Wyclif’s Latin works

De ecclesia, chapter 12, part 3

Privileges need prudent interpreters; the grant depends on the grantee; unjust mercy

Loserth pp. 258.23–263.26

¶1258.23–263.26

258Ad istum obiectum respondeo concedendo assumptum; sed nec lex Dei nec aliqua lex justa necessitat ad aliquid culpabiliter faciendum, ideo necesse est leges tales habere prudentes interpretes secundum sensum sacre scripture, ut tam privilegiantes quam privilegiati active et passive participant meritorium fructum privilegii, salvato semper iure cuiuslibet et postposita generaliter iniuria undequaque. Unde non est possibile legem rectam statui et casum contingere, quin secundum regulam sacre scripture tolli potest inconveniens peccati, quia ad minimum non existente 259fuga alia tolli debet statutum aut privilegium vel suspendi, nec fallat inscios ignorancia illius veritatis quam Anselmus declarat primo, Cur deus homo, XXI°, quod nec propter salvacionem tocius mundi vel infinitorum, si fuerint, non debet committi peccatum aliquod eciam veniale, quia tunc peccatum esset non peccatum, cum non sit possibile ut quis peccet in quantum facit ut debet, quia tunc debet peccare et prima iusticia exigit ut sic peccet. Sed revera iusticia dispensaret in casu huiusmodi, ut non peccet. Oportet ergo privilegia huiusmodi habere interpretes ad discernendum condicionem que debet subintelligi in tali privilegio, ut si quis proditorie occiderit regem, notorie molitus fuerit regni prodicionem, vel corporaliter aut spiritualiter superinduxerit simul vel paulative depopulatores regni, refugium ecclesie non ad illum. Unde recoleremus statutum nefandum Danielis VI°, 7, ubi dicitur satrapas consuluisse Dario, ut extinguerent Danielem, quod omnis qui peciverit aliquam peticionem a quocunque Deo et homine usque ad triginta dies nisi a rege Dario mittatur in lacum leonum, sed postquam compertum est Danielem tribus temporibus in die adorare Dominum versus Jerusalem, sinistri interpretes regem seduxerant, ut Daniel in lacum leonum mitteretur; sed iniquum iudicium probavit eventus miraculi. Et utinam satrape nostri non seducant principes ex insana interpretacione decreti regii. Nam vel est quodcunque tale decretum illicitum, vel oportet quod solum intelligatur in ipso quod nullius sapit 260iniuriam, quia iuxta dicta in proximo argumento oportet subintelligere in omni tali generali statuto beneplacitum prime iusticie. Oportet ergo secundum regulas scripture docere quod implecio privilegii generalis in casu posito sit consona legi Dei. Et si consiliarii sapientes mundialiter exigunt ex verbis privilegii tamquam concessum omne quod sciverint sophistice palliare, exacta est cum satrapis Medorum blasphema peticio; ipsi enim exigunt concessum a principe omne quod sophistice inferre possunt ex verbis privilegii, sive iustum fuerit sive iniustum, seu parti privilegianti aut privilegiate meritorium fuerit aut demeritorium, et ita sive Deus illud voluerit sive noluerit. Sed in istam blasphemiam non potest princeps seculi nec eciam Deus ipse, ideo instruendi sunt religiose domini seculares, ne ex ignorancia condicionis privilegii et interpretacionis eius participent tali blasphemie; videntur enim cecis secundum formam talem concedere sed non possunt. Sicut autem non possunt concedere quod manifeste vergeret ad destruccionem regni sui vel Dei iniuriam, sic non possunt concedere privilegium quod inferret per se alicui iniuriam vel quod occasione data suis subditis sit dampnosum. Concessio enim talis subdola non est concessio, sicut nec luciferina promissio Matthei IV°, 9, qua Jesu nostro false promiserat quod omnia regna mundi sibi daret, si cadens ipsum adoraverit, non fuisset donacio, nec fas est dogmatizare istam blasphemiam, ut eo ipso quo princeps terrenus decreverit sic esse, sequitur quod sit iustum, quia sanctus Nabuchodonosor qui fuit unus de potencioribus monarchis a mundi principio non potuit vendicare istam potenciam, cum soli Deo sit propria. Et dico ipsum 261sanctum, quia decret. XXIIIª, q. IV. Nabuchodonosor ex testimonio Augustini reputat eum sanctum. Ex istis colligitur quod concessio privilegiorum principum non minus dependet a privilegiandis qui ipsis participent quam ab ipsis principibus. Patet ex hoc quod non foret illis privilegium, nisi supposita capacitate ex vita meritoria participio talis privilegii forent digni; cum ergo talis dignitas essencialiter dependet ab illis privilegiandis et non ab illis privilegiantibus, patet conclusio. Ymmo cum privilegiacio passiva potest inferri ab aliis quam a datis principibus, (non autem potest inesse nisi insit ex dignitate quam privilegiatus perficit in se ipso), videtur quod talis passiva concessio vel privilegiacio prius natura dependet a privilegiandis quam ab istis privilegiantibus a quibus solum causatur per accidens. Concessio vero eciam activa dominorum, secundum racionem qua foret isti clerico privilegium, dependet essencialiter ab eodem clerico, quia si non meruerit, tunc dominus in concessione generali non concessit privilegium illud sibi, ideo (sicut dixi in solucione proximi argumenti) optimum medium conservandi privilegia est ut privilegiandus conformet se sacre scripture, quia (ut dicitur Matthei V°) eo ipso quo ipsam habuerit adversarium perdit privilegium, quia vitam propriam, in qua vivificata per Christum privilegium fundaretur. Conceditur ergo quod pie et misericorditer racione privilegii principum agendum est cum talibus fugitivis, sed (ut dixi proximo capitulo) cavenda est falsa pietas et misericordia iniusta. Ipsam autem declarat decretum sub auctoritate beati Ambrosii in libro suo De Officiis, 262ut recitatur XXIIIª, q. IV, ubi dicitur: Est iniusta misericordia. Denique scriptum est de quodam: Non misereberis illius, Deuteronomii XIX°, 13, et in libris Regum legitur quod Saul contraxit offensam, quia misertus est Agag regem hostium quem prohibuit divina sentencia servari, I° Regum XV°. Itaque si quis latronem filiis deprecantibus motus et lacrimis coniugis eius inflexus absolvendum putat, cui adhuc latrocinandi aspiret affectus, nonne innocentes tradet exicio qui sic liberat multorum exicia cogitantem? Certe si gladium domini reprimit, vincula dissolvit, laxat exilium, cur latrocinandi qua potest clemenciori via non eripit facultatem qui voluntatem extorquere non potuit? Deinde inter duos, hoc est, accusatorem et reum, pari periculo de capite decertantes, alterum si non probasset, alterum si esset ab accusatore convictus, si non id quod iusticie est iudex exequatur, sed miseretur alterius, aut dampnabit probantem aut dum accusatori favet, quod probare non possit, addicet innoxium. Non potest ergo hec dici iusta misericordia. In ipsa ecclesia, ubi maxime quis misereri debet, teneri autem quam maxime debet forma iusticie, ne quis a consorcio criminacionis abstractus brevi lacrimula atque ad tempus parata vel eciam uberioribus fletibus communionem, quam plurimis debet postulare temporibus, a facilitate sacerdotis extorqueat. Nonne cum uni indulget indigno, ad prolapcionis contagium provocat universos? Facilitas enim venie incentivum tribuit delinquendi. 263Quotlibet enim sunt tales leges cum racione docentes quod iudex debet secundum leges punire, faciendo utrique parti iusticiam. Princeps ergo precludens cursum talis iusticie est omnino reus iniurie; si enim antedictum privilegium fuit iustum de multis quod non obstante tali aufugio subirent penam legalem, quomodo excusat peccatum principis, quin dimissis magis induratis in suo facinore iniuriaretur Deo et partibus? Non enim facit regis concessio ut sic varietur iusticia quoad Deum, secura ergo via misericordie est dare tali criminoso quadraginta dies penitencie et post punire vel dimittere secundum disposicionem persone culpabilis, quia secundum illam misericordia vel crudelitas est taxanda. Et utinam hoc privilegium in recentibus criminosis observaretur per totam Angliam, aliis sceleratis deprehensis post correpcionem terciam secundum legem evangelii Matthei XVIII°, castigatis scilicet vel ociosis in casu quo probabiliter credatur illos intoxicare plus sancte matris ecclesie in futurum, vel aliter proscriptis in casu quo credatur illis prodesse profugis. Tale enim opus ex caritate procedens servaret undique misericordiam et (quantum est in homine) libertatem. Quantum ad secundam difficultatem in qua quidam instant fortiter, quod pro execucione et observacione legis debet iudex facere eciam scienter iniuriam, patet

To this objectioninstancia; objectum: objection I reply by granting the assumptionassumptum: the assumption; but neither God’s lawlex dei / lex Christi / lex evangelica: God's law / the law of Christ / the gospel law nor any just law necessitates [anyone] to do anything culpably; therefore it is necessary that such laws have prudent interpreters according to the sense of holy scripture, so that both those who privilegeprivilegium / privilegiare / privilegiacio: privilege / to privilege / privileging and those who are privileged, actively and passively, share in the meritorious fruit of the privilegeprivilegium / privilegiare / privilegiacio: privilege / to privilege / privileging, the right of everyone being always saved and injury being set aside generally on every side.1 Hence it is not possible for a right law to be established and a case to occur in which the ill consequenceinconveniencia; inconveniens: CONTEXTUAL: an absurdity (in argument) · troubles, ill consequences (in affairs) of sin cannot be removed according to the rule of holy scripture; because, at the least, if there is no 259other escape, the statute or privilege ought to be removed or suspendedsuspendere; suspencio: to suspend; suspension.2 Nor let ignorance of that truth which Anselm declares in the first [book] of Cur Deus homo, chapter 21, deceive the unknowing: that not even for the salvation of the whole world, or of infinitely many [worlds], if there were such, ought any sin, even venial, to be committed; because then sin would be not-sin, since it is not possible that anyone sin in so far as he does as he ought; because then he ought to sin, and the first justice demands that he so sin. But in truth justice would dispense in a case of this kind, so that he does not sin.3 Privileges of this kind must therefore have interpreters to discern the condition which must be understood as impliedsubintelligere: understand as implied in such a privilege: as, if anyone has treacherously killed the king, has notoriously plotted the betrayal of the kingdomregnum: kingdom, or has brought in, bodily or spiritually, all at once or little by little, despoilers of the kingdom, the refuge of the churchecclesia: church [does] not [extend] to him.4 Hence we should recall the abominable statute of Daniel 6:7, where it is said that the satrapssatrapa: satrap, in order to destroy Daniel, counselled Darius "that whosoever shall ask any petition of any god, or man, for thirty days, but of King Darius, shall be cast into the den of the lions"; but after it was found that Daniel worshipped the Lord three times a day toward Jerusalem, sinister interpreters had led the king astray, so that Daniel was cast into the den of the lions; but the outcome of the miracle proved the judgment wicked.5 And would that our satraps may not lead princes astray by a mad interpretation of a royal decree! For either every such decree is unlawful, or only that must be understood in it which savours of 260injury to no one; because, according to what was said in the preceding argument, in every such general statute the good pleasure of the first justice must be understood as implied. It must therefore be taught, according to the rules of scripture, that the fulfilment of a general privilege in the case supposed is consonant with God’s law.6 And if counsellors, wise in a worldly way, demand from the words of a privilege, as granted, everything that they know how to cloak sophistically, the blasphemous petition has been exacted as with the satraps of the Medes; for they demand as granted by the prince everything that they can sophistically infer from the words of the privilege, whether it be just or unjust, or meritorious or demeritorious to the privileging or the privileged party, and so whether God has willed it or not.7 But neither a prince of the world nor even God himself can [fall] into this blasphemy; therefore secular lords are to be instructed religiously, lest from ignorance of the condition of a privilege and of its interpretation they share in such blasphemy; for to the blind they seem to grant according to such a form, but they cannot.8 And just as they cannot grant what would manifestly tend to the destruction of their kingdom or to injury to God, so they cannot grant a privilege that would of itself inflict injury on anyone, or that, by occasion given, would be harmful to their subjects. For such a deceitful grantconcessio: grant is not a grant; just as the Luciferian promise of Matthew 4:9, by which [the devil] had falsely promised our Jesus "that he would give him all the kingdoms of the world, if, falling down, he adored him", would not have been a gift. Nor is it right to teach as dogma this blasphemy: that by the very fact that an earthly prince has decreed a thing to be so, it follows that it is just; because holy Nebuchadnezzar, who was one of the more powerful monarchs since the beginning of the world, could not claim that power, since it is proper to God alone. And I call him 261holy because the Decretum, C. 23 q. 4 [c. 22], Nabuchodonosor, on the testimony of Augustine, reckons him holy.9 From these things it is gathered that the grant of princes’ privileges depends no less on those to be privileged, who are to share in them, than on the princes themselves. This is clear from the fact that it would not be a privilege for them unless, their capacity being presupposed, they were worthy, from a meritorious life, of participationparticipium: participation in such a privilege; since, then, such worthiness depends essentially on those to be privileged and not on those privileging, the conclusionconclusio: conclusion is clear.10 Indeed, since passive privilegingprivilegium / privilegiare / privilegiacio: privilege / to privilege / privileging can be brought about by others than the given princes (but it cannot be present unless it is present from the worthiness which the privileged person perfects in himself), it seems that such passive grant or privileging depends, prior in nature, on those to be privileged rather than on those privileging, by whom it is caused only accidentally. And even the active grant of the lords, under the aspect by which it would be a privilege for this cleric, depends essentially on that same cleric; because if he has not merited, then the lord in the general grant did not grant that privilege to him.11 Therefore (as I said in the solution of the preceding argument) the best means of preserving privileges is that the one to be privileged conform himself to holy scripture; because (as is said in Matthew 5:25) by the very fact that he has it as his adversary he loses the privilege, because [he loses] his own life, in which, quickened through Christ, the privilege would be founded.12 It is granted, therefore, that by reason of the princes’ privilege such fugitives are to be dealt with piously and mercifully; but (as I said in the preceding chapter) false piety and unjust mercy are to be avoided. And the Decretum declares it under the authority of blessed Ambrose in his book De officiis, 262as it is recited in C. 23 q. 4, where it is said: "There is an unjust mercy. Finally, it is written of a certain man: Thou shalt not pity him (Deuteronomy 19:13); and in the books of Kings it is read that Saul incurred offence because he had mercy on Agag, the king of the enemies, whom the divine sentence forbade to be kept alive (1 Samuel 15). So if anyone, moved by [a robber’s] children pleading and bent by the tears of his wife, thinks a robber should be released in whom the desire of robbing still breathes, does he not hand the innocent over to destruction, who thus frees one plotting the destruction of many? Certainly, if he holds back the sword of the lord, loosens the chains, looses [from] exile, why does he not, by what milder way he can, take away the means of robbing from one whose will he could not wrest away? Then, between two, that is, accuser and accused, contending at equal peril of their heads, the one if he had not proved [his charge], the other if he were convicted by the accuser: if the judge does not carry out what belongs to justice, but takes pity on one of them, either he will condemn the one who proves, or, while he favours the accuser, he will hand over the innocent [on a charge] which [the accuser] could not prove. This, then, cannot be called just mercy. In the church itself, where one ought most to show mercy, but where the form of justice ought to be held most of all, [care must be taken] lest anyone withdrawn from fellowship by an accusation should extort from the easiness of a priest, by a brief little tear made ready for the occasion, or even by more abundant weeping, the communion which he ought to seek through a great many seasons. When he indulges one unworthy man, does he not provoke all to the contagion of a fall? For easiness of forgiveness gives an incentive to offending."13 263For there are any number of such laws teaching, with reason, that the judge ought to punish according to the laws, doing justice to each party. The prince, therefore, who shuts off the course of such justice is wholly guilty of injury; for if the aforesaid privilege was just as regards many, [namely] that notwithstanding such flight they should undergo the legal penalty, how does [it] excuse the prince’s sin, so that, when those more hardened in their misdeedfacinus: misdeed are let go, he would not do injury to God and to the parties?14 For the king’s grant does not bring it about that justice is thus varied as regards God. The safe way of mercy, therefore, is to give such a criminal forty days of penance, and afterwards to punish or release him according to the disposition of the guilty person; because according to that [disposition] mercy or cruelty is to be assessed.15 And would that this privilege were observed for recent criminals throughout all England, other criminals being taken after the third correction according to the law of the gospel, Matthew 18:15–17: chastised, that is, or [kept] idle, in a case where it is probably believed that they would poison more of holy mother church in future; or else outlawed, in a case where it is believed that it would profit them [to be] fugitives. For such a work, proceeding from charitycaritas: charity, would preserve mercy on every side and (as far as lies in man) liberty. As to the second difficulty, on which certain people press hard, that for the execution and observance of the law a judge ought to do injury even knowingly, it is clear16

Notes

  1. 1 A in the margin Responsio (258.23); side-note 258.23. Assumptum: the objector’s premiss that the privilege of kings is to be interpreted piously and mercifully (258.9). Necessitat ad … faciendum: compels [anyone] to do. Active et passive: the grantors actively, the grantees passively. Salvato … iure … et postposita … iniuria: ablatives absolute.
  2. 2 Side-note 259.1. Inconveniens peccati: the ill consequence that is sin (CONTEXTUAL, the glossary, the practical sense, as in the objection at 258.8–10). Non est possibile … quin … tolli potest: "not possible … in which … cannot be removed"; the double negative is resolved.
  3. 3 A in the margin, without reference mark, Anselmus. Privilegia principum sunt prudenter interpretanda (259.3). Anselm, Cur Deus homo I.21 (Loserth, 259.3: Anselmi Opp. pp. 84–85; primo is primo libro). Wyclif paraphrases: Anselm has the worlds multiplied to infinity (Si infinito numero multiplicarentur, PL 158), but quamlibet parvum, not veniale. Nec … non debet: the medieval cumulative negative, rendered as one; the apparatus gives B nec debet and non debet at 259.8. Sed revera iusticia dispensaret: if the sin were owed, justice itself would dispense from it, and it would not be sin; the reductio is Wyclif’s.
  4. 4 Refugium ecclesie non ad illum: the clause has no verb; "[does] not [extend]" is supplied. Depopulatores regni: despoilers of the kingdom, brought in corporaliter aut spiritualiter, "bodily or spiritually".
  5. 5 Side-note 259.18. Daniel 6:7 (DR), except that Wyclif has nisi a rege Dario for the Vulgate’s nisi a te, rex ("but of thee, O king"). In the Vulgate the counsel is given by "the princes …, the magistrates, and governors [satrapae]"; ut extinguerent Danielem is Wyclif’s statement of their motive. Daniel’s prayer: 6:10; the den: 6:16; the deliverance: 6:22. B reads probant (259.26).
  6. 6 Satrape nostri: Wyclif’s word for church-court officials (the glossary, ), set beside Darius’s satraps. Nullius sapit iniuriam: savours of injury to no one. In proximo argumento: the answer to the second objection (12-a and 12-b, 253.18–258.7). Prime iusticie: of God, the first justice. Side-note 260.4.
  7. 7 B reads exacta cum, without est (260.8). Exacta est cum satrapis Medorum blasphema peticio: "the blasphemous petition has been exacted, as with the satraps of the Medes", i.e. it is their petition over again; cum could also be read "together with the satraps". Sophistice palliare: to cloak by sophistry.
  8. 8 Non potest: Loserth supplies incidere, "fall into" (260.14), translated in brackets. Tali blasphemie: so the print; the manuscripts talis blasphemie (260.17–18). Religiose: an adverb, "religiously", not "religious lords". A in the margin Conclusio (260.19); side-note 260.19.
  9. 9 Matthew 4:8–9, paraphrased, italic in the print (DR "All these will I give thee, if falling down thou wilt adore me"). B reads contra Jesu (260.26). Loserth proposes supplying diabolus as the subject (adde: diabolus); "[the devil]" is supplied accordingly. A in the margin Conclusio (260.28). Nebuchadnezzar "holy": Decretum C. 23 q. 4 c. 22 (Loserth, 261.1: Decr. sec. pars, causa XXIII, q. IV, c XXII; the modern form is ours); its incipit is Nabuchodonosor penitenciam meruit fructuosam, ascribed to Augustine, De praedestinatione et gratia 15, a work not his (Friedberg I, n. 284); the canon does not call him "holy": Wyclif infers it. B in the margin Nabugodonosor est beatus (261.1), an early reader’s assent.
  10. 10 A in the margin Correlarium (261.3); side-note 261.3. Participio: participation (the glossary, ), not the grammatical participle. Supposita capacitate: their capacity [to receive] being presupposed.
  11. 11 Privilegiacio passiva: being privileged, against the grantor’s active privileging. Ab aliis quam a datis principibus: by others than the princes in question. Prius natura: prior in the order of nature. Secundum racionem qua: under the aspect by which. Si non meruerit: if the cleric has not merited.
  12. 12 B reads observandi for conservandi (261.22). Sicut dixi in solucione proximi argumenti: 257.33–258.4 (12-b). Matthew 5:25 ("Be at agreement with thy adversary betimes, whilst thou art in the way with him", DR) is cited, not quoted; Wyclif takes scripture as the adversary, a reading found in Augustine, Sermo 9.3. Vivificata: agrees with vita. Perdit … quia vitam propriam: perdit is understood again, "[he loses] his own life".
  13. 13 A in the margin, without mark, Nota contra falsam pietatem et iniustam misericordiam (261.30); side-notes 261.27, 262.1. Proximo capitulo: chapter 11. The quotation is a canon of C. 23 q. 4 drawn from Ambrose, De officiis; the canon is c. 33, Est iniusta misericordia (Friedberg I), and its text is in fact Ambrose, Expositio in Ps. 118, sermo 8.25 (PL 15), which the Decretum labels De officiis. Loserth corrects the manuscripts from the Decretum: they read Est iniusta misericordia, est et iusta (262.1), laxat exicium (262.11–12), probari (262.19), facultate (262.26); his text is translated. He reports the Decretum’s miseratus est and the manuscripts’ regis (262.4–5), and the Decretum’s Ita si quis (262.6). A and A₁ read latronis coniugis (262.7) and libertat (262.10); B prolacionis (262.28). Deuteronomy 19:13 (DR; Wyclif illius, Vulgate ejus); Saul spared Agag, 1 Samuel 15:8–9. B in the margin Iudex nulli auferret complementum iusticie motus favore aut pietate aut favore (262.14). A consorcio criminacionis abstractus: construed "withdrawn from fellowship by an accusation"; it could be "withdrawn from fellowship on a charge". Sentencia: here a judicial sentence (the glossary, CONTEXTUAL), God’s sentence on Amalek, so "sentence". Teneri … debet forma iusticie, ne quis: the ne clause hangs on the duty to hold the form of justice; "[care must be taken]" is supplied.
  14. 14 Side-note 263.3. Si … fuit iustum de multis quod … subirent: "if … was just as regards many, that … they should undergo"; the subject of excusat is taken to be the privilege. Aufugio: flight [to sanctuary]. Partibus: the parties to the suit. Facinore: misdeed (the glossary, ).
  15. 15 Forty days: the term a sanctuary-seeker had under English custom before he must abjure the realm. Disposicionem persone culpabilis: the guilty person’s disposition (penitent or hardened). Taxanda: to be assessed.
  16. 16 Matthew 18:15–17 (correction privately, before witnesses, then by the church); Loserth prints XVIII° without a verse. A and B read deprehensus (263.16). Castigatis … vel ociosis … vel … proscriptis: ablatives with aliis sceleratis; ociosis is construed "[kept] idle", i.e. kept from further harm. Intoxicare plus sancte matris ecclesie: to poison more of holy mother church. Secundam difficultatem: the jurist’s claim at 258.17–20 (12-b); side-note 263.24. Instant: "press", not the formula instatur. The sentence runs on into the next part (12-d).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Plate readings; page · reading · note):
    • 258: ∅ ('the' is English side-note text (We grant the); print: Ad istum obiectum)
    • 258: lex
    • 258: Dei
    • 258: ad
    • 259: fuga (F alinea + 165ᵇ folio mark glued)
    • 259: veritatis
    • 261: sanctum (G alinea + 165ᶜ folio mark in margin)
    • 261: privilegii
    • 262: recitatur
    • 262: XXIIIª
    • 262: Denique
    • 262: I° (full-height capital I with degree sign)
    • 263: facere [NW]
    • 263: iniuriam [NW]
    • 263: patet
    • 261: XXIIIª
    • 263: XVIII°, (line-final; next line starts castigatis, no verse) [-VERSE]