De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 11, part 1
The Subtle Doctor’s two respects, and his first four arguments
Harris pp. 185.0–189.33
¶1185.0–185.0
[It resolves the objectionsinstancia; objectum: objection by which the more modern doctorsmoderni doctores / moderniores doctores: the modern doctors / the more modern doctors seem to prop up their teachingsentencia: teaching / sentence, recounting ten ludicrous things to which those who grant the possibility of the laying-asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside consequently assent.]
¶2185.2–185.22
It remains to see the evidencesevidencia: evidence by which the opinionopinio: opinion contrary in words to this teaching of mine is propped up. And the Subtle DoctorDoctor Subtilis: the Subtle Doctor makes cleardeclarare / ostendere: make clear / show this opinion at the beginning of the third [book] of the Sentences, subtly enough.1 "An accidentaccidens: accident," he says, "has a twofold respecthabitudo: condition / respect to its subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute: namely, of the informing to the informed; and such an aspect includes imperfection of the subject, because [it includes] potencypotencia: potency / power to the act by which the subject is perfected; and the other respect, as naturally posterior, depending causally on the subject; and this respect attests the perfection of the subject and the imperfection of the dependent form.2 So," he says, "most like this, the assumed naturenatura: nature has a twofold respect to the WordVerbum: the Word: either under the aspect of causing, as generally every creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created depends on the whole Trinity; and this respect presupposes in the creature a natural capacity savouring of imperfection, which must have the act of the divine causingcausancia / causacio: causing / causation inseparably accompanying [it]. And the second respect is that by which the assumed nature, according to obediential potency, can be the nature of the Word; and this potency cannot be actualised except by miracle, and it signifiesdicere (logical use): signify in a way perfection in the assumingassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption personpersona: person; and so to terminate the dependencedependencia actualis / potencialis / obediencialis: actual dependence / potential dependence / obediential dependence of the creature according to this aspect is hypostaticallyypostatice: hypostatically to assume the said creature."3
¶3185.23–186.17
And this teaching pleases me. For every subject of an accident includes in itself, analogically, the account of a causer toward 186its caused, which in God is, equivocallyequivoce: equivocally, [a matter] of perfection without qualificationperfeccio simpliciter: perfection without qualification.4 Nevertheless every causing by which a subject causes an inhering accident savours of imperfection of the subject, because [it includes] material or subjective causing, by which it is in potency to be perfected by such a form. Hence one may not positest dare: one may posit another singular respect by which a subject can cause an accident without being informed by it. But every singular account or cause includes an analogous account, which, according to that which is of perfection without qualification, can belong to God alone. Nor does it follow from the miraculous transubstantiationtranssubstanciacio: transubstantiation in the eucharist that either quality or inhering quantity can exist of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself without informing and essential dependence on a subject. To this much, therefore, that teaching avails: that it truly posits that in every created account there shines a potency whereby God can be hypostatically joined to Christ’s humanityhumanitas: the humanity; but that he could assume another nature cannot be proved, or taught by example.5
¶4186.18–186.20
And that the Word can assume human nature, making it be his nature and not the Word himself, the Doctor proves by a fivefold argument.
¶5186.21–186.22
First, from this: that no absurdityinconveniencia; inconveniens: an absurdity (in argument) · troubles, ill consequences (in affairs) follows from this on the part of the assuming or of the assumed.6
¶6186.23–187.16
But in this argument the false is beggedpeticio (principii) / petitur: begging [of the question] / is begged; since the personal unionunio: union by which the humanity would become the nature of a man would imply that that humanity becomes one personally with the one taking [it].7 For the complete substantial nature is, generally, the same supposit as any suppositsuppositum: supposit whatever [whose nature it is]. And if the humanity is the complete nature of the Word, then it is the essenceens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence and substance of the Word, because perfect nature and essence are convertibleconvertibilis / converti: convertible / be convertible; and if it is the essence or substance of the Word, then it is the Word; since of any thing whatever, created or uncreated, the essence or substance and 187the thing whose essence it is are the same. Therefore the Word cannot make the humanity be the nature of the Word unless he made it be the essence and substance of the Word, and in consequence the Word himself. Nor does it follow—"this human nature is the nature of God; therefore it is the divine nature"—because such abstract [terms] with possessives of this kind call up the possession of their primitive with a certain account of reduplicating:8 as, if Christ’s humanity is the divine essence, nature or substance, then it is the nature of God under the aspect by which he is God, which is only the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity; and if the Godhead is human nature, then it is human nature under the aspect by which he is a man; and so by the Godhead the Word would formally be a man, and by the humanity God; which is impossible. And it is clear that there is much difference between saying "the Godhead is the nature of a man" and "it is human nature", [and between] "the humanity is the nature of God" and "it is the divine nature"; since those natures, so disparate, agree in the same supposit.
¶7187.17–187.21
Secondly, the Doctor argues by this: that a divine person can terminate any dependence of a creature whatever, which dependence it would be [a mark] of perfection to terminate; now it is [a mark] of perfection without qualification to be able to make a created nature be the nature of God; therefore God can do this.9
¶8187.22–188.13
Without doubt something true is inferredconcludere: to infer, but an unbelieverinfidelis: unbeliever; with a dative, faithless (to) would say that the minor would be a pure begging [of the question]. Hence, because we see that God produces of himself many effects, such as substances, as we take by faith concerning the beginning of the world, some draw out as a principle that the Godhead can supply the placevicem supplere / vicis supplecio: supply the place / the supplying of a place of any second cause whatever. And from that sprout very many vanities; for it is certain that the Godhead can supply the place of no material or subjective cause, that is, cause a form by the same causationcausancia / causacio: causing / causation, or a most similar one, with the subject withdrawn; for then the Godhead could be fiery and informed in any way whatever; which it is a madman’s part to say. Therefore to cause materially or subjectively cannot belong to it; indeed God cannot produce of himself any accident or material form without the causing 188of the substance: as, just as he cannot produce my motion unless I am moved, causing this, so of any material form. Indeed the same is said of a spiritual accident: as, he cannot produce a creature’s act of willing unless the creature itself not onlynedum: not only concurs with him by causing subjectively, but also by co-acting. Indeed, if one looks further, the Godhead can supply the place of no second agent by acting univocallyunivoce: univocally. Therefore the supplying of a place, since it signifies a vicarious condition of inferiority, cannot belong to the Godhead.10 When, therefore, he of himself miraculously performs a work which he could make a second agent effect instrumentally, with his governance, by an action other in kind, he does not supply the place of the agent; nor conversely when they are conformed in kind.11
¶9188.14–188.16
Thirdly, the Doctor argues that the assumed nature is a singular essence before it is suppositedsuppositari: be supposited; therefore for that prior [moment] God can make that nature a person in another.12
¶10188.17–188.25
But here it seems to me that the inferenceconsequencia: inference is to be denied. For according to that it would follow that anyone can be anyone. For Peter is, in origin, an essence before [he is] a substance; therefore for that prior [moment] God could make him a non-substance; and, since he is a substance before a body, and a body before an animal, and an animal before a man, because every superior is cause of its inferior, it follows that he could indifferently be made of any species of substance whatever, as much as to body as to soul.
¶11188.26–189.28
But further, for the matter of the argument, the answer is that, as early, as to inference, as Christ’s humanity is this singular nature, so early is it the person of the Word itself. For it could not be left unassumed, nor be laid asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside after the assumptionassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption; for then undoubtedly, just as the beginningincepcio: beginning of the humanity would be presupposed to the assumption by a priority of consequence, so would a created personationpersonare (active) / personacio: make a person / personation be, since to be an individualindividuum: individual of rational nature is to be a person.13 And it is clear that Christ is a person, supposit or hypostasisypostasis: hypostasis before he is a singular nature; 189but generally the reverse: as early as a substance is the singular nature of a given species, like Christ, equally early is it the supposit of human nature, as it is the person of a man. Therefore Christ is a person before he is a person of a man or a singular substance. Nevertheless there is no order between the divine supposit and the divine person as between the more general and the more contracted, as there is in created personalitiespersonalitas: personality.14 But in those too it is not necessary, if Peter is a supposit of substance before a person of human nature, that he can be a supposit [and] not a person, as is clear from what was said above. Christ’s singularity, therefore, is posterior to his personality, and is caused from the individuating conditions, for instance from that body and that soul, with that hypostatic union and the other things that follow. From which it seems to me that Christ cannot assume another nature, because then he could be another man; and in consequence this person [could], as will be deduced later; which is impossible.15 And the inference is clear from this: that if there were other individuating principles, then there would be another individual of the human species, and in consequence another man. Nor is there colourcolor (non est color): colour (a plausible ground) [for saying] that time or another requisite accident individuates the substance, except that much more evidently the hypostatic union had individuated the Lord Jesus Christ, as Anselm says in On the Incarnation, [chapter] 7.16 Nor does it stand in the way that Christ is a supposit and individual of the human species before he has the said union; for, as he is a man before he is this man, so he is an individual of the human species before this individual, and this union is prior to his being this individual.17
¶12189.29–189.33
Fourthly, this is confirmed from this: that God can make an accident be of itself, as is clear of the eucharist; therefore by the same token he can make a substance inhere: for it is as far to make, of the inhering, [something] not inhering, as, of the not-inhering, to make [something] that adheres to a person of a superior nature.
Notes
- 1 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III d. 1 q. 1, on whether a created nature can be united to the Word, with its two respects of an accident to its subject and its arguments for the possibility: the two respects are at n. 3 (Wadding VII.1, p. 6), and the arguments that singularity precedes personality and that an accident exists of itself in the Eucharist, which Wyclif gives as the Doctor’s own proofs (probat Doctor, 186.18–20), are reasons Scotus reports and rejects in the third article, n. 7 (p. 10); the passage quoted is given in Wyclif’s words. A B read insuper est for Superest (185.2); A B C huic sentencie contraria in verbis (185.2–3).
- 2 Habitudo in the "respect" sense throughout the chapter: the relation under which accident and subject, nature and Word, stand. Racio here (185.7, 185.13, 185.21) is the aspect under which the relation holds.
- 3 "Natural capacity": posse naturale. "Obediential potency": the creature’s capacity to receive from God what no natural agent can effect in it, actualised only by miracle; to terminate the dependence under this aspect is the Scotist definition of the hypostatic assumption. O reads assumentem for assumente (185.20).
- 4 "Perfection without qualification" (perfeccio simpliciter): a perfection it is better to have than not, which as such belongs to God; the subject’s causing of its accident is predicated of God only equivocally.
- 5 B reads imposita perficit, C imposita perfici (186.4–5) for in potencia perfici, where A has in in an erasure by a second hand; B C read idem for illud (186.8). O omits Deo (186.9), adds ·n· (its sign for enim, which Harris doubts here) after quantitas (186.11), and omits per se (186.11) and Christi (186.15).
- 6 Inconveniens here in the arguer’s sense, an absurd consequence. A B C read inconsequens "inconsistency" (186.21); O omits nec assumpti (186.22).
- 7 "Nature of a man": the humanity would become the nature by which one is a man, so one person with the Word who takes it; sumente "the one taking" stands for the assuming Word. A B C read implicat (186.24); B omits essencia … tunc est (186.28–30).
- 8 Convocant (187.6) stands in all the codices; Harris asks whether connotant "connote" should be read, which gives the same sense; the English renders the print as "call up". The possessive adjective (divina, humana) carries its primitive (Deus, homo) reduplicatively, "of God insofar as God": so natura Dei does not yield natura divina. O reads referret (187.13).
- 9 O reads esset for foret (187.19).
- 10 "Supply the place" (vicem supplere): to stand in for a second cause by doing what it does in the same way; Wyclif denies this of God for material and subjective causes, and for univocal agency. A B C read communicancia for causancia (187.34).
- 11 Quod posset facere agens secundum … efficere: causative facere with the infinitive, "which he could make a second agent effect". God is the subject of posset, agens secundum (accusative) is the subject of efficere, and suo regimine is God’s governance of the instrument. Alia accione in genere is "by an action other in kind". B reads solum illa for secundum alia (188.10); A’s first hand perficiunt is corrected to perficit (188.10).
- 12 "For that prior [moment]": pro illo priori, the prior instant of nature, not of time. "Make that nature a person": personare, the active beside personari "be made a person".
- 13 "To": ad assumpcionem, with O, which adds ad (188.31), against the print and A B C; without it assumpcionem does not construe after presupponeretur. "Personation": the constituting of a created person. The definition of person as an individual of rational nature is Boethius’s (Contra Eutychen 3, PL 64, 1343D: Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia).
- 14 A B C omit e contra … Christus (189.1–2); A B C read individuum for suppositum (189.6); O possit for potest (189.9).
- 15 "And in consequence this person [could]": the sense is that this person, the Word, would then be another man.
- 16 Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi c. 7 in Wyclif’s numbering (Schmitt c. 11; PL 158, c. VI), on what makes the person of Christ this individual: the collectio proprietatum, quibus homo communis fit singulus, which in Jesus is the same as the Word’s (PL 158, 278D–279A). "Colour": a plausible ground. C omits nisi, O ut (189.21).
- 17 O reads illi unio quam ille hoc (189.27).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- Plate readings; page · reading · note):
- 187: sequitur—ista (print as transcribed) [SUB]
- 187: dicere—deitas (print as transcribed) [SUB]