Wyclif’s Latin works

De eucharistia, chapter 7, part 1

Against the identification of the bread with the body of Christ

Loserth pp. 189.29–193.19

¶1189.29–190.12

189Ut autem a sacramento veritatis clarius fugetur falsitas, restat transcurrendum per alia dubia quibus scola theologie nimis inaniter accusatur, et primo de 190sentencia ydemptificacionis sacramenti in corpus Christi, qua creditur, quod nudus panis et vinum fient ydemptifice corpus Christi et sanguis. Et recitat illam Magister Sentenciarum IVᵒ, distinccione XIᵃ, capitulo primo; et habet ista sentencia pro se evidencias multas sophisticas et testimonia sanctorum sophistice intellecta. Arguitur ergo primo sic contra istam sentenciam: Panis et vinum non fient aliquid quod non erunt, sed non erunt ydemptice corpus Christi et sanguis, ergo non fient sic corpus Christi et sanguis. Si enim erunt idemptice hec partes Christi et omnia que erunt sunt, tunc sunt hec partes Christi.

And so that falsehood may be put to flight more clearly from the sacramentsacramentum (the Eucharist); sacramentum altaris: sacrament; the sacrament of the altar of truth, it remains to run through other doubts by which the school of theology is accused of being exceedinglynimis: exceedingly empty;1 and first of the 190teachingsentencia: teaching / sentence2 of the identificationydemptificare / ydemptificacio: identify / identification of the sacrament into the body of Christcorpus Christi / corpus Domini: the body of Christ / the body of the Lord, by which it is believed that bare breadpanis / vinum: bread / wine and winepanis / vinum: bread / wine will become by identificationydemptifice: by identification the body of Christ and the blood.3 And the MasterMagister: the Master of the Sentences recitesrecitare: recite it in the fourth [book], distinction 11, chapter 1;4 and this teaching has for itself many pieces of sophistical evidenceevidencia: evidence and testimonies of the saintssancti: the saints sophisticallysophistice: sophistically understood. It is argued, therefore, first thus against this teaching: bread and wine will not become anything that they will not be; now they will not be identicallyydemptice: identically the body of Christ and the blood; therefore they will not so become the body of Christ and the blood.5 For if these will be identically parts of Christ, and all things that will be, are, then these are parts of Christ.6

¶2190.13–190.26

190Contra quod arguitur secundo per hoc quod vinum non per accidens sed per se est vinum. Sed nihil quod per se est aliquid potest esse non illud, ergo nullum vinum potest esse non vinum. Si enim corpus Christi in fine verborum conversionis erit non vinum, tunc oportet quod materia vel forma vini aut aliquid sibi equale deficiat, quia manente omni essenciali requisito ad esse vini non est tunc racio quare non remaneret vinum et per consequens non tunc erit non vinum conversum in aliud. Si tunc deficiet materia, forma vel aliquid sibi essenciale, tunc oportet quod vinum desinet esse et per consequens ipsum vinum non tunc erit aliud quam vinum, quia tunc non erit aliquid.

Against which it is arguedarguitur per: it is argued by appeal to secondly by appeal to this, that wine is wine not by accidentper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself but of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself.7 Now nothing that is something of itself can be not that; therefore no wine can be not-wine. For if the body of Christ at the end of the words of conversionconversio (eucharistic): conversion will be not-wine,8 then the matter or the form of the wine, or something equal to it, must fail;9 because, while everything essential that is required for the beingens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence of wine remains, there is then no reason why it would not remain wine, and consequently it will not then be not-wine converted into another thing. If then the matter, the form or something essential to it fails, then the wine must cease to be, and consequently the wine itself will not then be anything other than wine, because then it will not be anything.

¶3190.27–191.12

190Item, vel erit ipsa ydemptificacio individualis per motum vel sine motu; si per motum, oportet signare aliquid quod deperdetur vel acquiretur vel utrumque; 191et signato illo quod acquiretur vel deperdetur, queritur (ut supra) utrum erit essenciale vel accidentale ydemptificando, si essenciale signatum non ydemptificatur sed destruetur. Si vero sit accidentale ydemptificando, sequitur quod non obstante illo motu manebit utrumque quidquid prefuit; non ergo ydemptificatur unum alteri, sed manebunt due res tantum essencialiter distincte sicut in principio. Si sine motu fiat ydemptificacio, tunc a neutro fiet ablacio alicuius essencialis vel accidentalis pertinens ydemptificacioni, et per consequens remanebunt tante distincta substancialiter et accidentaliter sicut in principio.

Again, the individual identification itself will be either through motion or without motion. If through motion, one must assign something that will be lost or will be acquired, or both; 191and, that which will be acquired or lost being assigned, it is asked (as above) whether it will be essential or accidental to the thing being identified.10 If essential, the thing assigned is not identified but will be destroyed. But if it is accidental to the thing being identified, it followssequitur: it follows that, notwithstanding that motion, each will remain whatever it was before; therefore the one is not identified with the other, but two things will remain as essentially distinct as in the beginning. If the identification comes about without motion, then from neither will there be a taking-awayablacio: taking-away of anything essential or accidental pertaining to the identification, and consequently they will remain as distinct, substantiallysubstancialiter: substantially and accidentally, as in the beginning.11

¶4191.13–193.10

191Item, posito quod Deus ydemptificet hominem cum asino vel quidlibet significandum cum alio, queratur post casum, utrum homo remanebit homo post ydemptificacionem vel asinus vel utrumque. Si utrumque, remanebunt tantum distincta in principio, si remanebit homo et asinus desinit esse vel econtra, videtur primo quod illud desinens non ydemptificatur sed corrumpitur, quod est contra concessum. Videtur secundo quod sequitur: Homo ydemptificatur asino, ergo asinus ydemptificatur homini et econtra; et ita ex casu non sequitur pocius quod remaneat homo quam asinus vel econtra. Non ergo concedendum est unum quin per idem et aliud. Et videtur idem tercio ex hoc quod illud ydemptificatum quod desinit perdit aliquid sibi essenciale ut animam asininam vel animam humanam, et per consequens illa non foret ydemptificacio sed destruccio. Et hic querunt logici de subiecto et terminis ydemptificacionis ut distingueretur ab aliis motibus et de eius celeritate ac aliis eius proprietatibus. 192Item, pono quod Deus ydemptificet quodlibet cuilibet, quod oportet concedere esse possibile, quia aliter staret Dei potencia infinita ad aliqua que non posset ydemptificare, consequens inpossibile, cum posset ydemptificare creaturas valde abiectas sibi ipsi, ut patet in materia de incarnacione tam quoad corpus Christi quam animam; quarum utrumque est verbum Dei et personaliter ipse Deus; quod videtur summe mirabile. Hoc ergo admisso videtur quod quilibet manet in sua specie ac individuacione ut mansit in principio, quia da quod non Petrus remanet ut in principio, contra quidlibet ydemptificatur Petro, ergo Petrus remanet summe multiplex. Et idem est argumentum de quolibet assignando. Si ergo tota universitas remanet in sua specie ac sua individuacione ut in principio, videtur quod utrobique tollitur ydemptificacio; nam ad omnem punctum mundi est summa diversificacio; que cum sit contraria ydemptificacioni, videtur quod tollit ydemptificacionem pro eodem tempore et subiecto. Si dicatur quod summa ydemptificacio est summa diversificacio, tunc (ut supra) debet correspondenter hoc posito variari responsio, quia repugnat quod quidquam remaneat compositum ex partibus vel accidentatum, ymmo notum est si quidlibet est, quidlibet solum Deus est. Item, stante hoc casu videtur quod quelibet pars mundi sit indivisibilis, quia ydemptificata est puncto et per consequens est punctus indivisibilis. Et videtur quod quelibet pars mundi sit in infinitum magna, quia cum quelibet pars mundi sit totus mundus, quelibet pars quantitativa mundi foret ita magna ut totus 193mundus et per consequens infinitum modica pars mundi foret ita magna ut aliquid. Ex quo cum principiis geometrie sequitur quod omnis pars mundi sit infinita, quia da quod caput tuum non sit nisi pedale, contra nasus tuus est ita magnus ut mundus, ergo caput tuum cuius nasus est pars quantitativa est maius quam pedale, cum omne totum huius est maius sua parte quantitativa capitis, ydemptificatur maxime linee, maxime superficiei et maximo tempori mundi; et tunc est nimis magna.

Again, supposing that God identifies a man with an ass, or anything that can be signified with another, let it be asked after the case whether the man will remain a man after the identification, or the ass, or both.12 If both, they will remain as distinct as in the beginning; if the man will remain and the ass ceases to be, or the other way round, it seems, first, that the thing ceasing is not identified but corrupted, which is against what was granted. It seems, secondly, that this follows: "a man is identified with an ass, therefore the ass is identified with the man", and conversely; and so from the case it does not follow that the man remains rather than the ass, or the other way round. Therefore the one is not to be granted without, by the same token, the other too. And the same seems to follow, thirdly, from this, that the identified thing which ceases loses something essential to it, as the ass’s soul or the human soul, and consequently that would be not identification but destruction. And here the logicians ask about the subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute and the terms of identification, so that it might be distinguished from other motions, and about its speed and its other properties.13 192Again, I posit that God identifies anything with anything, which one must grant to be possible; because otherwise God’s infinite powerpotencia: potency / power would stand toward some things that it could not identify, a consequent that is impossible, since he could identify very abject creaturescreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created with himself,14 as is clear in the matter of the incarnation, both as to the body of Christ and as to the soul; each of which is the WordVerbum: the Word of God and personally God himself;15 which seems supremely marvellous. This, then, being admitted, it seems that each thing remains in its species and individuation as it remained in the beginning; for grant that Peter does not remain as in the beginning: against this, anything whatever is identified with Peter; therefore Peter remains supremely manifold.16 And the argument is the same of anything one may assign. If, then, the whole universeuniversitas (bare: tota universitas): the whole universe remains in its species and its individuation as in the beginning, it seems that identification is taken away on both sidesutrobique: on both sides; for at every point of the world there is supreme diversification; and since this is contrary to identification, it seems that it takes away identification for the same time and subject. If it is said that supreme identification is supreme diversification, then (as above), this being posited, the response must vary correspondingly; because it is incompatiblerepugnare; repugnancia: to be incompatible; incompatibility that anything should remain composed of parts or subject to accidentsaccidentatus: subject to accidents; indeed, it is known that if anything whatever is, anything whatever is God alone.17 Again, while this case stands, it seems that any part of the world is indivisible, because it is identified with a point and consequently is an indivisible point. And it seems that any part of the world is infinitely great; because, since any part of the world is the whole world, any quantitative partpars quantitativa: quantitative part of the world would be as great as the whole 193world, and consequently an infinitely small part of the world would be as great as anything. From which, with the principles of geometry, it follows that every part of the world is infinite; for grant that your head is only a foot long: against this, your nose is as great as the world; therefore your head, of which the nose is a quantitative part, is greater than a foot long, since every whole of this [kind] is greater than its quantitative part. [Any part] of the head is identified with the greatest line, the greatest surface and the greatest time of the world; and then it is exceedingly great.18

¶5193.11–193.19

193Nec est racio quare quelibet pars panis potest ydemptificari corpori Christi et cuilibet sue parti, quin per idem posset ydemptificari cuilibet substancie vel accidenti, cum par sit racio et multiplicacio inconveniencium utrobique, quod ex tali ydemptificacione arguunt loyci quod inpossibile sequitur ex necessario quod quilibet est et quicunque non est et quod species et genera rerum que differunt ab invicem non differunt, quia omnis differencia foret unio et non differencia.

Nor is there any reason why any part of the bread can be identified with the body of Christ and with any part of it, but that by the same token it could be identified with any substancesubstancia: substance or accidentaccidens: accident, since the reason and the multiplication of absurditiesinconveniencia; inconveniens: an absurdity (in argument) · troubles, ill consequences (in affairs) are equal on both sides;19 in that from such identification the logicians argue that the impossible follows from the necessary: that each one is and whichever one is not,20 and that the species and genera of things which differ from one another do not differ, because every differencedifferencia: difference (logical differentia) would be unionunio: union and not difference.

Notes

  1. 1 Quibus scola theologie nimis inaniter accusatur, literally "by which the school of theology is accused exceedingly emptily": taken as the doubts showing the school to be empty. The adverb could instead qualify the accusation ("accused, exceedingly and in vain").
  2. 2 Sentencia is the position taught (the glossary, glossary entry), here the opinion that the bread is identified with the body; so throughout the chunk.
  3. 3 Ydemptificacio takes the row ruled for the hypostatic union in De incarnacione ("identification"), here of the bread with the body. Ydemptifice (190.3) is kept apart from ydemptice "identically" (190.11) as "by identification". At 190.11 ABCD omit ydemptice, which would deny the bread and wine are to be the body at all; the print is translated.
  4. 4 Peter Lombard, Sent. IV d. 11 c. 1 (Quibusdam esse videtur substantialis, dicentibus sic substantiam converti in substantiam, ut haec essentialiter fiat illa, PL 192); Loserth cites the Cologne 1576 Opera, fol. 352b–353a, and compares Thomas, Super IV Sent., printed "dist. XL, q. I, art. I" (so the plate: a slip for d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, Utrum substantia panis remaneat post consecrationem; d. 40 belongs to the treatise on marriage).
  5. 5 The syllogism: what the bread will become, it will be; it will not be the body identically; so it will not become the body in that way. The minor sed is "now".
  6. 6 Omnia que erunt sunt: Wyclif’s premiss that whatever will be, is (cf. 194.15–18, "everything which Christ will ever have as his part, that he now has"); so the bread, now not a part of Christ, could never be one. ABCE omit tunc sunt, which leaves the apodosis without a verb; the print is translated.
  7. 7 Per se / per accidens (glossary entry) in the logical sense, "of itself / by accident".
  8. 8 The print makes corpus Christi the subject: the body, which on this view the wine has become, would be not-wine. Vinum would give the expected subject; the apparatus records no variant (see the Latin doubts).
  9. 9 Aliquid sibi equale; ABCD read essenciale (placed before deficiat), as the print itself has at 190.23 (aliquid sibi essenciale). The print construes and is translated.
  10. 10 Ydemptificando is the dative of the gerundive, "to the thing being identified". Tantum … sicut (191.7–8) and tante … sicut (191.12) are taken as "as … as", not "only".
  11. 11 The dilemma: identification with motion either destroys (an essential change) or leaves both things as they were (an accidental change); without motion nothing is removed, so the two stay distinct.
  12. 12 Vel asinus: "or [whether] the ass [will remain]", as the next sentence shows (si remanebit homo et asinus desinit). At 191.17 C has an abbreviation (v*) before in principio, which Herzberg-Fränkel read as videlicet; Loserth notes ut is better, and "as … as in the beginning" follows that.
  13. 13 The "terms" of identification are those of a motion, from which and to which. Ut distingueretur is Loserth’s; the manuscripts all have et distingueretur, "and [ask] how it would be distinguished".
  14. 14 Potencia "power" (glossary entry), God’s might. Staret … ad aliqua que non posset ydemptificare: God’s power would be related to things it could not identify, i.e. it would be limited.
  15. 15 In materia de incarnacione: the teaching on the incarnation, Wyclif’s own De benedicta incarnacione, c. 4 (ed. Harris, 63): tam corpus Christi quam eius anima … utrumque eadem persona hominis … et per consequens eadem persona Verbi; cf. c. 2 (25), Christ as abiectissima creatura. The body and the soul of Christ are each "the Word of God and personally God himself"; C reads quod ipse Deus.
  16. 16 Da quod … contra …: the disputant’s "grant that …; against this …" (so at 193.5–6). If Peter did not remain as he was, then, since everything is identified with him, he would be supremely manifold.
  17. 17 As punctuated: under total identification whatever is would be God alone. Repunctuated, si quidlibet est quidlibet, solum Deus est ("if anything is anything, God alone is") gives the same sense. C adds in the margin, in another hand (Loserth: uncertain whether it belongs to the text): "because anything would be an intellective soul, and consequently would not be composed of parts nor subject to accidents, because anything would be God, who is not subject to accidents."
  18. 18 Cum omne totum huius est maius sua parte quantitativa capitis, ydemptificatur … does not construe as printed (D huius sit). Taken as huius[modi] and with a subject supplied for ydemptificatur (feminine, as magna shows: a part); words may be lost here (our emendation; the print governs).
  19. 19 Inconveniencia (glossary entry) are the absurd consequences of a premiss. Quod ex tali ydemptificacione is taken as causal ("in that"); C reads quia, D et ex tali.
  20. 20 Quod quilibet est et quicunque non est: taken as the contradictory pair, that each thing both is and is not; C puts quia before quilibet, D reads cuiusmodicunque.
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Plate readings; page · reading · note):
    • 190: IVᵒ, (print as transcribed) [SUB]
    • 190: Si (print as transcribed) [BT-ONLY]
    • 192: principio, contra quidlibet ydemptificatur Petro, ergo Petrus remanet summe multiplex. Et idem est argumentum de quolibet assignando. Si ergo tota universitas remanet in sua specie ac sua individuacione ut in principio, videtur quod utrobique tollitur ydemptificacio; nam ad omnem punctum mundi est summa diversificacio; que cum sit contraria ydemptificacioni, videtur quod tollit ydemptificacionem pro eodem tempore et subiecto. Si dicatur quod summa ydemptificacio est summa diversificacio, tunc (ut supra) debet correspondenter hoc posito variari responsio, quia repugnat quod quidquam remaneat compositum ex partibus vel accidentatum, ymmo notum est si quidlibet est, quidlibet solum Deus est. Item, stante hoc casu videtur quod quelibet pars mundi sit indivisibilis, quia ydemptificata est puncto et per consequens est punctus indivisibilis. Et videtur quod quelibet pars mundi sit in infinitum magna, quia cum quelibet pars mundi sit totus mundus, quelibet pars quantitativa mundi foret ita magna ut totus (print as transcribed) [BT-ONLY]
    • 193: ydemptificatur (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  • Variants (selected: those that touch the English; Loserth’s page-foot lines):
    • 189.29–31: B Et ut a; ABCD omit autem; D omits clarius; D fuceretur.
    • 190.2: E fierent. 190.4: Codd. IV Sentenciarium. 190.5: AB ista evidencia (C corrected). 190.11: ABCD omit ydemptice (n. 3). 190.12: ABCE omit tunc sunt (n. 6). 190.15: B non aliud. 190.19: ABCD essenciale before deficiat (n. 9). 190.20–21: B omits non est … vinum. 190.23: ABCD vel aliud.
    • 191.4: C destrueretur. 191.6: ABCD quidquid quod; DE idemptificabitur. 191.9: D oblacio. 191.16: AB vel utrum. 191.17: C v* before in principio (n. 12). 191.18: ABC desit. 191.20: E sed destruitur sive corrumpitur. 191.30: Codd. et distingueretur (n. 13).
    • 192.1: D suppono. 192.7: ABDE utraque. 192.8: C quod ipse Deus. 192.9: D dimisso. 192.11: E remanet Petrus in. 192.16: D utrolibet. 192.20: ABCE Si dicit. 192.23: E maneat. 192.25: C’s marginal addition (n. 17). 192.29: C omits in; ABC magno.
    • 193.5: E sicut. 193.6: D caput totum. 193.7: D huius sit (n. 18). 193.15: D et ex tali; C quia ex tali (n. 19). 193.17: C quia before quilibet; D cuiusmodicunque. 193.18: BC ad invicem.