Wyclif’s Latin works

De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 11, part 2

The eucharist and the fifth argument; the grace of union and its subject

Harris pp. 189.34–193.31

¶1189.34–191.16

189Hic dicitur quod loquendo de accidente inherente, ipsum 190non poterit per se esse, cum omne tale sit modus substancie, sed cum¹ omnis creatura sit accidens Deo adheretque² sibi tam essencialiter sicut accidens ad subiectum; patet quod accidens potest Deus facere per se esse, non sic quin alicui, scilicet Deo, adhereat, sed quod nulli formaliter inhereat; sicut est de toto predicamento substancie, quod non potest sic formaliter inherere. Si tamen racio predicta procederet, argueret direccius quod homo et quelibet alia substancia poterit inherere, sicut quantitas et qualitas creduntur hodie per se esse: quod ego non video. Ideo alias dixi quod, sicut³ univocando de accidente respectivo, cuiusmodi sunt⁴ relacio, accio, passio etc., nullum illorum poterit esse nisi insit substancie ut subiecto: sic nec qualitas nec quantitas, cum sint univoce accidencia sicut illa. De qualitate consentit sanctus Thomas, quod ipsa non potest esse nisi insit quantitati. Et de quantitate est michi evidencius, cum sit substanciam esse quantam, et non potest exspectare rarefaccionem et condensacionem et ceteras mutaciones, quas in benedicta eucaristia oculariter experimur. Ideo, ut alias dixi, esset nimis magna⁵ sensus illusio, nisi esset in eucaristia unum quantum diversimode qualificatum et accidentatum ac mobile. Et illud subicitur quantitati, qualitati et ceteris accidentibus que videmus. Sed quoad questionem—quid est de tali essencia ?—non sollicitor; licet sint quotlibet dicta sanctorum que sonant quod sit panis vel vinum; que forte intelligenda sunt, quod essencia subiecta illis accidentibus post transsubstanciacionem est panis⁶ ante transsubstanciacionem, et virtute transsubstanciacionis desinit esse quid vel substancia, et manet eadem essencia conformiter accidentata. Illa autem non fit corpus Christi sed fit signum signans nobis ineffabiliter quod ad omnem punctum sui sit sacramentaliter corpus Christi et concomitanter⁷ anima et omnia alia Christi accidencia absoluta. Nec est 191de substancia fidei viatorum¹ scire quid est illa essencia; sed satis est cognoscere questionem si est de ista cum transsubstanciacione et ceteris veritatibus que sacramento eucaristie sunt annexe. Non ergo sequitur—si Christus potest facere corpus suum virtute verborum sacramentalium esse ad omnem punctum illius essencie; ergo potest facere quod humanitas non² sit suppositum, vel quomodocunque aliter per terminos magistrales aliter³ extraneetur racio—⁴ in omnibus enim similibus evidenciis est pura peticio.⁴ Illud autem quod de eucaristia fides orthodoxa artat nos credere potest catholicus philosophice sustinere. Si enim secundum perspectivos corpus multiplicatur intencionaliter vere presens,⁵ ubicunque species eius agitur, et habet ibi efficaciam operandi; quod magisterium Deo facere corpus suum esse ad omnem punctum hostie sacramentaliter et effectus spirituales efficaciter operari!

Here the answer isdicitur (opening an answer): the answer is that, speaking of an inhering accidentaccidens: accident, it 190cannot be of itself, since every such [accident] is a mode of substance; but since every creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created is an accident to God, and adheres to him as essentially as an accident to its subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute, it is clear that God can make an accident be of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself: not so that it does not adhere to something, namely to God, but so that it formally inheres in nothing; as is the case with the whole categorypredicamentum: category of substance, that it cannot so formally inhere.1 If, nevertheless, the argument stated proceeded, it would argue more directly that a man and any other substance whatever could inhere, as quantity and quality are believed today to be of themselves: which I do not see. Therefore I have said elsewhere that, as, speaking univocally of a relationalrespectus; respectivus: relation; relational accident, of which kind are relation, action, being-acted-onsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute, etc., none of them can be unless it is in a substance as subject: so neither quality nor quantity, since they are accidents univocallyunivoce: univocally as those are.2 Of quality, Saint Thomas agrees that it cannot be unless it is in quantity. And of quantity it is more evident to me, since it is the substance’s being quantifiedquantus: quantified, and it cannot admit rarefaction and condensation and the other changes which in the blessed eucharist we experience with our eyes.3 Therefore, as I have said elsewhere, there would be an exceedinglynimis: exceedingly great illusion of the sense, unless there were in the eucharist one quantified [thing], variously qualified and subject to accidentsaccidentatus: subject to accidents and movablemobilis / mobilitas: movable / movability. And that is subjected to quantity, quality and the other accidents which we see. But as to the question—"what is such an essenceens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence?"—I am not anxious; although there are any number of sayings of the saintssancti: the saints which sound [as if] it is bread or wine; which perhaps are to be understood [thus]: that the essence subject to those accidents after the transubstantiationtranssubstanciacio: transubstantiation is the bread [that was] before the transubstantiation, and by virtue of the transubstantiation ceases to be a what, or a substance, and remains the same essence, conformably subject to accidents.4 And it does not become the body of Christ, but becomes a signsignum / signatum: sign / thing signified signifying to us ineffably that at every point of itself it is sacramentally the body of Christ, and concomitantly the soul and all the other absolute accidentsaccidens absolutum: absolute accident of Christ. Nor is it 191of the substance of the faith of wayfarersviator: wayfarer to know what that essence is; but it is enough to know the question "whether it is" of it, together with the transubstantiation and the other truths which are annexed to the sacramentsacramentum (the Eucharist); sacramentum altaris: sacrament; the sacrament of the altar of the eucharist.5 It does not followsequitur: it follows, therefore—"if Christ can make his body, by virtue of the sacramental words, be at every point of that essence; therefore he can make the humanityhumanitas: the humanity not be a suppositsuppositum: supposit," or in whatever other way the account is estrangedextraneare / extraneacio (supposicionis): estrange / estrangement (of supposition) by masters’ termstermini magistrales: masters' terms—for in all similar evidencesevidencia: evidence there is pure beggingpeticio (principii) / petitur: begging [of the question] / is begged [of the question].6 And what the orthodox faith constrains us to believe of the eucharist, a catholic can uphold philosophically. For if, according to the perspectivistsperspectivi: the perspectivists, a body is multiplied intentionally, truly present wherever its species is driven, and has there efficacy of working; what a feat of masterymagisterium: rule; of teaching, the teaching office; quale magisterium "what a feat of mastery" (Incarn. 137.14) for God to make his body be at every point of the host sacramentally and to work spiritual effects efficaciously!7

¶2191.17–191.21

1915ᵗᵒ confirmatur ex hoc quod accidencia maxime distancia potest Deus facere unitive concurrere in eodem, ut omnia novem genera⁶ accidencium sunt idem subiecto. Ergo per idem naturam humanam potest Deus facere inesse subiecto divino cum hoc, quod non realiter sit subiectum.

Fifthly, this is confirmed from this: that God can make accidents most distant concur unitively in the same [thing], as all nine genera of accidents are the same as the subject. Therefore by the same token God can make human naturenatura: nature be in a divine subject, with this: that it is not really the subject.8

¶3191.22–192.8

191Sed hic dicitur quod loquendo de unione ypostatica oppositum sequitur ex assumpto. Unde omnes iste evidencie confirmare possunt fidelem credere quod duas naturas potest Deus unire personaliter in eadem ypostasi ad sensum expositum. Sed quod Verbum assumens non sit natura assumpta, nec iste raciones nec alie possibiles⁷ poterunt⁷ edocere. Unde quam mirum est quod natura divina et humana tam distantes sint utraque eadem persona, tam mirum est et idem in numero, quod Deus sit homo. Unde accidencium ad subiecta non est unio ypostatica, cum sint essencie a subiecto generaliter condistincte sine communicacione ydiomatum, ut substancia fiat tale accidens vel e contra. Ideo sicut in materia de Trinitate trinitas creata 192memorie, racionis, et voluntatis anime est inter omnes hucusque inventas simillima pro Trinitate increata viatoribus cognoscenda; sic in materia de Incarnacione ypostatica unio creati spiritus ad naturam corpoream, ut utrumque sit eadem persona hominis, est inter alias plus propinqua; nec possunt,¹ si non fallor, fieri evidencie ut, vel probetur talis impossibilitas unionis, vel quod Deus aliam naturam possit assumere, aut assumptam dimittere.

But here the answer is that, speaking of the hypostaticypostatice: hypostatically unionunio: union, the opposite follows from the assumptionassumptum: the assumption.9 Hence all these evidences can confirm a believer in believing that God can unite two natures personally in the same hypostasisypostasis: hypostasis, in the sense set out. But that the assumingassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption WordVerbum: the Word is not the assumed nature, neither these arguments nor other possible ones will be able to teach. Hence, as wonderful as it is that the divine and the human nature, so distant, are each the same personpersona: person, so wonderful it is, and the same in number, that God is a man.10 Hence there is no hypostatic union of accidents to subjects, since they are essences generally distinct from the subject, without communication of idiomscommunicacio ydiomatum: communication of idioms, so that a substance becomes such an accident or conversely. Therefore, as in the matter of the Trinity the created trinity 192of memory, reason and will of the soul is, among all found hitherto, the most similar for the uncreated Trinity to be known by wayfarers; so in the matter of the Incarnation the hypostatic union of a created spirit to a bodily nature, so that each is the same person of a man, is nearer than the others; nor can evidences be made, if I am not mistaken, either that such a union be proved impossible, or that God could assume another nature, or lay asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside the one assumed.11

¶4192.9–192.14

192Sed instatur per hoc, quod gracia unionis foret gracia maxima possibilis creature, ut illa humanitas fiat Deus; et omnis gracia creata presupponit inesse tam gratificatum quam ipsum gratificans; ergo gracia unionis presupponit naturam assumptam, et per consequens ipsa natura prius est quam de facto assumitur.

But it is objectedinstatur; obicitur: it is objected by this: that the grace of uniongracia unionis: the grace of union would be the greatest grace possible to a creature, that that humanity becomes God; and every created grace presupposes, as being, both the one made pleasing and that which itself makes pleasing; therefore the grace of union presupposes the assumed nature, and in consequence the nature itself is before it is in fact assumed.12

¶5192.15–193.16

192Hic dicitur quod conclusio est concedenda, cum omne per se superius sit prius natura vel origine quam suum inferius; et per consequens et² prius quam passio vel accidens sibi inest. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod illa humanitas potest esse non assumpta, etsi sit non assumpta pro illa mensura nature sive originis. Sed notandum quod duplex est gracia unionis. Prima increata, qua Verbum voluit eternaliter humanitatem illam sibi ypostatice copulare; et illa potest intelligi tripliciter, scilicet essencialiter, personaliter, sive formaliter, ut patet alibi. 2ᵈᵃ autem est gracia creata qua humanitas est sic formaliter³ grata Deo. Et ista gracia licet sit natura⁴ vel origine posterior⁵ quam subiectum, non tamen est possibile quod dicta humanitas temporaliter ipsam procedat sic quod mereatur graciam unionis; sicut Augustinus innuit Enchiridion 29°, cum non sit possibile ipsam manere per instans temporis⁶ non assumptam. Et sicut in aliis hominibus presupponitur gracia preveniens ad meritum, sic in Christo gracia unionis presupponitur naturaliter ad Christi meritum, etsi meritum 193pro instanti unionis naturaliter consequatur. Et istum credo esse sensum Augustini 17° De Civitate Dei ca°... ‘In rebus, inquit, per tempus exortis summa gracia est quod Deus in unitate persone homini nullis precedentibus meritis copulatur;’ non quod gracia sit membrum in corpore vel anima colligans unionem; sed quia ista unio sit gracia non preventa habitu disponente. Unde illa unio cum sit relacio racionis est posterius subiecta humanitate quoad genus cause materialis, et tamen est efficienter¹ prius quam Christus est hoc singulare vel individuum hominis, ut tangitur superius. Sed caveatur de prioritate² temporis aut prioritate² quoad consequenciam, cum omnia ista pro omni tempore Christi se mutuo consequantur. Unde Augustinus Enchiridion dicit quod ista unio fuit illi homini quodammodo naturalis, cum iste homo non poterit esse sine illa.

Here the answer is that the conclusionconclusio: conclusion is to be granted, since every superior of itself is prior by nature or origin to its inferior; and in consequence also prior to the attributesubiectum / passio: subject / attribute or accident’s being in it. But from this it does not follow that that humanity can be unassumed, even if it is unassumed for that measure of nature or origin. But it is to be noted that the grace of union is twofold. The first uncreated, by which the Word willed eternally to join that humanity hypostatically to himself; and this can be understood in three ways, namely essentially, personally or formally, as is clear elsewhere. And the second is the created grace by which the humanity is so formally pleasing to God. And this grace, although it is posterior by nature or origin to its subject, yet it is not possible that the said humanity should precede it in time so that it might merit the grace of union; as Augustine intimates, Enchiridion 29, since it is not possible that it should remain for an instant of time unassumed.13 And as in other men prevenient gracegracia preveniens / comitans / concomitans / consumans: prevenient / accompanying / concomitant / consummating grace is presupposed to merit, so in Christ the grace of union is presupposed naturally to Christ’s merit, even if the merit 193follows naturally for the instant of the union. And this I believe to be the sense of Augustine, The City of God 17, chapter …: "In things arisen through time," he says, "the highest grace is that God is joined to man in unity of person, with no merits going before";14 not that grace is a member in body or soul binding the union; but because this union is a grace not preceded by a disposing habit. Hence that union, since it is a relation of reasonrelacio racionis: relation of reason, is posterior to the subject, the humanity, as to the genus of material cause, and yet it is efficiently prior to Christ’s being this singular or individualindividuum: individual of a man, as is touched on above. But let one beware of priority of time or priority as to inferenceconsequencia: inference, since all these, for every time of Christ, follow on one another mutually. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion says that this union was to that man in a way natural, since this man could not be without it.15

¶6193.17–193.31

193Et si queritur de subiecto eius primo dicitur quod anima est subiectum primum unionis creati spiritus, non quod sit infusus habitus, sed habitudo relativa. Alia autem unio corporis ad Verbum subiectatur multiplicative in corpore sicut filiacio temporalis, que est habitudo secundum quam cognitum³ causatum naturaliter est productum a suo simili in natura. Et per istas particulas patet quod Spiritus sanctus non est Filius Patris, nec vermis est filius hominis, ut docet Augustinus Enchiridion 3°, nec inanimatum est filius sui naturaliter generantis. Correspondenter unio est habitudo, secundum quam una natura alteri ydemptitate ypostatica copulatur; et illa dupliciter secundum diversitatem nature increate assumentis et nature create suppositis copulate. Nec est extraneum vocare illam unionem graciam cum sit donum perfectissimum gratis datum.

And if it is asked about its first subject, the answer is that the soul is the first subject of the union of the created spirit, not that it is an infused habit, but a relative respecthabitudo: condition / respect. And the other union, of the body to the Word, is subjected multiplicativelymultiplicative: multiplicatively in the body, like temporal sonshipfiliacio: sonship, which is the respect according to which a cognitive caused thing is naturally produced from its like in nature.16 And through these particles it is clear that the Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father, nor is a worm the son of a man, as Augustine teaches, Enchiridion 3, nor is an inanimate thing the son of what naturally generates it.17 Correspondingly, union is the respect according to which one nature is joined to another by hypostatic identityydemptitas ypostatica: hypostatic identity; and that [is] twofold, according to the diversity of the uncreated nature assuming and of the created nature joined to the supposits. Nor is it strange to call that union a grace, since it is a most perfect gift freely given.

Notes

  1. 1 "An accident to God": every creature depends on God as an accident on its subject, so an accident without a subject still adheres to God, though it inheres formally in nothing. A B C add tamen after sed (190.2); B C read adhereret quia, A et (190.2).
  2. 2 Passio in the list of categories is being-acted-on, against accio. "Speaking univocally": univocando, taking "accident" in one sense for all nine categories. A B C read sic for sicut (190.11); O cuiuscunque for cuiusmodi (190.11–12).
  3. 3 Thomas Aquinas, that in the sacrament the other accidents have quantity as their subject (Summa theologiae III q. 77 a. 2: accidentia alia … esse sicut in subiecto in quantitate dimensiva). "It is the substance’s being quantified": quantity is no thing other than the substance so disposed. C omits magna (190.20).
  4. 4 "Ceases to be a what": desinit esse quid, ceases to be a quiddity, a "what" in the category of substance, while the essence remains. "The bread [that was] before": est panis ante transsubstanciacionem; A B C add cum after panis (190.27). A B read comitanter, C comicantus, for concomitanter (190.32).
  5. 5 The schools’ two questions, quid est "what it is" and si est "whether it is": the faith needs only the second. O reads viatoris "of the wayfarer" (191.1).
  6. 6 Aliter stands twice (191.8) in all the codices, and Harris asks whether the second should be omitted; the English renders it once. "Masters’ terms": the schoolmen’s distinctions, by which the account of the thing is estranged from it. O reads sit non (191.7); B omits in … peticio (191.8–9).
  7. 7 The perspectivists: the writers on optics, for whom a body multiplies its species through the medium and is "intentionally" present wherever its species reaches. B C read prius for presens, A’s first hand et (191.13).
  8. 8 The fifth of the Doctor’s arguments (186.18–20). "The same as the subject": the accidents are the subject in a manner of being (cf. 182.21–23). A B C omit novem (191.19).
  9. 9 Assumptum is the logician’s premiss, the one the fifth argument assumed, not the nature assumed by the Word.
  10. 10 "And the same in number": it is one and the same wonder, that the two natures are one person and that God is a man. A B C read p°les poterint, i.e. possibiles poterint (191.27).
  11. 11 The created trinity of the soul: Augustine, De Trinitate X.11.18 (PL 42, 983), where the triad is memory, understanding and will, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas (Book IX has mens, notitia, amor); Wyclif names reason in place of understanding. B reads putant for possunt (192.6).
  12. 12 "Both the one made pleasing and that which itself makes pleasing": tam gratificatum quam ipsum gratificans, the subject of grace and the grace; grace that makes pleasing (gracia gratificans) presupposes a subject to be made pleasing.
  13. 13 Augustine, Enchiridion 11.36, that the human nature merited nothing before it was assumed into the unity of the person (PL 40, 250: quibus mereretur iste homo una fieri persona cum Deo?; Harris’s index has the same place). O omits et (192.17) and formaliter (192.25); A has natura in an erasure by another hand, B reads ullam, C nulla (192.26); O posterius (192.26); A C read per instanti, B pro instanti (192.30).
  14. 14 Harris’s index gives De civitate Dei X.29, which has the thought (Gratia Dei non potuit gratius commendari) but not the words. The words, with homo … Deo where Wyclif has Deus … homini, are Augustine’s De Trinitate XIII.19.24 (PL 42, 1033: In rebus enim per tempus ortis, illa summa gratia est, quod homo in unitate personae conjunctus est Deo). Nullis precedentibus meritis and copulatur come from Enchiridion 12.40.
  15. 15 Augustine, Enchiridion 12.40, the grace made "in a way natural" to that man (PL 40, 252: fieret quodam modo ipsa gratia illi homini naturalis). C reads efficaciter for efficienter (193.9); O omits temporis … prioritate (193.11–12).
  16. 16 "Cognitive": O reads 9gniti^m, which Harris takes as cognitivum, against the print’s cognitum "known" (193.22). The argument needs it: each particle of the definition excludes one case, "naturally" the Holy Spirit (proceeding by will), "from its like in nature" the worm, and only "cognitive" the inanimate thing, which a known thing would not exclude. The English follows O (Harris’s expansion, with his query).
  17. 17 Augustine, Enchiridion 12.39, that what is born of a man, as hair or worms, is not his son (PL 40, 252: capillum, pediculum, lumbricum, quorum nihil est filius). Augustine’s point there is that Christ, born of the Spirit, is not the Spirit’s son, so Wyclif’s 'the Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father' is his own application.