De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 10, part 1
The moderns’ negation, and the first arguments against it
Harris pp. 160.0–164.27
¶1160.0–160.0
[It makes the casesuadere: make the case with twelve pieces of evidenceevidencia: evidence that the humanityhumanitas: the humanity assumedassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption is Christ; and it strengthens this with the testimonies and examples of the doctors.]
¶2160.10–161.2
Because the greater part of the variation in this matter lies in the metaphysics of the assumed humanity, it is therefore expedient to set beside [them] the teachingssentencia: teaching / sentence contrary to those stated above. For the modernsmoderni (bare): the moderns say with one accord1 that the humanity of Christ is neither man, nor suppositsuppositum: supposit, nor personpersona: person, although it is a rational substance composed of body and soul, which are parts of the man Jesus Christ; but, that naturenatura: nature laid asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside to its own suppositationsuppositacio: suppositation, as it can be, by a possible case, that it remain unassumed, then it would be a man; and now it is not a man.2 Therefore they say that the definitiondiffinicio: definition of man includes a negationnegacio (constituent of the person): negation formally, so that, by way of definition, man is a substance composed of body and intellective soul, not suppositedsuppositari: be supposited by an alien suppositation.3 And because the last differencedifferencia: difference (logical differentia) is lacking to the assumed nature when 161it is supposited by the suppositation of the WordVerbum: the Word, therefore, while the hypostatic assumptionassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption stands, it is not a man.
¶3161.3–161.19
This teaching, now well known, is to me, and perhaps to others, more difficult than any teaching of the ancient doctors pressed home above.4 First, then, it seems that the humanity of Christ is not supposited by an alien suppositation: for it neither is nor becomes a supposit: and every being-supposited is becoming or being a supposit: therefore it is not supposited. Moreover, if it is supposited by some suppositation, since that belongs to no other creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created, it seems that it is a suppositation proper to it, and so not in any way alien. This is confirmed from this: the suppositation by which it is formally supposited is only temporal, and consequently depends on that humanity, as a relationalrespectus; respectivus: relation; relational accidentaccidens: accident depends essentially on its extreme.5 But if it is said that that suppositation is the supposit of the Word, then undoubtedly the suppositation of any createdcreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created supposit depends on an alien suppositation, since it is ultimately terminated from the uncreated supposit and at it; and consequently there would be no created supposit.
¶4161.20–162.11
But here the Subtle DoctorDoctor Subtilis: the Subtle Doctor, on the third [book] of the Sentences, dist. 1, question, article 3, says that one may positest dare: one may posit a threefold negation, as also a threefold pertinent dependencedependencia actualis / potencialis / obediencialis: actual dependence / potential dependence / obediential dependence.6 For something actually depends on an alien suppositation when it is the complete nature of a supposit of a higher nature; as the humanity of Christ is not a supposit but the nature of the supposit of the Word; and if the Word made it not to be the nature of a higher person, then it would be a supposit and a person. Nothing, therefore, is lacking for it to be a person but this negation, that it is not the nature of a supposit of a higher nature. Therefore the suppositation which it has in potencypotencia: potency / power is terminated by the suppositation of the Word, which is alien from the suppositation of the human nature not in act but in potency.7 The second dependence is called potential: namely when 162a rational nature depends on an uncreated supposit by which it can be assumed, but is not yet assumed into the unity of person; but a created nature must also have such a negation, that it may be a person of a man.8 The third is obediential dependence, by which every supposit of an essential substance depends on any uncreated person, but also can be assumed into the unity of an uncreated supposit, so that there is a communication of idiomscommunicacio ydiomatum: communication of idioms, and so that by that very fact the nature of an uncreated person, truly God, is a stone or wood or an individualindividuum: individual of any species of substance; as God now is an individual of the human species, although such a nature cannot be a divine person.9
¶5162.12–162.25
But, setting aside the verbal contention that the suppositation of the Word is not alien from the suppositation of the assumed nature, since the latter is not,10 it is arguedarguitur per: it is argued by appeal to first against it by appeal to this: every man-not-God is of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself a man: every complete human nature not assumed is a man: therefore every such nature is of itself a man, and consequently it cannot by turns be now man and now not-man. The major, although it is well known among the philosophers, can be made plain from this: that otherwise the humanity would not be the species or quiddityquiditas: quiddity of any person of a man, since it can remain the same as it is now and [be] not a man. Therefore "man" is not predicated in quidin quid (predicari in quid): in quid of any human supposit; and by the same token nothing can be of itself a species in the genus of substance,11 since every substance can be the same as it is and not be an individual of this species.12
¶6162.26–163.13
Again, it is impossible for something to be accidentally of some kind unless an accident is in it by which it is formally of this kind, as is clear to one who posits relationsrespectus; respectivus: relation; relational and accidents distinct [from their subjects]: now every man, according to this way, is accidentally a man: therefore one may posit an accidental form by which he is formally a man. But most concede this too, saying that in the hypostatic assumption the negation stated above is corrupted, and in the hypostatic laying-aside 163it is generated: and by it man is formally something positive, as nothing, insofar asin quantum (reduplicative): insofar as it lacks sight or does not have this or that, is something.13 From which it followssequitur: it follows that nothing, insofar as [it is] man or the person of a man, is something or of some positive kind; since whatever, or of whatever kind, a man now is, with the negation present that he is not supposited by an alien suppositation, he can be, with an alien suppositation supervening, he being by that very fact not a man or person.14 Which is against Augustine, De Trinitate 7, [chapter] 9, who holds that a person, insofar as [it is] such, is something, not relative to something.15 If, then, no one can become qualified or quantifiedquantus: quantified unless he is moved, much more can no one become a man without being moved thereby; for otherwise there would not be generation.
¶7163.14–163.33
Again, by the very fact that an inseparable form is merely formally in something, it namesdenominacio; denominare: naming; to name it: now the humanity is a form existing inseparably in any human nature: therefore, if it is in any singular nature, it names it: now it cannot name anything primarily [and] formally except a man: therefore, if it is formally in a created nature, that [nature] is a man. Since, then, the humanity remains continually in the assumed human nature, it seems that, while the assumption stands, it will be a man continually, as before. The minor appears from this: every man is formally a man by humanity, as a movablemobile (noun) / primum mobile: a movable / the first movable is moved formally by motion, a white thing is named by whiteness, and what is acted on by being-acted-onsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute.16 The humanity, therefore, remaining after the unionunio: union, formally names Christ to be a man, and not the said negation: indeed, since he is a man univocallyunivoce: univocally with us and in his own accountracio (against substancia): aspect, it is not necessary to posit a negation, but he is formally a man by humanity, namely, that the account of each of his brothers is the same.17 For he cannot be supposited by an alien suppositation, nor by a negation; but by humanity he must be formally a singular of the human species: therefore by the same token others too, univocally of a like species.
¶8164.1–164.27
Again, according to what is said in De universalibus, every humanity is "a human supposit’s being a man": now, supposing that the Word hypostaticallyypostatice: hypostatically assumes the nature of Peter, this assumed humanity will remain: therefore it will remain that the same supposit is a man; and so the Word would assume a person remaining a person.18 On the assumptionassumptum: the assumption it is not easy to imagine what the humanity is, which the Apostle calls "the form of a servant", unless it were the essenceens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence of a man, or a human essence.19 And from this it seems that another, new humanity began to be a man when Christ began to be a man, the humanity of Peter being extinguished through the assumption; since "the Word is a man" then began to be, and "Peter is a man" then ceases. From which it is clear that he did not assume the nature of Peter, since that nature now remains as far distant from the Word as before.20 For that thing which before was the supposit of Peter is neither a nature nor a divine person, nor is it now a man, just as Christ is not a human nature either: and beforehand this thing and Christ agreedconveniencia / convenire (in): agreement / agree in species, so that each was a man, as I suppose: therefore there was greater agreementconveniencia / convenire (in): agreement / agree then than now.21 Nor does it avail to say that Christ is formally a man not by negation nor by humanity, but by hypostatic union; since thus the account by which Christ is a man would be very equivocal from the account by which anyone else is a man; which undoubtedly follows for manifold reasons. For any other man is called formally a man negatively, and consequently by an uncreated account; but Christ is called a man through the hypostatic union, which can belong to no other.22
Notes
- 1 "With one accord": A B omit concorditer (160.13; C abbreviates it, conco). The moderns’ position, set out here and through the next paragraphs, is that the humanity is a man only by a negation (not being supposited by another’s suppositation).
- 2 Suppositacioni proprie is dative: the nature let go to a suppositation of its own; O reads prope "near". Ut possit per possibile (160.17) is the print; A B C all read posito (C ut posito possibile, B ait posito per possibile, A ut posito proporcionale): one recension against O, and the print stands. "And now it is not a man": while it is assumed.
- 3 Diffinicio … descriptive: diffinicio, and then descriptive, the adverb of descripcio; the glossary renders both "definition". The negation stands in the definition as its last difference. O reads composit (160.21). For suppositacione (160.21) A reads suppesitata, over an erasure by another hand, and B C read supposicione "supposition".
- 4 Inculcata "pressed home". O reads sentenciam (161.3) and et iam for nam (161.6).
- 5 A relation depends on its extreme, the term it is toward; so a temporal suppositation would depend on the humanity it belongs to. O reads nulli nature "to no nature" for nulli alii creature (161.9).
- 6 Scotus, Ordinatio III d. 1 q. 1, third article, n. 9 (Wadding VII.1, 16–17): distinguendum est inter dependentiam actualem, potentialem, et aptitudinalem; a created person has the negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence, never of the potential, since no created nature is incapable of being assumed by the Word. Scotus’s names are not Wyclif’s: Scotus has aptitudinalem where Wyclif has obediencialis, and the dependence Scotus says a created nature is never without (being assumable by the Word) is the one Wyclif describes under "obediential" (potest assumi, 162.6). It is not his "potential" (161.32–162.4), whose negation he says a created nature must have. Wyclif’s "question, article 3" is q. 1, art. 3. B omits dare (161.21); O omits enim (161.23) and Christi (161.25).
- 7 Potencia in Aristotle’s sense, potency against act. The foot notes that every manuscript abbreviates persone (161.27), and that the abbreviation can also mean per se: "not to be of itself a superior nature". O reads vel for Nichil (161.27).
- 8 Potencialis "potential" (161.32) is O’s reading, printed; A B C read personalis "personal". The print stands (one recension against O), and "potential" answers the in potencia of the first dependence. At 162.4 A B C read pars hominis "a part of a man" for persona hominis.
- 9 Obediencialis (162.4) is O’s alone: A B leave a space of twelve letters, C omits without one. O reads et for eciam (162.6); C omits communicacio (162.7); O omits substancie … speciei (162.9–10), the eye passing from speciei to speciei; A B C read posset (162.11), O possit persona without esse. Natura persone increate vere Deus may also be read with natura as ablative: "that God, by the nature of an uncreated person, is truly a stone".
- 10 Cum illa non sit: the suppositation of the assumed nature is not, so nothing is "alien" to it; the plain existential sense.
- 11 Nulla potest esse per se species: per se goes with esse species, as with per se est homo (162.15–17), not with in genere; nulla agrees with species ("no species can be a species of itself") or with natura understood (162.16), with the same sense.
- 12 Predicatur in quid: predicated as answering "what is it?", the essential predication of a species. O omits potest (162.19) and supposito (162.23); B reads per se for persone (162.20); C numero for modo (162.21).
- 13 A privation such as blindness is not something positive; the argument says the moderns’ negation makes "man" no more positive than that. A B C read alicuius for alicuiusmodi (162.26–27, 163.5).
- 14 A B C read supponitur for suppositatur (163.7); O reads in for non (163.8). Ipso facto non homine vel persona is an ablative absolute.
- 15 Augustine, De Trinitate VII.6.11 (PL 42, 943): ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad Filium vel Spiritum sanctum.
- 16 Passio here is the category against action: what is acted on is so by its being-acted-on, as a movable by motion. A B C omit inest (163.14) and read denominant (163.15, 17, 25); B adds et before Cum (163.19).
- 17 Homo nobiscum univoce et in sua racione (163.26–27) is the print with O; A B C read homo unitate in sua racione "a man by unity in his account", A B with a space of eight letters. The argument turns on univoce, and the print stands. O reads unde for videlicet (163.28). Christ’s brothers: Heb. 2:17.
- 18 Wyclif’s own De universalibus c. 8 (ed. Dziewicki, Miscellanea philosophica II, 49): Est humanitas in me … cum sit me esse hominem, the humanity as the supposit’s being a man. Peter is the stock case of an existing man whose nature the Word is supposed to assume.
- 19 Pro assumpto: the logician’s premiss, here the case supposed at 164.2–3 (posito quod Verbum assumat … naturam Petri), not the assumption of a nature. It could also be read "as for what was assumed", the nature the Apostle calls the form of a servant; the argument stands either way. Phil. 2:7; B omits servi (164.7). A B C add et before Pro (164.6) and read esse hominis "the being of a man" for esset hominis (164.8); B reads quo for isto (164.8).
- 20 "Began", incepit, with C O, against the print’s incipit (164.11): agreement across the families. At 164.9–10 the print joins the readings: A B C have incepit quando Christus incepit esse homo humanitate, without the first esse homo; O has incepit esse homo humanitate, without the quando clause. B reads non for modo (164.14).
- 21 "Beforehand", per ante, with A B C and O’s per añ, against the print’s per antecedens "by the antecedent" (164.17); the next clause sets tunc against modo. O omits prius (164.15).
- 22 Negative … racione increata: any other man is a man by the negation of being supposited by an uncreated supposit, so by an account taken from the uncreated. O omits non negacione (164.20), reads quia for qua (164.22) and homo et dubie sequitur quod (164.23); A B C read negacione for negative (164.25).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- None.