De potestate pape, chapter 1, part 4
The divisions of power, and five objections to multiplying them
Loserth pp. 12.1–16.21
¶112.1–14.10
"Teach, counsel, chastise, comfort, forgive, bear, pray";1 for (as has been said) "as many as received" Christ by formed faith, "he gave them power" so "to be made the sons of God" that it is lawful for them to direct themselves and their brothers in the way of their father Christ, even by correcting them, as is clear in Matthew 18.2 Hence, corresponding to spiritual powerpotestas: power, secular power is twofold, namely civil and common. Civil authoritative [power] belongs only to the civil lorddominus; dominari: lord; to exercise lordship / to lord it, but civil vicarious [power] befits bailiffs or others acting in place of the secular lords. And common secular power is that by which anyone can direct himself and his own according to the goods of nature and fortune. And so, just as a man cannot be without soul and body, nor an adopted son of God without the goods of nature and of grace, so it does not hold that one is a wayfarerviator: wayfarer unless he has both secular and spiritual common power, although in infants and fools it is bound. And spiritual power is the more perfect in both cases, and priestly spiritual power indeed adds over and above the common spiritual [power]. But that power over their temporal goods is assignedlimitare; limites: to assign (an office); limits to clerics, the power of seculars being shut out, seems to be the presumption and avarice of priests.3 And so there are any number of masters’ divisions of powers, which the curiosity of the church has devised, as an archdeacon and a bishop-elect are said to have power of jurisdictionpotestas iurisdiccionis: power of jurisdiction, even for absolving and excommunicating, although they do not have the power of orderpotestas ordinis: power of order for these; and laymen are said to have such power in the contentious court by commissions of prelates. Against what has been said of the multiplicity of human power it is argued.4 For it seems that God cannot 13ordain a more manifold means for an end that would be done equally perfectly by a shorter means, since every such ordinance would be in vain; now every end for which so manifold a power would be ordained would be done equally perfectly, if not more perfectly, by a single simple power, which is free choiceliberum arbitrium: free choice, as by any number of superadded powers; therefore it is superfluous to posit so many. The minor is proved from this, that every created power is for the work of the perfection of the universe according to the church or another part of it; now for every such work free choice suffices without accidental power, for in the state of innocence there would be only such power, just as after the state of innocence those who lived more religiously lacked power of this kind. What (I ask) is man sufficient to ordain or do that he is not sufficient for out of pure free choice? For it seems that a cloakedpalliacio; palliare: cloaking; to cloak superadded power rather disturbs the church. Again, the same power in number can at one time be loosedlaxare: loose and at another restricted5, as is clear of the power of order, equal in every priest, although in prelates it takes on manifold degrees in loosing and restriction; therefore, by the same token, natural power can at one time be loosed and at another restricted as much as is needed for the rule of the church; therefore, since in such loosing no new power is acquired, nor is one lost in restriction, it followssequitur: it follows that it is not necessary to superadd a new power of this kind. The minor is clear, both because power is not composed of its intensive parts, and also because otherwise it would not be the same power restricted or loosed, but either the old one wholly lost or a new one begotten. And this moves more evidently [to the view] that it is not necessary to posit in a priest a specific distinction between 14power of order and of jurisdiction, but he who gives the power of order gives as such the power of jurisdiction, since otherwise the bare power of order would be exceedinglynimis: exceedingly superfluous, being insufficient to pass into its matter however much it were exercised.6 Now Christ, when he gave the disciples the power of preaching, said generally, Matthew, the last chapter: "Going therefore, teach ye all nations: baptizing them";7 when, therefore, the principal is granted, the accessory is granted, without which it could not profit.
¶214.11–14.22
Again, no pure creature cooperates with God in producing an indivisible quantity of the mind; every such power is an indivisible quality of the mind; therefore no pure creature cooperates with God in producing such power, and consequently, besides the power which God creates in the soul, there is no other given by man.8 The assumptionassumptum: the assumption is clear from this, that nothing material acts on the immaterial, as Augustine says, On Genesis according to the Letter XII: "every potentate is a material substance";9 therefore he does not imprint such power on the spiritual soul.
¶314.23–14.29
Likewise, no pure creature cooperates with God except as his instrument; now God does not require a creature as instrument in the sudden production of this indivisible quality any more than in the production of grace, since this would be superfluous; therefore a creature does not co-produce such a quality with God.10
¶414.30–16.21
Likewise, supposing that the lord popepapa: pope commits power by bulls into England to Peter the archbishop, to absolve Paul, a criminal, in 15cases reserved to the curia, and I suppose that the lord pope dies before the bulls arrive in England,11 then the lord pope neither at the instant of his purpose to confer such power on Peter suddenly imprints such power in Peter, nor at any later [instant] that can be designated. And the same judgment [holds] of any creature that would give power to another; therefore there is no such power except a feigned one. For the vicar of Christvicarius Christi: vicar of Christ cannot at will imprint a quality in the soul at so great a distance, since then it would be superfluous to authorizeautorizare: authorize such power by bulls, and continuously afterwards the pope’s action would be irrelevant, as it would be, he being dead, at the instant the bulls became known. And by the same token it follows that it is not subject to his power to revoke power given by God, nor to loose power previously bound, just as it is not subject to his power that, whenever he claims to give such power, God concurs, principally providing the power. And otherwise it is certain that such power is not given by man; as, therefore, power is not given to the unqualifiedinhabilis: unqualified (to hold office) or the unwilling, so neither does a potentate give power to another if he claims to; for otherwise men could try out a tradecommercium; commercari: trade; to trade in powers among themselves, and the general volition by which every pope wills that all the qualifiedhabilis / habilitas; habilitare: qualified / qualification; to qualify priests of Christ, and only such, have power would cause power far otherwise than the church reckons. In this matter it seems to me that power at one time means absolutely a potencypotencia: potency / power for ruling, and at another means, aggregativelyaggregative: aggregatively, such a potency together with authenticautenticus / autenticacio: authentic / authentication notification or promulgation;12 and since 16the senses are equally known, it is clear that it is not repugnant that there is no power except from God, and yet that something other than God gives power, that is, authentic promulgation in the face of the church that a created person has such power from God; such an aggregate is indeed given in part by man, but only if God principally authorizes it, as is clear below. To the first, the inferenceconsequencia: inference is granted with the assumption, but the minor is denied, since after the fall it is necessary to have power promulgated by man according to servile fear for coercingcoactivus; cohercere, cohersitivus: coactive; coerce, coercive rebels, as it was not needed in the state of innocence nor in the rule of the piously obedient, since such a law is set because of transgressors, which the humble Christian will not fear.13 And it is granted that potentates wrongly take occasion to disturb the church from the fictionficticia: fiction of power; yet God must give spiritual powers for ministering the sacraments, for coercing the rebels of the church in secular fashion, besides free choice, as is clear from manifold scripture.
Notes
- 1 The verse names the seven spiritual works of mercy, the mnemonic line Consule, castiga, solare, remitte, fer, ora with doce. It completes the sentence left open at 11.32.
- 2 John 1:12 (Loserth 12.1), DR "as many as received him, he gave them power to be made the sons of God"; the quoted words follow Loserth’s italics, and Wyclif adds Christum fide formata, "by formed faith" (faith formed by charity). corripiendo: Matthew 18:15, "rebuke him between thee and him alone". Hus repeats 12.1–20 (Loserth: "Hussii Opp." 213b).
- 3 limitatur: "is assigned" (glossary: limitare); seclusa potestate secularium: the seculars’ power being shut out. Wyclif condemns the clergy’s claim to sole power over their temporal goods; Loserth’s side-note (12.22) reads it of jurisdiction. sed et: "and indeed", an addition, not a contrast.
- 4 B marks the objections in its margin: Obieccio at 12.33, then 2 (13.20), 3 (14.11), 4 (14.23), 5 (14.30); the answers begin at 16.8 (AB ad 1) and run into the next part. "It is argued" renders arguitur.
- 5 nun (p. 13): so the print, read on the plate; a misprint for nunc (nunc … nunc), our emendation.
- 6 quia insufficiens ut sit in materiam quantumcunque exercita: construed "being insufficient to pass into its matter (to take effect on anything), however much exercised", with exercita agreeing with potestas. The phrase is compressed and may have lost a word.
- 7 Matthew 28:19 (Math. ultimo, "the last chapter"), quoted to the end of Loserth’s italics.
- 8 14.12–15: the words from quantitatem to producendo are wanting in A and B; in A another hand adds them in the margin (Loserth). Within them quantitatem, "quantity", stands where the minor premiss and 14.24 have qualitas, "quality", which the argument needs; translated as printed. The minor premiss has no connective. B in the margin (14.11): 3.
- 9 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XII XII.16.33 (PL 34, 467: nec sane putandum est facere aliquid corpus in spiritu … praestantior est qui facit, ea re de qua aliquid facit; Loserth’s page is lost in the scan). Loserth italicises Omnis potentatus est substancia materialis, but the sentence may be Wyclif’s minor premiss rather than Augustine’s words. potentatus here, and at 15.13, 16.17 and 20.28, is the holder of power, "potentate", not the abstract "sovereignty".
- 10 in produccione subdita (14.25): so the print; A reads subita, "sudden", which gives the sense (cf. subito, 15.4) and is translated. B in the margin (14.23): 4.
- 11 15.2–3: the words from ante to papa are wanting in A and B; in A another hand adds them in the margin (Loserth). Translated as printed. B in the margin (14.30): 5.
- 12 potenciam ad regulandum: "potency", the bare capacity Wyclif sets against the aggregate (capacity together with authentic promulgation); potestas and potencia name one power here. AB in the margin (15.30): Potestas; B: Responsio ad obiectum. Hus repeats 15.30–16.7 (Loserth: "Hussii Opp." 213b).
- 13 lex talis propter transgressores posita est: an echo of Galatians 3:19, "it was set because of transgressions" (Vulgate propter transgressiones posita est); Wyclif has transgressores. AB in the margin (16.8): ad 1.
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- Plate readings; page · reading · note):
- 12: Quod
- 12: ∅ (English side-note word)
- 14: producendo
- 15: concurrat (20 is the line number)