Dialogus, chapter 12
Belief, opinion and faith
Pollard pp. 23.2–25.3
Falsehood and Truth23.2–25.3
Falsehood. I see that you involve many absurditiesinconveniencia; inconveniens: CONTEXTUAL: an absurdity (in argument) · troubles, ill consequences (in affairs)1 in the stupid ravings that you utter; for if in such a matter the faithful man ought to believe holy scripture alone, he would not believe papal bulls or the definition of the Roman curiacuria romana: the Roman curia, and so all the faith that should be placed in faithful companions living among us would perish, and much more would indulgencesindulgencie: indulgences not be believed, nor bishopsepiscopus; dominus episcopus: bishop; the lord bishop' letters, nor letters of fraternitylitere fraternitatum: letters of fraternity concerning spiritual suffrage.2 But who, living the common life of men, would not then despair of his blessedness? Indeed, human contracts, which are commonly made by oaths and testimonies, would perish, and, what is more, inheritances according to human laws, since no one would believe that a young man had such a father. Now this would too greatly disturb the commonwealth and the political law.
Truth. I see that you have learned from the father of lies3 to evade distinctions and equivocations, and you seem to inferconcludere: to infer absurdities that are at least apparent to you. And "to believe" is equivocal as regards: adhering with hesitation to a given teachingsentencia: teaching; or adhering to a given teaching without hesitation, yet as opinionopinio: opinion; or, thirdly, adhering to a teaching as to faith, which is said to come from the first truth, although it is not, for all that, demonstrated by human means from any other source.4 And so we suppose throughout this whole colloquy that "to believe" is taken for faith; but we do not speak so loosely in this matter as Boethius, [holding] that whatever opinion anyone holds is faith to him; but we speak of the catholic faith, since it must transcend opinion, because it produces infallible certainty, for which the faithful man ought to expose 24his life to the peril of death.5 And so a man can believe papal bulls as opinion; and especially if experience of the matter adds opinion over and above them; for they do not of themselves produce faith, and in many men they produce little or no credencecredulitas: credence, since both the popepapa: pope and his curia could be deceived, and deceive, for the sake of gain and through ignorance of the truth. And so it is commonly said that a fourfold response is to be fitted to questions or propositionsproponere: to propose. For some are to be granted without qualificationsimpliciter / secundum quid: without qualification / in a certain respect, above the opinions of men, as the truths of faith, perceptiblesensibilis: perceptible truths, and doctrinal truths demonstrated from certain principles. And in the second degree some are to be denied without qualification, as the falsehoods opposed to the truths mentioned above. And thirdly some are to be doubted, as words proposed to men which, because of contrary evidenceevidencia: evidence, they know neither to be true without qualification nor to be false without qualification. And in the fourth degree some are to be supposed, as matters of opinion falling short of the truths of the first mode, of which a man is not certain by faith or by demonstration, nor of their opposites, although he has no evidence for holding the contrary opinion; as, when one has experience of the manner of lifeconversacio: manner of life of a priestsacerdos / presbiter: priest / presbyter who lives catholicly, it can be supposed by the one who has the experience that he is a member of the churchecclesia: church, and yet this ought not to be believed by anyone as faith, because it is not known whether he is predestinatepredestinatus, -i: the predestinate (sg. "a predestinate [person]") or foreknownprescitus, -i: the foreknown to hell on account of a fall. Therefore we ought, as catholics, to abandon the famous childish principle that every proposition proposed is to be granted, denied, or doubted.6 When it is put to me whether I shall be saved, I neither grant nor deny nor doubt, but hope.7 And concerning other men I have none of these, but I suppose according to the evidence that I have, short of faithcitra fidem: short of faith. And it is clear that one who has experience of the malice of the Roman curia can speak with prudence against it, 25although he does not [thereby] speak against Christ and his church; for it is not of faith that that curia is the church militantecclesia militans / triumphans / dormiens: the church militant / triumphant / sleeping, although it has sometimes happened that it was the church here on the wayvia / patria: the way / the homeland.
Notes
- 1 Inconveniencia: what does not fit, in argument the absurd consequence, in affairs the disorder that follows (the glossary, CONTEXTUAL). Here, and at 23.16, the logical sense, so "absurdities".
- 2 Literae fraternitatum: letters by which a religious order, chiefly the friars, admitted a lay benefactor to a share in the order’s prayers and good works ("spiritual suffrage").
- 3 John 8:44, of the devil: "he is a liar, and the father thereof."
- 4 Credere equivocum ad: ad governs the three infinitive phrases that follow, the senses of credere; C reads aliud for ad. In the second sense B (corrected), B¹, C read tantum for tamen ("only as opinion"). In the third the print has adherere sentencia, which does not construe with tanquam fidei; B, B¹, C read sibi ("adhere to it as to faith"), with the same sense.
- 5 Credere fide sumi: "'to believe' is taken for faith"; B, B¹, C read fidem. B, B¹, C add loquitur after boicius, and B, B¹, C read quam for quoniam: "the catholic faith, which must transcend opinion". The Boethius reference is unidentified; Pollard gives none.
- 6 The "childish principle" is the rule of the scholastic disputation de obligationibus, in which the respondent must answer each proposition put to him by granting, denying, or doubting it.
- 7 The print reads Cum proposicio mihi si salvabor, which lacks a construction; we translate proposito (B, B¹, C), an ablative absolute: "when it is put to me whether I shall be saved". B¹ reads an for si; spero in B is corrected by another hand from suppono.
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- Plate readings; page · reading · note):
- 23: CAPITULUM 12m.
- 23: ∅ (side-note "As questions of")
- 23: ∅ (side-note "in matters of")
- 24: 4° (print: In 4° vero)
- 23: ∅ (side-note "To accept")
- 24: sive
- 23.20: sentencia (B, B¹, C sibi): see note 4.
- 24.25: proposicio (B, B¹, C proposito): variant translated, note 7.