Wyclif’s Latin works

De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 11, part 1

The Subtle Doctor’s two respects, and his first four arguments

Harris pp. 185.0–189.33

¶1185.0–185.0

185[Solvit instancias quibus moderniores doctores videntur fulcire suam sentenciam, recitando decem ludicra que concedentes possibilitatem dimissionis annuunt consequenter. Discussion of Duns Scotus’ theory of the Incarnation including the analogy of Transubstantiation in the Eucharist (pp. 189-191); followed by a refutation of the hypothesis that Christ could have assumed many humanities.]

[It resolves the objectionsinstancia; objectum: objection by which the more modern doctorsmoderni doctores / moderniores doctores: the modern doctors / the more modern doctors seem to prop up their teachingsentencia: teaching / sentence, recounting ten ludicrous things to which those who grant the possibility of the laying-asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside consequently assent.]

¶2185.2–185.22

185Superest¹ videre evidencias ex quibus fulcitur opinio huic sentencie² mee in verbis contraria.² Declarat autem Doctor Subtilis istam opinionem in principio 3ⁱⁱ Sentenciarum satis subtiliter. ‘Accidens, inquit, duplicem habitudinem habet ad subiectum: scilicet, informantis ad informatum; et talis racio includit imperfeccionem subiecti, quia potenciam ad actum quo subiectum perficitur: aliam autem habitudinem ut naturaliter posterius dependens a subiecto causaliter; et ista habitudo attestatur perfeccionem subiecti et imperfeccionem forme dependentis. Sic, inquit, simillime natura assumpta habet duplicem habitudinem ad Verbum, vel sub racione causandi sicut generaliter omnis creatura dependet a tota Trinitate; et illa habitudo presupponit in creatura posse naturale imperfeccionem sapiens, quod oportet habere actum causancie divine inseparabiliter comitantem. 2ᵃ autem habitudo est, qua natura assumpta secundum potenciam obediencialem potest esse natura Verbi, et illa potencia non potest actuari nisi per miraculum, et dicit quodammodo perfeccionem in persona assumente³; terminare itaque dependenciam creature secundum istam racionem est ypostatice assumere dictam creaturam.’

It remains to see the evidencesevidencia: evidence by which the opinionopinio: opinion contrary in words to this teaching of mine is propped up. And the Subtle DoctorDoctor Subtilis: the Subtle Doctor makes cleardeclarare / ostendere: make clear / show this opinion at the beginning of the third [book] of the Sentences, subtly enough.1 "An accidentaccidens: accident," he says, "has a twofold respecthabitudo: condition / respect to its subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute: namely, of the informing to the informed; and such an aspect includes imperfection of the subject, because [it includes] potencypotencia: potency / power to the act by which the subject is perfected; and the other respect, as naturally posterior, depending causally on the subject; and this respect attests the perfection of the subject and the imperfection of the dependent form.2 So," he says, "most like this, the assumed naturenatura: nature has a twofold respect to the WordVerbum: the Word: either under the aspect of causing, as generally every creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created depends on the whole Trinity; and this respect presupposes in the creature a natural capacity savouring of imperfection, which must have the act of the divine causingcausancia / causacio: causing / causation inseparably accompanying [it]. And the second respect is that by which the assumed nature, according to obediential potency, can be the nature of the Word; and this potency cannot be actualised except by miracle, and it signifiesdicere (logical use): signify in a way perfection in the assumingassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption personpersona: person; and so to terminate the dependencedependencia actualis / potencialis / obediencialis: actual dependence / potential dependence / obediential dependence of the creature according to this aspect is hypostaticallyypostatice: hypostatically to assume the said creature."3

¶3185.23–186.17

185Et ista sentencia placet michi. Nam omne subiectum accidentis includit in se analogice racionem causantis ad 186suum causatum quod est in Deo equivoce perfeccionis simpliciter. Verumptamen omnis causancia, qua subiectum causat inherens accidens, sapit imperfeccionem subiecti, quia causanciam materialem vel subiectivam qua est in¹ potencia perfici¹ tali forma. Unde non est dare aliam singularem habitudinem, qua subiectum potest causare accidens sine hoc, quod ipso informetur. Sed quelibet singularis racio vel causa includit racionem analogam, que secundum illud² quod est perfeccionis simpliciter, soli Deo³ potest competere. Nec sequitur ex miraculosa transsubstanciacione in eucaristia quod vel qualitas vel inherens quantitas⁴ possit per se⁵ existere sine informacione et essenciali dependencia ad subiectum. Ad tantum ergo valet illa sentencia, quod vere ponit in qualibet racione creata lucere potenciam unde Deus potest humanitati Christi⁶ ypostatice copulari, sed quod aliam naturam possit assumere probari non poterit vel exemplariter edoceri.

And this teaching pleases me. For every subject of an accident includes in itself, analogically, the account of a causer toward 186its caused, which in God is, equivocallyequivoce: equivocally, [a matter] of perfection without qualificationperfeccio simpliciter: perfection without qualification.4 Nevertheless every causing by which a subject causes an inhering accident savours of imperfection of the subject, because [it includes] material or subjective causing, by which it is in potency to be perfected by such a form. Hence one may not positest dare: one may posit another singular respect by which a subject can cause an accident without being informed by it. But every singular account or cause includes an analogous account, which, according to that which is of perfection without qualification, can belong to God alone. Nor does it follow from the miraculous transubstantiationtranssubstanciacio: transubstantiation in the eucharist that either quality or inhering quantity can exist of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself without informing and essential dependence on a subject. To this much, therefore, that teaching avails: that it truly posits that in every created account there shines a potency whereby God can be hypostatically joined to Christ’s humanityhumanitas: the humanity; but that he could assume another nature cannot be proved, or taught by example.5

¶4186.18–186.20

186Quod autem Verbum potest assumere naturam humanam faciendo ipsam esse naturam sui et non ipsum Verbum probat Doctor quintuplici racione.

And that the Word can assume human nature, making it be his nature and not the Word himself, the Doctor proves by a fivefold argument.

¶5186.21–186.22

186Primo ex hoc, quod nullum ex hoc sequitur inconveniens⁷ ex parte assumentis nec⁸ assumpti.⁸

First, from this: that no absurdityinconveniencia; inconveniens: an absurdity (in argument) · troubles, ill consequences (in affairs) follows from this on the part of the assuming or of the assumed.6

¶6186.23–187.16

186Sed in ista racione falsum petitur; cum personalis unio, qua humanitas fieret natura hominis, implicaret⁹ illam humanitatem fieri unum personaliter cum sumente. Natura enim completa substancialis cuicumque supposito est generaliter idem suppositum. Et si humanitas sit natura completa Verbi, tunc est essencia¹⁰ et substancia Verbi eo quod natura perfecta et essencia convertuntur, et si est essencia vel substancia Verbi, tunc est¹⁰ Verbum; cum cuiuslibet rei create vel increate idem est essencia vel substancia et 187res cuius est essencia. Ideo Verbum non potest facere humanitatem esse naturam Verbi, nisi fecerit ipsam esse essenciam ac substanciam Verbi, et per consequens ipsum Verbum. Nec sequitur—ista natura humana est natura Dei; ergo est natura divina—quia talia abstracta cum huiusmodi possessivis convocant¹ possessionem sui primitivi cum quadam racione reduplicandi; ut, si humanitas Christi sit essencia, natura, vel substancia divina, tunc est natura Dei sub racione qua Deus, quod solum est deitas; et si deitas sit natura humana, tunc est natura humana sub racione qua homo; et sic deitate foret Verbum formaliter homo, et humanitate Deus; quod est impossibile. Et patet quod multum refert² dicere—deitas est natura hominis— et—ipsa est natura humana; humanitas est natura Dei— et—ipsa est natura divina—; cum ille nature tam dispares conveniunt in eodem supposito.

But in this argument the false is beggedpeticio (principii) / petitur: begging [of the question] / is begged; since the personal unionunio: union by which the humanity would become the nature of a man would imply that that humanity becomes one personally with the one taking [it].7 For the complete substantial nature is, generally, the same supposit as any suppositsuppositum: supposit whatever [whose nature it is]. And if the humanity is the complete nature of the Word, then it is the essenceens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence and substance of the Word, because perfect nature and essence are convertibleconvertibilis / converti: convertible / be convertible; and if it is the essence or substance of the Word, then it is the Word; since of any thing whatever, created or uncreated, the essence or substance and 187the thing whose essence it is are the same. Therefore the Word cannot make the humanity be the nature of the Word unless he made it be the essence and substance of the Word, and in consequence the Word himself. Nor does it follow—"this human nature is the nature of God; therefore it is the divine nature"—because such abstract [terms] with possessives of this kind call up the possession of their primitive with a certain account of reduplicating:8 as, if Christ’s humanity is the divine essence, nature or substance, then it is the nature of God under the aspect by which he is God, which is only the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity; and if the Godhead is human nature, then it is human nature under the aspect by which he is a man; and so by the Godhead the Word would formally be a man, and by the humanity God; which is impossible. And it is clear that there is much difference between saying "the Godhead is the nature of a man" and "it is human nature", [and between] "the humanity is the nature of God" and "it is the divine nature"; since those natures, so disparate, agree in the same supposit.

¶7187.17–187.21

1872° arguit Doctor per hoc quod persona divina potest terminare quamcumque dependenciam creature, quam dependenciam terminare foret³ perfeccionis; sed perfeccionis simpliciter est posse facere naturam creatam esse naturam Dei; ergo Deus hoc potest.

Secondly, the Doctor argues by this: that a divine person can terminate any dependence of a creature whatever, which dependence it would be [a mark] of perfection to terminate; now it is [a mark] of perfection without qualification to be able to make a created nature be the nature of God; therefore God can do this.9

¶8187.22–188.13

187Sine dubio verum concluditur, sed infidelis diceret quod minor foret pura peticio. Unde quia videmus, quod Deus producit per se multos effectus ut substancias, sicut fide capimus de mundi principio; eliciunt quidam tanquam principium quod deitas vicem cuiuscunque cause secunde supplere poterit. Et ex illo pullulant plurime vanitates; quia certum est quod nullius cause materialis vel subiective vicem deitas supplere poterit, hoc est, causare formam eadem causacione sive simillima subducto subiecto; quia tunc deitas posset esse ignea et quomodolibet informata; quod dementis est dicere. Ideo causare materialiter vel subiective non potest sibi competere; ymo nullum accidens vel formam materialem potest Deus sine causancia⁴ 188substancie per se producere: ut, sicut non potest producere motum meum, nisi ego movear hoc causando, sic de qualibet forma materiali. Ymo de accidente spirituali idem dicitur; ut non potest actum volendi creature producere nisi ipsa creatura nedum concurrat cum eo subiective causando, sed et eciam coagendo. Ymo si ultra perspicitur, nullius secundi agentis potest deitas vicem supplere agendo univoce. Ideo vicis supplecio, cum dicit inferioritatis condicionem vicariam, non potest deitati competere. Quando ergo per se miraculose opus perficit,¹ quod posset facere agens secundum² alia² accione in genere cum suo regimine instrumentaliter efficere, non supplet vicem agentis; nec e contra cum conformantur in genere.

Without doubt something true is inferredconcludere: to infer, but an unbelieverinfidelis: unbeliever; with a dative, faithless (to) would say that the minor would be a pure begging [of the question]. Hence, because we see that God produces of himself many effects, such as substances, as we take by faith concerning the beginning of the world, some draw out as a principle that the Godhead can supply the placevicem supplere / vicis supplecio: supply the place / the supplying of a place of any second cause whatever. And from that sprout very many vanities; for it is certain that the Godhead can supply the place of no material or subjective cause, that is, cause a form by the same causationcausancia / causacio: causing / causation, or a most similar one, with the subject withdrawn; for then the Godhead could be fiery and informed in any way whatever; which it is a madman’s part to say. Therefore to cause materially or subjectively cannot belong to it; indeed God cannot produce of himself any accident or material form without the causing 188of the substance: as, just as he cannot produce my motion unless I am moved, causing this, so of any material form. Indeed the same is said of a spiritual accident: as, he cannot produce a creature’s act of willing unless the creature itself not onlynedum: not only concurs with him by causing subjectively, but also by co-acting. Indeed, if one looks further, the Godhead can supply the place of no second agent by acting univocallyunivoce: univocally. Therefore the supplying of a place, since it signifies a vicarious condition of inferiority, cannot belong to the Godhead.10 When, therefore, he of himself miraculously performs a work which he could make a second agent effect instrumentally, with his governance, by an action other in kind, he does not supply the place of the agent; nor conversely when they are conformed in kind.11

¶9188.14–188.16

1883° arguit Doctor quod natura assumpta est prius essencia singularis quam suppositatur; ergo pro illo priori potest Deus personare illam naturam in alio.

Thirdly, the Doctor argues that the assumed nature is a singular essence before it is suppositedsuppositari: be supposited; therefore for that prior [moment] God can make that nature a person in another.12

¶10188.17–188.25

188Sed hic videtur michi quod consequencia sit neganda. Nam iuxta illud sequeretur quod quilibet potest esse quilibet. Nam Petrus prius origine est essencia quam substancia; ergo pro illo priori Deus posset facere eum nonsubstanciam; et, cum prius sit substancia quam corpus, et prius corpus quam animal, et prius animal quam homo, eo quod omne superius est causa sui inferioris; sequitur quod posset indifferenter fieri cuiuscunque speciei substancie tam secundum corpus quam animam.

But here it seems to me that the inferenceconsequencia: inference is to be denied. For according to that it would follow that anyone can be anyone. For Peter is, in origin, an essence before [he is] a substance; therefore for that prior [moment] God could make him a non-substance; and, since he is a substance before a body, and a body before an animal, and an animal before a man, because every superior is cause of its inferior, it follows that he could indifferently be made of any species of substance whatever, as much as to body as to soul.

¶11188.26–189.28

188Sed ulterius pro materia argumenti dicitur quod, quam primo quoad consequenciam humanitas Christi est ista singularis natura, tam primo est ipsa persona Verbi. Non enim posset derelinqui non assumpta, nec post assumpcionem dimitti; quia tunc indubie, sicut incepcio humanitatis presupponeretur prioritate consequente assumpcionem,³ ita personacio creata, cum esse individuum racionalis nature sit esse personam. Et patet quod Christus prius est persona, suppositum, vel ypostasis quam ipse est natura singularis; 189sed generaliter e¹ contra primo, sicut substancia est natura singularis date speciei, ut Christus,¹ eque primo est suppositum humane nature, sicut est persona hominis. Ideo Christus prius est persona quam est persona hominis vel substancia singularis. Verumptamen non est ordo inter divinum suppositum² et personam divinam tanquam inter generalius et contraccius, sicut est in personalitatibus creatis. Sed et in illis non oportet, si Petrus sit prius suppositum substancie quam persona humane nature, quod potest³ esse suppositum non persona, ut patet ex dictis superius. Singularitas ergo Christi est posterior sua personalitate, et causatur ex condicionibus individuantibus, ut puta ex illo corpore et illa anima cum illa unione ypostatica et aliis que secuntur. Ex quo videtur michi quod Christus non potest aliam naturam assumere, quia tunc posset esse alius homo; et per consequens ista persona, ut post deducetur; quod est impossibile. Et consequencia patet ex hoc quod, si alia fuerint principia individuancia, tunc foret aliud individuum speciei humane et per consequens alius homo. Nec est color quod tempus aut aliud accidens requisitum individuat substanciam,⁴ nisi ut multo evidencius unio ypostatica individuaverat dominum Iesum Christum, ut dicit Anselmus in De Incarnacione 7°. Nec obest quod Christus sit prius suppositum et individuum speciei humane, quam habeat predictam unionem; quia, sicut prius est homo quam iste homo, sic prius est individuum speciei humane, quam hoc individuum, et prius est ista⁵ unio quam ipse sit hoc⁵ individuum.

But further, for the matter of the argument, the answer is that, as early, as to inference, as Christ’s humanity is this singular nature, so early is it the person of the Word itself. For it could not be left unassumed, nor be laid asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside after the assumptionassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption; for then undoubtedly, just as the beginningincepcio: beginning of the humanity would be presupposed to the assumption by a priority of consequence, so would a created personationpersonare (active) / personacio: make a person / personation be, since to be an individualindividuum: individual of rational nature is to be a person.13 And it is clear that Christ is a person, supposit or hypostasisypostasis: hypostasis before he is a singular nature; 189but generally the reverse: as early as a substance is the singular nature of a given species, like Christ, equally early is it the supposit of human nature, as it is the person of a man. Therefore Christ is a person before he is a person of a man or a singular substance. Nevertheless there is no order between the divine supposit and the divine person as between the more general and the more contracted, as there is in created personalitiespersonalitas: personality.14 But in those too it is not necessary, if Peter is a supposit of substance before a person of human nature, that he can be a supposit [and] not a person, as is clear from what was said above. Christ’s singularity, therefore, is posterior to his personality, and is caused from the individuating conditions, for instance from that body and that soul, with that hypostatic union and the other things that follow. From which it seems to me that Christ cannot assume another nature, because then he could be another man; and in consequence this person [could], as will be deduced later; which is impossible.15 And the inference is clear from this: that if there were other individuating principles, then there would be another individual of the human species, and in consequence another man. Nor is there colourcolor (non est color): colour (a plausible ground) [for saying] that time or another requisite accident individuates the substance, except that much more evidently the hypostatic union had individuated the Lord Jesus Christ, as Anselm says in On the Incarnation, [chapter] 7.16 Nor does it stand in the way that Christ is a supposit and individual of the human species before he has the said union; for, as he is a man before he is this man, so he is an individual of the human species before this individual, and this union is prior to his being this individual.17

¶12189.29–189.33

1894ᵗᵒ confirmatur ex hoc quod accidens potest Deus facere per se esse, ut patet de eucaristia; ergo per idem potest facere substanciam inherere: tantum enim distat de inherente facere non inherens, sicut de non-inherente facere quod adhereat persone nature superioris.

Fourthly, this is confirmed from this: that God can make an accident be of itself, as is clear of the eucharist; therefore by the same token he can make a substance inhere: for it is as far to make, of the inhering, [something] not inhering, as, of the not-inhering, to make [something] that adheres to a person of a superior nature.

Notes

  1. 1 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III d. 1 q. 1, on whether a created nature can be united to the Word, with its two respects of an accident to its subject and its arguments for the possibility: the two respects are at n. 3 (Wadding VII.1, p. 6), and the arguments that singularity precedes personality and that an accident exists of itself in the Eucharist, which Wyclif gives as the Doctor’s own proofs (probat Doctor, 186.18–20), are reasons Scotus reports and rejects in the third article, n. 7 (p. 10); the passage quoted is given in Wyclif’s words. A B read insuper est for Superest (185.2); A B C huic sentencie contraria in verbis (185.2–3).
  2. 2 Habitudo in the "respect" sense throughout the chapter: the relation under which accident and subject, nature and Word, stand. Racio here (185.7, 185.13, 185.21) is the aspect under which the relation holds.
  3. 3 "Natural capacity": posse naturale. "Obediential potency": the creature’s capacity to receive from God what no natural agent can effect in it, actualised only by miracle; to terminate the dependence under this aspect is the Scotist definition of the hypostatic assumption. O reads assumentem for assumente (185.20).
  4. 4 "Perfection without qualification" (perfeccio simpliciter): a perfection it is better to have than not, which as such belongs to God; the subject’s causing of its accident is predicated of God only equivocally.
  5. 5 B reads imposita perficit, C imposita perfici (186.4–5) for in potencia perfici, where A has in in an erasure by a second hand; B C read idem for illud (186.8). O omits Deo (186.9), adds ·n· (its sign for enim, which Harris doubts here) after quantitas (186.11), and omits per se (186.11) and Christi (186.15).
  6. 6 Inconveniens here in the arguer’s sense, an absurd consequence. A B C read inconsequens "inconsistency" (186.21); O omits nec assumpti (186.22).
  7. 7 "Nature of a man": the humanity would become the nature by which one is a man, so one person with the Word who takes it; sumente "the one taking" stands for the assuming Word. A B C read implicat (186.24); B omits essencia … tunc est (186.28–30).
  8. 8 Convocant (187.6) stands in all the codices; Harris asks whether connotant "connote" should be read, which gives the same sense; the English renders the print as "call up". The possessive adjective (divina, humana) carries its primitive (Deus, homo) reduplicatively, "of God insofar as God": so natura Dei does not yield natura divina. O reads referret (187.13).
  9. 9 O reads esset for foret (187.19).
  10. 10 "Supply the place" (vicem supplere): to stand in for a second cause by doing what it does in the same way; Wyclif denies this of God for material and subjective causes, and for univocal agency. A B C read communicancia for causancia (187.34).
  11. 11 Quod posset facere agens secundum … efficere: causative facere with the infinitive, "which he could make a second agent effect". God is the subject of posset, agens secundum (accusative) is the subject of efficere, and suo regimine is God’s governance of the instrument. Alia accione in genere is "by an action other in kind". B reads solum illa for secundum alia (188.10); A’s first hand perficiunt is corrected to perficit (188.10).
  12. 12 "For that prior [moment]": pro illo priori, the prior instant of nature, not of time. "Make that nature a person": personare, the active beside personari "be made a person".
  13. 13 "To": ad assumpcionem, with O, which adds ad (188.31), against the print and A B C; without it assumpcionem does not construe after presupponeretur. "Personation": the constituting of a created person. The definition of person as an individual of rational nature is Boethius’s (Contra Eutychen 3, PL 64, 1343D: Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia).
  14. 14 A B C omit e contra … Christus (189.1–2); A B C read individuum for suppositum (189.6); O possit for potest (189.9).
  15. 15 "And in consequence this person [could]": the sense is that this person, the Word, would then be another man.
  16. 16 Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi c. 7 in Wyclif’s numbering (Schmitt c. 11; PL 158, c. VI), on what makes the person of Christ this individual: the collectio proprietatum, quibus homo communis fit singulus, which in Jesus is the same as the Word’s (PL 158, 278D–279A). "Colour": a plausible ground. C omits nisi, O ut (189.21).
  17. 17 O reads illi unio quam ille hoc (189.27).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Plate readings; page · reading · note):
    • 187: sequitur—ista (print as transcribed) [SUB]
    • 187: dicere—deitas (print as transcribed) [SUB]