and what, hidden for many ages, a created [140]agent is sufficient to produce beyond the common course of nature.[10] And about the possibility of such things many are superfluously anxious: as those [who hold] that demons can, under a favourable aspect of the heaven, by means of the powers of mixed bodies such as herbs and stones, of themselves effect marvels unimaginable to the common people; those, that the heaven, according to the diverse figures and aspects of the stars, can of itself [act] on such things; and these, that men can, with the help of demons and the constellation of the heavenly bodies, produce unexpected marvels. And in speculation on such things the speculative theologize vainly. But

vult ipsum a quoquam fieri, et istam condicionem potencie non potest communicari alteri.

in practice the mathematicians consume their time, superfluously waiting on the figures of the heaven, and more perilously consulting demons.[11] It suffices, therefore, for the devout theologian that he know in general that such marvels can be done by a secondary agent; second, that he know that for these secondary agents terms are limited by God, from whom is all power,[12] as to maximum and minimum; and that no creature can [act] on anything except according to his ordinance and limiting benevolence; and third, that God, by the condition of omnipotence, does every work that is to be given by the very fact that he wills it to be done by anyone, and this condition of power cannot be communicated to another.[13]

¶2 140.22–141.15

[140]Quantum ad testimonium Commentatoris patet quod dictum Averrois[6] non debet esse alicui philosopho, et minus theologo, testis auctenticans, cum tam in philosophia quam fide presumptive[7] vel invide sepius[7] deviavit. Fautor autem Commentatoris, cui placeret[8] dictum suum palliare, posset fingere ipsum de Avicenna concipere; quod posset esse homo, cuius proxima materia subiecta anime foret terra, et per consequens corpus alterius speciei quam mixtum organicum[9] a sibi simili in specie procreatum; et cum forme dantur secundum disposicionem materie, si haberet[10] animam, ipsa foret ab humanitate nostra disparis racionis. Nam in tam [141]vilem materiam non inducit natura formam[1] simee vel pigmee:[1] vel 2°. quod natura plus ingenians[2] circa produccionem hominis quam animalis alterius imperfecti, quod corpus sicut et anima[3] non posset produci naturaliter nisi a racionali supposito producatur. Ideo non sequitur—animal imperfectum potest ex putrefaccione produci: ergo homo— qui est finis uniuscuiusque alterius animalis, quia effectum preciosiorem virtus regitiva universitatis plus curat. Unde figuracionem embrionis oportet fieri a virtute informativa ab anima hominis per species triplices dirivata, per fomentum caloris consimilis in matrice, et per nutricionem concepti de sanguine menstruo parientis. Quod si alius sit modus producendi quoad corpus hoc est auctori nature specialiter reservatum. Sed totum illud vix moveret protervum ad credendum possibilitatem negative que petitur.

As to the testimony of the Commentator, it is clear that the saying of Averroes ought not to be an authenticating witness for any philosopher, and less for a theologian, since both in philosophy and in faith he has quite often strayed, presumptuously or enviously.[14] And a supporter of the Commentator whom it pleased to cloak his saying could feign that he was speaking of Avicenna[‘s view]: that there could be a man whose proximate matter, subject to the soul, would be earth, and consequently a body of another species than the organic mixed body procreated from one like itself in species; and since forms are given according to the disposition of matter, if it had a soul, that soul would be of a kind disparate from our humanity. For into such [141]vile matter nature does not induce the form of an ape or a pygmy: or second, [that he meant] that nature, taking more pains over the production of man than of another, imperfect animal, [brings it about] that the body, as well as the soul, could not be produced naturally unless it is produced by a rational supposit.[15] Therefore it does not follow: “an imperfect animal can be produced from putrefaction: therefore a man [can]”, [man] who is the end of every other animal; since the ruling power of the universe takes more care for the more precious effect. Hence the shaping of the embryo must be done by an informing power derived from the soul of the man through threefold species, by the fostering of like heat in the womb, and by the nourishment of what is conceived from the menstrual blood of the mother.[16] And if there is another mode of producing as to the body, this is specially reserved to the author of nature. But all that would hardly move an obstinate man to believe the possibility that is sought negatively.[17]

¶3 141.16–142.9

[141]Tercii autem dicunt quod nemo post primum parentem potest produci nisi materialiter[4] producatur ab homine propter amorem humani generis nutriendum. Nam racione stipitis et cognacionis oportet nutriri amorem inter homines ultra bruta, quia aliter fuisset facile post peccatum Adam totam suam generacionem sicut genus Caim[5] exstinguere et aliud genus hominum ex disparato principio[6] procreare[6] sine hoc quod Christus paciatur pro salvanda specie. Et tunc esset homo species imperfecta, sine qua mundus posset existere; cum, nullo homine existente, celum posset ut vermes hominem[7] de novo producere; †et multo magis elementum[8] quod est[9] gracia hominis tamquam finis non esset de substancia universali;[10] et, sicut[11] situs spere[12] corruptibilium posset vacuus a corpore.†[13] Sed cum iste tractatus multum[14] distat a puncto proposito, redeundo dicitur quod philosophicum et facile est catholicum sustinere quod primus homo fiebat de terra, secundus sexus [142]ab illo, et tercius ab ambobus; et sic gradatim de genere consequente quousque novus homo atque novissimus eiusdem speciei cum aliis fiebat ex femina; et quinto[1] omnis homo secundum animam fit ab illo circulariter a quo ultimate reficitur: quinarius autem et senarius sunt numeri circulares. Non enim credo quod species humana peribit, vel quod possit sub tanto auctore eciam quoad perfeccionem illam[2] deficere.

And the third say that no one after the first parent can be produced unless he is materially produced by a man, for the sake of nourishing the love of the human race. For by reason of stock and kinship love must be nourished among men beyond [what there is among] the brutes; since otherwise it would have been easy after Adam's sin to extinguish his whole generation, like the race of Cain, and to procreate another race of men from a disparate principle, without Christ's suffering for the saving of the species. And then man would be an imperfect species, without which the world could exist; since, with no man existing, the heaven could produce a man anew, as [it does] worms; †and much more, the element which is for the sake of man as its end would not be of the universal substance; and, as the place of the sphere of corruptible things could [be] empty of body.†[18] But since this treatise stands far from the point proposed, returning: the answer is that it is philosophical, and easy for a catholic, to hold that the first man was made from earth, the second sex [142]from him, and the third from both; and so by degrees, of the kind that follows, until the new and newest man, of the same species with the others, was made from a woman; and fifth, every man as to the soul is made by him circularly, by whom he is ultimately remade: and five and six are circular numbers.[19] For I do not believe that the human species will perish, or that it could, under so great an author, fail even as to that perfection.[20]

Notes

1. "After all" renders *tamen*, with C O, against the print's *tum* "both" (138.25): agreement across the families, and the reading construes (*tamen* closes the objection, which denies the possibility just granted at 138.12–22); *tum* has no second *tum* to answer it. As printed: "both because it is neither authentic nor experienced, and …".
2. *Raciones seminales*: Augustine's term for the causes God set in created things at the beginning, from which the kinds unfold in time (*De Genesi ad litteram* IX.17.32, PL 34, 406, where the Creator can make from things *aliud, quam eorum quasi seminales rationes habent*; *verified*). The objection: if a man could be made otherwise than from seed, the seminal reasons would have been limited to sexual generation for nothing. *Limitate* (138.26), the print, with O; A B C read *linite* (as at 138.3–4).
3. The schools' animal lore of females conceiving without the male (mares by the wind, Aristotle, *Historia animalium* VI.18; vultures, Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* V.20.64–65, PL 14, 233C–D, *sine ullo masculorum concipere semine*, set there against those who mock the virgin birth; *verified*). A B C read *commixione* (139.6).
4. *Nature complete* is taken as dative after *copulatus sit* "was joined to the complete nature"; it could be genitive with *generacionis*, "at the instant of the generation of the complete nature". A B read *Deus per generacionem*, C *Deus per generacionis* (139.9).
5. *Ideo … unione* (139.10–13) is O's alone (A B C omit it); the print follows O, and the step "therefore … from faith" stands only there. Wyclif calls the union of mind with body itself "hypostatic"; the creed's likeness follows.
6. The *Quicunque vult* (the "Athanasian Creed"), v. 37 (PL 88, 586B). Augustine uses the likeness at *In Iohannis evangelium* tr. 78.3, PL 35, 1836 (*Sicut enim unus est homo anima rationalis et caro, sic unus est Christus Deus et homo*), and *Epistula* 137.3.11, PL 33, 520 (*sicut in unitate personae anima unitur corpori, ut homo sit; ita in unitate personae Deus unitur homini, ut Christus sit*) (*verified*). O omits *ita … est* (139.15).
7. The four ways of making man (from no man, from a man alone, from man and woman, from a woman alone) are Anselm's, *Cur Deus homo* II.8 (Schmitt II, 104.3–6; PL 158, 406B): *Quatuor modis potest deus hominem facere … aut de femina sine viro, quod nondum fecit* (*verified*). *Iusticie per se stantis in quatuor* (139.22), the print, with O; A B C read *persone stantis in quarto*, "for the completion of the person standing in the fourth [place]". O reads *utri* for *viri* (139.18); O omits *secundo … homine*, and C reads *secundo ex femina ex homine* (139.19–20).

8. Animals generated from putrefaction as well as from seed: Aristotle, *Historia animalium* V.1, 539a and *De generatione animalium* III.11, 762a8–15; *HA* V.1 also has such creatures generated male and female (*verified*).
9. *Potenciam obediencialem*: the potency sense of the CONTEXTUAL row: the creature's passive capacity to receive whatever God works in it beyond its nature. A B C read *sicut* for *sic* (139.30).
10. *Absconditum* is taken with *quid* ("what, hidden for many ages"); it could go with *agens* ("a created agent hidden for many ages"). The phrase echoes Col 1:26, "the mystery which hath been hidden from ages and generations".
11. *Mathematici*: the astrologers, who wait on the configurations of the heavens; not mathematicians in the modern sense.
12. *Potencia* leans here to the other sense of the CONTEXTUAL row, "power" (God's), as in *condicionem potencie* (140.20). C reads *et sic*, O *ut*, for *nec* (140.16).
13. *Eo ipso … quo vult*: correlatives, "by the very fact that he wills". *Quodlibet dandum opus*, "every work that is to be given", is construed as printed. God's omnipotence does every work immediately whenever a creature does it, and this cannot be shared.
14. The Commentator's testimony is the one cited at 137 (Averroes against Avicenna on the generation of animals from earth). *Presumptive vel invide sepius* (140.25), the print; O *p̄supue ve inde septus*.
15. Two ways the supporter could cloak the saying, both hanging on *posset fingere*: that Averroes spoke of Avicenna's man from earth, which would be of another species (Avicenna, *De diluviis*, ed. Alonso Alonso 1949, 307–308, as reported by Loconsole 2023; cf. Thomas, *ST* I q. 71 ad 1; Avicenna's Latin not read here); or that nature takes such pains over man that only a rational supposit can produce his body. The second has no main verb in the print; "[brings it about]" is supplied. "Forms are given according to the disposition of matter" is a schools' maxim on Avicenna's teaching that agents only dispose matter and the giver of forms (*dator formarum*) gives each form to matter so disposed; the wording is not traced in Avicenna.
16. *Per species triplices*: construed as printed, "through threefold species"; what the three are is not said. *Parientis*: the woman giving birth.
17. *Possibilitatem negative que petitur*: the possibility which the objection asks to be shown, here argued only by setting aside the reasons against it; the construal is uncertain.
18. Harris daggers the passage *et multo magis … a corpore* (141.26–29) and notes *hic locus corruptus videtur* "this place seems corrupt" (141 n. 13). It is translated as printed. A B C omit *elementum* and read *universi* "of the universe" for *universali*; A C omit *est*; O omits *sicut*. A's *hominem* (141.26) is supplied in the margin by another hand.
19. Five and six are "circular" because their powers end in the same figure (25, 36, 125, 216: Boethius, *De institutione arithmetica* II.30, PL 63, 1137B–C, numbers *cyclici vel sphaerici* because *in proprii semper principii reversione formantur*; *verified*). The fifth way closes the circle: every soul is made by God, by whom it is in the end remade. A B C read *ergo* for *quinto* (142.3). *Catholicum* (141.31) is taken as the subject of *sustinere*, "for a catholic"; it could be a third predicate, "philosophical, easy [and] catholic".
20. *Illam* (142.8), the print, with O, where Harris asks whether *ullam* "any" is meant; A B C read *secundam* "the second [perfection]".
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Plate readings:** none for this chunk.

Chapter 9

Part 1: The position recapitulated; the three roots of the moderns' variation; the first objection

Harris pp. 142.0–146.24

¶1 *142.0–142.0*

[142]Epilogat posicionem de humanitate; et, narrando tres radices causantes modernorum discrepancias, dissolvit tres obiectus eorum per ordinem. I. Gives a summary of the author's position concerning the humanity of Christ. II. Explains the three sources from which the modern divsrsities of opinion have arisen. III. Deals with three principal objections to the author's position.]

[It recapitulates the position on the humanity; and, by recounting three roots that cause the disagreements of the moderns, it resolves their three objections in order.]

¶2 *142.10–142.12*

[142]Consequens est iuxta ponere sentenciam illam sentenciis modernorum, ut diversitas summe veritatis magis appareat et obiectus, quos adversantes invehunt, planius dissolvantur.

The next thing is to set that teaching beside the teachings of the moderns, so that the difference of the highest truth may appear the more, and the objections which the adversaries bring in may be more plainly resolved.

¶3 *142.13–142.13*

[142]Primo ergo danda est posicio in quodam compendio.

First, then, the position is to be given in a kind of compendium.

¶4 *142.14–142.15*

[142]2°. declarende sunt radices ex quibus oritur discrepancia modernorum.

Second, the roots from which the discrepancy of the moderns arises are to be made clear.

¶5 *142.16–142.16*

[142]Et 3°. commixtim solventur instancie.

And third, the objections will be resolved, intermingled [with these].

¶6 *142.17–143.8*

[142]Stat itaque posicio in hoc—Quod humanitas assumpta a Verbo sit perfectus homo ex corpore et anima racionali compositus, et per ypostaticam unionem ydemptificatus Verbo in persona non natura—.Et sic non est aliud suppositum, individuum, ypostasis, vel persona in Christo ydemptice[3] quam persona eterna Dominus Iesus Christus; [143] cum tam corpus, quam anima, quam[1] eciam[1] humanitas completa sit persona eterna, quamvis sint inter[2] se nature solummodo temporales distincte plurimum ab invicem,[3] et a divinitate[4] a natura, et a substancia vel essencia divina. Et sic[5] cavendum est specialiter de his tribus. Primo ne credatur aliquam illarum naturarum esse aliud suppositum a Verbo, quod est simul Filius Dei eternus et filius hominis temporalis.

The position therefore stands in this: that the humanity assumed by the Word is a perfect man, composed of body and rational soul, and by hypostatic union identified with the Word in person, not in nature. And so there is in Christ no other supposit, individual, hypostasis or person by identity than the eternal person, the Lord Jesus Christ;[1] [143]since the body, the soul, and also the complete humanity, each is the eternal person, although among themselves they are natures, only temporal, very much distinct from one another, and from the divinity, from the [divine] nature, and from the divine substance or essence.[2] And so one must specially beware of these three [errors]. First, lest any of those natures be believed to be another supposit from the Word, who is at once the eternal Son of God and the temporal son of man.

¶7 143.9–143.23

[143]2°. oportet cavere ne credatur conversio[6] vel confusio naturarum; cum manet plene natura divina[7] cum duabus naturis incommunicantibus sed creatis constituentibus humanitatem perfectam, omnes[8] et singule eadem persona in numero. Si autem esset conversio tunc natura conversa pro mensura conversionis[9] non maneret; ut lignum conversum in ignem pro mensura conversionis desinit, nova forma inducta et veteri desinente; quod non potest esse de tribus formis incommunicantibus[10] supra dictis. Si autem esset confusio naturarum, tunc forent reciproce quelibet eadem cuilibet, vel omnis vel aliqua incompleta, sicut est de elementis et[11] mixtis integraliter componentibus ipsum mixtum.[12] Modo autem manent tres incommunicantes nature, quelibet plene incommunicans cuilibet; sed utraque creatura per unionem personalem idem ypostatice Verbo Dei.

Second, one must beware lest a conversion or confusion of the natures be believed;[3] since the divine nature remains fully, with two natures that do not communicate but are created, constituting the perfect humanity, all and each the same person in number. And if there were conversion, then the converted nature would not remain, to the measure of the conversion; as wood converted into fire ceases to the measure of the conversion, a new form being induced and the old ceasing; which cannot be the case with the three forms, that do not communicate, spoken of above.[4] And if there were confusion of the natures, then any would be reciprocally the same as any, or all or some incomplete, as is the case with elements and mixed bodies integrally composing the mixed body itself.[5] But as it is, three natures remain that do not communicate, each fully not communicating with each; but each of the two creatures is, through the personal union, the same hypostatically with the Word of God.

¶8 143.24–144.24

[143]3°. oportet cavere ne[13] credatur ex humanitate et deitate fieri unum aggregative, ut est cumulus lapidum, vel accidens et subiectum. Nam unio ypostatica, que est ydemptitas[14] personalis facit quod quelibet istarum trium incommunicancium naturarum est plene eadem communis persona; licet inter se naturaliter distinguantur per totum ex multis sanctorum testimoniis supradictis, ut Augustini, Gregorii, et Anselmi. Unde istam sentenciam colligit[15] venerabilis Anselmus in De Incarnacione Verbi ca°. 7. sub his verbis: [144]'Sicut, inquit, in Deo una natura est plures persone, et plures persone sunt una natura; sic in Christo una persona est plures nature, et plures nature sunt una persona. "Quemadmodum enim[1] Pater est Deus, Filius Deus et Spiritus sanctus Deus; et[2] non tamen tres dii, sed unus Deus;"[2] ita in Christo Deus est persona, et homo est persona, non tamen due persone sed una persona.' Intelligit autem iste doctor per Deum et hominem deitatem et humanitatem, quia aliter esset similitudo impertinens, et verba sequencia nimis falsa. 'Non, inquit, alius Deus alius homo in Christo, quamvis aliud sit Deus, aliud homo, sed idem ipse Deus qui et homo.' Quando ergo dicit cum beato Augustino, Ieronimo, Gregorio et aliis quod aliud Deus in Christo et aliud homo, intelligit quod alia natura est deitas et alia humanitas, sed utraque non alia sed eadem persona; quia homo, ut dicit, solum naturam significat, et illum assumptum hominem dicit postea esse Iesum, et eandem personam cum Verbo. Unde non dubium quin per assumptum hominem intelligit naturam humanam assumptam. 'Verbum, inquit, naturam aliam assumpsit, non aliam personam.' Et ita generaliter intendunt sancti quando dicunt

Third, one must beware lest it be believed that from the humanity and the Godhead there comes to be one thing aggregatively, as a heap of stones is, or an accident and its subject. For the hypostatic union, which is personal identity, makes each of these three natures that do not communicate to be fully the same common person; although among themselves they are naturally distinguished throughout, [as appears] from the many testimonies of the saints cited above, as of Augustine, Gregory and Anselm. Hence the venerable Anselm gathers this teaching in *On the Incarnation of the Word*, chapter 7, in these words: [144]"As," he says, "in God one nature is several persons, and several persons are one nature, so in Christ one person is several natures, and several natures are one person. 'For as the Father is God, the Son God and the Holy Spirit God, and yet not three gods but one God,' so in Christ God is a person and man is a person, yet not two persons but one person."[6] And this doctor understands by "God" and "man" the Godhead and the humanity, since otherwise the likeness would be irrelevant, and the words that follow exceedingly false. "There is not," he says, "another one who is God and another one who is man in Christ, although God is one thing and man another; but the very same is God who is also man."[7] When therefore he says, with the blessed Augustine, Jerome, Gregory and others, that God in Christ is one thing and man another, he understands that the Godhead is one nature and the humanity another, but each is not another but the same person;[8] since "man", as he says, signifies only the nature, and he says afterwards that that assumed man is Jesus,

'aliud Deus, aliud homo; sed non alius,' quod alia natura sit deitas et alia natura[3] humanitas, non autem persona alia sed eadem.

and the same person with the Word. Hence there is no doubt that by "the assumed man" he understands the assumed human nature. "The Word," he says, "assumed another nature, not another person." And so the saints generally maintain, when they say "God is one thing, man another, but not another one", that the Godhead is one nature and the humanity another nature, but not another person but the same.

¶9 144.25–145.3

[144]Pro 2°.[4] notandum quod in tribus radicibus stat modernorum variacio ab antiquis. Primo in hoc quod non concipiunt res communes. Noticia quidem[5] universalium secundum Anselmum in De Incarnacione ca° 1°. est medium ad cognoscendum misterium Trinitatis, misterium incarnacionis, et multa alia fidei sacramenta. Sicut enim natura vel forma[6] divina est communis ad tria supposita, sic omnis natura vel forma specifica universalis in actu est communis ad omnia eius singularia; et persona Verbi[7] communis ad [145]naturam divinam et alias duas contingenter extranee ypostatice copulatas: et tolluntur[1] hinc inde[1] sophistica argumenta conformiter.

For the second [point], it is to be noted that the variation of the moderns from the ancients stands in three roots. First in this, that they do not conceive common things.[9] The knowledge of universals, indeed, according to Anselm in *On the Incarnation*, chapter 1, is the means to knowing the mystery of the Trinity, the mystery of the incarnation, and many other sacraments of the faith.[10] For as the divine nature or form is common to three supposits, so every specific nature or form, universal in act, is common to all its singulars; and the person of the Word [is] common to [145]the divine nature and to the two others, joined hypostatically, contingently and extraneously: and on this side and that the sophistical arguments are disposed of in conformity.

¶10 145.4–145.15

[145]2ª radix est methaphisica de forma substanciali compositi. Quelibet enim talis forma substancialis compositi est eius[2] quiditas, idem essencialiter vel personaliter cum formato; ut quelibet anima animati, cum sit ipsum vivere et per consequens ipsum esse; et eius essencia, ex 2° De Anima, est idem essencialiter vel personaliter cum composito et subiecto; ut anima intellectiva hominis, que est eius humanitas, est eadem persona cum homine sic formato; igneitas est idem suppositum cum igne, et ita de ceteris: et per consequens, cum alique forme sint separabiles a materia que non accidentaliter[3] sunt persone, patet[4] quod personalitas manet cum forma a materia separata.

The second root is a metaphysical one, about the substantial form of a composite. For every such substantial form of a composite is its quiddity, the same essentially or personally with what is formed; as every soul of an animate thing, since it is its very living and consequently its very being, and its essence, from *De anima* II, is the same essentially or personally with the composite and subject;[11] as the intellective soul of man, which is his humanity, is the same person with the man so formed; fireness is the same supposit with fire; and so of the rest: and consequently, since some forms which are persons, and not accidentally, are separable from matter, it is clear that personality remains with the form separated from matter.

¶11 145.16–146.16

[145]3ª radix est abieccio predicacionis secundum essenciam, ut[5] recte admittentes predicacionem secundum essenciam concedunt cum Anselmo De Incarnacione 7 quod quelibet universalis forma est idem cum omnibus et singulis eius suppositis, et correspondenter de aliis rebus communibus: concedunt eciam quod tam in creatore quam eciam[6] in qualibet creatura omne esse est essencia et e contra, licet in omnibus istis sit formalis differencia vel distinccio racionis. Cum ergo moderniores variant in istis tribus radicibus, non mirum si variant in germine consequente. Ponunt enim quod non est possibile[7] plures

The third root is the rejection of predication by essence; as those who rightly admit predication by essence grant, with Anselm, *On the Incarnation* 7, that every universal form is the same with all and each of its supposits, and correspondingly of other common things:[12] they grant also that both in the creator and in every creature all being is essence and conversely, although in all these there is a formal difference or distinction of reason. Since therefore the more modern [doctors] vary in these three roots, it is no wonder if they vary in the shoot that follows. For they posit

naturas vel res alias[8] singulas esse unam. Ponunt 2° quod omnis forma substancialis compositi est distincta essencialiter a subiecto, in tantum quod aliqui dicunt omnem formam materialem substancie posse a natura separari. Et 3° dicunt[9] quod in omni creatura est dare essenciam, que non est esse, sed eius causa, sicut lux luminis vel[10] lucere. Ex istis dicunt consequenter [146]quod non est possibile multas naturas esse personam Verbi. Dicunt eciam quod in quolibet homine esse suum et essencia et per consequens ipse homo ac sua humanitas distinguantur, sic quod omnis homo vel non est humanitas, vel humanitas solum est homo per accidens: unde Christus ut dicunt non suscepit hominem, sed humanitatem, que non potest esse idem ypostatice Verbo Dei. In istis ergo tribus radicibus et aliis ex eis consequentibus stat modernorum variacio ab antiquis. Magnam[1] quidem vim habent principia, cum eorum variacio dilatat distinccionem multiplicem posterius dicendorum. Oportet igitur supponere res communes: quod idem est forma substancialis cuiuslibet et formatum; ac demum, admittendo[2] predicacionem secundum essenciam, quod sicut in omni creato vel increato omne esse est essencia et e contra; sic omnis humanitas vel[3] esse hominis est homo sive assumpta sive suppositacione propria terminata.

that it is not possible for several natures or other singular things to be one. They posit, second, that every substantial form of a composite is essentially distinct from the subject, so far that some say that every material form of a substance can be separated by nature. And third they say that in every creature one may posit an essence which is not being but its cause, as light [is the cause] of radiance, or of shining.[13] From these they say consequently [146]that it is not possible for many natures to be the person of the Word. They say also that in every man his being and essence, and consequently the man himself and his humanity, are distinguished, so that every man either is not humanity, or humanity is man only by accident: hence Christ, as they say, did not take up a man but a humanity, which cannot be the same hypostatically with the Word of God. In these three roots, therefore, and in others following from them, stands the variation of the moderns from the ancients. Great indeed is the force that principles have, since their variation widens the manifold distinction of what is to be said afterwards. We must therefore suppose common things; that the substantial form of anything and what is formed are the same; and finally, admitting predication by essence, that as in everything created or uncreated all being is essence and conversely, so every humanity, or being of a man, is man, whether assumed or terminated by its own suppositation.[14]

¶12 146.17–146.24

[146]Quibus suppositis restat 3° tollere evidencias ex adverso. Videtur enim primo quod Verbum personam assumpsit, quia humanitatem assumpsit, que quidem humanitas est persona. Nec valet nude negare consequenciam, cum arguitur ordinate ab inferiori ad suum superius. Et talis deduccio a Deo approbatur quod conceditur exinde Verbum sumpsisse aliquid quod prius non fuerat. Et istam racionem Nestorianorum recitat Anselmus in De Incarnacione in principio ca° 7.

These being supposed, it remains, third, to dispose of the evidences from the opposing side. For it seems, first, that the Word assumed a person, since he assumed a humanity, which humanity is a person. Nor does it avail barely to deny the inference, since it is argued in order from the inferior to its superior. And such a deduction is approved by God, in that it is granted from it that the Word took something which had not been before.[15] And this argument of the Nestorians Anselm recites in *On the Incarnation*, at the beginning of chapter 7.[16]

Notes

1. *Ydemptice* "by identity" (142.22), the print; O reads *ydemptite*, for which Harris asks whether *Christi ydemptitate* "in the identity of Christ" should be read. *Ydemptificatus* "identified": made the same (*idem*) with the Word.
2. *A divinitate, a natura, et a substancia vel essencia divina* is taken as a list of three, *divina* reaching back over the whole; "[divine]" is supplied once. A B C read *directe* for *divinitate* (143.4), "directly from the nature and from the divine substance or essence"; the print, with O, is kept. O omits *sic* (143.5) and reads *quantum vel* for *quam eciam* (143.1).
3. *Conversio* (143.9), the print, with O; A B C omit it, though the next sentence argues against conversion (*Si autem esset conversio*). Conversion of one nature into another, not the logical conversion of a proposition.
4. *Incommunicantibus* (143.17), the print, with B C; A reads *communicantibus*, O *et communicantibus*. A and O agree across the families against the print, which by this edition's rule (see the headnote) would outrank it; the print is kept because the argument fails without it: *supra dictis* points back to the *naturis incommunicantibus* of 143.11, and 143.21–22 restate them as *tres incommunicantes nature*. O reads *conversacionis* for *conversionis* (143.14).

5. *Et mixtis* (143.20), the print, with O; A B C read *in mixtis*, "elements in mixed bodies, integrally composing the mixed body itself". A B C are one family against the print and O, so the print stands (see the headnote); read with the print, the mixed bodies are partial mixtures composing the whole. C omits *mixtum*.
6. Anselm, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi*, "c. 7" in Wyclif's division, which is c. 11 in Schmitt (II, 28.23–29.1) and c. VI in Migne (PL 158, 278B–C). Wyclif's chapter numbers for this work run one above Migne's (his "6" is Migne's V) (*verified*). The inner quotation follows the *Quicunque vult*, vv. 15–16, PL 88, 585B: *Ita Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus sanctus; et tamen non tres dii, sed unus Deus* (*verified*). A B C omit *enim*, B *et non … Deus* (144.4–6).
7. *Alius … alius* (masculine: another one, a person) against *aliud … aliud* (neuter: another thing, a nature): the formula on which the paragraph turns.
8. The formula "one thing and another, not one and another" (*aliud et aliud, non alius et alius*) goes back to Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ep.* 101 (to Cledonius), known in Latin, e.g. in Rusticus, *Contra Acephalos*, PL 67, 1226C (*Non alius vero et alius: absit … illic enim alius et alius … non aliud vero et aliud*). Wyclif's wording is Anselm's, just quoted (*non alius deus, alius homo … quamvis aliud sit deus, aliud homo*); the Augustine and Jerome he names are not checked (*verified*). O reads *et alia sit humanitas* (144.23).
9. *Res communes*: common things, the universals as realities outside the mind; the first root is the moderns' denial of them. A B C read *Pro quo* for *Pro 2°* (144.25).
10. *Sacramenta*: "sacraments" in the Augustinian sense, "mysteries" (1 Tim 3:16), beside *misterium* in the same sentence. Anselm, *De incarnatione Verbi* 1, on the dialecticians who cannot understand universal substance: who does not grasp *quomodo plures homines in specie sint unus homo* cannot grasp three persons one God, nor a man assumed *non personam* (Schmitt II, 10; PL 158, 265A–C, Migne's c. II; *verified*). A B C omit *vel forma*; A reads *videtur* for *Verbi* (144.31–33).
11. "For living things, to live is to be": Aristotle, *De anima* II.4, 415b13, where the soul is the essence of the living body, *vivere viventibus est esse* (*verified*). A B C omit *eius* (145.6).
12. Anselm, *De incarnatione Verbi* "7" (Schmitt c. 11, II, 29.3–4; PL 158, 278C, Migne's c. VI), where *homo* signifies *natura tantum quae communis est omnibus hominibus*. The formula that every universal form is the same as its supposits is Wyclif's, as Harris notes (on 145.19), not Anselm's words (*verified*). O reads *nec* for *ut* (145.17).
13. *Lux luminis*: *lux*, light at its source, against *lumen*, the light it gives off; the moderns' essence is to being as light to its radiance. A B C read *et lucere* (145.33). O reads *impossibile* (145.27), which would invert the moderns' first thesis.
14. *Vel esse hominis* (146.15), the print, with O; A B C read *est esse hominis*. A B read *dimitendo* "setting aside" for *admittendo* (146.13), which inverts the sense.
15. *A Deo* is taken as the agent, "approved by God"; it could mean "a deduction from [the term] 'God'". The objection's step: the humanity is "something", and the Word took something new.
16. Anselm, *De incarnatione Verbi*, beginning of "c. 7" in Wyclif's division, which is the opening of Schmitt's c. 11 (II, 28.14–22; PL 158, 278B, Migne's c. VI): *homo assumptus persona est, quia omnis homo individuus esse persona cognoscitur*. Anselm says only *quidam*; the label "Nestorians" is Wyclif's (*verified*).
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 144: *in Christo* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  - 144: *Iesum,* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  - 144: *'Verbum,* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Augustine, Jeroine, o Gregory; (144.12).

Part 2: The Word assumed a nature, not a person

Harris pp. 146.25–150.24

¶1 146.25–147.18

[146]Hic dicitur quod consequencia non valet, cum idem sit ac si sic argueretur—Verbum fecit se esse hominem, et esse hominem est esse personam: ergo Verbum fecit se esse personam—ubi constat quod antecedente existente necessario consequens est impossibile; cum tantum[4] una persona, que absolute necessario est Verbum, poterit esse Verbum, et per consequens cum Verbum non potest se facere illam personam, patet quod Verbum non potest facere se personam. Sed pro ulteriori declaracione notandum quod assumere personale, de quo scriptura cum sanctis doctoribus in proposito loquitur, [147] est duas naturas personaliter unire, id est,[1] duas naturas facere esse unum suppositum vel[2] personam, et ideo vocatur[2] unio personalis. Et potest secundum[3] tres gradus active intelligi. Primo pro active principiare unionem huiusmodi: et sic tota Trinitas assumpsit naturam humanam de quanto univit[4] eam ypostatice Verbo Dei. 2° striccius pro

Here the answer is that the inference is not valid, since it is the same as if it were argued thus: "The Word made himself to be a man, and to be a man is to be a person: therefore the Word made himself to be a person"; where it is evident that, the antecedent being necessarily [true], the consequent is impossible;[1] since only one person, which absolutely of necessity is the Word, could be the Word; and consequently, since the Word cannot make himself that person, it is clear that the Word cannot make himself a person. But for further clarification it is to be noted that personal assuming, of which scripture with the holy doctors speaks in the matter in hand, [147] is to unite two natures personally, that is, to make two natures to be one supposit or person; and therefore it is called personal union. And it can be understood actively in three degrees. First, for actively being the

activa[5] causancia principali unientis, ut ipsum fiat eadem persona cum natura unita; et sic natura divina univit vel assumpsit in supposito Verbi[6] naturam hominis; quia fecit naturam hominis esse eandem personam non eandem naturam cum persona divina. 3° strictissime dicitur assumere personale pro causancia persone quia fecit[7] naturam creatam[8] esse idem personaliter sibi ipsi. Et illo modo solum Verbum assumpsit hominem. Ex istis patet, cum[9] nulla assumpcio ypostatica sit eterna, quod oportet assumptum esse solummodo creaturam, quia nec alia persona, nec alia natura est Christi humanitas; licet sit creator, quia persona Verbi, que secundum deitatem non secundum ipsam creat omnia.

principle of such a union: and so the whole Trinity assumed the human nature, inasmuch as it united it hypostatically to the Word of God.[2] Second, more strictly, for the active principal causing of the one uniting, so that it becomes the same person with the nature united; and so the divine nature united or assumed in the supposit of the Word the nature of man; since it made the nature of man to be the same person, not the same nature, with the divine person. Third, most strictly, personal assuming is said for the causing [proper] to the person, since it made the created nature to be the same personally with itself. And in that way the Word alone assumed man.[3] From these it is clear, since no hypostatic assumption is eternal, that what is assumed must be only a creature, since Christ's humanity is neither another person nor another nature; although it is creator, since [it is] the person of the Word, which as to the Godhead, not as to it, creates all things.[4]

¶2 147.19–148.2

[147]2° patet, quod non potest esse personalis assumpcio nisi persona naturam assumpserit non personam.[10] Oportet enim personam assumere, quia aliter non esset unio personalis, nisi persona ydemptificaret sibi naturam. Et quod oportet personam assumentem naturam assumere non personam, patet ex hoc quod personarum personalis[11] ydemptificacio vel naturarum essencialis ydemptificacio est impossibilis, ut nullum unum suppositum potest esse aliud, nec una natura fieri potest alia. Sed sicut persone maxime entitatis uniuntur in suprema essencia vel natura, sic nature maxime distantes ydemptificantur in eodem supposito vel persona. Et patet quod natura divina non potest primo sibi assumere naturam aliam vel personam. Patet ex hoc quod non potest esse alia natura vel persona quam est ab intrinseco necessario absolute, et nullius talis potest esse assumpcio. Oportet [148]ergo naturam divinam unire[1] Verbo non nature primo quam sumpsit.[2]

Second, it is clear that there cannot be a personal assumption unless a person has assumed a nature, not a person. For a person must assume, since otherwise there would not be a personal union, unless a person identified a nature with itself. And that the person assuming must assume a nature, not a person, is clear from this, that the personal identification of persons, or the essential identification of natures, is impossible, as no one supposit can be another, nor can one nature become another. But as the persons of the greatest entity are united in the supreme essence or nature, so the most distant natures are identified in the same supposit or person. And it is clear that the divine nature cannot primarily assume to itself another nature or person. It is clear from this, that it cannot be another nature or person than it is, from within, necessarily and absolutely; and of no such thing can there be assumption. [148]Therefore the divine nature must unite [the nature] which it took to the Word, not primarily to a nature.[5]

¶3 148.3–149.9

[148]3° patet quod assumpcio ypostatica, unio, vel incarnacio, aut quomodocunque[3] aliter nominetur,[3] nec est generacio, nec conversio, nec alteracio, sed ydemptificacio; et si est mutacio, tunc est potissima mutacio dextere excelsi. Non enim est generacio, licet[4] generacio[4] ad ipsam consequatur:[5] sicut motus localis ad motum augmentacionis, cum omnis generacio temporalis sit a non-esse ad esse produccio: assumpcio[6] autem[6] videtur esse subsistencie[7] summe minoracio, cum Verbum ex incarnacione minoratum est paulo minus ab angelis, ut exponit Apostolus ad Hebre. 2° illud Psalmi 8[i]; 'minuisti eum paulo

Third, it is clear that hypostatic assumption, union or incarnation, or however else it may be named, is neither generation, nor conversion, nor alteration, but identification; and if it is a change, then it is the mightiest "change of the right hand of the most High".[6] For it is not generation, although generation follows upon it, as local motion [follows] upon the motion of augmentation; since every temporal generation is a production from not-being to being: but assumption seems to be a lowering of the highest subsistence, since the Word through the incarnation was made

minus ab angelis.' Nec est conversio, cum subsistencia Verbi manet summa secundum omnes eius proprietates non composita[8] cum aliquo. Nec est alteracio, tum quia humanitas assumpta non est inherens accidens; tum eciam quia persona secundum naturam precedentem humanitatem assumptam est omnino immobilis eo quod illi nature non potest accidens, ad quod est motus, formaliter inherere. Ex istis colligitur[9] racio quare sequitur quod Verbum assumendo humanitatem assumpsit essenciam, substanciam, aliquid, et naturam; et non assumendo illam humanitatem assumpsit individuum, suppositum, vel personam. Nam[10] illa[10] humanitas est per se inferius ad aliquid, essenciam, vel naturam; cum sit per se quiditas singularis in specie humana; persona autem[11] cum sit extra racionem generis creati est solum accidentaliter superius ad substanciam, aliquid et[12] quodcunque genus creatum. Cum ergo persona Verbi sit equivoce Verbum respectu humanitatis, patet quod non sequitur, si Verbum illam humanitatem assumpsit, que non primo per [149]se sed a Deo equivoce est persona, quod exinde assumpsit personam: ut in exemplo non sequitur—Petrus fecit se septipedalem, album, patrem, et sic de ceteris generibus accidencium: ergo Petrus fecit se esse aliquid—; quia est aliquid extra racionem quanti, vel qualis etc. Correspondenter Verbum esse personam est tanquam longe prius extra racionem humanitatis, sed esse aliquid est racio per se humanitatis; cum Christus, in quantum homo, est aliquid eciam quod prius non fuerat: ideo assumendo hominem assumpsit aliquid non personam.

a little lower than the angels, as the Apostle, Hebrews 2, expounds that [verse] of Psalm 8, "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels."[7] Nor is it conversion, since the subsistence of the Word remains highest according to all its properties, not composed with anything.[8] Nor is it alteration, both because the assumed humanity is not an inhering accident, and also because the person, according to the nature preceding the assumed humanity, is altogether immovable, since no accident, to which motion tends, can inhere formally in that nature. From these the reason is gathered why it follows that the Word, by assuming the humanity, assumed an essence, a substance, something and a nature; and [why it does] not [follow that], by assuming that humanity, he assumed an individual, a supposit or a person. For that humanity is of itself an inferior to "something", "essence" or "nature", since it is of itself a singular quiddity in the human species; but "person", since it is outside the account of the created genus, is only accidentally a superior to "substance", "something" and any created genus whatever. Since therefore the person of the Word is equivocally the Word with respect to the humanity,[9] it is clear that it does not follow, if the Word assumed that humanity, which is a person not first of [149]itself but from God, equivocally, that he thereby assumed a person: as in the example it does not follow: "Peter made himself seven feet tall, white, a father, and so of the other genera of accidents: therefore Peter made himself to be something"; since he is something outside the account of the quantified or the qualified, etc. Correspondingly, the Word's being a person is, as something long prior, outside the account of the humanity; now being something is of itself the account of the humanity; since Christ, insofar as he is man, is something also which he had not been before: therefore by assuming man he assumed something, not a person.

¶4 149.10–149.28

[149]Et si arguatur ex illo sequi quod Christus assumpsit personam hominis, sicut fecit se esse personam hominis: dicitur quod non hoc sed oppositum sequitur ex predictis; cum assumpcio non sit nisi nature per se possibilis, et, nulla[1] inherente accidente,[1] mutacio est assumpcio. Non enim quelibet faccio, sed solum faccio, qua natura racionalis fit Deus, est assumpcio vel ypostatica unio; et per conquens solum ydemptificacio est assumpcio.[2] Et patet quod sicut Christus fecit se esse hominem, animal, corpus, substanciam, et aliquid; sic assumpsit hec omnia in illa substancia singulari. Unde idem aliquid, quod fuit eternaliter est equivoce ad[3] illud aliquid quod[3] assumpsit. Ideo sicut albefactum sit[4] ut sic[4] coloratum et quale, licet perante fuerat

And if it is argued that from that it follows that Christ assumed the person of a man, as he made himself to be the person of a man: the answer is that not this but the opposite follows from what has been said; since assumption is only of a nature possible of itself, and, with no accident inhering, the change is assumption.[10] For not every making whatever, but only the making by which a rational nature becomes God, is assumption or hypostatic union; and consequently only identification is assumption. And it is clear that, as Christ made himself to be man, animal, body, substance and something, so he assumed all these in that singular substance. Hence the same something which was eternally is equivocally [something]

coloratum, quia aliter non esset alteracio possibilis: sic in proposito per incarnacionem Christus fit aliquid licet prius fuit aliquid. Sicut enim sufficit ad alteratum, quod ipsum sit alterum secundum gradum quam prius; sic sufficit ad alietatem Christi quod aliquid aliud sit Christus quam prius fuerat.

with respect to that something which he assumed. Therefore, as what is whitened becomes, as such, coloured and qualified, although it had been coloured before, since otherwise alteration would not be possible:[11] so in the matter in hand, through the incarnation Christ becomes something, although before he was something. For as it suffices for what is altered that it be other in degree than before, so it suffices for Christ's otherness that something other is Christ than he had been before.

¶5 149.29–150.16

[149]Et patet quod non est assumpcio nisi substancie; et per consequens nullius forme inherentis est assumpcio: ut Christus non assumpsit ypostatice se pati, mori, vel ascendere, quamvis se fecit huiusmodi; quia tunc ydemptificasset passionem, mortem, et ascensionem ypostasi Verbi, sicut fecit [150]humanitatem; quod est impossibile. Et sic quelibet nature racionalis accidentalis transmutacio esset assumpcio; quod repugnat supradictis. Persona ergo Verbi accidentaliter est persona hominis. Ergo sicut non assumpsit dominium[1] in mundi principio, nec filium hominis pro instanti incarnacionis; sic nec personam hominis, cum non assumpsit personam. Sed assumendo 'formam servi' fecit se esse personam hominis; licet nullam personam se fecerit, sed illam naturam, quam assumpsit, se fecerit:[2] cum sophisma illud non habet hic locum—Christus fecit se esse hominem, sed nullum hominem—; cum illam[3] humanitatem, et per consequens hoc aliquid se fecit, quod prius non fuerat. Unde si correspondenter esset persona hominis, que tunc et non prius[4] fuit Verbum Dei; tunc concedendum esset quod personam hominis assumpsit: sed assumptum est impossibile.

And it is clear that there is no assumption except of substance; and consequently there is no assumption of any inhering form: as Christ did not assume hypostatically his suffering, dying or ascending, although he made himself such; since then he would have identified the passion, death and ascension with the hypostasis of the Word, as he did [150]the humanity; which is impossible. And so every accidental transmutation of a rational nature would be assumption; which is incompatible with what was said above. The person of the Word, therefore, is accidentally the person of a man. Therefore, as he did not assume lordship in the beginning of the world, nor [the] son of man at the instant of the incarnation, so neither [the] person of a man, since he did not assume a person.[12] But by assuming "the form of a servant" he made himself to be the person of a man;[13] although he made himself no person, but made himself that nature which he assumed: since that sophism has no place here: "Christ made himself to be man, but no man"; since he made himself that humanity, and consequently this something, which had not been before. Hence, if correspondingly there were a person of a man which then and not before was the Word of God, then it would have to be granted that he assumed the person of a man: but the assumption is impossible.[14]

¶6 150.17–150.24

[150]2° principaliter obicitur per hoc quod videtur esse distinccio inter humanitatem, naturam, vel formam hominis et personam hominis; cum humanitatem, naturam, et formam hominis Verbum assumpsit,[5] non personam: et hoc sufficit ad inferendum distinccionem. Oppositum tamen dicit posicio, cum dicit naturam assumptam esse personam Verbi; et sic non videtur quod Verbum hominem assumpsit,[6] cum omnis homo sit persona, et nullam personam assumpserit.[6]

Second, as a main head, it is objected, by appeal to this, that there seems to be a distinction between the humanity, nature or form of man and the person of man; since the humanity, nature and form of man the Word assumed, not the person: and this suffices for inferring a distinction. Yet the position says the opposite, since it says that the assumed nature is the person of the Word; and so it does not seem that the Word assumed a man, since every man is a person, and he assumed no person.[15]

Notes

1. *Antecedente existente necessario*: the antecedent ("the Word made himself to be a man") is necessarily true once the incarnation is supposed, while the consequent ("the Word made himself to be a person") is impossible; so the form of the objection's inference fails. O reads *tamen* for *tantum* (146.29).
2. *Principiare* (147.4): to be the principle of, active, not the the glossary's passive *principiari*. *De quanto*: "inasmuch as". The whole Trinity works the union, the Word alone assumes (cf. the Lombard, *Sent.* III d. 1 c. 4, PL 192, 758–759: *Trinitas ergo carnis assumptionem fecit, sed Verbo, non Patri vel Spiritui sancto*; *verified*). O reads *vincit*, corrected in the margin by another hand to *univit* (147.6).
3. In the second degree *ipsum* (neuter) is the uniting principle, the divine nature; in the third, *sibi ipsi* is the person, the Word. O adds *causa* after *activa* (147.6); C reads *facit* for *fecit*, O *creata* for *creatam* (147.12).
4. *Secundum ipsam*: "as to it", the humanity. The humanity is creator because it is the person of the Word, who creates as to the Godhead, not as to the humanity. A B read *quod* for *cum* (147.14).
5. *Unire Verbo non nature primo quam sumpsit* (148.1–2): *quam sumpsit* is taken as a relative with its antecedent understood, "[the nature] which it took", the object of *unire*; O makes it explicit, *naturam quam sumpsit*. A reads *unisi* (sic), B *uniri* "be united"; A reads *sumpserit*, B M *assumpsit*.
6. Ps 76:11 (Vulgate numbering), "this is the change of the right hand of the most High".
7. Ps 8:6 (DR "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels"), as Heb 2:7 cites it; *minoratum est* is Heb 2:9, "who was made a little lower than the angels". A B read *assumpcio enim*, O *assumptum autem* (148.10).
8. *Subsistencie* (148.10), the print; O *substancie*. *Composita* (148.15), the print, with O (which writes *compos-* at the line's end and omits *-ita*); A B C read *componens* "not composing with anything". A B C read *tollitur* for *colligitur* (148.21).
9. *Equivoce Verbum*: construed as printed, "is equivocally the Word with respect to the humanity": the humanity is a person, and the Word, only from God and not first of itself (148.31–149.1). O reads *naturaliter* for *Nam illa* (148.24–25).
10. *Nulla inherente accidente* (149.14), the print, with O (which adds *in*); A B read *natura inherente accidente*, C *natura [?]ente accidente*. The sense: assumption is a change in which no accident comes to inhere. *Nature per se possibilis*, "of a nature possible of itself", is construed as printed and is doubtful.
11. *Fit* "becomes", with M (and O's *tit*, a slip for the same word), against the print's *sit* (149.22): Wyclif's own parallel, *Christus fit aliquid licet prius fuit aliquid*, needs "becomes". As printed: "as what is whitened is, as such, coloured". C reads *sit ut sit*. A B C vary at *ad illud aliquid quod* (149.21): A *ab illo quod*, corrected in the margin to *ob illud*; B *ab illo quod*.
12. God is called Lord only from the time there was a creature to serve him: Augustine, *De Trinitate* V.16.17, the relation that comes to God in time without change in him, PL 42, 921–922: *si dominus non dicitur, nisi cum habere incipit servum, etiam ista appellatio relativa ex tempore est Deo* (*verified*). O reads *donum* "gift" for *dominium* (150.4).
13. Phil 2:7, "taking the form of a servant". A B C read *fecerat* for *fecerit* (150.9).
14. *Assumptum*: the logician's sense, "the assumption" (the premiss supposed: that there was such a person of a man), not the assumption of the nature. C reads *plus* for *prius* (150.14).
15. A B C read *assumpserit* (150.20); O reads *assumpserat* at the second figure 6 (150.24).
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Heb. ii. (148.12); reference Ps.Tiii. (148.13).

Part 3: A distinction of reason, and in what sense the Word assumed man

Harris pp. 150.25–154.21

¶1 150.25–151.16

[150]Hic dicitur sicut[7] in materia De Trinitate, quod multiplex est distinccio, ut alia essencialis, alia personalis, et alia racionis. Unde distinccio racionis non interimit mutuam predicacionem distinctorum; ut natura specifica hominis, licet a Petro racione distinguatur,[8] cum ipsa sit communicabilis omni homini, Petrus autem non; et[9] tamen Petrus est illa natura specifica, et conversim, sed non ex equo. Et natura vel essencia divina racione distinguitur a persona, cum ipsa communicatur tribus personis producentibus vel [151]productis; nulla autem persona sic communicari poterit,[1] sicut nec natura divina adintra producere poterit[1] vel produci. Et tamen non obstante distinccione huius racionis omnis persona divina est natura divina et e contra. Correspondenter cum persona Verbi communicatur[2] humanitati et divinitati, patet quod est distinccio racionis inter personam illam et humanitatem; cum illa persona sit deitas, illa persona est eterna absolute necessaria equalis

Here the answer is, as in the matter of the Trinity,[1] that distinction is manifold: one essential, another personal, and another of reason. Hence a distinction of reason does not destroy the mutual predication of the things distinguished; as the nature of the species of man, although it is distinguished from Peter by reason, since it is communicable to every man, but Peter is not, yet Peter is that nature of the species, and conversely, but not on equal terms.[2] And the divine nature or essence is distinguished by reason from a person, since it is communicated to the three persons, producing or [151]produced; but no person could be so communicated, just as the divine nature within could not produce or be produced.[3] And yet, notwithstanding the distinction of this reason, every divine person is the divine nature, and the converse. Correspondingly, since the person of the Word is communicated to the humanity and to the divinity, it

simpliciter Deo Patri. Illa quidem[3] humanitas non potest esse deitas; sed est necessario temporalis, contingens, et minor simpliciter Deo Patre, licet sit personaliter illud, quod est deitas, absolute necessarium et equale simpliciter Deo Patri. Et patet illa distinccio non tollit predicacionem mutuam forme hominis et persone. Et patet quod assumptum in argumento est verum, sed negatur minor, cum nemo recte dicit oppositum.

is clear that there is a distinction of reason between that person and the humanity; since that person is the Godhead, that person is eternal, absolutely necessary, equal without qualification to God the Father. That humanity indeed cannot be the Godhead; but it is necessarily temporal, contingent, and less without qualification than God the Father, although it is personally that which is the Godhead, absolutely necessary and equal without qualification to God the Father. And it is clear [that] that distinction does not take away the mutual predication of the form of man and the person. And it is clear that the assumption in the argument is true, but the minor is denied, since no one rightly says the opposite.[4]

¶2 151.17–152.23

[151]Unde si moderniores admisissent predicacionem secundum essenciam vel personam, licet non formalem, concedendo tamen cum Anselmo in De Incarnacione 7°. quod natura specifica est singulus[4] hominum, sicut natura divina est singulum suorum suppositorum; et correspondenter quod persona cuiuscumque hominis est tam corpus quam anima, licet ille nature essencialiter distinguantur; et quod inter quamlibet personam hominis et illas naturas sit cum predicacione mutua distinccio racionis: tunc, inquam, saperet illis quod natura divina et natura humana sunt utraque persona Verbi, licet ille nature essencialiter distinguantur, et inter Verbum et utramque naturam sit distinccio racionis; et tunc saperet illis exemplum illud[5] philosophicum fidei in simbolo Athanasii quod[6] Augustinus tam crebro recitat; 'sicut anima racionalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus.' Diversio autem[7] ab istis principiis facit nimirum variacionem maximam consequenter. [152]Ulterius concedendum est de virtute sermonis[1] quod Verbum hominem assumpsit, sicut persepe dicunt Augustinus, Ieronimus, et Anselmus, et antiqui qui recte sapuerunt in logica. Cum enim homo sit concretum humanitatis, sicut Deus deitatis, patet quod potest indifferenter simpliciter supponere pro natura, vel personaliter pro persona; ut sicut Deus communicatur omnibus tribus personis divinis, quia deitas est sic communis, et tamen idem Deus incommunicatus, cum sit persona gignens; sic homo communicatur omni persone hominis,[2] cum sit forma specifica; et tamen homo non potest sic communicari, cum sit persona hominis; et correspondenter de aliis secundum supposicionem simplicem et personalem equivoce variatis. Unde quandocunque dicitur quod hominem Verbum assumpsit, intelligendum est simpliciter pro natura; ut humanitatem nedum specificam sed singularem assumpsit, quam Anselmus nominat Iesum Christum. Imo si diligenter attendimus quomodo homo quale-quid vel substancialem qualitatem primo

Hence, if the more modern had admitted predication by essence or by person, though not formal [predication], granting nevertheless with Anselm, in *De incarnatione* chapter 7, that the nature of the species is each one of men, as the divine nature is each one of its supposits;[5] and correspondingly that the person of any man is both the body and the soul, although those natures are essentially distinguished; and that between any person of a man and those natures there is, with mutual predication, a distinction of reason: then, I say, it would savour to them that the divine nature and the human nature are each the person of the Word, although those natures are essentially distinguished, and between the Word and each nature there is a distinction of reason; and then that philosophical example of the faith in the creed of Athanasius, which Augustine so often recites, would savour to them: "as the rational soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ."[6] Therefore the turning aside from these principles makes, no wonder, the greatest variation in what follows.[7] [152] Further, it is to be granted, in the proper sense of the words, that the Word assumed man, as Augustine, Jerome and Anselm very often say, and the ancients who were rightly wise in logic.[8] For since "man" is the concrete [term] of the humanity, as "God" of the Godhead, it is clear that it can stand indifferently, with simple supposition, for the nature, or with personal supposition for the person; so that, as God is communicated to all three divine persons, because the Godhead is so common, and yet the same God is uncommunicated, since he is the begetting person; so man is communicated to every person of a man, since it is the form of the species; and yet man cannot be so communicated, since it is the person of a man; and correspondingly of other [terms] varied equivocally according to simple and personal supposition. Hence whenever it is said that the

significat, ut dicunt Aristoteles et Anselmus, prius significaret talis proposicio—hominem Verbum assumpsit—quod naturam humanam assumpserat[4] quam quod personam hominis assumpserat.[4] Ideo est talis proposicio ad sensum primarium concedenda et sensus alius est negandus.

Word assumed man, it is to be understood with simple supposition, for the nature; so that he assumed the humanity not only of the species but singular, which Anselm names Jesus Christ.[9] Indeed, if we attend diligently to how "man" primarily signifies a what-of-a-kind or substantial quality, as Aristotle and Anselm say, such a proposition (the Word assumed man) would signify that he had assumed the human nature before [it would signify] that he had assumed the person of a man.[10] Therefore such a proposition is to be granted in its primary sense, and the other sense is to be denied.

¶3 152.24–153.9

[152]Et si queritur[5] diversitas inter illos terminos humanitas et homo quoad modum significandi cum, licet de se mutuo predicentur, refert tamen multibi[6] ponere unum vel relicum: dicitur quod more aliorum terminorum quorum unus est concretus aliusque abstractus, concretum supponit indifferenter personaliter pro persona vel simpliciter pro natura; et hinc recipit formalem predicacionem cuiuscumque generis accidentis: abstractum autem abstractive tentum non suscipit formaliter nisi predicacionem per se et predicacionem secundum habitudinem abiciendo omnem formalem predicacionem [153]suppositalem; ut humanitas non est qualis aut quanta accidenter, nec agit, nec patitur, sedet vel ditatur,[1] sed predicaciones respectivas recipit modo quo dictum est de universalibus; ut, si humanitas esset alba, cum humanitas sit esse hominem, tunc esse hominem foret formaliter esse album; et per consequens, ut arguit Aristoteles, homo tunc esset albedo. Et patet quod Verbum solum humanitatem vel naturam humanum assumpsit, non personam hominis; licet secundum alium sensum omnis humanitas sit persona.

And if the difference is asked between those terms "humanity" and "man" as to the mode of signifying, since, although they are predicated of each other, yet it matters in many places to put the one or the other: the answer is that, in the manner of other terms of which one is concrete and the other abstract, the concrete stands indifferently, with personal supposition for the person or with simple supposition for the nature; and hence it receives formal predication of any kind of accident: but the abstract, taken abstractively, does not formally take up any predication but predication of itself and predication by respect,[11] rejecting all formal [153]suppositional predication; so that the humanity is not qualified or quantified by accident, nor acts, nor is acted on, sits or is enriched,[12] but it receives relational predications in the way that was said of universals; so that, if the humanity were white, since the humanity is to be a man, then to be a man would be formally to be white; and consequently, as Aristotle argues, man would then be whiteness.[13] And it is clear that the Word assumed only the humanity or human nature, not the person of a man; although in another sense every humanity is a person.

¶4 153.10–154.11

[153]Verumptamen notandum est quod in materia de incarnacione doctores sancti utuntur isto termino 'humanitas' tanquam medio inter abstractum et concretum: ut Augustinus Ome. 19. super Iohannem dicit, quod 'Maria humanitatem genuit que eciam in cruce passa est'; et Enchiridion 29°; 'illam, inquit, creaturam quam virgo concepit et peperit, quamvis ad solam personam Filii pertinentem, tota[2] Trinitas fecit.' Inseparabilia enim[3] sunt opera Trinitatis, et indubie per 'illam creaturam' intelligit substanciam humanam, que est humanitas, cum paulo ante dicit utramque substanciam, divinam scilicet[4] et humanam, esse Filium unicum Dei Patris. Et sic de multis similibus, que omnia cum eis similibus intelligenda sunt, quod persone Verbi Dei insunt

Nevertheless it is to be noted that in the matter of the incarnation the holy doctors use this term "humanity" as a mean between abstract and concrete: as Augustine says in homily 19 on John, that "Mary bore the humanity, which also suffered on the cross"; and *Enchiridion* 29: "that creature," he says, "which the virgin conceived and bore, although belonging to the person of the Son alone, the whole Trinity made." For the works of the Trinity are inseparable, and undoubtedly by "that creature" he understands the human substance, which is the humanity, since a little before he says that each substance, namely the divine and the human, is the only Son of God the Father.[14] And so of many like [sayings], all of which, with those

huiusmodi predicata[5] secundum quod[6] homo; hoc est,[6] humanitas est medium vel causa, secundum quam predicata huiusmodi insunt; ut non haberet unde temptaretur, gigneretur, vel meritorie pateretur, et[7] sic de aliis communicacionibus[7] ydiomatum, nisi assumendo naturam hominis. Nec mirum de ista transsumpcione dispari in illa materia, cum[8] [solum] Verbum Dei sit homo per accidens prius persona quam homo[8]; cum solum illa personalitas trahit[9] sibi naturam singularem in suam ypostasim; alie autem persone similis[10] nature sunt cum aliis[10] formis singularibus. [154]Ideo[1] sic cum dico hoc—'passus[1] est in cruce'—multi fideles sunt indifferentes ad intelligendum[2] illam passionem secundum deitatem vel humanitatem: multi autem proniores ad intelligendum hoc secundum illam naturam secundum quam habet subsistenciam et personam. Ideo racionabiliter ordinarunt sancti specialiter[3] in illa materia ad destruccionem ambiguitatis huiusmodi et certificacionem sentencie pertinentis, quod abstractum[4] limitaret ad sensum expositum. Quandocunque ergo dicitur quod humanitas Christi suscepit[5] predicaciones huiusmodi, intelligendum est quod Christus secundum illam sic suscipit.

like them, are to be understood [to mean] that predicates of this kind are in the person of the Word of God insofar as [he is] man; that is, the humanity is the means or cause according to which predicates of this kind are in [him]; so that he would not have whence to be tempted, to be begotten, or meritoriously to suffer, and so of the other communications of idioms, except by assuming the nature of man. Nor is this uneven transumption in that matter a wonder, since only the Word of God is man by accident, being person before man;[15] since only that personality draws to itself a singular nature into its hypostasis; but the other persons of like nature are [persons] with other singular forms. [154]Therefore thus, when I say this, "he suffered on the cross", many of the faithful are indifferent to understanding that passion as to the Godhead or as to the humanity; but many are more inclined to understand it as to that nature according to which he has subsistence and person.[16] Therefore the saints reasonably ordained, especially in that matter, for the destruction of ambiguity of this kind and the making certain of the pertinent teaching, that the abstract should limit to the sense expounded. Whenever, therefore, it is said that the humanity of Christ took up predications of this kind, it is to be understood that Christ as to it so takes them up.[17]

¶5 154.12–154.21

[154]3° principaliter arguitur deducendo[6] multiplicia inconveniencia[6] que secuntur. Nam primo videtur quod nedum idem est assumens et eciam assumptum, sed quod assumens est assumptum, creans est creatum, causa suum causatum; ymo si Dominus Iesus Christus sit assumptus, tunc et Deus assumitur, sicut humanitas[7] humiliatur:[7] et per consequens secundum duplicem naturam fuit duplex Christi assumpcio: ymo si nature tam distantes ydemptificari potuerunt, multo evidencius ypostases, que in natura magis conveniunt, tanta ydemptitate uniri potuerunt.[8]

Third, as a main head, it is argued by deducing many absurdities that follow.[18] For first it seems that not only is the same thing assuming and also assumed, but that the assuming is the assumed, the creating is the created, the cause its caused; indeed, if the Lord Jesus Christ is assumed, then God too is assumed, as the humanity is humbled:[19] and consequently, according to the twofold nature, there was a twofold assumption of Christ: indeed, if natures so distant could be identified, much more evidently could hypostases, which agree more in nature, be united by so great an identity.

Notes

1. *In materia De Trinitate*: Harris italicises *De Trinitate* as a title; but the phrase names the topic, the doctrine of the Trinity, as *in materia de incarnacione* does at 153.10. O reads *quod* for *sicut* (150.25).
2. "Yet", without "and": A C O omit *et* before *tamen* (150.30), against the print's *et tamen*; agreement across the families outranks the print. A B C read *distinguitur* for *distinguatur* (150.29).
3. O omits *sicut … poterit* (151.1–2), by eye-skip from *poterit* to *poterit*; O reads *communicati et* for *communicatur* (151.5) and *quieta* for *quidem* (151.9).
4. *Assumptum* is the logician's premiss, not the assumption of a nature: the objection's premiss (the Word assumed the humanity, not a person, 150.19–20) is true; the minor that would make it infer a distinction excluding mutual predication is denied.
5. Anselm, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi*, c. 7 in Wyclif's numbering (Schmitt c. 11; PL 158, c. VI, 278B–D): *in Deo una natura est plures personae*, and the person has the *collectionem … proprietatum, quibus homo communis sit singulus. Singulus hominum* "each one of men" (151.20) is the print; A B C read an abbreviated *sing…s*, O *singulis*. *Predicacio secundum personam* is set beside the ruled *predicacio secundum essenciam*.
6. The *Quicumque* (Athanasian Creed), v. 37 (PL 88, 586B). Augustine uses the likeness at *In Iohannis evangelium* tr. 78.3 (PL 35, 1836), *Epistula* 137.3.11 (PL 33, 520) and *Enchiridion* 11.36. *Saperet illis* "it would savour to them", i.e. they would grasp it; Wyclif plays on *sapuerunt in logica* (152.3). A B C omit *illud* (151.29); O reads *et* for *quod* (151.30).

7. "Therefore" with C (*ergo*) and O (*igitur*), against the print's *autem* (151.32, with A B): agreement across the families. As printed: "And the turning aside …".
8. That the Word assumed man (*hominem*): Augustine, *Enchiridion* 11.36 (*suscepit hominem*) and *De Trinitate* XIII.18.23; Anselm, *De incarnatione Verbi* (PL 158, 275C, 278B). For Jerome the phrase is found in the *Breviarium in Psalmos* (PL 26, 877C), which went under his name. A's text was erased and corrected in the margin to *de vi vocis* "by the force of the words" (152.1).
9. *Simpliciter* here is the supposition term (simple supposition, the term standing for the common nature), set against *personaliter* (personal supposition), not "without qualification". Anselm names the singular assumed man *Jesus*: *Verbum, et illum assumptum hominem, id est Jesum* (*De incarnatione Verbi*, PL 158, 279B, c. VI = Wyclif's 7). Wyclif takes this as a name of the singular humanity.
10. "Man" signifies *quale quid*, a substance of a kind: Aristotle, *Categories* 5, 3b13–21, and Anselm, *De grammatico* c. 19 (PL 158, 578B–C), where *homo* signifies *ut unum substantiam et qualitates* and is *non qualitas, sed quale*. *Prius … quam* "before … rather than". O omits *quam … assumpserat* (152.21).
11. *Habitudo* here in its "respect" sense: predication under a relation, as of a universal. *Per se*: predication of the essence itself. O reads *queretur* (152.24); A B C read *multicubi* for *multibi* "in many places" (152.26), the same word.
12. The categories in turn: quality, quantity, action, being-acted-on, position (*sedet*), having (*ditatur* "is enriched"). C O read *dicatur* "is said" for *ditatur* (153.2); it fits no category in the list, and the print is kept.
13. Aristotle's argument, *Metaphysics* VII.6, 1031a19–28: if an accidental unity were the same as its essence, the essence of man and of white man would be the same. Wyclif's conclusion that man would be whiteness is his own application. *Naturam humanum* (153.8) is the print's form for *humanam*.
14. Augustine, *Tractatus in Iohannem* 119.1 (PL 35, 1950; Wyclif's "19" probably drops a C): *quod Maria pepererat, pendebat in cruce*, cf. tr. 8.9 (PL 35, 1455), *genuisti infirmitatem meam … cum ipsa infirmitas pendebit in cruce*. Wyclif's sentence paraphrases this and puts *humanitas* for Augustine's *infirmitas*; *Enchiridion* 12.38 (PL 40, 251), where the *paulo ante* is earlier in the same section: *utraque substantia, divina scilicet atque humana, Filius est unicus Dei Patris*. O reads *totum* for *tota* (153.16), *non* for *enim* (153.17), omits *scilicet* (153.20).
15. "Only", with C O, which read *solum* (153.29); Harris brackets it as corrupted from the next line's *cum solum* and would omit it, an emendation against every manuscript that has the clause (A B omit *cum … homo*, 153.29–30). O reads *quod homo est quod* for *quod homo; hoc est* (153.23), *coicantibus* for *communicacionibus* (153.26–27), *transit* for *trahit* (153.30); A B C read *simul nature sunt cum illis* (153.32).
16. *Ideo sic cum dico hoc* is O's reading (154.1); A B C read *ideo cum sic dico homo*, "when I say thus, 'man suffered on the cross'"; Harris thinks *sic* or *hoc* superfluous. The nature by which he has subsistence and person is the divine nature: hence the saints' use of the abstract "humanity" to fix the predicate to the other.
17. *Suscepit* "took up" (154.9) stands in the print beside the foot's "*suscepit* O"; the print's own form here is in doubt. C omits *specialiter* (154.6) and reads *abstractis* (154.8).
18. *Inconveniencia* in its logical sense: absurd consequences. A B read *deducendo ad multiplicia inconveniencia*, O *deducenda* (154.12–13).
19. *Humiliatur* (154.17), the print, with O, read on the plate; A B C read *humanitas humanatur* "the humanity is humanated". O omits the final *potuerunt* (154.21).
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 154: *hoc—'passus* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  - 154: *humanitas* (print as transcribed (humanitas humiliatur)) [SUB]

Part 4: The assuming is the assumed; Christ's twofold sonship and twofold assumption

Harris pp. 154.22–158.23

¶1 154.22–156.16

[154]Ad illud conceditur quod sicut natura divina est generans et generatum, et natura specifica humana cum sit homo pater et eius filius, et per consequens efficiens[9] et effectum; sic Verbum commune[10] ad hec tria deitas, corpus, et anima est simul assumens et assumptum; et racione communicacionis personalis, que distinguitur a duabus prioribus, in quibus est communicacio naturarum, suppositis[11] istis, conceditur quod assumens et assumptum, quamvis in Trinitate non generans, sed illud quod est gignens est genitum; et sic non communis humanitas, sed persona, gignit et gignitur. Ideo aliter [155]loquendum est in communicacione personarum quam communicacione[1] naturarum eidem supposito. Verumptamen licet Verbum sit assumens et assumptum, tamen non assumitur, sed est natura que assumitur. Et conformiter conceditur quod causans est suum causatum, et[2] creans est suum creatum.[2] Nec ex illo sequitur

To that it is granted that, as the divine nature is generating and generated, and the human nature of the species, since it is a man [who is] father and his son, is consequently efficient and effect; so the Word, common to these three, the Godhead, body and soul, is at once assuming and assumed; and by reason of the personal communication, which is distinguished from the two prior ones, in which there is communication of natures to supposits,[1] it is granted that the assuming [is] the assumed, although in the Trinity [it is] not [granted that] the generating [is the generated], but that that which is begetting is begotten; and so not the common humanity but the person begets and is begotten.[2] Therefore one must [155]speak otherwise in the communication of persons than in the communication of natures to the same supposit. Nevertheless, although the Word is the assuming and

quod idem secundum[3] idem[3] causat se, cum Verbum solum secundum naturam divinam causat se secundum naturam humanam. Unde non sequitur, quod Deus assumitur, quia predicatum assumpcionis limitat ad naturam creatam excludendo actum persone vel nature divine assumpto competere: et aliter non esset concedendum quod Deus assumitur, nisi quia vel[4] natura vel persona divina assumitur, quorum[5] utrumque cum sit impossibile docet negandum esse quod Deus assumitur.[5] Et patet quod non est color concedendi quod natura divina creatur, assumitur, patitur, moritur etc. licet Christus, qui est natura divina, predicaciones tales recipiat; cum non secundum deitatem sed secundum humanitatem illas suscipiat. Et in isto sophismate[6] cecatus est ille Clericus in fide devius,[7] contra quem Anselmus fecit librum De Incarnacione; credidit enim si natura divina sit homo, tunc et omne, quod est natura divina, est homo, et[8] per consequens confuse quelibet persona divina est quelibet, vel tres persone[8] divine sunt tres homines; ignoravit enim naturam rerum communium. Licet autem negetur quod Deus assumitur, conceditur tamen quod Deus subicitur, humiliatur, et sic de similibus predicatis formalibus; generari quidem vel nasci non solum competit supposito sed nature. Ideo conceditur quod Christus, sicut est duplex essencia vel natura, sic habet duplex esse et duplicem nativitatem: et[9] iuxta illos qui restringunt racionem filii ad suppositum vel personam, tunc tantum una est filiacio in Christo, sicut tantum inest sibi una personalitas, ita quod filiacio [156]humana accidit[1] filiacioni divine, sicut singularitas hominis accidit personalitati[2] divine. Et sic filiacio humana in Christo simpliciter[3] non est filiacio; cum, multiplicata filiacione que est racio filii, multiplicarentur et filii; sed est genitura temporalis. Aliis autem plus[4] placet, cum quibus et michi, quod est dare in Christo[5] duplicem filiacionem, sicut et duplicem nativitatem, non autem duplicem personalitatem, cuius racio est nasci, sicut et mori competit persone Christi[6] racione humanitatis et non per se[6] primo illi nature. Ergo[7] per idem vel evidencius filiacio competit supposito primo racione nature, et non primo illi nature.[7] Et hoc sentenciant moderni, qui dicunt, quod natura assumpta non est filius, sed per eius dimissionem[8] Maria potuit[9] duos filios habuisse sine actu gignicionis duplici, vel sine hoc quod illa natura fuit filius Marie pro instanti aliquo vite sue, cum senex inciperet esse filius hominis, quando inciperet dimitti.

the assumed, yet he is not assumed, but it is a nature that is assumed.[3] And conformably it is granted that the causing is its caused, and the creating is its created. Nor does it follow from that that the same thing causes itself according to the same, since the Word causes himself as to the human nature only as to the divine nature. Hence it does not follow that God is assumed, because the predicate of assumption limits to the created nature, excluding that an act of the divine person or nature belongs to what is assumed: and otherwise "God is assumed" would not be to be granted except because either the divine nature or the divine person is assumed; and since each of these is impossible, it teaches that "God is assumed" must be denied.[4] And it is clear that there is no colour for granting that the divine nature is created, is assumed, suffers, dies, etc., although Christ, who is the divine nature, receives such predications; since he takes them up not as to the Godhead but as to the humanity.[5] And in this sophism that cleric astray in the faith was blinded, against whom Anselm made the book *De incarnatione*; for he believed that if the divine nature is man, then everything too that is the divine nature is man, and consequently, indistinctly, any divine person is any [other], or the three divine persons are three men; for he was ignorant of the nature of common things.[6] And although it is denied that God is assumed, it is nevertheless granted that God is subjected, is humbled, and so of like formal predicates; to be generated, indeed, or to be born belongs not only to the supposit but to the nature. Therefore it is granted that Christ, as he is a twofold essence or nature, so has a twofold being and a twofold nativity: and according to those who restrict the account of a son to the supposit or person, there is then only one sonship in Christ, as only one personality is in him, so that the human [156]sonship befalls the divine sonship, as the singularity of a man befalls the divine personality. And so the human sonship in Christ is not, without qualification, a sonship; since, if sonship, which is the account of a son, were multiplied, sons too would be multiplied; but it is a temporal begetting. But it pleases others more, and with them me too, that one may posit in Christ a twofold sonship, as also a twofold nativity, but not a twofold personality; the account of which [sonship] is to be born, as also to die belongs to the person of Christ by reason of the humanity, and not of itself first to that nature.[7] Therefore, by the same token or more evidently, sonship belongs to the supposit first by reason of the nature, and not first to that nature.[8] And this the moderns pronounce, who say that the assumed nature is not a son, but that by its laying-aside Mary could have

had two sons without a twofold act of begetting, or without that nature's having been the son of Mary for any instant of its life, since an old man would begin to be the son of a man when it began to be laid aside.[9]

¶2 156.17–157.11

[156]Licet autem talia ludicria sint impossibilia, tamen videtur probabile quod Christus racione humanitatis habeat filiacionem humanam, sicut racione eiusdem nature habet nativitatem[10] temporalem; potissime cum filiacio sit realis relacio persone[11] in genere sicut alia accidencia Christo humanitus dependent a parente temporali: non sic autem personalitas absoluta, cum persona dicitur ethimologice per se una: illa ergo non dependet relative ab extremo, nec ab actu temporali, ut nativitas, concepcio, sive gignicio. Unde vel oportet dici[12] quod filiacio eterna accidentaliter sit filiacio hominis, vel quod filiacio hominis non sit filiacio. Secundum non est dandum cum iste terminus hominis vel humanus non distrahit. Primum autem ex hoc videtur deficere quod filiacio eterna non potest fieri filiacio temporalis. Christus ergo habet in se tot filiaciones quot parentes, sicut Petrus in se tot proporciones duplas et similitudines [157]quot rebus ipse[1] duplus vel similis est. Et sic[1] cum Ioseph fuit pater eius, ut patet[2] testimonio beate virginis Luce 2°; 'ecce pater tuus et ego dolentes querebamus te;' patet quod Christus habuit ad istum parentem vel nutricium filiacionem legitimam putativam; non autem fuit filius adoptivus, cum non potuit esse filius perdicionis, et illa potencia vel imperfeccio presupponitur ad filium adoptivum. Verumptamen 'predestinatus est Filius Dei,' ut dicit Apostolus ad Rom. 1°. illa[3] quidem creatura ordinata est eternaliter esse Dei Filius naturalis ut[3] sepe dicit Augustinus, et recitat eum Magister 3°[4] Sentenciarum Dist. 6ª.

But although such playthings are impossible, yet it seems probable that Christ by reason of the humanity has a human sonship, as by reason of the same nature he has a temporal nativity; most of all since sonship is a real relation of the person in its category, as the other accidents depend in Christ humanly on a temporal parent: but not so the absolute personality, since a person is called, by etymology, "one by itself": that, therefore, does not depend relatively on a term, nor on a temporal act, such as nativity, conception or begetting.[10] Hence it must be said either that the eternal sonship is accidentally the sonship of a man, or that the sonship of a man is not a sonship. The second is not to be posited, since this term "of a man" or "human" is not a diminishing qualifier. And the first seems to fail from this, that the eternal sonship cannot become a temporal sonship. Christ, therefore, has in himself as many sonships as parents, as Peter has in himself as many double proportions and likenesses [157]as there are things to which he is double or like. And so, since Joseph was his father, as is clear from the testimony of the blessed virgin, Luke 2[:48], "behold thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing", it is clear that Christ had toward this parent or foster-father a lawful reputed sonship; but he was not an adoptive son, since he could not be a son of perdition, and that potency or imperfection is presupposed to an adoptive son.[11] Nevertheless, "he was predestinated the Son of God", as the Apostle says, Romans 1[:4]: that creature, indeed, was ordained eternally to be the natural Son of God, as Augustine often says, and the Master recites him in book 3 of the *Sentences*, distinction 6.[12]

¶3 157.12–157.18

[157]Redeundo ergo ad propositum conceditur quod Christus assumitur, sicut incepit esse et aliquando non fuit; et[5] negatur[6] quod Deus assumitur vel aliquando non fuit,[5] licet ille sit Christus. Et movet me inter alia anathema, quod Augustinus in Exposicione Fidei illud negantibus imprecatur: 'si quis, inquit, dixerit atque crediderit hominem[7] Iesum Christum a Filio Dei assumptum non fuisse, anathema sit.'

Returning, therefore, to the purpose, it is granted that Christ is assumed, as he began to be and at some time was not; and it is denied that God is assumed or at some time was not, although he is Christ.[13] And among other things there moves me the anathema which Augustine, in the *Exposition of the Faith*, calls down on those who deny it: "if anyone," he says, "says and believes that the man Jesus Christ was not assumed by the Son of God, let him be anathema."[14]

¶4 157.19–158.9

[157]Quod si obicitur quod alius sit sensus quem[8] verba pretendunt, dico quod ad sensum catholicum, quem et[9] ipse conceperat, loquor. Ego puto quidem me in recta logica et philosophia huius sancti dimissis sophismatibus scripture[10] sacre contrariis educari.[10] Christus ergo assumpsit hominem et non Deum, licet ille homo sit Deus. Nec est color negandi quod Deus sit exinanitus,[11] passus, humiliatus, et sic de predicatis creatis. Et[12] sic negatur,[12] quod Deus assumptus est; predicatum enim assumi limitat ad supposicionem simplicem pro[13] natura, ut—si Deus assumptus est, tunc est deitas—sicut[13] homo assumitur ex hoc quod humanitas est assumpta. Ulterius cum[14] assumpcio respicit [158]naturam, conceditur quod, sicut duplex natura a Christo assumitur, scilicet corpus et anima, sic[1] duplex fuit[1] in Christo simplex assumpcio et una completa ad humanitatem principaliter terminata. Nec[2] exinde sequitur quod aliqua illarum posset esse non existente reliqua; sed[3] ordo nature extitit inter[3] illas, ut assumpcio anime fuit prima; et mediante illa assumptum est corpus; et tercio ex his unita est completa humanitas, et totum in eodem instanti temporis, quo iste nature incipiunt esse.[4]

And if it is objected that the sense is other than the words purport, I say that I speak to the catholic sense, which he too had conceived.[15] I think, indeed, that I am trained in the right logic and philosophy of this saint, sophisms contrary to holy scripture being laid aside. Christ, therefore, assumed man and not God, although that man is God. Nor is there colour for denying that God was emptied, suffered, was humbled, and so of the created predicates. And so it is denied that God was assumed; for the predicate "to be assumed" limits to simple supposition for the nature, so that, if God was assumed, then it is the Godhead [that was assumed], as man is assumed from the fact that the humanity is assumed.[16] Further, since assumption regards [158]the nature, it is granted that, as a twofold nature is assumed by Christ, namely body and soul, so there was in Christ a twofold simple assumption, and one complete [assumption] terminated principally at the humanity. Nor does it follow thence that either of them could be while the other did not exist; but an order of nature stood between them, so that the assumption of the soul was first, and by means of it the body was assumed, and thirdly from these the complete humanity was united; and the whole in the same instant of time in which these natures begin to be.[17]

¶5 158.10–158.23

[158]Quoad ultimum de ydemptitate constat michi quod numerose evidencie volant hodie[5] ad probandum per locum a simili quod quidlibet[6] potest ydemptificari cuilibet, si natura[7] prope nichil potest fieri[7] Deus: exinde enim concluditur quod Deus quamlibet naturam creatam potest assumere, et sic de multis inaniter geminatis. Utrum autem ydemptitas personalis naturarum disparium in Christo sit maior quam ydemptitas personarum[8] in eadem natura simplici, est difficultas. Certum tamen est quod iste ydemptitates sunt disparium racionum et ydemptitas Trinitatis in prima essencia, cum presupponitur ad omnem aliam, est maior quam reliqua, licet non in proporcione racionali.[9] Quoad instancias factas per locum a simili, patet ex dictis quod similitudo non est probabilis.

As to the last, about identity, it is evident to me that numerous evidences fly about today to prove, by the topic from likeness, that anything whatever can be identified with anything whatever, if a nature next to nothing can become God: for thence it is inferred that God can assume any created nature whatever, and so of many things idly doubled.[18] But whether the personal identity of unlike natures in Christ is greater than the identity of persons in the same simple nature is a difficulty. Yet it is certain that these identities are of unlike kinds, and the identity of the Trinity in the first essence, since it is presupposed to every other, is greater than the other, though not in a natural proportion.[19] As to the objections made by the topic from likeness, it is clear from what has been said that the likeness is not probable.

Notes

1. "Of natures to supposits", with C O, which omit *istis* (154.28), against the print's *suppositis istis* "these being supposed": agreement across the families, and Wyclif's own phrase at 155.2, *communicacione naturarum eidem supposito*. B C read *effectus* for *effectum* (154.24); M reads *quoad* for *commune* (154.25).
2. Elliptical: *conceditur quod assumens [est] assumptum*; in the Trinity "the generating is the generated" is not granted (the nature does not generate), but "what is begetting is begotten" is, of the person.

3. *Assumptum* "the assumed", the participle as a noun: the Word is, by identity, what was assumed; *assumitur* predicates the act, which belongs to the nature. C adds *personarum* after *communicacione* (155.2).
4. All the manuscripts read *vel quia* at *vel* (155.12), against the print: "unless because either because the nature or the person …"; adopted, the English is the same. O omits *et creans … creatum* (155.5–6); A reads *illud* in *secundum idem* (155.6); B omits *quorum … assumitur* (155.13–14).
5. *Color*: a plausible ground. The predicates "is created, is assumed, suffers, dies" are received by Christ as to the humanity, not by the divine nature.
6. The cleric is Roscelin of Compiègne, against whom Anselm wrote the *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi* (c. 1, PL 158, 262A, *a quodam clerico*; named in Anselm's *Ep.* II.41, PL 158, 1192D, *Roscelinus clericus*), as Harris notes. A B add *Nestorius* after *devius*, C *n.* (155.19), a reader's gloss; A B C read *sophistice* for *sophismate* (155.19). O garbles *et per consequens … persone* (155.22–23).
7. *Cuius racio est nasci* is taken of the sonship: being born is its account, and belongs to the person by reason of the humanity. A B C omit *simpliciter* (156.3) and *plus* (156.5); B omits *in Christo* (156.6); O omits *Christi … per se* (156.9).
8. This sentence stands in O only: A B C omit *Ergo … nature* (156.10–11).
9. *Dimissionem* (156.13): the foot gives "*dimissionem* O", the print's own word, so the print's reading here is in doubt. The moderns' case: if the nature were laid aside, the man left would only then begin to be a son of a man. C omits *potuit* (156.13).
10. *Persona … per se una*: the etymology (*per se una*) that makes personality absolute, not relative like sonship; *extremum* is the term of a relation. A C read *filiacionem* for *nativitatem* (156.20); O reads *per se* for *persone* (156.21) and *oporteret dicere* (156.26).
11. Luke 2:48. *Filius perdicionis*: John 17:12, "the son of perdition"; adoption presupposes one who could have been lost, which Christ could not. *Potencia* is the capacity in the Aristotelian sense. B omits *ut patet* (157.2).
12. Rom 1:4 (DR "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power"). Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 15.31 (PL 44, 982), recited by the Lombard at *Sent.* III d. 7 (PL 192, 774). Wyclif's d. 6 is where the Lombard recites *Enchiridion* 11.36, *ex quo homo esse coepit, non aliud coepit esse homo quam Dei Filius* (PL 192, 768). A B read *illa quidem creata naturalis ordinata est eternaliter esse filius dei ut*, C *illa ordinata est eternaliter esse dei filius* (157.9–10); O omits *3°* (157.11).
13. C O omit *et negatur … non fuit* (157.13–14), by eye-skip from *non fuit* to *non fuit*: without it *licet ille sit Christus* qualifies nothing, so the print stands. A B read *negetur*.
14. A creed transmitted under Augustine's name: Ps.-Augustine, *Sermo* 233 (*De fide catholica*), PL 39, 2176, cited by the Lombard as Augustine *in Expositione Symboli* (*Sent.* III d. 5, PL 192, 767), whence Wyclif's title. A B C read *dominum* for *hominem* (157.17).
15. "Other than", *quam* with A B C (157.19), against the print's *quem*, which O has only as a later marginal addition in another hand; as printed: "that the sense which the words purport is another". A B C omit *et* (157.20).
16. *Tunc est deitas*: the predicate makes "God" stand with simple supposition for the nature, so "God was assumed" would assert that the Godhead was assumed. A B read *scripture contrariis educare*, C omits the words (157.22–23); A B C read *inanitus* (157.25); A B C *et sic negetur*, O *et si negatur* (157.26); C omits *pro … deitas* (157.28–29).
17. *Sic duplex fuit* (158.2): A B C *sic duplex sit*, O *sicut duplex fuit*. O omits *nec* (158.4); A B C read *sed est ordo nature inter* (158.5–6); O omits *esse* (158.9).
18. *Natura prope nichil*: a nature next to nothing, as prime matter as Augustine calls formless matter *informe prope nihil* (*Confessiones* XII.6.6, PL 32, 828; cf. XII.8.8, XII.19.28). *Quidlibet* (158.12): A has *quid libet* by another hand on an erasure, B *quelibet*, C *quilibet*; O reads *natura prope nichil fieri posset* (158.12–13). C omits *hodie* (158.11).
19. "Natural", *naturali* with C O (158.21), against the print's *racionali* (A B): agreement across the families. As printed, "not in a rational proportion", the mathematician's ratio between commensurable quantities. B omits *personarum* (158.17).
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Luke 48- (157.2); reference Rom- »• 4- (157.8); reference 15 s° Augustine, (157.15).

Part 5: Three examples that lead the faithful to the mystery

Harris pp. 158.24–160.9

¶1 158.24–160.9

[158]Sed dimissis arguciis queritur communiter racio diversitatis, quam est difficile placide assignare, cum sit de fundamento nature; ut quare Deus agens libere contradictorie adextra potuit illud tempus eternum, et non aliud nisi eius partem producere et sic de similibus. Prima ergo pars questionum huiusmodi vel non habet causam,[11] vel consequitur essencialiter ad Deum, sicut passio ad subiectum. Causa autem negative, que est secunda pars questionis, absolute necessaria est per se divina essencia. Cum enim[12] [159]non potest fieri quod due persone fiant eadem persona in numero, aut[1] due nature eadem natura

But, quibbles laid aside, the reason of the difference is commonly asked, which it is difficult to assign calmly, since it belongs to the foundation of nature: as, why God, acting freely, as between contradictories, outward, could produce that eternal time, and no other but its part, and so of like things.[1] The first part of questions of this kind, therefore, either has no cause, or follows essentially upon God, as an attribute upon its subject. And the cause of the negative, which is the second part of the question, is, absolutely necessary, the divine essence of itself.[2] For since [159]it cannot

in numero,[1] vel quod Verbum aliam naturam assumpserat;[2] patet quod solum Deus est causa huius. Quod si dicatur adversarium eque faciliter sustinere oppositum sicut illud a nobis fingitur, dicitur quod tales contenciones sophistice secundum Apostolum sunt nimis inutiles, et ideo debet theologus ipsas abicere[3] tenendo illud quod fides Christiana, scriptura sacra, et sanctorum doctorum consors sentencia ab antiquo nos edocet. Et in omni secta sunt multa credita[4] que nec sufficiunt nec expedit protervo deducere. In[5] hoc tamen[5] excedit secta Christiana quascunque alias, quod maxime archana sue fidei copiose probari possunt, miracula explanari in naturali lumine evidenciis et exemplis philosophicis, necnon omnes impugnatorum argucie evidenter tolli eciam ex naturalibus et propriis eorum principiis. Ut triplex exemplum[6] ponitur quod fidelis poterit manuduci ad credendum incarnacionis misterium. Primum quomodo duo accidencia diversorum generum, quorum nullum secundum genus potest esse reliquum, sunt idem subiecto ut quantitas et qualitas; non quod sint[7] nature, res, sive substancie[7] que possunt a subiecto et[8] a se invicem separari, sed quod eidem subiecto inest esse quantum et quale; sicut eidem supposito Verbi inest esse tam Deum quam hominem. 2^{m} exemplum propius est, quod eidem[9] essencie corporee inest posse igniri, quod est materia prima, et accidentaliter esse ignem quod est forma; et sic materia et forma tam dispares sunt eadem essencia, que[10] adventu forme sit aliud quam prefuit; sicut humanitas et deitas sunt eadem persona,[10] que est aliud quam prefuit. 3^{m} exemplum propinquissimum creatorum est de unione ypostatica corporis humani ad animam. Nam eadem persona est tam corpus [160]quam anima, aliud propter corpus et aliud propter spiritum, sed non alius. Proporcionaliter est de Christo, qui est duarum naturarum utraque. Nam sicut eadem persona hominis nunc est tantum spiritus, nunc cum hoc aliud quia corpus; sic et Christus necessario est deitas sed contingenter humanitas. Raciones autem alias diversitatis et alias conveniencias scit peritus satis elicere et raciones oppositas plane dissolvere.

be that two persons become the same person in number, or two natures the same nature in number, or that the Word had assumed another nature, it is clear that God alone is the cause of this. And if it is said that an adversary sustains the opposite as easily as that [position] is devised by us, the answer is that such sophistical contentions, according to the Apostle, are exceedingly unprofitable,[3] and therefore the theologian ought to reject them, holding that which the Christian faith, holy scripture and the concordant teaching of the holy doctors teach us from of old. And in every sect there are many things believed which neither suffice, nor is it expedient, to be deduced for an obstinate man.[4] Yet in this the Christian sect exceeds all others whatever, that the secrets of its faith can most of all be copiously proved, its miracles explained in natural light by evidences and philosophical examples, and also all the quibbles of its assailants evidently removed, even from their own natural and proper principles. So a threefold example is set down by which a faithful man could be led by the hand to believing the mystery of the incarnation.[5] The first: how two accidents of different genera, of which neither can, as to its genus, be the other, are the same in subject, as quantity and quality; not that they are natures, things or substances that can be separated from the subject and from each other, but that to be quantified and qualified is in the same subject; as to be both God and man is in the same supposit of the Word.[6] The second example is nearer: that in the same bodily essence there is being able to be set on fire, which is prime matter, and accidentally being fire, which is form; and so matter and form, so unlike, are the same essence, which at the coming of the form is other than it was before; as the humanity and the Godhead are the same person, which is other than it was before.[7] The third example, the nearest of created things, is of the hypostatic union of the human body to the soul. For the same person is both body [160]and soul, one thing by reason of the body and another thing by reason of the spirit, but not another one.[8] Proportionally it is with Christ, who is each of two natures. For as the same person of a man is now only spirit, now with this something else, because body, so Christ too is necessarily the Godhead but contingently the humanity. And other reasons of difference and other agreements the skilled man knows well enough how to draw out, and to dissolve plainly the opposite arguments.

Notes

1. Obscure as printed: *potuit illud tempus eternum, et non aliud nisi eius partem producere* is construed literally, the question why God produced this time and not another, nor more than a part of it. *Adextra* "outward", the works of God outside himself, against *adintra*.
2. *Causa … negative*: the cause why the contrary cannot be (the second part of the question) is the divine essence itself, of necessity. C omits *causam* (158.29); A B C omit *enim* (158.32).
3. Tit 3:9 (Harris's margin; DR "contentions … For they are unprofitable and vain"). A reads *ipsas abicere*, corrected by another hand to *ipsis*; B *ipsis obicere*; C *ipsis abicere* (159.7). B omits *aut … numero* (159.2); O reads *assumat* (159.3).
4. *Que nec sufficiunt nec expedit protervo deducere*: the plural *sufficiunt* has the things believed as subject; construed "which neither suffice to be deduced, nor is it expedient to deduce them, for the obstinate". A B C read *tradita* "handed down" for *credita* (159.10), and *et in hoc tantum* for *in hoc tamen* (159.11).
5. O omits *exemplum* (159.16).
6. *Sint nature, res, sive substancie* (159.20–21), with B C; A *sint vere res sive substancie*; O abbreviates, perhaps *sicut nature limitate substancie*. A B C omit *et* (159.21).
7. *Que adventu … persona* (159.27–29) is wanting in A B C; O has it, abbreviated. O reads *idem* for *eidem* (159.24).
8. *Aliud … sed non alius*: the neuter (another thing) against the masculine (another one, a person), the patristic formula of the two natures in one person.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Tit. iii. 9. (159.6).

Chapter 10

Part 1: The moderns' negation, and the first arguments against it

Harris pp. 160.0–164.27

¶1 *160.0–160.0*

[160][Suadet 12 evidenciis quod humanitas assumpta sit Christus; et hoc roborat doctorum testimoniis et exemplis. The proposition that the humanity assumed is Christ proved by twelve arguments; and supported by the authority of the Fathers.]

[It makes the case with twelve pieces of evidence that the humanity assumed is Christ; and it strengthens this with the testimonies and examples of the doctors.]

¶2 *160.10–161.2*

[160]Quia maior pars variacionis in ista materia stat in methaphisica de humanitate assumpta; ideo expedit iuxta ponere sentencias contrarias supradictis. Dicunt enim moderni concorditer[1] quod humanitas Christi nec est homo, nec suppositum, vel persona, licet sit substancia racionalis composita[2] ex corpore[2] et anima, que sunt partes hominis Iesu Christi; sed dimissa illa natura suppositacioni proprie,[3] ut[4] possit per possibile[4] quod maneat non assumpta, tunc foret homo et modo non est homo. Ideo dicunt quod diffinicio hominis negacionem includit formaliter, ita quod descriptive homo sit substancia ex corpore et anima intellectiva composita[5] non suppositata suppositacione[6] aliena. Et quia ultima differencia deficit nature assumpte cum [161]suppositatur suppositacione Verbi; ideo[1] stante assumpcione ypostatica non est homo.

Because the greater part of the variation in this matter lies in the metaphysics of the assumed humanity, it is therefore expedient to set beside [them] the teachings contrary to those stated above. For the moderns say with one accord[1] that the humanity of Christ is neither man, nor supposit, nor person, although it is a rational substance composed of body and soul, which are parts of the man Jesus Christ; but, that nature laid aside to its own suppositation, as it can be, by a possible case, that it remain unassumed, then it would be a man; and now it is not a man.[2] Therefore they say that the definition of man includes a negation formally, so that, by way of definition, man is a substance composed of body and intellective soul, not supposited by an alien suppositation.[3] And because the last difference is lacking to the assumed nature when [161]it is supposited by the suppositation of the Word, therefore, while the hypostatic assumption stands, it is not a man.

¶3 *161.3–161.19*

[161]Ista sentencia[2] iam famosa est michi et forte aliis magis difficilis quam aliqua sentencia antiquorum doctorum superius inculcata. Primo ergo videtur quod Christi humanitas non suppositatur suppositacione aliena: nam[3] nec est nec fit suppositum: et omne suppositari est fieri vel esse suppositum: ergo non suppositatur. Preterea si aliqua suppositacione suppositatur cum illa nulli[4] alii creature[4] conveniat, videtur quod sit suppositacio sibi propria, et sic non aliqualiter aliena. Confirmatur ex hoc quod suppositacio qua suppositatur formaliter est solummodo temporalis et per consequens dependet ab illa humanitate, sicut accidens respectivum dependet essencialiter ab extremo. Quod si dicatur suppositacionem illam esse suppositum Verbi, tunc indubie cuiuslibet suppositi creati suppositacio dependet a suppositacione

This teaching, now well known, is to me, and perhaps to others, more difficult than any teaching of the ancient doctors pressed home above.[4] First, then, it seems that the humanity of Christ is not supposited by an alien suppositation: for it neither is nor becomes a supposit: and every being-supposited is becoming or being a supposit: therefore it is not supposited. Moreover, if it is supposited by some suppositation, since that belongs to no other creature, it seems that it is a suppositation proper to it, and so not in any way alien. This is confirmed from this: the suppositation by which it is formally supposited is only temporal, and consequently depends on that humanity, as a relational accident depends essentially on its extreme.[5] But if it is said that that suppositation is the supposit of the Word, then undoubtedly the suppositation of any created supposit

aliena, quia a supposito increato et ad illud finaliter terminatur; et per consequens nullum esset suppositum creatum.

depends on an alien suppositation, since it is ultimately terminated from the uncreated supposit and at it; and consequently there would be no created supposit.

¶4 161.20–162.11

[161]Sed hic dicit Doctor Subtilis super 3° Sentenciarum Dist. 1ª Questione articuli 3ⁱ quod est dare triplicem[5] negacionem, sicut et triplicem dependenciam pertinentem. Aliquid enim[6] actualiter dependet a suppositacione aliena, quando est natura completa suppositi nature superioris; ut humanitas Christi[7] non est suppositum, sed natura suppositi Verbi; et si Verbum faceret ipsam esse non naturam persone[8] superioris, tunc esset suppositum et persona. Nichil[9] ergo deficit ad hoc quod sit persona nisi ista negacio quod non est natura suppositi superioris nature. Ideo suppositacio, quam habet in potencia terminatur suppositacione Verbi, que non actu sed potencia est aliena a suppositacione nature humane. 2ª dependencia vocatur potencialis;[10] quando scilicet [162]natura racionalis dependet a supposito increato a quo potest assumi, sed nondum assumitur in unitatem persone; sed et talem negacionem oportet naturam creatam habere, ut sit persona[1] hominis. 3ª est dependencia obediencialis,[2] qua omne suppositum substancie essencialis dependet a qualibet persona increata, sed eciam[3] potest assumi in unitatem suppositi increati, ut sit communicacio[4] ydiomatum, et ut ipso facto natura persone increate vere Deus sit lapis vel lignum vel cuiuscunque speciei substancie[5] individuum; sicut Deus iam est individuum speciei[5] humane, licet natura talis non possit esse[6] persona divina.

But here the Subtle Doctor, on the third [book] of the *Sentences*, dist. 1, question, article 3, says that one may posit a threefold negation, as also a threefold pertinent dependence.[6] For something actually depends on an alien suppositation when it is the complete nature of a supposit of a higher nature; as the humanity of Christ is not a supposit but the nature of the supposit of the Word; and if the Word made it not to be the nature of a higher person, then it would be a supposit and a person. Nothing, therefore, is lacking for it to be a person but this negation, that it is not the nature of a supposit of a higher nature. Therefore the suppositation which it has in potency is terminated by the suppositation of the Word, which is alien from the suppositation of the human nature not in act but in potency.[7] The second dependence is called potential: namely when [162]a rational nature depends on an uncreated supposit by which it can be assumed, but is not yet assumed into the unity of person; but a created nature must also have such a negation, that it may be a person of a man.[8] The third is obediential dependence, by which every supposit of an essential substance depends on any uncreated person, but also can be assumed into the unity of an uncreated supposit, so that there is a communication of idioms, and so that by that very fact the nature of an uncreated person, truly God, is a stone or wood or an individual of any species of substance; as God now is an individual of the human species, although such a nature cannot be a divine person.[9]

¶5 162.12–162.25

[162]Dimissa autem contencione verbali, quod suppositacio Verbi non est aliena a suppositacione nature assumpte, cum illa non sit; arguitur primo contra illud[7] per hoc quod omnis homo-non-Deus per se est homo: omnis natura humana completa non assumpta est homo: ergo omnis talis natura per se est homo, et per consequens non potest vicissim nunc esse homo et nunc non-homo. Maior licet sit famosa apud philosophos potest[8] ex hoc patescere, quia aliter humanitas non esset species vel quiditas cuiuscunque persone[9] hominis; cum potest manere idem quod est modo[10] et non homo. Non ergo predicatur homo in quid de aliquo supposito[11] humano; et per idem nulla potest esse per se species in genere substancie, cum omnis substancia potest esse idem quod est, et non esse individuum huius speciei.

But, setting aside the verbal contention that the suppositation of the Word is not alien from the suppositation of the assumed nature, since the latter is not,[10] it is argued first against it by appeal to this: every man-not-God is of itself a man: every complete human nature not assumed is a man: therefore every such nature is of itself a man, and consequently it cannot by turns be now man and now not-man. The major, although it is well known among the philosophers, can be made plain from this: that otherwise the humanity would not be the species or quiddity of any person of a man, since it can remain the same as it is now and [be] not a man. Therefore “man” is not predicated in quid of any human supposit; and by the same token nothing

can be of itself a species in the genus of substance,[11] since every substance can be the same as it is and not be an individual of this species.[12]

¶6 162.26–163.13

[162]Item impossibile est aliquid esse accidentaliter alicuiusmodi[12] nisi sibi insit accidens a quo est huiusmodi formaliter sicut patet ponenti respectus et accidencia distincta: sed omnis homo iuxta hanc viam accidentaliter est homo: ergo est dare formam accidentalem qua est homo formaliter. Sed et hoc concedunt plurimi dicentes quod in assumpcione ypostatica negacio supradicta corrumpitur et in dimissione [163]ypostatica generatur: et per illam est homo formaliter aliquid positivum, ut nichil, in quantum caret visu vel non habet hoc vel illud, est aliquid. Ex quo sequitur quod nichil in quantum homo vel persona hominis est aliquid vel alicuiusmodi[1] positivum; cum quicquid aut cuiusmodicunque[2] homo nunc est, assistente negacione quod non suppositatur[2] suppositacione aliena, potest esse adveniente suppositacione aliena ipso facto non[3] homine vel persona. Quod est contra Augustinum 7° De Trinitate 9° volente, quod persona in quantum huiusmodi, est aliquid, non ad aliquid. Si ergo nemo potest fieri qualis aut quantus nisi moveatur, multo magis nemo potest fieri homo cum hoc quod non exinde moveatur; aliter enim non esset generacio.

Again, it is impossible for something to be accidentally of some kind unless an accident is in it by which it is formally of this kind, as is clear to one who posits relations and accidents distinct [from their subjects]: now every man, according to this way, is accidentally a man: therefore one may posit an accidental form by which he is formally a man. But most concede this too, saying that in the hypostatic assumption the negation stated above is corrupted, and in the hypostatic laying-aside [163]it is generated: and by it man is formally something positive, as nothing, insofar as it lacks sight or does not have this or that, is something.[13] From which it follows that nothing, insofar as [it is] man or the person of a man, is something or of some positive kind; since whatever, or of whatever kind, a man now is, with the negation present that he is not supposited by an alien suppositation, he can be, with an alien suppositation supervening, he being by that very fact not a man or person.[14] Which is against Augustine, *De Trinitate* 7, [chapter] 9, who holds that a person, insofar as [it is] such, is something, not relative to something.[15] If, then, no one can become qualified or quantified unless he is moved, much more can no one become a man without being moved thereby; for otherwise there would not be generation.

¶7 163.14–163.33

[163]Item eo ipso quod forma inseparabilis inest[4] mere formaliter alicui, ipsum denominat[5]: sed humanitas est forma inseparabiliter existens cuicumque nature humane: ergo si inest alicui singulari nature ipsam denominat[5]: sed non potest denominare quicquam primo formaliter nisi hominem: ergo, si inest nature create formaliter, ipsa est homo. Cum[6] ergo humanitas manet continue in natura humana assumpta, videtur quod stante assumpcione erit homo continue sicut prius. Minor videtur ex hoc quod omnis homo est formaliter humanitate homo, sicut mobile movetur motu formaliter, album denominatur albedine, et paciens passione. Humanitas ergo manens post unionem denominat[5] formaliter Christum esse hominem et non dicta negacio: ymo cum ipse sit homo[7] nobiscum univoce et in[7] sua racione, non oportet negacionem ponere, sed ipse humanitate est homo formaliter, videlicet[8] quod eadem sit racio cuiuslibet fratris sui. Ipse enim non potest suppositari suppositacione aliena, nec negacione; sed humanitate oportet ipsum esse singulare speciei humane formaliter: ergo per idem et alios univoce consimilis speciei.

Again, by the very fact that an inseparable form is merely formally in something, it names it: now the humanity is a form existing inseparably in any human nature: therefore, if it is in any singular nature, it names it: now it cannot name anything primarily [and] formally except a man: therefore, if it is formally in a created nature, that [nature] is a man. Since, then, the humanity remains continually in the assumed human nature, it seems that, while the assumption stands, it will be a man continually, as before. The minor appears from this: every man is formally a man by humanity, as a movable is moved formally by motion, a white thing is named by whiteness, and what is acted on by being-acted-on.[16] The humanity, therefore, remaining after the union, formally names Christ to be a man, and not the said negation: indeed, since he is a man univocally with us and in his own account, it is not necessary to posit a negation, but he is formally a man by humanity, namely, that the account of each of his brothers is the same.[17] For he cannot be supposited by an alien

¶8 *164.1–164.27*

[164]Item iuxta dicta De Universalibus omnis humanitas est suppositum humanum esse hominem: sed, posito quod Verbum assumat ypostatice naturam Petri, manebit ista assumpta humanitas: ergo manebit quod idem suppositum est homo; et sic personam manentem personam Verbum assumeret. Pro[1] assumpto non est facile fingere, quid sit humanitas, quam Apostolus vocat 'formam servi,'[2] nisi esset[3] hominis vel humana essencia. Et ex isto[4] videtur quod alia nova humanitas incepit[5] esse homo, quando Christus incepit esse homo, humanitate[5] Petri extincta per assumpcionem; quia quod Verbum est homo, tunc incipit[6] esse et quod Petrus est homo tunc desinit. Ex quo patet quod non assumpsit naturam Petri, cum illa natura manet modo[7] tantum distans a Verbo ut prius. Nam illa res, que prius[8] fuit suppositum Petri, nec est natura nec persona divina, nec est homo modo sicut nec Christus est natura humana: per antecedens[9] vero ista res et Christus conveniebant in specie sic quod uterque fuit homo ut suppono[10]: ergo maior fuit conveniencia tunc quam modo. Nec valet dicere quod Christus est homo formaliter non negacione[11] nec humanitate, sed ypostatica unione; quia sic foret racio qua[12] Christus est homo multum equivoca a racione qua quicumque alius est homo[13]; quod indubie sequitur[13] multiplici racione. Nam quilibet alius homo dicitur formaliter homo negative[14] et per consequens racione increata; Christus autem dicitur homo per unionem ypostaticam, que nulli alii potest competere.

suppositation, nor by a negation; but by humanity he must be formally a singular of the human species: therefore by the same token others too, univocally of a like species.

Again, according to what is said in *De universalibus*, every humanity is "a human supposit's being a man": now, supposing that the Word hypostatically assumes the nature of Peter, this assumed humanity will remain: therefore it will remain that the same supposit is a man; and so the Word would assume a person remaining a person.[18] On the assumption it is not easy to imagine what the humanity is, which the Apostle calls "the form of a servant", unless it were the essence of a man, or a human essence.[19] And from this it seems that another, new humanity began to be a man when Christ began to be a man, the humanity of Peter being extinguished through the assumption; since "the Word is a man" then began to be, and "Peter is a man" then ceases. From which it is clear that he did not assume the nature of Peter, since that nature now remains as far distant from the Word as before.[20] For that thing which before was the supposit of Peter is neither a nature nor a divine person, nor is it now a man, just as Christ is not a human nature either: and beforehand this thing and Christ agreed in species, so that each was a man, as I suppose: therefore there was greater agreement then than now.[21] Nor does it avail to say that Christ is formally a man not by negation nor by humanity, but by hypostatic union; since thus the account by which Christ is a man would be very equivocal from the account by which anyone else is a man; which undoubtedly follows for manifold reasons. For any other man is called formally a man negatively, and consequently by an uncreated account; but Christ is called a man through the hypostatic union, which can belong to no other.[22]

Notes

1. "With one accord": A B omit *concorditer* (160.13; C abbreviates it, *conco*). The moderns' position, set out here and through the next paragraphs, is that the humanity is a man only by a negation (not being supposited by another's suppositation).
2. *Suppositacioni proprie* is dative: the nature let go to a suppositation of its own; O reads *prope* "near". *Ut possit per possibile* (160.17) is the print; A B C all read *posito* (C *ut posito possibile*, B *ait posito per possibile*, A *ut posito proporcionale*): one recension against O, and the print stands. "And now it is not a man": while it is assumed.
3. *Diffinicio … descriptive*: *diffinicio*, and then *descriptive*, the adverb of *descripcio*; the glossary renders both "definition". The negation stands in the definition as its last difference. O reads *composit* (160.21). For *suppositacione* (160.21) A reads *suppesitata*, over an erasure by another hand, and B C read *supposicione* "supposition".
4. *Inculcata* "pressed home". O reads *sentenciam* (161.3) and *et iam* for *nam* (161.6).
5. A relation depends on its extreme, the term it is toward; so a temporal suppositation would depend on the humanity it belongs to. O reads *nulli nature* "to no nature" for *nulli alii creature* (161.9).
6. Scotus, *Ordinatio* III d. 1 q. 1, third article, n. 9 (Wadding VII.1, 16–17): *distinguendum est inter dependentiam actualem, potentialem, et aptitudinalem*; a created person has the negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence, never of the potential, since no created nature is incapable of being assumed by the Word. Scotus's names are not Wyclif's: Scotus has *aptitudinalem* where Wyclif

has *obediencialis*, and the dependence Scotus says a created nature is never without (being assumable by the Word) is the one Wyclif describes under "obediential" (*potest assumi*, 162.6). It is not his "potential" (161.32–162.4), whose negation he says a created nature must have. Wyclif's "question, article 3" is q. 1, art. 3. B omits *dare* (161.21); O omits *enim* (161.23) and *Christi* (161.25).
7. *Potencia* in Aristotle's sense, potency against act. The foot notes that every manuscript abbreviates *persone* (161.27), and that the abbreviation can also mean *per se*: "not to be of itself a superior nature". O reads *vel* for *Nichil* (161.27).
8. *Potencialis* "potential" (161.32) is O's reading, printed; A B C read *personalis* "personal". The print stands (one recension against O), and "potential" answers the *in potencia* of the first dependence. At 162.4 A B C read *pars hominis* "a part of a man" for *persona hominis*.
9. *Obediencialis* (162.4) is O's alone: A B leave a space of twelve letters, C omits without one. O reads *et* for *eciam* (162.6); C omits *communicacio* (162.7); O omits *substancie … speciei* (162.9–10), the eye passing from *speciei* to *speciei*; A B C read *posset* (162.11), O *possit persona* without *esse*. *Natura persone increate vere Deus* may also be read with *natura* as ablative: "that God, by the nature of an uncreated person, is truly a stone".
10. *Cum illa non sit*: the suppositation of the assumed nature is not, so nothing is "alien" to it; the plain existential sense.
11. *Nulla potest esse per se species*: *per se* goes with *esse species*, as with *per se est homo* (162.15–17), not with *in genere*; *nulla* agrees with *species* ("no species can be a species of itself") or with *natura* understood (162.16), with the same sense.
12. *Predicatur in quid*: predicated as answering "what is it?", the essential predication of a species. O omits *potest* (162.19) and *supposito* (162.23); B reads *per se* for *persone* (162.20); C *numero* for *modo* (162.21).
13. A privation such as blindness is not something positive; the argument says the moderns' negation makes "man" no more positive than that. A B C read *alicuius* for *alicuiusmodi* (162.26–27, 163.5).
14. A B C read *supponitur* for *suppositatur* (163.7); O reads *in* for *non* (163.8). *Ipso facto non homine vel persona* is an ablative absolute.
15. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII.6.11 (PL 42, 943): *ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad Filium vel Spiritum sanctum.*
16. *Passio* here is the category against action: what is acted on is so by its being-acted-on, as a movable by motion. A B C omit *inest* (163.14) and read *denominant* (163.15, 17, 25); B adds *et* before *Cum* (163.19).
17. *Homo nobiscum univoce et in sua racione* (163.26–27) is the print with O; A B C read *homo unitate in sua racione* "a man by unity in his account", A B with a space of eight letters. The argument turns on *univoce*, and the print stands. O reads *unde* for *videlicet* (163.28). Christ's brothers: Heb. 2:17.
18. Wyclif's own *De universalibus* c. 8 (ed. Dziewicki, *Miscellanea philosophica* II, 49): *Est humanitas in me … cum sit me esse hominem*, the humanity as the supposit's being a man. Peter is the stock case of an existing man whose nature the Word is supposed to assume.
19. *Pro assumpto*: the logician's premiss, here the case supposed at 164.2–3 (*posito quod Verbum assumat … naturam Petri*), not the assumption of a nature. It could also be read "as for what was assumed", the nature the Apostle calls the form of a servant; the argument stands either way. Phil. 2:7; B omits *servi* (164.7). A B C add *et* before *Pro* (164.6) and read *esse hominis* "the being of a man" for *esset hominis* (164.8); B reads *quo* for *isto* (164.8).
20. "Began", *incepit*, with C O, against the print's *incipit* (164.11): agreement across the families. At 164.9–10 the print joins the readings: A B C have *incepit quando Christus incepit esse homo humanitate*, without the first *esse homo*; O has *incepit esse homo humanitate*, without the *quando* clause. B reads *non* for *modo* (164.14).
21. "Beforehand", *per ante*, with A B C and O's *per añ*, against the print's *per antecedens* "by the antecedent" (164.17); the next clause sets *tunc* against *modo*. O omits *prius* (164.15).
22. *Negative … racione increata*: any other man is a man by the negation of being supposited by an uncreated supposit, so by an account taken from the uncreated. O omits *non negacione* (164.20), reads *quia* for *qua* (164.22) and *homo et dubie sequitur quod* (164.23); A B C read *negacione* for *negative* (164.25).
How the Latin of this passage was established
- None.

Part 2: That Christ is univocally a man only if the humanity is Christ

Harris pp. 164.28–167.22

¶1 164.28–166.7

[164]Item quilibet alius homo a Christo[15] est per se humanitas; Christus secundum istam viam non potest esse humanitas: ergo non est univoce homo cum alio. Maior patet ex hoc quod licet omnis homo per accidens sit homo, tamen eo ipso [165]quod est[1] humanitas, cum iuxta hanc viam post assumpcionem manebit non homo sed humanitas: sed cum illa humanitas non inceperit[2] esse per assumpcionem, sequitur quod prius manserat iste homo. Hoc 2° confirmatur ex eo quod omne per accidens oportet[3] reduci ad aliquid per se[3]: sed Petrus est per

Again, every man other than Christ is of itself a humanity; Christ, according to this way, cannot be a humanity: therefore he is not univocally a man with another.[1] The major is clear from this: that, although every man is a man by accident, yet by the very fact [165]that he is a humanity [he is a man], since according to this way, after the assumption, he will remain not a man but a humanity: now since that humanity did not begin to be through the assumption, it follows that before, it had remained this man.[2] This is confirmed, second, from this: everything by accident must be

accidens homo: ergo est prius per se aliquid, quod potissime foret humanitas. 3° per istud[4] quod ista humanitas adequate individuatur ex eisdem principiis ex quibus iste homo: ergo sunt idem: non ergo potest esse ordo causandi inter eos. Et consequencia principalis ex hoc videtur quod, dato antecedente, Christus et quicumque alius homo non forent eiusdem nature univoce. Nam quilibet alius homo foret natura humana in recto: Christus non potest esse natura humana sed nature humane: igitur sicut Deus non predicatur univoce de creatura, de qua solum dicitur in obliquo, et de persona divina, de qua dicitur in recto; sic nec humanitas dicitur univoce de Christo et aliis: et per consequens non sunt univoce eiusdem nature: ymo cum humanitas sit nomen competentissimum speciei per se predicatum de suis suppositis[5] et non homo, humanitas autem non potest predicari in recto de Christo, videtur quod Christus non sit eiusdem speciei cum homine. Confirmatur ex hoc quod Christus non potest esse alicuius[6] speciei: ergo Christus non est singulare[7] speciei humane. Nam[8] per adversarios non potest esse[6] aliquid nisi deitas, sed[9] ipsa[10] non potest esse aliquid speciei humane[8]: ergo Christus non potest esse aliquid speciei humane. Si enim deitas foret illius speciei, tunc foret causabilis passibilis et activa, sicut alia individua speciei: quod est impossibile. Ideo, si non fallor, repugnat isti vie,[11] quod Christus sit eiusdem speciei cum aliis. Et in ista methaphisica vellem me studuisse, quando sollicitabam[12] me, si quantitas, motus, [166]et cetera accidencia distinguantur. Subtilior enim est distinccio humanitatis a Verbo quam accidentis huiusmodi a subiecto; cum[1] secundum moderniores[2] Petrus inficians[3] in ista hora per assumpcionem et dimissionem potest esse homo et post non homo[4] sine[5] generacione vel corrupcione alicuius rei vel motu aliquo pertinente; quod non contingit eciam de relacione.

reduced to something of itself: now Peter is a man by accident: therefore he is first of himself something, which would most of all be the humanity. Third, by this: this humanity is adequately individuated from the same principles from which this man [is]: therefore they are the same: therefore there cannot be an order of causing between them.[3] And the principal inference appears from this: that, given the antecedent, Christ and any other man would not be univocally of the same nature. For any other man would be human nature in the direct case: Christ cannot be human nature, but [is] of human nature: therefore, just as "God" is not predicated univocally of a creature, of which it is said only in an oblique case, and of a divine person, of which it is said in the direct case; so neither is "humanity" said univocally of Christ and of others: and consequently they are not univocally of the same nature: indeed, since "humanity" is the most fitting name of the species, predicated of itself of its supposits, and not "man", but "humanity" cannot be predicated in the direct case of Christ, it seems that Christ is not of the same species as man.[4] This is confirmed from this: Christ cannot be of any species: therefore Christ is not a singular of the human species. For according to the adversaries he cannot be anything but the Godhead, now it cannot be anything of the human species: therefore Christ cannot be anything of the human species. For if the Godhead were of that species, then it would be causable, passible and active, like the other individuals of the species: which is impossible. Therefore, if I am not mistaken, it is incompatible with this way that Christ should be of the same species as the others.[5] And I would wish to have studied in this metaphysics when I was troubling myself whether quantity, motion [166]and the other accidents are distinguished [from their subjects]. For the distinction of the humanity from the Word is subtler than that of an accident of this kind from its subject; since, according to the more modern, Peter can infinitely many times in this hour, by assumption and laying-aside, be a man and afterwards not a man, without generation or corruption of any thing, or any pertinent motion; which does not happen even with relation.[6]

¶2 166.8–167.15

[166]Item iuxta nunc tacta, si illa humanitas non sit Christus, sed Christus tam extranee differt et essencialiter et personaliter[6] ab illa; tunc Christus per incarnacionem non est aliquid[7] nisi quod fuit eternaliter, cum sit solum deitas sicut ante: sed in deitate non univocatur cum aliqua creatura: ergo nichil vel non aliquid[8] est Christus, in quo univocatur cum aliqua creatura.[9] Sequitur enim—Christus est univoce homo cum aliis: ergo est univoce aliquid cum

Again, according to what has now been touched on, if that humanity is not Christ, but Christ differs from it so foreignly, both essentially and personally, then Christ through the incarnation is not anything but what he was eternally, since he is only the Godhead, as before: now in the Godhead he is univocal with no creature: therefore nothing, or not anything, is Christ in which he is univocal with any creature.[7] For it

alio—sicut a simili,[10] si Christus sit univoce albus cum Petro, tunc est univoce coloratus, et qualis cum eo, et ita de aliis generibus quibuscumque. Et sequitur—Christus est univoce aliquid cum aliqua creatura; ergo[11] aliquid est Christus in quo ipse univocatur cum aliqua creatura—quod non esset possibile,[12] si solum deitas foret Christus: oportet ergo speciem humanam, que est communis humanitas, esse Christum; et per consequens non solum naturam divinam, cum illa sit natura plurimum separata a natura humana: ymo cum[13] nulla substancia secunda inest supposito nisi mediante substancia prima, patet quod non communis humanitas foret Christus, nisi singularis[14] humanitas, que natura assumpta foret[14] Christus: patet igitur,[15] si Christus sit eiusdem speciei nobiscum, quod ista species in athomo[16] vel individuo foret Christus; et sic aliquid, quod non eternaliter fuit [167]Christus. Et sic intelligit Augustinus Enchiridion 29°,[1] 'Utraque, inquit, substancia, divina scilicet atque humana, Filius est unicus Dei Patris omnipotentis, de quo procedit Spiritus[2] Sanctus; utraque[3] unus, sed aliud propter Verbum, et aliud propter hominem.' Unde prius 28°[4] miratur quomodo ille homo fit[5] una persona cum Deo. Et in libro De Predestinacione Sanctorum bene post medium: 'Ille, inquit, homo ut a Verbo Patri coeterno in unitate persone assumptus Filius Dei unigenitus esset! Unde[6] hoc meruit? Faciente, inquit, et suscipiente Deo Verbo,[7] ipse homo, ex quo esse cepit, Filius Dei unigenitus[8] esse cepit.' Ideo ut exponit 13 De Trinitate 37°. 'Gracia Dei in hoc commendatur quod Christus tanta unitate Deo sit coniunctus,[9] ut una cum illo persona Filius Dei fieret, nullis eius precedentibus meritis.'

follows, "Christ is univocally a man with others: therefore he is univocally something with another", as, by likeness, if Christ is univocally white with Peter, then he is univocally coloured, and qualified, with him, and so of any other genera whatever. And it follows, "Christ is univocally something with some creature; therefore something is Christ in which he is univocal with some creature"; which would not be possible if only the Godhead were Christ: therefore the human species, which is the common humanity, must be Christ; and consequently not only the divine nature, since that is a nature most separated from the human nature: indeed, since no second substance is in a supposit except by means of a first substance, it is clear that the common humanity would not be Christ unless the singular humanity, which [is] the assumed nature, were Christ: it is clear, therefore, that if Christ is of the same species with us, that species in an individual, or individual, would be Christ; and so something that was not eternally [167]Christ.[8] And so Augustine understands [it], *Enchiridion* 29: "Each substance," he says, "the divine, namely, and the human, is the only Son of God the Father almighty, from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds; both one, but [it is] another thing on account of the Word, and another thing on account of the man."[9] Hence earlier, [in chapter] 28, he marvels how that man becomes one person with God.[10] And in the book *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, well past the middle: "That man," he says, "that he, assumed by the Word coeternal with the Father into the unity of person, should be the only-begotten Son of God! Whence did he merit this? By God the Word making and taking up [him]," he says, "this man, from when he began to be, began to be the only Son of God."[11] Therefore, as he expounds [it] in *De Trinitate* 13, [chapter] 37: "The grace of God is commended in this, that Christ was joined to God with so great a unity that he would become, with him, one person, the Son of God, with no merits of his preceding."[12]

¶3 167.16–167.22

[167]Sed hic datur duplex responsio. Prima quod non est equivocacio vel univocacio nisi in signis solummodo, et sic nulla res est quicquam univoce sive equivoce, sed signa dicuntur quedam equivoce et quedam univoce. 2ª responsio modernorum doctorum stat in glosa Augustini et aliorum sic loquencium, quod ipsi non intendunt[10] naturam assumptam esse Verbum sed naturam[11] Verbi.

But here a twofold reply is given. The first, that there is no equivocation or univocation except in signs only, and so no thing is anything univocally or equivocally, but signs are said, some equivocally and some univocally. The second reply, of the modern doctors, consists in a gloss on Augustine and the others who speak so: that they do not maintain "the assumed nature is the Word", but "[it is] the nature of the Word".[13]

Notes

1. O omits *a Christo* (164.28). "This way" is the moderns' position of 10-a, that the humanity is not Christ.

2. The sentence lacks a main verb after *tamen eo ipso quod est humanitas*; the bracket supplies the obvious "he is a man". The manuscripts differ at *est* (165.1): A has an erased abbreviation, B *eius*, C *eius est. Prius manserat iste homo*: the humanity, before, had remained this man, taking *iste homo* as predicate. B reads *incepit*, O *incipit* for *inceperit* (165.3).
3. C reads *oportet alicui per se*, O *oportet inniti alicui per se* "must rest on something of itself" (165.5); B reads *ex isto*, O *per idem* for *per istud* (165.7).
4. *In recto / in obliquo*: "God" is said of a divine person in the nominative ("the Father is God"), of a creature only in an oblique case ("a creature of God"); so, for the moderns, "humanity" of Christ, who is "of human nature". O reads *compositis* for *suppositis* (165.20).
5. O omits *alicuius … esse* (165.23–25), the eye passing from *esse* to *esse*; C reads *simpliciter* for *singulare* (165.24); A C write *nam … humane* twice (165.24–26); O omits *sed* (165.25); C reads *ipse* (165.26); O *die* for *vie* (165.30).
6. "Infinitely many times", O's *infinicies* (166.3), against the print's *inficians* "denying" (A B *inficiens*, C *infi*): the print gives no sense, and the argument needs O's reading (the assumption and laying-aside repeatable without end in one hour). The irony is Wyclif's own: he once laboured whether accidents are distinct from their subjects. A B C read *sollicitabor* (165.32), *tamen* for *cum* (166.3) and omit *homo* (166.5); O reads *modernos* (166.3); A has *sive* corrected from *sine* (166.5).
7. O reads *potencialiter* for *personaliter* (166.9–10); B *aliud* for *aliquid* (166.11); C *aliquando* (166.13); A B C write *ergo non aliquid … creatura* twice (166.13–14).
8. Second and first substance: Aristotle's species and individual (*Categories* 5). *In athomo vel individuo*: the logicians' *atomus* and the plain word together. *Que natura assumpta foret Christus* (166.27–28) is the print with O; A B C read *singularis humanitatis, que est natura humana, foret Christus*. B O read *inassimili* for *a simili* (166.16); O reads *et* for *ergo* (166.19), adds *et* (166.20) and *sicut* (166.24); A B C read *ergo* (166.28); B *athopio*, C a gap, O *attomo* (166.29).
9. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 12.38 (PL 40, 251; Wyclif's c. 29; A B C "ninth"): *utraque substantia … Filius est unicus Dei Patris omnipotentis, de quo procedit Spiritus sanctus*; the clause *utrumque unus, sed aliud propter Verbum, aliud propter hominem* is from 10.35 (PL 40, 250), joined to it. A B O omit *Spiritus* (167.4) and C has it struck through, leaving *de quo procedit Sanctus*; the print, which Augustine's text supports, is kept. At 167.4 O reads *utrumque*, as *Ench.* 10.35 does, against the print's *utraque*; "both" renders either.
10. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 11.36 (PL 40, 250; Wyclif's c. 28): *quibus mereretur iste homo una fieri persona cum Deo?*. C leaves a space for "28" (167.5); A B C read *sit* "is" for *fit* (167.6).
11. Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 15.30 (PL 44, 981–982), where the second *unigenitus* (167.11) is *unicus*, as in O: *ipse homo, ex quo esse coepit, Filius Dei unicus esse coepit*. The English follows *unicus* "only", with O and Augustine, against the print's *unigenitus* "only-begotten" there. A B C add *cum* after *Unde* (167.9); A has *Deo* with *cum Verbo* struck through (167.10).
12. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII.17.22 (PL 42, 1031; Wyclif's c. 37), closely paraphrased: *ut tanta unitate Deo vero conjunctus una cum illo persona Filius Dei fieret*. O reads *conuictus*, perhaps for *convinctus*, for *coniunctus* (167.13).
13. A has *intendunt* in the margin, B omits it (167.21); for *naturam Verbi* (167.22) A B C read *natura*, O *secundum naturam*, which changes no English. Wyclif answers the first reply next (167.23), the second at 171.14.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- None.

*Part 3: What Christ became by the incarnation, and the decretal *Cum Christus**

Harris pp. 167.23–171.13

¶1 167.23–169.5

[167]Contra primum verbale sophisticum non delector pro[12] nunc arguere, quia intencio loquencium de rebus univocis est cognoscere, si res similes in racione vel quiditate communicant, vel si de creata essencia Christi est quod ipse sit homo, sicut est de essencia cuiuscunque alterius singularis hominis quod sit homo. Aliter enim secundum verbales logicos non predicaretur iste terminus homo in quid de Verbo et secundum rectam methaphisicam; nisi Christus[13] secundum humanitatem, vel secundum quod homo sit aliquid sit[14] sic quod humanitas [168]sit causa, quare ipse est idem.[1] Aliter non foret univoce homo cum aliis humanitate specifica. Sicut enim[2] quantitate est subiectum quantum, qualitate quale, et ita de ceteris; sic substancia vel quiditate est quid vel aliquid formaliter: et ita, sicut adveniente qualitate fit subiectum eo[3] ipso quale quod prius[3] non fuerat; sic adveniente[4] substancia vel quiditate fit subiectum eo ipso aliquid quod prius non fuerat. Cum ergo humanitas st per consequens quiditas

Against the first, verbal and sophistical, [reply] I do not care to argue for now, since the intention of those who speak of univocal things is to know whether like things communicate in account or quiddity, or whether it is of the created essence of Christ that he is a man, as it is of the essence of any other singular man that he is a man.[1] For otherwise, according to the verbal logicians, this term "man" would not be predicated in quid of the Word, and [neither would it] according to right metaphysics, unless Christ, as to the humanity, or insofar as [he is] man, is something, in such a way that the humanity [168]is the cause why he is the same [thing].[2] Otherwise he would not be univocally a man with others by the humanity of the species. For as by quantity the subject is quantified, by quality qualified, and so of the rest; so by substance or quiddity it is formally what or something: and so, as, with a quality supervening, the subject by that very fact becomes qualified, which it had not been before; so, with substance or quiddity supervening,

advenit Christo formaliter, sequitur quod secundum illam fit aliquid quod prius non fuerat, et per consequens est dare,[5] quod aliquid est[5] Christus per incarnacionem, in quo convenit cum homine plus quam ante: et cum quid dicit naturam ut quis dicit personam, sequitur quod post incarnacionem alia substancialis essencia est Christus, que[6] prius non fuerat: quia aliter indubie in nullo esset univoce vel conveniens creature plus quam ante. Sicut ergo pertinenter queritur et solvitur—[7] Qualis est Petrus post alteracionem,[7] qualis prius non fuerat ?—sic pertinenter queritur et solvitur—Quid est Christus[8] post incarnacionem, quod ante non fuerat?—[9] et illud est substancia,[9] natura, et essencia creata Dominus Iesus Christus, que[10] est Verbum esse hominem; quia aliter indubie homo non predicaretur in quid de Verbo: nec Christus, in quantum homo esset aliquid, quod nedum contradicit principiis philosophicis, sed eciam Decretali*[11] Cum Christus[12] libro 7° De Hereticis. Quomodo queso dicerent[13] doctores tam veteres quam novi quod aliquid cepit esse Christus, nisi aliquid per incarnacionem fuerit factum Christus? Aliter non oportuit Decretalem libro 7° De Hereticis sic scripsisse: 'Cum Christus perfectus Deus [169] et perfectus homo, mandamus quatenus[1] sub anathemate interdicas—Ne quis de ceteris[2] audeat dicere, Christum non esse aliquid secundum quod homo—quia sicut Christus verus est Deus, ita verus est homo ex anima racionali et humana carne[3] subsistens.'[3]

the subject by that very fact becomes something which it had not been before. Since, then, the humanity, and consequently a quiddity, comes to Christ formally, it follows that as to it he becomes something which he had not been before; and consequently one may posit that something is Christ through the incarnation in which he agrees with man more than before: and since "what" signifies a nature as "who" signifies a person, it follows that after the incarnation another substantial essence is Christ which had not been before: since otherwise, undoubtedly, he would in nothing be univocal with or agreeing with a creature more than before.[3] As, then, it is pertinently asked and solved, "Of what quality is Peter after alteration, which he had not been before?", so it is pertinently asked and solved, "What is Christ after the incarnation that he had not been before?"; and that is the substance, nature and created essence, the Lord Jesus Christ, which is "the Word to be man";[4] since otherwise undoubtedly "man" would not be predicated in quid of the Word, nor would Christ, insofar as [he is] man, be something; which contradicts not only philosophical principles but also the decretal *Cum Christus*, in book 7, *De haereticis*.[5] How, I ask, would the doctors, old as well as new, say that something began to be Christ, unless something was made Christ through the incarnation? Otherwise the decretal in book 7, *De haereticis*, need not have written thus: "Since Christ [is] perfect God [169]and perfect man, we command that you forbid under anathema that anyone henceforth dare to say 'Christ is not something insofar as he is man'; because, as Christ is true God, so he is true man, subsisting of a rational soul and human flesh."[6]

¶2 169.6–170.15

[169]Ex qua Decretali patet primo quod Christus, quia homo, est aliquid quod ante non fuerat; 2° quod sit univoce homo cum aliis. Nam aliter non esset verus homo ex elementis[4] univocis cum aliis principiis fratrum suorum. Aliter enim non esset vere homo, sicut nec Spiritus Sanctus est vere columba. Habito ergo quod sit univoce homo cum aliis, ut dicit Augustinus in quodam Sermone De Trinitate: patet quod est univoce animal, corpus, et substancia cum aliis; et per consequens substancia, que est Christus, est univoce substancia cum aliis substanciis creatis: et[5] cum nulla natura divina sit univoce substancia cum aliis creatis substanciis[5]; sequitur quod creata substancia assumpta est univoce[6] et Christus cum aliis[6] substanciis. Confirmatur tripliciter. Omnis[7] substancia unica univoce[7] subiecta est accidentibus cum aliis creatis substanciis: sed illa non potest esse substancia, essencia, vel natura divina: ergo relinquitur quod alia substancia, ita quod sit gigas gemine substancie, ut canit ecclesia. Item Christus cum sit univoce

From this decretal it is clear, first, that Christ, because [he is] man, is something which he had not been before; second, that he is univocally a man with others. For otherwise he would not be a true man from elements univocal with the other principles of his brothers. For otherwise he would not be truly a man, just as the Holy Spirit is not truly a dove either.[7] Having established, then, that he is univocally a man with others, as Augustine says in a certain sermon on the Trinity, it is clear that he is univocally animal, body and substance with others; and consequently the substance which is Christ is univocally substance with other created substances: and since no divine nature is univocally substance with other created substances, it follows that the created substance assumed is univocally [substance], and [is] Christ, with the other substances.[8] This is confirmed in three ways. Every single substance univocally is subject to accidents

homo, animal, corpus, et substancia cum aliis est species et genus hominis; et omne tale universale est creatum secundum se totum: ergo Christus est aliquod creatum. Item si Decretalis solum intelligit Christum esse aliquid secundum quod homo; quia omnis homo est aliquid, et, si Christus est homo, ipse est aliquid; tunc conceditur, quod Christus secundum quod quantus, qualis, vel quomodolibet aliter accidentatus foret aliquid; quod notum est repugnare logice, methaphisice, et sensui Decretalis. Sic enim dicerent quod omnis homo secundum quod peccator est aliquid placens: et Christus [170] secundum quod homo natus ex virgine creavit mundum, cum ut sic inanitus sit equalis Deo[1] Patri; et per consequens secundum quod minor Patre est equalis Patri. Sed quis, rogo, hereticus negaret quin Christus, si est homo, est aliquid? Ideo certum est quod nec Decretalis nec hereticus intelligit sic reduplicativam; sed ut iste terminus secundum signat causam formalem specificam, que est causa subiectiva, unde Christus sit aliquid ut pugnarius substancie. Unde videtur michi indubie quod quicunque concedit de Christo communicacionem ydiomatum et denominacionem univocam accidencium cum creatura, habet concedere consequenter,[2] quod Christus sit duplex substancia et per consequens creatura. Nam increata non potest esse creato accidenti absoluto subiecta; quia tunc foret mole magna et specialis,[3] ut alie create substancie.*[4]

with other created substances: now that cannot be the divine substance, essence or nature: therefore it remains that [it is] another substance, so that he is "a giant of twin substance", as the church sings.[9] Again, Christ, since he is univocally man, animal, body and substance with others, is the species and genus of man; and every such universal is created in its whole self: therefore Christ is something created. Again, if the decretal understands only "Christ is something insofar as he is man" [in this way], because every man is something, and, if Christ is a man, he is something; then it is granted that Christ, insofar as [he is] quantified, qualified, or in any other way subject to accidents, would be something; which is known to be incompatible with logic, metaphysics and the sense of the decretal.[10] For thus they would say that every man, insofar as [he is] a sinner, is something pleasing: and that Christ, [170] insofar as [he is] man born of a virgin, created the world, since as such, emptied, he is equal to God the Father; and consequently, insofar as [he is] less than the Father, he is equal to the Father.[11] But what heretic, I ask, would deny that Christ, if he is a man, is something? Therefore it is certain that neither the decretal nor the heretic understands the reduplicative [proposition] so; but [it understands it] as this term *secundum* signifies the formal cause of the species, which is the subjective cause, whence Christ is something as a champion of substance.[12] Hence it seems to me undoubted that whoever grants of Christ the communication of idioms and the univocal naming of accidents with a creature must consequently grant that Christ is a twofold substance and consequently a creature. For an uncreated [substance] cannot be subject to a created absolute accident; since then it would be of great bulk and of a species, like other created substances.[13]

¶3 170.16–170.27

[170] Confirmatur ex hoc, quod post incarnacionem fideles sciverunt quid est Verbum,. quod per ante nec Deus sciverat esse Verbum: ergo aliquid tunc fuit[5] Verbum quod prius non fuerat. Infideles ergo nescientes ipsum esse Deum sciverunt quid[6] fuerat: ergo fuit aliquid preter deitatem. Cum ergo aliqua racio substancialis post incarnacionem Verbo conveniat, que non prius convenerat, que non potest poni, nisi hoc quod Verbum est homo; sequitur quod hec sit racio substancialis non aliena a Christo, ut nunc fingitur. Nec sollicitor[7] aptare verba, ut pertineret volenti contendere cum doctoribus signorum[8]; quia ex dictis[9] patet materialiter sentencia et racio Augustini.

This is confirmed from this: after the incarnation the faithful knew what the Word is, which beforehand not even God had known to be the Word: therefore something was then the Word which had not been before.[14] The unbelievers, therefore, not knowing him to be God, knew what he had been: therefore he was something besides the Godhead. Since, then, some substantial account belongs to the Word after the incarnation which had not belonged [to him] before, which cannot be posited except this, that the Word is man, it follows that this is a substantial account not alien from Christ, as is now feigned. Nor am I troubled to fit the words as would pertain to one wishing to contend with the doctors of signs; since

¶4 170.28–171.13

[170]Illud confirmari potest tripliciter. Primo ex hoc: Verbum assumendo hominem assumpsit aliquid; ergo cum omne assumere sit facere, sequitur, quod faciendo se esse[10] hominem, fecit se esse aliquid; et per consequens per assumpcionem fuit aliquid quod prius non fuerat. 2° confirmatur. Posito quod[11] [171]pro instanti incarnacionis Petrus fidelis cognoscat Verbum divinum nunc esse Deum et ignoret quod nunc sit homo; tunc patet quod sequitur—Verbum divinum nunc non est aliquid quin iste Petrus nunc[1] cognoscat ipsum esse aliquid: sed Verbum divinum nunc est homo: ergo Petrus cognoscit ipsum nunc esse hominem—. Hic enim non est fallacia accidentis, cum Christus, in quantum homo, sit aliquid: et consequens est falsum: ideo relinquitur quod maior: ex quo sequitur aliquid esse nunc Verbum, quod Petrus nunc ignorat esse Verbum, quod non potest poni deitas. 3° confirmatur ex hoc quod quantitas et cetera accidencia non sunt essencialiter distincta[2] a subiectis: ergo multo evidencius humanitas est homo.

from what has been said the teaching and the reasoning of Augustine are materially clear.[15]

This can be confirmed in three ways. First from this: the Word, by assuming man, assumed something; therefore, since every assuming is making, it follows that, by making himself to be man, he made himself to be something; and consequently through the assumption he was something which he had not been before. This is confirmed, second. Suppose that [171]at the instant of the incarnation the faithful Peter knows "the divine Word is now God" and is ignorant of "he is now man"; then it is clear that it follows: "The divine Word is not now anything without this Peter now knowing him to be it: now the divine Word is now man: therefore Peter knows him now to be man." For here there is no fallacy of accident, since Christ, insofar as [he is] man, is something: and the consequent is false: therefore it remains [that] the major [is false]: from which it follows that something is now the Word which Peter now does not know to be the Word, which cannot be posited [to be] the Godhead.[16] This is confirmed, third, from this: quantity and the other accidents are not essentially distinct from their subjects: therefore much more evidently the humanity is man.[17]

Notes

1. The first reply of 167.16–19: univocation is only in signs. Wyclif sets it aside as a quarrel over words: those who speak of univocal things mean the things. A B C omit *pro* (167.23).
2. "In such a way that": O omits the second *sit* (167.31), which the print doubles (*sit aliquid sit sic quod*); the English follows O. O omits *Christus* (167.30) and has *aliud* "another thing" over an erasure for *idem* (168.1). *Idem*: the same thing he is, a man.
3. *Quid* and *quis*: "what" asks after a nature, "who" after a person; so a new "what" in Christ is a created substance, not a new person. The print's *st* (168.8) is read as *et*. A B C read *ergo* for *enim* (168.2); B *quale eo ipso quale prius* (168.5–6); A B *sic deveniente*, O *si adveniente* (168.6); C *dare quod est* (168.10–11); A B *qui* for *que* (168.14).
4. *Que est Verbum esse hominem*: the created essence is the Word's being a man. O omits *Qualis … alteracionem* (168.17) and adds *et* after *Christus* (168.19); A B C read *et idem substancia* (168.19–20) and *qui* for *que* (168.21).
5. The decretal of Alexander III, *Cum Christus*, in the *Liber Extra* 5.7.7, under the title *De haereticis* (Friedberg II, 779); Wyclif's "book 7" stands for the title. O omits everything from *Decretali* (168.24) to *substancie* (170.15), and so is no witness for the rest of this paragraph and the next. C reads *debent* for *dicerent* (168.26).
6. "Henceforth", *de cetero*, with B C and the decretal (Friedberg II, 779), against the print's *de ceteris* "of the others" with A (169.2). C reads *carne assumpta vel subsistens* (169.5). A B C abbreviate *quatenus* variously (169.1).
7. The dove: Matt. 3:16 ("as a dove"). The brothers: Heb. 2:17. C leaves a space for *elementis* (169.9).
8. Augustine, "a certain sermon on the Trinity": Ps.-Augustine, *Sermo* 236 (*De fide catholica* IV, inc. *Multa quidem*; in fact Pelagius's *Libellus fidei*), PL 39, 2182: Christ assumed *perfectum naturae nostrae hominem … nobis confitemur fuisse conformem*. Wyclif names it by this incipit in *De veritate Sacrae Scripturae* and reads it as teaching that Christ is univocally a man with others. The final clause is construed as printed; Harris asks at the foot whether to read *univoce homo cum aliis* "univocally a man with the others" for *univoce et Christus cum aliis* (169.18). B omits *et … substanciis* (169.15–17).
9. "A giant of twin substance": Ambrose's hymn *Intende qui regis Israel* (*Veni redemptor gentium*), after Ps. 18:6; PL 16, 1411, *Geminae gigas substantiae*. The major as printed, "every single substance", must mean the substance that is in Christ subject to accidents; C reads *ee substancia univoce* (169.19).
10. The reading Wyclif rejects: that *secundum quod homo* only marks the condition "if he is a man", under which any accidental predicate would do as well.
11. Phil. 2:6–7 (equal to God, emptied); John 14:28 (the Father greater). C omits *Deo* (170.2).

12. *Secundum* in the reduplicative names the formal cause, so "insofar as man" gives what Christ is by his humanity. *Ut pugnarius substancie* (170.8) is the print and has no variant: "as a champion of substance", recalling the giant of twin substance (169.22); the word is doubtful.
13. *Specialis* "of a species", belonging to a species as created substances do; B reads *speciabilis* (170.14). A has *communitur* corrected to *consequenter*, C *communiter* (170.11).
14. The faithful knew after the incarnation a new "what" of the Word, the man, which before was not the Word and so was not known, even by God, to be the Word. A B C read *fuerat* for *fuit* (170.18); B *quod* for *quid* (170.20).
15. O reads *Nolicitor* (170.25) and *terminorum* "of terms" for *signorum* (170.26); C *signis* for *dictis* (170.26).
16. The fallacy of accident would excuse the inference if "man" were only an accident of the Word; Wyclif denies it, since by the humanity Christ is something. So the major, that Peter knows the Word to be everything it is, is false. O omits *esse* (170.30) and *quod* (170.32); B omits *nunc*, O reads *non* (171.4).
17. Wyclif's own teaching that accidents are not essentially distinct from their subjects (cf. 165.31–166.1). O reads *distincte* (171.12).
How the Latin of this passage was established
• None.

Part 4: The moderns' gloss on the saints, and Christ and his humanity the same in all their parts

Harris pp. 171.14–175.16

¶1 171.14–173.7

[171]Quoad 2^{dam3} patet cuilibet volenti advertere, quod glosa est nimis extranea preter mentem sanctorum; ut quando Augustinus, Gregorius, Ieronimus, Anselmus, et alii dicunt, quod utraque substancia, scilicet divina et humana, est Christus, dicit glosa ipsos per hoc intendere, quod altera non est Christus, sed natura eius, nec conveniens secum^{4} in essencia nec persona. Pro certo inter omnes glosas, quas unquam audiveram est hec inculcior, glosare dicta sanctorum directe per sua opposita. Si,^{5} inquam, ista glosa sufficeret, quis formidaret auctoritatem sibi oppositam? Sed^{6} ut pallient^{6} glosam suam, dimittunt verbaliter negativam^{7} dicentes quod Augustinus intendit utramque naturam esse naturam Christi. Quando autem queritur utrum Augustinus intendit utramque naturam esse Christum, dicunt quod non, sed utramque esse naturam Christi. Et quando ulterius opponitur, si^{8} intenderit naturam humanam esse Christum, sicut intendit naturam divinam esse Christum, dicunt quod non: et sic^{9} finaliter incidunt in glosam yronicam supradictam. Sed quam sinistrum est dicere quod tam subtiles logici et [172]philosophi tam pii et prudentes theologi in precipua materia fidei, capciosissimis hereticis circumsepti, dicerent tam crebro et patule quod utraque natura Christi est Deus, quia persona Christi, si finaliter intenderent quod altera est Deus, et^{1} altera non est Deus.^{1} Et nimis leve^{2} verbum est dicere Augustinum intendere,^{3} quando dicit^{3} 'aliud Deus aliud homo sed non alius, quia non alia persona,'^{4} quod est^{4} quod ipse per hoc intendit, quod non natura alterius persone sit Christi deitas sive humanitas: tum quia glosa illa seipsam interimit falsitate, cum natura divina sit natura alterius persone quam Filii, quia tam Patris quam Doni^{5}; tum eciam quia verba essent nimis impertinencia suis sentenciis. Nam Augustinus persepe asserit, quod anima sit Christus et^{6} caro Christus, sicut deitas Christus et humanitas

As to the second [reply], it is clear to anyone willing to pay attention that the gloss is exceedingly far-fetched, beyond the mind of the saints:[1] as when Augustine, Gregory, Jerome, Anselm and others say that each substance, namely the divine and the human, is Christ, the gloss says that by this they mean that the one is not Christ but his nature, agreeing with him neither in essence nor in person. Certainly, among all the glosses I had ever heard, this is the crudest: to gloss the sayings of the saints directly by their opposites. If, I say, this gloss sufficed, who would fear an authority opposed to himself? But to cloak their gloss they let go the negative [proposition] in words, saying that Augustine means "each nature is the nature of Christ". And when it is asked whether Augustine means "each nature is Christ", they say no, but "each is the nature of Christ". And when it is further objected, whether he meant "the human nature is Christ" as he means "the divine nature is Christ", they say no: and so in the end they fall into the ironical gloss mentioned above.[2] But how perverse it is to say that such subtle logicians and [172]philosophers, such pious and prudent theologians, in a chief matter of faith, hemmed in by most captious heretics, would say so often and so openly that each nature of Christ is God, because [each is] the person of Christ, if in the end they meant that the one is God and the other is not God. And it is an exceedingly light word to say that Augustine means, when he says "one thing God, another thing man, but not another one, because not another person", that is, that he means by this that the Godhead or the humanity of Christ is not the nature of another person:[3] first, because that gloss destroys itself by its falsity, since the divine nature is the nature of another person than the Son, since [it is the nature] of the Father as well as of the Gift; and also

Christus,[6] utrumque aliud a reliquo sed non alius[7]; ut patet super Ioh. Ome. 47. 78 et sepe alibi ut patet superius. Et ad hunc sensum ut verba sonant ac raciones concordant, exponunt eum Anselmus, Hugo de Sancto Victore, et alii. Unde De Incarnacione ca° 6° in fine sic scribit Anselmus; 'suscepit Verbum hominem in unitatem persone, ut due nature, scilicet[8] divina et humana, sint una persona.' Et hoc dicit Augustinus in Dialogo ad Felicianum; 'aliud, inquit, Dei Filius, aliud hominis filius, sed non alius:' et primo De Trinitate 9° ca°; 'forma Dei[9] formam[9] hominis accepit, utraque[10] Deus utraque homo'; et sic de quotlibet similibus, ex quibus patet quod sensus datus Augustini primo De Trinitate[11] 16° sit nimis sophisticus,[11] quando dicit, 'talis fuit illa suscepcio, que hominem faceret Deum et Deum hominem'; hoc est, ut inquiunt, 'illa suscepcio fecit quod homo est Deus, et e contra.' Quis dubitat eciam laicus[12] de conversione illorum? Non ergo oportuit Augustinum [173]exponere quod idem sit—Deum esse hominem—et—hominem esse Deum. Intenditur[1] ergo, ut alibi sepe dicit, quod natura illa sit[2] Deus et Deus sit illa natura ypostatice assumendo.[3] Et sic favorabilius et coloracius sunt moderni glosandi, qui dicunt quod humanitas non est Deus. Intendunt enim quod Deus nec per se nec formaliter nec secundum essenciam deitatis sit humanitas.

because the words would be exceedingly irrelevant to his teachings.[4] For Augustine very often asserts that the soul is Christ and the flesh Christ, as the Godhead [is] Christ and the humanity Christ, each another thing than the other but not another one; as is clear on John, homilies 47 and 78, and often elsewhere, as is clear above. And in this sense, as the words sound and the arguments agree, Anselm, Hugh of St Victor and others expound him. Hence in *De incarnatione*, c. 6, at the end, Anselm writes thus: "The Word took up man into unity of person, so that two natures, namely the divine and the human, are one person."[5] And Augustine says this in the *Dialogue to Felician*: "Another thing," he says, "the Son of God, another thing the son of man, but not another one"; and in *De Trinitate* book 1, c. 9: "the form of God took the form of man, each God, each man"; and so of any number of like [sayings], from which it is clear that the sense given of Augustine in *De Trinitate* book 1, c. 16, is exceedingly sophistical, when he says, "such was that taking-up, as would make man God and God man"; that is, as they say, "that taking-up brought it about that 'man is God', and conversely".[6] Who, even a layman, doubts the conversion of these? So there was no need for Augustine [173]to explain that it is the same, "God is man" and "man is God". What is meant, then, as he often says elsewhere, is that that nature is God and God is that nature, by assuming hypostatically. And so the moderns are to be glossed more favourably and more colourably, who say "the humanity is not God". For they mean that God is neither of himself nor formally nor according to the essence of the Godhead the humanity.[7]

¶2 173.8–173.20

[173]Et si queratur qualis predicacio sit[4] ista—Deus est homo sive humanitas—, dicitur quod equivocando in nomine accidentis ut[5] supra; hoc[5] est, per accidens; sicut et hec— Petrus est bipedalis—secundum[6] negantes quantitates distingui est predicacio secundum essenciam; non quod deitas sit natura humana, sed quod persona deitatis sit illa essencia. Est eciam in parte predicacio causalis et formalis, cum humanitas causata a Deo sit 'forma servi,[7] secundum quam Deus est servus obediens Trinitati. Et patet quod humanitas cum sit forma temporalis distinguitur a Verbo, licet sit ypostatice ipsum Verbum. Nec sequitur per locum a simili quod substancia sit sua quantitas; cum non possit esse personalis unio substancie ad accidens inherens formaliter.

And if it is asked what kind of predication this is, "God is man" or "[God is the] humanity", the answer is that [it is so] by equivocating on the name of accident, as above; that is, by accident; as this also, "Peter is two feet [tall]", according to those who deny that quantities are distinct, is a predication by essence: not that the Godhead is the human nature, but that the person of the Godhead is that essence.[8] It is also in part a causal and formal predication, since the humanity caused by God is "the form of a servant", according to which God is a servant obedient to the Trinity.[9] And it is clear that the humanity, since it is a temporal form, is distinguished from the Word, although it is hypostatically the Word himself. Nor does it follow by the topic from likeness that a substance is its quantity, since there cannot be a personal union of a substance to an accident inhering formally.[10]

¶3 173.21–174.17

[173]Item si sint aliqua duo, quorum omnes partes sint idem inter se, et[8] ipsa sunt idem[9] inter se: sed Christus et eius humanitas sunt duo distincta quorum omnes partes sunt idem inter se: ergo[9] et ipsa tota eisdem[10] adequale composita. Minor[11] patet ex hoc quod quelibet pars corporis Christi sicut et totum ipsum corpus et anima est pars humanitatis Christi et e contra; cum Christus non habet partem[12] qualitativam aut quantitativam, nisi secundum humanitatem eo quod secundum deitatem sit indivisibilis omnino. Et maior patet eis qui ponunt omne totum compositum ex partibus esse insimul[13] illas partes; hoc autem [174]hic supponitur. Et patet cum ista multitudo parcium sit Christus et ista eadem multitudo sit ista humanitas, quod Christus et ista humanitas sunt idem alicui tercio; et per consequens inter se: et cum nulla ydemptitas sit pertinens nisi fuerit personalis, sequitur quod Christus et illa humanitas sunt eadem[1] persona.[1] Et istam sentenciam videtur sapere prima conclusio 5^{ti2} Elementorum Euclidis: 'si fuerint quotlibet quantitates aliquarum totidem eque multiplices, ut eque maiores aut eque minores, aut singule singulis equales, quemadmodum una[3] illarum[3] ad sui comparem; necesse est totum aggregatum ex his singulariter[4] se habere.' Quod eque evidenter videtur de ydemptitate tocius ad totum, presupposita ydemptitate numerali[5] cuiuscunque partis ad partem sibi correlatam,[6] sicut de[7] paritate proporcionum, sicut patet† applicati.[8] Nam si sint aliqua duo, et quelibet pars unius ydemptificata fuerit parti alterius et e contra; tunc unum[9] ydemptificatur[10] primo alteri.

Again, if there are any two things all of whose parts are the same as one another, they too are the same as one another: now Christ and his humanity are two distinct things all of whose parts are the same as one another: therefore the wholes too, composed of the same [parts] in equal measure, [are the same].[11] The minor is clear from this, that every part of Christ's body, as also the whole body itself and the soul, is a part of Christ's humanity, and conversely; since Christ has no qualitative or quantitative part except as to the humanity, because as to the Godhead he is altogether indivisible. And the major is clear to those who hold that every whole composed of parts is those parts together; and this [174]is supposed here. And it is clear, since this multitude of parts is Christ and this same multitude is this humanity, that Christ and this humanity are the same as some third [thing], and consequently as one another: and since no identity is to the point unless it is personal, it follows that Christ and that humanity are the same person. And this teaching seems to savour of the first conclusion of the fifth [book] of Euclid's *Elements*: "If there are any number of quantities equally multiple of as many [others], as equally greater or equally less, or each equal to each, as one of them [is] to its counterpart; the whole aggregate of them must stand in the same way."[12] Which seems equally evident of the identity of whole to whole, presupposing the numerical identity of each part to the part correlated with it, as [it is] of the parity of proportions, as is clear † applied.[13] For if there are any two things, and every part of the one has been identified with a part of the other and conversely, then the one is identified primarily with the other.

¶4 174.18–174.29

[174]Pono ergo quod Verbum incipiat a pedibus Petri usque ad caput assumendo ypostatice quamlibet partem quantitivam aut qualitativam Petri, sic quod primo in fine hore tam corpus quam anima sit ypostatice assumpta: et patet, posito quod Verbum non aliunde habuerit partem aliquam, nec assumptum dimiserit ante finem, quod quelibet pars Petri fiet idem parti Verbi; et quelibet pars Verbi fiet[11] pars Petri,[11] posito quod in hora alia dimittatur. Nec fingendum quod ydemptificabuntur totali ydemptificacione, nisi Christus et Petrus vel eius natura. Si ergo quamlibet[12] partem humanitatis Christi fecit esse partem sui, tunc se totum fecit totam illam naturam, ut loquitur Augustinus.

I posit, then, that the Word begins from Peter's feet up to the head, assuming hypostatically every quantitative or qualitative part of Peter, so that only at the end of the hour are both body and soul hypostatically assumed: and it is clear, supposing that the Word had no part from elsewhere and did not lay aside what he had assumed before the end, that every part of Peter will become the same as a part of the Word; and every part of the Word will become a part of Peter, supposing that it is laid aside in another hour. Nor is it to be feigned that [any] will be identified by a total identification except Christ and Peter, or his nature.[14] If, then, he made every part of Christ's humanity to be a part of himself, then he made the whole of himself the whole of that nature, as Augustine speaks.[15]

¶5 174.30–175.16

[174]Et potest confirmari tripliciter.[13] Primo per hoc quod Christus non est[14] infinitum bonus homo, sed tantum [175]finite bonus ut ·homo; licet sit infinitum bonus Deus, ut hic supponitur: sed omnis bonitas humana, quam habet, resultat precise[1] ex eisdem principiis ex quibus resultat bonitas humanitatis: ergo precise[1] eadem est Christi secundum quod homo, que est bonitas sue humanitatis, cum bonitas et entitas convertuntur: sequitur quod eadem sit entitas Christi, que et sue humanitatis. Sed et hoc[2] sonat vocabulum et omnia que movent concedere Christum esse creaturam. Non enim est dare, que creatura esset Christus, nisi foret illa humanitas: bonitates enim non possunt dici incommunicantes; et, si in aliquo communicant, communicant[3] secundum[4] totum; nec est inconveniens sed necessarium, quod Christus habeat quiditatem creatam, cum sit univoce homo cum aliis habens denominaciones accidentales creatas, quod sonat in amplius imperfectum: aliter enim non, in quantum homo, foret aliquid.

And it can be confirmed in three ways. First by this, that Christ is not an infinitely good man but only [175]finitely good as man, although he is infinitely good God, as is supposed here: now all the human goodness that he has results precisely from the same principles from which the goodness of the humanity results: therefore precisely the same [goodness] is Christ's insofar as [he is] man as is the goodness of his humanity; since goodness and entity are convertible, it follows that the same entity is Christ's as [is] his humanity's.[16] But this too is what the word sounds, and all the things that move [men] to grant "Christ is a creature". For one may posit no creature that Christ would be, unless it were that humanity: for goodnesses cannot be called things that do not communicate; and if they communicate in anything, they communicate as to the whole.[17] Nor is it an absurdity, but necessary, that Christ have a created quiddity, since he is univocally a man with others, having created accidental namings, which sounds toward what is more imperfect still: for otherwise he would not, insofar as [he is] man, be anything.[18]

Notes

1. "The second [reply]": A B C read *tercium* "the third" (171.14); Harris notes at the foot that the second reply of 167.20 is in hand, the moderns' gloss that Augustine and the others do not mean "the assumed nature is the Word" but "the nature of the Word". O is with the print, and A B C, one family, do not outweigh it. *Extranea* "far-fetched": foreign to the saints' mind.
2. The negative [proposition] the moderns let go in words is "the human nature is not Christ"; when pressed, they come back to it, which is the gloss "by the opposite". A B C omit *secum* (171.19); C reads *sed* for *Si* (171.22), *negacionem* for *negativam* (171.24); O *sed plus pallientes* "but cloaking it further" (171.23–24), *sed* for *si* (171.29), *quia sit* for *et sic* (171.31).
3. Augustine's saying, not found in these words; the nearest is Ps.-Augustine, *Contra Felicianum* 11 (PL 42, 1166), *Aliud, inquam, pro discretione substantiae: non alius, pro unitate personae*: *aliud* and *alius*, natures against persons. "That is" renders *quod est*, which A B C omit (172.7); the clause after it gives the moderns' reading of the saying. O omits *et altera non est Deus* (172.4–5) and *leve* (172.5); B reads *intenderet aliud* for *intendere, quando dicit* (172.6).
4. "The Gift" (*Donum*): the Holy Spirit. The gloss is false because the divine nature is also the Father's and the Spirit's, and so is the nature of a person other than the Son. A reads *dei*, struck through, B *dōi* (172.11). *Sentenciis*: "teachings", the positions Augustine teaches.
5. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 47.12 (PL 35, 1739), *et caro Christus, et anima Christus, et Verbum Christus … sed unus Christus*, and 78.2 (PL 35, 1836), the buried flesh called Son of God. Anselm, *De incarnatione Verbi*, c. 6 in Wyclif's numbering, at the end: Schmitt c. 10 (II, 28.9–10), *Suscepit autem hominem in unitatem personae … ut sint duae naturae, divina scilicet et humana, una persona*; Migne prints it as the opening of c. VI (PL 158, 278A). Hugh of St Victor is named without a place. B omits *et caro … humanitas Christus* (172.13–14); C omits *alius* (172.15); O omits *scilicet* (172.21).
6. The *Dialogue to Felician* is the *De unitate Trinitatis contra Felicianum* transmitted among Augustine's works, in fact Vigilius of Thapsus, c. 11 (PL 42, 1166): *aliud Dei Filius, aliud hominis fuit … Aliud, inquam, pro discretione substantiae: non alius, pro unitate personae*; Wyclif's wording is the Lombard's. *De Trinitate* I.7.14 (PL 42, 829; Wyclif's c. 9), where Augustine reads *forma Dei accepit formam servi, utrumque Deus et utrumque homo*, *servi* where Wyclif has *hominis*; and I.13.28 (PL 42, 840; Wyclif's c. 16), *Talis enim erat illa susceptio, quae Deum hominem faceret, et hominem Deum.* O abbreviates *forma* in both places (172.24); B reads *utrumque* (172.25). A B C read *racio sit nimis sophistica* "the account … is exceedingly sophistical" (172.27); A B *logicus* "logician", C *laycus*, for *laicus* (172.30).
7. "By assuming": the gerund, the Word assuming the nature. The moderns' "the humanity is not God", taken of predication of itself, formally and by essence, is a sense Wyclif can grant; so they are glossed "more colourably" than they gloss the saints. A B C read *intendunt* "they mean" for *Intenditur* (173.2); O *fit* for *sit* (173.3); A *assumenda*, corrected from *assumendo* (173.4).
8. The predication is "by accident" only by an equivocation on the name: the humanity is no accident inhering in God. "Those who deny that quantities are distinct" from their subjects: Wyclif's own view (cf. 171.11–13). A B read *septipedalis* "seven feet", O *bipedalitas*, for *bipedalis* (173.11); the print is C's. B reads *accidentis hic*, without *ut supra* (173.10); O *est* for *sit* (173.8).
9. Phil. 2:7 ("taking the form of a servant") and 2:8 ("becoming obedient"). Harris opens the quotation at *forma* and does not close it; the bound is set after *servi*. O omits *servi* (173.15).
10. The topic from likeness would argue: as the Word is the humanity, so a substance is its quantity. Wyclif blocks it: the union is personal, and there is no personal union of a substance with an accident that inheres in it.

11. The conclusion is elliptical; "[are the same]" is supplied from the major. *Adequale* (173.24) has no variant and is taken as an adverb, "in equal measure", the parts answering one to one; doubtful. A B C read *idem sed sic est de Christo et eius humanitate ergo* for *idem … ergo* (173.22–24), *ex eis* for *eisdem* (173.24), and *maior* for *Minor* (173.25), against the argument, which proves the minor here; A B C omit *et* (173.22); O omits *partem* (173.28); A B C read *in simile* for *insimul* (173.31).
12. Euclid, *Elements* V, prop. 1, in Campanus's version (Venice 1482): *necesse est quemadmodum una illarum ad sui comparem, totum quoque ex his aggregatum ad omnes illas pariter acceptas similiter se habere*; Campanus has *similiter* where Wyclif has *singulariter*, and lacks *ut eque maiores aut eque minores*. A B C read *conclusio 7*, O *9° 5ti* (174.7). At 174.11 the English reads *similiter* "in the same way" (our emendation, with Campanus) for the print's *singulariter*, which O omits: a misread abbreviation of *similiter*, the aggregate in the same ratio as each to each. O omits *una illarum* (174.10) and has *idem persona etc.* (174.6).
13. Harris daggers *applicati* (174.15), the reading of A B C (O *applıti*), and asks whether to read *applicatis* or *applicacione* ("as is clear to those who apply it", "by application"); translated as printed, with the dagger. A B C read *naturali* for *numerali* (174.13); O *coloratam* for *correlatam* (174.14) and omits *de*; A B *una* for *unum*, O *ydemptificabitur* (174.17).
14. A thought experiment: the Word assumes Peter part by part through an hour. "What he had assumed" is the assumed nature, not the logician's *assumptum*. "Except Christ and Peter, or his nature": only whole and whole are identified by a total identification. A B C read *fiet pars verbi*, O *fiat pars petri* (174.24); the print has O's words.
15. Augustine, place not given and not found; compare *Ep.* 264.3 (PL 33, 1085), *in illo homine totam naturam nostram suscepit Filius Dei*. A reads *qualibet* (174.27).
16. "As man" is the Latin's *ut homo*; Harris prints a point before *homo* (175.1). O omits *tripliciter* (174.30) and *est* (174.31), and reads *pure* "purely" for *precise* twice (175.3–4).
17. "The word" (*vocabulum*): probably the name "creature" itself. A B read *sed ex hoc*, C *secundo*, for *Sed et hoc* (175.7). A B C read *communicat semel se secundum totum* (175.12).
18. *Inconveniens* here is "an absurdity" in argument. *Quod sonat in amplius imperfectum*: created accidental namings import more imperfection than a created quiddity, so the lesser is granted a fortiori; the construal is doubtful.

How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 173: *sit—Deum* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  - 173: *hominem—et—hominem* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Augustine not only asserts that c x ' * (172.8); reference Petrus est (173.15).

Part 5: The humanity is the same man as Christ: accidents, difference, and blessedness

Harris pp. 175.17–179.19

¶1 175.17–176.2

[175]2do confirmatur ex hoc quod eadem in numero est quantitas, qua ista[5] duo quantificantur, eadem qualitas qua qualificantur; et sic de motu et ceteris accidentibus quibuscunque, que insunt Christo humanitus, ut patet posterius: quod non esset nisi foret ydemptitas in subiecto: ergo idem est iste homo et ista humanitas. Cum ergo accidens non sit nisi modus subiecti, patet quod ad numeracionem subiectorum oportet accidencia numerari; ut, si aliquid est[6] A motum, aliud est B motum;[6] alia est mocio A mobilis, et alia est mocio B mobilis; neutra[7] autem predictarum[7] substanciarum est pars alterius, cum preter humanitatem vel eius partes non restat signare aliam partem Christi. Ideo humanitas nec est pars quantitativa nec qualitativa Christi; et per consequens, si essent distincte substancie, omnia accidencia, que insunt eis formaliter, distinguerentur; cuius impossibilitatem suppono ex alibi declaratis. Non enim est [176]possibile puncta[1] et quantitates, qualitates, et ceteras formas simillimas coextendi.

Second, this is confirmed by this, that the quantity by which these two are quantified is the same in number, the same the quality by which they are qualified; and so of motion and any other accidents whatever that are in Christ humanly, as is clear later: which would not be unless there were identity in the subject: therefore this man and this humanity are the same. Since, then, an accident is nothing but a mode of the subject, it is clear that accidents must be numbered according to the numbering of subjects; as, if something is A in motion, something is B in motion, the motion of the movable A is one and the motion of the movable B another; now neither of the aforesaid substances is a part of the other, since besides the humanity or its parts there remains no other part of Christ to designate.[1] So the humanity is neither a quantitative nor a qualitative part of Christ; and consequently, if they were distinct substances, all the accidents that are in them formally would be distinguished; whose impossibility I suppose from what has been made clear elsewhere. For it is not [176]possible for points and quantities, qualities and other forms most alike to be coextended.[2]

¶2 176.3–176.26

[176]Et ex isto capitur 3° quod omnis differencia substancialis vel accidentalis, qua Verbum secundum humanitatem differt ab alio supposito vel natura, est differencia qua humanitas Christi differt ab eodem. Ex quo sequitur ulterius, quod nulla est differencia, qua Christus humanitus differt ab illa humanitate: et cum non sit possibile quod aliquid differat ab aliquo, nisi aliqua differencia differat ab eodem; patet quod non est differencia inter Christum et illam humanitatem assumptam. Patet ex hoc quod omnis substancialis differencia capitur vel a materia vel a forma: sed omnis talis pars Christi est pars sue humanitatis et e contra, sicut et omne aliud accidens absolutum: ergo non superest fundamentum, unde caperetur differencia Christi humanitus, nisi ab illa natura assumpta. Nec valet dicere quod solum secundum naturam divinam differt ab illa; quia[2] sic[3] tantum differret[3] ab illa[2] sicut Pater, et precise[4] convenirent, non obstante unione ypostatica, appropriate[5] ad Verbum: et tunc non plus conveniret[6] Verbum cum aliqua creatura[7] post incarnacionem quam ante; et per consequens non foret eiusdem speciei vel generis cum aliqua creatura,[7] eo quod tantum differt ab ista humanitate cum qua maxime conveniret inter omnes creaturas, quantum differret si esset pure Deus et illa homo, cum differencia amplior non sit fundabilis.

And from this is taken, third, that every substantial or accidental difference by which the Word as to the humanity differs from another supposit or nature is a difference by which Christ's humanity differs from the same. From which it follows further that there is no difference by which Christ humanly differs from that humanity: and since it is not possible that something differ from something unless it differ from the same by some difference, it is clear that there is no difference between Christ and that assumed humanity.[3] It is clear from this, that every substantial difference is taken either from matter or from form: now every such part of Christ is a part of his humanity and conversely, as also every other absolute accident: therefore there remains no foundation whence a difference of Christ humanly might be taken, except from that assumed nature. Nor is it of avail to say that he differs from it only as to the divine nature; for so he would differ from it only as the Father [does], and they would agree precisely [as much], notwithstanding the hypostatic union, appropriated to the Word: and then the Word would agree with no creature more after the incarnation than before; and consequently he would not be of the same species or genus with any creature, because he differs from this humanity, with which he would agree most among all creatures, as much as he would differ if he were purely God and it a man, since no fuller difference can be founded.[4]

¶3 176.27–177.22

[176]Item humanitas Christi habet causas completas et denominaciones positivas,[8] que non possunt nisi homini competere: ergo est homo. Et, cum non potest poni alius homo, quam Christus; quia sic Verbum gereret in se monstruose duos homines, quia personam quam assumeret ad suam personam sed non in unitatem persone, et ipsemet foret alius homo, et illi concurrerent faciendo redempcionis commercium: [177]oportet ergo quod illa humanitas[1] sit idem homo, qui Christus. Assumptum videtur primo ex hoc quod illa humanitas[1] est substancia[2] corporea racionalis ad ymaginem Dei facta, et hoc[3] sufficit ad esse hominis secundum Augustinum et Lincolniensem ut patet superius. Nec valet ficta[4] negacio, quod sic nemo esset formaliter humanitate homo; nec in quantum homo esset aliquid vel alicuius generis pocius quam in quantum peccator, quod non consonat philosophie vel fidei; ymo nemo sciret an esset homo. Quod autem illa humanitas sit substancia racionalis, omnes concorditer confitentur, cum sit composita[5] ex corpore Christi et eius anima. Ideo, si illa non esset substancia, nesciretur quid esset, aut que alia res esset substancia;

Again, Christ's humanity has complete causes and positive namings which can belong only to a man: therefore it is a man. And since no other man can be posited than Christ (because so the Word would carry two men in himself monstrously, because [there would be] a person whom he would assume to his person but not into unity of person, and he himself would be another man, and they would concur in carrying out the trade of redemption), [177]it must therefore be that that humanity is the same man as Christ.[5] The assumption seems [clear] first from this, that that humanity is a corporeal rational substance made to the image of God, and this suffices for the being of a man according to Augustine and Lincoln, as is clear above.[6] Nor is the feigned negation of avail, since so no one would be a man formally by humanity; nor insofar as [he is] man would he be anything, or of any genus, rather than insofar as [he is] a sinner, which does not accord with philosophy or faith; indeed no one would know whether he was a man.[7] And that that humanity is a rational substance all confess with one accord, since it is composed of Christ's body and his soul. So, if it

et ultra videtur, cum omnis substancia sit substancia prima vel secunda, quod illa humanitas sit substancia prima, et per consequens individuum speciei vel generis. Et cum non solum sit in genere substancie vel corporis, sed[6] inferius in genere animalis, eo quod est sensitiva et racionalis et per consequens substancia animata sensibilis; sequitur quod sit animal. Non enim est racio quod negacio caderet in diffinicione animalis pocius quam in diffinicione cuiuscunque substancie, cum omnis singularis substancia sit suppositum.

were not a substance, it would not be known what it was, or what other thing would be a substance; and further it seems, since every substance is first substance or second, that that humanity is a first substance, and consequently an individual of a species or genus. And since it is not only in the genus of substance or of body but lower, in the genus of animal, because it is sensitive and rational and consequently a sentient animate substance, it follows that it is an animal. For there is no reason why the negation should fall in the definition of animal rather than in the definition of any substance whatever, since every singular substance is a supposit.[8]

¶4 177.23–179.19

[177]Confirmatur. Anima Christi, corpus, et unio eorum cum suis consequentibus sufficiunt principiare humanitatem esse hominem, et non impediuntur propter Verbi incarnacionem: ergo de facto constituunt illam in esse hominis. Maior patet ex quolibet alio homine principiato et individuato per corpus et animam unita cum suis consequentibus: ymo videtur quod absolute necessario sequitur[7] positis istis principiis cum unione predicta, quod individuum constituatur in specie. Nam non est[8] possibile quod forma[9] elementi vel mixti inanimati informet[10] proporcionatam materiam, nisi eo ipso constituatur elementum vel mixtum in sua [178]specie: ergo cum totum genus animalis sit perfeccius et[1] eque plene ab intrinseco principiatum; sequitur quod est dare principia intrinseca et eorum unionem, cum quibus non stat quod individuum illius generis non resultet. Si enim non sit[2] possibile quod albedo informet subiectum, nisi eo ipso[3] constituatur unum album; eque[4] evidenter, si anima informat proporcionatum subiectum, oportet quod[5] ex eis constituitur in signanda[6] specie individuum animalis. Quod autem natura Christi non impeditur ne sit animal, probatur sic. Per assumpcionem est humanitas Christi summe exaltata et in perfeccione ultima creature possibili collocata: ergo non est ab aliqua perfeccione naturali, quam naturaliter appeteret, prepedita: cum ergo omnis perfeccio substancialis sit suppositum, vel presupponit suppositum ut subiectum, et omnis perfeccio accidentalis presupponit essencialem, et suppositum sic perfectum; videtur quod, si natura assumpta[7] sit, ut sic, a racione suppositi exclusa, et[8] a perfeccione maxima sit prepedita. Quomodo ergo non tristaretur languens circa perfeccionem possibilem a qua deficit per ypostaticam unionem? Maxima quidem perfeccio creature possibilis est beatitudo, sicut philosophi et theologi profitentur concorditer cum scriptura: modo illa beatitudo consistit in clara visione et fruicione divine essencie iuxta vocem Veritatis Ioh. 17;[9] 'hec est vita eterna ut cognoscant etc.'; ergo illa creatura

This is confirmed. Christ's soul, body and their union, with their consequents, suffice to be the principle of the humanity's being a man, and they are not hindered on account of the Word's incarnation: therefore in fact they constitute it in the being of a man. The major is clear from any other man, constituted from principles and individuated through body and soul united, with their consequents: indeed it seems that it follows absolutely necessarily, these principles being posited with the aforesaid union, that an individual is constituted in the species. For it is not possible that the form of an element or of an inanimate mixed body inform proportioned matter unless by that very fact an element or mixed body is constituted in its [178]species: therefore, since the whole genus of animal is more perfect and equally fully constituted from principles from within, it follows that one may posit intrinsic principles and their union, with which it is not consistent that an individual of that genus should not result. For if it is not possible that whiteness inform a subject unless by that very fact one white thing is constituted, equally evidently, if a soul informs a proportioned subject, an individual animal is constituted from them in a species that can be designated.[9] Now that Christ's nature is not hindered from being an animal is proved thus. Through the assumption Christ's humanity is supremely exalted and set in the ultimate perfection possible to a creature: therefore it is not hindered from any natural perfection that it would naturally desire: since, then, every substantial perfection is a supposit or presupposes a supposit as subject, and every accidental perfection presupposes the essential [perfection], and the supposit so perfected, it seems that, if the assumed nature is, as such, excluded from the account of a supposit, it is also hindered from the greatest perfection. How then would it not grieve, languishing over the possible perfection from which it falls short through the hypostatic union?[10] The greatest

cum[10] non potest[11] esse[11] suppositum stante unione et per consequens non exercere[12] actus suppositales, non potest, ut sic, perfeccionem talem attingere. Sed et hoc[13] concedunt concorditer dicentes quod ista natura, cum non sit suppositum, nec agit nec patitur. Unde et illud Psalmi 44[ti] ad litteram dictum de Christo, 'beatus quem[14] elegisti et assumpsisti,' dicunt esse falsum de virtute sermonis: sed sic intelligitur —beatus, cuius est natura, quam [179]elegisti et assumpsisti—ista autem natura non est beata, cum non sit suppositum, quia per idem meruit redempcionem generis humani, quod non sufficit creatura, nec est colenda vel latria adoranda: illud ergo, quod nunquam exercuit actus suppositales, non est beatum. Sed rogo attendat lector et iudicet,[1] que istarum viarum[2] sit auribus fidelium magis pia; vel dicere quod natura illa per assumpcionem est beatissima creaturarum; (sic quod[3] non deficit sibi esse hominis vel persone racio[4] per se agendi et paciendi ac recipiendi formaliter felicitatem et cuiuscunque generis perfeccionem; sic quod assumpcio extollat eam ad omne genus perfeccionis et non vinculat eam excludendo a perfeccione huiusmodi;) quam dicere eius oppositum? quia non dubium quin esse hominem summe merentem ex passione maxime acceptabili Trinitati, et postmodum esse beatum beatitudine maxima[5] possibili creature, est perfeccionis denominacio. Illam autem tollit adversa posicio, et illam ponit expresse nostra posicio concorditer cum antiquis doctoribus et scriptura.

perfection possible to a creature is indeed blessedness, as philosophers and theologians profess with one accord with scripture: now that blessedness consists in the clear vision and fruition of the divine essence, according to the voice of the Truth, John 17, "this is eternal life: that they may know" etc.; therefore that creature, since it cannot be a supposit while the union stands, and consequently cannot exercise the acts of a supposit, cannot, as such, attain such perfection.[11] But this too they grant with one accord, saying that this nature, since it is not a supposit, neither acts nor is acted on. Hence also that [verse] of Psalm 44, said literally of Christ, "Blessed is he whom thou hast chosen and taken to thee", they say is false in the proper sense of the words: but it is understood thus, "blessed [is he] whose is the nature which [179]thou hast chosen and taken to thee"; and this nature is not blessed, since it is not a supposit, because by the same token it [would have] merited the redemption of the human race, for which a creature does not suffice, and it is neither to be worshipped nor adored with latria: so that which never exercised the acts of a supposit is not blessed.[12] But I ask the reader to attend and judge which of these ways is the more pious to the ears of the faithful: either to say that that nature through the assumption is the most blessed of creatures (so that it does not lack the being of a man or of a person, the ground of acting and being acted on of itself and of receiving formally happiness and perfection of every kind; so that the assumption raises it to every kind of perfection and does not bind it by excluding it from perfection of this sort), or to say its opposite? For there is no doubt that to be a man meriting supremely from a passion supremely acceptable to the Trinity, and afterwards to be blessed with the greatest blessedness possible to a creature, is a naming of perfection. Now the opposing position takes it away, and our position lays it down expressly, in accord with the ancient doctors and scripture.[13]

Notes

1. "Something is B": O reads *aliquid* (175.25), where the print's *aliud* "another thing" stands in no manuscript; A B C are corrupt (*est ·a· motum ad ·b· moto* A, and the like). The English follows O, against Harris's *aliud*. "These two": Christ and his humanity; A B C read *isti* (175.18). A B C read *aliquid predicatarum* for *neutra predictarum* (175.26).
2. Wyclif's own teaching, made clear "elsewhere": forms most alike cannot be coextended in one subject, so two substances in one place would need two sets of accidents. O reads *pun9* for *puncta* (176.1).
3. "Third": the third confirmation (cf. 174.30). *Aliqua differencia* is construed as ablative, "by some difference".
4. "They would agree precisely [as much]": the Word and the humanity, no more than the Father and the humanity. *Appropriate* (176.19) is construed as qualifying the union, which is appropriated to the Son; O's word is doubtful (*apP1etate*). A omits *quia … illa* (176.17–18); B reads *sicut differet*, without *tantum*; A B C read *p~cie*, O *p~e* "purely", for *precise* (176.18); A *communicaret* for *conveniret* (176.20); A B C omit *post … creatura* (176.20–22), the eye passing between the two *creatura*.
5. The parenthesis gives the absurdity of a second man in Christ: the Word would carry a person assumed to his person but not into unity of person, and the two would carry out the redemption together. A B C read *positas* "posited" for *positivas* (176.28).

6. *Assumptum*: the logician's assumption, the antecedent "Christ's humanity has … namings that can belong only to a man". Augustine and Grosseteste (*Lincolniensis*, Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln), cited above at 127–128: Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV.7.11 (PL 42, 1065), *Homo est substantia rationalis constans ex anima et corpore*, and Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron*, sixth day, *creatura racionalis, facta ad ymaginem conditoris*. O omits *sit … humanitas* (177.1–3), the eye passing between the two *humanitas*; A B C omit *substancia* (177.3) and read *sic* for *hoc* (177.4).
7. The moderns' negation, the constituent of the person (161–162): if a man is a man only with a negation added, he is a man by the negation, not formally by humanity. A B C read *facta* "the negation made" for *ficta* (177.5); B *compositum*, O *componitur* without *sit* (177.11); O *secundum* for *sed* (177.17).
8. *Sensibilis* in the definition of animal (Porphyry's *substancia animata sensibilis*) is "sentient", not "perceptible". The negation that would make the humanity no supposit would have to enter every definition of substance, since every singular substance is a supposit.
9. "Is constituted": C and O omit *oportet quod* "it must be that" (178.7), against the print; the English follows C O, with whose reading the indicative *constituitur* construes. A B read *in assignanda* (178.8). O reads *consequitur* (177.29) and omits *non est* (177.31); A B C *formale* for *forma*; A B *informaret* (177.32); A B C omit *et* (178.1) and read *est* for *sit* (178.5); B omits *eo ipso* (178.6); O *que* for *eque*.
10. The subject of "grieve" is the assumed nature, on the opponents' account. A B C omit *assumpta* (178.16) and read *quod* for *et* (178.17).
11. John 17:3; Wyclif has no *autem* ("Now", DR). O reads *14* for *17* (178.24). A B C omit *cum* (178.25) and read *exercendo* for *exercere* (178.26); O *pre ê* for *potest esse*.
12. Ps. 64:5 (Vulgate; Harris's margin Ps. lxv), not Psalm 44 as Wyclif has it. "Taken to thee" (DR) renders *assumpsisti*, the verb of the assumption, which is why the opponents must deny the verse in the proper sense of the words. "By the same token": were the nature blessed, it would equally have merited the redemption and be adored with latria, the worship due to God alone, which the opponents deny. O reads *quam* "whom" (fem., the nature) for *quem* (178.30); C *sed secundo* (178.28); O *indiget* for *iudicet* (179.6); A B C omit *viarum*.
13. *Racio per se agendi* is taken as "the ground of acting"; the words may also be construed *persone racio* "the account of a person … of acting". B omits *racio* (179.9); O reads *quid* for *quod* (179.8); A B C *maxime* for *maxima* (179.16).
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Ps. lxv. (178.30).

Part 6: The humanity's acts and blessedness, and the properties of a man in it

Harris pp. 179.20–182.31

¶1 179.20–181.12

[179]Sed ne dicatur tales denominaciones humanitatis non posse probabiliter sustineri, cum non sit persona; arguitur primo sic ad illam probandam. Nam illa humanitas est mole magna et accidentaliter qualis cum aliis denominacionibus corporeis accidencium; ergo per idem habet denominaciones spirituales accidentales secundum animam. Probatur consequencia eo quod dato antecedente[6] illa humanitas crevit a quantitate infantili[6] usque ad quantitatem virilem, et hoc[7] secundum omnes condiciones augmentacioni proprie competentes: ergo augmentabatur, et per idem ambulabat super terram et mare, predicavit, manducavit, et sic de ceteris actibus[8] animalibus, que Christo conveniebant. Nam, cum componitur ex omnibus partibus,[9] ex quibus et Christus; fuit ex se mobilis, sicut et Christus: et per consequens [180]sufficeret exspirando aerem a suo pulmone secundum suam ymaginativam et[1] cetera[2] vocis organa formare voces simillime sicut Christus. Non enim haberet organa sensuum[2] et operum suppositalium superflua; sic quod, habendo oculos et aures et instrumenta vocalia, preclusa esset sibi via per positivam[3] assumpcionem ne sufficiat plus sentire quam surdus et mutus; sic quod sufficiencia senciendi et personaliter operandi foret per negacionem,[4] qua[5] imperficitur relaxata. Patet ergo, cum[6] humanitas Christi habet de propriis tam formas quam organa ad humanitus

But lest it be said that such namings of the humanity cannot be upheld with probability, since it is not a person, it is argued first thus to prove it. For that humanity is of great bulk and accidentally qualified, with the other bodily namings of accidents; therefore by the same token it has spiritual accidental namings as to the soul. The inference is proved by this, that, the antecedent being granted, that humanity grew from the quantity of infancy up to the quantity of manhood, and this according to all the conditions properly belonging to augmentation: therefore it was augmented, and by the same token it walked upon land and sea, preached, ate, and so of the other animal acts that belonged to Christ. For since it is composed of all the parts of which Christ also [is], it was movable of itself, as Christ also [was]: and consequently [180]it would suffice, breathing out air from its lung according to its imagination, and [with] the other organs of the voice, to form utterances most like Christ's.[1] For it would not have the organs of the senses and of the works of a supposit superfluous, so that, having eyes and ears and vocal instruments, the way would be closed to it by a positive assumption, so that it could sense no more than one deaf and dumb; so that the sufficiency for sensing and for acting personally would come through a negation, upon whose relaxing it is made imperfect.[2] It is

operandum, nec ligatur ex benedicta unione, qua[7] tantum perficitur; quod sufficit, ut loquitur scriptura, humanitus operari. Et confirmatur ex hoc quod Christus non predicat,[8] vel ambulat,[8] nec 'interpellat pro nobis' 'factus obediens,' nisi secundum illam humanitatem. Sed quandocunque duobus nate[9] sunt inesse denominaciones et non uni nisi[10] per reliquum, sequitur quod illi reliquo denominacio inest primo iuxta illud principium Aristotelis primo Posteriorum; 'propter quod unumquodque et illud magis.' Ergo prius taliter[11] predicavit et ceteros actus humanos fecit illa humanitas quam Christus, cum solum secundum illam sic fecerat: sic enim iuxta sentenciam 5^to^ Physicorum: si homo sit sanus secundum thoracem vel moveatur secundum partem, tunc illa pars primo movetur et totum per accidens. Cum ergo denominaciones humane insunt Verbo secundum illam humanitatem, que est primum et completum subiectum eorum; videtur quod prius insunt sibi quam Verbo, cum non possunt inesse Verbo nisi per illam, et sibi possunt inesse cum hoc quod non insunt Verbo; ut signato motu progressivo Christi certum est quod iste non potuit fuisse sine illa humanitate, cum motus ex 5^to^ Physicorum individuatur[12] a spacio, a [181]tempore, et subiecto. Si ergo Christus secundum aliam humanitatem moveretur pro eodem loco et tempore secundum quamlibet eius partem quantitativam, alius foret motus. Cum igitur illi humanitati dimisse potest inesse dictus motus sine hoc quod insit Verbo, ut dicitur, et Verbo non possit inesse nisi sibi infuerit[1]; patet[2] quod naturaliter prius sibi inest.[3] Si enim denominacio creata post naturaliter insit Verbo hoc foret[2] secundum deitatem vel secundum humanitatem vel mixtim; non secundum deitatem quia nulla forma accidentalis inest sibi nisi secundum naturam qua est mobilis; si secundum humanitatem sive parcialiter[4] sive totaliter; tunc illi humanitati naturaliter prius inest.

clear, then, since Christ's humanity has of its own both forms and organs for acting humanly, and is not bound by the blessed union, by which it is only perfected, that it suffices, as scripture speaks, to act humanly. And this is confirmed by this, that Christ does not preach or walk, nor "maketh intercession for us", "becoming obedient", except according to that humanity.[3] Now whenever namings are of a nature to be in two, and in the one only through the other, it follows that the naming is first in that other, according to that principle of Aristotle in the first [book] of the *Posterior* [*Analytics*]: "that on account of which each thing [is such] is itself more [so]". Therefore that humanity preached and did the other human acts in this way before Christ [did], since he had done so only according to it: for so, according to the teaching of *Physics* V, if a man is healthy as to his chest, or is moved as to a part, then that part is moved first and the whole by accident.[4] Since, then, human namings are in the Word according to that humanity, which is their first and complete subject, it seems that they are in it before [they are] in the Word, since they cannot be in the Word except through it, and they can be in it without being in the Word; as, designating Christ's progressive motion, it is certain that it could not have been without that humanity, since motion, from *Physics* V, is individuated by space, [181]time and subject. If, then, Christ were moved according to another humanity for the same place and time, as to every quantitative part of it, it would be another motion.[5] Since, then, the said motion can be in that humanity, once laid aside, without being in the Word, as is said, and cannot be in the Word unless it has been in it, it is clear that it is naturally first in it. For if a created naming were afterwards naturally in the Word, this would be either as to the Godhead or as to the humanity or mixedly; not as to the Godhead, since no accidental form is in him except according to the nature by which he is movable; if as to the humanity, whether partially or totally, then it is naturally first in that humanity.[6]

¶2 181.13–182.8

[181]Et indubie[5] idem videtur iudicium de spirituali denominacione secundum animam. Nam si anime sanctorum sunt beate in celo, ymo et corpora; quanto magis completa Christi humanitas, cum habeat in se primo subiective omnem creatam beatitudinem qua Christus humanitus est beatus. Augustinus itaque, qui ponit quod anima prius nedum intelligit ymo sentit quam totum compositum, diceret quod anima Christi in celo haberet visionem et fruicionem beatificam ultra quamcunque aliam animam. Nec est fingendum quod assumpcio ligat spiritum Iesu ne beatifice delectetur. Et per idem habendo quatuor[6]

And undoubtedly the same judgement seems [to hold] of a spiritual naming as to the soul. For if the souls of the saints are blessed in heaven, indeed the bodies too, how much more the complete humanity of Christ, since it has in itself first, as subject, all the created blessedness by which Christ humanly is blessed. So Augustine, who holds that the soul not only understands but even senses before the whole composite, would say that Christ's soul in heaven would have the beatific vision and fruition beyond any other soul.[7] Nor is it to be feigned that the assumption binds

dotes corporis foret perfecte et complete beata eadem beatitudine, qua est Christus; et idem est iudicium de omnibus accidentibus creatis que humanitus[7] insunt Christo. Quomodo, queso, aliter adorarem eam latria, si non tantum benefecit michi ut crux Christi? aut quomodo dimissa recoleret de operibus Christi sui, vel maneret inter passionem et mortem dimissa a Deo corpore fatigata[8] si nichil antea[9] fuit passa. Dimissa ergo in uno loco et Christo assumente eam in alio, foret plus quam Christi germanus, ut patet de convenienciis substancialium [182]et accidentalium: et non est conveniencia amplior nisi fuerit personalis; in nullo itaque casu Verbum assumeret personam, que esset natura Verbi passa et quomodolibet temporaliter[1] formata; ut patet de comitancia absolutorum conmultiplicatorum cum taliter multiplicatis; et sic facta revelacione illi homini quod adnichilabitur, patet quod dolor redundaret in Christum, nulli autem alteri homini posset sic affici.

the spirit of Jesus so that it may not delight beatifically. And by the same token, having the four dowries of the body, it would be perfectly and completely blessed with the same blessedness with which Christ is; and the same is the judgement of all the created accidents that are in Christ humanly.[8] How, I ask, should I otherwise adore it with latria, if it has not done me as much good as the cross of Christ? Or how, laid aside, would it recall the works of its Christ, or remain between the passion and death, laid aside by God, wearied in body, if it had suffered nothing before?[9] If, then, it were laid aside in one place and Christ assumed it in another, it would be more than Christ's brother, as is clear from the agreements of substantial [182]and accidental [things]: and there is no fuller agreement unless it is personal; so in no case would the Word assume a person which was a nature of the Word that had suffered and been formed in any way in time; as is clear from the concomitance of absolutes multiplied together with the things so multiplied; and so, if it were revealed to that man that he will be annihilated, it is clear that the grief would redound to Christ; but he could be so affected toward no other man.[10]

¶3 182.9–182.31

[182]Quo dato, videtur multipliciter quod humanitas Christi sit homo, et sic persona Verbi. Nam nichil est risibile nisi homo; humanitas Christi est risibilis, cum sufficiat predicare: ergo est homo. Maior patet ex hoc quod risibilitas est propria passio hominis convertibilis cum specie. Et idem est iudicium de passione mortalitatis capta a causa materiali, de productivitate sui similis in specie, que competit sibi passionaliter a causa efficiente, et de beatificabilitate[2] secundum corpus et animam que competit sibi a[3] causa finali.[3] Cum ergo predicaciones huiusmodi solum possunt formaliter inesse suppositis, videtur, cum humanitati Christi insunt, quod ipsa sit suppositum Verbi. Secundo confirmatur idem ex hoc quod omnis forma[4] accidentalis non est aliud[5] nisi subiectum accidentaliter se habere; ut mocio est mobile[6] moveri, locucio est ipsum loqui, et ita de ceteris, ut hic supponitur. Cum ergo eodem accidente informatur Christus et ista humanitas, sequitur quod idem est Christus et illa humanitas: vel[7] si Christus non sit illa humanitas sed movetur secundum illam, alia est mocio Christi et alius motus eius: et ita numerarentur omnes forme complete accidentales in Christo secundum numerum subiectorum: quod[8] est impossibile, cum nullum tale accidens foret pars alterius, sed quelibet pars unius pars alterius et e contra.

This granted, it seems in many ways that Christ's humanity is a man, and so the person of the Word. For nothing is risible but a man; Christ's humanity is risible, since it is able to preach: therefore it is a man. The major is clear from this, that risibility is the proper attribute of man, convertible with the species.[11] And the same is the judgement of the attribute of mortality, taken from the material cause; of the productivity of its like in species, which belongs to it as an attribute from the efficient cause; and of beatifiability as to body and soul, which belongs to it from the final cause. Since, then, predications of this sort can be formally only in supposits, it seems, since they are in Christ's humanity, that it is a supposit of the Word.[12] Second, the same is confirmed by this, that every accidental form is nothing but the subject's being accidentally disposed; as motion is the movable's being moved, speech is the speaking itself, and so of the rest, as is supposed here.[13] Since, then, Christ and this humanity are informed by the same accident, it follows that Christ and that humanity are the same: or if Christ is not that humanity but is moved according to it, the motion (*mocio*) of Christ is one, and his movement (*motus*) another; and so all complete accidental forms in Christ would be numbered according to the number of subjects: which is impossible, since no such accident would

be a part of the other, but every part of the one [is] a part of the other and conversely.[14]

Notes

1. "And [with] the other organs": *cetera vocis organa* stands in the accusative beside *aerem* without a verb of its own; "[with]" is supplied. C omits *humanitas* (179.26), O reads *illa humanitas crevit infacili* (179.26–27); A B C read *sic* for *hoc* (179.28), *accidentibus* for *actibus* (179.31), omit *partibus* (179.32) and *et* (180.2); A B C rearrange or shorten *cetera … sensuum* (180.2–3).
2. The opponents' account turned on itself: if the assumption is "positive" and the person is constituted by a negation of dependence, the assumed humanity would lose by the assumption the powers it had as a person; *qua … relaxata* is construed as an ablative absolute, "upon whose relaxing". A B C read *mediacionem* "mediation" for *negacionem* (180.8); O *quia* for *qua*; A B *propositum*, C *perpositam*, for *positivam* (180.6).
3. Rom. 8:34 ("who also maketh intercession for us"; cf. Heb. 7:25); Phil. 2:8 ("becoming obedient"). A B C read *quod* for *cum* (180.9) and *predicavit vel meruit* "preached or merited" for *predicat, vel ambulat* (180.13); O *quam* for *qua* (180.11).
4. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I.2 (72a29–30), the axiom *propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis*, the cause of an attribute's inherence inhering more than the attribute; Wyclif has no *tale*. *Physics* V.1 (224a21–26): the body is healed because the eye or the chest is; Aristotle calls this change in respect of a part, which he distinguishes from change by accident. *Sentencia*: the teaching of the book. O reads *causaliter* "causally" for *taliter* (180.19); B *innate*, C omits *sunt* (180.15); A B C read *unica per* without *nisi* (180.16).
5. *Physics* V.4 (227b21–29), a motion one without qualification by the oneness of that in which, the time, and the thing moved. O reads *indîatur* (180.31).
6. *Post* "afterwards" (181.7) is doubtful; A B C, which omit the passage from *Si enim* to *hoc foret*, have *prius* in what they keep (*patet quod si naturaliter prius insit verbo hoc foret*, 181.6–8). O omits *infuerit* (181.6), reads *in esse* for *inest* (181.7) and *particulariter* for *parcialiter* (181.11).
7. Augustine, that the soul understands and senses before the composite: place not found; compare *De Genesi ad litteram* III.5.7 (PL 34, 282), *sentire non est corporis, sed animae per corpus*. O omits *Et indubie* (181.13).
8. The four dowries of the glorified body. B omits *quatuor* (181.23); O reads *humana* for *humanitus* (181.26).
9. Latria, the worship due to God alone: Wyclif argues from the adoration of Christ's humanity, which would be idle were it no subject of merit. O reads *fangata* for *fatigata* (181.30) and *anna* for *antea*, which Harris asks whether to take as *anima*.
10. The case of the humanity laid aside and reassumed: it would be nearer to Christ than any brother, and since no agreement is fuller than the personal, the Word could not assume as a separate person a nature that had been his. "Absolutes": absolute accidents, multiplied with their subjects. A B C read *temporalis* for *temporaliter* (182.4).
11. Risibility is the stock example of a *proprium*, the proper attribute convertible with the species; "since it is able to preach": the power of speech goes with reason, and so with risibility.
12. A B C read *et beatificante* for *beatificabilitate* (182.16) and omit *a causa finali* (182.17).
13. "Is nothing but": C and O omit *aliud* (182.21), against the print's *non est aliud nisi* "is not anything other than"; the English follows C O. C omits *forma* (182.21) and *mobile* (182.22).
14. *Mocio* and *motus* are set apart here: one motion of Christ, another of the humanity by which he is moved. O reads *ut* for *vel* (182.26) and *et* for *quod* (182.30).

Part 7: The price of the redemption: the humanity adored with latria and hyperdulia

Harris pp. 182.32–184.23

¶1 182.32–184.14

[182]Tercio confirmatur ex hoc quod nichil sufficit redimere genus humanum perfecte, ut modo redimitur, nisi ipsum sit [183]Deus: humanitas Christi sic redimit: ergo est Deus. Ipsa[1] enim fuit passa omni passione, qua Christus dedit sanguinem in redempcionem ut Christus, et sic de posicione anime ac commercio quo mercatus est Christus. Cum ergo per[2] passionem et tales formas fiebat redempcio, sequitur quod ipsa fecit redempcionem; aliter enim[3] non esset illa humanitas tante[4] diligenda nec latria adoranda. Cum tamen indubie quilibet[5] Christianus debet tantum diligere humanitatem Christi quantum[5] et Christum sub racione qua homo: ymo hec idem sunt et colenda eadem pietate in numero, ut ostendit Magister 3°[6] Sentenciarum Dist. 8. ex[7] testimonio beati Augustini. Christus enim ex hoc quod est

Thirdly, this is confirmed from this: that nothing suffices to redeem the human race perfectly, as it is now redeemed, unless it is [183]God; Christ's humanity so redeems: therefore it is God. For it suffered every suffering by which Christ gave his blood for redemption, as Christ [did]; and so of the laying-down of the soul and the trade by which Christ made his purchase.[1] Since, therefore, the redemption was made through the passion and such forms, it follows that it made the redemption; for otherwise that humanity would not be so greatly to be loved, nor to be adored with latria; whereas, nevertheless, every Christian undoubtedly ought to love Christ's humanity as much as [he loves] Christ too, under the aspect by which he is a man: indeed these are the same, and to be worshipped with

ista humanitas et per consequens creatura adorari debet yperdulia, et omnis alia creatura venerari debet tantum[8] dulia. Nam excellens honor debet[8] Christo attribui, qui ex unione ypostatica est creator ac eciam creatura; et illa vocatur significanter yperdulia; et cum hoc, cum idem Christus sit creator, debet latria soli deo debita adorari. Correspondenter humanitas Christi cum sit Verbum, debet adorari latria,[9] et cum in se sit creatura debet adorari[9] yperdulia sicut Christus. Et sic tam Christus quam ista humanitas, que est personaliter ipse Christus, debet secundum duplicem racionem eadem tam latria quam yperdulia adorari: sed absit hoc, nisi illa humanitas foret[10] Christus! Ex quo patet quod non solum deitati, sed soli deo est latria exhibenda. Nec est putandum quod humanitas Christi adoranda sit latria solum secundum ordinem ad alterum, sicut crux, ymago, vel pars Christi quantitativa, sed[11] tanquam corpus animatum, sumptum de virgine, passum pro nobis, dolens et merens, et per consequens vere positum precium pro redempcione humani generis: 'empti enim estis[12] precio [184]magno,' ut dicit Apostolus prima ad Cor. 6° et 7°: et ad id precium atque commercium explanat expressius: 'Deus, inquit, proprio Filio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum': et indubie sic fecit tota Trinitas: unde ad Gal. 2°, 'in fide vivo Filii Dei, qui dilexit me et tradidit semetipsum pro me': et indubie precium traditum fuit Christi humanitas; unde[1] si per impossibile humanitas Christi dimissa[1] fuerit personalitati proprie conversans nobiscum ut proximis, ego diligerem eum ut salvatorem et redemptorem meum, adoraremque eum latria sicut prius: nulli enim alteri hominum adeo potero obligari. Nec video quin iste homo dimissus, sine peccato vel merito decedens, foret supra angelos et omnes alios homines merito exaltandus propter meritum quo meruit ypostatice copulatus.

the same piety in number, as the Master shows, [book] 3 of the *Sentences*, dist. 8, from the testimony of blessed Augustine. For Christ, from this, that he is this humanity, and in consequence a creature, ought to be adored with hyperdulia, and every other creature ought to be venerated only with dulia.[2] For an excelling honour ought to be ascribed to Christ, who from the hypostatic union is creator and also creature; and that is called, significantly, hyperdulia; and together with this, since the same Christ is creator, he ought to be adored with latria, owed to God alone. Correspondingly Christ's humanity, since it is the Word, ought to be adored with latria, and since in itself it is a creature it ought to be adored with hyperdulia, as Christ is. And so both Christ and this humanity, which is personally Christ himself, ought, according to a twofold aspect, to be adored with the same, both latria and hyperdulia: but far be this, unless that humanity were Christ! From which it is clear that latria is to be shown not only to the Godhead, but to God alone.[3] Nor is it to be thought that Christ's humanity is to be adored with latria only according to its order to another, as the cross, an image, or a quantitative part of Christ, but as a body animated, taken from the virgin, suffering for us, grieving and mourning, and in consequence truly laid down as the price for the redemption of the human race:[4] "For you are bought with a great [184]price," as the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 6:20 and 7:23; and he sets out that price and trade more expressly: "God," he says, "spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all";[5] and undoubtedly the whole Trinity did so. Hence Galatians 2:20: "I live in the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and delivered himself for me"; and undoubtedly the price delivered was Christ's humanity. Hence if, by an impossible [supposition], Christ's humanity had been laid aside to a personality of its own, living its life with us as neighbours, I would love him as my saviour and redeemer, and would adore him with latria as before: for to no other of men shall I be able to be so bound. Nor do I see but that this man, laid aside, dying without sin or merit, would deservedly be exalted above the angels and all other men, for the merit by which he merited when hypostatically joined.[6]

¶2 184.15–184.23

[184]Tales sunt multe[2] evidencie[2] ex quibus credi debet—si illa humanitas sit aliquid, tunc est Christus—et sic intelligo illud ad Titum 3°; 'cum[3] autem benignitas et humanitas apparuit[3] salvatoris nostri Dei' etc. Illa quidem humanitas est mas de quo Baruch 3° 'in terris visus est et cum hominibus conversatus est'; ipse enim est 'vir quem femina

Such are the many evidences from which it ought to be believed—"if that humanity is anything, then it is Christ"—and so I understand that [text] of Titus 3:4: "But when the goodness and humanity of our Saviour God appeared" etc.[7] That humanity indeed is the male of whom Baruch 3:38 [speaks]: "he was seen upon earth, and conversed with men"; for he is

circumdedit.' Ierem. 31°. Et hinc dicit Augustinus in De Vera Religione quod 'Verbum virum suscepit natus ex femina.'

"the man (*vir*) whom a woman compassed," Jeremiah 31:22. And hence Augustine says in *On True Religion* that "the Word took up a man (*vir*), born of a woman."[8]

Notes

1. *Passio* (183.2) is here the suffering, the Passion, not the attribute of the logicians' *subiectum / passio*; "as Christ [did]": *ut Christus* may also be read "as being Christ". *Posicio anime*: the laying-down of the soul, i.e. of life (John 10:15, 17–18), not the logical "position". O reads *ipsum* for *Ipsa* (183.1), A B C *ipâ*; A B C omit *per* (183.4) and *enim* (183.6); A C read *tantum tante* (183.7).
2. *Latria*: the worship due to God alone; *dulia*: the veneration due to a creature; *yperdulia* "hyperdulia": the higher veneration of a creature above the rest. The Master: Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III; the adoration of Christ's humanity with Augustine's testimony stands at d. 9 c. 1–2 (PL 192, 775–776), not d. 8, which asks whether the divine nature is born of the Virgin. B reads *Christus debet diligere humanitatem tantum quantum* (183.8–9); O omits *3°* and A adds *hoc* (183.11); O omits *tantum dulia … debet* (183.14–15).
3. Latria goes to whatever is God, not to the abstract Godhead only: so the humanity, if it is the Word, is adored with latria in its own right. O omits *latria … adorari* (183.19–20); B reads *Christus sit* for *foret Christus* (183.24).
4. C O read *sit* for *sed* (183.28), against A B and the print; with *sit* the clause has no construction ("nor is it to be thought … it is as a body animated"), and the print is kept.
5. 1 Cor. 6:20 (DR); 7:23 has *pretio empti estis* without *magno*. Rom. 8:32, from the same Apostle: Wyclif supplies *Deus* and drops *Qui etiam* and *suo*; DR "He that spared not even his own Son, but delivered him up for us all". O reads *est* for *estis* (183.31).
6. The counterfactual of the laying-aside: if the humanity were left to a personality of its own, the man would still be redeemer and owed latria. "Without sin or merit": dying with no sin and no merit of his own after the laying-aside; the second *merito* (184.13) is the adverb "deservedly". A B C read *que si dimissa fuerit*, omitting *per impossibile humanitas Christi* (184.7–8).
7. Titus 3:4: DR "the goodness and kindness of God our Saviour"; Wyclif reads *humanitas* as the humanity, and the English keeps "humanity" because the argument turns on it. A B C omit *multe evidencie* (184.15); A C read *cum autem et humanitas apparuerit*, B *cum autem et apparuerit* (184.17–18), against the Vulgate.
8. Baruch 3:38 (DR), without *Post haec*. Jer. 31:22: the Vulgate has *femina circumdabit virum*, DR "A woman shall compass a man"; Wyclif puts it in the past. Augustine, *De vera religione* 16.30 (PL 34, 135): *ne quis forte sexus a suo Creatore se contemptum putaret, virum suscepit, natus ex femina. Mas* "male" and *vir* name the sex, against the bare *homo*.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Gal. ii. 20. (184.5); reference Tit. iii. 4. (184.17); reference Jer. xxxi. 22, (184.21).

Chapter 11

Part 1: The Subtle Doctor's two respects, and his first four arguments

Harris pp. 185.0–189.33

¶1 *185.0–185.0*

[185][Solvit instancias quibus moderniores doctores videntur fulcire suam sentenciam, recitando decem ludicra que concedentes possibilitatem dimissionis annuunt consequenter. Discussion of Duns Scotus' theory of the Incarnation including the analogy of Transubstantiation in the Eucharist (pp. 189-191); followed by a refutation of the hypothesis that Christ could have assumed many humanities.]

[It resolves the objections by which the more modern doctors seem to prop up their teaching, recounting ten ludicrous things to which those who grant the possibility of the laying-aside consequently assent.]

¶2 *185.2–185.22*

[185]Superest[1] videre evidencias ex quibus fulcitur opinio huic sentencie[2] mee in verbis contraria.[2] Declarat autem Doctor Subtilis istam opinionem in principio 3[ii] Sentenciarum satis subtiliter. 'Accidens, inquit, duplicem habitudinem habet ad subiectum: scilicet, informantis ad informatum; et talis racio includit imperfeccionem subiecti, quia potenciam ad actum quo subiectum perficitur: aliam autem habitudinem ut naturaliter posterius dependens a subiecto causaliter; et ista habitudo attestatur perfeccionem subiecti et imperfeccionem forme dependentis. Sic, inquit, simillime natura assumpta habet duplicem habitudinem ad Verbum, vel sub racione causandi sicut generaliter omnis creatura dependet a tota Trinitate; et illa habitudo presupponit in creatura posse naturale imperfeccionem sapiens, quod oportet habere actum causancie divine inseparabiliter comitantem. 2[a] autem habitudo est, qua natura assumpta secundum potenciam obediencialem potest esse natura Verbi, et illa potencia non potest actuari nisi per miraculum, et dicit quodammodo perfeccionem in persona assumente[3]; terminare itaque dependenciam creature secundum istam racionem est ypostatice assumere dictam creaturam.'

It remains to see the evidences by which the opinion contrary in words to this teaching of mine is propped up. And the Subtle Doctor makes clear this opinion at the beginning of the third [book] of the *Sentences*, subtly enough.[1] "An accident," he says, "has a twofold respect to its subject: namely, of the informing to the informed; and such an aspect includes imperfection of the subject, because [it includes] potency to the act by which the subject is perfected; and the other respect, as naturally posterior, depending causally on the subject; and this respect attests the perfection of the subject and the imperfection of the dependent form.[2] So," he says, "most like this, the assumed nature has a twofold respect to the Word: either under the aspect of causing, as generally every creature depends on the whole Trinity; and this respect presupposes in the creature a natural capacity savouring of imperfection, which must have the act of the divine causing inseparably accompanying [it]. And the second respect is that by which the assumed nature, according to obediential potency, can be the nature of the Word; and this potency cannot be actualised except by miracle, and it signifies in a way perfection in the assuming person; and so to terminate the dependence of the creature according to this aspect is hypostatically to assume the said creature."[3]

¶3 *185.23–186.17*

[185]Et ista sentencia placet michi. Nam omne subiectum accidentis includit in se analogice racionem causantis ad [186]suum causatum quod est in Deo equivoce perfeccionis simpliciter. Verumptamen omnis causancia, qua subiectum causat inherens accidens, sapit imperfeccionem subiecti, quia causanciam materialem vel subiectivam

And this teaching pleases me. For every subject of an accident includes in itself, analogically, the account of a causer toward [186]its caused, which in God is, equivocally, [a matter] of perfection without qualification.[4] Nevertheless every causing by which a subject causes an inhering accident

qua est in[1] potencia perfici[1] tali forma. Unde non est dare aliam singularem habitudinem, qua subiectum potest causare accidens sine hoc, quod ipso informetur. Sed quelibet singularis racio vel causa includit racionem analogam, que secundum illud[2] quod est perfeccionis simpliciter, soli Deo[3] potest competere. Nec sequitur ex miraculosa transsubstanciacione in eucaristia quod vel qualitas vel inherens quantitas[4] possit per se[5] existere sine informacione et essenciali dependencia ad subiectum. Ad tantum ergo valet illa sentencia, quod vere ponit in qualibet racione creata lucere potenciam unde Deus potest humanitati Christi[6] ypostatice copulari, sed quod aliam naturam possit assumere probari non poterit vel exemplariter edoceri.

savours of imperfection of the subject, because [it includes] material or subjective causing, by which it is in potency to be perfected by such a form. Hence one may not posit another singular respect by which a subject can cause an accident without being informed by it. But every singular account or cause includes an analogous account, which, according to that which is of perfection without qualification, can belong to God alone. Nor does it follow from the miraculous transubstantiation in the eucharist that either quality or inhering quantity can exist of itself without informing and essential dependence on a subject. To this much, therefore, that teaching avails: that it truly posits that in every created account there shines a potency whereby God can be hypostatically joined to Christ's humanity; but that he could assume another nature cannot be proved, or taught by example.[5]

¶4 186.18–186.20

[186]Quod autem Verbum potest assumere naturam humanam faciendo ipsam esse naturam sui et non ipsum Verbum probat Doctor quintuplici racione.

And that the Word can assume human nature, making it be his nature and not the Word himself, the Doctor proves by a fivefold argument.

¶5 186.21–186.22

[186]Primo ex hoc, quod nullum ex hoc sequitur inconveniens[7] ex parte assumentis nec[8] assumpti.[8]

First, from this: that no absurdity follows from this on the part of the assuming or of the assumed.[6]

¶6 186.23–187.16

[186]Sed in ista racione falsum petitur; cum personalis unio, qua humanitas fieret natura hominis, implicaret[9] illam humanitatem fieri unum personaliter cum sumente. Natura enim completa substancialis cuicumque supposito est generaliter idem suppositum. Et si humanitas sit natura completa Verbi, tunc est essencia[10] et substancia Verbi eo quod natura perfecta et essencia convertuntur, et si est essencia vel substancia Verbi, tunc est[10] Verbum; cum cuiuslibet rei create vel increate idem est essencia vel substancia et [187]res cuius est essencia. Ideo Verbum non potest facere humanitatem esse naturam Verbi, nisi fecerit ipsam esse essenciam ac substanciam Verbi, et per consequens ipsum Verbum. Nec sequitur—ista natura humana est natura Dei; ergo est natura divina—quia talia abstracta cum huiusmodi possessivis convocant[1] possessionem sui primitivi cum quadam racione reduplicandi; ut, si humanitas Christi sit essencia, natura, vel substancia divina, tunc est natura Dei sub racione qua Deus, quod solum est deitas; et si deitas sit natura humana, tunc est natura humana sub racione qua homo; et sic deitate foret Verbum formaliter homo, et humanitate Deus; quod est impossibile. Et patet quod multum refert[2] dicere—deitas est natura hominis— et—ipsa est natura humana;

But in this argument the false is begged; since the personal union by which the humanity would become the nature of a man would imply that that humanity becomes one personally with the one taking [it].[7] For the complete substantial nature is, generally, the same supposit as any supposit whatever [whose nature it is]. And if the humanity is the complete nature of the Word, then it is the essence and substance of the Word, because perfect nature and essence are convertible; and if it is the essence or substance of the Word, then it is the Word; since of any thing whatever, created or uncreated, the essence or substance and [187]the thing whose essence it is are the same. Therefore the Word cannot make the humanity be the nature of the Word unless he made it be the essence and substance of the Word, and in consequence the Word himself. Nor does it follow—"this human nature is the nature of God; therefore it is the divine nature"—because such abstract [terms] with possessives of this kind call up the possession of their primitive with a certain account of reduplicating:[8] as, if Christ's humanity is the divine essence, nature or substance, then it is the nature of God under the aspect by which he is God, which is only the Godhead; and if the Godhead is human nature, then it is human nature

humanitas est natura Dei— et—ipsa est natura divina—; cum ille nature tam dispares conveniunt in eodem supposito.

under the aspect by which he is a man; and so by the Godhead the Word would formally be a man, and by the humanity God; which is impossible. And it is clear that there is much difference between saying "the Godhead is the nature of a man" and "it is human nature", [and between] "the humanity is the nature of God" and "it is the divine nature"; since those natures, so disparate, agree in the same supposit.

¶7 187.17–187.21

[187]2° arguit Doctor per hoc quod persona divina potest terminare quamcumque dependenciam creature, quam dependenciam terminare foret[3] perfeccionis; sed perfeccionis simpliciter est posse facere naturam creatam esse naturam Dei; ergo Deus hoc potest.

Secondly, the Doctor argues by this: that a divine person can terminate any dependence of a creature whatever, which dependence it would be [a mark] of perfection to terminate; now it is [a mark] of perfection without qualification to be able to make a created nature be the nature of God; therefore God can do this.[9]

¶8 187.22–188.13

[187]Sine dubio verum concluditur, sed infidelis diceret quod minor foret pura peticio. Unde quia videmus, quod Deus producit per se multos effectus ut substancias, sicut fide capimus de mundi principio; eliciunt quidam tanquam principium quod deitas vicem cuiuscunque cause secunde supplere poterit. Et ex illo pullulant plurime vanitates; quia certum est quod nullius cause materialis vel subiective vicem deitas supplere poterit, hoc est, causare formam eadem causacione sive simillima subducto subiecto; quia tunc deitas posset esse ignea et quomodolibet informata; quod dementis est dicere. Ideo causare materialiter vel subiective non potest sibi competere; ymo nullum accidens vel formam materialem potest Deus sine causancia[4] [188] substancie per se producere: ut, sicut non potest producere motum meum, nisi ego movear hoc causando, sic de qualibet forma materiali. Ymo de accidente spirituali idem dicitur; ut non potest actum volendi creature producere nisi ipsa creatura nedum concurrat cum eo subiective causando, sed et eciam coagendo. Ymo si ultra perspicitur, nullius secundi agentis potest deitas vicem supplere agendo univoce. Ideo vicis supplecio, cum dicit inferioritatis condicionem vicariam, non potest deitati competere. Quando ergo per se miraculose opus perficit,[1] quod posset facere agens secundum[2] alia[2] accione in genere cum suo regimine instrumentaliter efficere, non supplet vicem agentis; nec e contra cum conformantur in genere.

Without doubt something true is inferred, but an unbeliever would say that the minor would be a pure begging [of the question]. Hence, because we see that God produces of himself many effects, such as substances, as we take by faith concerning the beginning of the world, some draw out as a principle that the Godhead can supply the place of any second cause whatever. And from that sprout very many vanities; for it is certain that the Godhead can supply the place of no material or subjective cause, that is, cause a form by the same causation, or a most similar one, with the subject withdrawn; for then the Godhead could be fiery and informed in any way whatever; which it is a madman's part to say. Therefore to cause materially or subjectively cannot belong to it; indeed God cannot produce of himself any accident or material form without the causing [188] of the substance: as, just as he cannot produce my motion unless I am moved, causing this, so of any material form. Indeed the same is said of a spiritual accident: as, he cannot produce a creature's act of willing unless the creature itself not only concurs with him by causing subjectively, but also by co-acting. Indeed, if one looks further, the Godhead can supply the place of no second agent by acting univocally. Therefore the supplying of a place, since it signifies a vicarious condition of inferiority, cannot belong to the Godhead.[10] When, therefore, he of himself miraculously performs a work which he could make a second agent effect instrumentally, with his governance, by an action other in kind, he does not supply the place of the agent; nor conversely when they are conformed in kind.[11]

¶9 188.14–188.16

[188]3° arguit Doctor quod natura assumpta est prius essencia singularis quam suppositatur; ergo pro illo priori potest Deus personare illam naturam in alio.

Thirdly, the Doctor argues that the assumed nature is a singular essence before it is supposited; therefore for that prior [moment] God can make that nature a person in another.[12]

¶10 188.17–188.25

[188]Sed hic videtur michi quod consequencia sit neganda. Nam iuxta illud sequeretur quod quilibet potest esse quilibet. Nam Petrus prius origine est essencia quam substancia; ergo pro illo priori Deus posset facere eum nonsubstanciam; et, cum prius sit substancia quam corpus, et prius corpus quam animal, et prius animal quam homo, eo quod omne superius est causa sui inferioris; sequitur quod posset indifferenter fieri cuiuscunque speciei substancie tam secundum corpus quam animam.

But here it seems to me that the inference is to be denied. For according to that it would follow that anyone can be anyone. For Peter is, in origin, an essence before [he is] a substance; therefore for that prior [moment] God could make him a non-substance; and, since he is a substance before a body, and a body before an animal, and an animal before a man, because every superior is cause of its inferior, it follows that he could indifferently be made of any species of substance whatever, as much as to body as to soul.

¶11 188.26–189.28

[188]Sed ulterius pro materia argumenti dicitur quod, quam primo quoad consequenciam humanitas Christi est ista singularis natura, tam primo est ipsa persona Verbi. Non enim posset derelinqui non assumpta, nec post assumpcionem dimitti; quia tunc indubie, sicut incepcio humanitatis presupponeretur prioritate consequente assumpcionem,[3] ita personacio creata, cum esse individuum racionalis nature sit esse personam. Et patet quod Christus prius est persona, suppositum, vel ypostasis quam ipse est natura singularis; [189]sed generaliter e[1] contra primo, sicut substancia est natura singularis date speciei, ut Christus,[1] eque primo est suppositum humane nature, sicut est persona hominis. Ideo Christus prius est persona quam est persona hominis vel substancia singularis. Verumptamen non est ordo inter divinum suppositum[2] et personam divinam tanquam inter generalius et contraccius, sicut est in personalitatibus creatis. Sed et in illis non oportet, si Petrus sit prius suppositum substancie quam persona humane nature, quod potest[3] esse suppositum non persona, ut patet ex dictis superius. Singularitas ergo Christi est posterior sua personalitate, et causatur ex condicionibus individuantibus, ut puta ex illo corpore et illa anima cum illa unione ypostatica et aliis que secuntur. Ex quo videtur michi quod Christus non potest aliam naturam assumere, quia tunc posset esse alius homo; et per consequens ista persona, ut post deducetur; quod est impossibile. Et consequencia patet ex hoc quod, si alia fuerint principia individuancia, tunc foret aliud individuum speciei humane et per consequens alius homo. Nec est color quod tempus aut aliud accidens requisitum individuat substanciam,[4] nisi ut multo evidencius unio ypostatica individuaverat dominum Iesum Christum, ut dicit Anselmus in De Incarnacione 7°. Nec obest quod Christus

But further, for the matter of the argument, the answer is that, as early, as to inference, as Christ's humanity is this singular nature, so early is it the person of the Word itself. For it could not be left unassumed, nor be laid aside after the assumption; for then undoubtedly, just as the beginning of the humanity would be presupposed to the assumption by a priority of consequence, so would a created personation be, since to be an individual of rational nature is to be a person.[13] And it is clear that Christ is a person, supposit or hypostasis before he is a singular nature; [189]but generally the reverse: as early as a substance is the singular nature of a given species, like Christ, equally early is it the supposit of human nature, as it is the person of a man. Therefore Christ is a person before he is a person of a man or a singular substance. Nevertheless there is no order between the divine supposit and the divine person as between the more general and the more contracted, as there is in created personalities.[14] But in those too it is not necessary, if Peter is a supposit of substance before a person of human nature, that he can be a supposit [and] not a person, as is clear from what was said above. Christ's singularity, therefore, is posterior to his personality, and is caused from the individuating conditions, for instance from that body and that soul, with that hypostatic union and the other things that follow. From which it seems to me that Christ cannot assume another nature, because then he could be another man; and in consequence this person [could], as will be deduced later; which is impossible.[15] And the inference is clear from this: that if there were other individuating principles, then there would be another individual of the human species, and in consequence another man. Nor is there colour [for saying] that

sit prius suppositum et individuum speciei humane, quam habeat predictam unionem; quia, sicut prius est homo quam iste homo, sic prius est individuum speciei humane, quam hoc individuum, et prius est ista[5] unio quam ipse sit hoc[5] individuum.

time or another requisite accident individuates the substance, except that much more evidently the hypostatic union had individuated the Lord Jesus Christ, as Anselm says in *On the Incarnation*, [chapter] 7.[16] Nor does it stand in the way that Christ is a supposit and individual of the human species before he has the said union; for, as he is a man before he is this man, so he is an individual of the human species before this individual, and this union is prior to his being this individual.[17]

¶12 189.29–189.33

[189]4[to] confirmatur ex hoc quod accidens potest Deus facere per se esse, ut patet de eucaristia; ergo per idem potest facere substanciam inherere: tantum enim distat de inherente facere non inherens, sicut de non-inherente facere quod adhereat persone nature superioris.

Fourthly, this is confirmed from this: that God can make an accident be of itself, as is clear of the eucharist; therefore by the same token he can make a substance inhere: for it is as far to make, of the inhering, [something] not inhering, as, of the not-inhering, to make [something] that adheres to a person of a superior nature.

Notes

1. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III d. 1 q. 1, on whether a created nature can be united to the Word, with its two respects of an accident to its subject and its arguments for the possibility: the two respects are at n. 3 (Wadding VII.1, p. 6), and the arguments that singularity precedes personality and that an accident exists of itself in the Eucharist, which Wyclif gives as the Doctor's own proofs (*probat Doctor*, 186.18–20), are reasons Scotus reports and rejects in the third article, n. 7 (p. 10); the passage quoted is given in Wyclif's words. A B read *insuper est* for *Superest* (185.2); A B C *huic sentencie contraria in verbis* (185.2–3).
2. *Habitudo* in the "respect" sense throughout the chapter: the relation under which accident and subject, nature and Word, stand. *Racio* here (185.7, 185.13, 185.21) is the aspect under which the relation holds.
3. "Natural capacity": *posse naturale*. "Obediential potency": the creature's capacity to receive from God what no natural agent can effect in it, actualised only by miracle; to terminate the dependence under this aspect is the Scotist definition of the hypostatic assumption. O reads *assumentem* for *assumente* (185.20).
4. "Perfection without qualification" (*perfeccio simpliciter*): a perfection it is better to have than not, which as such belongs to God; the subject's causing of its accident is predicated of God only equivocally.
5. B reads *imposita perficit*, C *imposita perfici* (186.4–5) for *in potencia perfici*, where A has *in* in an erasure by a second hand; B C read *idem* for *illud* (186.8). O omits *Deo* (186.9), adds *·n·* (its sign for *enim*, which Harris doubts here) after *quantitas* (186.11), and omits *per se* (186.11) and *Christi* (186.15).
6. *Inconveniens* here in the arguer's sense, an absurd consequence. A B C read *inconsequens* "inconsistency" (186.21); O omits *nec assumpti* (186.22).
7. "Nature of a man": the humanity would become the nature by which one is a man, so one person with the Word who takes it; *sumente* "the one taking" stands for the assuming Word. A B C read *implicat* (186.24); B omits *essencia … tunc est* (186.28–30).
8. *Convocant* (187.6) stands in all the codices; Harris asks whether *connotant* "connote" should be read, which gives the same sense; the English renders the print as "call up". The possessive adjective (*divina*, *humana*) carries its primitive (*Deus*, *homo*) reduplicatively, "of God insofar as God": so *natura Dei* does not yield *natura divina*. O reads *referret* (187.13).
9. O reads *esset* for *foret* (187.19).
10. "Supply the place" (*vicem supplere*): to stand in for a second cause by doing what it does in the same way; Wyclif denies this of God for material and subjective causes, and for univocal agency. A B C read *communicancia* for *causancia* (187.34).
11. *Quod posset facere agens secundum … efficere*: causative *facere* with the infinitive, "which he could make a second agent effect". God is the subject of *posset, agens secundum* (accusative) is the subject of *efficere*, and *suo regimine* is God's governance of the instrument. *Alia accione in genere* is "by an action other in kind". B reads *solum illa* for *secundum alia* (188.10); A's first hand *perficiunt* is corrected to *perficit* (188.10).
12. "For that prior [moment]": *pro illo priori*, the prior instant of nature, not of time. "Make that nature a person": *personare*, the active beside *personari* "be made a person".
13. "To": *ad assumpcionem*, with O, which adds *ad* (188.31), against the print and A B C; without it *assumpcionem* does not construe after *presupponeretur*. "Personation": the constituting of a created person. The definition of person as an individual of rational nature is Boethius's (*Contra Eutychen* 3, PL 64, 1343D: *Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia*).
14. A B C omit *e contra … Christus* (189.1–2); A B C read *individuum* for *suppositum* (189.6); O *possit* for *potest* (189.9).
15. "And in consequence this person [could]": the sense is that this person, the Word, would then be another man.
16. Anselm, *De incarnatione Verbi* c. 7 in Wyclif's numbering (Schmitt c. 11; PL 158, c. VI), on what makes the person of Christ this individual: the *collectio proprietatum, quibus homo communis fit singulus*, which in Jesus is the same as the Word's (PL 158, 278D–279A). "Colour": a plausible ground. C omits *nisi*, O *ut* (189.21).

17. O reads *illi unio quam ille hoc* (189.27).
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 187: *sequitur—ista* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  - 187: *dicere—deitas* (print as transcribed) [SUB]

Part 2: The eucharist and the fifth argument; the grace of union and its subject

Harris pp. 189.34–193.31

¶1 189.34–191.16

[189]Hic dicitur quod loquendo de accidente inherente, ipsum [190]non poterit per se esse, cum omne tale sit modus substancie, sed cum[1] omnis creatura sit accidens Deo adheretque[2] sibi tam essencialiter sicut accidens ad subiectum; patet quod accidens potest Deus facere per se esse, non sic quin alicui, scilicet Deo, adhereat, sed quod nulli formaliter inhereat; sicut est de toto predicamento substancie, quod non potest sic formaliter inherere. Si tamen racio predicta procederet, argueret direccius quod homo et quelibet alia substancia poterit inherere, sicut quantitas et qualitas creduntur hodie per se esse: quod ego non video. Ideo alias dixi quod, sicut[3] univocando de accidente respectivo, cuiusmodi sunt[4] relacio, accio, passio etc., nullum illorum poterit esse nisi insit substancie ut subiecto: sic nec qualitas nec quantitas, cum sint univoce accidencia sicut illa. De qualitate consentit sanctus Thomas, quod ipsa non potest esse nisi insit quantitati. Et de quantitate est michi evidencius, cum sit substanciam esse quantam, et non potest exspectare rarefaccionem et condensacionem et ceteras mutaciones, quas in benedicta eucaristia ocullariter experimur. Ideo, ut alias dixi, esset nimis magna[5] sensus illusio, nisi esset in eucaristia unum quantum diversimode qualificatum et accidentatum ac mobile. Et illud subicitur quantitati, qualitati et ceteris accidentibus que videmus. Sed quoad questionem—quid est de tali essencia ?—non sollicitor; licet sint quotlibet dicta sanctorum que sonant quod sit panis vel vinum; que forte intelligenda sunt, quod essencia subiecta illis accidentibus post transsubstanciacionem est panis[6] ante transsubstanciacionem, et virtute transsubstanciacionis desinit esse quid vel substancia, et manet eadem essencia conformiter accidentata. Illa autem non fit corpus Christi sed fit signum signans nobis ineffabiliter quod ad omnem punctum sui sit sacramentaliter corpus Christi et concomitanter[7] anima et omnia alia Christi accidencia absoluta. Nec est [191]de substancia fidei viatorum[1] scire quid est illa essencia; sed satis est cognoscere questionem si est de ista cum transsubstanciacione et ceteris veritatibus que sacramento eucaristie sunt annexe. Non ergo sequitur—si Christus potest facere corpus

Here the answer is that, speaking of an inhering accident, it [190]cannot be of itself, since every such [accident] is a mode of substance; but since every creature is an accident to God, and adheres to him as essentially as an accident to its subject, it is clear that God can make an accident be of itself: not so that it does not adhere to something, namely to God, but so that it formally inheres in nothing; as is the case with the whole category of substance, that it cannot so formally inhere.[1] If, nevertheless, the argument stated proceeded, it would argue more directly that a man and any other substance whatever could inhere, as quantity and quality are believed today to be of themselves: which I do not see. Therefore I have said elsewhere that, as, speaking univocally of a relational accident, of which kind are relation, action, being-acted-on, etc., none of them can be unless it is in a substance as subject: so neither quality nor quantity, since they are accidents univocally as those are.[2] Of quality, Saint Thomas agrees that it cannot be unless it is in quantity. And of quantity it is more evident to me, since it is the substance's being quantified, and it cannot admit rarefaction and condensation and the other changes which in the blessed eucharist we experience with our eyes.[3] Therefore, as I have said elsewhere, there would be an exceedingly great illusion of the sense, unless there were in the eucharist one quantified [thing], variously qualified and subject to accidents and movable. And that is subjected to quantity, quality and the other accidents which we see. But as to the question—"what is such an essence?"—I am not anxious; although there are any number of sayings of the saints which sound [as if] it is bread or wine; which perhaps are to be understood [thus]: that the essence subject to those accidents after the transubstantiation is the bread [that was] before the transubstantiation, and by virtue of the transubstantiation ceases to be a what, or a substance, and remains the same essence, conformably subject to accidents.[4] And it does not become the body of Christ, but becomes a sign signifying to us ineffably that at every point of itself it is sacramentally the body of

suum virtute verborum sacramentalium esse ad omnem punctum illius essencie; ergo potest facere quod humanitas non[2] sit suppositum, vel quomodocunque aliter per terminos magistrales aliter[3] extraneetur racio—[4] in omnibus enim similibus evidenciis est pura peticio.[4] Illud autem quod de eucaristia fides orthodoxa artat nos credere potest catholicus philosophice sustinere. Si enim secundum perspectivos corpus multiplicatur intencionaliter vere presens,[5] ubicunque species eius agitur, et habet ibi efficaciam operandi; quod magisterium Deo facere corpus suum esse ad omnem punctum hostie sacramentaliter et effectus spirituales efficaciter operari!

Christ, and concomitantly the soul and all the other absolute accidents of Christ. Nor is it [191]of the substance of the faith of wayfarers to know what that essence is; but it is enough to know the question "whether it is" of it, together with the transubstantiation and the other truths which are annexed to the sacrament of the eucharist.[5] It does not follow, therefore —"if Christ can make his body, by virtue of the sacramental words, be at every point of that essence; therefore he can make the humanity not be a supposit," or in whatever other way the account is estranged by masters' terms—for in all similar evidences there is pure begging [of the question].[6] And what the orthodox faith constrains us to believe of the eucharist, a catholic can uphold philosophically. For if, according to the perspectivists, a body is multiplied intentionally, truly present wherever its species is driven, and has there efficacy of working; what a feat of mastery for God to make his body be at every point of the host sacramentally and to work spiritual effects efficaciously![7]

¶2 191.17–191.21

[191]5to confirmatur ex hoc quod accidencia maxime distancia potest Deus facere unitive concurrere in eodem, ut omnia novem genera[6] accidencium sunt idem subiecto. Ergo per idem naturam humanam potest Deus facere inesse subiecto divino cum hoc, quod non realiter sit subiectum.

Fifthly, this is confirmed from this: that God can make accidents most distant concur unitively in the same [thing], as all nine genera of accidents are the same as the subject. Therefore by the same token God can make human nature be in a divine subject, with this: that it is not really the subject.[8]

¶3 191.22–192.8

[191]Sed hic dicitur quod loquendo de unione ypostatica oppositum sequitur ex assumpto. Unde omnes iste evidencie confirmare possunt fidelem credere quod duas naturas potest Deus unire personaliter in eadem ypostasi ad sensum expositum. Sed quod Verbum assumens non sit natura assumpta, nec iste raciones nec alie possibiles[7] poterunt[7] edocere. Unde quam mirum est quod natura divina et humana tam distantes sint utraque eadem persona, tam mirum est et idem in numero, quod Deus sit homo. Unde accidencium ad subiecta non est unio ypostatica, cum sint essencie a subiecto generaliter condistincte sine communicacione ydiomatum, ut substancia fiat tale accidens vel e contra. Ideo sicut in materia de Trinitate trinitas creata [192]memorie, racionis, et voluntatis anime est inter omnes hucusque inventas simillima pro Trinitate increata viatoribus cognoscenda; sic in materia de Incarnacione ypostatica unio creati spiritus ad naturam corpoream, ut utrumque sit eadem persona hominis, est inter alias plus propinqua; nec possunt,[1] si non fallor, fieri evidencie ut, vel probetur talis impossibilitas unionis, vel quod Deus aliam naturam possit assumere, aut assumptam dimittere.

But here the answer is that, speaking of the hypostatic union, the opposite follows from the assumption.[9] Hence all these evidences can confirm a believer in believing that God can unite two natures personally in the same hypostasis, in the sense set out. But that the assuming Word is not the assumed nature, neither these arguments nor other possible ones will be able to teach. Hence, as wonderful as it is that the divine and the human nature, so distant, are each the same person, so wonderful it is, and the same in number, that God is a man.[10] Hence there is no hypostatic union of accidents to subjects, since they are essences generally distinct from the subject, without communication of idioms, so that a substance becomes such an accident or conversely. Therefore, as in the matter of the Trinity the created trinity [192]of memory, reason and will of the soul is, among all found hitherto, the most similar for the uncreated Trinity to be known by wayfarers; so in the matter of the Incarnation the hypostatic union of a created spirit to a bodily nature, so that each is the same person of a man, is nearer than the others; nor can evidences be made, if I am not mistaken,

either that such a union be proved impossible, or that God could assume another nature, or lay aside the one assumed.[11]

¶4 192.9–192.14

[192]Sed instatur per hoc, quod gracia unionis foret gracia maxima possibilis creature, ut illa humanitas fiat Deus; et omnis gracia creata presupponit inesse tam gratificatum quam ipsum gratificans; ergo gracia unionis presupponit naturam assumptam, et per consequens ipsa natura prius est quam de facto assumitur.

But it is objected by this: that the grace of union would be the greatest grace possible to a creature, that that humanity becomes God; and every created grace presupposes, as being, both the one made pleasing and that which itself makes pleasing; therefore the grace of union presupposes the assumed nature, and in consequence the nature itself is before it is in fact assumed.[12]

¶5 192.15–193.16

[192]Hic dicitur quod conclusio est concedenda, cum omne per se superius sit prius natura vel origine quam suum inferius; et per consequens et[2] prius quam passio vel accidens sibi inest. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod illa humanitas potest esse non assumpta, etsi sit non assumpta pro illa mensura nature sive originis. Sed notandum quod duplex est gracia unionis. Prima increata, qua Verbum voluit eternaliter humanitatem illam sibi ypostatice copulare; et illa potest intelligi tripliciter, scilicet essencialiter, personaliter, sive formaliter, ut patet alibi. 2[da] autem est gracia creata qua humanitas est sic formaliter[3] grata Deo. Et ista gracia licet sit natura[4] vel origine posterior[5] quam subiectum, non tamen est possibile quod dicta humanitas temporaliter ipsam procedat sic quod mereatur graciam unionis; sicut Augustinus innuit Enchiridion 29°, cum non sit possibile ipsam manere per instans temporis[6] non assumptam. Et sicut in aliis hominibus presupponitur gracia preveniens ad meritum, sic in Christo gracia unionis presupponitur naturaliter ad Christi meritum, etsi meritum [193]pro instanti unionis naturaliter consequatur. Et istum credo esse sensum Augustini 17° De Civitate Dei ca°… 'In rebus, inquit, per tempus exortis summa gracia est quod Deus in unitate persone homini nullis precedentibus meritis copulatur;' non quod gracia sit membrum in corpore vel anima colligans unionem; sed quia ista unio sit gracia non preventa habitu disponente. Unde illa unio cum sit relacio racionis est posterius subiecta humanitate quoad genus cause materialis, et tamen est efficienter[1] prius quam Christus est hoc singulare vel individuum hominis, ut tangitur superius. Sed caveatur de prioritate[2] temporis aut prioritate[2] quoad consequenciam, cum omnia ista pro omni tempore Christi se mutuo consequantur. Unde Augustinus Enchiridion dicit quod ista unio fuit illi homini quodammodo naturalis, cum iste homo non poterit esse sine illa.

Here the answer is that the conclusion is to be granted, since every superior of itself is prior by nature or origin to its inferior; and in consequence also prior to the attribute or accident's being in it. But from this it does not follow that that humanity can be unassumed, even if it is unassumed for that measure of nature or origin. But it is to be noted that the grace of union is twofold. The first uncreated, by which the Word willed eternally to join that humanity hypostatically to himself; and this can be understood in three ways, namely essentially, personally or formally, as is clear elsewhere. And the second is the created grace by which the humanity is so formally pleasing to God. And this grace, although it is posterior by nature or origin to its subject, yet it is not possible that the said humanity should precede it in time so that it might merit the grace of union; as Augustine intimates, *Enchiridion* 29, since it is not possible that it should remain for an instant of time unassumed.[13] And as in other men prevenient grace is presupposed to merit, so in Christ the grace of union is presupposed naturally to Christ's merit, even if the merit [193]follows naturally for the instant of the union. And this I believe to be the sense of Augustine, *The City of God* 17, chapter …: "In things arisen through time," he says, "the highest grace is that God is joined to man in unity of person, with no merits going before";[14] not that grace is a member in body or soul binding the union; but because this union is a grace not preceded by a disposing habit. Hence that union, since it is a relation of reason, is posterior to the subject, the humanity, as to the genus of material cause, and yet it is efficiently prior to Christ's being this singular or individual of a man, as is touched on above. But let one beware of priority of time or priority as to inference, since all these, for every time of Christ, follow on one another mutually. Hence Augustine in the

Enchiridion says that this union was to that man in a way natural, since this man could not be without it.[15]

¶6 *193.17–193.31*

[193]Et si queritur de subiecto eius primo dicitur quod anima est subiectum primum unionis creati spiritus, non quod sit infusus habitus, sed habitudo relativa. Alia autem unio corporis ad Verbum subiectatur multiplicative in corpore sicut filiacio temporalis, que est habitudo secundum quam cognitum[3] causatum naturaliter est productum a suo simili in natura. Et per istas particulas patet quod Spiritus sanctus non est Filius Patris, nec vermis est filius hominis, ut docet Augustinus Enchiridion 3°, nec inanimatum est filius sui naturaliter generantis. Correspondenter unio est habitudo, secundum quam una natura alteri ydemptitate ypostatica copulatur; et illa dupliciter secundum diversitatem nature increate assumentis et nature create suppositis copulate. Nec est extraneum vocare illam unionem graciam cum sit donum perfectissimum gratis datum.

And if it is asked about its first subject, the answer is that the soul is the first subject of the union of the created spirit, not that it is an infused habit, but a relative respect. And the other union, of the body to the Word, is subjected multiplicatively in the body, like temporal sonship, which is the respect according to which a cognitive caused thing is naturally produced from its like in nature.[16] And through these particles it is clear that the Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father, nor is a worm the son of a man, as Augustine teaches, *Enchiridion* 3, nor is an inanimate thing the son of what naturally generates it.[17] Correspondingly, union is the respect according to which one nature is joined to another by hypostatic identity; and that [is] twofold, according to the diversity of the uncreated nature assuming and of the created nature joined to the supposits. Nor is it strange to call that union a grace, since it is a most perfect gift freely given.

Notes

1. "An accident to God": every creature depends on God as an accident on its subject, so an accident without a subject still adheres to God, though it inheres formally in nothing. A B C add *tamen* after *sed* (190.2); B C read *adhereret quia*, A *et* (190.2).
2. *Passio* in the list of categories is being-acted-on, against *accio*. "Speaking univocally": *univocando*, taking "accident" in one sense for all nine categories. A B C read *sic* for *sicut* (190.11); O *cuiuscunque* for *cuiusmodi* (190.11–12).
3. Thomas Aquinas, that in the sacrament the other accidents have quantity as their subject (*Summa theologiae* III q. 77 a. 2: *accidentia alia … esse sicut in subiecto in quantitate dimensiva*). "It is the substance's being quantified": quantity is no thing other than the substance so disposed. C omits *magna* (190.20).
4. "Ceases to be a what": *desinit esse quid*, ceases to be a quiddity, a "what" in the category of substance, while the essence remains. "The bread [that was] before": *est panis ante transsubstanciacionem*; A B C add *cum* after *panis* (190.27). A B read *comitanter*, C *comicantus*, for *concomitanter* (190.32).
5. The schools' two questions, *quid est* "what it is" and *si est* "whether it is": the faith needs only the second. O reads *viatoris* "of the wayfarer" (191.1).
6. *Aliter* stands twice (191.8) in all the codices, and Harris asks whether the second should be omitted; the English renders it once. "Masters' terms": the schoolmen's distinctions, by which the account of the thing is estranged from it. O reads *sit non* (191.7); B omits *in … peticio* (191.8–9).
7. The perspectivists: the writers on optics, for whom a body multiplies its species through the medium and is "intentionally" present wherever its species reaches. B C read *prius* for *presens*, A's first hand *et* (191.13).
8. The fifth of the Doctor's arguments (186.18–20). "The same as the subject": the accidents are the subject in a manner of being (cf. 182.21–23). A B C omit *novem* (191.19).
9. *Assumptum* is the logician's premiss, the one the fifth argument assumed, not the nature assumed by the Word.
10. "And the same in number": it is one and the same wonder, that the two natures are one person and that God is a man. A B C read *p°les poterint*, i.e. *possibiles poterint* (191.27).
11. The created trinity of the soul: Augustine, *De Trinitate* X.11.18 (PL 42, 983), where the triad is memory, understanding and will, *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas* (Book IX has *mens, notitia, amor*); Wyclif names reason in place of understanding. B reads *putant* for *possunt* (192.6).
12. "Both the one made pleasing and that which itself makes pleasing": *tam gratificatum quam ipsum gratificans*, the subject of grace and the grace; grace that makes pleasing (*gracia gratificans*) presupposes a subject to be made pleasing.
13. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 11.36, that the human nature merited nothing before it was assumed into the unity of the person (PL 40, 250: *quibus mereretur iste homo una fieri persona cum Deo?*; Harris's index has the same place). O omits *et* (192.17) and *formaliter* (192.25); A has *natura* in an erasure by another hand, B reads *ullam*, C *nulla* (192.26); O *posterius* (192.26); A C read *per instanti*, B *pro instanti* (192.30).
14. Harris's index gives *De civitate Dei* X.29, which has the thought (*Gratia Dei non potuit gratius commendari*) but not the words. The words, with *homo … Deo* where Wyclif has *Deus … homini*, are Augustine's *De Trinitate* XIII.19.24 (PL 42, 1033: *In rebus enim per tempus ortis, illa summa gratia est, quod homo in unitate personae conjunctus est Deo*). *Nullis precedentibus meritis* and *copulatur* come from *Enchiridion* 12.40.

15. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 12.40, the grace made "in a way natural" to that man (PL 40, 252: *fieret quodam modo ipsa gratia illi homini naturalis*). C reads *efficaciter* for *efficienter* (193.9); O omits *temporis … prioritate* (193.11–12).
16. "Cognitive": O reads *9gniti^m*, which Harris takes as *cognitivum*, against the print's *cognitum* "known" (193.22). The argument needs it: each particle of the definition excludes one case, "naturally" the Holy Spirit (proceeding by will), "from its like in nature" the worm, and only "cognitive" the inanimate thing, which a known thing would not exclude. The English follows O (Harris's expansion, with his query).
17. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 12.39, that what is born of a man, as hair or worms, is not his son (PL 40, 252: *capillum, pediculum, lumbricum, quorum nihil est filius*). Augustine's point there is that Christ, born of the Spirit, is not the Spirit's son, so Wyclif's 'the Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father' is his own application.

Part 3: The laying-aside of the nature; the moderns' sophisms, first to eighth

Harris pp. 193.32–197.29

¶1 193.32–194.6

[193]Quantum ad dimissionem nature assumpte patet ex dictis quod Verbum non potest illam dimittere licet contingentissime possit illa[4] natura Verbo deesse cum sit contingens [194]ad utrumlibet Verbum esse hominem vel fuisse. Movent autem ad negandum dimissionem nature assumpte, hoc est ad dereliccionem illius[1] personalitatis non nature[1] ipsius Verbi Dei, argumenta facta superius 5° ca°; et omnia que monent[2] quod humanitas sit idem personaliter Verbo Dei, ut tactum est 10° ca°.

As to the laying-aside of the assumed nature, it is clear from what has been said that the Word cannot lay it aside, although that nature can most contingently be lacking to the Word, since "the Word is a man", or "was one", is [194]contingent either way.[1] And what moves [one] to deny the laying-aside of the assumed nature, that is, the abandoning of that personality, not nature, of the Word of God himself, are the arguments made above in chapter 5, and everything that urges that the humanity is personally the same as the Word of God, as was touched on in chapter 10.[2]

¶2 194.7–194.10

[194]Et ita de assumpcione multarum humanitatum vel simul vel successive; aut quod alia persona eandem naturam assumat. Et placet michi quod ex hoc pereunt modernorum doctorum vocata subtilia et gloriosa sophismata.

And so [it is] with the assumption of many humanities, either at once or successively, or that another person should assume the same nature. And I am pleased that from this the so-called subtle and glorious sophisms of the modern doctors perish.[3]

¶3 194.11–194.20

[194]Primo, posito quod Verbum omnem naturam humanam a mundi exordio assumpsisset que continue viveret assumpta; tunc species humana non salvaretur per successionem suorum individuorum; quia vel tantum unum foret individuum in specie humana, quod foret totum genus hominum[3] et faceret quidquid operatum esset[4] ab homine vel si essent multa individua, tamen posito illo[5] essent nature humane non homines;[6] et sic omne suppositum nature[7] humane[7] foret prius naturaliter quam sua species, a qua tamen non caperet quiditatem.

First, suppose that the Word had assumed every human nature from the beginning of the world, which lived on continually as assumed: then the human species would not be preserved through the succession of its individuals; for either there would be only one individual in the human species, which would be the whole race of men and would do whatever had been done by a man; or, if there were many individuals, yet on that supposition they would be human natures, not men; and so every supposit of human nature would be naturally prior to its species, from which, however, it would not take its quiddity.[4]

¶4 194.21–194.29

[194]2do dicitur[8] quod potest, quociens libuerit, fieri mutacio a contradictorio in contradictorium sine mutacione aut generacione aut corrupcione veritatis pertinentis. Ut posito quod in qualibet istarum parcium proporcionalium imparium huius hore[9] omnis humanitas dimittatur et quelibet permaneat[10] cum omnibus positivis[11] continue

Secondly, it is said that, as often as one pleases, a change can be made from contradictory to contradictory without change or generation or corruption of any truth that pertains. As, suppose that in each of the odd proportional parts of this hour every humanity is laid aside, and each remains, with all its positive [features], continually re-assumed: which is impossible, since a

reassumpta; quod est impossibile, cum negacio non potest incipere; ymo unio, que est relacio tercii modi, non potest terminare mutacionem nisi in aliquo proprie[12] fiat motus.

negation cannot begin; indeed, union, which is a relation of the third mode, cannot terminate a change unless there is properly motion in something.[5]

¶5 194.30–195.8

[194]3° dicitur consequenter quod in fine illius hore fient quotlibet homines, et tamen non fiet aliquid[13] nec alicuiusmodi positivum,[13] posito quod quotlibet nature iam assumpte [195]dimittantur immote primo in fine hore. Unde subducta omni mutacione preter talem alternam dimissionem et reassumpcionem foret tempus et motus mirabilis successivus. Nec negabunt quin Deus potest, subducto alio[1] motu quocunque,[2] alternare mutaciones huiusmodi, cum dependeant solum a volucione libera Dei; et indubie, cum una foret prius quam reliqua, nedum natura sed tempore foret continua[3] successio temporalis.

Thirdly, it is said in consequence that at the end of that hour any number of men will come to be, and yet there will not come to be anything, nor anything positive of any kind, on the supposition that any number of natures now assumed [195]are laid aside, without being moved, first at the end of the hour. Hence, with every change taken away except such alternate laying-aside and re-assumption, there would be time and a wondrous successive motion. Nor will they deny that God can, with any other motion whatever taken away, alternate changes of this kind, since they depend only on the free volition of God; and without doubt, since one would be prior to the other not only by nature but in time, there would be a continuous temporal succession.[6]

¶6 195.9–195.17

[195]4to conceditur de possibili quod iam non est nisi unicus homo, et infiniti homines ante finem illius hore adnichilabuntur, nec citra generabitur aliquid[4] positivum, et tamen in fine erunt infiniti homines, posito quod Deus ex omnipotencia sua creet infinitas humanitates in domo illa, quarum infinitum parva sit aliqua, et totidem[5] creet Rome, et assumat omnes illas usque ad finem[6] hore in qua[6] adnichilet omnes Rome et dimittat omnes Oxonie aliter non mutatas.

Fourthly, it is granted as possible that now there is only a single man, and infinitely many men will be annihilated before the end of that hour, nor will anything positive be generated in the meantime, and yet at the end there will be infinitely many men: on the supposition that God of his omnipotence creates infinitely many humanities in that house, of which some one is infinitely small, and creates as many at Rome, and assumes all of them up to the end of the hour, in which he annihilates all those at Rome and lays aside all those at Oxford, not otherwise changed.[7]

¶7 195.18–195.27

[195]5to concedunt in casu quod[7] in ista hora generabuntur vel fient infiniti homines et nichil illorum generabitur vel fiet ab aliquo, sed nec Deus sciet quando aliquis illorum hominum erit, ut divisa[8] ista hora in suas partes proporcionales minores versus ultimum instans et quod in cuiuslibet illarum parcium prima medietate Deus dimittat unam, et in secunda reassumat reliquam dimittendo, servando in eis omnia positiva: tunc patet conclusio, cum nunquam erit ita[9] quod isti homines sunt, et per consequens non erit aliquid de numero istorum hominum.

Fifthly, they grant in a case that in this hour infinitely many men will be generated or come to be, and none of them will be generated or made by anyone, but not even God will know when any of those men will be: as, this hour being divided into its proportional parts, smaller toward the last instant, and [supposing] that in the first half of each of those parts God lays aside one [humanity], and in the second re-assumes [it], laying aside the other, keeping in them all their positive [features]: then the conclusion is clear, since it will never be so that "these men are", and consequently there will be nothing of the number of these men.[8]

¶8 195.28–196.11

[195]6to concedunt quod in casu sex filii fuerint in b instanti geniti de Maria, in quo instanti non genuit nisi unum, et tamen non potest esse[10] in b instanti nec alium filium nisi Iesum suum unigenitum genuisse, posito quod b fuit instans in quo genuit Iesum et quod

Sixthly, they grant that in a case six sons were begotten of Mary at instant b, at which instant she begot only one; and yet it cannot be that at instant b she begot any other son than Jesus, her only-begotten: on the supposition that b was the instant at which she begot Jesus, and that after

post assumpcionem[11] multiplicata illa humanitate ad sex loca maneat assumpta a [196]Trinitate in tribus locis et in aliis tribus maneat non assumpta: et tunc patet quod sex homines communicant in corpore Christi quod fuit genitum de Maria; ergo sex homines fuerunt ab ea geniti; et patet quod[1] residuum, illi quidem sex homines, forent genus Dei, quia tres persone divine et alie tres creature, hi[2] homines et illi[3] non-homines, hi[2] filii et illi[3] non-filii; et per consequens beata virgo nunquam genuit hos filios, et per idem nunquam fecit ut esset mater eorum; sicut nec corpus pro mensura, qua incepit esse multi homines, incepit secundum aliquid gigni vel esse filius, cum sola negacio non facit filium.

the assumption, that humanity being multiplied to six places, it remains assumed by the [196]Trinity in three places and in the other three remains not assumed. And then it is clear that six men share in the body of Christ which was begotten of Mary; therefore six men were begotten by her; and it is clear that the remainder, namely those six men, would be the race of God, for three [are] divine persons and the other three creatures, these men and those not-men, these sons and those not-sons;[9] and consequently the blessed Virgin never begot these sons, and by the same token never brought it about that she was their mother; just as neither did the body, for the measure at which it began to be many men, begin in any respect to be begotten or to be a son, since a negation alone does not make a son.[10]

¶9 196.12–196.30

[196]7° concedunt quod stat infinita loca in b instanti repleri per[4] istum hominem, qui nec est nec generatur nec generabitur: sed iste idem homo continue usque ad b instans distabit a quolibet illorum nec movebitur nec multiplicabitur ad aliquem[5] eorum vel e contra, cum tamen ad situm tanquam[6] ad per se terminum erit[6] motus, posito quod Pater in divinis incipiat assumere naturam humanam glorificatam in celo; et cum hoc, posito quod in b ultimo instanti illius hore infinitas humanitates assumeret,[7] que manebunt perpetuo[8] fixe ad modum coree[9] disposite: et patet conclusio. Nam Deus Pater non potest generari divinitus nec generaretur humanitus nisi ad generacionem nature pro tempore quo assumeretur, quod non competit seni vel beato. Sicut ergo Filius adquirit loca[10] movendo humanitus, ita Pater adquirens et replens corporee[11] illa loca quodammodo moveretur. Sed quomodo moveretur aliquid adquirendo locum, qualitatem, et quantitatem in se subiective, si secundum nullam naturam nec secundum subiectum motus primo motum taliter moveretur?

Seventhly, they grant that it can stand that infinitely many places are filled at instant b by this man, who neither is nor is generated nor will be generated; but this same man will continually, up to instant b, be distant from each of them, and will neither be moved nor multiplied to any of them, nor the converse, although there will yet be motion to place as to its terminus of itself: on the supposition that the Father among the divine [persons] begins to assume human nature glorified in heaven; and with this, on the supposition that at b, the last instant of that hour, he assumed infinitely many humanities, which will remain perpetually fixed, arranged in the manner of a ring-dance: and the conclusion is clear. For God the Father cannot be generated divinely, nor would he be generated humanly except at the generation of the nature for the time at which it was assumed, which does not befit [one] old or blessed. As, then, the Son acquires places by moving humanly, so the Father, acquiring and filling those places bodily, would in a way be moved. But how would anything be moved by acquiring place, quality, and quantity in itself as subject, if it were moved in this way as to no nature, nor as to the subject of motion first moved?[11]

¶10 196.31–197.29

[196]8° concedunt de possibili quod Petrus in infinitum [197]remittetur[1] inmerito[2] et nunquam intendetur[3] quousque fuerit infinitum Deo carior quam est modo; Paulus autem per idem tempus in infinitum intendetur[3] inmerito et tamen[4] in eodem fine temporis[5] sine suo demerito erit Deo quantumlibet minus[6] carus; ex quo videtur quod apud Deum sit excepcio personarum; posito quod Petrus per istam horam remittetur usque ad non gradum meriti exclusive et in fine assumatur a Verbo ypostatice; Paulus autem per idem tempus assumptus continue mereatur et in fine dimittatur: tunc

Eighthly, they grant as possible that Peter will be [197]remitted in merit to infinity and never intensified until he is infinitely dearer to God than he is now; and Paul through the same time will be intensified in merit to infinity, and yet at the same end of the time, without demerit of his own, will be as much less dear to God as you please; from which it seems that with God there is exception of persons:[12] on the supposition that Peter through this hour is remitted down to no degree of merit, exclusively, and at the end is assumed by the Word hypostatically; and Paul, assumed through the same

patet conclusio, petito hoc notorio principio quod non est possibile Deum tantum diligere naturam hominis non assumptam sicut naturam propriam quam assumit: tunc posito quod infinitum bonus sit aliquis homo non assumptus, adhuc melior et Deo carior est quecunque humanitas quam assumit. Et revera[7] talia videntur michi dissona: scilicet quod homo Petrus demereatur continue, quousque fuerit infinitum Deo carus; et Paulus continue mereatur, quousque decidat a summa amicicia Dei sui; cum sceleratissimus peccator contingentissime, ut asserunt, potest assumi[8]; et cum ignorare poterit assumpcionem propriam, non est evidencia dans fidem quin quelibet creatura ypostatice unibilis sit assumpta. Et tunc non video quomodo quis convinceretur ex ydololatria vel cognosceret quiditatem aliquam creature. Concedunt enim quod Deus potest esse lapis et speciei abiectissime creature, potest esse dampnatus, quod est perfeccius. Sed procul a fidelibus ista ludicra venenosa. Unde Augustinus 83 Vet.[9] et Nov. Test.[9] Questionum questione 5ª dicit quod nullum animal irracionale potest esse beatum, et multo evidencius nulla inanimata substancia.

time, continually merits and at the end is laid aside. Then the conclusion is clear, granting this well-known principle: that it is not possible that God should love a nature of man not assumed as much as the nature, his own, which he assumes.[13] Then, supposing that some man not assumed is infinitely good, still better and dearer to God is any humanity whatever which he assumes. And in truth such things seem to me discordant: namely that the man Peter demerits continually until he is infinitely dear to God, and Paul continually merits until he falls from the highest friendship of his God; since the most wicked sinner can, most contingently, as they assert, be assumed; and since he could be ignorant of his own assumption, there is no evidence giving faith against any creature whatever that can be hypostatically united being assumed.[14] And then I do not see how anyone would be convicted of idolatry, or would know the quiddity of any creature. For they grant that God can be a stone, and [of] the species of the most abject creature, [and] can be damned, which is more perfect.[15] But far from the faithful be these poisonous games. Hence Augustine, in the Eighty-three Questions, question 5, says that no irrational animal can be blessed, and much more evidently no inanimate substance.[16]

Notes

1. "Can be lacking" (*deesse*) against "cannot lay it aside" (*dimittere*): the nature might never have been the Word's, since "the Word is a man" is contingent either way; but once assumed it is not laid aside. *Verbum esse hominem vel fuisse* is rendered as the quoted proposition.
2. "Of that personality, not nature": the laying-aside would be the abandoning of the personal union, not of the Word's nature. The print here follows O; A B C omit *illius personalitatis non nature* (194.3), giving "the abandoning of the Word of God himself", and O omits *ipsius*. "Urges": *monent*, with O; A B C read *movent* "move" (194.5), as at the head of the sentence. Chapters 5 and 10 are this treatise's: chapter 5 argues that the Word could not lay aside the nature he assumed, chapter 10 that the humanity is personally the same as the Word.
3. "And so with": the same grounds settle the chapter's next questions, many humanities assumed and one nature assumed by another person. The eight consequences that follow (the ninth and tenth in the next part) are those the moderns grant from these possibilities, each with the case (*posito quod*) that makes it true.
4. "Preserved": *salvaretur*, the species kept in being by the succession of its individuals. On the moderns' terms an assumed nature is not a man, and the Word with all the humanities is one man: hence the two horns. A B C omit *non homines* "not men" (194.17–18); the print follows O, and the second horn needs it. O reads *humanum* for *hominum* (194.15) and for *nature humane* (194.18).
5. "Any truth that pertains": no reality bearing on the case changes, yet "every humanity is assumed" and "it is not assumed" alternate. "Which is impossible" is Wyclif's verdict: a negation cannot begin of itself, and a relation of the third mode, the non-mutual relation of the measurable to its measure (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V.15, 1021a26–b3: the measurable is called relative because something else is related to it), comes only with a change in one of its terms. O omits *huius hore* (194.25).
6. "Men will come to be": on the moderns' terms a nature laid aside is at once a man of its own, so new men are without anything positive being made. Wyclif presses the case: alternations of assumption with no other change would give time and successive motion with nothing moved. O reads *aliquid nec alicuius positivi*, A B C *aliud nec alicuiusmodi positivum* (194.31–32).
7. "That house … at Oxford": the house where the case is put, at Oxford, set against Rome. The case turns on the moderns' terms: humanities are not men while assumed and are men when laid aside, so men begin and cease with nothing positive generated. O reads *finem in quo* for *finem hore in qua* (195.15); C *cottidie* for *totidem* (195.14).
8. "Re-assumes [it], laying aside the other": *reassumat reliquam dimittendo*; the words can also be construed "re-assumes the other, laying [the first] aside". Either way no humanity stays laid aside through any whole part, so there is no instant at which "these men are", and none at which God could know them to be. O reads *dimissa* for *divisa* (195.21).
9. "Share in the body": *communicant in corpore*; the six (three where the body is assumed by the three persons, three where it is not) have the one body born of Mary. "These men and those not-men, these sons and those not-sons": A B C read *hic* "here" for *hi*, A C *ibi* "there" for *illi* (196.6–7; B *illi*), "here men and there not-men", which fits the six places; O abbreviates both words. The print is kept. O reads *ascensionem* "ascension" for *assumpcionem* (195.32).
10. "For the measure": *pro mensura*, at the instant (the measure of duration) at which the body, multiplied, began to be many men. Nothing positive came to be in it then: only the not-being-assumed of three of the six, and "a negation alone does not make a son".

11. "Who neither is nor is generated": the Father as man, who is not generated, since he begins to assume a humanity already grown and glorified ("old or blessed", *seni vel beato*, of that nature); yet he fills the places as the Son fills them by moving. "Ring-dance": *coree*, in all the codices; Harris asks whether *chorea* is meant (196.21). A B leave a gap of eight letters in *tanquam … erit*, C reads *tanquam ad per se erit* (196.17); A B C read *in* for *per* (196.12); O omits *loca* (196.25).
12. "Exception of persons": *excepcio personarum*, after Rom. 2:11, "there is no respect of persons with God" (Vulgate *acceptio*). "Remitted … intensified in merit": *remittetur inmerito … intendetur inmerito* (197.1, 197.3), the schools' remission and intension of a quality, here of merit. The case below ("remitted down to no degree of merit") requires *inmerito*, one word in the print, to be read *in merito*; the adverb "undeservedly" does not fit it. O reads *merito* at the first (197.1); A B C omit *tamen* (197.3); A B read *nimis* for *minus* (197.5).
13. "Granting": *petito*, the principle asked for and granted as a postulate, not the begging of the question. Peter, assumed at the end, is dearer to God than any unassumed man however good; Paul, laid aside, is less dear than he was while assumed, with no change in their merit.
14. "Giving faith against": *non est evidencia dans fidem quin … sit assumpta*, there is no evidence to make it of faith that any given creature is not assumed. A B C omit *revera* "in truth" (197.15); O reads *sumi* for *assumi* (197.19).
15. "Which is more perfect": ironic; a damned man is at least a rational creature, and so above a stone.
16. Whether an irrational animal can be blessed is question 5 of Augustine's *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII* (PL 40, 12: *Nullum autem animal quod scientia caret, beatum esse potest*). The words "of the Old and New Testament" (*Vet. et Nov. Test.*) stand in O and the print and are lacking in A B C (197.27); they bring in the title of the pseudo-Augustinian *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, whose question 5 is on Abel and Cain, so the source supports A B C, and the English follows them, against the print with O.

Part 4: The ninth and tenth consequences: three eternal men, and the Trinity as every creature

Harris pp. 197.30–201.17

¶1 197.30–199.2

[197]9° videtur de possibili concedendum quod Deus faciendo tres homines eternos, qui non possunt a Deo fieri, tantum perfecit genus humanum, sicut potuit de sua potencia absoluta, licet non plures homines quam illos tres potuit produxisse. [198]Assigno totam multitudinem hominum a Deo producibilium[1] quoad intellectum divinum, et pono[2] quod tota Trinitas quamlibet talem naturam assumat ypostatice; tunc patet quod natura divina fecit trinitatem, tres homines, quos oportet sic opinantes dicere eternos homines, cum non habeant limitandum peryodum temporalem. Et secunda pars gratis conceditur cum dicunt hominem Iesum non posse fieri. Et tercia pars[3] patet ex hoc quod tam perfectum est genus sicut aliquod individuum speciei; et[4] infinitum perfectus est omnis homo in casu posito; ergo infinitum perfectum genus hominum; ymo, si consideretur, omnis homo foret infinitum perfectus humanitus, quia infinitam perfectam multitudinem tam animarum[5] quam corporum tanquam partes proprias contineret; ergo infinitum perfectus humanitus foret omnis homo, quia infinitum perfeccior quam data anima vel corpus finitum; patet itaque quod non meliores homines[6] vel magis graciosos plus Deum amantes concorditer aut plus beatos in corpore et anima omnino impeccabiles et imperfectibiles perfecciores omnimode quam poterit esse aliqua creatura. Et ultima particula patet illis, qui ponunt naturam assumptam esse hominem. Nam si Deus non potest assumere materiam primam vel formam materialem in unitatem suppositi nisi ydemptificaverit[7] se illi nature, eo quod non est aliquid cuius ipsa est natura; per idem non potest aliam naturam assumere nisi ydemptificaverit se eidem,

Ninthly, it seems it must be granted as possible that God, by making three eternal men, who cannot be made by God, perfected the human race as much as he could by his absolute power, although he could not have produced more men than those three.[1] [198]I assign the whole multitude of men producible by God as to the divine intellect, and I suppose that the whole Trinity assumes each such nature hypostatically: then it is clear that the divine nature made a trinity, three men, whom those who so opine must call eternal men, since they have no temporal period to be bounded.[2] And the second part is granted freely, since they say "the man Jesus cannot be made". And the third part is clear from this: that the race is as perfect as any individual of the species, and every man is infinitely perfect in the case supposed; therefore the race of men is infinitely perfect. Indeed, if it is considered, every man would be infinitely perfect humanly, since he would contain an infinitely perfect multitude of souls as well as of bodies as his own parts; therefore every man would be infinitely perfect humanly, since [he would be] infinitely more perfect than a given soul or finite body. It is clear, then, that [there could] not [be] better men, or more gracious, loving God more concordantly, or more blessed in body and soul, wholly unable to sin and unable to be perfected [further], more perfect in every way than any creature could be.[3] And the last particle is clear to those who hold "the assumed nature is a man". For if God cannot assume prime matter or a material form into the unity of a supposit unless he has identified himself with that nature, because there is nothing of which it is the nature, by

cum indifferenter cuiuslibet nature create quiditas sit natura. Sed iuxta sentenciam sancti Thome ponent[8] Verbum posse esse multos homines per idem: nam infiniti homines possunt esse isti tres homines, et per consequens non plures istis tribus hominibus possunt esse. 3° confirmatur ex hoc quod unus illorum trium hominum cum sit Pater in divinis, est omnino incausabilis[9] et improducibilis:[9] [199]ergo non plures quam isti tres poterunt esse; quia, data affirmativa[1] opposita, deficit positum.[2]

the same token he cannot assume another nature unless he has identified himself with it, since indifferently of any created nature the quiddity is [its] nature.[4] But according to the teaching of St Thomas they will hold "the Word can be many men" by the same token: for infinitely many men can be these three men, and consequently not more [men] than these three men can be.[5] Thirdly, this is confirmed from this: that one of those three men, since he is the Father among the divine [persons], is wholly uncausable and unproducible: [199]therefore not more than these three can be; for, the opposite affirmative being granted, what was posited fails.[6]

¶2 199.3–200.4

[199]10° eliciuntur in casu sic opinanti possibili denominaciones inconpossibiles[3] de eodem; posito quod tota Trinitas assumat ypostatice universitatem creabilem vel creatam. In quo casu videtur primo quod, posita eius possibilitate, non debet a catholico negari[4] simpliciter: cum catholicus debet sustinere ut maximam quod, sicut Deus sit tam bonus intrinsecus sicut aliquid potest intelligi vel eciam cogitari, sic tante perficit universitatem creatam quante potest sustineri quod ipsam perficiat sine[5] repugnancia racionis, experiencie, vel scripture.[5] Sed sine repugnancia alicuius istorum sustineri poterit quod Deus universitatem creatam ad tantum perficiat; ergo quilibet catholicus debet illam sentenciam sustinere. Non enim[6] repugnat racioni pocius quam ipso de possibili posito repugnaret; nec experiencie repugnat cum nullus sensus humanus sciat discutere utrum Deus sit[7] lapis, asinus,[7] et sic de ceteris creaturis; nec scriptura de dampnacione hominum vel peccatis aut aliis obviat ne sic fiat, quia post peccatum potest Deus dampnandum assumere; eo quod minus videtur Deo contrarium quod sit racionalis homo vel angelus, quam quod sit omnis bestia hic sit quantificatus, figuratus, senex, agens, motus, et sic de aliis denominacionibus tam substancialibus quam accidentalibus, ibi autem opposite formatus. Nec valet dicere quod posito hoc de facto scriptura sacra illud exprimeret, quia Paulus 'audivit archana que non licet homini loqui': ymo ut diceretur ex scriptura hoc sequitur,[8] cum Deus summe potens et non invidus vel avarus ex bonitate sua non potest se ab ista beneficiencia continere.[9] Nam iuxta argumentum Veritatis Matt. 7. 'si vos, cum sitis mali, nostis[10] bona data dare filiis vestris; quanto magis Pater celestis dabit spiritum bonum petentibus se?' ista consequencia non valeret, si [200]homo posset dimittere beneficienciam quam facillime posset perficere instar[1] Dei: tunc enim posset Deus ex libertate de obligacionis nulli hominum[2] sequencium[2] tribuere quamlibet promerenti.

Tenthly, there are drawn out, in a case possible for one who so opines, incompossible namings of the same [thing]: supposing that the whole Trinity assumes hypostatically the creatable or created totality.[7] In which case it seems, first, that, its possibility being posited, it ought not to be denied by a catholic without qualification: since a catholic ought to maintain as a maxim that, as God is as good intrinsically as anything can be understood or even thought, so he perfects the created totality as greatly as it can be maintained that he perfects it without incompatibility with reason, experience, or scripture.[8] Now without incompatibility with any of these it could be maintained that God perfects the created totality to that degree; therefore every catholic ought to maintain that teaching. For it is not incompatible with reason, any more than it would be were it itself posited as possible; nor is it incompatible with experience, since no human sense knows how to determine whether God is a stone, an ass, and so of the other creatures; nor does scripture, on the damnation of men or on sins or other things, stand in the way of its being so, since after sin God can assume one who is to be damned; because it seems less contrary to God that he be a rational man or angel than that he be every beast, here quantified, shaped, old, acting, moved, and so of the other namings, substantial as well as accidental, but there formed in the opposite way.[9] Nor does it avail to say that, if this were posited in fact, holy scripture would express it, since Paul "heard secret [things] which it is not granted to man to utter": indeed, as might be said, this follows from scripture, since God, supremely powerful and not envious or avaricious, cannot from his goodness hold himself back from this beneficence.[10] For according to the argument of the Truth, Matthew 7, "if you, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will the heavenly Father give the good Spirit to them that ask him?", that inference would not hold if [200]

¶3 200.5–201.17

[200]Tales autem dilapsus vani ficti ex amplitudine divine potencie forent nidi[3] hereticis ad hereses periculosissimas seminandum. Descendendo autem in speciali concedunt in tali casu quod Deus est quelibet eius pars quantitativa infinitum modica, et infinitum longa et lata; et ita, sicut est 'primus et novissimus,' sic est maximus et minimus possibilis, longissimus, latissimus, brevissimus, et indivisibilis quoad molem. Cum enim sit omnis ignis et omne corpus omogenium et[4] ethrogenium, patet quod foret totus mundus multiplicatus dimensionaliter ubique, et sic nichil per se in genere foret in denominacione aliqua maius aut minus reliquo; cum quidlibet tale sit Deus, et per consequens nichil haberet plures partes quantitativas quam tres, que sunt Trinitas increata, super quibus cuncta sunt posita. Addunt eciam quod in casu posito acciones et passiones et cetere forme personales multiplicarentur concomitanter ubique consequenter ad immensam co-existenciam Trinitatis; et sic non est motus successivus; et per consequens neque tempus, cum prius ac posterius in situ deficiant; et sic de multis quibus ego noc sufficerem assentire. Quomodo queso quelibet pars quantitativa corporis foret essencialiter[5] idem cuilibet? cum tunc pars foret non-pars; quia omne corpus indivisibile, et nulla pars minor aut maior[6] reliqua; quia essencia divina et Trinitas benedicta, et sic mundus et quelibet pars eius quantitativa summe perfecta; quia realiter ipse Deus et sic tota Trinitas, si foret quelibet pars quantitativa corporis, differret quotlibet differenciis a seipsa. Deduccio omnium istorum patet ex possibilitate casus et principiis opinionis. Videtur enim multis quod [201]sicut Verbum[1] potest esse dominus[2] sibimet et minister, ac tota generis humani cognacio, sic potest esse totus ignis et quelibet eius pars quantitativa: nec credo racionem diversitatis possibiliter assignandam. 2do dicunt quod, sicut Verbum est tantum unus homo,[3] sic quod non multi, ponendo quod mille vel quotlibet humanitates assumpsit sic est tantum unus ignis licet infinitas igneitates assumpserit. Quod non dicunt illi qui ponunt Verbum in casu illo[4] esse multos homines. Et patet plane ranga[5] inconveniencium supradicta, cum omnis substancia per se in genere foret Pater, Filius, vel Spiritus sanctus: et sic utrobique illa tria[6] supposita simul omnes substancie et omnia accidentibus informata sic quod, ubicunque est unus ignis, sunt tres ignes solummodo, qui sunt omnes. Infinitatem autem inconveniencium que secuntur videtur michi stultum deducere, cum gignit sollicitudinem apparencie sine fructu.

a man could forgo a beneficence which he could very easily perform after the manner of God: for then God could, out of a freedom from obligation, grant to none of the men who follow, however much he deserved.[11]

And such vain slips, feigned from the breadth of the divine power, would be nests for heretics for the sowing of most dangerous heresies.[12] And, descending to the particular, they grant that in such a case God is each quantitative part of it, infinitely small, and infinitely long and broad; and so, as he is "the First and the Last", so he is the greatest and least possible, longest, broadest, shortest, and indivisible as to bulk. For since he is every fire and every body, homogeneous and heterogeneous, it is clear that the whole world would be multiplied dimensionally everywhere, and so nothing [that is] of itself in a genus would in any naming be greater or less than another; since every such thing is God, and consequently nothing would have more quantitative parts than three, which are the uncreated Trinity, on which all things are set.[13] They add, too, that in the case supposed actions and beings-acted-on and the other personal forms would be multiplied concomitantly everywhere, consequently on the immense co-existence of the Trinity; and so there is no successive motion, and consequently no time either, since before and after in position would be lacking; and so of many things to which I could not bring myself to assent.[14] How, I ask, would each quantitative part of a body be essentially the same as each? since then a part would be a non-part; for every body [would be] indivisible, and no part less or greater than another; for [each would be] the divine essence and the blessed Trinity, and so the world and each quantitative part of it supremely perfect; for really God himself, and so the whole Trinity, if he were each quantitative part of a body, would differ from himself by any number of differences. The deduction of all these is clear from the possibility of the case and the principles of the opinion. For it seems to many that, [201]as the Word can be lord to himself and servant, and the whole kindred of the human race, so he can be the whole fire and each quantitative part of it: nor do I believe a reason for the difference can possibly be assigned.[15] Secondly, they say that, as the Word is only one man, so that [he is] not many, supposing that he assumed a thousand or any number of humanities, so he is only one fire, although he assumed infinitely many firenesses. Which those do not say who hold that the Word in that case is many men.[16] And the row of absurdities above is plainly clear, since every substance of itself in a genus would be Father, Son, or

Holy Spirit: and so on both sides those three supposits [would be] at once all substances and all things informed by accidents, so that wherever there is one fire there are three fires only, which are all [the fires]. But to deduce the infinity of absurdities that follow seems to me foolish, since it begets anxiety for appearance without fruit.[17]

Notes

1. The ninth consequence has four parts, taken in turn below: God makes three eternal men; they cannot be made by God; he thereby perfects the human race as much as his absolute power allows; and he could not produce more men than those three.
2. "A trinity, three men": if the whole Trinity assumes every producible humanity, then on the moderns' terms each person, however many humanities he assumes, is one man; so there are three men only, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and as divine persons they have no beginning: "eternal men". A B C read *posito* for *pono* (198.2); if that is right, Harris notes, *assignato* should be read for *assigno*.
3. "[There could] not [be]": the clause has no main verb; the supplied words give the sense of *patet itaque quod non meliores homines … quam poterit esse aliqua creatura*. A B C read *naturarum* "natures" for *animarum* "souls" (198.13) and omit *homines* (198.17); O reads *particula* for *pars* (198.8).
4. "Identified himself": *ydemptificaverit se*, made himself the same as (*idem*) the nature. Prime matter or a material form is no one's nature, so it could be assumed only by identification; the same holds of every created nature, so that the Word assuming a humanity is identified with it, and is a man for each. O reads *ydemptificaret* (198.23).
5. "The teaching of St Thomas": *sentencia* (CONTEXTUAL), the position taught, that one who assumes many humanities is many men (below, 203.7–9; *Scriptum super Sententiis* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 5 ad 2–3: *dicerentur duo homines … plures homines, et non unus homo*). A B C read *ponentis* "who holds" for *ponent* (198.28): "the teaching of St Thomas, who holds …". The print is kept.
6. "What was posited fails": one of the three men, the Father, is uncausable, so no fourth man can be granted without denying the case. A B C read *incommunicabilis et improductibilis* (198.32); O adds *mu* (perhaps *materia*) after *affirmativa* and reads *positivum* for *positum* (199.2).
7. "Namings": *denominaciones*, the predicates that name a thing from its forms, here God named from every creature. "Possible for one who so opines": on the moderns' principles, not Wyclif's. O reads *compossibiles* (199.4).
8. "As anything can be understood or even thought" recalls Anselm, *Proslogion* 2, *aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*, and c. 5, where God is *quidquid melius est esse quam non esse* (PL 158, 227C, 229B–C). The maxim's three tests, *sine repugnancia racionis, experiencie, vel scripture*, stand in O and the print and are lacking in A B C (199.11–12); the next sentence ("any of these") and the three answers need them. A B C add *perfecta* after *negari* (199.7) and read *ergo* for *enim* (199.15).
9. "Any more than it would be were it posited as possible": *pocius quam ipso de possibili posito repugnaret*, no more against reason than any case granted as possible. "Than that he be every beast, here quantified …": the print has *sit* twice (*quam quod sit omnis bestia hic sit quantificatus*, 199.22); the second is taken as opening the list of namings. C reads *sit hominis assinus* for *sit lapis, asinus* (199.17–18).
10. 2 Cor. 12:4, without the Vulgate's *verba* ("heard secret words"). "Not envious": the commonplace that the good God grudges nothing (Plato, *Timaeus* 29e, in Calcidius's Latin *ab optimo porro invidia longe relegata est*; cf. Boethius, *Consolatio* III m. 9, *livore carens*). "As might be said": *ut diceretur*; or "so that it might be said [that] this follows from scripture". B reads *sequeretur* (199.28); O *contrahere* for *continere* (199.30).
11. Wyclif's words are Luke 11:13's ("the good Spirit", *spiritum bonum*), with "the heavenly Father" (*Pater celestis*) for the Vulgate's "your Father", under Matthew's reference (Matt. 7:11, "give good things"); both Vulgate texts open *Si ergo vos*. A reads *scitis*, and B omits *nostis … se* (199.31–33). "A freedom from obligation": the print divides *de obligacionis* (200.3; so on the plate), which does not construe; it is read as one word, *deobligacionis* (our reading). "After the manner of God": *instar Dei*; A B read *iusticionem*, C *iusta et* (200.2). O reads *bonum sequentis* "the good of the one who follows" for *hominum sequencium* (200.3).
12. "Slips": *dilapsus*, fallings-away from the truth. *Potencia* (CONTEXTUAL) is here God's power. "Nests": *nidi*, with O; A B C read *vie* "ways" (200.6).
13. "The First and the Last": Apoc. 1:17 (Harris's margin; cf. Isa. 44:6). "Of it": *eius*, the created totality the Trinity has assumed. "Not more quantitative parts than three": each part of a body being God, its only parts are the three persons. A B C read *vel* for *et* (200.13).
14. *Passiones*, against *acciones*: the category of being-acted-on. "Consequently on": following upon the immensity, the presence everywhere, of the Trinity. "Could not": the print's *noc* (200.24; so on the plate) is a misprint for *non*.
15. "Lord to himself and servant": the Word is lord of his own humanity and, as having it, servant; and on the moderns' terms he is all the men of his kindred. O reads *numeraliter* "numerically" for *essencialiter* (200.25–26) and adds *quam* after *maior* (200.27); B adds *non* after *Verbum*, and A B C read *deus* "God" for *dominus* (201.1).
16. "Firenesses": *igneitates*, the forms of fire, formed as *humanitates*. "Which those do not say": those who hold that the Word with many humanities would be many men must say by the same token that with many firenesses he would be many fires. O omits *unus homo* (201.5) and reads *illud* for *illo* (201.8).
17. "Absurdities": *inconveniencia* (CONTEXTUAL), the logical sense. "Row": *ranga* (201.9), apparently "rank, row"; A has *aren* written above it (*arenga*, "harangue"), B reads *arenga*, C leaves a gap. "On both sides": *utrobique*, in substances and accidents alike. O omits *tria* (201.12).
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 198: *humanitus*, (plate: print = humanitus; the transcription normalised it)
  - 198: *humanitus* (plate: print = humanitus; the transcription normalised it)
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference 1 0 Jeree*f um“ (199.10); reference Cor. xii. 4. (199.27); reference Matt. vii. u. (199.31); reference Rev. i. 17. [B152a’ (200.10).

Chapter 12

Part 1: The moderns' three opinions, Thomas's many men, and the monstrous Christ

Harris pp. 201.0–205.24

¶1 *201.0–201.0*

[201][Recitando opiniones varias de assumpcione creature declarat quod, si assumeret multas humanitates, foret multi homines, sicut dictat sentencia sancti Thome. Against the several opinions that any divine Person can assume (a) any created nature; (b) every substance existing by itself and only such a substance; (c) every rational creature capable of bliss and only such a creature: it is contended that only the Word could assume human nature, and that only in the man Christ Jesus: and it is argued according to the dictum of St. Thomas that, if the Word assumed many humanities, he would be many men.]

[It recites various opinions on the assumption of a creature, and makes clear that, if he assumed many humanities, he would be many men, as the teaching of St Thomas dictates.]

¶2 *201.18–202.27*

[201]Sed descendendum est ad trimembrem posicionem modernorum qui inani sollicitudine venantur[7] quid contingeret si Christus multas humanitates assumeret. Falsitas enim [202]dissonat sibi ipsi, teste Gregorio 12 Moralium ca° 14. 'Alius, inquit, relicta veritate mentiri deliberat ut audiencium animum fallat. Sed quantus labor est custodire sollicite, ne ipsa eius fallacia deprehendi queat! Ponit quippe ante oculos quid aliis veritatem scientibus responderi possit; et cum magno cogitatu pertractat quomodo per argumenta falsitatis documenta[1] veritatis exsuperet; hinc inde se circumtegit; et contra hoc, ubi deprehendi potuerit, veritati similem responsionem querit; qui si utrobique verum diceret, hucusque[2] sine labore potuisset. Plana quippe est veritatis via et grave est iter mendacii.'[3] Et indubie, sicut in agilibus, sic in speculabilibus verificatur ista sentencia; et patet tam exemplariter quam eciam racione. Si, inquam, consideremus pictacias quibus negantes universalia, extensionem temporis, et veritates de anima cum sibi similibus pregravantur, in quot errores incidunt, quot subterfugia querunt, et quam onerose locuntur, ut sub falsitatis pallio simulent veritatem; patesceret in speculabilibus sentencia Gregorii supradicta. Sed et racio illud idem exigit. Veritas enim obiective movet[4] et instruit ad ipsam vere cognoscendum in animo et proporcionaliter proferendum: sed[5] ad exprimendum[5] falsitatem deficit obiectum huiusmodi in natura. Ideo difficultatur falsidicus pallians non existens, ac si absque fundamento vel exemplari aliquis[6] intendit unum non ens vel vacuum fabricare. Unde et illud potest patescere in varietate sentenciarum de incarnacione hodie ventilata.

But we must descend to the three-membered position of the moderns, who with empty anxiety hunt for what would happen if Christ assumed many humanities.[1] For falsehood [202]is discordant with itself, as Gregory witnesses, *Morals* 12, chapter 14: "Another," he says, "having abandoned the truth, resolves to lie so as to deceive the mind of his hearers. But how great a labour it is to guard anxiously lest his very deceit be detected! For he sets before his eyes what could be answered by others who know the truth; and with great thought he works out how, by the arguments of falsehood, he may overcome the proofs of truth; he covers himself on this side and that; and against this, where he could be detected, he seeks an answer like the truth; who, if he spoke the truth on both sides, could surely have [done it] without labour. For plain is the way of truth, and heavy is the road of lying."[2] And without doubt, as in matters of action, so in speculative matters this teaching holds true; and it is clear both by example and also by reason. If, I say, we consider the patches with which those who deny universals, the extension of time, and the truths about the soul, with their like, are weighed down; into how many errors they fall, how many subterfuges they seek, and how burdensomely they speak, so as to simulate truth under the cloak of falsehood: Gregory's teaching above would become plain in speculative matters.[3] But reason too demands the same. For truth moves objectively, and instructs toward knowing it truly in the mind and uttering it proportionately; now for expressing falsehood such an object is lacking in nature. Therefore the false speaker, cloaking

¶3 *202.28–203.6*

[202]Ponunt enim hi quod quamlibet naturam creatam quelibet persona divina indifferenter potest assumere: hi quod omnem et solam substanciam per se entem: et hi quod omnem et solam creaturam racionalem beatificabilem: et sic de quotlibet subdicionibus et evidenciis, quas nobis, qui ponimus solum Verbum pure Dominum Iesum Christum posse assumere, [203]non expedit recitare; sed in difficultate, si Verbum multas humanitates assumeret, moderni doctores senciunt satis opposite. Sed pro ulteriori declaracione huius materie iuxta[1] ponam istorum sentencias, ut videatur quomodo exorbitantes a seipsis dissonant, et veritas rectissime in omnibus consonat sibi ipsi.

For these hold that any divine person can indifferently assume any created nature; these, every and only substance that is of itself; and these, every and only rational creature that can be beatified: and so of any number of subdivisions and evidences, which it is not expedient for us, who hold that only the Word can assume, [and] purely the Lord Jesus Christ, [203] to recite; but on the difficulty, if the Word assumed many humanities, the modern doctors feel quite oppositely.[5] But for the further making clear of this matter I shall set their teachings side by side, so that it may be seen how those who leave the track are discordant with themselves, and truth is most rightly in harmony with itself in all things.[6]

¶4 *203.7–203.23*

[203]Ponit enim sanctus Thomas super 3^{m} Sentenciarum Distinccione prima Questione 8^{a} et 9^{a} quod, si Verbum multas humanitates assumeret, foret[2] multi homines; sicut si tres persone eandem humanitatem assumerent, forent omnes et singule idem homo. Et inter omnes veritates, quas laudabiliter de Christo[3] scripserat, non estimo aliquam veriorem. Illa enim veritas connexionis est absolute necessaria, quomodolibet fuerit de extremis. Patet sic. Si aliqua sit humanitas, ipsa est homo; ergo si insint multe humanitates, ille sunt multi homines; et per consequens, si Verbum assumit ypostatice[4] multas humanitates, tunc assumendo facit se multos homines. Antecedens[5] patet quodammodo ex predictis.[5] Ymo ex dictis De Anima palam sequitur: quia cum quilibet spiritus hominis per se sit homo, patet quod, si sint multi spiritus tales assumpti, assumuntur et multi homines. Sed[6] et hoc[6] patet ex eo quod omnis humanitas est personam esse hominem.

For St Thomas holds, on the third [book] of the *Sentences*, distinction 1, questions 8 and 9, that if the Word assumed many humanities he would be many men; just as, if three persons assumed the same humanity, they would all and each be the same man.[7] And among all the truths which he wrote laudably about Christ, I reckon none truer. For that truth of the conditional is absolutely necessary, however it may be with the extremes. It is clear thus. If there is some humanity, it is a man; therefore if many humanities are there, they are many men; and consequently, if the Word assumes hypostatically many humanities, then by assuming he makes himself many men.[8] The antecedent is clear in a way from what has been said. Indeed, from what was said in *De anima* it plainly follows: for since each spirit of a man is of itself a man, it is clear that, if many such spirits are assumed, many men are also assumed. And this too is clear from this: that every humanity is a person's being a man.[9]

¶5 *203.24–204.10*

[203]Sed quia sanctus Thomas sicut et alii moderni doctores discordant a principiis iam assumptis, ideo oportet arguere contra possibilitatem suppositi aliis evidenciis. Videtur enim quod Christus posset esse quantumlibet monstruosus, quod esse non potest, cum minimum inconveniens sit Deo impossibile; et consequencia videtur ex hoc; quod, mille capitibus incommunicantibus existentibus in eodem corpore[7] humano et[7] proporcionaliter de aliis membris organicis, foret ille homo evidentissime monstrum magnum; sed hoc potest esse de Christo, cum omnem humanitatem potest [204]simul assumere: ergo

But because St Thomas, like the other modern doctors too, departs from the principles already assumed, it is therefore necessary to argue against the possibility of the [case] supposed with other evidences.[10] For it seems that Christ could be as monstrous as you please, which cannot be, since the least absurdity is impossible for God; and the inference appears from this: that, with a thousand heads that do not communicate existing in the same human body, and proportionately of the other organic members, that man would most evidently be a great monster; now this can be [so]

conclusio. Si enim Verbum totam unam cognacionem assumpserit tam maris quam femine, adhuc foret per adversarios solummodo unus homo, et per consequens tantum unum animal ac unum corpus; et super isto forent omnia dicta membra[1] monstruosa[2] ut estimo. Unde credo quod sanctus Thomas negans multiplicacionem dimensionalem eiusdem corporis, negaret in casu isto quod Christus est solummodo unus homo; nedum quod tunc foret hermofrodita,[3] pater et filius, et tota cognacio; verum quia idem[4] corpus foret dimensionaliter per loca distancia.

of Christ, since he can assume every humanity [204]at once: therefore the conclusion. For if the Word assumed the whole of one kindred, male as well as female, he would still, according to the adversaries, be only one man, and consequently only one animal and one body; and on this [body] all the said members would be monstrous, as I reckon.[11] Hence I believe that St Thomas, denying the dimensional multiplication of the same body, would deny in this case "Christ is only one man"; not only because he would then be a hermaphrodite, father and son, and the whole kindred, but because the same body would be dimensionally in distant places.[12]

¶6 204.11–204.14

[204]Sed hic dicitur quod monstruositas et impossibilitas multiplicacionis dimensionalis intelligitur secundum idem corpus; sed in casu posito foret secundum corpora multum disparia habitus talium situum et membrorum.

But here the answer is that monstrosity and the impossibility of dimensional multiplication are understood as to the same body; but in the case supposed the having of such positions and members would be as to very disparate bodies.[13]

¶7 204.15–205.14

[204]Contra illud tripliciter arguitur.[5] Primo probatur quod secundum idem corpus habeat Christus istas denominaciones; quia secundum eandem naturam creatam et eandem humanitatem, que est Verbum esse unicum hominem; ergo secundum idem corpus. Si enim secundum seipsum habet ista, et ipse sit idem corpus, ubicunque est homo; sequitur quod secundum idem corpus habet ista, ubicunque sit homo.[6] Similiter, si omnia ista corpora essent localiter copulata et adunata stante unione[7] sine generacione vel corrupcione alicuius partis eorum, foret monstrum horribilissimum; quia corpus compositum ex corpore vetule et infantis, viri et uxoris, et sic de tota cognacione. Illud ergo cum fuerit totale et adequatum corpus Christi idem quod prefuit, sicut est modo, sic fuit ante monstruosum. Non enim adquiritur Christo aliqua pars vel partis posicio propter motum localem vel continuacionem[8]; ergo nec aliqua monstruositas secundum se totam. Et hoc est evidencius illis qui ponunt quod omnes partes integri[9] sunt simul ipsum totum. Similiter non est evidencia contra multiplicacionem dimensionalem [205]eiusdem corporis quin consimile contingit reducere contra hoc quod eadem persona sit dimensionaliter multiplicata secundum diversa corpora, ut quod hic sit senex, hic iuvenis, hic mas, hic femina, hic pater et uxor procreans[1] seipsum infantem, et hic adolescens sepeliens seipsum vetulam,[2] et ita de aliis denominacionibus aliorum generum. Unde, cum acciones et passiones personales individuantur primo a supposito non[3] natura, videtur quod multiplicantur ad multiplicacionem suppositi; et sic idem homo foret quantumlibet dissimilis et contrarius sibi ipsi tam secundum accidencia corporis quam anime, ut sedulus excogitator

Against this it is argued in three ways. First it is proved that Christ has these namings as to the same body; because [he has them] as to the same created nature and the same humanity, which is the Word's being a single man; therefore as to the same body. For if he has these as to himself, and he is the same body wherever he is a man, it follows that he has these as to the same body, wherever he is a man.[14] Likewise, if all these bodies were locally joined and united, the union remaining, without the generation or corruption of any part of them, there would be a most horrible monster; for [it would be] a body composed of the body of an old woman and of an infant, of husband and wife, and so of the whole kindred. Since, then, that would be the total and adequate body of Christ, the same as it was before, as it is now so was it before monstrous. For no part, or position of a part, is acquired by Christ through local motion or continuation; therefore no monstrosity either, as to the whole of it. And this is more evident to those who hold that all the parts of an integral [whole] together are the whole itself.[15] Likewise there is no evidence against the dimensional multiplication [205]of the same body without a like [argument] being brought back against this: that the same person is dimensionally multiplied as to diverse bodies, so that here he is old, here young, here male, here female, here father and wife procreating himself an infant, and here a youth burying himself an old woman, and so of the other namings of other genera.[16] Hence, since personal actions and beings-acted-on are individuated first by the supposit, not the nature, it seems that they are

potest calculare.[4] Et sic contra principia sancti Thome idem corpus in numero foret quantumlibet multis et disparibus formis substancialibus accidentatum.[5]

multiplied at the multiplication of the supposit; and so the same man would be as dissimilar and contrary to himself as you please, as to the accidents of the body as well as of the soul, as a diligent deviser can calculate. And so, against the principles of St Thomas, the same body in number would be subject to accidents by as many and as disparate substantial forms as you please.[17]

¶8 205.15–205.24

[205]Item, si Christus potest simul habere[6] humanitates tam dispariter accidentatas cum hoc quod maneat idem homo, tunc posset pro diversis sitibus habere denominaciones contrarias; et per consequens, coextensis illis humanitatibus, forent accidencia contraria coextensa; et sic idem simul et semel contrariis accidentibus informatum. Sed hoc modicum videtur modernis, si secundum diversas naturas eidem supposito ista insint. Unde concedunt quod qualescunque forme contrarie per eundem situm et idem suppositum, sed secundum diversas naturas, coextendi poterunt.

Again, if Christ can at once have humanities so disparately subject to accidents, with this: that he remains the same man, then he could, for diverse positions, have contrary namings; and consequently, those humanities being coextended, contrary accidents would be coextended; and so the same [thing] would at once and together be informed by contrary accidents. But this seems a small matter to the moderns, if these things are in the same supposit as to diverse natures. Hence they grant that any contrary forms whatever could be coextended through the same position and the same supposit, but as to diverse natures.[18]

Notes

1. "Three-membered position": the three opinions set out at 202.28–203.1 on which creatures a divine person can assume; *posicio* is the moderns' position, not a proposition. O reads *variantur* for *venantur* "hunt" (201.19).
2. Gregory, *Moralia in Iob* XII.42.47 (Wyclif's c. 14; PL 75, 1008C). "Surely": *utique*, with O and Gregory, against the print's *hucusque* "thus far" (202.10); it is Gregory's word (*si vellet verum dicere, utique sine labore potuisset*). A B C read *argumenta* for *documenta* "proofs" (202.7); O *menda[ciu]m* (202.11).
3. *Sentencia* (CONTEXTUAL) is "teaching" throughout this chunk: Gregory's saying, Thomas's position, the opinions on the incarnation. "Patches": *pictacias* (*pittacium*), the patches on the "cloak of falsehood" (*pallio*) in the same sentence. Those weighed down by them are the moderns who deny real universals, the extension of time, and truths about the soul.
4. "Now for expressing falsehood": *sed* brings the minor premiss, closed by *ideo*. Truth is the object that moves the mind; falsehood has none in nature, so its speaker must build on nothing. O omits *sed ad exprimendum* (202.21–22); A B C read *monet* "admonishes" for *movet* (202.20); B *aliquid* for *aliquis* (202.24).
5. "Only the Word can assume, [and] purely the Lord Jesus Christ": Wyclif's own position, that only the Word can assume and he only the humanity of Christ; Harris's summary has "only in the man Christ Jesus". The three opinions: any person any created nature; every and only substance existing of itself; every and only beatifiable rational creature.
6. "Side by side": *iuxta ponam*; O reads *antequam* for *iuxta* (203.4).
7. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 5, which grants "many men" (ad 3: *plures homines, et non unus homo*); not *Summa theologiae* III q. 3 a. 7, which concludes "one man". Wyclif's "questions 8 and 9" count the articles of the distinction straight through: q. 1 has four, so 8 and 9 are q. 2 a. 4 and a. 5. The three persons and one humanity: the same distinction, q. 2 a. 4 ad 6, *dicerentur tres unus homo* (Wyclif's "8"; cf. *Summa theologiae* III q. 3 a. 6). *Foret* "he would be" is singular; A C read *forent* (203.9). A B C omit *de Christo* "about Christ" (203.12).
8. "Truth of the conditional": *veritas connexionis*; the "if … then" holds necessarily whatever the truth of its antecedent and consequent, "the extremes". B omits *ypostatice* (203.17).
9. *De anima*: Wyclif's own *De anima*, which the first sentence of this treatise names as its introduction; Harris notes it as unprinted and cited here (Notes on p. 1 l. 3). "A person's being a man": *personam esse hominem*, the humanity as that by which a person is a man. B C omit *Antecedens … predictis* (203.18–19); A B C read *sicut et modo* "as also now" for *Sed et hoc* (203.22).
10. "Principles already assumed": taken up in the argument, the logician's sense of *assumere*, not the assumption of a nature. "The possibility of the [case] supposed": *suppositi*, what is supposed (that the Word assumes many humanities), not the supposit. Thomas is counted among the modern doctors. *Inconveniens* (CONTEXTUAL) below is "absurdity", the logical sense.
11. "On this [body]": *super isto*, the one body the adversaries must grant. A B C read *corpore ut* and omit *humano* (203.30–31); B omits *membra*, and O reads *monstruose* (204.5).
12. Thomas's denial that one body can be dimensionally in several places (*Quodlibet* III q. 1 a. 2: *idem corpus simul localiter … in duobus locis*, which *a Deo fieri non potest*). A B C read *illud* "that" for *idem* "the same" (204.10). O spells *hermifodrita* (204.9).
13. "The having": *habitus*, the possession of positions and members, not the Lombard's *habitus*. The reply: the members are spread over many bodies, each normal, so no one body is monstrous.
14. "The Word's being a single man": the humanity is the Word's being one man (cf. 203.22–23, "a person's being a man"); the first proof runs from one humanity to one body. A C omit *homo* (204.21).

15. "Continuation": *continuacionem*, the making of bodies into one continuum, not "carrying on"; Harris suggests *contiguacionem* "contiguity", citing *Trialogus* p. 87 l. 23 (204.30). A B C omit *unione* (204.23); A B read *integre* for *integri* (204.32): *integri*, genitive, the integral whole whose parts together are it.
16. "Without a like [argument] being brought back": whatever is urged against one body in many places can equally be urged against one person in many bodies, which the adversaries grant. O reads *procreatus* for *procreans* (205.4); A B C omit *vetulam* (205.5–6).
17. "Subject to accidents by … substantial forms": *accidentatum*, with O and B; A C read *actuatum* "actuated" (205.14), the plainer sense against Thomas's unity of substantial form (*Summa theologiae* I q. 76 a. 4: *nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva*), but the print stands. *Passiones*, against *acciones*: being-acted-on. O reads *nam* for *non* (205.8) and *coniungere* for *calculare* (205.12).
18. "As to diverse natures": the moderns' rule, by which contraries are said of Christ as to the Godhead and as to the humanity, here stretched to many humanities. B reads *summe* (perhaps *sumere*) for *habere* (205.15).

Part 2: Against one man with many humanities: motion, goodness, size, and multiplied principles

Harris pp. 205.25–209.26

¶1 205.25–206.3

[205]Sed contra illud tripliciter arguitur.[7] Primo posito quod duo corpora coextendantur et utrumque simul pro eodem loco et tempore gradiatur, videtur quod sunt duo motus progressivi,[8] sicut due quantitates et cetera accidencia coextensa. Oppositum tamen videtur, cum motus individuatur sufficienter a spacio, tempore, et subiecto; sed idem est homo in numero, idem tempus et spacium; ergo cum nulla pars quantitativa hominis graditur, eadem est mocio progressiva. Et per idem posito quod secundum unam humanitatem [206]penetraret progrediendo multas continuas humanitates[1] quiescentes continue,[2] idem Christus simul et semel secundum idem quiesceret,[2] et motu contrario moveretur.

But against that, in three ways.[1] First, supposing that two bodies are coextended and each walks at once for the same place and time, it seems that there are two progressive motions, just as [there are] two quantities and the other accidents coextended. Yet the opposite seems [true], since a motion is individuated sufficiently by space, time and subject; now the man is the same in number, the time and the space the same; therefore, since no quantitative part of the man walks, the progressive motion is the same.[2] And by the same token, supposing that as to one humanity [206]he were to penetrate, in going forward, many continuous humanities that are continually at rest, the same Christ would at one and the same time be at rest in the same respect, and be moved with a contrary motion.[3]

¶2 206.4–207.10

[206]Similiter iuxta illud sequitur quod Christus infinitum bonum animal potest esse, quia mensura bonitatis rei composite capitur a principiis intrinsecis cum disposicionibus formalibus in eadem. Ex quo sequitur quod Christus racione multitudinis humanitatum foret melior homo quam si solum unam assumeret. Patet consequencia, supposito primo quod Christus sit tantum finite bonus iuxta illam vocem Veritatis, 'Pater maior me est,' Ioh. 14.[3] Ymo si foret infinitum bonus homo racione deitatis, foret per idem infinitum antiquus, et per consequens primus homo, consequens contra Apostolum prima ad Cor. 15. 'primus, inquit, homo de terra terrenus, et secundus homo de celo celestis.' Et ita oportet limitare in Christo omnia alia[4] accidencia, que habet humanitus, sic quod non infinitum bonum corpus vel animam habet Christus; et per idem non infinitum magnus senex vel antiquus homo est Christus, nec infinitum potens ac virtuosus vel sciens homo, quia sic excederet limites speciei eciam secundum hominem assumptum; et per consequens non conveniret nobiscum in specie; que contradicunt supradictis. Quo supposito patet quod Christus existens

Likewise, according to that, it follows that Christ can be an infinitely good animal, because the measure of the goodness of a composite thing is taken from its intrinsic principles together with the formal dispositions in it. From which it follows that Christ, by reason of the multitude of humanities, would be a better man than if he assumed only one. The inference is clear, it being supposed first that Christ is only finitely good, according to that word of the Truth, "The Father is greater than I," John 14[:28].[4] Indeed, if he were an infinitely good man by reason of the Godhead, he would by the same token be infinitely old, and consequently the first man: a consequent against the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 15[:47]: "The first man," he says, "was of the earth, earthly, and the second man, from heaven, heavenly."[5] And so one must limit in Christ all the other accidents which he has humanly, so that Christ does not have an infinitely good body or soul; and by the same token Christ is not an infinitely great old man or ancient man, nor an infinitely powerful and virtuous or knowing man,

bonus homo racione unius humanitatis foret melior homo racione alterius humanitatis incommunicantis coassumpte; cum bonitatem magnam acquireret nullam aliunde deperdens. Nec superest in quo per humanitatem melioraretur[5] nisi in esse hominis. Et per idem foret in duplo melior homo per assumpcionem duarum humanitatum quam per assumpcionem unius solummodo; et sic de aliis denominacionibus accidentalibus[6] consequentibus ad easdem. Ex quo videtur primo quod infinitas humanitates assumendo foret eque bonus homo ut Deus, vel unum infinitum foret reliquo maius. Videtur 2^do^ [207]quod infinitum melior potest[1] esse asinus quam homo, posito quod infinitas naturas asininas Verbum assumeret naturam hominis dimittendo. Et per consequens sequitur 3° quod species non assimilatur numeris, cum omnis creata substancia magis et minus susciperet[2] ut unus homo[3] esset[4] reliquo in duplo magis homo propter humanitatem duplicem; et sic de qualibet proporcione racionali reali;[5] et per consequens Christus racione multitudinis naturarum excederet in humanitate quodcunque aliud individuum speciei.

because so he would exceed the limits of the species even as to the assumed man; and consequently he would not agree with us in species: which contradicts what was said above.[6] This supposed, it is clear that Christ, being a good man by reason of one humanity, would be a better man by reason of another humanity that does not communicate [with it], assumed along with it; since he would acquire great goodness, losing none from elsewhere. Nor is anything left in which he would be bettered through the humanity, except in the being of a man. And by the same token he would be a man doubly better by the assumption of two humanities than by the assumption of one only; and so of the other accidental namings following on them.[7] From which it seems, first, that by assuming infinite humanities he would be as good a man as God, or one infinite would be greater than another. It seems, second, [207]that an ass can be infinitely better than a man, supposing that the Word assumed infinite asinine natures, laying aside the nature of man. And consequently it follows, third, that species are not likened to numbers, since every created substance would admit of more and less, so that one would be doubly more a man than another on account of a double humanity; and so of any rational proportion; and consequently Christ, by reason of the multitude of natures, would exceed in humanity any other individual of the species.[8]

¶3 207.11–208.5

[207]3° videtur quod ex omni genere accidentis corporei potest esse composicio parcium intensive. Nam coextensis humanitatibus secundum materias possent partes quantitative materierum et suorum accidencium coextendi; et per consequens, cum omnia sunt forme vel materie eiusdem suppositi, sequitur quod per talem composicionem posset unum componi non extensive; ergo intensive; quod est impossibile. Et [sic][6] de materia et ceteris accidentibus, que secundum philosophos[7] non possunt magis vel minus suscipere. Nam eque magnus foret Christus secundum unam humanitatem, sicut[8] foret[9] Christus secundum[9] infinitas equales insimul coextensas. Nec sapit quod Christus sit intensius septipedalis quam prius. Et hic videtur possibile[10] quod infinitum magnus iam est Christus, et nullam quantitatem deperdet, et tamen in fine erit solum septipedalis, posito quod infinitas humanitates equales assumat ad modum coree[11] iuxta positas; sic[12] quod omnes ille sese penetrantes coextendantur in fine sine augmentacione[13] vel diminucione; et patet conclusio. Et sic infinitum magnum potest continue maiorari continue adquirendo quantitatem ac nullam penitus deperdendo quousque infinitum parvum fuerit, ut alibi declaratur. Et conformis

Third, it seems that in every genus of bodily accident there can be a composition of parts intensively. For, with humanities coextended as to their matters, the quantitative parts of the matters and of their accidents could be coextended; and consequently, since all are forms or matters of the same supposit, it follows that by such a composition one [thing] could be composed not extensively; therefore intensively; which is impossible.[9] And [so] of matter and the other accidents, which according to the philosophers cannot admit of more or less.[10] For Christ would be as great as to one humanity as Christ would be as to infinite equal [humanities] coextended all together. Nor does it make sense that Christ should be more intensely seven feet tall than before. And here it seems possible that Christ is now infinitely great, and will lose no quantity, and yet at the end will be only seven feet tall, supposing that he assume infinite equal humanities placed side by side after the manner of a ring-dance, so that all of them, penetrating one another, are coextended at the end without augmentation or diminution; and the conclusion is clear.[11] And so the infinitely great can continually be increased, continually acquiring quantity and losing

est consideracio [208]de motu, ut infinitum intensus potest esse motus per motuum incommunicancium extensionem,[1] cum hoc quod mobile quantumcunque tarde ad velocissimum moveatur. Et ex istis potest calculator elicere quotlibet conclusiones nimis mirabiles, quia regularum de velocitate motuum destructivas.

none at all, until it is infinitely small, as is made clear elsewhere.[12] And the consideration [208]of motion is conformable: a motion can be infinitely intense through the extension of motions that do not communicate, with this, that the movable is moved however slowly toward the swiftest. And from these a calculator can elicit any number of exceedingly marvellous conclusions, since they destroy the rules on the velocity of motions.[13]

¶4 208.6–208.17

[208]Item hoc corpus et hec anima cum ista unione ypostatica et aliis que secuntur sunt sufficiencia principia ad faciendum Christum esse hominem; cum illis sive[2] aliis quibuscunque[2] positis, hoc sequatur. Sed multiplicatis completis principiis oportet multiplicari effectum formaliter consequentem. Ergo si sint multe humanitates assumpte, sunt multi homines; ut si Christus iam ad humanitatem habitam assumeret aliam humanitatem incommunicantem, illa assumpcio cum sit sufficiens principium, sufficit facere Christum iterum esse hominem; et sic quociens illa principia fuerint geminata.[3] Ex quo sequitur quod si Christus multas humanitates assumeret, foret multi homines consequenter.

Again, this body and this soul, with this hypostatic union and the other things that follow, are sufficient principles for making Christ to be a man; with these, or with any others whatever, posited, this would follow. Now when complete principles are multiplied, the effect that follows formally must be multiplied. Therefore, if there are many humanities assumed, there are many men; as, if Christ now, besides the humanity he has, assumed another humanity that does not communicate [with it], that assumption, since it is a sufficient principle, suffices to make Christ to be a man again; and so as often as those principles have been generated.[14] From which it follows that, if Christ assumed many humanities, he would consequently be many men.

¶5 208.18–208.30

[208]Confirmatur tripliciter. Primo si aliqua principia individuant Christum, ut homo potissime foret[4] corpus et anima; et per consequens variatis illis oportet individuum hominis variari. Aliud ergo est Christum esse istum hominem ex hoc corpore et hac anima integratum, et aliud esse[5] istam personam ex alio corpore et alia anima compositum quia aliter indubie non foret Christus aliud per humanitatis assumpcionem quam foret eternaliter, si solummodo foret Deus. Et patet sentencia sancti Thome, quod Verbum si assumeret multas humanitates ut Iohannem, Petrum et cetera, foret correspondenter multi homines. Verbum igitur esse hominem foret communis humanitas ad ipsum esse Iesum, Petrum etc.

This is confirmed in three ways. First, if any principles individuate Christ, as a man, it would above all be body and soul; and consequently, when these are varied, the individual of man must be varied.[15] It is one thing, therefore, for Christ to be this man, integrated from this body and this soul, and another to be that person, composed from another body and another soul; because otherwise, without doubt, Christ would not be anything other through the assumption of the humanity than he would be eternally if he were only God. And the teaching of St Thomas is clear, that the Word, if he assumed many humanities, as John, Peter and so on, would correspondingly be many men.[16] The Word's being a man, therefore, would be a humanity common to his being Jesus, Peter, etc.[17]

¶6 208.31–209.9

[208]Similiter impossibile est formas completas eciam accidentales multiplicari simul et semel, nisi eo ipso multiplicentur supposita. Sed omnis humanitas est forma, cum sit illud [209]quo substancia formaliter est homo; ergo multiplicatis humanitatibus multiplicabuntur et homines. Assumptum declaratum est de formis, accidentibus, et earum substanciis proximis, ut si sint multe ambulaciones simul et semel oportet multa supposita ambulare; et ita de aliis; ergo a maiori vel pari, cum humanitas sit suppositum esse hominem non individuata

Likewise, it is impossible for complete forms, even accidental ones, to be multiplied at one and the same time, unless by that very fact the supposits are multiplied. Now every humanity is a form, since it is that [209]by which a substance is formally a man; therefore, when humanities are multiplied, men too will be multiplied. The assumption has been made clear of forms, accidents, and their proximate substances: as, if there are many walkings at one and the same time, many supposits must walk; and so of the

ex successione temporis vel adquisicione adventicii accidentis, quod positis multis humanitatibus multi homines consecuntur.

others; therefore, from the greater or from the equal, since the humanity is a supposit's being a man, not individuated by succession of time or by the acquiring of an adventitious accident, [it follows] that, when many humanities are posited, many men follow.[18]

¶7 *209.10–209.26*

[209]3°· idem patet, posito quod Verbum assumat multas embriones et post completas humanitates[1] animabus congenitis, patet quod anime advenientes, cum sint forme substanciales, faciunt Verbum esse aliud; et per consequens non relinquitur quid[2] aliud nisi illum hominem. Prius enim fuit completus Iesus et per consequens per posteriores animas non fit Iesus. Et si dicatur quod anime advenientes non faciunt Christum esse aliud sed alterius[3] modi,[3] tunc sunt forme accidentales advenientes enti in actu et non eiusdem racionis cum ceteris animabus, que in quantum[4] huius modi, faciunt corpora animata. Patet igitur, si experiencia et principia philosophica salvari debeant, quod Verbo assumente multas humanitates est multi homines. Nam numerus hominum, qui est sensibile commune ex 2do De Anima, ita patescit sensui secundum quantitates continuas dislocatas et secundum quotlibet differencias accidentales illarum naturarum, sicut innotescit aliquis sensibilis numerus alicui.

Third, the same is clear, supposing that the Word assume many embryos, and, after the humanities have been completed with souls generated along with them, it is clear that the souls that come to them, since they are substantial forms, make the Word to be another thing; and consequently nothing else is left but that man.[19] For before, Jesus was complete, and consequently he is not made Jesus through the later souls. And if it be said that the souls that come do not make Christ to be another thing but [to be] of another mode, then they are accidental forms coming to a being in act, and not of the same kind as the other souls, which, insofar as [they are] of this kind, make bodies animate.[20] It is clear, therefore, if experience and the principles of philosophy are to be saved, that, the Word assuming many humanities, he is many men. For the number of men, which is a common sensible, from the second [book] *On the Soul*, is as plain to sense, according to continuous quantities set in different places and according to any number of accidental differences of those natures, as any perceptible number becomes known to anyone.[21]

Notes

1. "In three ways": C O omit *arguitur* "it is argued" (205.25), A B with the print. O with C, across the families, against the print: the English follows them, and the verb is understood. The three: motion (205.25), goodness (206.4), intensive composition (207.11). B reads *successivi* "successive" for *progressivi* (205.28).
2. "Now the man is the same": *sed* brings the minor premiss, closed by *ergo*. The argument sets the two coextended bodies of Christ's two humanities against the rule that a motion is individuated by space, time and subject: one subject, one motion. *Motus* and *mocio* are both "motion" here; Wyclif does not set them against each other.
3. "In the same respect": *secundum idem*, the condition under which contraries cannot hold of one thing; one humanity moves through the others while they rest, so Christ both rests and moves. O omits *humanitates* (206.1) and *continue … quiesceret* (206.2–3), losing the rest.
4. John 14:28; O cites chapter "10" (206.11).
5. 1 Corinthians 15:47; Wyclif adds *inquit* and *et* "and" before *secundus*, which the Vulgate lacks. The argument: an infinitely good man by reason of the Godhead would by parity be infinitely old, the first man, against Paul's "second man".
6. "Limit": restrict, not assign. "As to the assumed man": the limits of the species bind Christ even as he is the assumed man; if any accident of his humanity were infinite he would not share our species, against the identity of species argued in earlier chapters. A reads *illa* for *alia* (206.16).
7. "Doubly better": *in duplo melior*, goodness counted per humanity, the absurdity the argument draws out. O reads *melioratur* (206.28); A B C omit *accidentalibus* "accidental" (206.31), O with the print.
8. "Species are not likened to numbers": Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VIII.3 (1043b33–1044a11), that a definition, like a number, becomes another species by any addition, and that, as number does not admit of more and less, neither does substance as form (1044a9–11); "admit of more and less": substance does not, *Categories* 5 (3b33–4a9). *Suscipere* here is "admit of", not the taking-up of a nature. "Rational proportion": a ratio of whole numbers. "So that one would be": *ut unus esset*, with C O, against the print's *ut unus homo esset* (207.5); "any rational proportion": with C O, who omit *reali* "real" (207.7). O reads *suscipiat* (207.5), *est* (207.6); B omits *potest* (207.1).
9. "Intensively": as a quality grows in degree in one subject, not by adding parts side by side; coextended humanities would compose one quantified thing without extension, so quantity would be intensified, which is impossible.

10. "And [so] of matter": the manuscripts read *Et de materia* (O *de materia*); Harris supplies *sic* against them all (207.18). The English follows the manuscripts and supplies "so" in brackets as the ellipsis requires. B reads *philosophum* "the Philosopher" (207.19).
11. "After the manner of a ring-dance": *coree*, A B C (O *sefe*); Harris asks whether *choreae* is meant, as at 196. The humanities stand in a ring and then all penetrate one another, so that infinite quantity ends as seven feet without loss. A B C omit *Christus secundum* (207.21), and A C first wrote *simul* for *sicut*; B reads *impossibile* (207.24); O omits *sic* (207.27). O and M read *alteracione* "alteration" for *augmentacione* (207.28): the print keeps the pair of quantity, augmentation and diminution.
12. "As is made clear elsewhere": not identified; Harris gives no reference, and the Wyclif Society volumes searched have no parallel (cf. the sophismata on *infinitum magnum* and *infinitum parvum* in *De logica*).
13. "Toward the swiftest": *ad velocissimum*, perhaps "up to the swiftest [speed]"; the motion would be infinitely intense though the movable moves however slowly. The "calculator" is one practised in the Oxford calculations of intension and velocity. O reads *coextensionem* for *extensionem* (208.2), in keeping with the coextended humanities; the print stands.
14. "Generated": *genita*, with B C O, against the print's *geminata* "doubled", A's reading (208.15); the principles are produced again with each new humanity. "Now when complete principles": *sed*, the minor, closed by *ergo*. "With these, or with any others whatever, posited": O reads *sive plurimum positis* (or *positivis*) (208.8).
15. "As a man": *ut homo*; or "so that the man would above all be body and soul". A B C read *forent* "they would be" (208.19). "To be that person": *esse*, A B C *est* (208.22), which Harris thinks may stand for *est esse*.
16. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 5, where the Word assuming many humanities would be many men; not *Summa theologiae* III q. 3 a. 7, which concludes "one man" (ad 2: *Petrus et Jesus non sunt unus homo, sed duo homines*; ad 3: *plures homines, et non unus homo*). "As John, Peter": the humanities of John, of Peter.
17. The inference turns Thomas's teaching against the alternative: if the Word with many humanities were one man, his being a man would be one humanity common to his being Jesus and his being Peter, a common humanity in place of singular ones.
18. "The assumption": *assumptum*, the logician's premiss (the minor, that complete forms multiply supposits), not the assumption of a nature. "From the greater or from the equal": *a maiori vel pari*, the argument from a stronger or like case. "A supposit's being a man": cf. 203.22–23 (*personam esse hominem*).
19. The case: the Word assumes many embryos and the humanities are later completed by souls; the later souls make him another thing, and what is left for them to make is only "that man", another man. B reads *humanitatibus* (209.11); C *quin* for *quid* (209.14).
20. "Of another mode": A B C read *alterum* "another one" for *alterius modi* (209.17), O with the print; the reply would make the souls accidental forms, against their being of the same kind as the souls that animate bodies. O reads *christum* for *in quantum* (209.19).
21. Aristotle, *De anima* II.6 (418a17–20): number is among the common sensibles. *Sensibile commune*: the "common sensible" of the schools, perceived by more than one sense.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference l Cor. xv. 47. (206.14).

Part 3: Every animal assumed, the continuous giant, and Christ as his own parts

Harris pp. 209.27–213.28

¶1 209.27–211.11

[209]Item posito quod quodlibet suppositum generis animalis servatis[5] omnibus positivis sit Verbo ypostatice copulatum; patet quod non exinde periret genus, species, vel differencia animalis; et per consequens non omne animal foret Christus; ex quo per locum a sufficienti similitudine sequitur quod Verbum assumendo multas humanitates non foret solummodo unus homo. Assumptum patet eo quod Verbum non[6] necessitatur ex unione ypostatica corrumpere aliquod positivum; [210]et, cum genus, species, et differencia sint plurimum positiva, patet quod non ex assumpcione oportet illas exstinguere; et cum non sit genus in actu nisi habeat species et illa supposita, que specifice[1] distinguantur, patet ex casu possibili illis quos alloquor[2] de facto posito; consequens est quod sint multa individua[3] distincta specifice; non ergo omne individuum[3] de genere vivencium foret Christus; maiorem enim distinccionem oportet esse individuis quam in formis communibus, cum omnia inferiora in suis

Again, supposing that every supposit of the genus animal, with all [its] positive [features] preserved, is joined hypostatically to the Word: it is clear that the genus, species or difference of animal would not perish from that; and consequently not every animal would be Christ; from which, by the topic from sufficient likeness, it follows that the Word, by assuming many humanities, would not be only one man.[1] The assumption is clear in that the Word is not necessitated by the hypostatic union to corrupt anything positive; [210]and, since genus, species and difference are very much positive, it is clear that there is no need to extinguish them by the assumption; and since there is no genus in act unless it has species and those supposits which are distinguished in species, it is clear from the case, possible for those whom I address, posited as fact: the consequent is that there are many individuals distinct in species; not every individual of the genus of living things, therefore, would be Christ; for there must be greater

communioribus uniuntur. Nec potest dici quod manet genus animalis cum suis divisivis differenciis sicut prius, cum indifferenter omnis homo sit asinus, leo, capra, et sic de aliis, si Christus non sit multa animalia racione multarum animalitatum ypostatice coniunctarum. Ubi ergo foret genus distinctum a specie vel individuo secundum communioritatem, si idem individuum cuiuslibet generis animalis sit commune cuilibet animali? Ubi eciam tunc[4] foret differencia inter racionale et irracionale, rudibile et irrudibile[5] et ita de ceteris,[6] si omne animal racionale sit animal irracionale, rudibile sit irrudibile, et ita de[6] omnibus aliis[7] differenciis assignandis? Omnes ergo termini per se in predicamento substancie nec predicarentur in quid, nec de rebus distinctis specifice cum omne animal sit omne animal, nec forma aliqua est sufficiens medium distinguendi unum suppositum vel naturaliter[8] ab altero eo quod species permixte de se mutuo predicantur; et cum[9] tam species differant[9] quam individua speciei, videtur quod ydemptificatis speciebus individua ydemptificari poterunt. Nec valet dicere quod ex assumpcione huiusmodi species corrumpuntur, quia omnis species, que prius fuit, habet omnem singularem essenciam, quam prius habuit; et Verbum nedum est suppositum hominis sed bovis, leonis, et cuiuslibet animalis. Cum ergo sufficit ad existenciam [211]speciei quod unum suppositum illius nature[1] existat,[2] sequitur quod manet omnis species, que perante. Non enim est hic fallacia accidentis—quicquid fuerit in principio huius[3] hore est modo; species leonis est[4] aliquid quod fuit in principio[5] illius hore; ergo omnis talis species est modo—. Et cum[6] nulla possunt nunc plus differre et nunc minus, manencia omnino immota; sequitur quod, sicut nature per ante differebant specifice, sic et modo; et per consequens modo est species. Confirmatur ex hoc quod omnis species est natura,[7] omnis[7] natura animalis, que prius fuit, modo est; ergo[8] omnis species, que prius fuit, modo est.[8]

distinction in individuals than in common forms, since all lower things are united in their more common [ones].[2] Nor can it be said that the genus animal remains with its dividing differences as before, since, indifferently, every man would be an ass, a lion, a goat, and so of the others, if Christ is not many animals by reason of many animalities hypostatically conjoined. Where, then, would the genus be, distinct from the species or the individual by greater commonness, if the same individual of every genus of animal is common to every animal? Where, too, would the difference then be between rational and irrational, able to bray and unable to bray, and so of the rest, if every rational animal is an irrational animal, the able-to-bray is the unable-to-bray, and so of all the other differences to be assigned?[3] All the terms, therefore, that are of themselves in the category of substance would be predicated neither *in quid* nor of things distinct in species, since every animal would be every animal; nor is any form a sufficient middle term for distinguishing one supposit even naturally from another, in that the species are predicated of one another in a mixed way; and since species differ just as the individuals of a species do, it seems that, the species being identified, the individuals could be identified.[4] Nor does it avail to say that by such an assumption the species are corrupted, because every species that was before has every singular essence that it had before; and the Word is not only the supposit of man but of ox, of lion, and of every animal. Since, therefore, it suffices for the existence [211]of a species that one supposit of that nature exist, it follows that every species remains that [was] before. For there is no fallacy of accident here: "whatever was at the beginning of this hour is now; the species of lion is something that was at the beginning of that hour; therefore every such species is now."[5] And since no things can differ now more and now less while remaining wholly unmoved, it follows that, as the natures differed in species before, so also now; and consequently species is now. This is confirmed from this, that every species is a nature; every nature of animal that was before is now; therefore every species that was before is now.[6]

¶2 211.12–212.3

[211]Item Deus potest de omnibus hominibus per viam continuacionis facere unum compositum, sicut infinitum magnum et infinitum parvum potest Deus facere hominem. Quo posito[9] videtur primo quod homo potest infinitum maiorari et alias infinitum minorari sine hoc quod quantitatem aliquam adquirat vel deperdat[10]; ut posito quod Verbum quotlibet humanitates seorsum assumat et omnes illas stante unione continuet, et[11] iterum discontinuet, secundum quod exigit

Again, God can, by way of continuation, make one composite out of all men, just as God can make a man infinitely great and infinitely small. This being postulated, it seems, first, that a man can be infinitely increased and at another time infinitely diminished without acquiring or losing any quantity; as, supposing that the Word assume any number of humanities separately and, while the union stands, make them all continuous, and

conclusio probanda. Nam Christus fuit ante unionem homo medie quantitatis et post continuacionem erit monstrum grandissimum et deforme; et cum ex continuacione nulla quantitas secundum se totam adquiritur, sequitur propositum. Et idem contingit arguere de alteracione; ut potencia[12] naturali tam corporis quam anime tale quidem corpus multiplex sufficeret quantumlibet distanter sentire, et quantumlibet tarde[13] moderando[14] spacium longissimum[15] in brevi[14] describere. Cum ergo cuiuslibet partis illius corporis aliqua pars sit pars corporis Christi, sequitur quod hoc totum corpus sit corpus [212]Christi; et per consequens Christus, postquam[1] fuit communis stature, iam est ita magnus sicut hoc corpus. Ex quo inferenda sunt alia.

again discontinuous, according as the conclusion to be proved requires.[7] For Christ was, before the union, a man of middling quantity, and after the continuation will be a most huge and misshapen monster; and since by continuation no quantity is acquired as a whole, the proposition follows. And the same can be argued of alteration: as, by the natural power both of body and of soul, such a manifold body would suffice to sense however distantly, and, moderating however slowly, to describe a very long space in a short [time].[8] Since, then, of each part of that body some part is a part of Christ's body, it follows that this whole body is the body [212]of Christ; and consequently Christ, after he was of common stature, is now as great as this body. From which other things are to be inferred.[9]

¶3 212.4–213.14

[212]2°. videtur sequi quod Christus sit quotlibet partes sue quantitative. Nam ante continuacionem Christus fuit compositum ex qualibet istarum animarum et suo corpore; ex quo sequitur quod Christus sit multe partes quantitative. Nec valet dicere quod natura humana, et non homo, sit pars hominis; quia partes quantitative corporis[2] sunt substancie per se in genere, quod negatur de humanitate; ergo sicut monstrum quod est homo geminus et a dyafragmate versus superius habet hominem eius partem, sic et Christus in casu posito. Non enim desinit esse completus homo secundum illam humanitatem propter continuacionem; sicut nec inciperet esse homo secundum istam humanitatem propter discontinuacionem. Concesso autem consequente videtur primo, si Christus sit quotlibet partes sue, quod multa quorum quodlibet[3] est Christus; et cum Christus non sit aliud quam homo, sequitur quod multi homines sunt Christus et non propter continuacionem; ergo ante continuacionem fuit Christus multi homines; et non, si non ex assumpcione multarum humanitatum; ergo posito quod Christus multas humanitates assumat, consequitur ipsum esse multos homines, quod est intentum. Nec valet dicere quod Christus non habet partes huiusmodi, cum ex illis denominatur magnus, agens, beatus, et sic de formis ceteris que partibus suis insunt. Et si dicatur quod omnes sunt Christus et non pars eius, sed idem cum toto, tunc restat dicere secundum quam humanitatem Christus a Deo maioratur; cum non sit possibile humanitatem aggregari ex multis humanitatibus, nisi illa a qualibet illarum differat. Et patet quod secundum nullam illarum humatatum parcialium maioratur; ergo secundum illam totalem; et per consequens est nova humanitas sine correspondenti [213]anima generata; quod est impossibile; cum nec corpus organicum correspondens tali humanitati fingi poterit, nec spiritus[1] implens materiam; nec corpus est maius

Second, it seems to follow that Christ is any number of his quantitative parts. For before the continuation Christ was a composite of each of these souls and its body; from which it follows that Christ is many quantitative parts. Nor does it avail to say that the human nature, and not the man, is the part of a man; because the quantitative parts of a body are substances of themselves in a genus, which is denied of the humanity; therefore, as the monster that is a twin man, and from the diaphragm upward has a man [as] its part, so too Christ in the case supposed.[10] For he does not cease to be a complete man as to that humanity on account of the continuation; just as neither would he begin to be a man as to this humanity on account of the discontinuation. And, the consequent being granted, it seems, first, if Christ is any number of his parts, that [he is] many [things] of which each is Christ; and since Christ is nothing other than a man, it follows that many men are Christ, and not on account of the continuation; therefore before the continuation Christ was many men; and not [so], if not from the assumption of many humanities; therefore, supposing that Christ assume many humanities, it follows that he is many men, which is the point intended.[11] Nor does it avail to say that Christ does not have such parts, since from them he is named great, acting, blessed, and so of the other forms which are in his parts. And if it be said that all are Christ and not a part of him, but the same with the whole, then it remains to say as to which humanity Christ is made greater by God; since it is not possible for a humanity to be aggregated from many humanities unless it differs from each of them. And it is clear that he is made greater as to none of those partial humanities; therefore as to that total [one]; and consequently there is a new humanity generated without a corresponding [213]soul; which is

propter iuxtaposicionem corporis quod non incidit in partem sui. Patet itaque logicis in casu posito quod ad omnem punctum Christi est non gradus augmentacionis, cum non sit motus nisi subiectum aliquod primo moveatur. Et hoc replicatur consequenter contra hoc Euclidis principium, 'omne totum est maius sua parte quantitativa.' Et posito[2] quod Christus assumat[3] omnem naturam animalis; tunc post continuacionem omnium illorum factus monstrum foret alicubi non monstrum, et sic foret multe res, et per consequens multe substancie; quia aliter non foret pars sui, nisi pars et totum ponant in numerum.

impossible; since neither could an organic body corresponding to such a humanity be feigned, nor a spirit filling the matter; nor is a body greater on account of the juxtaposition of a body that does not fall into its part.[12] It is clear, therefore, to logicians, in the case supposed, that at every point of Christ there is no degree of augmentation, since there is no motion unless some subject is first moved. And this is rejoined consequently against this principle of Euclid's: "every whole is greater than its quantitative part."[13] And supposing that Christ assume every nature of animal: then, after the continuation of all of them, having been made a monster, he would somewhere not be a monster, and so would be many things, and consequently many substances; because otherwise he would not be a part of himself, unless part and whole make up a number.[14]

¶4 213.15–213.28

[213]3° potest poni casus de Dei omnipotencia quod infinitas naturas corporeas adaptet infinitis animabus, quarum prima sit dupla ad secundum,[4] et sic in infinitum; et omnibus illis continuatis assumat quamlibet in ypostaticam unionem. Tunc videtur quod Christus sit infinite partes sue, et sic infinitum parvus, et per consequens maior seipso; et cum, ubicunque fuerit, est eque magnus racione multiplicacionis concomitancie, ut patet de eucaristia; sequitur quod in quotlibet locis est minor seipso. Ymo cum infinitas animas Deus potest producere et facere eas incommunicantes[5] materias[6] actuare, sequitur quod sit possibile[7] quamlibet partem quantitativam Christi esse Christum; quod est impossibile, cum tunc non forent multe partes sui quantitative, ut tactum est superius proximo capitulo.

Third, a case can be posited from God's omnipotence: that he fit infinite bodily natures to infinite souls, of which the first is double the second, and so to infinity; and, all of them being made continuous, assume each into hypostatic union. Then it seems that Christ is infinitely [many of] his parts, and so infinitely small, and consequently greater than himself; and since, wherever he is, he is equally great by reason of the multiplication of concomitance, as is clear of the eucharist, it follows that in any number of places he is less than himself.[15] Indeed, since God can produce infinite souls and make them actuate matters that do not communicate, it follows that it is possible for each quantitative part of Christ to be Christ; which is impossible, since then there would not be many quantitative parts of him, as was touched on above in the preceding chapter.[16]

Notes

1. "The topic from sufficient likeness": if the Word, joined to every animal, does not make every animal Christ, then by like reasoning many humanities do not make him only one man. "Preserved": *servatis*; B reads *sequitur*, and A first wrote *seiuat* (209.28).
2. "The assumption": *assumptum*, the logician's premiss (that the union destroys nothing positive), not the assumption of a nature; *assumpcio* in the next clause is the assumption of the nature. A B C omit *non* (209.33), which the argument needs; O with the print. "Possible for those whom I address": the case is possible on the adversaries' terms; O reads *alloquitur* (210.5). A B C read *specificate* for *specifice* (210.4); O omits *distincta … individuum* (210.6–7).
3. "By greater commonness": *secundum communioritatem*, the genus's being more common than its species. "Able to bray": *rudibile*, the stock difference of the ass; A B C read *hinibile* "able to neigh" for *irrudibile* (210.18), and omit *ceteris … de* (210.18–20) and *aliis* (210.20). A B read *tunc ergo*, O *insuper*, for *tunc* (210.17).
4. *In quid*: predicated as what a thing is, as against *in quale*. "Even naturally": *vel naturaliter*; M reads *numeraliter* "numerically" (210.24), the print stands. "Species differ just as the individuals of a species do": *cum tam species differant quam individua*, or "as much as"; O reads *cum species plus differant* "since species differ more" (210.26), which would run against "greater distinction in individuals than in common forms" (210.8). The print stands.
5. The syllogism shows the species persist through the assumption: the major is about things, the minor puts the species under it, and the conclusion is drawn without the fallacy of accident. B reads *speciei* for *nature* (211.1), A B C *existit* (211.1); O *illius* for *huius* (211.3), *eciam fuit* for *est* and omits *in principio* (211.4–5).
6. O omits *natura omnis* (211.10); A B omit the conclusion *ergo … est* (211.11). C reads *tamen*, O *tunc*, for *cum* (211.6).

7. "This being postulated": *petito*, with C O, against the print's *posito* "supposed" (211.15). A B C read *perdat* for *deperdat* (211.17) and *ut* for *et* (211.19). "Continuation": making the bodies one continuous body.
8. *Potencia* (CONTEXTUAL) is "power" here, the natural capacity of body and soul. "Moderating however slowly … a very long space": the line is uncertain in the witnesses: A B C omit *tarde* (211.27), O omits *moderando … brevi* (211.27–28), and for *longissimum*, Harris's own word, A B C read *longis*, which does not construe; he thinks *longissimum* or *longum* necessary (211.28). The English follows the print. O reads *poñ* for *potencia* (211.25).
9. A reads *preterquam* "except" for *postquam* (212.1).
10. "Substances of themselves in a genus": a quantitative part (a hand, a half) is a substance in the category; a humanity is not, so the part of a man must be a man. The twin monster: one body from the diaphragm down, two men above, each a part of the whole. B omits *corporis* (212.9).
11. "[He is] many [things] of which each is Christ": the clause has no verb; perhaps a word is lost. "Not [so], if not from": he was many men only by the assumption of many humanities.
12. "Humanities": the print's *humatatum* (212.32–33) for *humanitatum*. A B C read *species* for *spiritus* (213.3). A body set beside another does not enlarge it unless it becomes its part.
13. Euclid, *Elements* I, common notion 5, in Campanus's Latin the ninth *communis animi conceptio*, *omne totum est maius sua parte* (Harris: i. axiom 9), "the whole is greater than the part"; Wyclif adds "quantitative". "Rejoined": *replicatur*, raised against an answer; continuation would make the whole no greater than its part.
14. "Make up a number": *ponant in numerum*, count as two. O reads *proposito* for *posito* (213.9) and *assumendo* for *assumat* (213.10).
15. "Double the second": the parts diminish by halves to infinity, as the proportional parts of a continuum. B C read *duplam* (213.17). "Multiplication of concomitance": as Christ's whole body is under each part of the host. "Infinitely small": *infinitum parvus*, the print's paradox, as at 207.31.
16. "The preceding chapter": chapter 11, p. 200.24–30, where a body each of whose quantitative parts were the same as every other would make the part a non-part. O reads *communicantes* "that communicate" for *incommunicantes* (213.24); B adds *creature* after *materias* (213.25); A reads *impossibile* for *possibile* (213.25).

Part 4: Thomas's argument from the name "man", and what "man" would signify

Harris pp. 213.29–216.7

¶1 213.29–216.7

[213]Item ex evidencia sancti Thome videtur quod Christus assumendo multas humanitates sit multi homines. Nam omne nomen appellativum, cuius principalia significata[8] multiplicantur, predicatur[9] vere[9] pluraliter de eisdem. Sed hoc nomen homo primo et principaliter significat qualitatem [214]substancialem ut humanitatem: ergo multiplicatis humanitatibus in Christo, et[1] homo vere predicatur pluraliter de eodem.[1] Maior ex hoc est evidens quod multiplicatis significatis multiplicanda sunt nomina significatorum; ut si tres persone divine haberent multas divinitates, tunc essent multi dii;[2] et sic de similibus quibuscunque. Minor autem patet ex hoc quod substancia secunda secundum Aristotelem in Predicamentis capitulo De Substancia significat quale-quid hoc est, substancialem[3] qualitatem.[3] Ut patet in methaphisica; homo enim principaliter significat humanitatem, album albedinem. Concesso ergo consequente et posito quod Verbum assumat omnes humanitates; consequens est quod sint multi homines ex assumpto; et cum Verbum sit omnis homo, sequitur quod Verbum sit multi homines. Negato vero assumpto de talibus concretis, sed concesso quod principaliter significant talia supposita, oportet dicere consequenter quod iste terminus homo[4] omne quod est de sua primaria imposicione significat; et per idem quodlibet nomen appellativum vel concretum quodcunque significat.[5] Nam omnem personam divinam homo de imposicione sua primaria significat, et cum hoc singulas creaturas; ergo conclusio. Maior patet ex

Again, from the evidence of St Thomas it seems that Christ, by assuming many humanities, is many men. For every appellative name whose principal significates are multiplied is truly predicated in the plural of them. Now this name "man" first and principally signifies a substantial quality, [214]as humanity: therefore, when the humanities are multiplied in Christ, "man" is truly [said] in the plural of him.[1] The major is evident from this, that when the significates are multiplied, the names of the significates are to be multiplied; as, if the three divine persons had many divinities, they would then be many gods; and so of any like [cases]. And the minor is clear from this, that second substance, according to Aristotle in the *Categories*, the chapter *On Substance*, signifies a "what-of-a-sort" (*quale quid*), that is, a substantial quality; as is clear in the *Metaphysics*; for "man" principally signifies humanity, [as] "white" whiteness.[2] The consequent being granted, then, and supposing that the Word assume all humanities, the consequent is that there are many men from what is assumed; and since the Word is every man, it follows that the Word is many men.[3] But if the assumption is denied of such concrete [terms], but it is granted that they principally signify such supposits, one must say consequently that this term "man" signifies, by its primary imposition, everything that is; and by the same token that any appellative or concrete name whatever [so] signifies. For "man", by its primary imposition, signifies every divine

hoc quod omne suppositum quod potest esse homo, signum significat; omnis persona divina potest esse homo; ergo etc. Et per idem bovem, asinum, leonem, et quamlibet speciem creature; cum omnis natura singularis huiusmodi potest a Verbo assumi stante unione personali ad hominem; quo posito de facto omnem talem naturam significaret, quia omnem hominem significaret;[6] omnis talis species foret homo;[6] ergo omnem talem speciem significaret; et cum nullum nomen significat universaliter formas specificas nisi eo ipso significaverit omnes formas individuas sub eis contentas, sequitur conclusio. Certum est tamen quod non fuit de intencione imponencium terminos ad significandum, [215]quod iste terminus homo significaret deitatem; et ita de quolibet designando, quia tunc essent omnes tales termini analogi[1] et equivoci. Perirent eciam superioritas et inferioritas terminorum, et multi sillogismi in terminis substancialibus per fallaciam accidentis; ut sic arguendo— quicquid nascetur ex homine non eternaliter existebat; iste[2] homo nascetur ex homine; ergo non eternaliter existebat[2]; et sic de similibus. Ymo non est verisimile terminum significare philosopho illud quod nescit sibi significare, ymo quod credit non posse esse hominem. Sed constat quod gentiles philosophi assererent[3] Deum non directe significari per terminos tales specificos, quia tunc concederent Deum posse[4] esse hominem; ergo[5] non significaverat illis Deum; et per idem nec nobis; cum univoce nobis significaret sicut illis nisi[6] per accidens, quia contingit humanitatem esse Deum. Aliter enim cognoscerent et crederent omnes philosophi in confuso Deum fore hominem in hoc universali—omnis homo erit homo—et nunquam negarent differencias divisivas generi de se invicem predicari, ut sic—omnis homo est racionalis; asinus est homo; ergo est racionalis—. Sic enim concedunt theologi quod homo creavit mundum, quia persona Verbi, que est homo, creavit mundum. Pono itaque quod in mente philosophi ignorantis incarnacionem sit ista intencio specifica 'homo' naturaliter significans hominem et solum hominem. Et pono quod stante illa unione Deus assumat quamcunque naturam specificam animalis; et patet ex dictis et dicendis quod homo foret in qualibet specie animalis; et sic cum veris[7] sequitur quod ista intencio homo continue naturaliter significans significaret asinum, leonem etc, sicut modo significat; et ita, ut arguitur in materia de ydemptificacione, quilibet terminus eque indifferenter significaret quidlibet. Quo dato non foret negandum quod homo est asinus; et sic quandocumque [216]predicatur positivum de aliquo positivo, quod idem est directe significatum per predicatum et subiectum, quod sufficit ad verificandum enunciaciones huiusmodi cum paribus que ponuntur. Nec valet dicere quod nullus talis terminus

person, and with this the single creatures; therefore the conclusion. The major is clear from this, that the sign signifies every supposit that can be a man; every divine person can be a man; therefore etc.[4] And by the same token [it signifies] ox, ass, lion and every species of creature; since every such singular nature can be assumed by the Word while the personal union to the man stands; and, this being posited in fact, it would signify every such nature, because it would signify every man; every such species would be a man; therefore it would signify every such species; and since no name signifies the forms of species universally unless by that very fact it has signified all the individual forms contained under them, the conclusion follows. Yet it is certain that it was not of the intention of those who imposed terms to signify [215]that this term "man" should signify the Godhead; and so of any [term] designating, because then all such terms would be analogous and equivocal.[5] There would perish too the superiority and inferiority of terms, and many syllogisms in substantial terms [would fail] by the fallacy of accident, as by arguing thus: "whatever will be born of man did not exist eternally; this man will be born of man; therefore he did not exist eternally"; and so of like [ones].[6] Indeed, it is not likely that a term signifies to a philosopher what he does not know it signifies to him, indeed what he believes cannot be a man. Now it is evident that the pagan philosophers would assert that God is not directly signified by such terms of species, because then they would grant "God can be a man"; therefore it had not signified God to them; and by the same token not to us; since it would signify to us univocally as to them, except by accident, because it happens that the humanity is God.[7] For otherwise all the philosophers would know and believe indistinctly "God will be a man" in this universal, "every man will be a man", and would never deny that the differences dividing a genus are predicated of one another, thus: "every man is rational; an ass is a man; therefore it is rational." For so the theologians grant "man created the world", because the person of the Word, which is man, created the world.[8] I posit, then, that in the mind of a philosopher ignorant of the incarnation there is this intention of the species, "man", naturally signifying man and only man. And I posit that, while that union stands, God assume any nature of the species of animal whatever; and it is clear from what has been said and is to be said that man would be in every species of animal; and so, with true [premisses], it follows that this intention "man", continuing to signify naturally, would signify ass, lion, etc., as it signifies now; and so, as is argued in the matter of identification,

naturam significat; cum sic iste terminus deus de sua intencione primaria hominem et omne assertibile significat.

any term would signify anything equally indifferently.[9] Which being given, it would not be to be denied that a man is an ass; and so, whenever a positive is predicated of some positive, [it would not be to be denied] [216] that the same thing is directly signified by predicate and subject, which suffices for making such statements true, with the like [conditions] that are posited. Nor does it avail to say that no such term signifies a nature; since in that way this term "god", by its primary intention, signifies man and every assertible.[10]

Notes

1. Thomas's argument from the signification of names, as in his *Scriptum super Sententiis* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 5 ad 2, where the number of a substantive term follows the plurality of the nature it signifies, not of the supposits. "Now this name": *sed*, the minor, closed by *ergo*. "'Man' is truly [said] in the plural of him": *est homo vere pluraliter de eodem*, with O, against the print's *et homo vere predicatur pluraliter de eodem* (214.2–3), which no manuscript has: A B C O all read *est homo*, and none *predicatur* (A B *est homo nature personalis personaliter*, C *est homo vere personalis personaliter*). O reads *significancia* for *significata* (213.31); A B C *vere probatur* for *predicatur vere* (213.32).
2. Aristotle, *Categories* 5 (3b13–21): second substance signifies "a certain qualification" of substance (while *white* signifies quality only, 3b19). "As is clear in the *Metaphysics*": the reference is not identified; Wyclif states the same doctrine in *De compositione hominis* 2 (ed. Beer, p. 23), *album solam qualitatem significat, sicut homo humanitatem*, but refers it there to the *Categories*. O reads *substanciale qualitate* (214.9); B omits *dii* "gods" (214.6).
3. "From what is assumed": *ex assumpto*, from the humanities assumed; or "from the assumption", the premiss just granted. "The Word is every man": on the case that he assumes all humanities.
4. "The assumption": *assumptum*, the logician's premiss (the minor, that "man" principally signifies a substantial quality), not the assumption of a nature. The adversary who denies it of concrete terms, and makes them signify supposits, must grant that "man" signifies every divine person and every creature. A B C omit *homo* (214.17); B reads *signat* (214.19).
5. "Of the intention of those who imposed terms": the first imposition of a name, by those who fixed its sense. B omits *omnis … homo* (214.28–29).
6. The sample syllogism is valid on the adversaries' terms only if "man" does not signify the eternal Word; if it did, the minor "this man will be born of man" would fail of the Word and the conclusion would be the fallacy of accident.
7. "Would assert": *assererent*; A B C read *asseruerunt* "asserted" (215.11). "Now it is evident": *sed*, the minor, closed by *ergo*. "Except by accident, because it happens that the humanity is God": the term would signify God to us only by an accident of fact (the union), not by its imposition. B omits *posse* (215.13) and reads *non* for *nisi* (215.15); A B omit *ergo* (215.13).
8. "Which is man": *que est homo*, bare predication of the person of the Word; the theologians' "man created the world" is true of the person, not by the term's imposition.
9. "This intention of the species, 'man'": *intencio specifica*, the concept of the species in the philosopher's mind. "With true [premisses]": *cum veris*; A B C read *viris* "men" (215.28). "The matter of identification": probably the arguments, reported and rejected in chapter 9 (p. 158.10–23), that anything can be identified with anything, *quidlibet potest ydemptificari cuilibet*.
10. "[It would not be to be denied] that the same thing": the clause *quod idem est …* depends on *non foret negandum*; or, "whenever a positive is predicated of a positive, [it is because] the same thing is directly signified". "Assertible": what a proposition asserts.

Chapter 13

Part 1: If he assumed every humanity: one man, or many men?

Harris pp. 216.0–220.23

¶1 216.0–216.0

[216][Confirmat aliorum sentencias quod, si omnes humanitates assumeret, tunc nec foret unus homo nec multi homines, sed et unicus atque multi; et sic concordat modernorum sentencias cum antiquis. Assuming, as proved in the last chapter (p. 203), the truth of the dictum of St. Thomas that if Christ assumed many humanities, He would be many men: the modern view is supported that He assumed all humanities, and was thereby both THE ONE MAN and also many men; and thus opinions are reconciled and the unity of truth established.]

[It confirms the teachings of others, that if he assumed all humanities, then he would be neither one man nor many men, but both one and many; and so it brings the teachings of the moderns into accord with the ancients.]

¶2 216.8–216.12

[216]Habito quod Christus assumendo multas humanitates foret consequenter multi homines, ut sentenciat sanctus Thomas; probatur quod, si omnes humanitates assumeret, foret unicus homo tantum, ut recentissimi scribentes asserunt satis vere.

Given that Christ, by assuming many humanities, would consequently be many men, as Saint Thomas pronounces,[1] it is proved that, if he assumed all humanities, he would be a single man only, as the most recent writers assert, truly enough.

¶3 216.13–217.9

[216]Nam hoc posito, omnis homo foret omnis homo; ergo foret solummodo unus homo. Antecedens patet per exponentes, cum homo Christus sit omnis homo; ut patet per conversionem, omnis homo est Christus. Nam si in tali casu non omnis homo sit Christus, cum nulla natura assumpta sit homo, ut dicunt concorditer; sequitur quod aliqua[1] persona de specie humana non sit Christus, et illam personam oportet in casu posito dicere Verbum Dei. Sed constat quod illa [217]est Christus; cum ergo Verbum sit omnis homo, quod quidem Verbum est aliquis homo; sequitur quod aliquis homo sit omnis homo; et tamen[1] nichil est homo nisi illud Verbum; sequitur ex posicione[2] quod omnis homo sit omnis homo. Quo habito[3] probo quod repugnat huic multos homines esse. Nam si duo homines sunt, tunc[4] duo homines sunt[4] duo homines, et per consequens sunt duo homines differentes, et sic unus illorum non est reliquus; consequens contra datum, cum omnis homo sit omnis homo.

For, this posited, every man would be every man; therefore there would be only one man. The antecedent is clear through the exponents,[2] since the man Christ is every man; as is clear by conversion: every man is Christ. For if in such a case not every man is Christ, since no assumed nature is a man, as they say with one accord, it follows that some person of the human species is not Christ, and that person must, in the case posited, be called the Word of God. Now it is evident that that [person] [217]is Christ; since, therefore, the Word is every man, which Word indeed is some man, it follows that some man is every man; and yet nothing is a man except that Word; it follows from the position[3] that every man is every man. With this established, I prove that it is incompatible with this that there be many men. For if there are two men, then two men are two men, and consequently they are two different men, and so one of them is not the other; the consequent is against what was granted, since every man is every man.

¶4 217.10–217.25

[217]Item si Verbum in tali casu sit multi homines[5] propter multitudinem formarum, quas predicatum significat; tunc forme ille sive nature plurificate essent Verbum; consequens impossibile

Again, if the Word in such a case is many men by reason of the multitude of forms which the predicate signifies, then those forms or natures,

sic dicenti; et consequencia ex hoc deducitur[6] quod predicatum nunquam dicitur pluraliter de subiecto nisi quodlibet illorum pluraliter significatorum per predicatum vere dicatur[7] de subiecto; ut natura divina non est multe persone, nisi quelibet illarum personarum sit deitas.[8] Cum ergo pluralitas in casu posito[9] sit solummodo[10] in naturis, que non sunt homines: videtur[11] quod alienum sit concedere Verbum esse multos homines[11] propter illarum naturarum multitudinem, quarum[12] nulla est homo; ut Petrus non est multa accidencia, licet sit album et musicum, quia tunc esset[13] multe substancie accidentate, et per consequens multi homines, et per idem infinite substancie; et patet prima consequencia[14] eo quod Petrus est precise[15] substancia.

multiplied, would be the Word; a consequent impossible for one who speaks so; and the inference is derived from this: that a predicate is never said in the plural of a subject unless each of the things signified in the plural by the predicate is truly said of the subject; as the divine nature is not many persons unless each of those persons is the Godhead. Since, therefore, the plurality in the case posited is only in natures, which are not men, it seems that it is out of place to grant "the Word is many men" by reason of the multitude of those natures, none of which is a man;[4] as Peter is not many accidents, although he is white and musical, because then he would be many substances subject to accidents, and consequently many men, and by the same token infinitely many substances; and the first inference is clear from the fact that Peter is precisely substance.[5]

¶5 217.26–218.12

[217]Item si Verbum ad multitudinem[16] humanitatum sit multi homines, et omnis homo est individuum; tunc est multa individua, et per consequens multe persone; quod est impossibile. Et consequencia sic probatur. Si Christus est multi homines, et per se homo est substancia; tunc est multe substancie[17] individue racionalis nature non aliene [218]suppositate[1]; et per consequens multe persone; quod foret absurdissimum, quod Deus esset mille persone, ut puta totus populus Christianus; cum ista posicio negat hominem communem. Minus ergo colorate una persona speciei humane[2] foret communicata tot hominibus quot foret omnis et singuli eorundem, quam quod natura specifica foret unum quodque eius suppositum, quia ibi maneret suppositorum distinccio cum ydemptitate nature specifice. Hic autem est idem singularis homo omnium hominum quilibet; et per consequens omnis homo est[3] omnis homo; persona ergo que communicatur tot substanciis ydemptitate[4] non foret incommunicabilis existencie.

Again, if the Word, according to the multitude of humanities, is many men, and every man is an individual, then he is many individuals, and consequently many persons; which is impossible. And the inference is proved thus. If Christ is many men, and a man is of itself a substance, then he is many individual substances of a rational nature not supposited to another,[6] [218]and consequently many persons; which would be most absurd, that God should be a thousand persons, for example the whole Christian people; since this position denies the common man.[7] With less colour, then, would one person of the human species be communicated to as many men as it would be, all and each of them, than that the nature of the species should be each one of its supposits; because there the distinction of supposits would remain together with the identity of the nature of the species. But here the same singular man is each one of all men; and consequently every man is every man; the person, therefore, that is communicated to so many substances by identity would not be of incommunicable existence.[8]

¶6 218.13–218.22

[218]Item si in casu posito Verbum sit multi homines differentes, ut puta Iesus, Petrus, Paulus; tunc illi homines differunt potissime per sua principia intrinseca, scilicet per corpus et animam; sed non in hoc differunt homines; ergo non restat in eis principium differendi. Minor probatur eo quod omnis homo habet omne corpus humanum vel animam suam partem, et per consequens per appropriatas habitaciones talium non est dare distinccionem hominum. Antecedens patet per Doctorem: concedit[5] enim[5] quod Iesus est Petrus, et tamen illi non sunt unus homo, sed duo homines.

Again, if in the case posited the Word is many different men, for example Jesus, Peter, Paul, then those men differ most of all by their intrinsic principles, namely by body and soul; now men do not differ in this; therefore no principle of differing remains in them. The minor is proved from the fact that every man has every human body or soul as his part, and consequently by the appropriated habitations of such things one may not posit a distinction of men. The antecedent is clear through the Doctor: for he grants that Jesus is Peter, and yet those are not one man, but two men.[9]

¶7 218.23–218.32

[218]Ex prima parte sequitur quod Iesus habet corpus et animam Petri tanquam suas partes, et per idem omnem partem qualitativam hominis. Sicut[6] enim conceditur ex posicione[7] quod homo Christus Iesus[8] creavit stellas, quia Verbum, quod est Iesus Christus,[9] sic fecit; et ita de quibuscunque predicatis personalibus, que Verbo conveniunt, cum homo concretum sit terminus personalis; ita concedi debet quod iste idem homo componitur ex corpore Petri et eius anima, sicut Verbum, quod est iste homo, ex eis[10] componitur.[11]

From the first part it follows that Jesus has the body and soul of Peter as his parts, and by the same token every qualitative part of a man. For just as it is granted from the position that the man Christ Jesus created the stars, because the Word, which is Jesus Christ, did so; and so of any personal predicates whatever that agree with the Word, since the concrete "man" is a personal term; so it must be granted that this same man is composed of the body of Peter and his soul, just as the Word, which is this man, is composed of them.[10]

¶8 219.1–219.33

[219]Quoad 2^{dam} partem non video colorem in dicto, nisi per homines appropriate intelligat humanitates; et tunc foret proposicio sibi impossibilis; vel aliter concedat quod Verbum est omnes illi homines; et per consequens, Iesus est Paulus, cum hec nomina personalitatem[1] significant. Sed iste homo non est iste homo, cum tale subiectum cum persona Verbi connotat individuacionem, ab isto corpore et ista anima non personaliter sed simpliciter. Sed tunc videtur concedendum quod iste homo non potest istam naturam dimittere vel aliud corpus et aliam animam assumere; nec quod ille homo fuit, antequam fuit homo; et per consequens non creavit mundum, nec est Deus; et per consequens Verbum non est isti multi homines sicut prius, cum non sit eorum personalis assumpcio; cum tunc persona eterna foret quilibet eorundem. Et perirent tales sillogismi in quocunque modo —omne Verbum divinum est Iesus; omnis homo compositus ex corpore Petri et eius anima est Verbum divinum; ergo omnis homo compositus ex corpore Petri et eius anima est Iesus—. Et sic arguendo in 2do modo prime figure— nullus homo compositus ex corpore Iesu et eius anima est[2] homo Petrus; sed omne Verbum divinum est homo compositus ex corpore Iesu et eius anima[2]; ergo nullum Verbum divinum est homo Petrus—et sic de ceteris quibuslibet sillogismis. Nec tollit[3] ista responsio raciones predictas quin, si[4] Verbum sit multi homines, tunc est multe substancie vel nature, et sic multe persone; et per consequens simpliciter creatura; quod negat posicio. Nam Deus in casu isto est mille[5] res et quelibet earundem, et per consequens quelibet earundem[6] mille verum est Deus; et cum non eternaliter essent Deus, sequitur quod[7] inceperant esse Deus; ex quo sequitur quod[7] sunt creature; et sic Deus esset multe creature et quelibet earundem; quod non sapit,[8] nisi concedatur humanitatem esse[9] Christum.[9]

As to the second part, I see no colour[11] in the saying, unless by "men" he understands, by appropriation, the humanities; and then the proposition would be impossible for him; or else [unless] he grants that the Word is all those men[12]; and consequently Jesus is Paul, since these names signify personality. But this man is not that man, since such a subject, with the person of the Word, connotes individuation from this body and this soul, not in the personal but in the simple way.[13] But then it seems it must be granted that this man cannot lay aside this nature or assume another body and another soul; nor that that man was before he was a man; and consequently he did not create the world, nor is he God; and consequently the Word is not those many men as before, since there is no personal assumption of them; since then the eternal person would be each one of them. And such syllogisms would perish in any mood whatever: "every divine Word is Jesus; every man composed of the body of Peter and his soul is the divine Word; therefore every man composed of the body of Peter and his soul is Jesus". And so, arguing in the second mood of the first figure:[14] "no man composed of the body of Jesus and his soul is the man Peter; now every divine Word is a man composed of the body of Jesus and his soul; therefore no divine Word is the man Peter"; and so of all other syllogisms whatever. Nor does this reply so remove the foregoing arguments but that, if the Word is many men, then he is many substances or natures, and so many persons; and consequently a creature without qualification; which the position denies. For God in this case is a thousand things and each of them, and consequently each of those thousand truly is God; and since they would not eternally be God, it follows that they began to be God; from which it follows that they are creatures; and so God would be many creatures and each of them; which makes no sense, unless it is granted "the humanity is Christ".[15]

¶9 220.1–220.23

[220]Item si Christus in tali casu sit multi homines, tunc dimittendo paulative naturas assumptas multi homines per ordinem desinerent esse Christus; quia dimittendo naturam Petri non remaneret ille homo; quia sic per assumpcionem paulativam non fieret multi homines, sed remaneret precise idem homo. Concesso ergo consequente videtur primo quod aliquid desinit esse Christus, quia aliquis homo, et per consequens natura[1] creata[1] est Christus. Patet deduccio querendo sollicite, quid est illud quod desinit esse Christus. Nam si omnis homo, qui nunc est Christus eternaliter fuit Christus, tunc non multi homines sed solum Deus est Christus. Concesso ergo quod per dimissiones huiusmodi paulativas alique res, quia aliqui homines, desinerent[2] esse Christus; tunc palam sequitur quod multe substancie create forent Christus, cum quelibet illarum rerum, que desinerent esse Christus, non foret natura vel substancia divina, sed alia: et cum non ad dimissionem huiusmodi consequitur alicuius rei corrupcio; sequitur cum veris quod ille res, que desinerent[2] esse Christus, remanerent non-Christus; et non superest que foret talis res derelicta, nisi foret assumpta humanitas; ergo relinquitur[3] concedendum quod humanitas assumpta foret Christus; et hoc videtur michi sequi formaliter si Christus ex unione ypostatica sit multi homines.

Again, if Christ in such a case is many men, then, by his laying aside the assumed natures little by little, many men would, one after another, cease to be Christ; because by laying aside the nature of Peter that man would not remain; because so, by assumption little by little, he would not become many men, but would remain precisely the same man.[16] The consequent, then, being granted, it seems first that something ceases to be Christ, because some man [does], and consequently a created nature is Christ. The deduction is clear by asking carefully what that is which ceases to be Christ. For if every man who now is Christ was eternally Christ, then not many men but God alone is Christ. Granted, then, that by such layings-aside little by little some things, because some men, would cease to be Christ, then it plainly follows that many created substances would be Christ, since each of those things which would cease to be Christ would not be the divine nature or substance, but another: and since on a laying-aside of this kind the corruption of no thing follows, it follows, with true [premisses], that those things which would cease to be Christ would remain non-Christ; and nothing is left that would be such a thing left behind, unless it were the assumed humanity; therefore it remains to be granted that the assumed humanity would be Christ; and this seems to me to follow formally if Christ by the hypostatic union is many men.

Notes

1. Thomas's "many men": *Scriptum super Sententiis* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 5, argued in chapter 12 (not *Summa theologiae* III q. 3 a. 7, which concludes "one man"). In ad 2 and ad 3 Thomas says such a person would be called *duo homines* and *plures homines, et non unus homo* (*verified*). "The most recent writers": the *moderni*, unnamed.
2. "Through the exponents": the propositions into which a proposition is resolved in exposition; here the universal "every man is every man" is resolved into its exponents, given in full at 217.2–4: "some man is every man" and "nothing is a man except that Word", from which "every man is every man" follows. "By conversion": "the man Christ is every man" converted gives "every man is Christ".
3. "From the position": *ex posicione* (217.4, again 218.25–26), with O; A B C read *expositorie* "expositorily" in both places, the expository syllogism, whose singular middle term (*Verbum*) would fit the argument as well. A B C are one family; the print stands. O reads *quod* for *tamen* (217.3).
4. C and O omit *videtur … homines* (217.19–20), which leaves the *cum*-clause without a main verb; the print, with A B, is kept. A B C omit *posito* and read *solum* for *solummodo* (217.18).
5. "Precisely": *precise* (217.25); O omits the word and leaves a gap of three letters, and Harris asks whether *per se* "of itself" should be read. A B C read *est* "he is" for *esset* (217.23) and *conclusio* for *consequencia* (217.25).
6. "Individual substance of a rational nature": Boethius's definition of person (*Contra Eutychen* 3), with the scholastic proviso "not supposited to another", which excludes the assumed humanity. Boethius, PL 64, 1343D: *Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia*; the proviso is not his (*verified*). O omits *substancie* (217.31); B reads *supponente* for *suppositate* (218.1).
7. "The common man": the universal man, the common thing the realist posits (*res communis*); the position under attack denies it, so nothing common is left in which many men could be one but the person itself.
8. "Incommunicable existence": Richard of St Victor's definition of a divine person, *divine nature incommunicabilis existencia* (*De Trinitate* IV.22, PL 196, 945C–D, where it is said of the divine person only; *verified*). A B C omit *humane* (218.4); O omits *est* (218.10).
9. "The Doctor": Thomas, as Harris saw (Notes on 218.21: *Doctorem, apparently Aquinas*), who holds that several assumed humanities make several men: *Scriptum super Sententiis* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 5 ad 2, *haec est vera: Petrus est Jesus; et tamen Petrus et Jesus non sunt unus homo, sed duo homines* (*verified*). The "first part" and "second part" (218.23, 219.1) are these two clauses of his. C omits *concedit enim* (218.21).

10. "From the position": *ex posicione* (218.25–26); A B C *expositorie*, as at 217.4 (note 3). A B read *sic* for *Sicut* (218.25); O omits *Iesus* and *Christus* (218.26–27) and *ex eis*, and adds *ex corpore Petri et eius anima sicut verbum quod est ille homo* after *componitur* (218.31–32).
11. "Colour": a plausible ground (glossary: *color*).
12. *vel aliter concedat* (219.3): read as a second condition under *nisi* ("I see no colour … unless he understands … or else [unless] he grants …"), parallel to *intelligat*; each way out is then closed in turn (an impossible proposition; "Jesus is Paul"). Read as a jussive ("or else let him grant"), the sense is close.
13. "Not in the personal but in the simple way": *non personaliter sed simpliciter* (219.7–8), the pair of supposition (personal against simple, as at 224.20–26), not *simpliciter / secundum quid*: the subject connotes the individuation of a nature from this body and this soul, not of the person. "This man is not that man": *iste homo non est iste homo*, the reply Wyclif puts in the defender's mouth.
14. The first syllogism is in the first mood of the first figure (Barbara); the second mood is Celarent, with a universal negative major. Both are valid in form, and both fail on the position, whose premisses are all true of the one Word.
15. "Which makes no sense": *quod non sapit*; O *capit* (219.32). A B C read *multe* for *mille* (219.28); O omits *inceperant … quod* (219.30–31) and reads *humanitas . . . Christus* (219.33), the nominative "the humanity … Christ", with the same sense.
16. The second *quia* gives the ground of the first by symmetry: if laying aside Peter's nature left the same man, then assuming natures one by one would likewise never make him many men. B reads *nulla creatura* for *natura creata* (220.8), "no creature is Christ"; O *desiverint* (220.13, 220.19); B C *derelinquitur* (220.21).
How the Latin of this passage was established
- None.

Part 2: The three teachings agree; why neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit can assume a humanity

Harris pp. 220.24–223.16

¶1 220.24–221.3

[220]Propter tales evidencias dicit Doctor Subtilis super 3° Sententiarum Distinccione prima Questione 3ª quod, si Christus multas humanitates assumpserit, non esset multi homines nec unicus homo; sed et istud[4] debet catholicus concedere tanquam sequens. Nam Christus non esset unicus homo, si multas humanitates assumpserit iuxta[5] proximo capitulo declarata; nec esset multi homines iuxta proxime replicata; ergo conclusio. Certum est tamen quod esset homo, si sic esset. Nam si essent multe uniones ypostatice humanitatum ad Verbum, tunc aliqua humanitas foret ypostatice copulata; et omnis talis unio ponit secundum [221]communicacionem ydiomatum Verbum esse hominem; ergo hoc posito Deus foret unus homo, et per idem multi homines.

Because of such evidences the Subtle Doctor says, on the third [book] of the *Sentences*, distinction 1, question 3, that if Christ had assumed many humanities, he would be neither many men nor a single man;[1] and this too the catholic ought to grant, as following. For Christ would not be a single man, if he had assumed many humanities, according to what was made clear in the last chapter; nor would he be many men, according to what has just been rehearsed; therefore the conclusion. Yet it is certain that he would be a man, if it were so. For if there were many hypostatic unions of humanities to the Word, then some humanity would be hypostatically joined; and every such union posits, according to the [221]communication of idioms, "the Word is a man"; therefore, this posited, God would be one man, and by the same token many men.

¶2 221.4–221.17

[221]Item impossibile est Deum esse hominem postquam non fuit homo, nisi per novam ypostaticam unionem. Sed, dimissis omnibus humanitatibus assumptis usque ad unam, foret Verbum homo sine nova ypostatica unione: ergo per ante erat stante ista unione continue idem homo. Si enim Verbum omnem humanitatem assumeret, non exinde periret sed perficeretur species humana, ut patet ex dictis; sed cum non posset[1] esse species hominis sine individuo hominis, quia destructis primis[2] substanciis[2] impossibile est aliquod aliorum remanere; sequitur quod illo posito foret homo aliquis singularis nullus si non Christus; ergo illo posito Christus foret unus homo. Quod ego

Again, it is impossible for God to be a man after he was not a man, except through a new hypostatic union. Now, all the assumed humanities being laid aside down to one, the Word would be a man without a new hypostatic union: therefore beforehand, while that union stood, he was continuously the same man. For if the Word assumed every humanity, the human species would not thereby perish but be perfected, as is clear from what has been said; now since there could not be a species of man without an individual of man, because when the first substances are destroyed it is impossible for any of the others to remain,[2] it follows that, this posited, there would be

non verto in dubium; sed credo quod ex Spiritu sancto diversificate sunt iste tres sentencie per locum a sufficienti divisione.

no singular man if not Christ; therefore, this posited, Christ would be one man. Which I do not call into doubt; but I believe that by the Holy Spirit these three teachings have been made diverse by the topic from sufficient division.[3]

¶3 221.18–221.26

[221]Quarum prima, ut sanctus Thomas cum suis sequacibus, dicit, quod Christus assumendo multas humanitates foret multi homines consequenter: 2da opinio modernorum loquencium dicit quod Christus ·hoc posito foret solummodo solus homo: 3^{a} Doctoris subtilis dicit quod hoc posito nec foret multi homines nec unicus homo tantum. Et quamlibet illarum sentenciarum credo esse absolute necessariam, cum Verbum nullam humanitatem potest assumere preter Dominum Iesum Christum.

Of which the first, as Saint Thomas with his followers, says that Christ, by assuming many humanities, would consequently be many men; the second, the opinion of the modern speakers, says that Christ, this posited, would be only the one sole man; the third, of the Subtle Doctor, says that, this posited, he would be neither many men nor a single man only. And each of those teachings I believe to be absolutely necessary, since the Word can assume no humanity besides the Lord Jesus Christ.[4]

¶4 221.27–222.12

[221]Ideo opposito posito est quidlibet formaliter inferendum. Et patet concordancia doctorum in infringibili[3] stipite veritatis; et per idem plane sequitur quod non multe persone divine possunt eandem humanitatem assumere eo quod tunc essent idem homo ad ydemptitatem humanitatis, ut dicit prima sentencia; essent eciam multi homines propter multitudinem personarum, quarum quelibet foret homo, ut dicit 2da sentencia; essent 3° nec unicus nec multi, ut dicit [222]3^{a} sentencia, eo quod denominaciones multiplicantur vel ydemptificantur ex multiplicacione vel ydemptificacione formarum; cum omnis forma sit essenciam vel personam in aliquo formaliter se habere; multe ergo humanitates forent multas personas esse homines, et una humanitas foret essenciam esse unum hominem. Sed certum est, si multe[1] persone divine sunt[1] unus homo, sunt et una persona, et sic eadem creata substancia, et per consequens persona eadem foret quelibet persona divina; et sic foret nedum confusio personarum, sed persona illa communis creata et assumpta foret cuilibet persone divine ydemptificata; quod esse non potest.

Therefore, the opposite being posited, anything whatever is to be inferred formally. And the agreement of the doctors is clear in the unbreakable stock of truth;[5] and by the same token it plainly follows that many divine persons cannot assume the same humanity, because then they would be the same man by the identity of the humanity, as the first teaching says; they would also be many men by reason of the multitude of persons, each of which would be a man, as the second teaching says; thirdly, they would be neither one nor many, as [222]the third teaching says, because namings are multiplied or identified from the multiplication or identification of forms; since every form is an essence's or person's being formally disposed in some respect;[6] many humanities, then, would be many persons' being men, and one humanity would be an essence's being one man. Now it is certain that, if many divine persons are one man, they are also one person, and so the same created substance, and consequently the same person would be each divine person; and so there would be not only a confusion of persons, but that common person, created and assumed, would be identified with each divine person; which cannot be.

¶5 222.13–223.16

[222]Et per idem nec Pater nec Spiritus sanctus potest humanitatem assumere; quia non eandem quam Verbum, ut patet ex dictis; nec alias separatas, quia deficit principium iniciantis,[2] mittentis, vel principiantis Patrem incarnandum. Quamvis enim tota Trinitas incarnavit Verbum et misit Spiritum sanctum, hoc tamen solum[3] originaliter fit ex Patre, 'qui sic dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret,' Ioh[4] 3°; cum sic[4] fuissent tres Filii Dei; et, cum non adoptivi, omnes fuissent filii naturales; quod esse non potest. Et 3°

And by the same token neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit can assume a humanity: not the same one as the Word, as is clear from what has been said; nor other, separate ones, because there is lacking the principle of one initiating, sending, or being the principle of the Father to be incarnated.[7] For although the whole Trinity incarnated the Word and sent the Holy Spirit, yet this is done originally from the Father alone, "who so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son", John 3[:16]; since in that way there

Deus foret triplex substancia, quia tres persone hominum; et de lege evangelica quilibet subiectus et obediens cuilibet; et in casu Pater in divinis filius vel nepos naturalis Filii vel Spiritus sancti, et sic sibi[5] obediens tanquam superiori, ut Abraham offerebat Melchisedech ad Heb. 7°. Ymo, quantumcunque extraneas cognaciones assumpserint, forent plus convenientes quam cognati aliqui vel germani; cum omnes sint eadem essencia singularissima, eadem latria adorandi. Et sicut in divinitate nullus reliquo plus colendus sit, sic[6] secundum humanitatem nullus honore alteri[7] preponendus; et per consequens non foret eorum facilis cohabitacio propter repugnanciam maioritatis in [223] susceptis hominibus, et occasionem date opinionis, quis altero sit melior; cum in doctrina, conversacione, et merito differrent ab invicem, sicut in personalitate et humanitate assumptis secundum quotlibet condiciones individuantes. Que si appareant nobis non sequi vel non esse inconveniencia plus quam Verbum esse hominem, tamen satis est quod sanctis appareat hoc non posse essencie[1] divine competere, nec ex scripturis vel racionibus edoceri sic posse fieri. Ad quid ergo sollicitaremur aggravantes fidem circa illud quod absolute necessarium est non esse? Non,[2] ymo si problema[3] de possibilitate[4] talium[5] non fuerit nichil venturum,[5] ego non vagarer circa conclusiones, que illo posito sequerentur; sed pie dubitarem possibilitatem casuum; nec admitterem casus huiusmodi cum suis sequentibus, nisi aliunde michi fuerint evidentes, ne forte sustinerem repugnans fidei arroganter, pertinaciter, vel aliter viciose.

would have been three Sons of God; and, since not adoptive, all would have been natural sons; which cannot be. And thirdly, God would be a threefold substance, because three persons of men; and by the gospel law each would be subject and obedient to each; and in the case [posited] the Father, among the divine [persons], would be the natural son or grandson of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, and so obedient to him as to a superior, as Abraham made offering to Melchisedech, Hebrews 7.[8] Indeed, however foreign the kinships they assumed, they would be more at one than any kinsmen or brothers, since all are the same most singular essence, to be adored with the same latria.[9] And just as in the divinity none is to be worshipped more than another, so as to the humanity none is to be preferred to another in honour; and consequently their joint dwelling would not be easy, because of the incompatibility of greatness in the [223]men taken up, and the occasion given for the opinion, which of them is better than the other; since in doctrine, manner of life, and merit they would differ from one another, as in the personality and humanity assumed, according to any number of individuating conditions. And if these things appear to us not to follow, or not to be absurdities[10] more than "the Word is a man", yet it is enough that it appears to the saints that this cannot befit the divine essence, nor be taught from the scriptures or from reasons that it can be done so. To what end, then, should we trouble ourselves, burdening the faith about that which it is absolutely necessary should not be? No; indeed, if the problem of the possibility of such things were not [one about] nothing to come,[11] I would not wander about the conclusions which would follow on that supposition; but I would piously doubt the possibility of the cases; nor would I admit cases of this kind with their consequences, unless they were evident to me from elsewhere, lest perhaps I should maintain something incompatible with the faith arrogantly, obstinately, or otherwise viciously.

Notes

1. Scotus, *In III Sent.* (*Ordinatio*) d. 1 q. 3, ad 1 (Wadding VII.1, 44–45): *dicitur, quod nec esset unus homo, nec plures.* In the *Ordinatio* this is an answer Scotus reports (Lychetus gives it to Richard of Middleton) and rejects, before answering by his analogy of one spirator and two spirantes; one reading recorded by Lychetus makes it Scotus's own, and Wyclif follows that reading (*verified*).
"Made clear in the last chapter": chapter 12, from p. 203. A B C read *idem* for *istud* (220.27); C omits *iuxta* (220.29).
2. Aristotle, *Categories* 5 (2b5–6): if the first substances did not exist, none of the other things could exist. Boethius's Latin is *Non existentibus ergo primis substantiis impossibile est esse aliquid aliorum* (PL 64, 184D); Wyclif's *destructis … remanere* is the schools' form of it (*verified*). O reads *principiis* for *primis substanciis* (221.12) and *possit* for *posset* (221.11).
3. "The topic from sufficient division" (glossary: *locus … a divisione*): a division that exhausts the cases (many men, one man, neither), of which the three teachings of the next paragraph are the members.
4. "Absolutely necessary": each teaching is a conditional whose antecedent (another humanity assumed) is impossible, so each is necessary; and from the impossible anything follows (221.27).
"The modern speakers": *moderni loquentes.* The print has a stray point before *hoc* (221.21).
5. "Unbreakable": *infringibili* (221.28); O *singulari* "singular".

6. *Cum omnis forma sit essenciam vel personam in aliquo formaliter se habere* (222.3–4): a form is the fact that an essence or person stands so in some respect; hence "many humanities would be many persons' being men". B writes *multe … sunt* twice (222.6–7).
7. The Father is from no principle, so there is none to initiate, send, or originate his incarnation, as the Father sends the Son. O omits *iniciantis* (222.16); B omits *solum* (222.18); O omits *Ioh 3° cum sic* (222.20).
8. Hebrews 7:1–7: Abraham gives tithes to Melchisedech, and "that which is less is blessed by the better" (7:7). O reads *eis* for *sibi* (222.25).
9. *Latria*: the worship owed to God alone (glossary: *dulia / latria*). A B C add *nec* before *secundum humanitatem* (222.31); O reads *alterius* (222.32).
10. "Absurdities": *inconveniencia*, in the sense of argument (the glossary, CONTEXTUAL). O reads *decencie* "decency" for *essencie* (223.7).
11. 223.10–11, doubtful. The print, with O: *si problema de possibilitate talium non fuerit nichil venturum*, perhaps "if the question were not an idle one" (about what will never come to pass). A B C read *talium fuerint mihi neutram*, perhaps for *neutrum*: "if the problem of the possibility of such things were neutral to me" (doubtful either way), which suits "I would piously doubt the possibility". A B C are one family; the print stands. A B C omit *Non* (223.10).
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Johniii. 16. (222.20); reference Heb. vii. i. (222.27).

Part 3: The moderns' three created substances; why the Word was incarnate; the doctors reconciled

Harris pp. 223.17–227.32

¶1 223.17–225.5

[223]Unde miror quomodo moderni negantes Christum esse creaturam, et cum hoc admittentes tres personas divinas eandem humanitatem vel tres omnimode separatas assumere, dicunt quod substancia divina est tres homines et per consequens tres substancie; non enim tres substancie increate, cum tunc eternaliter ita essent. Si autem sit[6] tres create substancie, tunc tres creature forent substancia divina per conversionem; et sic aliquid quod[7] prius non fuerat. Si enim iste tres substancie differunt personaliter, tunc tres persone divine sunt tres substancie, quas notum est oportere distingui a communi divina substancia. Et si dicatur quod, postquam eternaliter erant persone et non substancie, facte sunt substancie, hoc est equivoce ad eternam substanciam vel personam; quia aliter unica substancia et non plures foret Trinitas increata. Et multo evidencius si tantum una humanitas sit assumpta a tota Trinitate, non essent tres [224] materiales substancie, ut puta tria animalia vel tria corpora; et sic de ceteris passionibus humanis cum ceteris accidentibus separabilibus; quia adequatum corpus, compositum ex isto corpore et ista anima, est omne animal quod est homo in dato situ, eo quod eadem sunt principia singulorum, ut deductum est superius. Ymo videtur quod quilibet illorum trium hominum habeat peccatum maximum naturale, cum quilibet caret proprio capite, et sic de ceteris organis quibuscunque; et per idem sunt unum[1] corpus tantum. Licet autem tres persone assumendo tres homines forent indubie tres create substancie; tamen inconveniens est quod increata substancia sic plurificetur[2] in multas substancias, cum divina substancia non in plura dispergitur, sed in ipsam omnis pluralitas creature unite[3] colligitur; quamvis enim Verbum sit due substancie, divina scilicet et humana, divina tamen

Hence I wonder how the moderns, denying "Christ is a creature", and with this admitting "three divine persons assume the same humanity, or three wholly separate ones", say "the divine substance is three men", and consequently three substances; for [it is] not three uncreated substances, since then they would be so eternally. But if it is three created substances, then three creatures would be the divine substance by conversion;[1] and so [it would be] something it had not been before. For if these three substances differ personally, then the three divine persons are three substances, which, it is known, must be distinguished from the common divine substance. And if it is said that, after they were eternally persons and not substances, they were made substances, this is [said] equivocally with respect to eternal substance or person; because otherwise the uncreated Trinity would be a single substance and not several. And much more evidently, if only one humanity is assumed by the whole Trinity, there would not be three [224]material substances, for example three animals or three bodies; and so of the other human attributes with the other separable accidents; because the adequate body, composed of this body and this soul, is every animal that is a man in a given place, since the principles of the singulars are the same, as was deduced above. Indeed it seems that each of those three men would have the greatest natural defect, since each lacks a head of his own, and so of any other organs whatever;[2] and by the same token they are one body only. And although three persons, by assuming three men, would undoubtedly be three created substances, yet it is an absurdity[3] that the uncreated substance should be thus multiplied into many substances, since the divine substance is not dispersed into

substancia est tantum una substancia, cum non sit substancia creata: accipiendo enim huiusmodi substanciam pro natura et substanciam personaliter, sic non ponitur[4] in numerum cum divina,[5] cum sit ipsa. Unde videtur quod subiectum abstractum contrahat predicatum ad supponendum simpliciter pro natura, quando sic dicitur—substancia divina est substancia creata—et per consequens proposicio est neganda. Sed cum subiecto personali conceditur quod Verbum est substancia creata, quia homo et humanitas, quod non est deitas. Cuius racionis diversitas est variacio a supposicione simplici in personalem secundum limitacionem personalis termini vel abstracti. Et tunc non oportet concedere quod substancia increata sit creata substancia; licet Verbum, quod est increata substancia, sit creata substancia. Trinitas ergo foret in casu illo tres create substancie; et per consequens necessaria[6] esset ad[7] finem attingendum[7] tanta in Deo pluralitas naturarum; quod est impossibile; cum ad redempcionem humani generis, ad beatitudinem hominis secundum [225]corpus et animam, et quemlibet alium effectum eque sufficit Christi incarnacio, sicut incarnacio horum trium. Sicut ergo non sunt ponendi plures dii propter impossibilitatem superflui, sic nec plurium personarum incarnacio propter causam consimilem.

many things, but into it all the plurality of the united creature is gathered; for although the Word is two substances, namely divine and human, yet the divine substance is only one substance, since it is not a created substance: for, taking substance of this kind for the nature, and substance personally, it is thus not put into number with the divine, since it is it.[4] Hence it seems that an abstract subject restricts the predicate to stand with simple supposition for the nature,[5] when it is said thus: "the divine substance is a created substance"; and consequently the proposition is to be denied. But with a personal subject it is granted that "the Word is a created substance", because [he is] a man and a humanity, which is not the Godhead. The diversity of this reasoning is a variation from simple supposition to personal, according to the limitation of a personal or an abstract term.[6] And then it is not necessary to grant "the uncreated substance is a created substance", although the Word, which is uncreated substance, is created substance. The Trinity, then, would in that case be three created substances; and consequently so great a plurality of natures in God would be necessary for attaining the end;[7] which is impossible, since for the redemption of the human race, for the blessedness of man as to [225]body and soul, and for any other effect whatever, the incarnation of Christ suffices equally, as would the incarnation of these three. Just as, then, several gods are not to be posited because of the impossibility of the superfluous, so neither is the incarnation of several persons, for a like cause.

¶2 225.6–225.20

[225]Ponunt autem doctores congruenciam[1] in Christo quare incarnatus est et nec Pater nec Spiritus sanctus. Primo quia[2] Verbum,[2] quod est naturalis ymago Patris; per quod factus est homo ad Dei ymaginem, per eandem ymaginem debuit reformari. Unde ex proprietate ymaginis fuit consonancius quod ymago ymaginem assumeret, quam potencia vel benevolencia alterius persone. Forme enim est reformare deformitatem; sapiencie vincere peccati maliciam remissibilem ex ignorancia contractam; et ymaginis exemplaris fabricam turpatam ad dictam ymaginem prius factam [revocare].[3] Verumptamen sicut vir non peccavit nisi excitante muliere et dyabolo, et sic iuvamine alterius[4] debuit relevari:[5] sic nec persona Verbi fecit redempcionis misterium sine coefficiencia Trinitatis, aliter tamen Verbum quam duo alii.

And the doctors posit a fittingness in Christ, why he was incarnate and neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit.[8] First, because the Word is the natural image of the Father; through him man was made to the image of God, [and] through the same image he had to be reformed.[9] Hence from the property of an image it was more consonant that the image should assume the image than the power or benevolence of another person. For it belongs to form to reform deformity; to wisdom to overcome the malice of sin, remissible [as] contracted from ignorance; and to the exemplar image to [restore] the defaced workmanship to the said image after which it was first made.[10] Nevertheless, just as the man did not sin except at the instigation of the woman and the devil, and so had to be raised up by the help of another, other than the devil,[11] so neither did the person of the Word perform the mystery of redemption without the co-working of the Trinity, though the Word [did so] otherwise than the two others.

¶3 225.21–225.31

[225]2do cum Verbum sit Dei Filius naturalis, habet in[6] Trinitate[6] principium a quo mittatur, in cuius auctoritate vel virtute operetur obedienter humanitus. Unde filiacio temporalis habet proprietates analogas in Filio naturali aliter quam haberet in Patre vel Spiritu. Nam utrobique nascitur ex suo principio, et manet Filius faciens nos filios adoptivos[7] et[8] heredes, ut ipse est primogenitus;[8] et hoc sine confusione filiorum[9] cognacionis in Deo, quod Patri innascibili non potest competere. Et si iste conveniencie videntur nobis ignaris modice, tamen sunt apud Deum, qui ponderat cuncta, ad regulam infringibiliter perficiende.

Secondly, since the Word is the natural Son of God, he has in the Trinity a principle by which he may be sent, in whose authority or power he may work obediently, humanly.[12] Hence temporal sonship has analogous properties in the natural Son, otherwise than it would have in the Father or the Spirit. For on both sides he is born from his principle, and remains the Son, making us adoptive sons and heirs, as he himself is the firstborn;[13] and this without a confusion of sons or of kinship in God, which cannot befit the innascible Father. And if these agreements seem slight to us in our ignorance, yet with God, who weighs all things, they are to be perfected unbreakably to the rule.

¶4 226.1–226.25

[226]3° concludendo[1] breviter, non est aliqua Verbi proprietas quin limitat Verbo[2] congruere[2] incarnacionis misterium ultra quam aliis. Mediam quidem[3] personam oportet esse mediatorem Dei et hominum; Verbum eternaliter de corde ingenito eructatum decet verbis predicacionis ostendere Patrem suum Ioh. 17°. 'Pater, manifestavi nomen tuum;' 'Dei virtus atque Dei sapiencia,' prima ad Cor. 1°, debuit vicium ex ignorancia superare;[4] ut homo, qui[4] in sapiencia conditus est per insipienciam perditus appetendo equalitatem increate sapiencie, per illam sapienciam restauretur, et dyabolus usurpando acceptam virtutem et potenciam[5] per dantem[6] virtutem et[5] bracchium deprimeretur, Luc 1°. 'fecit potenciam in bracchio suo.' Et sicut secundum Augustinum est equalitas immediate consequens ad suum principium, sic ab eo specialiter omnis morbi inequalitas ad temperanciam reducatur: ut inequalitas sanitatis in qua dyabolus cecidit, appetendo equalitatem divine auctoritatis sive potencie, secundum iudicium datum Filio per impotenciam puniatur, qua non possit a peccato in Spiritum[7] sanctum resurgere; inequalitas autem, in qua homo ignoranter peccando in sapienciam, stulte appetendo eius equalitatem, ceciderat, est[8] precise equalitatis terminus,[9] cum sit sapiencia, verbum, virtus, pulcritudo, et species reducenda; et ita de ceteris sacramentis que scriptura de Christo commemorat.

Thirdly, concluding briefly, there is no property of the Word that does not assign to the Word that the mystery of the incarnation befits [him] beyond the others. The middle person, indeed, must be the mediator of God and men;[14] it befits the Word, eternally uttered from the unbegotten heart, to show his Father by words of preaching, John 17[:6]: "Father, I have manifested thy name";[15] "the power of God and the wisdom of God", 1 Corinthians 1[:24], had to overcome the vice [that comes] from ignorance; so that he who[16] was established in wisdom [and] was lost through folly by desiring equality with the uncreated wisdom, might be restored through that wisdom; and that the devil, by usurping the power and might he had received, might be pressed down through the power and arm of the one who gave [them], Luke 1[:51]: "He hath shewed might in his arm."[17] And as, according to Augustine, equality follows without intermediary upon its principle,[18] so by him in particular every inequality of disease should be brought back to temperance: so that the inequality of health in which the devil fell, desiring equality of divine authority or power, should be punished, according to the judgement given to the Son, by an impotence through which he cannot rise again from the sin against the Holy Spirit;[19] and the inequality in which man, sinning ignorantly against wisdom by foolishly desiring its equality, had fallen, is to be brought back through precisely the term of equality, since he is wisdom, word, power, beauty, and form;[20] and so of the other sacraments[21] which scripture records of Christ.

¶5 226.26–226.30

[226]Redeundo igitur ad propositum ex dictis colligitur quod quelibet trium predictarum opinionum sentenciat[10] fidei consonum quoad superius recitatum. Et sic concordande sunt apparentes doctorum repugnancie in tam alta materia fidei Christiane.

Returning, therefore, to the purpose, it is gathered from what has been said that each of the three aforesaid opinions pronounces what is consonant with the faith as to what was rehearsed above. And so the apparent

incompatibilities of the doctors are to be brought into agreement in so high a matter of the Christian faith.[22]

¶6 226.31–227.26

[226]Quod si obicitur omnes tres sectas concorditer admittere quod quelibet persona[11] divina eandem naturam assumat [227]vel quotlibet[1] separatim; dicitur tripliciter concordando istam radicem. Primo quod in ista materia opinative locuti sunt nichil temere asserendo, ut patet ex scriptis eorum. 2[do] quod ipsi intelligunt ipsam possibilitatem condicionaliter, si Deus voluerit; ad modum loquendi Anselmi. Vel 3° si replicando inutiliter de sensibus eorum argueretur, quod ipsi sic simpliciter sencierunt, potest dici quod non ad laudem eorum opinio eorum forsitan fuit talis. Et taliter glosant ipsi superiores doctores, quorum sensus pocius debet credi. Sed non valet—si isti sic senciunt opinando; ergo verum—cum per idem contradiccio sequeretur; ipsi enim discrepant a seipsis. Sed et sanctus Thomas super Dist. 6. 3[ii] Sentenciarum Questione….,[2] dicit quod sentencia concedens humanitatem assumptam esse Christum non est heretica, licet sit impossibilis in precipua materia fidei. De quo miror, cum tot sancti doctores qui in aliis materiis ambigue sunt locuti, illam sentenciam in materia fidei affirmaverant tam constanter. Cum ergo pium et salubre foret de fide Christiana sentenciam impossibilem tocius fidei corruptivam investigando excludere, videtur quod ecclesia sollicite discuteret quid in ista materia foret catholice sustinendum; quia certum est quod una pars est formaliter impossibilis; ex qua sequitur oppositum tocius fidei, ymo ut noverunt logici, quidlibet inferendum; et talis latens error in principio per vias inopinatas infirmat partes fidei consequenter.

But if it is objected that all three sects[23] with one accord admit "each divine person assumes the same nature, [227]or any number separately", the answer is, bringing this root into agreement in three ways: first, that in this matter they spoke by way of opinion, asserting nothing rashly, as is clear from their writings. Secondly, that they understand that possibility conditionally, "if God should will", after Anselm's manner of speaking.[24] Or thirdly, if, by rejoining uselessly about their meanings, it were argued that they thought so without qualification, it can be said that perhaps their opinion was such, not to their praise. And in this way the doctors [named] above themselves gloss [it], whose sense ought rather to be believed. But it does not hold: "if these think so by way of opinion, therefore it is true", since by the same token a contradiction would follow; for they disagree with themselves. Moreover, Saint Thomas too, on distinction 6 of the third [book] of the *Sentences*, question …,[25] says that the teaching granting "the assumed humanity is Christ" is not heretical, although it is impossible in a principal matter of faith. At which I wonder, since so many holy doctors, who in other matters have spoken ambiguously, affirmed that teaching in a matter of faith so constantly. Since, then, it would be pious and salutary to exclude from the Christian faith, by investigation, an impossible teaching, corruptive of the whole faith, it seems that the church should carefully discuss what in this matter should be held as catholic; because it is certain that one side is formally impossible; from which follows the opposite of the whole faith, indeed, as the logicians know, anything whatever is to be inferred; and such a hidden error in the principle, by unexpected ways, consequently weakens parts of the faith.

¶7 227.27–227.32

[227]Sed forte preter instancias factas superius arguitur possibilitas trium casuum abiectorum, scilicet quod quelibet persona divina indifferenter poterit incarnari; quia eadem persona multas humanitates simul vel successive potest assumere et quocienslibet potest dimittere; ac 3° quod multe possunt eandem humanitatem assumere.

But perhaps, beyond the objections made above, the possibility of the three rejected cases is argued: namely that each divine person indifferently could be incarnated; that the same person can assume many humanities at once or successively, and can lay them aside as often as he pleases; and thirdly that many [persons] can assume the same humanity.[26]

Notes

1. "By conversion": the proposition "the divine substance is three created substances" converted gives "three created substances [three creatures] are the divine substance". The words also bear the sense the creed excludes, a real conversion of the Godhead into the creature (*non conversione divinitatis in carnem*; the glossary *conversio naturarum*), which *et sic aliquid quod prius non fuerat* ("something it had not been before") would suit; the logical sense is kept because *per conversionem* has no genitive of the natures. C reads *sint* "they are" for *sit* (223.22).
2. "The greatest natural defect": *peccatum … naturale*, a fault of nature (the "sin" of nature in Aristotle, *Physics* II.8, the monster), not a moral sin: each of the three would lack a head of his own, since the one body is all three (there monsters are failures, ἁμαρτήματα, of nature's purposive effort; *verified*). O reads *unicum* for *unum* (224.9).
3. "An absurdity": *inconveniens*, in the sense of argument (the glossary, CONTEXTUAL). A B C read *plurificaretur* (224.12) and *univoce* "univocally" for *unite* (224.14).
4. 224.17–19: "it" is the human substance taken personally, i.e. the Word, which is not counted with the divine substance because it is the divine substance. A B C read *potest* "can" for *ponitur* (224.18) and add *substancia* after *divina* (224.19).
5. "Stand with simple supposition" (*supponendum simpliciter*): the theory of supposition (glossary: *suppositio simplex*), not the pair *simpliciter / secundum quid*. The abstract subject *substancia divina* makes the predicate stand for the nature, so the proposition is false; the personal subject *Verbum* lets it stand for the person, so "the Word is a created substance" is true.
6. *Cuius racionis diversitas*: "the diversity of this reasoning"; or, taking *cuius* with *diversitas*, "the reason for this diversity". "Limitation": the restriction of the predicate's supposition by the kind of subject term.
7. "For attaining the end": *ad finem attingendum* (224.31), with A B; C *ad finem a…* with a gap, O *ad finem aliquem* "for some end"; O also *necessarium* (224.31).
8. The doctors' reasons why the Son rather than the Father or the Spirit was incarnate: cf. Anselm, *De incarnatione Verbi* c. 10 (Schmitt; PL 158, c. V; c. 6 in Wyclif's numbering), on the image, the confusion of sons and the Father as "grandson"; Peter Lombard, *Sent.* III d. 1; Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III q. 3 a. 8; closest to Wyclif's list is Thomas, *Scriptum* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 2 co., *quod filius est, quod verbum est, quod imago, quod media in Trinitate persona*; Lombard's place is d. 1 c. 2, PL 192, 757 (*ne alius in divinitate esset Filius, alius in humanitate*) (*verified*). "Fittingness": *congruencia*; A B C *convenienciam* "agreement" (225.6).
9. 225.8–10: the sentence changes construction after *Patris* (*per quod … per eandem ymaginem debuit reformari*); the subject of *debuit reformari* is man. O omits *quia Verbum*.
10. "[Restore]": *[revocare]*, Harris's supplement, which no manuscript has ("*revocare* or something like it is needed for the sense"); the clause has no verb without it.
11. "Other than the devil": *alter quam dyabolus*, with O; A B C *aliter quam dyabolus* "otherwise than the devil". All four manuscripts have the words after *alterius*; Harris drops both readings as a gloss (225.17). O reads *revelari* for *relevari* (225.18).
12. "In the Trinity": *in Trinitate*, with O; A B C *intrinsece* "intrinsically" (225.21).
13. "Adoptive sons and heirs … firstborn": cf. Romans 8:17, 29 and Galatians 4:5. O reads *adopcionis* (225.26) and writes *et heredes … primogenitus* twice. "Of sons or of kinship": *filiorum vel cognacionis*, with C O, against the print's *filiorum cognacionis* "of sons of kinship" (225.28).
14. 1 Timothy 2:5, "one mediator of God and men" (quoted at 231.17). "Indeed": *quidem*; O *quippe*. O reads *concludo* (226.1) and *congrue* without *Verbo* (226.2).
15. John 17:6 has "I have manifested thy name" without "Father", which Wyclif takes from the vocatives of the same prayer (17:1, 5, 11). "Eternally uttered from the unbegotten heart": cf. Psalm 44:2, "My heart hath uttered a good word".
16. "So that he who": *ut qui*, with O. The print's *ut homo, qui* (226.8) is no manuscript's reading (A B *homo autem*, C *ut autem*, O *ut qui*; figure 4 stands before *ut* on the plate): Harris has joined A B's *homo* to O's *ut … qui*. O gives *restauretur* and *deprimeretur* one construction under *ut*; "he" is man, as A B make explicit.
17. "Might": *potencia*, given the Douay word of Luke 1:51 so that the verse answers to the devil's "power and might" (*virtutem et potenciam*); *virtus* is "power" throughout, as in "the power of God". B omits *potenciam … et* (226.11–12); A B C read *datam* "the given [power]" for *dantem* (226.12).
18. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I.5.5, "in the Father unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality" (PL 34, 21; *verified*).
19. "The judgement given to the Son": John 5:22, "hath given all judgment to the Son". "The sin against the Holy Spirit": Matthew 12:32. C reads *peccatum* for *Spiritum* (226.19).
20. "Is to be brought back through precisely the term of equality": *est per precise equalitatis terminum … reducenda*, with O, against the print's *est precise equalitatis terminus* (226.22), which leaves *reducenda* without construction. "Beauty, and form": *species* appropriated to the Son, as in Hilary's triad quoted by Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI.10.11 (PL 42, 931: *species in Imagine*, which Augustine glosses *propter pulchritudinem, ubi jam est … prima aequalitas*; *verified*).
21. *Sacramentum*: in the Augustinian sense, "mystery" (1 Timothy 3:16).
22. "Pronounces": *sentenciat*; O *senciat fide* "thinks by faith" (226.27).
23. "Sects": the three schools of opinion (Thomas's, the moderns', the Subtle Doctor's), the glossary *secta*. B reads *natura* for *persona* (226.32); for *quotlibet* (227.1) A has *t* over an erasure by another hand, B *quidlibet*, C *quodlibet*.
24. "If God should will": Harris italicizes the words as Anselm's formula; Anselm's way of speaking is *Cur Deus homo* II.10 (PL 158, 409A), *Possumus itaque dicere de Christo, quia potuit mentiri, si subaudiatur, si vellet*: a possibility granted only under the condition of a will; Thomas uses the same *sub conditione, scilicet si vellet* on this question (*Scriptum* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 3 co.) (*verified* in sense).
25. "Question …": the number is wanting in all the manuscripts, and Harris prints points. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* III d. 6 q. 1 a. 2 co., on the first opinion (the assumed man): *non est haeretica … immo impossibile est … et ideo non sustinetur* (*verified*).
26. *Quia eadem persona* (227.29): *quia* here introduces the second case, in the sense of *quod* "that", parallel to *quod quelibet* and *quod multe*.
How the Latin of this passage was established
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference Luke i. 5i. (226.13).

Part 4: The arguments for the three cases answered; "insofar as God" and "insofar as man"; the end of the treatise

¶1 227.33–228.3

[227]Primo generatur ex hoc quod precipui moderni doctores catholici et subtiles in scripturis reliquerant possibilitates [228]omnium istorum casuum cum suis probacionibus et solucionibus obiectorum; quod non est veri simile de talibus ac tantis doctoribus nisi subsit possibilitas eorundem: ergo etc.

First, [the argument] is generated from this: that the chief modern doctors, catholic and subtle, left in their writings the possibilities [228]of all these cases, with their proofs and the solutions of objections; which is not likely of such and so great doctors unless the possibility of them underlay [it]: therefore etc.[1]

¶2 228.4–228.21

[228]Hic dicitur ut supra quod variacio in methaphisica et honoris extraneandi ambicio est in causa. In cuius signum vix duos invenies quin discordent. Alii autem superiores doctores ut Augustinus, Ieronimus, Gregorius, et Anselmus cum suis sequacibus dicunt concorditer quod Christus post incarnacionem est aliquid, quod prius non fuerat, ut patet superius; et illi concordant cum racione, et verbaliter ac sentencialiter cum scriptura. Nec sequitur ex illo quod posteriores erant heretici, cum sentenciam hereticam potest catholicus sine pertinacia defendere, sicut credo in proposito contigisse. Verumptamen vanum est excludere illos simpliciter a peccato; cum laborando circa[1] veram sentenciam secundum studium bonum[2] de genere contingit catholicum presumptiva superbia vel[3] inani gloria peccare facillime; quanto magis defendendo impossibile, licet intencio secundum aliquid sit recta et vera sentencia: quodlibet[4] enim impossibile disperiret,[5] si per se sine mixtura veri defensum fuerit!

Here the answer is, as above, that variation in metaphysics and the ambition for the honour of estrangement is the cause. In token of which you will scarcely find two who do not disagree. But the other, superior doctors, such as Augustine, Jerome, Gregory, and Anselm with their followers, say with one accord that Christ after the incarnation is something which he had not been before, as is clear above; and they agree with reason, and in word and in teaching with scripture.[2] Nor does it follow from that that the later [doctors] were heretics, since a catholic can defend a heretical teaching without pertinacity, as I believe has happened in the case at hand. Nevertheless it is vain to exclude them without qualification from sin; since in labouring about a true teaching, with a study good in its kind,[3] it happens most easily that a catholic sins by presumptuous pride or vain glory; how much more by defending the impossible, although the intention in some respect be right and the teaching true: for every impossible [position], indeed, would perish, if it were defended by itself without admixture of truth![4]

¶3 228.22–228.26

[228]2do obicitur per raciones sancti Thome Questione 7. 3^{ii} et duabus sequentibus. 'Omnis, inquit, necessitas et impossibilitas Deo subicitur.' Cum ergo voluntati Dei omnis impossibilitas subicitur, sequitur quod Patrem incarnari non sit sibi[6] impossibile.

Secondly, it is objected, by appeal to the arguments of Saint Thomas, question 7 of the third [book], and the two following:[5] "Every necessity", he says, "and impossibility is subject to God." Since, then, every impossibility is subject to the will of God, it follows that for the Father to be incarnated is not impossible for him.[6]

¶4 228.27–229.8

[228]Hic videtur michi quod argumentum peccat tam in materia quam in forma. In materia, quia solum veritas Deo subicitur; nulla impossibilitas est veritas; ergo assumptum peccat. Quod si intelligamus per impossibilitatem signi impossibilis falsitatem vel veritatem negativam, que est absoluta necessitas, nichil ad propositum; sed ad oppositum adducitur. Nam non prodest quod hoc signum sit impossibile—Pater [229]potest incarnari—vel—quod necessario non potest esse quod Pater potest incarnari—ad concludendum propositum.

Here it seems to me that the argument errs both in matter and in form. In matter, because only truth is subject to God; no impossibility is a truth; therefore the assumption[7] errs. And if by "impossibility" we understand the falsity of an impossible sign, or a negative truth, which is absolute necessity, it is nothing to the purpose, but is brought forward for the opposite. For it does not help, for concluding the purpose, that this sign is impossible, "the Father [229]can be incarnated", or "necessarily it cannot be

Nec oportet instare pro improbacione argumenti, cum reductum ad formam patenter peteret; sicut facit secundum argumentum, quo capit humanam naturam infinitum distare a qualibet persona divina, et omnium[1] eque distancium est eque possibilis coniunccio. Nam maior est impossibilis, et sensus minoris petitur.

that the Father can be incarnated". Nor is there need to object in disproof of the argument, since, reduced to form, it would plainly beg [the question]; as does the second argument, in which he takes "human nature is infinitely distant from each divine person, and of all things equally distant the conjunction is equally possible". For the major is impossible, and the sense of the minor is begged.[8]

¶5 229.9–229.10

[229]3° arguitur ex hoc quod posse assumere carnem est dignitatis[2] in Filio; ergo Patri potest competere.

Thirdly, it is argued from this: that to be able to assume flesh is [a matter] of dignity in the Son; therefore it can befit the Father.[9]

¶6 229.11–229.14

[229]Sed iuxta illud sequeretur quod gigni conveniat Patri, cum sit dignitatis in Filio. Dicitur ergo cum isto sancto quod Deus non potest incarnari in persona alia de potencia ordinata; sed, si voluerit de potencia absoluta.

But according to that it would follow that to be begotten befits the Father, since it is [a matter] of dignity in the Son. The answer, then, is, with this saint, that God cannot be incarnated in another person by ordained power; but, "if he should will, by absolute power".[10]

¶7 229.15–229.30

[229]Et conformiter dicitur ad argumenta quibus videtur probare quod eadem natura potest assumi a qualibet personarum. Primo ex hoc quod omnis humanitas est indifferenter ad ymaginem Trinitatis, et[3] illa est racio assumendi; ymo cum Verbum humanitatem assumpserit,[4] est ipsa similior et habilior[5] ut ab utraque reliqua assumatur. Constat quidem quod faccio ad ymaginem Dei non est communis racio ut quelibet humanitas[6] a qualibet[6] persona assumi poterit, quia sic omnis homo posset esse Trinitas increata; sed Christo inest racio singularis, unde ille singulariter a Verbo assumi poterit; et petitur utrobique probandum. Unde multum distat unio potenciarum anime eidem organo et[7] unio humanitatis ad Filium; ita quod non sequitur per locum a simili—si multe potencie anime possunt simul uniri eidem organo,[7] ergo per idem multe persone divine possunt uniri[8] ypostatice eidem corpori—.

And conformably the answer is given to the arguments by which he seems to prove that the same nature can be assumed by any of the persons. First, from this: that every humanity is indifferently to the image of the Trinity, and that is the reason for assuming; indeed, since the Word has assumed the humanity, it is the more like and the more qualified[11] to be assumed by either of the others. It is evident, indeed, that the making to the image of God is not a common reason why any humanity whatever could be assumed by any person whatever, because then every man could be the uncreated Trinity; but in Christ there is a singular reason, whence he could singularly be assumed by the Word; and in both places what is to be proved is begged. Hence the union of the powers of the soul to the same organ is far different from the union of the humanity to the Son; so that it does not follow by the topic from likeness: "if many powers of the soul can be united at once to the same organ, therefore by the same token many divine persons can be united hypostatically to the same body".[12]

¶8 229.31–230.18

[229]Quod si queratur[9] racio diversitatis, satis est quod hoc facto tres persone possent[10] esse unus homo et quelibet [230]persona divina multi homines; sicut consequenter annuit sanctus Thomas, et[1] hoc posito non sic esset, ut patet ex dictis. Quantum ad argumenta, que facit Doctor subtilis in principio 3[ii] pro hac parte, respondet ipsemet satis clare. Quod si addatur— Verbum divinum liberius copulatum Christo quam aliquam[2] carnem carni ypostatice copulatam; sed anima potest multis carnibus copulari; ergo multo magis Verbum alii humanitati—;

And if the reason for the difference is asked, it is enough that, this done, three persons could be one man and each [230]divine person many men, as Saint Thomas consequently grants; and, this posited, it would not be so, as is clear from what has been said.[13] As for the arguments which the Subtle Doctor makes for this side at the beginning of the third [book], he himself answers them clearly enough.[14] And if it is added: "the divine Word [is] more freely joined to Christ than another flesh hypostatically

dicitur quod consequencia non valet per locum a simili. Nam Verbum liberius produxit hoc tempus perpetuum quam Petrus hunc filium; et tamen Verbum non potuit produxisse aliud tempus, quod nec sit illud nec eius pars, licet Petrus potuit alium filium produxisse, ymo filium qui non fuisset pertinens huic nato. Conceditur tamen quod quamcunque carnem spiritus assumpserit vel sibi personaliter uniret,[3] foret solummodo idem homo. Et sic licet homo posset esse aliud quam est modo, quia alia natura corporea, non tamen aliud suppositum vel persona, ut patet in materia De Anima.

joined to flesh; now a soul can be joined to many fleshes; therefore much more the Word to another humanity", the answer is that the inference does not hold by the topic from likeness.[15] For the Word more freely produced this perpetual time than Peter this son; and yet the Word could not have produced another time, which would be neither this one nor a part of it, although Peter could have produced another son, indeed a son who would not have been related to this one born. It is granted, however, that whatever flesh the spirit had assumed or personally united to itself, it would be only the same man. And so, although a man could be another thing than he is now, because another bodily nature, yet not another supposit or person, as is clear in the matter of the *De anima*.[16]

¶9 230.19–231.22

[230]Ex istis colligitur quomodo aliqua insint Verbo pure in quantum Deus; aliqua[4] in quantum homo; et[4] aliqua mixtim. In quantum Deus, creavit mundum; in quantum homo, passus est mortem; et in quantum Deus et homo, redemit hominem. Nec debet signum reduplicatum intelligi utrobique, ut dicat[5] consequenciam formalem logicam et causalem; sicut hic Christus in quantum homo est creatura; sed et[6] quomodolibet dicit causam, ut licet potest esse Deus et non produxisse mundum, tamen deitas fuit[7] causa quare produxit mundum et non sua humanitas. Et licet deitas fuit[8] causa quare paciebatur, non tamen secundum illam; quia tunc fuisset causa formalis vel[9] subiectum passionis; conceditur tamen quod humanitas fuit causa[9] formalis Christi et causa subiectiva mortis: et sic in quantum homo passus est mortem, quia secundum humanitatem. Et [231]intelligendum est in quantum, ut dicat[1] generaliter causam[2] quamlibet parcialem vel totalem, completam vel incompletam. Ego non video quin sane concedi poterit quod, in quantum Deus, paciebatur; cum deitas fuit per se causa illius passionis, sed non secundum deitatem, cum tunc deitas principaliter pateretur. Redempcio autem humani generis pro offensa dicit infinitatem precii proporcionaliter ad delictum; et sic oportet redimentem esse precium infinitum; et per consequens Deum; et preter hoc oportet quod distinguatur essencialiter a solvente, cum non sit possibile quidquam[3] mercari primo et immediate secundum seipsum; et per consequens oportet precium, quod secundum deitatem est infinitum, esse naturam alienam[4] creatam. Cum autem nulla alia potuit pertinere nisi illa que peccaverat, que compendiosissime sit[5] et satisfaciens et precium, mercans et mercatum, reconcilians et reconciliatum; relinquitur quod oportet ipsam esse humanitatem 'mediatorem[6] Dei et hominum, hominem Christum Iesum.' Et sic quidquid infuit sibi formaliter,[7] infuit sibi[7] in quantum Deus; licet non

From these things it is gathered how some things belong to the Word purely insofar as God; some insofar as man; and some in a mixed way. Insofar as God, he created the world; insofar as man, he suffered death; and insofar as God and man, he redeemed man. Nor ought the reduplicated sign to be understood in both places as signifying a formal, logical and causal inference, as here: "Christ insofar as man is a creature"; but also as it signifies a cause in any way whatever; as, although he can be God and not have produced the world, yet the Godhead was the cause why he produced the world, and not his humanity. And although the Godhead was the cause why he suffered, yet not as to it; because then it would have been the formal cause or the subject of the passion; it is granted, however, that the humanity was the formal cause of Christ and the subjective cause of death: and so insofar as man he suffered death, because [he suffered it] as to the humanity. And [231]"insofar as" is to be understood as it signifies generally any cause, partial or total, complete or incomplete.[17] I do not see but that it could soundly be granted that, insofar as God, he suffered; since the Godhead was of itself the cause of that passion, but not as to the Godhead, since then the Godhead would principally suffer. And the redemption of the human race for the offence signifies an infinity of price in proportion to the fault; and so the redeemer must be an infinite price, and consequently God; and besides this he must be distinguished essentially from the one paying, since it is not possible for anything to buy, first and without intermediary, according to itself; and consequently the price, which as to the Godhead is infinite, must be a foreign created nature.[18] Now since no other could pertain except that which had sinned, which most compendiously would be both the satisfying and the price, the

omne, quod sibi infuit, inerat secundum quod Deus, nec in quantum homo. Deitas enim fuit per se causa cuiuscunque causati, quod sic infuit Iesu nostro.

buyer and the bought, the reconciler and the reconciled, it remains that it must be the humanity, "the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus".[19] And so whatever was in him formally was in him insofar as (*in quantum*) God; although not all that was in him was in him insofar as (*secundum quod*) God, nor insofar as man.[20] For the Godhead was of itself the cause of anything caused that was thus in our Jesus.

¶10 231.23–231.31

[231]Et si obicitur quod Christus, si in quantum Deus moriebatur, tunc est de racione Dei mori, et indifferenter quelibet persona divina morietur; patet quod consequencia non valet; cum non sit de racione hominis ita mori, cum homo posset esse naturalissime et nec mori[8] nec esse mortalis, id est non habere aptitudinem naturalem nec necessitatem preternaturalem, ut suo tempore moriatur. Ideo tales reduplicative sumuntur satis equivoce ut patet in logica, quam equivocacionem specialiter in illa materia oportet attendere.

And if it is objected that, if Christ insofar as God died, then it is of the account of God to die, and each divine person indifferently will die, it is clear that the inference does not hold; since it is not of the account of man so to die, since a man could be most naturally and neither die nor be mortal, that is, not have a natural aptitude nor a preternatural necessity to die in his time.[21] Therefore such reduplicatives are taken quite equivocally, as is clear in logic; which equivocation it is especially necessary to attend to in that matter.

¶11 231.32–232.7

[231]Ex dictis[8] ergo patet quodammodo qualiter scriptura sacra cum antiquis sanctis doctoribus in materia de Incarnacione [232]Domini ad litteram est sustinenda; et quomodo iacula sophistica modernorum sunt scuto veritatis infallibilis repellenda, ac eorum discordancia equivoca detegenda; ut sic possit theologus in tractando dubia Incarnacionis realia libere sine formidine impugnacionis sophistice procedere in dicenda ad laudem, gloriam, et honorem eiusdem Domini nostri Iesu Christi. Amen.[1]

From what has been said, then, it is clear in some measure how holy scripture, with the ancient holy doctors, is to be upheld to the letter in the matter of the incarnation [232]of the Lord; and how the sophistical darts of the moderns are to be repelled by the shield of infallible truth, and their equivocal discordance exposed; so that thus the theologian, in treating the real doubts of the incarnation, may proceed freely, without misgiving of sophistical attack, in what is to be said, to the praise, glory, and honour of the same our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.[22]

Notes

1. "Is generated": *generatur*, of an argument that arises from a premiss; the first of the arguments for the three rejected cases (227.27–32).
2. "As above": the variation in metaphysics and the moderns' ambition are charged earlier in the treatise; "as is clear above": the fathers' "Christ is something he was not before", argued in the earlier chapters.
3. "A study good in its kind": *studium bonum de genere*, an act good by its kind (generically good), short of goodness in all its circumstances. B marks *circa* for omission (228.15); O reads *hominum* for *bonum* (228.16); A B C omit *vel* (228.17).
4. "Indeed": *quidem*, with all the manuscripts, against the print's *enim* "for", which Harris supplied (228.19: *pro quidem in omn. codd. inventum enim supposui*). A B C read *quod* for *quodlibet*; the print, with O, is kept there. A B C read *disparet* for *disperiret* (228.20).
5. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 3, counted serially as "question 7", with a. 4–5 "the two following": whether the Father or the Holy Spirit could have been incarnate, whether several persons could assume one nature, whether one person could assume two. D. 1 q. 1 has four articles, so q. 2 a. 3 is the seventh. The quotation is a. 3 s. c. 1, *sicut dicit Anselmus, omnis necessitas et impossibilitas Deo est subjecta* (Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II.17, PL 158, 421C); the second and third arguments are s. c. 2 and 3, and the arguments at 229.14–29 are a. 4 s. c. 1 and 2 (*verified*).
6. "For him": *sibi*; A B C omit it (228.26).
7. "The assumption": *assumptum*, the logician's premiss (here the quoted proposition), not the assumption of a nature (glossary: *assumere*). "Errs": *peccat.*
8. "In which he takes": *quo capit*, Thomas's second argument. "Of all things equally distant": *omnium*; A B C *omni* (229.6).
9. "Of dignity": *dignitatis*; A B C *dignitas* "is a dignity" (229.10).

10. "With this saint": Thomas, who grants the Father could have been incarnate, and (230.1–2) that three persons so incarnate would be one man: *Scriptum* III d. 1 q. 2 a. 3 co., *pater potuit carnem assumere … loquendo de potentia absoluta*, and a. 4 ad 6, *dicerentur tres unus homo* (*verified*). The last words are in Harris's italics, as a formula, and are quoted here; *ordinata / absoluta* is the pair of God's ordained and absolute power.
11. "More qualified": *habilior*, the print's reading; A B C read *humilior* "humbler", and O has *hîlior*, an abbreviation that may stand for either (229.20). With O doubtful the manuscripts do not agree across the families, and the print stands. O reads *in* before *illa* (229.18), *assumpsit* (229.19), and omits *humanitas a qualibet* (229.22).
12. B omits *et … organo* (229.26–29); for *uniri* (229.30) A B put *copulari* at the end of the sentence, and C has neither.
13. The case yields both "three persons would be one man" (as Thomas grants) and, by what has been said, "it would not be so"; hence the case is impossible. A B C read *queritur* (229.31); A B *possunt* (229.32); O *in* for *et* (230.2).
14. Scotus, *In III Sent.* (*Ordinatio*) d. 1 q. 2, *Utrum tres personae possint assumere eandem naturam numero*: the opening arguments *quod sic* (Wadding VII.1, 34–35), which Scotus answers under *Ad argumenta principalia* (*verified*).
15. "Another flesh": *aliam*, with C O, against the print's *aliquam* "any flesh" (230.6). "The topic from likeness": *locus a simili*.
16. "The *De anima*": Harris italicizes the words as a title; Harris's Notes on 1.3 count this place among the references to Wyclif's own unprinted *De anima* (*It is referred to infra, pp. 7, 22, 44, 203, 230*). C reads *unierit*, O *vineret* for *uniret* (230.15).
17. "As it signifies": *ut dicit*, with all the manuscripts, against the print's *ut dicat* "so as to signify" (231.1), Harris's emendation. B omits *causam*; O omits *aliqua … et* (230.20) and *ut dicat* (230.24), and reads *in* for *et* (230.26) and *divinitas sint / sit* for *deitas fuit* (230.27, 230.29); C omits *vel … causa* (230.30–31).
18. "Anything": *quidquam*; O *quemquam* "anyone" (231.11). "Foreign": *alienam*, a nature other than the divine; O *aliam* "another" (231.13). A B C omit *sit* (231.15).
19. 1 Timothy 2:5. A omits *mediatorem* (231.17).
20. The two reduplications are kept apart here: *in quantum* in the wide causal sense just defined (231.1–3), *secundum quod* of the formal cause only, as *secundum deitatem* above. B omits *formaliter … sibi* (231.19).
21. "Of the account of": *de racione*, part of what it is to be God or man. O reads *mîori* for *mori* (231.27).
22. After *Amen* B adds: "Here ends the treatise *de incarnacione* of M. I. Wy., in the year of the Lord 1433. To the scribe for his pen let everlasting joys be given. Let the thief of this sheet be hurt by the devil's art. Et cetera." C has: "Here ends the treatise *de benedicta incarnacione* of the reverend master John Wycleph. Let all things say Amen. If the end is good, then the whole is praiseworthy."
How the Latin of this passage was established

- **Plate readings**; page · reading · note):
  - 229: *incarnari—vel—quod* (print as transcribed) [SUB]
- **Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English** (margin matter): reference 1 Tim- 5- (231.17).

Glossary

The renderings held steady across the translation. Each row: the Latin term, its English, and a note where the choice needs defending.

The church

ecclesia: church. Lower-case in English except in a proper title.
ecclesia militans / triumphans / dormiens: the church militant / triumphant / sleeping. *Dormiens* = the souls in purgatory. Not "dormant".
pars peregrinans; peregrinari: the pilgrim part; to be a pilgrim. Augustine's *peregrinatio* (Ench. 56).
predestinatus, -i: the predestinate (sg. "a predestinate [person]"). Never "the elect", which is *electi* and gets "the elect".
prescitus, -i: **the foreknown**. Wyclif's technical term for those God foreknows will be damned. It is **not** "the reprobate" (*reprobi* → "the reprobate"). Explain it in a note at its first occurrence in **each work**. The English word misleads on its own and Penn explains it only once (T. p. 361 n. 12).
presciencia: foreknowledge.
viator: wayfarer. One still on the road, not yet in the homeland. Loserth: "a traveller on earth".
viare; vians: to be a wayfarer; [one] on the way. The verb of *viator*; tag g:viator. (8 sites).
via / patria: the way / the homeland. *Beatitudo patrie* → "the blessedness of the homeland". The earthly sense (one's native country) is also "homeland"; a note where it matters (*Dial.* 54.2).
sponsa / sponsus: bride / bridegroom.
corpus Christi misticum: the mystical body of Christ.
mater nostra: our mother. Church as mother is the governing figure of *De ecclesia* I.
symbolum: creed. *Utrumque simbolum* = both creeds, Apostles' and Nicene (T. p. 368).
fides formata / informis: formed faith / unformed faith. Faith formed by charity.
fides explicita / implicita: explicit faith / implicit faith. The scholastic pair (*Dial.* 28.16–17)..
articulus fidei: article of faith. (4 sites).
infidelis: unbeliever; with a dative, faithless (to). Two senses by construction. Pairs with *infidelitas*, unbelief. (10 sites).
apocrifa; apocrifus: apocrypha; apocryphal. Wyclif applies it to the saints' chronicles as well as to books outside the canon. (6 sites).
sacerdotes vulgares: common priests. The adjective; kept apart from *vulgares*, "the common people". (2 sites).
neophitus: novice. 1 Tim. 3:6..
Christicole: worshippers of Christ. .
caritas: charity. Never "love". *Amor* and *dilectio* → "love". The argument often turns on charity as the Holy Spirit (Lombard, *Sent.* I d.17).
suffragia: suffrages. The prayers and good works shared out by the church or an order. (11 sites).
suffragari: to aid by intercession. The verb of *suffragia*. (2 sites). Where privileges or law, not prayers, do the aiding: "to aid" (*Eccl.* 241.1; cf. *suffragium* "aid").
litere fraternitatum: letters of fraternity. Friars' letters admitting a benefactor to the order's suffrages. (4 sites).
canonizare: canonize. The same English whether pope or scripture canonizes (*Dial.* 20.31, 21.1). (6 sites).
viantes: those on the road. The participle beside *viator* (wayfarer); kept distinct so the reader sees which word Wyclif used. (≈22 sites in *De ecclesia*; first *Eccl.* 10.12).
capitaneus: captain. Kept apart from *caput* "head": Wyclif grants the pope captaincy and denies him headship. (*Eccl.* 17.13, 19.21–24, 22.8).
matrix ecclesia: mother church. The local mother church (cathedral or metropolitan); a **C** note at the first occurrence in each chunk, to keep it apart from the church as *mater nostra*. (*Eccl.* 23.12).
universitas fidelium: the whole body of the faithful. (*Eccl.* 37.13).
obedienciarius: one who obeys. Non-classical agent noun: the subject bound to obey (not the monastic officer). (*Eccl.* 39.3).
elemosinarius: almsman. The one who receives alms (cf. *elemosinatus*). (46.21).
caput: head. The card's key ruling, now a row: Christ alone is head of the church; kept apart from *capitaneus* "captain"..
speculator: watchman. The bishop as watchman (Ezek. 3:17). (*Eccl.* 55.16).
ecclesiastici: CONTEXTUAL: clergy / those who belong to the church. Usually the clergy; where Wyclif means every member of the church (*Eccl.* 81.4) render "those who belong to the church" and write a **C** note..
placitare: plead at law. (85.8).
iuvencula: young girl. The church militant as Christ's young bride; kept apart from the Song's *adolescentula* "young maiden" (DR). (*Eccl.* pp. 23, 37, 94.27).

adolescentula: young maiden. Song 1:2, 6:7 (DR "young maidens")..
prepositura: office of superior. The abstract beside *prepositi*. (95.3).
filii imitacionis: sons of imitation. Children of Abraham by imitating him, not by flesh. (89.27, 90.7).
regalia: regality. The king's royal right. (*Eccl.* 148.3, 151.12, 152.12).
forisfacere: commit forfeiture. (152.13).
ecclesia laycalis / secularis: the lay church / the secular church. (154.15, 156.3).
orator: CONTEXTUAL: bedesman / advocate / suppliant. Plural *oratores* "bedesmen" (Dialogus ruling); of one who pleads the church's cause (*orator ecclesie*, *Eccl.* 165.25, 166.4) "advocate", with a **C** note.. Of one who prays to God himself (*devotus Dei orator*, *Pot. pape* 68.17) "suppliant", with a **C** note.
privilegium / privilegiare / privilegiacio: privilege / to privilege / privileging. The key term of *Eccl.* 8–9..
exempcio: exemption. (*Eccl.* 9).
furce et puteus: gallows and pit. The franchise of capital justice. (*Eccl.* 9).
expropriacio: renunciation of property. Never "expropriation" (seizure). (*Eccl.* 9).
uxoratus: married. .
membrum: member. The card's key ruling, now a row (with *caput*)..
vicarius Christi: vicar of Christ. The card's ruling, now a row..
elemosinans: almsgiver. The participle of *elemosinare*: the donor. (*Eccl.* 13).

Lordship, law, office

dominium: **lordship**. Not "dominion". Titles: *De civili dominio* → *On Civil Lordship*; *De dominio divino* → *On Divine Lordship*.
dominus; dominari: lord; to exercise lordship / to lord it. Pick by context (neutral vs. pejorative) and note the pejorative.
dominium civile / naturale / evangelicum: civil / natural / evangelical lordship.
regnum: kingdom. Every sense: the political state as well as the kingdom of God and scripture's kingdoms. Not "realm". Wilson, (27 sites).
dominacio: exercise of lordship. Kept apart from *dominium*. (6 sites).
ordinacio; ordinancia: ordinance; of the sacrament, ordination. Two senses by referent (not CONTEXTUAL): the sacrament (*clericorum ordinacio*, *Dial.* 50.21) is "ordination"; everywhere else "ordinance". (22 sites). Third referent, the logician's arrangement of terms in a proposition (*Incarn.* 49.10): "ordering", with a **C** note.
consuetudo: custom. (28 sites).
autorizare: authorize. (6 sites).
familia: household. A great man's retinue..
magnates: magnates. .
capitalis dominus; tenere de: chief lord; to hold of. Feudal tenure language, kept literal: the lords "hold of Christ as chief lord".
titulus: title. As in title to property.
servicium: service. Pair with *dominium* (T. p. 363 n. 19 on the definitions). Liturgical *servicia ecclesie*, "services of the church", is untagged..
ius: right / law. Two senses (subjective right vs. body of law). The chunk's note picks one wherever it matters.
lex dei / lex Christi / lex evangelica: God's law / the law of Christ / the gospel law.
vicarius deitatis / vicarius humanitatis Christi: vicar of the Godhead / vicar of Christ's humanity. King and priest respectively (*Dial.* 2.14–16; *Off. reg.* 13, 137).
deitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity. Kept distinct; B reads *divinitatis* at *Dial.* 2.13.
potencia regulata racione: power regulated by reason.
elemosina: alms.
elemosinare; elemosinatus: to give alms to; almsman. The almsman is the beneficiary of an endowment. (2 sites).
manus mortua: the dead hand. Mortmain; kept literal because Truth's pun turns on it (*Dial.* 60.18, 61.14–17). (3 sites).
ditare: to enrich. Kept apart from *dotare*, endow. (21 sites).
appropriare; appropriacio: to appropriate; appropriation. Canon law: a parish church annexed to a college or house. (4 sites).
affeccio proprietaria: proprietary affection. .
decime; pars decima: tithes; the tenth part.
dotacio: endowment.
temporalia: temporal goods.
prelatus: prelate.
curatus: curate. In the old sense: a priest with the cure of souls. Note at first occurrence per work.

sacerdos / presbiter: priest / presbyter. Kept distinct: Wyclif's argument on orders needs the difference visible.
clerus; clericus: the clergy; cleric.
clerus cesareus: the caesarean clergy. Wyclif's term for clergy in secular office.
temporales domini: temporal lords. Kept apart from *mundani domini*, worldly lords. (22 sites).
brachium seculare: the secular arm. (7 sites).
milicia; milites: knighthood; knights. The second estate; Pollard's word.. *Milites Christi / antichristi* (the Pauline figure, 2 Tim. 2:3 DR "good soldier of Christ Jesus") ⟶ "soldiers"; the estate stays "knights"..
coactivus; cohercere, cohersitivus: coactive; coerce, coercive. Kept apart: *potencia coactiva* "coactive power" (the ruler's), *cohercere* "coerce"..
laboratores: labourers. The third estate..
tercia pars ecclesie: the third part of the church. The commons (*Dial.* 85.15, 85.22)..
prepositi: superiors. Heads of houses; kept apart from *prelatus*..
ius patronatus: right of patronage. .
prescripcio: prescription. The legal title by long use..
sacramentalia: sacramentals. .
secularitas: worldliness. Kept apart from *secularis*, a secular..
simonia: simony. (3 sites).
beneficium ecclesiasticum: ecclesiastical benefice. .
patronus: patron. Of a benefice. (13 sites).
procurator; procuratrix: proctor. Pollard's word..
gleba: glebe. (12 sites).
mortificacio: amortization. Land put into mortmain; with *manus mortua*. (2 sites). Of a privilege that dies by abuse (*mortificacio privilegii*, *Eccl.* 200.17): "mortification", with a G note.
legalitas: legal standing. .
castra caynitica: Caim's castles. The friars' houses; the Wycliffite English name (CAIM = the four mendicant orders' initials)..
commutacio; commutare: exchange; to exchange. The argument on true and false trade turns on it (*Dial.* cap. 33). (8 sites).
secularis (noun): a secular. English keeps Latin's range (secular cleric or layman); a C note where the referent matters. (80 sites, *secular-*).
censura: censure. (4 sites).
citare; citacio: to cite; citation. Summons to a church court. (12 sites).
suspendere; suspencio: to suspend; suspension. Note the pun on hanging where live (*Dial.* 57.10–16)..
graduacio; graduati: CONTEXTUAL: graduation / gradation; graduates. Academic "graduation" (Dialogus, 4 sites); of rank or lordship (*graduacio dominii*, *Pot. pape* 293.33, 297) "gradation".; CONTEXTUAL.
prelatus / sacerdos cesarius: caesarean prelate / priest. Extends *clerus cesareus*. (22 sites, *cesar-*).
papa: pope. (34 sites).
indulgencie: indulgences. (7 sites).
oratores: bedesmen. Those bound or paid to pray for a benefactor; Pollard's side-note word. Not "those who pray". (5 sites).
pencio annua: yearly pension. (3 sites).
commercium; commercari: trade; to trade. (21 sites).
conducentes: those who hire them. .
episcopus; dominus episcopus: bishop; the lord bishop. *Dominis episcopis* ⟶ "the lord bishops". The courtesy is his, possibly barbed; don't sharpen it.
religio privata; secta: private religion; sect. His name for the religious orders. Keep "sect".
religiosi: the religious. Members of the orders. (8 sites).
claustrales: cloisterers. (20 sites).
doctrina: doctrine. Kept apart from *sentencia*, teaching. (12 sites).
thema: theme. The scripture text of a sermon. (2 sites).
frater: friar (of the mendicants) / brother. By context.
possessionati: the possessioners. Endowed religious.
satrapa: satrap. Derogatory: church-court officials wielding delegated power (T. p. 378 n. 58). Keep the word; note it at first occurrence per work.
vulgares: the common people. The third estate. Not "the vulgar".
iconomus (= oeconomus): householder. *Dial.* 2.21., with a note.

protestacio; protestari: declaration; to declare solemnly. The submission formula ("if anyone can teach me this is contrary to scripture or reason, I will humbly retract"). Penn and Lahey both inverted it (T. pp. 369, 378). Render it as a retraction offer, never as defiance.
lex gracie: the law of grace. The new law, opposed to *lex vetus*. (*Dial.* 10.3; 7 sites).
curia romana: the Roman curia. (*Dial.* 7.8; 5 sites).
heretica pravitas: heretical depravity. The heresy courts' formula; keep it recognisable. (*Dial.* 7.5, 7.8).
plenitudo potestatis: plenitude of power. The canonists' term for papal power. (6 sites in *De ecclesia*; first 13.6).
bigamia: bigamy. Canon-law sense: a second marriage (successive, or to a widow), a bar to orders; a **C** note at the first occurrence in each chunk says so. (3 sites; first *Eccl.* 11.6).
habitudo: CONTEXTUAL: condition / respect. "Condition": a person's present state, set against predestination (Richard of St Victor). *Habitudo ad*: "condition toward", a relation (180). (*Eccl.* 72.24). "Respect": the logical relation under which a predicate holds (*posiciones secundum habitudinem*), with a **C** note (Wilson; *Incarn.* 4.16).
humidum radicale / fluens: radical / flowing moisture. The physicians' terms. (75.19).
de virtute sermonis: in the proper sense of the words. Wyclif's recurring formula for the literal force of an expression. (*Eccl.* 115.6, 115.8).
distrahens: diminishing qualifier. The logicians' *determinacio distrahens*, which takes away from what it qualifies ("a dead man"). (*Eccl.* 128.3).
locus a maiori: the topic from the greater. The dialectical topic; for *a simili* see "the topic from likeness". (*Eccl.* 144.27).
ficticia: fiction. A feigned ground in an objection (*Nec valet ficticia*). (145.19).
gracia preveniens / comitans / concomitans / consumans: prevenient / accompanying / concomitant / consummating grace. (06-g).
allegare / allegacio: allege / allegation. To cite as an authority; implies nothing about truth (the period sense). (*Eccl.* 162–165; as earlier chunks).
insolubilia: insolubles. The logicians' paradoxes of self-reference. (*Eccl.* 175.11).
perquisitum: acquisition. Property acquired, not inherited (the legal term). (*Eccl.* 215.4).
contribules: countrymen. Lev. 25:17 (DR). (208.2, 214.20, 214.27).
franchisia: franchise. (*Eccl.* 239.22).
facinus: misdeed. Wyclif equates it with "felony" (239.13, 239.21)..
privilegiandus: the one to be privileged. (*Eccl.* 12).
elemosina temporalis / perpetua: temporary alms / perpetual alms. "Temporary" keeps it apart from *temporalia*; *perpetua* answers to frankalmoign. Where the sense is alms *paid in* temporal goods (as 335.11), "alms in temporal goods", with a C note. (*Eccl.* 13, 15).
manucapcio: mainprise. (270.13).
autenticus / autenticacio: authentic / authentication. The key term of *Eccl.* 13..

Logic, disputation, metaphysics

quiditas: quiddity. Kept. Explain at first use per work ("what a thing is").
inconveniencia; inconveniens: CONTEXTUAL: an absurdity (in argument) · troubles, ill consequences (in affairs). One word for what does not fit: the absurd consequence of a premiss, and the disorder that follows from an act. Dikaiosune rule: English by context, **C** note at first occurrence in each chunk and wherever it leans the other way (*Dial.* 22.16 troubles; 23.2, 23.16 absurdities). (3 sites).
opinio: opinion. Opposed to *fides* throughout (*Dial.* 20.24–31). (11 sites).
credulitas: credence. With *credere*, believe (*Dial.* 23.17–24.4)..
argumentum topicum: topical argument. Merely probable, not demonstrative. (4 sites).
medium inductivum: a middle term that leads on. (*Dial.* 25.5).
ars obligacionis: the art of obligation. The disputation genre *de obligationibus*. (2 sites).
assumptum: the assumption. The premiss taken for the argument. (3 sites).
sentenciare: to pronounce. The verb of *sentencia*. (2 sites).
predicamentum: category. The Aristotelian category; never "predicament" (*Dial.* 92.1: the standard member of a category)..
sequela: CONTEXTUAL: what follows / following. The logical consequence "what follows"; of following Christ (*sequela Christi*) "following" (*Pot. pape* 63.13).; second sense.
practizare: to put into practice. (4 sites). With *contra* + person, "practise against" (plot), *Dial.* ch. 17..
sophisticare (transitive): to counterfeit. Kept apart from *sophisticari*, to play the sophist..
respectus; respectivus: relation; relational. .
racio (against substancia*)*: aspect. This technical sense only; *racio* elsewhere by context..
locus a simili: the topic from likeness. Wyclif's jibe *a simiali similitudine*: "from apish likeness". (6 sites).
sinderisis: synderesis. .
fallacia: fallacy. .

sophisticari: to play the sophist. (6 sites).
insinuativus: implied. Paired with *expressus*, express..
occasionaliter: by occasion. Occasion, not cause..
quid nominis: what the name means. Not "the name" (T. p. 365).
differencia: difference (logical *differentia*).
subiectum / passio: subject / attribute. *Passio* in the *Posterior Analytics* sense (a proper attribute), never "passion".
dicitur multipliciter: is said in many ways. Aristotle's *pollachōs legetai.*
sumitur pro: is taken for. Supposition language.
famosior: best-known [sense].
simpliciter / secundum quid: **without qualification / in a certain respect**. Always opposable. Never "simply", "wholly", "directly", "naturally" etc. (T. p. 364).
necessitas supposicionis / ex supposicione: necessity of supposition / necessity on supposition. Conditional necessity.; *ex supposicione* (34.12, 38.22).
de congruo / de condigno: by congruity / by condignity.
contingens ad utrumlibet: contingent either way. T. p. 364.
consequencia: inference. Not "consequence" (T. p. 361 n. 13).
consequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent.
sequitur: it follows. Introduces a stated inference, often quoted in the next words. Not tagged where it is not an inference ("the third law follows", *Dial.* ch. 5)..
propositio copulativa / disiunctiva: conjunction / disjunction. Not "copulative proposition" (T. p. 365).
claudit contradictionem / contradictorium: it implies a contradiction. Stronger than "is against reason". Keep the escalation visible.
instancia; objectum: objection. Not "instance" (T. p. 373). Also "urgency" (*ad instanciam*, at someone's urging, *Eccl.* 154.16), with a **C** note.
tollere (instanciam, argumentum): to dispose of, demolish. T. p. 373.
redarguere: to refute. T. p. 365.
proponere: to propose. Against *postponere* (put after), "put forward" may keep the pair visible, with a note (*Dial.* 74.25–26).
concludere: to infer. "Conclude" only when a conclusion is literally drawn (T. p. 365).
instatur; obicitur: it is objected. The disputation's objection formulae (*Eccl.*). (Wilson, with the *De ecclesia* card).
dicitur (opening an answer): the answer is. Elsewhere "it is said" (*Hic dicitur quod …*, *Eccl.* 26.8: "To this the answer is that …"). (Wilson).
respondetur: the reply is. (Wilson).
descripcio: definition. Not "description" (T. p. 363).
glosare: to gloss. Interpret so as to remove the difficulty (T. p. 366).
argucie; argucia: stratagems, quibbles; a quibble. T. p. 367.
sophisma: sophism. A proposition that can apparently be proved and disproved (T. p. 360 n. 10).
successivum / permanens: successive entity / permanent entity. T. p. 368 n. 31.
ens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence. *Esse* is ambiguous; note when it matters.
universale; ydea: universal; idea.
ampliacio: ampliation. Logical term (T. p. 364 n. 23).
metaphisica: metaphysics. *Inter omnes metaphisicas* → "among all the metaphysics": he counts the doctrine of the church as one (T. p. 368).
philosophia sermocinalis / realis: the philosophy of language / the philosophy of reality. T. pp. 364–5.
liberum arbitrium: free choice. The scholastic term, not "free will" (*voluntas*). (*Dial.* 4.15).
ex fide: as faith teaches; with a genitive, from the faith of [scripture]. "It is of faith", on scripture's authority. *Ex fide scripture / duplicis testamenti* → "from the faith of scripture / of the twofold testament". after a census (30 sites in the *Dialogus*). An adjective works like the genitive: *ex fide catholica* → "from the catholic faith". Not the formula when a verb or participle governs *ex* (*racio capta ex fide* → "reason drawn from faith", epil-a)..
citra fidem: short of faith. The contrast with *ex fide*: held on evidence, not as faith teaches. (4 sites).
sentencia: CONTEXTUAL: teaching / sentence. The position taught, incl. Falsehood's (*tua sentencia*, "your teaching"). Not "sentence" for a position taught. (51 sites in the *Dialogus*). A judicial sentence (of excommunication) is "sentence", with a **C** note (*Eccl.* 221.33).
evidencia: evidence. "Proof" only where it names a demonstration, with a note. (41 sites).
repplicacio; repplicare: rejoinder; to rejoin · of a grant, renewal. Two senses by referent: the disputation move / the re-grant of a charter or privilege (*Dial.* 70.24).
concessio: grant. Of property or privilege. (5 sites).
exproprietarii / exproprietarie: the propertyless / without property. The friars who profess to own nothing. (6 sites); the adverb (*Eccl.* 169.6); the adjective (*status exproprietarius*) "propertyless" (*Pot. pape* 146.25).
reditus: revenue(s). (23 sites). Exception: *Dial.* 18 (ch. 9 n5), *reditus* = the clergy's "return" (to wealth), on *revertatur* 15.9 / *redire* 15.21; the note gives "revenue" as the alternative..

*formido (*sine / cum formidine*)*: misgiving. The scholastic "fear of the opposite" that qualifies assent; "fear" only where it is plainly the emotion. (19 sites in *De ecclesia*; first 5.24).
capitas: headship. Non-classical abstract of *caput* (*officium capitatis*). (*Eccl.* 18.19; B *capitis*).
obicitur per: it is objected, by appeal to. Parallel to *arguitur per.* (*Eccl.* 21.27).
aggregative: aggregatively. The church taken as an aggregate of its members. (26.21).
de inesse: as a matter of fact. The assertoric (non-modal) proposition. (31.22).
sillogismus expositorius / expositorie: expository syllogism / expositorily. A syllogism with a singular middle term. (28.13, 31.11).
influxus / influere: inflow / flow in. The head's inflow of grace into the members; not "influence" (which renders *influencia*). (33–34).
*confuse / confusus (*fides, noticia*)*: indistinct(ly). The scholastic *cognitio confusa*: known in the whole, not in its parts; never "confused". (42.19, 46.2, 46.6).
viacio: wayfaring. The state of the *viator.* (42.30).
citra Christum: short of Christ. As *citra fidem.* (45.8).
*color (*non est color*)*: colour (a plausible ground). The period sense, as in "colour of title"; never "pretext". A **C** note at the first occurrence in each chunk. (Wilson; *Eccl.* 21.18, 23.5, 23.7).
fucus: disguise; pretence. CONTEXTUAL. "Disguise" of hypocrisy, its recurring use (*Eccl.* 51.23, 53.24). "Pretence" of a specious argument (*ex isto fuco concluditur*, *Pot. pape* 12-f).; merged with the *Pot. pape* row.
glosa: gloss. The noun beside *glosare.* (52.10).
*vocatus (*vocata bona, vocata ecclesia*)*: so-called. (55.6, 62.7).
libertas arbitrii: freedom of choice. Beside *liberum arbitrium.* (60.18).
digestio: digestion. The recurring figure of the four digestions (Rom. 8:30). (60.29 ff.).
concorporacio: concorporation. Incorporation into one body (Loserth's own English). (73.11).
capitaliter: as head (as chief lord). (64.33, 76.9). Of a crown worn on the head (Apoc. 12:1, *Pot. pape* 143.20): "at her head", with a C note.
penaliter: in hardship. The adverb of *penalitas.* (76.29, 76.34).
participium: participation. Not the grammatical participle, except where Wyclif is doing grammar (*Pot. pape* 21.24 *participium neutrum*, G note). (85.6).
suffragium sensus: aid of sense. As *suffragium* "aid"; not the church's *suffragia.* (97.22).
dyameter / costa: diameter / side. The geometers' terms (the square's incommensurable diagonal). (97.21 ff.).
dulia / latria: dulia / latria. Kept as the theologians' terms, glossed once per chunk. (95.17).
conclusio: conclusion. The disputation formula (card)..
terminus communis: common term. Aristotle's common boundary of a continuum (*Cat.* 6). (*Eccl.* 104.23 ff., 107.23).
capitari / capitatus: to be headed / headed. The verb beside *capitas.* (116.21, 117.2–3).
tyriaca: theriac. The medieval antidote to poison; a recurring medical figure, with *apostema.* (130.21, 131.1).
inobedienciarius: disobedient man. The negative of *obedienciarius.* (146.11).
*suffragium (*legis, privilegii*)*: aid. As *suffragium* "aid" (01-a) and *suffragium sensus.* (149.29, 152.8).
ingratitudo: ingratitude. Toward a person. (156.8).
indoles: promise. The natural promise of a thing (the midwives' argument, *Eccl.* 163.18, 164.1–12; Comestor reads *de dolo*)..
colorare: give colour to. The verb beside *color.* (163.2).
minoritas: lesser standing. Beside *maioritas* "greatness". (172.22).
philargiria: love of money. 1 Tim. 6:10 *radix omnium malorum cupiditas*..
mundialitas / secularitas: mundanity / worldliness. Kept apart. (*Eccl.* 9).
laureola: aureole. The theologians' special crown (of virgins, martyrs, doctors)..
sagena: dragnet. Matt. 13:47..
impetrare: obtain (by request). .
indispensabilis: not to be dispensed. .
falsigraphus: false writer. The one who sets out false figures or texts. (*Eccl.* 9).
iugum: yoke (a pair). (*Eccl.* 202.9 ff.).
ociatores: men of leisure. (201.27).
*irreatus (*pene*)*: non-liability (to penalty). Non-classical abstract. (*Eccl.* 239.30).
subintelligere: understand as implied. Recurs through *Eccl.* 12..
distribucio accomoda: accommodated distribution. The logicians' term. (268.19).
compossibilis: compossible. (271.13).
satispassio: satispassion. Set against *satisfaccio.* (270.11).

humanitas: the humanity. The nature the Word assumed, body and soul; with the article (*humanitas sit Christus*, "the humanity is Christ"). Not "the human nature", which is *natura humana*. (Wilson; *Incarn.* prol, 1).
*incommunicans / incommunicantes (*nature*)*: that do not communicate (with one another). None predicated of, or shared with, another (Godhead, body, soul). Not "incommunicable": keep the participle. (Wilson; *Incarn.* 1.4).
*dimittere / dimissio (*naturam*)*: lay aside / the laying-aside. Letting go the assumed nature, so the union would be dissolved. (Wilson; *Incarn.* prol, 2.23).
*assumere / assumpcio (*naturam*)*: assume / assumption. Of the nature, as in the fathers. Kept apart from the logician's *assumptum* "the assumption" (above): C note where the logical sense occurs. (Wilson; *Incarn.* prol, 1).
*triduum (*in triduo*)*: the three days. Death to resurrection, body in the tomb (Lombard, *Sent.* III d. 22). (Wilson; *Incarn.* prol).
ydemptitas specifica: identity of species. That Christ and other men are of one species. Not "specific identity" (reads as "particular"). (Wilson; *Incarn.* prol, 8).
Verbum: the Word. Pronoun **"he"** (as Douay–Rheims John 1:3, "by him"), never "it", though the Latin is neuter; so also *Sapiencia* where Wisdom is the Word in person (*Incarn.* 7). (Wilson; *Incarn.* prol 2.3–4).
homo assumptus: the assumed man. A term of art (the Lombard's first opinion, *Sent.* III d. 6); keep "assumed" before "man", never "the man assumed". With the agent expressed (*homo assumptus a Verbo*) "the man assumed by the Word", which cannot be misread. (Wilson; *Incarn.* 5.15).
secundum quod (reduplicative): insofar as. Never "in that" (heard as "because", which inverts the logic). (Wilson; *Incarn.* 5.29–6.24).
secundum deitatem / secundum humanitatem: as to the Godhead / as to the humanity. The rule of reduplication; keep it in Wyclif's place in the sentence. Never supply "as God / as man" where the Latin has bare apposition (*ipse Deus*) or bare predication. (Wilson; *Incarn.* 1).
natura: nature. (Wilson; *Incarn.* 3.4).
persona: person. (Wilson; *Incarn.* 4.14).
creatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created. Never "creation" for the created thing. (Wilson; *Incarn.* 1).
posicio / proposicio / predicacio: position / proposition / predication. Kept apart: the apparatus shows the three trading places (*Incarn.* 4.15). (Wilson).
verificari (de): be true (of). The logicians' sense; not "verified" (modern "checked"). (Wilson; *Incarn.* 7.6).
sacramentum (of the incarnation, of creation): sacrament. The Augustinian sense, "mystery" (1 Tim. 3:16): G note at the first occurrence in the chunk. Kept apart from *misterium*. (Wilson; *Incarn.* prol 1.8).
misterium: mystery. (Wilson; *Incarn.* prol 1.3).
moderni doctores / moderniores doctores: the modern doctors / the more modern doctors. Ockham and the *moderni*, usually unnamed. (Wilson; *Incarn.* prol 2.1).
sancti: the saints. The fathers. (Wilson; *Incarn.* prol 1.15).
probabiles doctores: reputable doctors. *Probabilis*: worthy of credence (cf. *probabiliter*). (Wilson; *Incarn.* 7.1) as "approved doctors"; changed the same day to free "approved" for *approbati*.
approbati doctores: approved doctors. Kept apart from *probabiles doctores*..
adintra: within. Of the divine life *ad intra*..
abstractive: abstractively. .
copulative (adv.): conjunctively. .
ypostatice: hypostatically. .
ypostaticus: hypostatic. *Unio ypostatica* "the hypostatic union"..
novelli: the newer [doctors]. .
determinacio: determination. A qualifying addition to a predicate (*cum determinacione*)..
Sermo (beside Verbum*)*: Speech. The divine title, capitalised; *Verbum* stays "the Word"..
fontaliter: fontally. .
sophistice: sophistically. .
de vi vocis / de vi sermonis: by the force of the words. Kept apart from *de virtute sermonis* "in the proper sense of the words"..
natura specifica: the nature of the species. After *ydemptitas specifica*..
paralogismus: paralogism. .
nuncupative: nuncupatively. "By name only"..
protervus: obstinate. .
*motrix (*anima, virtus*)*: moving. *Anima motrix* "the moving soul"; as a noun, "mover"..
determinaciones ecclesie: the church's determinations. Rulings of the church, not the logician's *determinacio*..
nedum: not only. "Let alone" where the sense is a fortiori..
materia prima: prime matter. .
gracia unionis: the grace of union. .

exinanicio / exinanire / inanicio: emptying / empty. Phil. 2:7 (Douay "emptied himself"); *inanicio* (*Incarn.* 33) the same..
minoracio: lowering. .
humiliacio: humbling. .
coamicus: fellow-friend. .
regnacio: reigning. .
immediate: without intermediary. The scholastic sense, not "at once"..
humanitus: humanly. .
spoliare / spoliacio: despoil / despoiling. Of hell..
suscipere / suscepcio (of the soul, the nature): take up / taking-up. Kept apart from *assumere* "assume"..
suppositum: supposit. .
individuum: individual. .
*machina (*mundi*)*: frame. "The frame of the world"..
omagium: homage. .
limbus: limbo. .
in quantum (reduplicative): insofar as. As *secundum quod*..
unio: union. .
synecdochica locucio: synecdochic locution. .
universitas creaturarum: the totality of creatures. .
pars qualitativa: qualitative part. Body or soul as the parts that make up a man by kind; set against *pars quantitativa*..
diccio (logical): word. A single term in a proposition..
pars discretiva: discrete part. .
intransitive: intransitively. .
dos immortalitatis: dower of immortality. Of the glorified body..
in effectu: in actual fact. As against in potency or in name; not "in effect" (modern "virtually")..
animare: animate. The argument turns on it (45.30–46.4)..
communicacio ydiomatum: communication of idioms. .
predicacio actualis / aptitudinalis / habitudinalis / mixtim: actual / aptitudinal / habitudinal / mixed predication. *Habitudinalis* is its own term (the four MSS at 49.6), not under *habitudo*..
denominativum: denominative. .
Doctor Subtilis: the Subtle Doctor. Scotus..
Deus-homo: God-man. .
convertibilis / converti: convertible / be convertible. Of terms..
previe requisitum: required beforehand. .
forma totalitatis: form of totality. .
quantus: quantified. The adjective beside *quantitas*..
suppositacio: supposition. Kept apart from *supposicio* "supposition"..
construccio synecdochica: synecdochic construction. Beside *synecdochica locucio*..
carneus / carnalis: fleshy / carnal. .
moderniores loquentes: the more modern speakers. .
ampliativus: ampliative. Beside *ampliacio*..
passio (against accio*)*: being-acted-on. The category; G note at the first occurrence in a chunk..
supposibilis: that can be supposited. .
proditor: the traitor. Judas..
dampnificare / dampnificacio: damage / damaging. Kept apart from *dampnum* "loss" and *dampnari* "be damned"; the argument of 65–68 turns on it..
peiorare / peioracio: make worse / worsening. .
*illacio (*mali*)*: bringing-on. .
per se / per accidens: of itself / by accident. .
comprehensor: comprehensor. The blessed, against *viator*..
arraliter: by way of earnest. As a pledge (*arra*)..
locus a sufficienti similitudine / a (sufficienti) divisione: the topic from sufficient likeness / from (sufficient) division. As *locus a simili*..

pretericio: being past. .
solvere / solucio (of the union): loose / loosing. Except inside a Douay quotation (John 10:35 “cannot be broken”)..
adnichilare / adnichilacio: annihilate / annihilation. Wyclif’s *De adnichilacione*..
libere contradictorie: freely, as between contradictories. .
ypostasis: hypostasis. .
insolubilitas: inextricability. As *insolubiliter*..
peccabilis: able to sin. .
medium (logical): middle term. Of a syllogism; elsewhere “means” by context..
inconsequens: inconsistency. Kept apart from *inconveniens* (an unfitting conclusion)..
Donum: the Gift. The Holy Spirit..
ydemptitas ypostatica: hypostatic identity. Beside *ydemptitas specifica*..
passionatus: subject to passion. .
capitales doctores: the chief doctors. .
intricaciones sophistice: sophistical entanglements. .
eiusdem / consimilis / alterius racionis: of the same / like / another kind. The species-sense of *racio*; *racio speciei* “the account of the species” (Aristotle’s *logos*)..
principiari: be constituted from principles. .
univocacio: univocation. .
accidentatus: subject to accidents. .
in recto / in obliquo: in the direct case / in an oblique case. .
illusor: deceiver. .
mobilis / mobilitas: movable / movability. Of Christ’s humanity (ch. 7)..
passibilis: passible. .
signum / signatum: sign / thing signified. .
*conveniencia / convenire (*in*)*: agreement / agree. The argument of 90–91 turns on it; not “fittingness” (that is *congruencia*)..
illusivus: deceptive. Beside *illusor*..
predicacio synecdochica: synecdochic predication. .
paranymphus: paranymph. The bridegroom’s friend (Gabriel)..
humidum infantile / radicale: the moisture of infancy / radical moisture. .
conversari: live one’s life (among men). Beside *conversacio*..
esse intelligibile: intelligible being. .
faccio: making. .
extraneare / extraneacio (supposicionis): estrange / estrangement (of supposition). *Affeccio extraneandi* “an affection of estrangement”..
ministerialiter: ministerially. .
mobile (noun) / primum mobile: a movable / the first movable. Against the adjective *mobilis*; ch. 7 turns on it..
immobilis / immobilitas: immovable / immovability. .
res racionis: thing of reason. .
universitas creata: the created totality. Beside *universitas creaturarum*..
significatum: significate. Kept apart from *signatum* “thing signified”..
anthitesis: antithesis. The grammatical figure (the print’s spelling)..
imbrigabilis: troublesome. .
sermo vocalis: the spoken word. Against *Sermo* “Speech”, the divine title..
predicacio secundum essenciam / formalis: predication by essence / formal predication. Wyclif’s modes of predication (cf. *predicacio secundum causam*)..
forma substancialis: substantial form. .
exclusiva: the exclusive [proposition]. .
redarguere / redargucio: refute / refutation. .
concepcio (figure): conception. The grammatical figure..
antropospatos: anthropopathos. The figure, kept..
habitus (of the humanity): habit. The Lombard’s third opinion (*Sent.* III d. 6)..
reputacio: estimation. .

accidens: accident. The category; *accidit* "befalls"..
habicio: holding. .
habitacio: habitation. .
denominacio respectiva: relational naming. .
figura / figuratum: figure / thing figured. .
incepcio: beginning. .
exceptiva: exceptive [proposition]. Beside *exclusiva*..
conversio (of a proposition): conversion. .
humanitacio: humanation. .
quiditativus: quidditative. Beside *quiditas*..
deduccio: deduction. .
racio (individual, personal): account. *Racio individui / persone* "the account of an individual / a person", as *racio speciei*; not "aspect" (the row against *substancia*)..
vir (against homo*)*: man (*vir*). Where Wyclif sets *vir* against *homo*, the Latin in parentheses..
univocare / univocari: make univocal / be univocal. .
analogicari: be said analogically. .
exemplaria / exemplata: exemplars / things exemplified. .
res secunde intencionis: things of second intention. .
complexio: complexion. The mixture of qualities..
materia proxima / remota: proximate / remote matter. .
personari: be made a person. .
colorate: with colour enough. With a plausible ground (cf. *color*)..
mathematici: mathematicians. The astrologers (configurations of the heavens), C note at first use; not the modern sense..
ydemptificare / ydemptificacio: identify / identification. Make the same (*idem*); the hypostatic union as identification, not conversion or generation..
res communis / res communes: the common thing / common things. The realist universal the *moderni* do not conceive (first root of their error)..
distinccio racionis: distinction of reason. Beside *differencia formalis*..
conversio naturarum / confusio naturarum: conversion of the natures / confusion of the natures. Kept apart from *conversio* of a proposition..
moderni (bare): the moderns. Beside *moderni doctores* "the modern doctors"..
alietas: otherness. .
principiare (active): be the principle of. Beside the passive *principiari* "be constituted from principles"..
subsistencia: subsistence. .
assumere personale: personal assuming. The infinitive used as a noun; kept apart from *assumpcio personalis* "personal assumption"..
moderniores (bare): the more modern. Beside *moderniores doctores* "the more modern doctors"..
supposicio simplex / supposicio personalis: simple supposition / personal supposition. Supposition theory. *Simpliciter / personaliter supponere* "stand with simple / personal supposition": NOT the *simpliciter / secundum quid* pair, C note where the two could be confused..
concretum / abstractum: concrete [term] / abstract [term]. *Homo* the concrete, *humanitas* the abstract..
transsumpcio: transumption. Beside *transsumptive*..
filiacio: sonship. .
personalitas: personality. The scholastic term: what makes a person a person, not character..
nativitas: nativity. Christ's twofold birth..
adextra: outward. Beside *adintra* "within": the works of God toward creatures..
aliud / alius: another thing / another one. The neuter against the masculine (*aliud et aliud, non alius et alius*): natures against persons..
in quid (predicari in quid): in quid. Kept in Latin (predication of what a thing is, as against *in quale*), glossed at first use in a chunk..
suppositari: be supposited. Verb beside *suppositum*, *suppositacio*..
negacio (constituent of the person): negation. The moderns' account: a person = nature + negation of dependence..
dependencia actualis / potencialis / obediencialis: actual dependence / potential dependence / obediential dependence. .
substancia prima / substancia secunda: first substance / second substance. Aristotle, *Cat.* 5..
a simili: by likeness. Bare, as an argument form; beside *locus a simili* "the topic from likeness"..
reduplicativa: reduplicative [proposition]. .
racio substancialis: substantial account. As *racio individui* "account"..

doctores signorum: the doctors of signs. The logicians who reason from terms, not things..
sensibilis (in the definition of animal): sentient. *Substancia animata sensibilis*: able to sense. Elsewhere the §D row "perceptible" holds; G note at first use..
ydemptitas numeralis: numerical identity. Beside *ydemptitas specifica* "identity of species"..
suppositalis: of a supposit. .
fruicio: fruition. The enjoyment of God in beatitude..
accidens absolutum: absolute accident. Quantity and quality, against relative accidents..
augmentacio: augmentation. Growth in quantity (Aristotle's motion of increase)..
risibilis / risibilitas: risible / risibility. The proper attribute of man..
beatificabilitas: beatifiability. .
passionaliter: as an attribute. Beside *passio* (the proper attribute)..
mocio / motus (paired): motion (*mocio*) / movement (*motus*). Only where Wyclif pairs them; otherwise "motion"..
yperdulia: hyperdulia. Beside *dulia / latria*; glossed once per chunk..
posicio anime: the laying-down of the soul. John 10:17–18; not the logical *posicio* "position", C note..
causancia / causacio: causing / causation. Kept apart (both at 187.30–34)..
personare (active) / personacio: make a person / personation. Beside the passive *personari* "be made a person"..
peticio (principii) / petitur: begging [of the question] / is begged. .
vicem supplere / vicis supplecio: supply the place / the supplying of a place. God supplying the place of a second cause..
perfeccio simpliciter: perfection without qualification. After *simpliciter* "without qualification"..
perspectivi: the perspectivists. The writers on optics (*perspectiva*)..
transsubstanciacio: transubstantiation. .
multiplicative: multiplicatively. .
habitudo relativa: relative respect. The "respect" sense of the CONTEXTUAL *habitudo* row..
remitti / intendi (of a quality, merit): be remitted / be intensified. The intension and remission of forms; not *remissio* of sin..
in divinis: among the divine [persons]. Keeps "Godhead" for *deitas*..
partes proporcionales: proportional parts. The halving division of a continuum..
igneitas: fireness. Formed on *humanitas*..
universitas creabilis: the creatable totality. Beside *universitas creaturarum* "the totality of creatures"..
incausabilis: uncausable. .
multiplicacio dimensionalis: dimensional multiplication. One body in several places by its dimensions..
habitus (= possession, habere*)*: the having. The category of having, C note; kept apart from *habitus* "habit"..
proporcio racionalis: rational proportion. The mathematical ratio..
a maiori vel pari: from the greater or from the equal. Arguments *a maiori*; cf. *locus a maiori*..
sensibile commune: common sensible. Aristotle's common sensibles (number, motion, figure); the term of art, against the §D row "perceptible"..
mocio progressiva / motus progressivus: progressive motion. Locomotion..
communioritas: greater commonness. .
multiplicacio concomitancie: multiplication of concomitance. Cf. *gracia concomitancie*..
nomen appellativum: appellative name. .
imposicio primaria: primary imposition. Of a term's first assignment to signify..
assertibile: assertible. The thing a proposition asserts..
superioritas / inferioritas terminorum: superiority / inferiority of terms. .
exponentes: the exponents. The propositions into which a proposition is resolved (expounded)..
homo communis: the common man. The universal man, with *res communis*; not "the ordinary man"..
incommunicabilis existencia: incommunicable existence. Richard of St Victor's definition of person..
moderni loquentes: the modern speakers. Beside *moderniores loquentes*..
congruencia: fittingness. The reasons of fittingness for the Son's incarnation..
temperancia (of a complexion): temperance. The medical balance of qualities; with *complexio*..
bonum de genere: good in its kind. Moral goodness by the kind of act..
mixtim (bare): in a mixed way. Beside *predicacio mixtim*..
signum reduplicatum: the reduplicated sign. The reduplicative word (*secundum quod*, *in quantum*)..

supposicio: supposition. Of a term (supposition theory) or of a premiss laid down (cf. *supponitur* "it is supposed"); the English word serves both, C note where it matters. Kept apart from *suppositacio* "suppositation"..
univocus: univocal. Beside *univoce*, *univocare*..
lex proximitatis: the law of neighbourhood. The duty to love one's neighbour (*proximus*)..
negacio preposita toti: a negation placed before the whole. The negation governing a whole proposition..
Magister: the Master. Peter Lombard. (Wilson; *Incarn.* 3.24).
declarare / ostendere: make clear / show. Kept apart (both in one sentence, prol 2.5–7). (Wilson).
epilogus / epilogare: recapitulation / recapitulate. (Wilson; *Incarn.* 3.25, prol 2.14).
infirmitas (of Christ's flesh): weakness. (Wilson; *Incarn.* 5.31–6.11).

False friends and ordinary words that mislead

sensibilis: perceptible. "sensible" (T. p. 362)
insensibilis: imperceptible; of a thing that cannot feel, without sensation. Two senses by referent: what cannot be perceived / what cannot perceive (*lapis insensibilis*, *Dial.* 56.3). Kept visibly paired with *sensibilis*. (3 sites).
zizania: cockle. Douay–Rheims (Matt. 13:25)..
cautela: wile. Not "caution"; *cautela diaboli*, the devil's wile. (8 sites).
apostema: abscess. A recurring medical figure. (3 sites).
illabi: to flow into. .
sub divo: in the open air. The refrain of cap. 21. (10 sites).
vecors; vecorditer; vecordia: faint-hearted; faint-heartedly; faint-heartedness. The medieval sense, not classical "senseless". (5 sites).
affectare: to desire. Kept apart from *affeccio*, affection. (3 sites).
ingratus: displeasing (to God). *Ingratus deo*: unpleasing to God. "Ungrateful" only where a person is ungrateful to someone. (5 sites).
perplexus: perplexed. The moral-theology sense: bound to sin whichever way one turns..
cataracta: trapdoor. "Floodgate" in a C note where the Genesis image is live..
globus: band. Derogatory collective (*globus reprobus*, *globos claustralium*). (2 sites). Of things (*globus temporalium*): "mass", untagged with a note.
solvere (oaths, charters): to dissolve. Not "pay" in this use..
cohabitacio: joint dwelling. .
idiota: unlearned man. Not "idiot"..
deacceptus: disowned. .
monita: admonitions. .
indebitare se: to make oneself a debtor. Sense doubtful; C note (*Dial.* 85.15)..
discoli: froward. Douay–Rheims (1 Pet. 2:18)..
magisterium: rule; of teaching, the teaching office; *quale magisterium* "what a feat of mastery" (*Incarn.* 137.14). Provisional; by context, C note (*Dial.* 83.15)..
subtiliare: to lighten; to refine (argue subtly). CONTEXTUAL. "Lighten" provisional in *Dial.* 67.19, 68.11 (C note); "refine, argue subtly" of argument (*Pot. pape* 260.8).
infidelitas: heathenism, unbelief. "infidelity" (T. p. 362)
sciolus: knowing, wise. "smatterer" (the classical sense). Neutral in Wyclif.
philocaptus: besotted. "philo-captive" (T. p. 363)
hictericus: jaundiced. "hysterical" (T. p. 366)
impresenciarum: nowadays, at present. (T. p. 366)
ut plurimum: for the most part. "to the highest degree" (T. p. 366)
inhabilis: unqualified (to hold office). "unwieldy" (T. p. 366)
detegere: to expose. "wipe away" (T. p. 366)
ignorare: to be ignorant of. "ignore" (T. p. 366)
disciplinabilis: teachable. "impressionable" (T. p. 366)
laude digni: worthy of praise. (T. p. 366)
arguitur per: it is argued by appeal to. "X raises objections" (T. p. 366)
autonomatice / antonomastice: by antonomasia (pre-eminently).
in necessitatis articulo: at the point of need.

processus (of a book): the course, the argument.
recencius: more freshly.
mulier aliena: strange woman. Proverbs' figure.
mulier fortis: valiant woman. DR Prov. 31:10.
indispositus; (se) indisponere: unfit; to make (oneself) unfit. "indisposed" (now "unwell"). (8 sites).
limitare; limites: to assign (an office); limits. "to limit" for the verb (i.e. never "to assign" where it means to restrict, as beside *restringere*, *Eccl.* 217.10). The noun *limites* stays "limits" (*in limitibus apostoli*). after a census (13 verb, 5 noun).
prevaricator; prevaricancia; prevaricacio: transgressor; transgression; transgression. (*prevaricacio*, *Pot. pape* 155.10). *Basali prevaricancia* (*Dial.* 9.24) is doubtful: see its C note.
carecter, caracter (sensibilis): (perceptible) character. "reputation". The mark of orders. (*Dial.* 5.7).
conversacio: manner of life. "conversation". (6 sites).
mendicacio; mendicare; mendicitas: begging; to beg; beggary. Kept apart; *mendicitas* is DR's "beggary" (Prov. 30:8)..
penalitas: hardship. "penalty"..
gratitudo: kindness (received). "gratitude"..
habere conscienciam super: to be troubled in conscience over. (5 sites).
prioritas; majoritas: priority; greatness. Paired with *prior / major* in the argument (*Dial.* 12.4–8)..
prevaricari: to transgress. The verb of *prevaricator*..
servitivus: serviceable. .
precipui sacerdotes: leading priests. Kept apart from *principes sacerdotum*, "chief priests"..
intendere (a thesis): maintain. Scholastic "hold, argue for": *intendimus quod* → "we maintain that" (epil-a 86.4, 90.19). "Intend" only for purpose..
pietas / pie: piety / piously. Kept apart from *misericordia* "mercy". (*Eccl.* 12).
irreligiositas: irreligion. .
ecclesia cesarea: the caesarean church. The church as endowed by Caesar; pairs with *clerus cesareus* (§B). (*Eccl.* 13).
elemosina cartalis: charter alms. Alms granted by charter. (*Eccl.* 13).
ditarius: almsman. The one enriched by the alms (cf. *ditare*, §B). (*Eccl.* 13).
pseudomonachus: false monk. Kept apart from *pseudofrater* if it appears. (*Eccl.* 13).
elemosinator: almsgiver. Agent noun beside *elemosinans* (same English); *elemosinatus* "almsman" (the 09-28 row governs; conformed, *Eccl.* 16). (*Eccl.* 13).
elemosinacio: almsgiving. *Temporalis elemosinacio* "almsgiving from time to time" against perpetual alms. (*Eccl.* 13).
ius poli / ius fori: the law of heaven / the law of the court. Augustine's pair. (*Eccl.* 14).
mundialis (noun): worldly man. Beside *mundialitas*. (*Eccl.* 14).
nolicio: nolition. Scholastic act of not-willing, against *volicio*. (*Eccl.* 14).
dispensator: dispenser. As DR 1 Cor. 4:1–2; kept apart from *procurator* "proctor". (*Eccl.* 14). Inside a DR quotation of Titus 1:7, DR's "steward".
clericatus: clerical state. (*Eccl.* 14).
in capite (tenure): in chief. Feudal tenure from the king directly. (*Eccl.* 14).
ritus: rite. Any usage or observance, not only liturgical. (*Eccl.* 14).
civilitas: civil standing. Kept apart from *dominium civile* "civil lordship". (*Eccl.* 14).
ydiota: unlettered man. Never "idiot". (*Eccl.* 14).
catholicare / hereticare: to declare catholic / to pronounce heretical. (*Eccl.* 14).
dominatus: lordly rule. Bernard's word (*apostolis interdicitur dominatus*); kept apart from *dominium* "lordship". (*Eccl.* 14).
ablacio: taking-away. Set against *restituere*/*restitucio*. (*Eccl.* 15).
forisfactura: forfeiture. Noun beside *forisfacere* "forfeit". (*Eccl.* 15).
subdominans: holding lordship under. Beside *dominari*. (*Eccl.* 15, 339.6).
redempcio temporalium: redemption of the temporal goods. Chapters buying back seized goods. (*Eccl.* 15, 340.15).
nominetenus clerici: clerics in name only. Recurs (*solum nomine sacerdotes*, 347). (*Eccl.* 15, 340.19). Of a pope (*Pot. pape* 147.31): "pope in name only".
cognoscere super: take cognizance of. Legal sense. (*Eccl.* 15, 340.31).
subautenticus: sub-authentic. Beside *autenticus*. (*Eccl.* 15, 345.15).
ablatarius: the one from whom it is taken. Beside *ablacio* "taking-away". (*Eccl.* 15, 343.7).
salvacio: salvation. Covers bodily and eternal; Wyclif pairs the senses. (*Eccl.* 15, 345.24–26).
virtus: power (faculty) / virtue (moral habit). Split by sense. (*Eccl.* 15, 345).
legii: lieges. (*Eccl.* 15, 343–344).

redempcio (of a sentence): redemption. Buying off a penalty; kept apart from *redempcio temporalium*. C note at first use. (*Eccl.* 15, 352.1).
signa (of an argument): stages. (*Eccl.* 15, 351.19).
oculata fide: with our own eyes. (*Eccl.* 15, 352.27).
susurrones: whisperers. As DR Rom. 1:29. (*Eccl.* 15, 356.13).
pseudoprepositi: false superiors. (*Eccl.* 15, 358.24).
dii subterranei: gods beneath the earth. (*Eccl.* 15, 357.30).
brocardicum / brogardicum: brocard. The schoolmen's stock maxim. (*Eccl.* 16, 360.9).
calumpnia (ponere / capere): challenge (to lay a challenge against / to be open to challenge). The disputant's formal objection to a premiss. (*Eccl.* 16, 363.18, 363.24, 367.11).
usufructus: usufruct. Beside *dominacio evangelica*. (*Eccl.* 16, 365.23).
Romanus pontifex: Roman pontiff. Kept apart from *papa* "pope". (*Eccl.* 16, 366.29).
clerimonia: learning. The clergy's lettered state (ME "clergy"). (*Eccl.* 16, 373–374).
cantaria: chantry. (*Eccl.* 16, 16-d/16-e).
collegiatus: collegiate. (*Eccl.* 16, 16-d/16-e).
dominabilia: the things held in lordship. (*Eccl.* 16, 378.6).
potencia absoluta: absolute power. (*Eccl.* 16, 375).
presbiteri conducticii: hired presbyters. (*Eccl.* 16, 374).
milicia / milites (the clergy as paid spiritual army): soldiery / soldiers. Under the Pauline-figure clause of the 09-28 *milicia; milites* row, which governs; G note at use. The captive knight (381.1–2) stays "knight". (*Eccl.* 16, 384–385).
collacio: CONTEXTUAL: conferral / collection. "Collection" in *collacio proprietatum* (the personal properties gathered, *Incarn.* 129.31). Of a gift or endowment "conferral"; paired with *ablacio* "taking-away". (*Eccl.* 16, 385–386).
ficcio: fiction. As *ficticia*; Wyclif numbers six *ficciones*. (*Eccl.* 16, 385.7).
amerciare; multacio: amerce; fine. Legal terms. (*Eccl.* 16, 387.19–21).
monstracio: muster. (*Eccl.* 16, 384.11).
legalia: the legal precepts. Of the old law, beside *cerimonialia* "ceremonial precepts". (*Eccl.* 17, 389.2–3).
raciuncula: little argument. The opponent's ten arguments. (*Eccl.* 17, 398.15).
signabile: signifiable; assignable. CONTEXTUAL. The logical noun (*omne signabile*, what can be signified) is "signifiable" (*Eccl.* 17, 398.29). As an adjective on a degree, instant or step (*in quocumque gradu/profectu signabili*) it is "assignable", any one could name (*Pot. pape* 11-j, 11-k).; extended (close-out R3).
adequata ecclesia: the adequate church. C note at use. (*Eccl.* 17, 393).
denominacio; denominare: naming; to name. The argument turns on it. (*Eccl.* 17, 391.17, 398.2).
dotes (docium) beatorum; dotes corporis: the dowries of the blessed; the dowries of the body. (*Eccl.* 17, 396.6).
christianus in figura / in effectu / in fructu: Christian in figure / in effect / in fruit. (*Eccl.* 17, 397–398).
Jesuani: Jesuans. (*Eccl.* 17, 400.11).
diffinicio: definition. Beside *descripcio* (also "definition", frozen row governs): where the two stand together a C note gives the Latin. (*Eccl.* 17, 403.25).
humidum naturale: natural moisture. Synonym of *humidum radicale* (row above); G note at use. (*Eccl.* 17, 410.2).
color rethoricus: rhetorical colour. The figure of speech, distinct from *color* "plausible ground". (*Eccl.* 17, 405.3).
argumentum ad hominem: argument to the man. (*Eccl.* 17, 405.13).
habitus fidei: habit of faith. (*Eccl.* 17, 407–408).
pars quantitativa: quantitative part. (*Eccl.* 17, 406–407).
ecclesia nuncupativa: the church in name only. (*Eccl.* 17, 408.27).
secundum presentem iusticiam: according to present justice. As against predestination; "present justice" is the established rendering (11 chunks; 18-a conformed). (*Eccl.* 18, 415–416).
falsarius: falsifier. The opponent's epithet. (*Eccl.* 17, 414.6).
adnascencia: growing-on. Adhesion without being a part. (*Eccl.* 18, 416.15).
species specialissima: most special species. (*Eccl.* 18, 418).
unum per accidens: one by accident. (*Eccl.* 18, 418).
legiste: legists. Civil lawyers. (*Eccl.* 18, 420.20).
persona successiva: successive person. (*Eccl.* 17, 414.1).
capitales (noun): chiefs. (*Eccl.* 18, 424.30).
proprietarius: proprietary. (*Eccl.* 18, 425.5, 427.15).
transsumptive: transumptively. (*Eccl.* 18, 431.30).

circumscriptive: circumscriptively. (*Eccl.* 18, 423.24).
acephala; incapitata: acephalous; unheaded. *Incapitata* pairs with *capitatus*. (*Eccl.* 18, 435.20–23).
possessionatus (adj.): possessioned. The adjective beside the noun *possessionati* "the possessioners". (*Eccl.* 18, 434–435).
pseudocardinales: pseudo-cardinals. (*Eccl.* 18, 426.32).
quadriga diaboli: the devil's four-horse chariot. (*Eccl.* 18, 427.12).
vetula: old woman. (*Eccl.* 18, 431–433).
summi pontifices: highest pontiffs (of popes); high priests (of the Jewish priesthood). Split by referent. (*Eccl.* 18, 424.19, 425.20).
equivoce: equivocally. (*Eccl.* 19, 444; as in 05-a, 06-b, 06-f).
limitacio (ad officium): assignment. Follows *limitare* "to assign" (row above); where it means restriction, "limitation". (*Eccl.* 19, 445).
gracia gratificans: grace that makes pleasing. (*Eccl.* 18, 441.8).
deputacio: deputation. (*Eccl.* 19, 443.34).
responsalis: the respondent. (*Eccl.* 19, 445.24).
termini magistrales: masters' terms. (*Eccl.* 19, 445.23).
continuacio: continuity. (*Eccl.* 18, 436.19).
continuacio (of bodies, the act) / discontinuacio; continuare / discontinuare: continuation / discontinuation; make continuous / make discontinuous. The making of several bodies into one continuum (*Incarn.* ch. 12), G note at first use: not "carrying on"..
precaria: precarial grant. Wyclif defines it (*Eccl.* 453.21). (*Eccl.* 19).
vir ecclesiasticus: churchman. (*Eccl.* 19, 450.18, 451.10).
ecclesiasticus (sg. noun): ecclesiastic. (*Eccl.* 19, 453.10).
lex cesarea: caesarean law. Of the *clerus cesareus* family (pejorative), not neutral "imperial/civil law". (*Eccl.* 19, 451.17).
indisposicio: unfitness. Noun of *indispositus*. (*Eccl.* 19).
evidencia topica: topical evidence. Pairs with *argumentum topicum*. (*Eccl.* 19).
locus evidencie: topic of evidence. *locus* = dialectical topic (cf. *locus a maiori*); not "place". (*Eccl.* 19).
porisma: porism. A consequence drawn from a principle; kept apart from *corollarium* "corollary". (*Eccl.* 19, 462.22).
confundere (supposition): make (a term) stand confusedly. The logic of supposition; distinct from the *confuse/confusus* "indistinct" row. (*Eccl.* 19, 463.15).
translative: by transference. Kept apart from *transsumptive* "transumptively". (*Eccl.* 19, 467.10).
rectiloqui: those who speak correctly. (*Eccl.* 19, 468.15).
habilis / habilitas; habilitare: qualified / qualification; to qualify. The positive of *inhabilis* "unqualified". (*Eccl.* 19, 469.4).
perplexitas: perplexity. The noun beside *perplexus* "perplexed". (*Eccl.* 19, 470.3).
raciones exemplares / seminales: exemplary reasons / seminal reasons. Augustine's terms; "seminal reasons" already used at 06-d. (*Eccl.* 20, 473.18).
affidacio: affiance. Betrothal by plighted trust; keeps the play on *confidit*. (*Eccl.* 20, 475.22).
institor: merchant. After Douay "merchant's ship" (Prov. 31:14); *mercantes* = "traders". (*Eccl.* 20, 478.20).
predicacio secundum causam: predication by cause. One of Wyclif's modes of predication. (*Eccl.* 20, 481.14).
preconium: commendation. (*Eccl.* 20, 488.20).
excrescencia: increase. (*Eccl.* 20, 485.28).
beatitudo essencialis / accidentalis: essential / accidental blessedness. The scholastic pair; follows *beatitudo* "blessedness". (*Eccl.* 20, 490.15).
signacio / significacio: signification. B treats them as one word (492.9–10, 493.1). (*Eccl.* 21, 491).
dampnacio: CONTEXTUAL: damnation / condemnation. Thomas's broad/strict senses turn on it; Douay "condemnation" kept in Luke 23:40. (*Eccl.* 21, 495.24). Of a judgement passed on a teaching (*dampnacio istius sentencie tamquam heretice*, *Pot. pape* 84.10) "condemnation".
taxacio (pene): assessment. (*Eccl.* 21, 498.8).
sophista: sophist. Kept apart from *sophisma*. (*Eccl.* 21, 495.15).
commentum (mendacii): fabrication. Wyclif numbers the opponent's fabrications. (*Eccl.* 21, 498.31).
signaculum: seal. (*Eccl.* 21, 500.21).
laicatus: the lay state. (*Eccl.* 21, 502.7).
partes potestative / subiective / aliquote: potestative / subjective / aliquot parts. The scholastic division of wholes. (*Eccl.* 21, 509.3–5).
pars integralis: integral part. (*Eccl.* 21, 514.15).
res sacramenti: reality of the sacrament. (*Eccl.* 21, 511.8).
gracie gratis date: graces freely given. Kept apart from *gracia gratificans*. (*Eccl.* 21, 512.13).
baptismus flaminis: baptism of the Spirit. (*Eccl.* 21, 514.24).

caracter in actu: character in act. (*Eccl.* 21, 513.18).
pseudoclerici: false clerics. Cf. *pseudomonachus.* (*Eccl.* 21, 511.17).
ordo per accidens: order by accident. (*Eccl.* 21, 514.29).
univoce: univocally. (*Eccl.* 21, 514.4).
incompossibilis: incompossible. Beside *compossibilis.* (*Eccl.* 22, 522.1).
beatificacio: beatification. (*Eccl.* 22).
sacerdotes annales: annual priests. Priests hired to say masses for a year. (*Eccl.* 22).
perfeccio secunda (mundi): second perfection. (*Eccl.* 22).
oracio absoluta / condicionata: absolute / conditional prayer. (*Eccl.* 22).
bona de genere: good in kind. (*Eccl.* 22).
bonum honestum / utile / delectabile: honourable / useful / pleasurable good. (*Eccl.* 22).
exequie: exequies. (*Eccl.* 22).
obsequium: CONTEXTUAL: duty / obeisance. "Obeisance" where it is homage paid to a lord (*Incarn.* 35.2, beside *omagium*), with a **C** note. For the dead, "duty": Kept apart from *servicium* "service", *officium* "office". (*Eccl.* 22).
gilda: gild. (*Eccl.* 22).
liga: league. (*Eccl.* 22).
memoriale: memorial. (*Eccl.* 22).
affeccio naturalis / deliberativa: natural / deliberative affection. (*Eccl.* 22).
beatitudo circularis: circular blessedness. Hostiensis's term. (*Eccl.* 22).
indulgere: to indulge. The etymology (*inde* + *algere*) turns on the verb. (*Eccl.* 23, 549).
forum penitencie / penitenciale; forum ecclesie / Dei: court of penance; court of the church / of God. (*Eccl.* 23, 550.15).
condonare; condonacio: to pardon; pardon. Kept apart from *remittere / remissio* "remit / remission". (*Eccl.* 23, 549.27).
cambium: barter. Kept apart from *commutacio* "exchange". (*Eccl.* 23, 551.24).
thesaurus ecclesie: treasury of the church. (*Eccl.* 23, 551.11).
supererogare; supererogacio: pay out beyond [what is owed]; supererogation. *supererogata merita* "supererogated merits". (*Eccl.* 23, 551).
reatus pene: liability to punishment. (*Eccl.* 23, 552.4).
copia / habundancia: plenty / abundance. (*Eccl.* 23, 553.15, 555.20).
relaxare; relaxacio: to relax; relaxation. (*Eccl.* 23, 554.9).
satisfaccio; satisfacere: satisfaction; to make satisfaction. Cf. *satispassio.* (*Eccl.* 23, 556).
participative / iuvative: participatively / helpingly. (*Eccl.* 23, 558.2).
in athomo: in an individual. The logicians' *atomus.* (*Eccl.* 23, 558.4).
Romanus episcopus: the Roman bishop. Kept apart from *Romanus pontifex.* (*Eccl.* 23, 563.10).
palliacio; palliare: cloaking; to cloak. (*Eccl.* 23, 566.27).
potestas iudiciaria: judicial power. (*Eccl.* 23, 565.26).
papa superstes: the surviving pope. (*Eccl.* 23, 567).
premium accidentale: accidental reward. (*Eccl.* 23, 565.6).
laxare: loose. Kept apart from *relaxare* "relax". (*Eccl.* 23, 571.29).
perdoniste: pardoners. (*Eccl.* 23, 572.24).
venia: forgiveness. Kept apart from *condonacio* "pardon". (*Eccl.* 23, 573.4).
taxare: assess. Beside *taxacio* "assessment". (*Eccl.* 23, 574.1).
casus calculatorii: calculatory cases. (*Eccl.* 23, 574.32).
pars quanta / quota: a part of a quantity / a proportional part. As at 519.1. (*Eccl.* 23, 572.29).
colorabilis: colourable. Beside *color, colorare.* (*Eccl.* 23, 575.1).
potestas ordinis: power of order. (*Eccl.* 23, 575.15).
vicarius Petri: vicar of Peter. Kept apart from *vicarius Christi.* (*Eccl.* 23, 575.31).
remissio; remittere: remission; to remit. Headword row (cf. *condonacio* "pardon", *venia* "forgiveness"). (*Eccl.* 23).
potestas iurisdiccionis: power of jurisdiction. Paired with *potestas ordinis.* (*Eccl.* 23).
potestas: power. Always "power" (*De pot. pape*, Wilson). Its kin by row: *potestas ordinis, iurisdiccionis, iudiciaria.*

potencia: CONTEXTUAL: potency / power. "Potency" inside Aristotle's analysis of *dynamis* (active / passive potency, rational potency, the potency terminated); "power" elsewhere (God's power, free choice, might). Wyclif uses *potestas* and *potencia* interchangeably (*potestas vel potencia*, *Pot. pape* 4.7): a pair is "power or potency" with a **C** note. Keeps *potencia absoluta* "absolute power". Ruled by Wilson (*Pot. pape* 01-a review).
potentatus: CONTEXTUAL: sovereignty / potentate. The abstract "sovereignty" (*Pot. pape* 4.27); of the person who holds power "potentate" (*Pot. pape* 14.20, 15.13, 16.17, 20.28, 22.20, 23.13, 27.13), no note needed where the person is plain..
iurisdiccio: jurisdiction. Cf. *potestas iurisdiccionis*. (*Pot. pape* 23.17).
gentilitas: paganism. Kept apart from *infidelitas* "heathenism, unbelief". (*Pot. pape* 29.26).
pseudochristus: false christ. Matt. 24:24 (DR "false Christs"). (*Pot. pape* 28.32).
Ardmacanus; dominus Ardmacanus: Armachanus; the lord of Armagh. Richard FitzRalph. The bare name stays "Armachanus" (as in *De ecclesia*); with *dominus* "the lord of Armagh" (card)..
conficere: to consecrate (the eucharist). Of the priest at the altar; otherwise "to make up, compose". (*Pot. pape* 11.20).
licencia: licence. Permission granted; never "power". Wyclif usually sets it against *potestas*, but can also identify the two where power is defined as a grant (*illa licencia est potestas*, *Pot. pape* 21.29): render "licence" either way and let the argument show which. (*Pot. pape* 41.21); qualified (close-out R1).
primatus: primacy. Peter's and the pope's; *preeminencia* stays "preeminence". (*Pot. pape* ch. 3).
primitas: firstness. Being first in order, as against *primatus*. (*Pot. pape* ch. 3).
auctoritas: authority. (*Pot. pape* 63.16).
procuratoria potestas: proctorial power. From *procurator* "proctor". (*Pot. pape* 63.9).
archivicarius: archvicar. (*Pot. pape* 62.20).
geromantici: geomancers. (*Pot. pape* 71.23).
superintendencia: oversight. The bishop's office as *episcopus* "overseer". (*Pot. pape* 73.20).
repugnare; repugnancia: to be incompatible; incompatibility. The logical sense; not "to fight". (*Pot. pape* 73–75).
episcopus suffraganeus: suffragan bishop. .
auctoritativus, autoritativus: authoritative. Beside *auctoritas* "authority". (*Pot. pape* 76–78).
decretiste: decretists. The commentators on Gratian. (*Pot. pape* 81.27).
officiarii: officers. (*Pot. pape* 86.19).
religiositas: religiousness. (*Pot. pape* 86.21).
coraula: choir-leader. (*Pot. pape* 92.17).
negociatores: dealers. Kept apart from *mercantes* "traders" (*Eccl.*); the servants of the talents parable (Matt. 25). (*Pot. pape* 101.7).
trahere in consequenciam: draw into a precedent. The legal idiom; *consequencia* stays "inference". (*Pot. pape* 94.13).
primogenitura: primogeniture. (*Pot. pape* 103.2).
potestas regiminis: power of rule. Paired with *potestas ordinis* "power of order". (*Pot. pape* 115.2).
preco (Dei): herald (of God). (*Pot. pape* 06-b, 06-d).
criminosus: criminous man. (*Pot. pape* 06-c).
deliramenta: ravings. (*Pot. pape* 06-c).
Lincolniensis: Lincoln. Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln (S note at first occurrence), as in *De ecclesia*. (*Pot. pape* 59.8).
seculares domini: secular lords. Kept apart from *temporales domini* "temporal lords". (*Pot. pape* 52.16).
potestas dominativa: lordly power. .
relacio racionis: relation of reason. Scholastic term (a relation in the mind only)..
debitum (coniugale), ex debito: the (marriage) debt. Of spouses (1 Cor 7:3–4): "the marriage debt", not "what is owed". (*Pot. pape* 5.8).
maneries: kind. .
status (disposicionis, virtutis, …): state (of disposition, of virtue, …). Ch. 6 turns on it (a man's state changed by sin)..
preeminencia: preeminence. Kept apart from *primatus* "primacy"..
primas (noun): primate. .
dominari (with a negative, 1 Pet. 5:3): lord it (over). DR "lording it over"..
correpcio fraterna: fraternal correction. .
dileccio: love. Kept apart from *caritas* "charity"..
gracia concomitancie: by reason of concomitance. Not *gracia concomitans* "concomitant grace": *gracia* + genitive = "for the sake of". (*Pot. pape* 06-h).
Pseudo (as a noun): the Pseudo. Wyclif's name for the false pope of the eleven conditions (ch. 6)..
illapsus: inflowing. .
generalis attornatus: general attorney. Legal term (a proctor with general powers)..

claves potestatis / auctoritatis (sciencie): keys of power / of authority (of knowledge). The pair kept fixed..
suppeditacio (temporalium): treading (temporal goods) underfoot. .
fantasia: imagination. The faculty (scholastic *phantasia*)..
propriacio: owning. The opposite of *expropriacio*; kept apart from *appropriacio* "appropriation"..
paterfamilias: householder. DR's word (Matt. 20:1 etc.)..
regulariter: as a rule. .
capitalis (civitas, episcopus): capital (city, bishop). Rome as capital (ch. 8); *capitalis dominus* stays "chief lord"..
sessiva / sesina: seisin. *Sesina* the spelling at *Incarn.* 33. So the manuscripts (Loserth 170.8, *ita cod.*); feudal possession that perfects a title..
influencia (celestis): (celestial) influence. Astrological sense..
quaternarius / denarius / quadragenarius: the four / the ten / the forty. Number exegesis (the 153 fishes, ch. 7)..
heresis realis: real heresy (heresy in deed). .
pseudopapa: pseudo-pope. Cf. *pseudocardinales*..
impertinens; impertinencia: irrelevant; irrelevance. .
eleccio equivoca: equivocal election. Ch. 8's two elections (God's and men's)..
apostolicus (noun, not the papal title): an apostolic man. Where it is the pope's title, "the apostolic [lord]" with a G note..
connexio: conditional (proposition). Logic: the "if … then" proposition..
tenacia: tight-fistedness. Avarice's vice of holding on..
irregularitas: irregularity. Canonical impediment to orders or office..
negociacio: dealing. Pairs with *negociatores* "dealers"..
allocari (in an account): be allowed. Accounting sense..
Cestrensis: the Chester [chronicler]. Ranulf Higden, *Polychronicon* (S note at first occurrence in a chunk)..
infundabilis; infundabiliter: without foundation. .
seniores; maiores natu: elders; the ancients. Inside a DR quotation, DR's word ("ancients", Acts 20:17)..
pompare; pompacio; pompa: boast; boasting; boasting. .
fantasticus: imaginary. Cf. *fantasia* "imagination"..
extollencia: exaltation. Self-exaltation of the proud..
servitus (laboris): servitude. Kept apart from *servicium* "service"..
capitalitas: capital standing. Rome's standing as capital; cf. *capitalis*..
memorativa potencia: memorative power. A faculty of the soul (the "power" sense of *potencia*)..
discrasia: distemper. Physicians' term..
media (of an argument): middle terms. .
policia: polity. .
carismata; carisma: CONTEXTUAL: charisms / chrism. "Charisms" (gifts; *Pot. pape* 176.1). Singular *misticum carisma* in Augustine's sense of the anointing that names Christians (*chrisma*, *Pot. pape* 312.16) "chrism", with a T note.; CONTEXTUAL.
primicia (virtutum): being first (in the virtues). Kept apart from *primatus* "primacy" and *primitas* "firstness"..
bipapalis: two-pope. Of the church under two popes (1378)..
defidare: distrust. .
replicatur; replicatum: it is rejoined; rejoinder. A further objection against an answer; kept apart from *respondetur* "the reply is" (so 04-b)..
potestas vicaria: vicarial power. .
locus a simili: the topic from likeness. Dialectical topic..
ordo cesareus / divinus: the caesarean / divine order. .
malum culpe / pene: the evil of fault / of penalty. .
neutra: neutral things. Things neither commanded nor forbidden (obedience *in neutris*)..
reputative; assertive: by estimation; assertively. Opposed to *ex revelacione*..
eleccio passiva / activa: passive / active election. .
equivocacio: equivocation. .
papa cesareus: caesarean pope. The pope as endowed temporal lord (chs. 10–12)..
imperium (vicarium, autoritativum): command (vicarial, authoritative). The power to command (*par in parem non habet imperium*); "empire" only of the Empire..
corripere; correpcio: reprove; reproof. Kept apart from *corrigere; correccio* "correct; correction"; *correpcio fraterna* stays "fraternal correction"..

credulitas explicita / implicita: explicit / implicit credence. Beside *fides explicita / implicita*..
summus sacerdos: high priest. DR; kept apart from *summus pontifex* "highest pontiff"..
preponderancia; dispensacio: preponderance; dispensation. .
sensus compositus / divisus: composite / divided sense. The logicians' pair..
precellencia: pre-excellence. Kept apart from *preeminencia* "preeminence"..
summum sacerdocium: high priesthood. Cf. *summus sacerdos* "high priest"..
preternecessarius: beyond necessity. .
cultus Dei: worship of God. .
pontifex (Old Testament, unqualified): pontiff. Kept apart from *sacerdos* "priest"; *summus pontifex* of the Jewish priesthood is "high priest" (see *summi pontifices*)..
superhumerale; racionale: superhumeral; rational. The ephod and the breastplate (DR)..
penalis: hard, of hardship. Beside *penalitas*..
pastor cesareus: caesarean shepherd. The *papa cesareus* family..
vians: wayfarer. As *viator*..
laxus: lax. (*Eccl.* 23).
episcopus Nullatensis: a bishop "of Nowhere". (*Eccl.* 23).
demereri: to demerit. (*Eccl.* 23).
questores: questors. Kept apart from *perdoniste* "pardoners". (*Eccl.* 23, 584).
bonificare: make good. (*Eccl.* 23).
precellenter: pre-excellently. Adverb beside *precellencia* "pre-excellence"..
difformitas; difformis: difformity; difform. Paired against *uniformitas*..
archiprepositus: arch-superior. Formed on *prepositi* "superiors"..
correptibilis: open to reproof. Beside *corripere* "reprove"..
potencia ordinata: ordained power. Pair of *potencia absoluta* "absolute power"..
necessarioritas: greater necessity. Non-classical comparative abstract..
inhabilitas: lack of qualification. Beside *inhabilis* "unqualified"..
vita suffraganea: the suffragan life. .
calumpniator: challenger. Under *calumpnia* "challenge"..
pallium privilegii: cloak of privilege. Kept apart from *palliacio* "cloaking"..
sacramentum cesareum: caesarean sacrament. Ironic..
interludium: interlude. .
refuga: deserter. .
remisse (of assent): with slackened [assent]. Opposed to full assent in the degrees of belief..
gradus (of belief): degree. The four degrees of belief (*Pot. pape* 327.18 ff.)..
potissimus; pocior (Antichristus): foremost; greater. Superlative and comparative kept visible as a pair..
raciones topice: topical arguments. With *evidencia topica*..
meander (dyaboli): meander. Figure for the devil's tortuous wiles, with a C note..
episcopi cesarei: caesarean bishops. Extends *prelatus / sacerdos cesarius*..
pseudopontifices: false pontiffs. Cf. *pseudoclerici*..
sophisticacio: sophistry. Noun beside *sophisticare*..
procuratorium: proctor's mandate. .
patronus (a saint): patron. A second sense beside the benefice row; untagged..
spissius (vivere): more closely. Of living to a rule..
evangelizans: preacher of the gospel. .
prepositus (participle of* preponere*): the one preferred. CONTEXTUAL beside *prepositi* "superiors" (the noun); untagged..
capitalis eleccio: the chapter's election. .
gracia (papal provision): grace. The papal grant of a benefice; untagged..
persona populi: the person of the people. .
dominativa forma: lordly form. After *potestas dominativa*..
pagina (of a law): page. .

latitudo (of a quality): latitude. The intension/remission term..
illibertare: rob of liberty. .
provisio (papal): provision. .
proventus: proceeds. Kept apart from *redditus* “revenues”..
civilitas cesarea: caesarean civil standing. After *civilitas* “civil standing” and *papa cesareus*..
decimacio: tithing. .
decimantes: tithe-payers. .
involucrum: wrapping. .
sophisticare quod (with a clause): argue sophistically that. Takes *sophisticari*’s sense, not “counterfeit” (which needs an object)..
gravandi: those to be charged. .
inhabilitare: disqualify. Beside *inhabilis* “unqualified”, *inhabilitas*..
indiffinite: without fixed bounds. .
principatus (pl., given to churches): principalities. I.e. prelacies..
contracta / contrata: district. Loserth glosses “country”..
papatus; racio papatus: papacy; the nature of the papacy. .
forum consciencie: court of conscience. Extends the *forum penitencie* row..
dicere (logical use): signify. Of a term or name..
coloracior: more colourable. Comparative, with the *color* / *colorabilis* rows..
obviare; obvia (logical): meet; meeting. Of a case or argument..
diccio procuratoria: proctorial pronouncement. C note gives *dicio* “authority” as the alternative..
refrigescentia arma: arms that grow cold. .
specularis prudencia: the prudence of a watchman. .
ars cesarea: the caesarean art. After *papa cesareus*..
servitus ydolorum: servitude of idols. Beside *servitus laboris*..
ingeniacio: wit. .
*principaliter (*secundo/tercio principaliter*)*: as a main head. Marks the compendium’s main divisions against the counts within them..
precellere: excel. Verb beside *precellencia* “pre-excellence”; not “pre-excel”..
suadere: make the case. To persuade, not to prove..
ditacio: enrichment. .
cesaree (adv.): in caesarean fashion. After *papa cesareus*..
est dare: one may posit. .
insolubiliter: inextricably. Kept apart from *insolubilia* “insolubles”..
probabiliter: with probability; by probable argument. Scholastic: argued from probable premisses, as against demonstration; not the modern hedge “probably”. (close-out R1; *Pot. pape* 52.3).
nimis: exceedingly. Medieval intensive (= *valde*); “too much” only where excess is the point. (close-out R2; *Pot. pape* 169.2).