De ecclesia, chapter 10, part 4
Objections to the privilege: a harbour for enemies and criminals
Loserth pp. 216.27–220.25
¶1216.27–217.8
Therefore it remains now, fourthly, to object against those [arguments]. It seems, first: if the tenor of the privilegesprivilegium / privilegiare / privilegiacio: privilege / to privilege / privileging must be understood thus, barely, according to the letter, then, supposing that an army of enemies invades England, it must have refuge in that place, so that after refreshment it could plunder the province more boldly. For every person of such an army is 217some man coming from some place, on foot or on horseback, entering that place for some cause; now every such man, according to the tenor of the words of the privilege, will have in that place immunity of every kind; therefore every person of such an army, by virtue of the privilege, will rest there in peace as long as he wishes. For if in any case it admits an objectioninstancia; objectum: objection, the bare words must be cast aside and sound teachingsentencia: CONTEXTUAL: teaching / sentence understood.1
¶2217.9–218.13
Here a certain ingenious lawyer told me that every person of such an army will enjoy this privilege, since there is no need, on account of such impossible cases, to limit or restrict the privileges of kings.2 But that incurs manifold challenge with anyone in his right mind. For neither could the king grant such a privilege, nor ought the clergyclerus; clericus: the clergy; cleric to admit it as a privilege for themselves, since it cannot be a privilege for our kingdomregnum: kingdom, or for a part of it, to shelter the destroyers of the kingdom and of the whole English churchecclesia: church, just as it is no privilege for anyone to destroy himself by making himself worse. Therefore whoever has obtainedimpetrare: obtain (by request) or defended this as a privilege for our kingdom degenerates, as one faithlessinfidelis: unbeliever; with a dative, faithless (to) to God and to the kingdom. Nor does it avail to say that such a company could not rise up and invade our kingdom, since this happened in three conquests, namely of the Britons, the Saxons and the Normans; indeed, such depopulators had risen in the time of King Edward the Second and despoiled cardinals in the county of Durham; and in the noble kingdom of France, in Lombardy and in other powerful kingdoms such depopulating companies have risen in our times: indeed, in these days kingdoms are never or rarely without such men, confederated bodily or spiritually for their destruction, since such corruption under the cloak of privilege could of itself destroy a kingdom.3 218Again, the king cannot rightly grant anything that would tend to the enervation of his kingdom or to the injury of his people; now both would happen, given the words of the privilege recited, according to their bare verbal conception. Therefore it does not lie within the king’s power to grant such a privilege. The major is clear from what has been said of privilege, since nothing is a privilege except what tends directly to the benefit of holy mother church; now the destruction of our kingdom and injury done to its people cannot tend directly to the honour of God and the benefit of holy mother church; therefore it does not lie within the power of any king to grant such a privilege; for God cannot [do] what is contradictory.4
¶3218.14–219.22
And the confirmation is that the office of an earthly king, as such, is to defend holy church, rigidly to coercecoactivus; cohercere, cohersitivus: coactive; coerce, coercive its enemies, and to keep justice for all, but especially for his lieges (as is clear in book 3, chapter [ ]).5 Now the minor is shown thus: nothing would more enervate a kingdom than the protection of criminals without lawful correction. Hence it is written, Ecclesiasticus 10:8: "A kingdom is translated from one people to another, because of injustices, wrongs, injuries and divers deceits"; now nothing would contribute more to the fostering of these four than to grant anyone the liberty that, whatever crime he has perpetrated, by fleeing to so open a place he will not be chastised by anyone; therefore this would evidently threaten ruin to the kingdom.6 For if this privilege were granted throughout all England, how would the kingdom stand? For the king would not have power to coerce his liege men by civil [process], and then he would not be univocally king of them, or of a people that is not subject to his power. Nor is there a reason why the king could grant liberty to so great a place 219but that by the same token [he could grant it] also to a homelandvia / patria: the way / the homeland, and so another king to another homeland, and so on until the whole of England were set at liberty. For if total exemptionexempcio: exemption would extinguish the whole royal power, partial exemption would extinguish a part of it, since to that extent the king would not have power over the place, or over the person dwelling in it, to chastise it, however much it had offended against king or kingdom; and so he would not be king of all England, since the exempt place would be in the kingdom but not of the kingdom.7 For the king would not have as much power to subjugate the inhabitants of such a place as he has power to punish the people of France, since they are exempted from royal coercion as much as the inhabitants of Germany or of a wholly foreign province. And as regards the injury of the people, it is clear that a liberty is claimed such that, however wickedly anyone has injured his neighbour, by homicide, theft, adultery, transgressingprevaricari: to transgress against every kind of the commandments of the decalogue, he may flee to that place, and the fulfilment of justice is shut off from the injured man, since [the fugitive] is not bound, in person or by proctorprocurator; procuratrix: proctor, there or elsewhere, to stand to lawius: right / law; and yet the king of England at his coronation is sworn, by a laudable religious bond, that he will not deny but will grant justice to anyone whatever.8
¶4219.23–219.28
O, if the whole kingdom were thus privileged as to every wicked deed, and lying everywhere proclaimed lawful, what a nest would the devil have in England for protecting the people of darkness in offences of word and deed? Truly, in the abyss he has no such privilege.9
¶5219.29–220.25
Hence I put two cases to [my] adversaries. First, whether one who plunders, steals or borrows a treasure however great from another church, and flees thither with the treasure, will have, on the sense expounded, liberty of every kind. And I was told that he would: both because the words of the privilege, from which it is not lawful to depart, 220say that generally, and also because otherwise it would be too suspect, denying the laity the fulfilment of justice and doing justice to the clergy.10 But then it followssequitur: it follows, first, that the king, who could grant that the most wicked men should unjustly keep back in perpetuity the relics and any goods whatever of an immune church, could grant that the just should take away temporal goodstemporalia: temporal goods from a delinquent church. For it is known of itself that he who can grant what is further removed from common law can grant what is more consonant with the law of God. And again it is known that it would be a greater sin unjustly, pertinaciously and obstinately to keep back another’s property than an unjust taking away would be; because for the first a man is to be excommunicated as a heretic, and for the second not, unless contumacious obstinacy is present, as the lawyers knew.11 Therefore there is no doubt: if the king can grant a privilege that anyone in his kingdom may have liberty perpetually to keep back what has been unjustly taken from holy mother church, much more can he grant licence that the just may take away their almselemosina: alms, which those who defraud the kingdom and holy mother church abuse. Hence it has been an inconsistent thing, and contrary to itself, to defend that so fervently as a catholic privilege, and anxiously to labour, when reasons fail, to condemn the other as heretical.12
Notes
- 1 A in the margin Prima racio (216.27); side-note 216.27. Quarto obicere contra illa: after the arguments for the privilege (10-b) and the answers to them (10-c), the fourth step is to argue against it; illa is taken as those arguments, though it may be the privileges. The minor echoes the words of the privilege itself ("whoever comes, from whatever place, on foot or on horseback …"). Si … capit instanciam: if the privilege admits an objection (an exception) in any one case, its bare letter cannot be the rule. Sapere sanam sentenciam: to understand (literally "savour") the sound teaching, as against the bare words.
- 2 A in the margin Responsio quedam (217.9); A writes hoc hoc (217.10). Legista: a civil lawyer, as against a canonist. Limitare has here its plain sense, "limit", beside restringere; the the glossary sense "assign" does not fit, and the word is untagged. Capit calumpniam: is open to challenge.
- 3 The robbery of the cardinals in the county of Durham: Loserth refers to Walsingham I, p. 151 (217.25); the event is the robbery of the two cardinals and of Louis de Beaumont, bishop-elect of Durham, near Darlington in 1317 by Gilbert de Middleton and Walter de Selby. B lacks secundi (217.26); Loserth would read surrexerunt for surrexerant (217.26), which does not change the sense. Comitive depopulantes: the free companies of France and Lombardy. Vel corporaliter vel spiritualiter confederatis: destroyers of the body (armed bands) or of the spirit; the second presumably aims at the clergy who shelter them. B privilegio (217.33). Side-note 217.22.
- 4 A in the margin Secunda racio (218.1) and Nota de privilegiis ut supra (218.5); side-note 218.1. Maior is Loserth’s correction: the codices have the abbreviation for assumptum, which he reads as maior against Minor autem at 218.18 (218.6). B lacks quod (218.7). Ex dictis de privilegio: the definition of privilege argued earlier (cap. 8–9). Deus enim non potest in contradiccionem: not even God can make a thing both privilege and destruction; a fortiori not the king.
- 5 Confirmacio: a further proof of the major. A in the margin Officium regis (218.14). Legiis: the king’s lieges, his sworn subjects. The chapter number is wanting in the print; which work’s "book 3" is meant is not identified.
- 6 Ecclesiasticus 10:8 (Vulgate numbering): Wyclif has de gente and lists the four without the conjunctions (Vulgate a gente … propter iniustitias, et iniurias, et contumelias, et diversos dolos); the sense is DR’s. A in the margin Contra privilegia locorum (218.22); side-note 218.24. Tam patentem locum: a place so open (to all comers).
- 7 Univoce: he would be their king only in an equivocal sense, in name. Patria: here the earthly sense (the glossary): a whole district or country, against the single place of sanctuary. Quin per idem et patrie: "but that he could by the same token [grant it] to a homeland". In regno, sed non de regno: inside the kingdom, but not part of it.
- 8 Non … tantam potestatem … sicut: the comparison is printed so; the sense is that the king would have no more hold on the sanctuary than on France or Germany. Side-note 219.14. Stare iuri: to answer at law; ius is "law" here. Prevaricando in omnem speciem mandatorum: transgressing every kind of commandment. The coronation oath (1308 form) asks the king to cause justice to be rendered "rightly, impartially, and wisely"; Wyclif’s non negabit is nearer Magna Carta (1297) c. 29, "we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right".
- 9 A in the margin Casus (219.23). Et undique proclamatum licitum mendacium: taken as a second thing the kingdom would be privileged in, lying (the delicta verbi) proclaimed lawful; it could also be read "and [were] proclaimed everywhere a lawful lie". Baratrum: the pit of hell.
- 10 A in the margin Prima questio (219.27); side-note 219.29. B reads si predicans (219.29–30) and omnimoda libertate (219.32–33); the print is translated. Ad sensum expositum: on the sense the defenders give the privilege, the bare letter. Aliter foret nimis suspectum: if the refuge covered those who rob laymen but not those who rob churches, the privilege would look partial, denying justice to the laity while doing it to the clergy.
- 11 A in the margin Bona racio (220.3). Immunis ecclesie: a church enjoying immunity, as the sanctuary does. Magis elongatum a communi iure: the privilege, further removed from common law than the grant Wyclif proposes. A₁ corrects to noverunt (220.15); the print is translated. Ius is "law" throughout.
- 12 Elemosinas suas: the alms the just themselves gave, the endowments. Aliud: the opposite thesis, that the just may take temporal goods from a delinquent church, which Wyclif’s opponents condemn as heretical; the sixth of his conclusions condemned by Gregory XI in May 1377 (Fasciculi zizaniorum, p. 248; Walsingham, Hist. Angl. i. 354). A in the margin Conclusio (220.27) opens the next chunk.
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- Plate readings; page · reading · note):
- 216: primo (glued 'army to' is the English side-note)
- 217: aliquis (K 158ᵈ are margin letter and folio mark)
- 217: legista [NW]
- 217: impetraverit (im-/petraverit hyphenated; main token holds whole word)
- 218: legiis [NW]
- 218: III°
- 219: cohercione [NW]
- 220: ∅ (print has sus-/pectum; main already holds suspectum whole at pos 8)
- 220: consonancius [NW]
- 220: legiste [NW]
- 219: quin (alinea L and 159b folio mark glued)
- 219: idem
- 217: quod (159ª is the folio mark, dropped) [-MARK]