Wyclif’s Latin works

De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 10, part 5

The humanity is the same man as Christ: accidents, difference, and blessedness

Harris pp. 175.17–179.19

¶1175.17–176.2

1752ᵈᵒ confirmatur ex hoc quod eadem in numero est quantitas, qua ista⁵ duo quantificantur, eadem qualitas qua qualificantur; et sic de motu et ceteris accidentibus quibuscunque, que insunt Christo humanitus, ut patet posterius: quod non esset nisi foret ydemptitas in subiecto: ergo idem est iste homo et ista humanitas. Cum ergo accidens non sit nisi modus subiecti, patet quod ad numeracionem subiectorum oportet accidencia numerari; ut, si aliquid est⁶ A motum, aliud est B motum;⁶ alia est mocio A mobilis, et alia est mocio B mobilis; neutra⁷ autem predictarum⁷ substanciarum est pars alterius, cum preter humanitatem vel eius partes non restat signare aliam partem Christi. Ideo humanitas nec est pars quantitativa nec qualitativa Christi; et per consequens, si essent distincte substancie, omnia accidencia, que insunt eis formaliter, distinguerentur; cuius impossibilitatem suppono ex alibi declaratis. Non enim est 176possibile puncta¹ et quantitates, qualitates, et ceteras formas simillimas coextendi.

Second, this is confirmed by this, that the quantity by which these two are quantified is the same in number, the same the quality by which they are qualified; and so of motion and any other accidentsaccidens: accident whatever that are in Christ humanlyhumanitus: humanly, as is clear later: which would not be unless there were identity in the subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute: therefore this man and this humanityhumanitas: the humanity are the same. Since, then, an accident is nothing but a mode of the subject, it is clear that accidents must be numbered according to the numbering of subjects; as, if something is A in motion, something is B in motion, the motion of the movablemobile (noun) / primum mobile: a movable / the first movable A is one and the motion of the movable B another; now neither of the aforesaid substances is a part of the other, since besides the humanity or its parts there remains no other part of Christ to designate.1 So the humanity is neither a quantitativepars quantitativa: quantitative part nor a qualitative partpars qualitativa: qualitative part of Christ; and consequently, if they were distinct substances, all the accidents that are in them formally would be distinguished; whose impossibility I suppose from what has been made cleardeclarare / ostendere: make clear / show elsewhere. For it is not 176possible for points and quantities, qualities and other forms most alike to be coextended.2

¶2176.3–176.26

176Et ex isto capitur 3° quod omnis differencia substancialis vel accidentalis, qua Verbum secundum humanitatem differt ab alio supposito vel natura, est differencia qua humanitas Christi differt ab eodem. Ex quo sequitur ulterius, quod nulla est differencia, qua Christus humanitus differt ab illa humanitate: et cum non sit possibile quod aliquid differat ab aliquo, nisi aliqua differencia differat ab eodem; patet quod non est differencia inter Christum et illam humanitatem assumptam. Patet ex hoc quod omnis substancialis differencia capitur vel a materia vel a forma: sed omnis talis pars Christi est pars sue humanitatis et e contra, sicut et omne aliud accidens absolutum: ergo non superest fundamentum, unde caperetur differencia Christi humanitus, nisi ab illa natura assumpta. Nec valet dicere quod solum secundum naturam divinam differt ab illa; quia² sic³ tantum differret³ ab illa² sicut Pater, et precise⁴ convenirent, non obstante unione ypostatica, appropriate⁵ ad Verbum: et tunc non plus conveniret⁶ Verbum cum aliqua creatura⁷ post incarnacionem quam ante; et per consequens non foret eiusdem speciei vel generis cum aliqua creatura,⁷ eo quod tantum differt ab ista humanitate cum qua maxime conveniret inter omnes creaturas, quantum differret si esset pure Deus et illa homo, cum differencia amplior non sit fundabilis.

And from this is taken, third, that every substantial or accidental differencedifferencia: difference (logical differentia) by which the WordVerbum: the Word as to the humanitysecundum deitatem / secundum humanitatem: as to the Godhead / as to the humanity differs from another suppositsuppositum: supposit or naturenatura: nature is a difference by which Christ’s humanity differs from the same. From which it followssequitur: it follows further that there is no difference by which Christ humanly differs from that humanity: and since it is not possible that something differ from something unless it differ from the same by some difference, it is clear that there is no difference between Christ and that assumed humanity.3 It is clear from this, that every substantial difference is taken either from matter or from form: now every such part of Christ is a part of his humanity and conversely, as also every other absolute accidentaccidens absolutum: absolute accident: therefore there remains no foundation whence a difference of Christ humanly might be taken, except from that assumed nature. Nor is it of avail to say that he differs from it only as to the divine nature; for so he would differ from it only as the Father [does], and they would agree precisely [as much], notwithstanding the hypostatic unionunio: union, appropriated to the Word: and then the Word would agreeconveniencia / convenire (in): agreement / agree with no creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created more after the incarnation than before; and consequently he would not be of the same species or genus with any creature, because he differs from this humanity, with which he would agree most among all creatures, as much as he would differ if he were purely God and it a man, since no fuller difference can be founded.4

¶3176.27–177.22

176Item humanitas Christi habet causas completas et denominaciones positivas,⁸ que non possunt nisi homini competere: ergo est homo. Et, cum non potest poni alius homo, quam Christus; quia sic Verbum gereret in se monstruose duos homines, quia personam quam assumeret ad suam personam sed non in unitatem persone, et ipsemet foret alius homo, et illi concurrerent faciendo redempcionis commercium: 177oportet ergo quod illa humanitas¹ sit idem homo, qui Christus. Assumptum videtur primo ex hoc quod illa humanitas¹ est substancia² corporea racionalis ad ymaginem Dei facta, et hoc³ sufficit ad esse hominis secundum Augustinum et Lincolniensem ut patet superius. Nec valet ficta⁴ negacio, quod sic nemo esset formaliter humanitate homo; nec in quantum homo esset aliquid vel alicuius generis pocius quam in quantum peccator, quod non consonat philosophie vel fidei; ymo nemo sciret an esset homo. Quod autem illa humanitas sit substancia racionalis, omnes concorditer confitentur, cum sit composita⁵ ex corpore Christi et eius anima. Ideo, si illa non esset substancia, nesciretur quid esset, aut que alia res esset substancia; et ultra videtur, cum omnis substancia sit substancia prima vel secunda, quod illa humanitas sit substancia prima, et per consequens individuum speciei vel generis. Et cum non solum sit in genere substancie vel corporis, sed⁶ inferius in genere animalis, eo quod est sensitiva et racionalis et per consequens substancia animata sensibilis; sequitur quod sit animal. Non enim est racio quod negacio caderet in diffinicione animalis pocius quam in diffinicione cuiuscunque substancie, cum omnis singularis substancia sit suppositum.

Again, Christ’s humanity has complete causes and positive namingsdenominacio; denominare: naming; to name which can belong only to a man: therefore it is a man. And since no other man can be posited than Christ (because so the Word would carry two men in himself monstrously, because [there would be] a person whom he would assume to his person but not into unity of personpersona: person, and he himself would be another man, and they would concur in carrying out the tradecommercium; commercari: trade; to trade of redemption), 177it must therefore be that that humanity is the same man as Christ.5 The assumptionassumptum: the assumption seems [clear] first from this, that that humanity is a corporeal rational substance made to the image of God, and this suffices for the beingens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence of a man according to Augustine and LincolnLincolniensis: Lincoln, as is clear above.6 Nor is the feigned negationnegacio (constituent of the person): negation of avail, since so no one would be a man formally by humanity; nor insofar asin quantum (reduplicative): insofar as [he is] man would he be anything, or of any genus, rather than insofar as [he is] a sinner, which does not accord with philosophy or faith; indeed no one would know whether he was a man.7 And that that humanity is a rational substance all confess with one accord, since it is composed of Christ’s body and his soul. So, if it were not a substance, it would not be known what it was, or what other thing would be a substance; and further it seems, since every substance is first substancesubstancia prima / substancia secunda: first substance / second substance or second, that that humanity is a first substance, and consequently an individualindividuum: individual of a species or genus. And since it is not only in the genus of substance or of body but lower, in the genus of animal, because it is sensitive and rational and consequently a sentientsensibilis (in the definition of animal): sentient animate substance, it follows that it is an animal. For there is no reason why the negation should fall in the definitiondiffinicio: definition of animal rather than in the definition of any substance whatever, since every singular substance is a supposit.8

¶4177.23–179.19

177Confirmatur. Anima Christi, corpus, et unio eorum cum suis consequentibus sufficiunt principiare humanitatem esse hominem, et non impediuntur propter Verbi incarnacionem: ergo de facto constituunt illam in esse hominis. Maior patet ex quolibet alio homine principiato et individuato per corpus et animam unita cum suis consequentibus: ymo videtur quod absolute necessario sequitur⁷ positis istis principiis cum unione predicta, quod individuum constituatur in specie. Nam non est⁸ possibile quod forma⁹ elementi vel mixti inanimati informet¹⁰ proporcionatam materiam, nisi eo ipso constituatur elementum vel mixtum in sua 178specie: ergo cum totum genus animalis sit perfeccius et¹ eque plene ab intrinseco principiatum; sequitur quod est dare principia intrinseca et eorum unionem, cum quibus non stat quod individuum illius generis non resultet. Si enim non sit² possibile quod albedo informet subiectum, nisi eo ipso³ constituatur unum album; eque⁴ evidenter, si anima informat proporcionatum subiectum, oportet quod⁵ ex eis constituitur in signanda⁶ specie individuum animalis. Quod autem natura Christi non impeditur ne sit animal, probatur sic. Per assumpcionem est humanitas Christi summe exaltata et in perfeccione ultima creature possibili collocata: ergo non est ab aliqua perfeccione naturali, quam naturaliter appeteret, prepedita: cum ergo omnis perfeccio substancialis sit suppositum, vel presupponit suppositum ut subiectum, et omnis perfeccio accidentalis presupponit essencialem, et suppositum sic perfectum; videtur quod, si natura assumpta⁷ sit, ut sic, a racione suppositi exclusa, et⁸ a perfeccione maxima sit prepedita. Quomodo ergo non tristaretur languens circa perfeccionem possibilem a qua deficit per ypostaticam unionem? Maxima quidem perfeccio creature possibilis est beatitudo, sicut philosophi et theologi profitentur concorditer cum scriptura: modo illa beatitudo consistit in clara visione et fruicione divine essencie iuxta vocem Veritatis Ioh. 17;⁹ ‘hec est vita eterna ut cognoscant etc.’; ergo illa creatura cum¹⁰ non potest¹¹ esse¹¹ suppositum stante unione et per consequens non exercere¹² actus suppositales, non potest, ut sic, perfeccionem talem attingere. Sed et hoc¹³ concedunt concorditer dicentes quod ista natura, cum non sit suppositum, nec agit nec patitur. Unde et illud Psalmi 44ᵗⁱ ad litteram dictum de Christo, ‘beatus quem¹⁴ elegisti et assumpsisti,’ dicunt esse falsum de virtute sermonis: sed sic intelligitur—beatus, cuius est natura, quam 179elegisti et assumpsisti—ista autem natura non est beata, cum non sit suppositum, quia per idem meruit redempcionem generis humani, quod non sufficit creatura, nec est colenda vel latria adoranda: illud ergo, quod nunquam exercuit actus suppositales, non est beatum. Sed rogo attendat lector et iudicet,¹ que istarum viarum² sit auribus fidelium magis pia; vel dicere quod natura illa per assumpcionem est beatissima creaturarum; (sic quod³ non deficit sibi esse hominis vel persone racio⁴ per se agendi et paciendi ac recipiendi formaliter felicitatem et cuiuscunque generis perfeccionem; sic quod assumpcio extollat eam ad omne genus perfeccionis et non vinculat eam excludendo a perfeccione huiusmodi;) quam dicere eius oppositum? quia non dubium quin esse hominem summe merentem ex passione maxime acceptabili Trinitati, et postmodum esse beatum beatitudine maxima⁵ possibili creature, est perfeccionis denominacio. Illam autem tollit adversa posicio, et illam ponit expresse nostra posicio concorditer cum antiquis doctoribus et scriptura.

This is confirmed. Christ’s soul, body and their union, with their consequents, suffice to be the principle ofprincipiare (active): be the principle of the humanity’s being a man, and they are not hindered on account of the Word’s incarnation: therefore in fact they constitute it in the being of a man. The major is clear from any other man, constituted from principlesprincipiari: be constituted from principles and individuated through body and soul united, with their consequents: indeed it seems that it follows absolutely necessarily, these principles being posited with the aforesaid union, that an individual is constituted in the species. For it is not possible that the form of an element or of an inanimate mixed body inform proportioned matter unless by that very fact an element or mixed body is constituted in its 178species: therefore, since the whole genus of animal is more perfect and equally fully constituted from principles from within, it follows that one may positest dare: one may posit intrinsic principles and their union, with which it is not consistent that an individual of that genus should not result. For if it is not possible that whiteness inform a subject unless by that very fact one white thing is constituted, equally evidently, if a soul informs a proportioned subject, an individual animal is constituted from them in a species that can be designated.9 Now that Christ’s nature is not hindered from being an animal is proved thus. Through the assumptionassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption Christ’s humanity is supremely exalted and set in the ultimate perfection possible to a creature: therefore it is not hindered from any natural perfection that it would naturally desire: since, then, every substantial perfection is a supposit or presupposes a supposit as subject, and every accidental perfection presupposes the essential [perfection], and the supposit so perfected, it seems that, if the assumed nature is, as such, excluded from the accountracio (against substancia): aspect of a supposit, it is also hindered from the greatest perfection. How then would it not grieve, languishing over the possible perfection from which it falls short through the hypostatic union?10 The greatest perfection possible to a creature is indeed blessedness, as philosophers and theologians profess with one accord with scripture: now that blessedness consists in the clear vision and fruitionfruicio: fruition of the divine essence, according to the voice of the Truth, John 17, "this is eternal life: that they may know" etc.; therefore that creature, since it cannot be a supposit while the union stands, and consequently cannot exercise the acts of a supposit, cannot, as such, attain such perfection.11 But this too they grant with one accord, saying that this nature, since it is not a supposit, neither acts nor is acted on. Hence also that [verse] of Psalm 44, said literally of Christ, "Blessed is he whom thou hast chosen and taken to thee", they say is false in the proper sense of the wordsde virtute sermonis: in the proper sense of the words: but it is understood thus, "blessed [is he] whose is the nature which 179thou hast chosen and taken to thee"; and this nature is not blessed, since it is not a supposit, because by the same token it [would have] merited the redemption of the human race, for which a creature does not suffice, and it is neither to be worshipped nor adored with latriadulia / latria: dulia / latria: so that which never exercised the acts of a supposit is not blessed.12 But I ask the reader to attend and judge which of these ways is the more pious to the ears of the faithful: either to say that that nature through the assumption is the most blessed of creatures (so that it does not lack the being of a man or of a person, the ground of acting and being acted on of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself and of receiving formally happiness and perfection of every kind; so that the assumption raises it to every kind of perfection and does not bind it by excluding it from perfection of this sort), or to say its opposite? For there is no doubt that to be a man meriting supremely from a passion supremely acceptable to the Trinity, and afterwards to be blessed with the greatest blessedness possible to a creature, is a naming of perfection. Now the opposing positionposicio / proposicio / predicacio: position / proposition / predication takes it away, and our position lays it down expressly, in accord with the ancient doctors and scripture.13

Notes

  1. 1 "Something is B": O reads aliquid (175.25), where the print’s aliud "another thing" stands in no manuscript; A B C are corrupt (est ·a· motum ad ·b· moto A, and the like). The English follows O, against Harris’s aliud. "These two": Christ and his humanity; A B C read isti (175.18). A B C read aliquid predicatarum for neutra predictarum (175.26).
  2. 2 Wyclif’s own teaching, made clear "elsewhere": forms most alike cannot be coextended in one subject, so two substances in one place would need two sets of accidents. O reads pun9 for puncta (176.1).
  3. 3 "Third": the third confirmation (cf. 174.30). Aliqua differencia is construed as ablative, "by some difference".
  4. 4 "They would agree precisely [as much]": the Word and the humanity, no more than the Father and the humanity. Appropriate (176.19) is construed as qualifying the union, which is appropriated to the Son; O’s word is doubtful (apP1etate). A omits quia … illa (176.17–18); B reads sicut differet, without tantum; A B C read p~cie, O p~e "purely", for precise (176.18); A communicaret for conveniret (176.20); A B C omit post … creatura (176.20–22), the eye passing between the two creatura.
  5. 5 The parenthesis gives the absurdity of a second man in Christ: the Word would carry a person assumed to his person but not into unity of person, and the two would carry out the redemption together. A B C read positas "posited" for positivas (176.28).
  6. 6 Assumptum: the logician’s assumption, the antecedent "Christ’s humanity has … namings that can belong only to a man". Augustine and Grosseteste (Lincolniensis, Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln), cited above at 127–128: Augustine, De Trinitate XV.7.11 (PL 42, 1065), Homo est substantia rationalis constans ex anima et corpore, and Grosseteste, Hexaemeron, sixth day, creatura racionalis, facta ad ymaginem conditoris. O omits sit … humanitas (177.1–3), the eye passing between the two humanitas; A B C omit substancia (177.3) and read sic for hoc (177.4).
  7. 7 The moderns’ negation, the constituent of the person (161–162): if a man is a man only with a negation added, he is a man by the negation, not formally by humanity. A B C read facta "the negation made" for ficta (177.5); B compositum, O componitur without sit (177.11); O secundum for sed (177.17).
  8. 8 Sensibilis in the definition of animal (Porphyry’s substancia animata sensibilis) is "sentient", not "perceptible". The negation that would make the humanity no supposit would have to enter every definition of substance, since every singular substance is a supposit.
  9. 9 "Is constituted": C and O omit oportet quod "it must be that" (178.7), against the print; the English follows C O, with whose reading the indicative constituitur construes. A B read in assignanda (178.8). O reads consequitur (177.29) and omits non est (177.31); A B C formale for forma; A B informaret (177.32); A B C omit et (178.1) and read est for sit (178.5); B omits eo ipso (178.6); O que for eque.
  10. 10 The subject of "grieve" is the assumed nature, on the opponents’ account. A B C omit assumpta (178.16) and read quod for et (178.17).
  11. 11 John 17:3; Wyclif has no autem ("Now", DR). O reads 14 for 17 (178.24). A B C omit cum (178.25) and read exercendo for exercere (178.26); O pre ê for potest esse.
  12. 12 Ps. 64:5 (Vulgate; Harris’s margin Ps. lxv), not Psalm 44 as Wyclif has it. "Taken to thee" (DR) renders assumpsisti, the verb of the assumption, which is why the opponents must deny the verse in the proper sense of the words. "By the same token": were the nature blessed, it would equally have merited the redemption and be adored with latria, the worship due to God alone, which the opponents deny. O reads quam "whom" (fem., the nature) for quem (178.30); C sed secundo (178.28); O indiget for iudicet (179.6); A B C omit viarum.
  13. 13 Racio per se agendi is taken as "the ground of acting"; the words may also be construed persone racio "the account of a person … of acting". B omits racio (179.9); O reads quid for quod (179.8); A B C maxime for maxima (179.16).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English (margin matter): reference Ps. lxv. (178.30).