Bonaventure against suffrages for the damned

I ask you to note how the doctor Bonaventure on the fourth [book] of the Sentences is allegedallegare / allegacio: allege / allegation to have acted effectually for this side; for he writes on the forty-sixth distinction of the fourth book in this form: "It seems," he says, "that some mitigation is made for the damned through suffragessuffragia: suffrages"; and making five arguments for that side, he recites three answers, which he rejects.¹ The first says that the suffrages of the churchecclesia: church profit the damned, yet not all, since not the very evil; and this, he says, was Master Prepositivus’s. But this remission of punishment is only for a time (as some say that on every Easter day all the damned have remission of punishment).² The second say that remission is made without qualificationsimpliciter / secundum quid: without qualification / in a certain respect, not according to arithmetical but according to geometrical proportion (as is said of indulgencesindulgencie: indulgences), so that not every equally meritorious work diminishes the eternal punishment equally, but every equally meritorious work of the church diminishes proportionally the punishment it finds; so that if the merit of the church, as four, diminishes a hundredth 495qualitative part of the punishment, then any merit of the lord diminishes proportionally a hundredth part of the punishment it finds; and so there always remains to the rich occasion to obtainimpetrare: obtain (by request) indulgences, for the living as much as for the dead, for those in purgatory as much as for the damned.³ The third opinionopinio: opinion says that the suffrages of the church do not profit the damned either for deliverance from the whole punishment or for the taking-awayablacio: taking-away of part of the punishment, by diminishing or mitigating, the one punishing [acting] so that [the sufferer] is not punished so much, but by strengthening the one punished, so that he may bear it better and more tolerably.⁴ But, these three opinions having been rejected, there follows the doctor’s teachingsentencia: CONTEXTUAL: teaching / sentence in these words: "Therefore," he says, "the opinion of others is more common and truer, that suffrages do not profit the damned, nor does the church intend to pray for them." And if a sophist should object that each of these opinions is then true, it is clear that the doctor understands that each of the others is true in part, or, negatively, is not true; but this one, contradictory to them, is true wholly.⁵ And consequently he answers the five arguments made for the opposite. The first is from the saying of blessed Augustine, Enchiridion 110, who says that to those dead whom the suffrages of the church profit, they profit either so that remission may be full or so that damnation may become more tolerable for them. From which it seems that the punishment of a damned man can be mitigated. "It must be said," he says, "that this is not understood of damnation made in hell, where there is no redemption, but in purgatory, where they profit them in two ways: either by freeing them at once, as those who have little of what is burnable, or by mitigating, as regards those who have sinned more gravely."⁶ And Saint Thomas holds the same answer on the 496fourth [book], distinction 46, question 1. "Damnation," he says, "is sometimes taken broadly for deputationdeputacio: deputation to any punishment whatever, as in Luke 23:40 the blessed Thief says, 'thou art under the same condemnation'; but sometimes it is taken strictly for deputation to perpetual punishment, as in Matthew 25:46: 'These shall go into everlasting punishment'; and this signification is the best-knownfamosior: best-known [sense]."⁷ And Hostiensis holds this answer in his Summa, book five, On Penances and Remissions, under "That the souls of the departed", and the saying of Augustine is expounded at [Causa] 13, q. 2, [c.] Tempus. But the Gloss that says that the popepapa: pope dispenses against God expounds badly, contrary to Hostiensis.⁸

Secondly the doctor argues from another saying of blessed Augustine, who says of the punishment of Arius that it is not determined, since it is increased according as sinners are multiplied by his error; now God is more inclined to have mercy than to punish. Therefore if in the state of damnation their punishment can be increased, it can also be lessened. "It must be said," he says, "that it is not alike, since remission must be founded on the foundation of charitycaritas: charity, now Arius continually has an evil will, but not charity."⁹ Thirdly he argues thus: It is impossible that the prayers of many should not be heard; now the church prays for all the faithful who die, of whom it is evident that many are damned. Therefore if the church does not pray in vain, all the faithful must be saved. "It must be said," he says, "that if it were evident to the church that someone was damned, it would not pray for him." And as to the form and the further matter of this argument, it is clear below.¹⁰ Fourthly the doctor argues thus: The punishment one bears willingly pleases God more than another 497which one bears unwillingly; now the damned man bears his punishment unwillingly. Now a just man, in a given case, bears punishment willingly for the damned man; therefore the surviving just man pays more to God for the damned man by suffering willingly than the damned man would be able to pay for himself. Therefore if satisfaction has been made to God’s justice by what pleases less, God’s mercy will be gained by what pleases more. "It must be said," he says, "that it is true," since God rewards the just man who piouslypietas / pie: piety / piously and conditionally prays for a dead man who is damned. But (as I shall say later) such a man really prays for himself and only for those capable [of it]. So the doctor says [it], because voluntary punishment cannot be taken on or accepted for one who does not have charity.¹¹ Fifthly the doctor argues thus: Such a just man punishes himself meritoriously for the damned man; therefore God accepts this punishment for him. Now God does not punish twice for the same thing; therefore the damned man must have mitigation of punishment. It is clear from the signification of the previous argument that the just man punishes himself for his own merit and the church’s, and not for the salvationsalvacio: salvation of such a damned man.¹² But further the doctor asks whether mitigation of the punishment of the damned comes about from the pietypietas / pie: piety / piously of the divine mercy. And he argues first that it does, by that [verse] of Psalm 76:10: "Will God forget to shew mercy? or will he in his anger shut up his mercies?"¹³ Secondly, by this: that one who sins mortally offends God, from whom is every good; therefore he deserves to lose every good; since, then, God does not annihilate him, it seems that God punishes him mercifully. Thirdly, by this: that by the very fact that someone sins he offends against order, and in consequence deserves to be ordered at once to punishment; since, then, God awaits his conversion and does not at once 498damn him, it seems that the piety of God extends to the damnable. Fourthly, by this: that one who sins offends against an infinite good; therefore he deserves infinite punishment; and since God does not inflict it, it follows that God punishes every sinner mercifully. But the doctor answers by granting the consequentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent: "It must be said," he says, "that mitigation of the punishment of the damned can in two ways

be understood: either as to the assessment and infliction of the punishment, and in this way without doubt there is mitigation of punishment in hell, since that mitigation is nothing but a mild and merciful deputation to perpetual punishment. But in the second way mitigation can be understood after the assessment and infliction of the punishment, and in this way no mitigation falls from the divine mercy."¹⁴ And I ask the school here to attend vigilantly whether it is not a feigned lie to bring forward the testimony of this doctor in anything, since he so manifestly contradicts one who says that the church ought to pray for the damned in hell so that their punishment may become more remiss. Hence Saint Thomas (in the place cited above), reciting three erroneous opinions, imputes the third to [William of] Auxerre, who says that the damned are aided by intercessionsuffragari: to aid by intercession not by diminution or interruption of punishment but by comforting of the sufferer; as if a man were carrying a heavy load and his face were bathed with water, he would be comforted, although the load is in no way lighter. "The aforesaid opinion," says the saint, "is presumptuous, that is, contrary to the sayings of the saints, and empty, supported by no authority, and nonetheless irrational, since the damned in hell are outside the bond of charity, according to which the works of the living are joined to the dead."¹⁵