Wyclif’s Latin works

De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 10, part 2

That Christ is univocally a man only if the humanity is Christ

Harris pp. 164.28–167.22

¶1164.28–166.7

164Item quilibet alius homo a Christo¹⁵ est per se humanitas; Christus secundum istam viam non potest esse humanitas: ergo non est univoce homo cum alio. Maior patet ex hoc quod licet omnis homo per accidens sit homo, tamen eo ipso 165quod est¹ humanitas, cum iuxta hanc viam post assumpcionem manebit non homo sed humanitas: sed cum illa humanitas non inceperit² esse per assumpcionem, sequitur quod prius manserat iste homo. Hoc 2° confirmatur ex eo quod omne per accidens oportet³ reduci ad aliquid per se³: sed Petrus est per accidens homo: ergo est prius per se aliquid, quod potissime foret humanitas. 3° per istud⁴ quod ista humanitas adequate individuatur ex eisdem principiis ex quibus iste homo: ergo sunt idem: non ergo potest esse ordo causandi inter eos. Et consequencia principalis ex hoc videtur quod, dato antecedente, Christus et quicumque alius homo non forent eiusdem nature univoce. Nam quilibet alius homo foret natura humana in recto: Christus non potest esse natura humana sed nature humane: igitur sicut Deus non predicatur univoce de creatura, de qua solum dicitur in obliquo, et de persona divina, de qua dicitur in recto; sic nec humanitas dicitur univoce de Christo et aliis: et per consequens non sunt univoce eiusdem nature: ymo cum humanitas sit nomen competentissimum speciei per se predicatum de suis suppositis⁵ et non homo, humanitas autem non potest predicari in recto de Christo, videtur quod Christus non sit eiusdem speciei cum homine. Confirmatur ex hoc quod Christus non potest esse alicuius⁶ speciei: ergo Christus non est singulare⁷ speciei humane. Nam⁸ per adversarios non potest esse⁶ aliquid nisi deitas, sed⁹ ipsa¹⁰ non potest esse aliquid speciei humane⁸: ergo Christus non potest esse aliquid speciei humane. Si enim deitas foret illius speciei, tunc foret causabilis passibilis et activa, sicut alia individua speciei: quod est impossibile. Ideo, si non fallor, repugnat isti vie,¹¹ quod Christus sit eiusdem speciei cum aliis. Et in ista methaphisica vellem me studuisse, quando sollicitabam¹² me, si quantitas, motus, 166et cetera accidencia distinguantur. Subtilior enim est distinccio humanitatis a Verbo quam accidentis huiusmodi a subiecto; cum¹ secundum moderniores² Petrus inficians³ in ista hora per assumpcionem et dimissionem potest esse homo et post non homo⁴ sine⁵ generacione vel corrupcione alicuius rei vel motu aliquo pertinente; quod non contingit eciam de relacione.

Again, every man other than Christ is of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself a humanityhumanitas: the humanity; Christ, according to this way, cannot be a humanity: therefore he is not univocallyunivoce: univocally a man with another.1 The major is clear from this: that, although every man is a man by accidentper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself, yet by the very fact 165that he is a humanity [he is a man], since according to this way, after the assumptionassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption, he will remain not a man but a humanity: now since that humanity did not begin to be through the assumption, it follows that before, it had remained this man.2 This is confirmed, second, from this: everything by accident must be reduced to something of itself: now Peter is a man by accident: therefore he is first of himself something, which would most of all be the humanity. Third, by this: this humanity is adequately individuated from the same principles from which this man [is]: therefore they are the same: therefore there cannot be an order of causing between them.3 And the principal inferenceconsequencia: inference appears from this: that, given the antecedentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent, Christ and any other man would not be univocally of the same naturenatura: nature. For any other man would be human nature in the direct casein recto / in obliquo: in the direct case / in an oblique case: Christ cannot be human nature, but [is] of human nature: therefore, just as "God" is not predicated univocally of a creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created, of which it is said only in an oblique casein recto / in obliquo: in the direct case / in an oblique case, and of a divine personpersona: person, of which it is said in the direct case; so neither is "humanity" said univocally of Christ and of others: and consequently they are not univocally of the same nature: indeed, since "humanity" is the most fitting name of the species, predicated of itself of its suppositssuppositum: supposit, and not "man", but "humanity" cannot be predicated in the direct case of Christ, it seems that Christ is not of the same species as man.4 This is confirmed from this: Christ cannot be of any species: therefore Christ is not a singular of the human species. For according to the adversaries he cannot be anything but the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity, now it cannot be anything of the human species: therefore Christ cannot be anything of the human species. For if the Godhead were of that species, then it would be causable, passiblepassibilis: passible and active, like the other individuals of the species: which is impossible. Therefore, if I am not mistaken, it is incompatiblerepugnare; repugnancia: to be incompatible; incompatibility with this way that Christ should be of the same species as the others.5 And I would wish to have studied in this metaphysics when I was troubling myself whether quantity, motion 166and the other accidentsaccidens: accident are distinguished [from their subjects]. For the distinction of the humanity from the WordVerbum: the Word is subtler than that of an accident of this kind from its subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute; since, according to the more modernmoderniores (bare): the more modern, Peter can infinitely many times in this hour, by assumption and laying-asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside, be a man and afterwards not a man, without generation or corruption of any thing, or any pertinent motion; which does not happen even with relation.6

¶2166.8–167.15

166Item iuxta nunc tacta, si illa humanitas non sit Christus, sed Christus tam extranee differt et essencialiter et personaliter⁶ ab illa; tunc Christus per incarnacionem non est aliquid⁷ nisi quod fuit eternaliter, cum sit solum deitas sicut ante: sed in deitate non univocatur cum aliqua creatura: ergo nichil vel non aliquid⁸ est Christus, in quo univocatur cum aliqua creatura.⁹ Sequitur enim—Christus est univoce homo cum aliis: ergo est univoce aliquid cum alio—sicut a simili,¹⁰ si Christus sit univoce albus cum Petro, tunc est univoce coloratus, et qualis cum eo, et ita de aliis generibus quibuscumque. Et sequitur—Christus est univoce aliquid cum aliqua creatura; ergo¹¹ aliquid est Christus in quo ipse univocatur cum aliqua creatura—quod non esset possibile,¹² si solum deitas foret Christus: oportet ergo speciem humanam, que est communis humanitas, esse Christum; et per consequens non solum naturam divinam, cum illa sit natura plurimum separata a natura humana: ymo cum¹³ nulla substancia secunda inest supposito nisi mediante substancia prima, patet quod non communis humanitas foret Christus, nisi singularis¹⁴ humanitas, que natura assumpta foret¹⁴ Christus: patet igitur,¹⁵ si Christus sit eiusdem speciei nobiscum, quod ista species in athomo¹⁶ vel individuo foret Christus; et sic aliquid, quod non eternaliter fuit 167Christus. Et sic intelligit Augustinus Enchiridion 29°,¹ ‘Utraque, inquit, substancia, divina scilicet atque humana, Filius est unicus Dei Patris omnipotentis, de quo procedit Spiritus² Sanctus; utraque³ unus, sed aliud propter Verbum, et aliud propter hominem.’ Unde prius 28°⁴ miratur quomodo ille homo fit⁵ una persona cum Deo. Et in libro De Predestinacione Sanctorum bene post medium: ‘Ille, inquit, homo ut a Verbo Patri coeterno in unitate persone assumptus Filius Dei unigenitus esset! Unde⁶ hoc meruit? Faciente, inquit, et suscipiente Deo Verbo,⁷ ipse homo, ex quo esse cepit, Filius Dei unigenitus⁸ esse cepit.’ Ideo ut exponit 13 De Trinitate 37°. ‘Gracia Dei in hoc commendatur quod Christus tanta unitate Deo sit coniunctus,⁹ ut una cum illo persona Filius Dei fieret, nullis eius precedentibus meritis.’

Again, according to what has now been touched on, if that humanity is not Christ, but Christ differs from it so foreignly, both essentially and personally, then Christ through the incarnation is not anything but what he was eternally, since he is only the Godhead, as before: now in the Godhead he is univocalunivocare / univocari: make univocal / be univocal with no creature: therefore nothing, or not anything, is Christ in which he is univocal with any creature.7 For it followssequitur: it follows, "Christ is univocally a man with others: therefore he is univocally something with another", as, by likenessa simili: by likeness, if Christ is univocally white with Peter, then he is univocally coloured, and qualified, with him, and so of any other genera whatever. And it follows, "Christ is univocally something with some creature; therefore something is Christ in which he is univocal with some creature"; which would not be possible if only the Godhead were Christ: therefore the human species, which is the common humanity, must be Christ; and consequently not only the divine nature, since that is a nature most separated from the human nature: indeed, since no second substancesubstancia prima / substancia secunda: first substance / second substance is in a supposit except by means of a first substance, it is clear that the common humanity would not be Christ unless the singular humanity, which [is] the assumedassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption nature, were Christ: it is clear, therefore, that if Christ is of the same species with us, that species in an individualin athomo: in an individual, or individual, would be Christ; and so something that was not eternally 167Christ.8 And so Augustine understands [it], Enchiridion 29: "Each substance," he says, "the divine, namely, and the human, is the only Son of God the Father almighty, from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds; both one, but [it is] another thingaliud / alius: another thing / another one on account of the Word, and another thing on account of the man."9 Hence earlier, [in chapter] 28, he marvels how that man becomes one person with God.10 And in the book De praedestinatione sanctorum, well past the middle: "That man," he says, "that he, assumed by the Word coeternal with the Father into the unity of person, should be the only-begotten Son of God! Whence did he merit this? By God the Word making and taking upsuscipere / suscepcio (of the soul, the nature): take up / taking-up [him]," he says, "this man, from when he began to be, began to be the only Son of God."11 Therefore, as he expounds [it] in De Trinitate 13, [chapter] 37: "The grace of God is commended in this, that Christ was joined to God with so great a unity that he would become, with him, one person, the Son of God, with no merits of his preceding."12

¶3167.16–167.22

167Sed hic datur duplex responsio. Prima quod non est equivocacio vel univocacio nisi in signis solummodo, et sic nulla res est quicquam univoce sive equivoce, sed signa dicuntur quedam equivoce et quedam univoce. 2ª responsio modernorum doctorum stat in glosa Augustini et aliorum sic loquencium, quod ipsi non intendunt¹⁰ naturam assumptam esse Verbum sed naturam¹¹ Verbi.

But here a twofold reply is given. The first, that there is no equivocationequivocacio: equivocation or univocationunivocacio: univocation except in signssignum / signatum: sign / thing signified only, and so no thing is anything univocally or equivocallyequivoce: equivocally, but signs are said, some equivocally and some univocally. The second reply, of the modern doctorsmoderni doctores / moderniores doctores: the modern doctors / the more modern doctors, consists in a glossglosa: gloss on Augustine and the others who speak so: that they do not maintainintendere (a thesis): maintain "the assumed nature is the Word", but "[it is] the nature of the Word".13

Notes

  1. 1 O omits a Christo (164.28). "This way" is the moderns’ position of 10-a, that the humanity is not Christ.
  2. 2 The sentence lacks a main verb after tamen eo ipso quod est humanitas; the bracket supplies the obvious "he is a man". The manuscripts differ at est (165.1): A has an erased abbreviation, B eius, C eius est. Prius manserat iste homo: the humanity, before, had remained this man, taking iste homo as predicate. B reads incepit, O incipit for inceperit (165.3).
  3. 3 C reads oportet alicui per se, O oportet inniti alicui per se "must rest on something of itself" (165.5); B reads ex isto, O per idem for per istud (165.7).
  4. 4 In recto / in obliquo: "God" is said of a divine person in the nominative ("the Father is God"), of a creature only in an oblique case ("a creature of God"); so, for the moderns, "humanity" of Christ, who is "of human nature". O reads compositis for suppositis (165.20).
  5. 5 O omits alicuius … esse (165.23–25), the eye passing from esse to esse; C reads simpliciter for singulare (165.24); A C write nam … humane twice (165.24–26); O omits sed (165.25); C reads ipse (165.26); O die for vie (165.30).
  6. 6 "Infinitely many times", O’s infinicies (166.3), against the print’s inficians "denying" (A B inficiens, C infi): the print gives no sense, and the argument needs O’s reading (the assumption and laying-aside repeatable without end in one hour). The irony is Wyclif’s own: he once laboured whether accidents are distinct from their subjects. A B C read sollicitabor (165.32), tamen for cum (166.3) and omit homo (166.5); O reads modernos (166.3); A has sive corrected from sine (166.5).
  7. 7 O reads potencialiter for personaliter (166.9–10); B aliud for aliquid (166.11); C aliquando (166.13); A B C write ergo non aliquid … creatura twice (166.13–14).
  8. 8 Second and first substance: Aristotle’s species and individual (Categories 5). In athomo vel individuo: the logicians’ atomus and the plain word together. Que natura assumpta foret Christus (166.27–28) is the print with O; A B C read singularis humanitatis, que est natura humana, foret Christus. B O read inassimili for a simili (166.16); O reads et for ergo (166.19), adds et (166.20) and sicut (166.24); A B C read ergo (166.28); B athopio, C a gap, O attomo (166.29).
  9. 9 Augustine, Enchiridion 12.38 (PL 40, 251; Wyclif’s c. 29; A B C "ninth"): utraque substantia … Filius est unicus Dei Patris omnipotentis, de quo procedit Spiritus sanctus; the clause utrumque unus, sed aliud propter Verbum, aliud propter hominem is from 10.35 (PL 40, 250), joined to it. A B O omit Spiritus (167.4) and C has it struck through, leaving de quo procedit Sanctus; the print, which Augustine’s text supports, is kept. At 167.4 O reads utrumque, as Ench. 10.35 does, against the print’s utraque; "both" renders either.
  10. 10 Augustine, Enchiridion 11.36 (PL 40, 250; Wyclif’s c. 28): quibus mereretur iste homo una fieri persona cum Deo?. C leaves a space for "28" (167.5); A B C read sit "is" for fit (167.6).
  11. 11 Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum 15.30 (PL 44, 981–982), where the second unigenitus (167.11) is unicus, as in O: ipse homo, ex quo esse coepit, Filius Dei unicus esse coepit. The English follows unicus "only", with O and Augustine, against the print’s unigenitus "only-begotten" there. A B C add cum after Unde (167.9); A has Deo with cum Verbo struck through (167.10).
  12. 12 Augustine, De Trinitate XIII.17.22 (PL 42, 1031; Wyclif’s c. 37), closely paraphrased: ut tanta unitate Deo vero conjunctus una cum illo persona Filius Dei fieret. O reads conuictus, perhaps for convinctus, for coniunctus (167.13).
  13. 13 A has intendunt in the margin, B omits it (167.21); for naturam Verbi (167.22) A B C read natura, O secundum naturam, which changes no English. Wyclif answers the first reply next (167.23), the second at 171.14.
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • None.