De eucharistia, chapter 8, part 7
Against the fiction of a discrete angelic time
Loserth pp. 255.24–259.18
¶1255.24–256.5
Against this fictionficticia: fiction it is argued, first, through this: that nothing is to be posited without philosophical reason or testimony from scripture; now neither of these teaches this doubleness of time; therefore it is not to be posited. The assumptionassumptum: the assumption is clear from this, that otherwise what is posited would be a dream without foundationinfundabilis; infundabiliter: without foundation, a thing posited without reason, since by the same evidenceevidencia: evidence infinitely many other things would have to be feignedfingere (a miracle): feign against the rules of nature, which 256always acts in the more compendious way, without superfluity; and God would unreasonably burden the churchecclesia: church of the faithful with believing, and truth would burden falsehood and lying;1 and the minor is clear in consequence. And this is a common tentative argumentargumentum temptativum: tentative argument,2 by which one who holds an opinion is forced to give evidence for his way.
¶2256.6–256.21
Again, since time is the common measure of all things that stand temporally, and every angel (insofar asin quantum (reduplicative): insofar as he thus) changes in temporal alternation, [and] stands temporally,3 it seems that common time suffices to measure every temporal alternation of an angel; for there is no need to posit a new genus of time for this, since the ancient time suffices to number that alternation, as it measures the motion of an angel and other imperceptibleinsensibilis: imperceptible; of a thing that cannot feel, without sensation alternations. For otherwise it would be necessary to posit time in God on account of the variation of his extrinsic action, a time that would itself measure more limitedly than eternity. If therefore our time would suffice to measure even God’s successive creatingcreancia: creating, from the equal or from the greatera maiori vel pari: from the greater or from the equal it would suffice to measure the angel’s successive affection; for the time of merit measures motions of the intellect of man that involve alternation.
¶3256.22–257.14
Again, God by his absolute powerpotencia absoluta: absolute power could permit a variation of an angel’s affection without producing a new genus of time, but would measure the affections succeeding one another by common time; therefore a new genus of time does not followsequitur: it follows from the variation of such affections. Otherwise, thus: one affection can be permanent, however long-lasting, measured by aeviternityevum: aeviternity, after which another permanent affection can succeed; and God would not be necessitated, for the measure of the one affection, nor for the measure of the other, nor for the instant of time between, to procreate a new genus of time; therefore this would be possible to God. For the common aeviternity4 257would suffice to measure the following [affection]; nor at an instant of time can a discrete time be produced suddenly, whole according to itself. Indeed, as he says on distinction 11 of the fourth [book] of the Sentences, "that one may positest dare: one may posit a last time and not a last instant in which the form of breadpanis / vinum: bread / wine will remain, and a first instant in which the body of Christcorpus Christi / corpus Domini: the body of Christ / the body of the Lord will be under those accidentsaccidens: accident,"5 so it seems one must consequently say that it is [so]6 with the angelic affection varied without the creation of a new genus of time; since neither can aeviternity be a part of time, nor can two or finitely many instants of time constitute a time however long, because so it would be a discrete time, long by accidentper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself, measured continuously by our time. And it is clear that this fiction is unreasonable, without cause.
¶4257.15–258.21
Again, by the same evidence by which one new genus of time would be created from the alternation of affections in one angel, [it would be created] in another too, and so there would be any number of times at once, none of which would be part of any time, which is impossible. And the inferenceconsequencia: inference appears from this, that no reason is to be feigned why, on account of one bad angel varied in affection, the genus of time ought to be varied, without [its varying], by the same token, for the alternation of anyone whatever; indeed, on account of the local motion of an angel or the variation of a soul’s affection, since that motion is not ordered to the motion of the first movablemobile (noun) / primum mobile: a movable / the first movable. For it is not known, or required, that the alternation of angelic affection be measured by the variation of the affection of the first angel as by the first measure, because God can freely vary the affection of any angel whatever while the affection in any other one stands. If, then, this be an abiding 258of angelic affection which can be time, and no time can be time by accidentper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself, since time is of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself a species of quantityquantitas / qualitas: quantity / quality, it follows that this abiding is time; and according to this it follows that every aeviternity of an angel is an instant of time or time, because it can be time or an instant of time, and is whatever it can be.7 For if an angel varied his affection in the future, then the abiding of these two affections would be a time that would have one part measuring the first affection and another measuring the second; and since no aeviternity can be longer or shorter, as neither can an instant of discrete time, it follows that every such [aeviternity] is equal to everlasting time; and so it seems that every discrete time is composed only of two instants, or at least is made equal to so much time. To what end, then, would such a discrete [thing] be posited to be time, in whose length no certainty is posited? For as the angel would be the same whether he endured perpetually or were annihilated sooner or later,8 so it is with his aeviternity: therefore the philosophers have to say that aeveity is eternity by accident, as it accidentally regards the abiding of time.9
¶5258.22–259.18
Again, discrete time from the affection of angels is prior to and worthier than our continuous time, and equally sufficient to measure every perceptiblesensibilis (in the definition of animal): sentient motion or alternation; therefore it is superfluous to posit another. For through this, that the duration of the motion of the first movable suffices to measure all other motions, this sectreligio privata; secta: private religion; sect posits it specially to be time. If then the angelic duration suffices, prior [to it], to measure that motion, it follows that it would be time to it, and its duration only a "when".10 Nor is it sound to say that the angelic alternation is not continuous, because each half of it, which is an instant of that time, is trulyvere: truly continuous;11 why then not the whole, since one part follows without intermediaryimmediate: without intermediary upon 259the other, and this suffices for the continuationcontinuacio: continuity of time? Indeed, it seems that in every instant of our time there is a change of alternation of angelic affection; for the angel sees creatures not onlynedum: not only in the WordVerbum: the Word but in their proper genus; since, then, the angel continually sees anew the presence and newness of the creature begotten for every instant of our time, it seems that he continually has a new knowledge or mode of knowing. For as discrete time follows upon the affection or volition of an angel, so it follows upon intuition and any variation on the angel’s side; and so (as the Subtle DoctorDoctor Subtilis: the Subtle Doctor argues against this way)12 not only would there be many times at once, but [as many as] the numbers of angels varying their affections,13 which times would be distinct in species as [their] subjects and objects [are]; but the same angel in number, according to the variations of intentions and affections about objects diverse in species, would cause at once times diverse in species.
Notes
- 1 Veritas oneraret falsitatem: construed as it stands, truth (perhaps God, the Truth) burdening falsehood, i.e. made to carry it; the sense may be "truth would be charged with falsehood". The doubt is noted, not resolved.
- 2 Argumentum temptativum: the testing argument of the dialecticians (Aristotle’s peirastic), which makes the respondent show grounds for his position. It has no row. D reads patet per posterius, E patet posterius for patet per consequens (256.3–4).
- 3 Omnis angelus (in quantum sic) mutat … se habet temporaliter: two finite verbs with no connective; construed as "every angel, insofar as he thus changes in temporal alternation, stands temporally". A word (qui or et) may have been lost (256.8).
- 4 The print has commune evangelium, "the common gospel", which does not construe in an argument about measures; we read evum "aeviternity" (our emendation), the same confusion as evangelice for angelice at 255.3, where Loserth prefers C’s angelico. The apparatus gives no variant (256.33).
- 5 Thomas, In IV Sent. d. 11; Loserth’s foot quotes it: Et ideo dicendum quod non est designare ultimum instans, sed ultimum tempus in quo est panis … (d. 11 q. 1 a. 3, Solutio). The same reply ends in toto tempore praecedenti erat panis, praeter ultimum instans, in quo est corpus Christi, Wyclif’s first instant of the body; his forma panis is his own for Thomas’s panis.
- 6 Dicendum quod est de affeccione: a sic ("that it is so") seems lost before or after est; supplied in brackets (257.5–6).
- 7 Est quidquid potest esse: the principle that in everlasting things to be possible and to be do not differ (Aristotle, Phys. III.4, 203b30: "in the case of eternal things what may be must be").
- 8 Annichilaret is active in form ("annihilated"); taken as "were annihilated", the angel being the one whose duration is in question.
- 9 Evum is rendered "aeviternity" (the angel’s measure) and evitas "aeveity", to keep the two words apart; neither has a row. Per accidens "by accident" is kept apart from accidenter "accidentally".
- 10 Quando: the category "when". If angelic duration were the first measure, the duration of the first movable’s motion would be a mere "when" of it, not time.
- 11 Utraque eius medietas que est instans illius temporis: each half is an instant of discrete time, yet within itself continuous; the argument is that two continuous parts that follow without intermediary make a continuous whole.
- 12 Scotus against the discrete time of the angels (Ordinatio II d. 2 p. 1 q. 4, nn. 158–159, against Henry of Ghent: magnam multitudinem temporum, a discrete time for every angel and two in each, with "nows" differing in species).
- 13 Sed numeri angelorum variancium: construed as "[as many times as] the numbers of angels varying"; the phrase does not construe without a supplied word. At 259.14 D reads que ita ut for que tempora ut, and ABCD substancia et for subiecta et; the print is translated.
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- Plate readings; page · reading · note):
- 257: XIᵃ, IVᵗⁱ (print as transcribed) [SUB]
- Departures from the print: 256.33 evangelium translated as evum (our emendation, n. 4); 257.5–6 [sic] supplied (n. 6).
- Variants (selected; those bearing on the English): 256.3–4 D patet per posterius, E patet posterius (n. 2); 256.4–5 C temptativum in marg. alia manu; 256.25 A marg. alias ubi for sibi; 256.27 alias alia manu; 257.10 ABC secundo, D nec secunda; 257.13 ABC continuo; 257.14 B racionalis; 258.14 ABC videtur esse, C tempus om.; 258.23 E et dignius; 258.31 E Nec videtur; 259.2 AB corporis, C temporis in rasura; 259.8 C novam om.; 259.14 D que ita ut, ABCD substancia et (n. 13); 259.17 C simul om.