Wyclif’s Latin works

De ecclesia, chapter 23, part 8

Common arguments: the pope’s power would be infinite, and the calculators’ cases would empty purgatory and hell

Loserth pp. 570.28–574.32

¶1570.28–574.22

570Ulterius fiunt argumenta communia contra omnem theologorum et decretistarum sentenciam in hac parte. Videtur enim, primo quod potestas pape sit potencia infinita; nam papa habet potestatem ad concedendum indulgencias infinitis personis per infinitum tempus duraturas, ergo infinitum maioris potencie est quam episcopus, qui solum quadraginta dies solum finitis subditis potest concedere. 571Consequencia patet ex hoc quod penes hoc est potestas maior, cum omnes ille sint univoce consimilis speciei; et antecedens videtur, tum quia super totum thesaurum ecclesie dominatur papa, qui thesaurus est quodammodo infinitus, tum quia non est dare quot personis potest papa thesaurum illum distribuere nec ad quantum. Item, videtur quod papa debet ex consciencia facere generaliter illud opus misericordie spiritualis, nam potens relevare fratrem suum et inexcusabiliter differens usque ad mortem corporalem fratris sui est reus homicidii, ergo multo magis differens liberare fratrem a morte spirituali, cuiusmodi est quicunque papa avarus de indulgencia generali; nec valet dicere quod potestas prelati in isto vilesceret, quia generaliter potentatus ex beneficii percepcione fit carior. Quam ergo excusacionem haberet qui a dampnacione perpetua posset proximum liberare quem debet diligere ut se ipsum, et tamen sine racione omittit? Numquid ille cui preceptum est eciam in sabbato extrahere bovem fratris de puteo non incurret prevaricacionem, si negligit liberare animam proximi ab inferno? Si ignorancia voluntatis divine excusat, quomodo alicui concedere talem indulgenciam papa temptat? Item, posito quod dictus papa Gregorius laxet ad tantum plenitudinem potestatis quantum Deus permiserit, et potestas sibi data suffecerit ad iuvandum spiritus in inferno, in purgatorio et hoc mundo, et sic concedat cuicunque presbitero plenitudinem vicarie potestatis ad absolvendum et indulgendum generaliter tam vivos quam mortuos, quantumcunque claves ecclesie permiserint, casus non videtur negandus, 572quia tunc dictus Gregorius non foret precise tante potestatis quante foret papa alius post vel ante, ymmo non precise tante potestatis quante ipsemet foret, quia non foret dare in eo maximam potestatem nec aliquam parcialem potestatem (ut patet in materia De Maximo et Minimo). Admisso ergo casu videtur quod omnes spiritus liberarentur de inferno et purgatorio, et omnes viantes forent in gracia finalis perseverancie confirmati. Nam thesaurus ecclesie cuius accepit plenam dispensacionem est infinitum plus bonus quam habitus sibi oppositus est malus, et limitatur secundum sui ultimum ad agendum; ergo extingueret totum malum. Quis ergo argueret talem papam de imprudencia qui destrueret totam mundi maliciam, restituendo seculum aureum, ut in statu innocencie? Et cum quo Deus tam efficaciter concurreret approbando? Excitandus ergo foret papa ad tam instanter proficiendum ecclesie, si non diffidit, sed confidit in plenitudine potencie quam pretendit. Item, dominus papa potest remittere medietatem vel terciam partem tocius penitencie aut quamcunque partem eius aliquotam (ut dicit ista posicio et perdoniste preconizant) in patria, sed si hoc potest tunc potest totalem penitenciam omnino remittere, et sicut de una persona, sic de totali ecclesia; ergo potest preservare totalem ecclesiam ab omni pena purgatorii vel inferni. Hic dicunt decretiste communiter quod papa non remittit regulariter secundum partem quantam sed quotam, ut tetigi per Hostiensem superius et recitat glossa in decretis, XIIIª q. IIª super capitulo Tempus; et ista scola videtur 573sompniata ut populus habeat continue aliquid redimendum. Contra istud queritur, primo utrum papa potest de plenitudine potestatis sue pro quocunque opere eque meritorio in persona habente tantum de culpa et eque capaci venie tantum peccatum remittere? Si potest, pono quod concedat cuicunque vere confesso et contrito facienti elemosinam ut quatuor, remissionem peccati ut quatuor, et indulgenciam ut quatuor, et pono insuper quod quilibet peccator iam militantis ecclesie multiplicet elemosinas, quousque totum peccatum suum sit dimissum et pena remissa, sicut faciliter hoc ordinato posset contingere. Illo ergo statuto pro lege perpetua faciliter excluderetur dyabolus a punicione hominum in inferno et tolleretur omnis punicio in purgatorio, et per idem liberarentur per tales indulgencias mortui puniti vel in purgatorio vel inferno. Si dicatur quod papa non potest statuere talem legem, sed oportet ipsum proporcionaliter semper remittere, videtur primo quod hoc derogat potestati divine, quod Deus personis eque dignis non potest tantam mercedem tribuere pro meritis paribus, ut Petro habenti peccatum ut octo in purgatorio vel inferno potest dare remissionem pene et culpe ut quatuor pro elemosina viatoris dantis pro eo denarium. Paulo autem ibi detento pro peccato ut quatuor non posset dare cum illis paribus remissionem pene et culpe ut quatuor pro tanta elemosina in via facta pro ipso, quia tunc posset Deus communicare potestatem talem eius vicario, ut omnino absolveret a pena et culpa tam vivos quam mortuos. Sed constat quod primum assumptum sequi ex opinione claudit contradiccionem; secundo videtur istam sentenciam derogare potestati papali, quia, si lex ligat papam 574quod potest facere maius et non minus, quomodo concederetur legi sue, quod taxat ad votum pro quantumcunque parva elemosina remitti quamcunque partem aliquotam pene vel culpe? Numquid eo ipso quo ipse dicit terciam vel quartam aut quamcunque aliam partem penitencie indultam pro denario sequitur quod sit ita? Numquid oporteret quod previe subsit racio apud Deum? Ubi ergo est evidencia maioris racionis laxandi, est evidencia maioris potestatis ad hoc et econtra de irracionabilitate, ut repugnat prime racioni, per quam oportet omnes indulgencias fieri, quod hic sint infiniti puniti; quorum primus est aliqualiter capax venie secundum dignitatem habitam a Deo, secundus vero in duplo capacior et sic in infinitum, et tamen proporcionaliter ut fit maior elemosina pro magis capaci quoad Deum, habet ex taxacione pape minorem efficaciam ad peccatum vel penitenciam remittendum. Tales multe conclusiones impossibiles sequuntur ex potestate pape taxandi penas et peccata hominis suffragandi ad suum placitum et ex casibus calculatoriis quos ista scola habet admittere.

Further, common arguments are made against every teachingsentencia: CONTEXTUAL: teaching / sentence of the theologians and decretists on this matter. For it seems, first, that the power of the popepapa: pope is an infinite power; for the pope has power to grant to infinitely many persons indulgencesindulgencie: indulgences lasting for an infinite time; therefore he is of infinitely greater power than a bishopepiscopus; dominus episcopus: bishop; the lord bishop, who can grant only forty days, and only to finitely many subjects.1 571The inferenceconsequencia: inference is clear from this: that by this measure power is greater, since all those [powers] are univocallyunivoce: univocally of a like species; and the antecedentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent seems [true], both because the pope exercises lordshipdominus; dominari: lord; to exercise lordship / to lord it over the whole treasury of the churchthesaurus ecclesie: treasury of the church, which treasury is in a certain way infinite, and because there is no assigning to how many persons the pope can distribute that treasury, nor to how much.2 Again, it seems that the pope ought in conscience to do that work of spiritual mercy generally; for one who is able to relieve his brother and inexcusably puts it off until his brother’s bodily death is guilty of homicide; therefore much more one who puts off freeing his brother from spiritual death; of which kind is any pope whatever who is niggardly with a general indulgence. Nor is it valid to say that the prelateprelatus: prelate's power would grow cheap in this, because generally a power becomes dearer from the receiving of benefit.3 What excuse, then, would he have who could free his neighbour, whom he ought to love as himself, from perpetual damnationdampnacio: damnation, and yet without reason omits it? Shall not he who is commanded even on the sabbath to draw his brother’s ox out of the pit incur transgression, if he neglects to free his neighbour’s soul from hell? If ignorance of the divine will excuses [him], how does the pope attempt to grant such an indulgence to anyone?4 Again, suppose that the said Pope Gregory looseslaxare: loose his plenitude of powerplenitudo potestatis: plenitude of power to as great an extent as God shall have permitted, and that the power given him shall have sufficed for helping spirits in hell, in purgatory and in this world, and that so he grants to any presbytersacerdos / presbiter: priest / presbyter whatever the plenitude of vicarial power for absolving and indulgingindulgere: to indulge generally both living and dead, as far as the keys of the church shall have permitted: the case does not seem to be deniable, 572because then the said Gregory would not be of precisely as much power as another pope after or before would be; indeed, not of precisely as much power as he himself would be, because there would be no assigning in him a greatest power, nor any partial power (as is clear in the matter De maximo et minimo).5 The case being admitted, then, it seems that all spirits would be freed from hell and purgatory, and all those on the roadviantes: those on the road would be confirmed in the grace of final perseverance. For the treasury of the church, of which he has received full dispensation, is infinitely more good than the habit opposed to it is evil, and it is assignedlimitare; limites: to assign (an office); limits to act according to its utmost; therefore it would extinguish all evil.6 Who, then, would accuse of imprudence such a pope, who would destroy all the malice of the world, restoring the golden age, as in the state of innocence? And with whom God would so effectively concur, approving? The pope, then, would have to be roused to profiting the church so urgently, if he does not mistrust, but trusts in, the plenitude of power that he claims.7 Again, the lord pope can remitremissio; remittere: remission; to remit half or a third part of the whole penance, or any aliquot partpartes potestative / subiective / aliquote: potestative / subjective / aliquot parts of it whatever (as this position says and the pardonersperdoniste: pardoners proclaim) in the homelandvia / patria: the way / the homeland; now if he can do this, then he can remit the whole penance altogether; and as of one person, so of the whole church; therefore he can preserve the whole church from all punishment of purgatory or of hell.8 To this the decretists commonly say that the pope does not, as a rule, remit according to a part of a quantity, but according to a proportional part, as I touched on through Hostiensis above, and as the gloss on the Decretum recounts, C. 13 q. 2, on the chapter Tempus; and this school seems 573to have been dreamt up so that the people may always have something to redeem.9 Against this it is asked, first, whether the pope can, of the plenitude of his power, for any equally meritorious work, in a person having as much guilt and equally capable of forgivenessvenia: forgiveness, remit as much sin? If he can, I posit that he grants to anyone truly confessed and contrite who gives alms as four, remission of sin as four, and indulgence as four; and I posit further that every sinner of the church now militant multiplies his alms until his whole sin is forgiven and the punishment remitted, as could easily happen once this was ordained.10 That being established, then, as a perpetual law, the devil would easily be shut out from punishing men in hell, and all punishment in purgatory would be taken away; and by the same token the dead who are punished, either in purgatory or in hell, would be freed by such indulgences. If it is said that the pope cannot establish such a law, but must always remit proportionally, it seems, first, that this derogates from the divine power, [namely] that God cannot bestow so great a reward on equally worthy persons for equal merits: as, to Peter, having sin as eight in purgatory or hell, he can give remission of punishment and guilt as four for the alms of a wayfarerviator: wayfarer who gives a penny for him; but to Paul, held there for sin as four, he could not, other things being equal, give remission of punishment and guilt as four for so great an alms made on the way for him; because then God could communicate such power to his vicar, so that he would absolve altogether from punishment and guilt both living and dead.11 But it is evident that the first assumptionassumptum: the assumption, which follows from the opinion, implies a contradictionclaudit contradictionem / contradictorium: it implies a contradiction. Secondly, this teaching seems to derogate from the papal power; because, if a law binds the pope 574so that he can do the greater and not the less, how would it be granted to his law that he assesses at will that any aliquot part of punishment or guilt be remitted for an alms however small? Does it follow, by the very fact that he says a third or a fourth or any other part of penance [is] indulged for a penny, that it is so? Would it not have to be that a reason underlies it beforehand with God?12 Where, then, there is evidenceevidencia: evidence of a greater reason for loosing, there is evidence of a greater power for it, and conversely of unreasonableness; as it is repugnant to the first reason, through which all indulgences must be made, that there be here infinitely many punished, of whom the first is in some degree capable of forgiveness according to the worthiness had from God, the second twice as capable, and so to infinity; and yet, in proportion as a greater alms is made for the one more capable before God, it has, by the pope’s assessmenttaxacio (pene): assessment, less efficacy for remitting sin or penance.13 Many such impossible conclusions follow from the pope’s power of assessing at his pleasure the punishments and sins of a man to be aided by intercessionsuffragari: to aid by intercession, and from the calculatory casescasus calculatorii: calculatory cases which this school has to admit.14

¶2574.23–574.32

574Tercio videtur quod subiacet potestati pape omnino absolvere tam vivos quem mortuos a pena et a culpa, et pono quod sint infiniti homines et infiniti denarii sive simul sive successive creati et adnichilati de Dei potencia absoluta, et iniungat papa primo illorum quod det primum denarium pro delenda prima parte penitencie Petri; secundo autem iniungat quod secundus det secundum denarium pro delenda secunda parte sue penitencie, et sic in infinitum. Et patet quod in fine foret tota penitencia Petri deleta.

Thirdly, it seems that it lies within the pope’s power to absolve altogether both living and dead from punishment and from guilt. And I posit that there are infinitely many men and infinitely many pennies, created and annihilated, either together or successively, by God’s absolute powerpotencia absoluta: absolute power; and that the pope enjoins the first of them to give the first penny for blotting out the first part of Peter’s penance, and enjoins the second that the second give the second penny for blotting out the second part of his penance, and so to infinity. And it is clear that in the end the whole of Peter’s penance would be blotted out.15

Notes

  1. 1 Argumenta communia: arguments that tell against theologians and decretists alike. Sentencia: CONTEXTUAL (the glossary): the position taught, so 'teaching'. Infinitum maioris potencie: of infinitely greater power. Quadraginta dies: the bishop’s indulgence of forty days, the limit set for bishops by the Fourth Lateran Council, c. 62 (X 5.38.14; form ours). Solum finitis subditis: only to finitely many subjects. R. Side-note 570.28.
  2. 2 Penes hoc: by this measure, the number of persons and the length of time. Univoce consimilis speciei: of one species in the same sense (row univoce), so that the powers can be compared by quantity. Non est dare quot … nec ad quantum: no number of persons and no amount can be assigned. Dominatur: exercises lordship (row dominari, here neutral).
  3. 3 Ex consciencia: in conscience. Illud opus misericordie spiritualis: the general indulgence. Differens: putting off. Avarus de indulgencia generali: niggardly with a general indulgence. Potentatus … fit carior: taken as "a power becomes dearer [to its subjects]" through the benefit they receive; potentatus may be the person, "a potentate". T. B lacks fratrem (571.13). R. Side-note 571.8. Hus reuses the passage (cf. Hus, Opp. I, 184a). B’s margin at 571.8 asks what the lawyers’ saying means, "that the lord pope does not remit as a rule according to a part of a quantity but a proportional part", with Loserth’s cross-reference to p. 752, l. 30; Wyclif reaches that saying at 572.28.
  4. 4 Quem debet diligere ut se ipsum: Matthew 22:39, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Douay–Rheims). Eciam in sabbato extrahere bovem fratris de puteo: Luke 14:5, the ox fallen "into a pit" and drawn out "on the sabbath day", with Deuteronomy 22:4, "thy brother’s … ox"; Wyclif joins the two. C. Prevaricacionem: transgression (cf. row prevaricator). Si ignorancia … excusat: if the pope pleads ignorance of whom God wills to free, the same ignorance forbids him to grant any indulgence.
  5. 5 Dictus papa Gregorius: Gregory XI, named earlier in the chapter (564.15). Laxet ad tantum plenitudinem potestatis: looses (lets out) his plenitude of power as far as God allows; laxare is rendered "loose" throughout. Vicarie potestatis: the power of a vicar. Casus non videtur negandus … quia tunc: taken as "on that teaching", that the pope’s power is infinite: such a power has no greatest degree, so nothing fixes how much power Gregory has, and nothing bars the case. De Maximo et Minimo: Wyclif’s own treatment of the limits of capacities, "on maximum and minimum", which he cites as his in De dominio divino I c. 4 (27) and De veritate c. 19; cf. Logice continuacio c. 7.
  6. 6 Admisso … casu: the disputant’s admission of a posited case. Viantes: those on the road (row). Habitus sibi oppositus: the contrary habit, sin. Limitatur secundum sui ultimum ad agendum: taken as "is assigned (row limitare) to act to its utmost", the full dispensation having been granted. T. AA₁ forent magna (572.8); its sense is unclear and the print is translated. R. Side-note 572.7.
  7. 7 Seculum aureum … status innocencie: the golden age set beside the state of man before the fall. Plenitudine potencie quam pretendit: the plenitude of power (here potencia, not potestas) that he claims. T. Quis is Loserth’s emendation; the codices read quia (572.13). Approbando is Loserth’s doubtful reading (he marks it "?"); A and B have the abbreviation app’ndo (572.17).
  8. 8 Dominus papa: the lord pope. Partem … aliquotam: an aliquot part, one that measures the whole exactly (row partes aliquote). Perdoniste preconizant: the pardoners proclaim. In patria: taken with preconizant, "in the homeland", that is, in this country (row patria, the earthly sense); if it goes with remittere, it would be the remission of what is owed in the next life. R. Side-note 572.21.
  9. 9 Hic dicunt decretiste: the decretists’ answer (A and B mark it Responsio decretistarum in the margin, 572.28). Secundum partem quantam sed quotam: not by a fixed quantity, but by a proportional part, a fraction of what remains, so that the remission never reaches the whole; Hostiensis’s formula secundum partem cotam non quantam (519.1). Glossa in decretis: the ordinary gloss on Decretum C. 13 q. 2 c. 23 Tempus (form ours). Ut populus habeat continue aliquid redimendum: the remainder is never paid off. T. A habeant (573.1).
  10. 10 Contra istud queritur: A in the margin Questio (573.2). Eque capaci venie: equally capable of forgiveness (venia, kept apart from condonacio "pardon"). Ut quatuor: "as four", the calculators’ measure of degree: alms of four degrees, remission of four. Peccator iam militantis ecclesie: a sinner of the church now militant (row ecclesia militans). Hoc ordinato: once this was ordained.
  11. 11 Si dicatur: A in the margin Responsio quedam (573.18). Proporcionaliter semper remittere: always to remit only a proportional part. Quod Deus … non potest: the derogation, in apposition to hoc. Peter, owing eight, can have four remitted (a half) for a penny; Paul, owing four, could not have four remitted (the whole) for the same alms, since a whole remission would open the way to total absolution. Cum illis paribus: other things being equal. In via: on the way, by a wayfarer. R. Side-note 573.18.
  12. 12 Primum assumptum sequi ex opinione: taken as "the first assumption, which follows from the opinion" (that God cannot give the same reward for equal merits); the infinitive may instead make the whole the subject: "that the first assumption follows from the opinion implies a contradiction". Claudit contradiccionem: implies a contradiction (row). Si lex ligat papam quod potest facere maius et non minus: if the law of proportional remission lets him remit a part and forbids him the whole. Taxat ad votum: assesses at will (cf. row taxacio). Numquid … Numquid: the first expects "no", the second "yes". T. AA₁ crederetur for concederetur (574.2). B prime subsit for previe subsit (574.7–8). R. Side-note 574.1.
  13. 13 Et econtra de irracionabilitate: and conversely: where the reason is less, the power is less. Ut repugnat prime racioni … quod hic sint infiniti puniti: taken as introducing a case that offends the first reason, God’s: an infinite series of the punished, each twice as capable of forgiveness as the one before, for whom larger alms are given, and who yet get less by the pope’s fixed assessment. Habet: its subject taken as the alms. Dignitatem habitam a Deo: the worthiness had from God.
  14. 14 Hominis suffragandi: of the man to be aided (row suffragari). Taxandi: of assessing (cf. row taxacio). Casibus calculatoriis: the calculatory cases, the logicians’ cases on infinite series and degrees. Habet admittere: has to admit.
  15. 15 Tercio: the third argument against the decretists’ answer (the first at 573.2, the second at secundo videtur, 573.33). Quem mortuos: the print’s quem is taken as quam. Prima pars … secunda pars: taken as proportional parts (a half, a quarter and so on), as at 575.5–6, so that the infinite series completes the whole. R. Side-note 574.23.
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Plate readings; page · reading · note):
    • 572: tunc
    • 572: forent
    • 573: sompniata (margin letter N and 206a folio mark precede)
    • 573: populus