Wyclif’s Latin works

De eucharistia, chapter 8, part 8

The five conclusions against a time proper to each thing

Loserth pp. 259.19–263.13

¶1259.19–260.7

259Confirmatur ex hoc quod idem homo intuens coloratum vel lucidum motum celeriter variat continue visionem et sic intuicionem, ergo multo magis sic potest angelus qui est celerior ad mutandum intuicionem in proprio genere et affeccionem, quamvis enim ponitur quod Deus et angelus semper intuetur in verbo omnia preterita et futura, non tamen intuentur illa angeli in proprio genere nisi dum sunt, quia aliter dyabolus semper intueretur casum suum; et quomodocunque sit de hoc, Deus sicut in uno instanti potest mutare affeccionem angeli, ita continue in quocunque. 260Nec est dubium isti secte, si sic faciat, quo facto mora affeccionis talis angeli foret mensura continua tocius mundi sensibilis et tempus compositum ex instantibus, ita quod nullum argumentum fieret contra composicionem continui ex non quantis, quin eque procederet contra illud; quod tamen negat hec secta esse possibile.

This is confirmed from the fact that the same man, gazing at something coloured or luminous that is moved swiftly, varies his vision continuously, and so his intuitionintuicio: intuition; therefore much more can an angel do so, who is swifter at changing his intuition in its proper genus,1 and his affection. For although it is posited that God and an angel always intuit in the Word all things past and future, yet the angels do not intuit them in their proper genus except while they are, since otherwise the devil would always be intuiting his fall; and however it may be with this, God, as he can change an angel’s affection in one instant, so [can he change it] continuously in any [instant] whatever. 260Nor is it doubtful to this sect2 that, if he were to do so, once that was done the abidingmora: abiding of such an angel’s affection would be a continuous measure of the whole perceptiblesensibilis (in the definition of animal): sentient world, and time [would be] composed of instants; so that no argument would be made against the composition of the continuum from non-quantifiedquantus: quantified things which would not proceed equally against that; which yet this sect denies to be possible.

¶2260.8–260.18

260Item (ut sepe assumpsi) forent simul iuxta hanc sectam multa tempora non communicancia nec pars alicuius temporis tercii; quod est inpossibile, quia posito quod quelibet creatura permanens habeat tempus proprium sibi inexistens formaliter, ut conceditur de evo quoad angelos, tunc cum veris sequitur quod tempus componitur ex suis partibus coextensis et omne permanens duraret per infinitum magnum tempus, et quodlibet foret in quolibet, et infinitum maior foret in casu pars quantitativa suo toto, et periret omnis certitudo de mora temporis mensurantis.

Again (as I have often assumed), according to this sect there would be at once many times not communicatingnon communicans (of times): not communicating, and not part of any third time; which is impossible, because, supposing that every permanent creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created has a time proper to it, existing in it formally, as is granted of aeviternityevum: aeviternity as regards the angels, then with true [premisses]3 it followssequitur: it follows that time is composed of its coextended parts, and that every permanent thing would last through an infinitely great time, and that anything would be in anything, and that in that case a quantitative partpars quantitativa: quantitative part would be infinitely greater than its whole, and that all certainty about the abiding of the measuring time would perish.4

¶3260.19–262.3

260Prima istarum quinque conclusionum videtur ex hoc quod omnis rei temporalis duracio potest esse tempus sed omnis talis rei duracio est quidquid potest esse, ergo omnis rei talis duracio est tempus. Assumptum patet per hoc quod tempus et quando sunt accidencia diversorum generum, sic quod omne tempus per se primo est tempus, sicut omnis homo est per se homo, et sic de quando; posito ergo de quacunque re permanente quod per se foret successive durans, tunc eius duracio foret tempus, quod sic opinans dicit esse contingencium; sive ergo fuerit forma sive materia sive accidens per se positum, ipsum posset per se subiectare tempus; ymmo tempus cum sit quantitas poterit per se esse; quod est magis quam posse informare quamcunque substanciam permanentem; ideo non negabit ista secta possibilitatem assumpti. Nec 261valet allegari Aristoteles vel Averrois quod tempus solum sequitur motum primi mobilis in quo est solummodo subiective, quia illi negant accidens per se esse; ideo miror qua fronte ipsi allegarent istos pro sua sentencia, cum tantum discordant in principiis. Isti enim dicunt quod Deus non potest facere quod incipiat esse tempus, cum non potest (ut inquiunt) creare mundum nec potest movere aliquam partem mundi nisi mediante motu primi mobilis; quorum quodlibet est summe hereticum, ideo est baculus nimis arundineus accipere sentencias istas hereticas ad stabiliendum subiectum temporis. Ideo iuxta sentenciam Augustini, XII Confessionum, totus mundus est subiectum temporis, cum quiescente toto celo et mota rota figuli foret idem tempus quod modo; cum ergo tempus non potest migrare de subiecto in subiectum, manifestum est quod tempus individuatur et subiectatur in mundo; nam quiescente quacunque parte mundi non subiectaret tempus et per idem nec modo. Et istam sentenciam consideraret hec secta, antequam dixisset tot sentencias hereticas in materia de sacramento altaris. Ponit enim quod inpossibile est panem remanere post consecracionem (ut dictum est quinto capitulo) et fundatur super isto principio summe heretico: Nichil potest esse ubi prius non fuit, nisi vel moveatur illuc localiter vel aliud convertatur in ipsum; quod indubie destrueret totam fidem, quia tunc Deus non posset creare celum vel aliquid nec dominus Jesus Christus posset crescere corporaliter (ut deductum est ibidem) nec Spiritus Sanctus posset elevare hominem ad conversandum in celo, nisi moveat illuc localiter corpus suum. Que tria destruerent 262totam fidem. Oportet ergo fidelem rimari aliud fundamentum ad stabiliendum subiectum temporis a quo ipsum dependeat.

The first of these five conclusionsconclusio: conclusion appears from this: the duration of every temporal thing can be time; now the duration of every such thing is whatever it can be; therefore the duration of every such thing is time. The assumptionassumptum: the assumption5 is clear from the fact that time and the whenquando (the category): the when are accidentsaccidens: accident of different genera, so that every time is of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself,6 first, time, as every man is of himself man; and so of the when. So, supposing of any permanent thing whatever that of itself it were lasting successively, then its duration would be time, which the one who holds this opinionopinio: opinion says is among contingent things.7 So whether it be form or matter or an accident posited of itself, it could of itself be the subject ofsubiectare: be the subject of time; indeed time, since it is a quantityquantitas / qualitas: quantity / quality, will be able to be of itself; which is more than to be able to informinformacio; informare: informing; inform any permanent substancesubstancia: substance whatever; therefore this sect will not deny the possibility of the assumption. Nor 261is it any use to allegeallegare / allegacio: allege / allegation Aristotle or Averroes to the effect that time follows only the motion of the first movablemobile (noun) / primum mobile: a movable / the first movable, in which alone it is subjectivelycontentive / causaliter / subiective / obiective: by way of containing / causally / subjectively / objectively,8 for they deny that an accident is of itself; so I wonder with what face they would allege these men for their teachingsentencia: teaching / sentence,9 since they disagree so much in principles. For these men say10 that God cannot make time begin to be, since (as they say) he cannot create the world, nor can he move any part of the world except by means of the motion of the first movable; each of which is supremely heretical; so it is an exceedinglynimis: exceedingly reedy staff11 to take these heretical teachings to establish the subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute of time. Therefore, according to the teaching of Augustine, Confessions XII,12 the whole world is the subject of time, since, if the whole heaven were at rest and a potter’s wheel were moved, there would be the same time as now. Since, then, time cannot migrate from subject to subject, it is manifest that time is individuated and has its subject in the world; for when any part of the world whatever is at rest, it would not be the subject of time, and by the same token not now either. And this sect should have considered this teaching before it had uttered so many heretical teachings in the matter of the sacrament of the altarsacramentum (the Eucharist); sacramentum altaris: sacrament; the sacrament of the altar. For it posits that it is impossible for the breadpanis / vinum: bread / wine to remain after the consecrationconsecracio: consecration (as was said in the fifth chapter), and it is founded on this supremely heretical principle: "Nothing can be where it previously was not, unless either it is moved there locallylocaliter: locally or something else is converted into it";13 which would without doubt destroy the whole faith, because then God could not create heaven or anything, nor could the Lord Jesus Christ grow bodilycorporaliter: bodily (as was deduced in the same place), nor could the Holy Spirit raise a man up to live his lifeconversari: live one's life (among men) in heaven, unless he moves his body there locally.14 Which three things would destroy 262the whole faith. The faithful man must therefore search out another foundation, on which it may depend, for establishing the subject of time.

¶4262.4–262.8

262Et patet prima istarum conclusionum ex opinione, quia capto uno corpore inanimato per se durante cuiuslibet sue partis duracio foret tempus et coextensis materia et forma substanciali et accidentali forent duraciones tempora coextensa.

And the first of these conclusions is clear from the opinion, because, taking one inanimate body lasting of itself, the duration of each of its parts would be time; and, matter and substantial formforma substancialis: substantial form and accidental form being coextended, their durations would be coextended times.

¶5262.9–262.13

262Et patet secunda conclusio, quia omne durans per tempus duraret per infinita tempora non communicancia, quorum quodlibet foret tantum ut hec hora, ut patet de partibus intensivis vel quantitativis date substancie vel de lineis vel superficiebus equalibus.

And the second conclusion is clear, because everything lasting through a time would last through infinitely many non-communicating times, each of which would be as great as this hour, as is clear of the intensive or quantitative parts of a given substance, or of equal lines or surfaces.

¶6262.14–262.17

262Et tercia conclusio, scilicet quod quidlibet foret in quolibet, videtur ex hoc, quod quidlibet foret in tempore cuiuslibet, sed nichil est in tempore subiecti, nisi fuerit in ipso; ergo quidlibet foret in quolibet.

And the third conclusion, namely that anything would be in anything, appears from this: anything would be in the time of anything; now nothing is in the time of a subject unless it is in it; therefore anything would be in anything.

¶7262.18–262.27

262Unde sollempniores doctores novelli dicunt quod nullum sublunare foret in tempore primi celi, nisi quia omne corpus sublunare habet dependenciam ordinis causalis ad ipsum, sicut dicimus omne temporale se habere ad mundum. Nec dubium quin omne temporale coexistens cuicunque tempori est in eodem, quia est cum tempore illo in quo potest esse; et hoc sufficit ad aliquid esse in illo; sic enim due quantitates eiusdem speciei possunt informare idem subiectum, sicut est de qualitatibus.

Hence the more eminentsollempnior (of doctors): more eminent newernovelli: the newer [doctors] doctors15 say that nothing sublunar would be in the time of the first heaven, except because every sublunar body has a dependence of causal order on it, as we say every temporal thing stands to the world. Nor is there doubt that every temporal thing coexisting with any time whatever is in the same, because it is with that time in which it can be; and this suffices for something to be in it; for so two quantities of the same species can inform the same subject, as is the case with qualitiesquantitas / qualitas: quantity / quality.

¶8262.28–263.13

262Et quarta conclusio, scilicet quod infinitum maior est de possibili pars quantitativa quam suum integrum, patet capiendo A pedale cum sua duracione, et pono quod Deus annichilet secundam medietatem A cum sua 263duracione conservando residuum duracionis perpetuo, et tunc videtur quod medietas quantitativa temporis A est ita longa et per consequens ita magna ut tempus aliquid et totum tempus sicut et suum subiectum nunc desinit esse. Sic enim foret dare temporis primum instans et ultimum; et sic videtur quod positis infinitis temporibus omnino equalibus quoad molem infinitum minus est aliquod quoad duracionem, et ut unum est relacio minus quoad molem, est ipso maius quoad duracionem. Ex quibus sequuntur inconveniencia, dato quod sequitur tempus est sic magnum quoad molem vel duracionem, ergo tempus est sic magnum.

And the fourth conclusion, namely that a quantitative part is, as a possibility, infinitely greater than its integral whole, is clear by taking A, a foot long, with its duration; and I suppose that God annihilates the second half of A with its 263duration, preserving the rest of the duration perpetually; and then it seems that the quantitative half of the time of A is as long, and consequently as great, as any time, and that the whole time, as also its subject, now ceases to be. For so one could positest dare: one may posit a first and a last instant of time; and so it seems that, infinitely many times being posited that are altogether equal as to bulk, one is infinitely less as to duration; and as one is, by relation, less as to bulk, it is greater than it as to duration.16 From which absurditiesinconveniencia; inconveniens: an absurdity (in argument) · troubles, ill consequences (in affairs)17 follow, granted that [the inference] "time is so great as to bulk or duration, therefore time is so great" follows.

Notes

  1. 1 In proprio genere against in verbo: knowing a thing in its own kind, as it is in itself, against knowing it in the Word, where past and future are present together. The pair is Augustine’s evening and morning knowledge of the angels (De Gen. ad litt. IV.24 and IV.30, PL 34, 313 and 316: in ipso Verbo Dei prius … ac deinde in ipsa creatura).
  2. 2 Nec est dubium isti secte: the sect, on its own premisses, cannot doubt the outcome of the case; the clause closing the paragraph turns this back on it, since it denies that time composed of instants is possible.
  3. 3 Cum veris: "together with true [propositions]", the case joined to premisses the sect grants. The five consequents that follow are the "five conclusions" proved in turn in ¶3–¶8 and, for the fifth, at the opening of the next part.
  4. 4 260.16: D quidlibet for quodlibet; no change to the sense.
  5. 5 260.22–23: ABCD Argumentum patet; Loserth prints E’s Assumptum, which refers back to the first premiss (omnis rei temporalis duracio potest esse tempus) and is translated.
  6. 6 Per se here is the logical "of itself" (a thing being first and of itself what it is), not the spatial "by itself, apart". In the rest of the paragraph per se esse (an accident’s being of itself, without a subject) is the point at issue.
  7. 7 Quod sic opinans dicit esse contingencium: read as "which [case] the holder of this opinion says is among things contingent", i.e. possible. ABC read contingentivum. The construal is doubtful: quod may instead take duracio or tempus as its antecedent.
  8. 8 Aristotle, Physics IV.14 (223b18–21: the uniform circular motion of the heaven as the measure of time), with Averroes’ commentary on the place, which was not read. The side-note gives Loserth’s summary.
  9. 9 Sentencia (context-dependent) is "teaching" throughout this paragraph: the position the sect, and Augustine, hold.
  10. 10 Isti are Aristotle and Averroes, who deny that God can make time begin or create the world (Aristotle, Physics VIII.1, 251b14–26, where time is "uncreated" and "there must always be time"); ipsi in the clause before are the sect, who cite them.
  11. 11 Baculus arundineus: Isa. 36:6, Egypt as "this broken staff of a reed", and 4 Kgs. 18:21, "a staff of a broken reed"; Wyclif’s figure, not a quotation.
  12. 12 Loserth refers to "S. Augustini Opp. tom. I, pag. 210". The potter’s wheel turning while the heavenly bodies stand stands in Confessions XI.23.29, not XII (PL 32, 820); the book number is Wyclif’s. 261.13.
  13. 13 The principle the moderns use against the remaining of the bread, as Wyclif set it out in ch. 5; Thomas, In IV Sent. d. 11 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 1, with ST III q. 75 a. 2 as the parallel. 261.26: ABC lack vel before moveatur, with no change to the sense.
  14. 14 The subject of moveat is left open: the Holy Spirit moving the man’s body, or the man moving his own. The bodily raising to heaven alludes to the conversation "in heaven" of Phil. 3:20.
  15. 15 Sollempniores: "more eminent", the medieval sense of sollempnis (renowned), not "more solemn". Wyclif names none of them.
  16. 16 263.8–10: ABCE lack et ut unum … duracionem; Loserth prints D’s clause. Relacio does not construe well (an adverbial relacione or racione, "by relation", is likely); the print is translated, and its sense is doubtful. 263.8: ABC aliquid for aliquod.
  17. 17 Inconveniencia (context-dependent): "absurdities", the unfitting consequences of the argument, not ill consequences in affairs.
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Plate readings; page · reading · note):
    • 259: motum (print as transcribed) [SUB]
    • 261: modo; (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  • Variants (selected: every variant of these lines that bears on the English is given in the notes; the rest are orthographic or leave the sense unchanged): 259.21 D intelleccionem, ABC sic om.; 259.22 D est om.; 259.27 E quia alias; 260.1 D Ideo est; 260.6 D contra illa; 260.9 D nec partes; 260.16 D quidlibet (n. 4); 260.22–23 ABCD Argumentum patet (n. 5); 260.29 ABC contingentivum (n. 7); 260.31 D hoc tempus, ymmo om.; 261.1 ABDE allegare; 261.4 A ideo minor, miror in marg. alia manu; 261.10–11 ABC arundeneus; 261.15 D ut modo; 261.26 ABC vel om. (n. 13); 261.27 D quod non; 262.5 D pro se; 262.7 D in materia, D ac accidentali; 262.13 D aut superficiebus; 262.14 ABC quod quodlibet; 262.15–16 D videtur — cuiuslibet om.; 262.19 AB in parte; 262.23 ABC cuicunque tempori; 262.25 DE aliquid om.; 262.31 D annichilaret; 263.8 ABC aliquid; 263.8–10 ABCE et ut unum — duracionem om. (n. 16); 263.12–13 C quoad — magnum in marg. alia manu.