De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 11, part 3
The laying-aside of the nature; the moderns’ sophisms, first to eighth
Harris pp. 193.32–197.29
¶1193.32–194.6
As to the laying-asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside of the assumed naturenatura: nature, it is clear from what has been said that the WordVerbum: the Word cannot lay it asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside, although that nature can most contingently be lacking to the Word, since "the Word is a man", or "was one", is 194contingent either waycontingens ad utrumlibet: contingent either way.1 And what moves [one] to deny the laying-aside of the assumed nature, that is, the abandoning of that personalitypersonalitas: personality, not nature, of the Word of God himself, are the arguments made above in chapter 5, and everything that urges that the humanityhumanitas: the humanity is personally the same as the Word of God, as was touched on in chapter 10.2
¶2194.7–194.10
And so [it is] with the assumptionassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption of many humanities, either at once or successively, or that another person should assumeassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption the same nature. And I am pleased that from this the so-calledvocatus (vocata bona, vocata ecclesia): so-called subtle and glorious sophismssophisma: sophism of the modern doctorsmoderni doctores / moderniores doctores: the modern doctors / the more modern doctors perish.3
¶3194.11–194.20
First, suppose that the Word had assumed every human nature from the beginning of the world, which lived on continually as assumed: then the human species would not be preserved through the succession of its individualsindividuum: individual; for either there would be only one individual in the human species, which would be the whole race of men and would do whatever had been done by a man; or, if there were many individuals, yet on that supposition they would be human natures, not men; and so every suppositsuppositum: supposit of human nature would be naturally prior to its species, from which, however, it would not take its quiddityquiditas: quiddity.4
¶4194.21–194.29
Secondly, it is said that, as often as one pleases, a change can be made from contradictory to contradictory without change or generation or corruption of any truth that pertains. As, suppose that in each of the odd proportional partspartes proporcionales: proportional parts of this hour every humanity is laid aside, and each remains, with all its positive [features], continually re-assumed: which is impossible, since a negation cannot begin; indeed, unionunio: union, which is a relation of the third mode, cannot terminate a change unless there is properly motion in something.5
¶5194.30–195.8
Thirdly, it is said in consequence that at the end of that hour any number of men will come to be, and yet there will not come to be anything, nor anything positive of any kind, on the supposition that any number of natures now assumed 195are laid aside, without being moved, first at the end of the hour. Hence, with every change taken away except such alternate laying-aside and re-assumption, there would be time and a wondrous successivesuccessivum / permanens: successive entity / permanent entity motion. Nor will they deny that God can, with any other motion whatever taken away, alternate changes of this kind, since they depend only on the free volition of God; and without doubt, since one would be prior to the other not onlynedum: not only by nature but in time, there would be a continuous temporal succession.6
¶6195.9–195.17
Fourthly, it is granted as possible that now there is only a single man, and infinitely many men will be annihilatedadnichilare / adnichilacio: annihilate / annihilation before the end of that hour, nor will anything positive be generated in the meantime, and yet at the end there will be infinitely many men: on the supposition that God of his omnipotence creates infinitely many humanities in that house, of which some one is infinitely small, and creates as many at Rome, and assumes all of them up to the end of the hour, in which he annihilates all those at Rome and lays aside all those at Oxford, not otherwise changed.7
¶7195.18–195.27
Fifthly, they grant in a case that in this hour infinitely many men will be generated or come to be, and none of them will be generated or made by anyone, but not even God will know when any of those men will be: as, this hour being divided into its proportional parts, smaller toward the last instant, and [supposing] that in the first half of each of those parts God lays aside one [humanity], and in the second re-assumes [it], laying aside the other, keeping in them all their positive [features]: then the conclusion is clear, since it will never be so that "these men are", and consequently there will be nothing of the number of these men.8
¶8195.28–196.11
Sixthly, they grant that in a case six sons were begotten of Mary at instant b, at which instant she begot only one; and yet it cannot be that at instant b she begot any other son than Jesus, her only-begotten: on the supposition that b was the instant at which she begot Jesus, and that after the assumption, that humanity being multiplied to six places, it remains assumed by the 196Trinity in three places and in the other three remains not assumed. And then it is clear that six men share in the body of Christ which was begotten of Mary; therefore six men were begotten by her; and it is clear that the remainder, namely those six men, would be the race of God, for three [are] divine persons and the other three creatures, these men and those not-men, these sons and those not-sons;9 and consequently the blessed Virgin never begot these sons, and by the same token never brought it about that she was their mother; just as neither did the body, for the measure at which it began to be many men, begin in any respect to be begotten or to be a son, since a negation alone does not make a son.10
¶9196.12–196.30
Seventhly, they grant that it can stand that infinitely many places are filled at instant b by this man, who neither is nor is generated nor will be generated; but this same man will continually, up to instant b, be distant from each of them, and will neither be moved nor multiplied to any of them, nor the converse, although there will yet be motion to place as to its terminus of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself: on the supposition that the Father among the divinein divinis: among the divine [persons] [persons] begins to assume human nature glorified in heaven; and with this, on the supposition that at b, the last instant of that hour, he assumed infinitely many humanities, which will remain perpetually fixed, arranged in the manner of a ring-dance: and the conclusion is clear. For God the Father cannot be generated divinely, nor would he be generated humanlyhumanitus: humanly except at the generation of the nature for the time at which it was assumed, which does not befit [one] old or blessed. As, then, the Son acquires places by moving humanly, so the Father, acquiring and filling those places bodily, would in a way be moved. But how would anything be moved by acquiring place, quality, and quantity in itself as subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute, if it were moved in this way as to no nature, nor as to the subject of motion first moved?11
¶10196.31–197.29
Eighthly, they grant as possible that Peter will be 197remittedremitti / intendi (of a quality, merit): be remitted / be intensified in merit to infinity and never intensifiedremitti / intendi (of a quality, merit): be remitted / be intensified until he is infinitely dearer to God than he is now; and Paul through the same time will be intensified in merit to infinity, and yet at the same end of the time, without demerit of his own, will be as much less dear to God as you please; from which it seems that with God there is exception of persons:12 on the supposition that Peter through this hour is remitted down to no degree of merit, exclusively, and at the end is assumed by the Word hypostaticallyypostatice: hypostatically; and Paul, assumed through the same time, continually merits and at the end is laid aside. Then the conclusion is clear, granting this well-known principle: that it is not possible that God should love a nature of man not assumed as much as the nature, his own, which he assumes.13 Then, supposing that some man not assumed is infinitely good, still better and dearer to God is any humanity whatever which he assumes. And in truth such things seem to me discordant: namely that the man Peter demerits continually until he is infinitely dear to God, and Paul continually merits until he falls from the highest friendship of his God; since the most wicked sinner can, most contingently, as they assert, be assumed; and since he could be ignorant of his own assumption, there is no evidenceevidencia: evidence giving faith against any creature whatever that can be hypostatically united being assumed.14 And then I do not see how anyone would be convicted of idolatry, or would know the quiddity of any creature. For they grant that God can be a stone, and [of] the species of the most abject creature, [and] can be damned, which is more perfect.15 But far from the faithful be these poisonous games. Hence Augustine, in the Eighty-three Questions, question 5, says that no irrational animal can be blessed, and much more evidently no inanimate substance.16
Notes
- 1 "Can be lacking" (deesse) against "cannot lay it aside" (dimittere): the nature might never have been the Word’s, since "the Word is a man" is contingent either way; but once assumed it is not laid aside. Verbum esse hominem vel fuisse is rendered as the quoted proposition.
- 2 "Of that personality, not nature": the laying-aside would be the abandoning of the personal union, not of the Word’s nature. The print here follows O; A B C omit illius personalitatis non nature (194.3), giving "the abandoning of the Word of God himself", and O omits ipsius. "Urges": monent, with O; A B C read movent "move" (194.5), as at the head of the sentence. Chapters 5 and 10 are this treatise’s: chapter 5 argues that the Word could not lay aside the nature he assumed, chapter 10 that the humanity is personally the same as the Word.
- 3 "And so with": the same grounds settle the chapter’s next questions, many humanities assumed and one nature assumed by another person. The eight consequences that follow (the ninth and tenth in the next part) are those the moderns grant from these possibilities, each with the case (posito quod) that makes it true.
- 4 "Preserved": salvaretur, the species kept in being by the succession of its individuals. On the moderns’ terms an assumed nature is not a man, and the Word with all the humanities is one man: hence the two horns. A B C omit non homines "not men" (194.17–18); the print follows O, and the second horn needs it. O reads humanum for hominum (194.15) and for nature humane (194.18).
- 5 "Any truth that pertains": no reality bearing on the case changes, yet "every humanity is assumed" and "it is not assumed" alternate. "Which is impossible" is Wyclif’s verdict: a negation cannot begin of itself, and a relation of the third mode, the non-mutual relation of the measurable to its measure (Aristotle, Metaphysics V.15, 1021a26–b3: the measurable is called relative because something else is related to it), comes only with a change in one of its terms. O omits huius hore (194.25).
- 6 "Men will come to be": on the moderns’ terms a nature laid aside is at once a man of its own, so new men are without anything positive being made. Wyclif presses the case: alternations of assumption with no other change would give time and successive motion with nothing moved. O reads aliquid nec alicuius positivi, A B C aliud nec alicuiusmodi positivum (194.31–32).
- 7 "That house … at Oxford": the house where the case is put, at Oxford, set against Rome. The case turns on the moderns’ terms: humanities are not men while assumed and are men when laid aside, so men begin and cease with nothing positive generated. O reads finem in quo for finem hore in qua (195.15); C cottidie for totidem (195.14).
- 8 "Re-assumes [it], laying aside the other": reassumat reliquam dimittendo; the words can also be construed "re-assumes the other, laying [the first] aside". Either way no humanity stays laid aside through any whole part, so there is no instant at which "these men are", and none at which God could know them to be. O reads dimissa for divisa (195.21).
- 9 "Share in the body": communicant in corpore; the six (three where the body is assumed by the three persons, three where it is not) have the one body born of Mary. "These men and those not-men, these sons and those not-sons": A B C read hic "here" for hi, A C ibi "there" for illi (196.6–7; B illi), "here men and there not-men", which fits the six places; O abbreviates both words. The print is kept. O reads ascensionem "ascension" for assumpcionem (195.32).
- 10 "For the measure": pro mensura, at the instant (the measure of duration) at which the body, multiplied, began to be many men. Nothing positive came to be in it then: only the not-being-assumed of three of the six, and "a negation alone does not make a son".
- 11 "Who neither is nor is generated": the Father as man, who is not generated, since he begins to assume a humanity already grown and glorified ("old or blessed", seni vel beato, of that nature); yet he fills the places as the Son fills them by moving. "Ring-dance": coree, in all the codices; Harris asks whether chorea is meant (196.21). A B leave a gap of eight letters in tanquam … erit, C reads tanquam ad per se erit (196.17); A B C read in for per (196.12); O omits loca (196.25).
- 12 "Exception of persons": excepcio personarum, after Rom. 2:11, "there is no respect of persons with God" (Vulgate acceptio). "Remitted … intensified in merit": remittetur inmerito … intendetur inmerito (197.1, 197.3), the schools’ remission and intension of a quality, here of merit. The case below ("remitted down to no degree of merit") requires inmerito, one word in the print, to be read in merito; the adverb "undeservedly" does not fit it. O reads merito at the first (197.1); A B C omit tamen (197.3); A B read nimis for minus (197.5).
- 13 "Granting": petito, the principle asked for and granted as a postulate, not the begging of the question. Peter, assumed at the end, is dearer to God than any unassumed man however good; Paul, laid aside, is less dear than he was while assumed, with no change in their merit.
- 14 "Giving faith against": non est evidencia dans fidem quin … sit assumpta, there is no evidence to make it of faith that any given creature is not assumed. A B C omit revera "in truth" (197.15); O reads sumi for assumi (197.19).
- 15 "Which is more perfect": ironic; a damned man is at least a rational creature, and so above a stone.
- 16 Whether an irrational animal can be blessed is question 5 of Augustine’s De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII (PL 40, 12: Nullum autem animal quod scientia caret, beatum esse potest). The words "of the Old and New Testament" (Vet. et Nov. Test.) stand in O and the print and are lacking in A B C (197.27); they bring in the title of the pseudo-Augustinian Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti, whose question 5 is on Abel and Cain, so the source supports A B C, and the English follows them, against the print with O.