Wyclif’s Latin works

De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 11, part 4

The ninth and tenth consequences: three eternal men, and the Trinity as every creature

Harris pp. 197.30–201.17

¶1197.30–199.2

1979° videtur de possibili concedendum quod Deus faciendo tres homines eternos, qui non possunt a Deo fieri, tantum perfecit genus humanum, sicut potuit de sua potencia absoluta, licet non plures homines quam illos tres potuit produxisse. 198Assigno totam multitudinem hominum a Deo producibilium¹ quoad intellectum divinum, et pono² quod tota Trinitas quamlibet talem naturam assumat ypostatice; tunc patet quod natura divina fecit trinitatem, tres homines, quos oportet sic opinantes dicere eternos homines, cum non habeant limitandum peryodum temporalem. Et secunda pars gratis conceditur cum dicunt hominem Iesum non posse fieri. Et tercia pars³ patet ex hoc quod tam perfectum est genus sicut aliquod individuum speciei; et⁴ infinitum perfectus est omnis homo in casu posito; ergo infinitum perfectum genus hominum; ymo, si consideretur, omnis homo foret infinitum perfectus humanitus, quia infinitam perfectam multitudinem tam animarum⁵ quam corporum tanquam partes proprias contineret; ergo infinitum perfectus humanitus foret omnis homo, quia infinitum perfeccior quam data anima vel corpus finitum; patet itaque quod non meliores homines⁶ vel magis graciosos plus Deum amantes concorditer aut plus beatos in corpore et anima omnino impeccabiles et imperfectibiles perfecciores omnimode quam poterit esse aliqua creatura. Et ultima particula patet illis, qui ponunt naturam assumptam esse hominem. Nam si Deus non potest assumere materiam primam vel formam materialem in unitatem suppositi nisi ydemptificaverit⁷ se illi nature, eo quod non est aliquid cuius ipsa est natura; per idem non potest aliam naturam assumere nisi ydemptificaverit se eidem, cum indifferenter cuiuslibet nature create quiditas sit natura. Sed iuxta sentenciam sancti Thome ponent⁸ Verbum posse esse multos homines per idem: nam infiniti homines possunt esse isti tres homines, et per consequens non plures istis tribus hominibus possunt esse. 3° confirmatur ex hoc quod unus illorum trium hominum cum sit Pater in divinis, est omnino incausabilis⁹ et improducibilis:⁹ 199ergo non plures quam isti tres poterunt esse; quia, data affirmativa¹ opposita, deficit positum.²

Ninthly, it seems it must be granted as possible that God, by making three eternal men, who cannot be made by God, perfected the human race as much as he could by his absolute powerpotencia absoluta: absolute power, although he could not have produced more men than those three.1 198I assign the whole multitude of men producible by God as to the divine intellect, and I suppose that the whole Trinity assumesassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption each such nature hypostaticallyypostatice: hypostatically: then it is clear that the divine naturenatura: nature made a trinity, three men, whom those who so opine must call eternal men, since they have no temporal period to be bounded.2 And the second part is granted freely, since they say "the man Jesus cannot be made". And the third part is clear from this: that the race is as perfect as any individualindividuum: individual of the species, and every man is infinitely perfect in the case supposed; therefore the race of men is infinitely perfect. Indeed, if it is considered, every man would be infinitely perfect humanlyhumanitus: humanly, since he would contain an infinitely perfect multitude of souls as well as of bodies as his own parts; therefore every man would be infinitely perfect humanly, since [he would be] infinitely more perfect than a given soul or finite body. It is clear, then, that [there could] not [be] better men, or more gracious, loving God more concordantly, or more blessed in body and soul, wholly unable to sin and unable to be perfected [further], more perfect in every way than any creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created could be.3 And the last particle is clear to those who hold "the assumed nature is a man". For if God cannot assume prime mattermateria prima: prime matter or a material form into the unity of a suppositsuppositum: supposit unless he has identifiedydemptificare / ydemptificacio: identify / identification himself with that nature, because there is nothing of which it is the nature, by the same token he cannot assume another nature unless he has identified himself with it, since indifferently of any created nature the quiddityquiditas: quiddity is [its] nature.4 But according to the teachingsentencia: teaching / sentence of St Thomas they will hold "the WordVerbum: the Word can be many men" by the same token: for infinitely many men can be these three men, and consequently not more [men] than these three men can be.5 Thirdly, this is confirmed from this: that one of those three men, since he is the Father among the divinein divinis: among the divine [persons] [persons], is wholly uncausableincausabilis: uncausable and unproducible: 199therefore not more than these three can be; for, the opposite affirmative being granted, what was posited fails.6

¶2199.3–200.4

19910° eliciuntur in casu sic opinanti possibili denominaciones inconpossibiles³ de eodem; posito quod tota Trinitas assumat ypostatice universitatem creabilem vel creatam. In quo casu videtur primo quod, posita eius possibilitate, non debet a catholico negari⁴ simpliciter: cum catholicus debet sustinere ut maximam quod, sicut Deus sit tam bonus intrinsecus sicut aliquid potest intelligi vel eciam cogitari, sic tante perficit universitatem creatam quante potest sustineri quod ipsam perficiat sine⁵ repugnancia racionis, experiencie, vel scripture.⁵ Sed sine repugnancia alicuius istorum sustineri poterit quod Deus universitatem creatam ad tantum perficiat; ergo quilibet catholicus debet illam sentenciam sustinere. Non enim⁶ repugnat racioni pocius quam ipso de possibili posito repugnaret; nec experiencie repugnat cum nullus sensus humanus sciat discutere utrum Deus sit⁷ lapis, asinus,⁷ et sic de ceteris creaturis; nec scriptura de dampnacione hominum vel peccatis aut aliis obviat ne sic fiat, quia post peccatum potest Deus dampnandum assumere; eo quod minus videtur Deo contrarium quod sit racionalis homo vel angelus, quam quod sit omnis bestia hic sit quantificatus, figuratus, senex, agens, motus, et sic de aliis denominacionibus tam substancialibus quam accidentalibus, ibi autem opposite formatus. Nec valet dicere quod posito hoc de facto scriptura sacra illud exprimeret, quia Paulus ‘audivit archana que non licet homini loqui’: ymo ut diceretur ex scriptura hoc sequitur,⁸ cum Deus summe potens et non invidus vel avarus ex bonitate sua non potest se ab ista beneficiencia continere.⁹ Nam iuxta argumentum Veritatis Matt. 7. ‘si vos, cum sitis mali, nostis¹⁰ bona data dare filiis vestris; quanto magis Pater celestis dabit spiritum bonum petentibus se?’ ista consequencia non valeret, si 200homo posset dimittere beneficienciam quam facillime posset perficere instar¹ Dei: tunc enim posset Deus ex libertate de obligacionis nulli hominum² sequencium² tribuere quamlibet promerenti.

Tenthly, there are drawn out, in a case possible for one who so opines, incompossibleincompossibilis: incompossible namingsdenominacio; denominare: naming; to name of the same [thing]: supposing that the whole Trinity assumes hypostatically the creatable or created totalityuniversitas creata: the created totality.7 In which case it seems, first, that, its possibility being posited, it ought not to be denied by a catholic without qualificationsimpliciter / secundum quid: without qualification / in a certain respect: since a catholic ought to maintain as a maxim that, as God is as good intrinsically as anything can be understood or even thought, so he perfects the created totality as greatly as it can be maintained that he perfects it without incompatibilityrepugnare; repugnancia: to be incompatible; incompatibility with reason, experience, or scripture.8 Now without incompatibility with any of these it could be maintained that God perfects the created totality to that degree; therefore every catholic ought to maintain that teaching. For it is not incompatible with reason, any more than it would be were it itself posited as possible; nor is it incompatible with experience, since no human sense knows how to determine whether God is a stone, an ass, and so of the other creatures; nor does scripture, on the damnation of men or on sins or other things, stand in the way of its being so, since after sin God can assume one who is to be damned; because it seems less contrary to God that he be a rational man or angel than that he be every beast, here quantified, shaped, old, acting, moved, and so of the other namings, substantial as well as accidental, but there formed in the opposite way.9 Nor does it avail to say that, if this were posited in fact, holy scripture would express it, since Paul "heard secret [things] which it is not granted to man to utter": indeed, as might be said, this follows from scripture, since God, supremely powerful and not envious or avaricious, cannot from his goodness hold himself back from this beneficence.10 For according to the argument of the Truth, Matthew 7, "if you, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will the heavenly Father give the good Spirit to them that ask him?", that inferenceconsequencia: inference would not hold if 200a man could forgo a beneficence which he could very easily perform after the manner of God: for then God could, out of a freedom from obligation, grant to none of the men who follow, however much he deserved.11

¶3200.5–201.17

200Tales autem dilapsus vani ficti ex amplitudine divine potencie forent nidi³ hereticis ad hereses periculosissimas seminandum. Descendendo autem in speciali concedunt in tali casu quod Deus est quelibet eius pars quantitativa infinitum modica, et infinitum longa et lata; et ita, sicut est ‘primus et novissimus,’ sic est maximus et minimus possibilis, longissimus, latissimus, brevissimus, et indivisibilis quoad molem. Cum enim sit omnis ignis et omne corpus omogenium et⁴ ethrogenium, patet quod foret totus mundus multiplicatus dimensionaliter ubique, et sic nichil per se in genere foret in denominacione aliqua maius aut minus reliquo; cum quidlibet tale sit Deus, et per consequens nichil haberet plures partes quantitativas quam tres, que sunt Trinitas increata, super quibus cuncta sunt posita. Addunt eciam quod in casu posito acciones et passiones et cetere forme personales multiplicarentur concomitanter ubique consequenter ad immensam co-existenciam Trinitatis; et sic non est motus successivus; et per consequens neque tempus, cum prius ac posterius in situ deficiant; et sic de multis quibus ego noc sufficerem assentire. Quomodo queso quelibet pars quantitativa corporis foret essencialiter⁵ idem cuilibet? cum tunc pars foret non-pars; quia omne corpus indivisibile, et nulla pars minor aut maior⁶ reliqua; quia essencia divina et Trinitas benedicta, et sic mundus et quelibet pars eius quantitativa summe perfecta; quia realiter ipse Deus et sic tota Trinitas, si foret quelibet pars quantitativa corporis, differret quotlibet differenciis a seipsa. Deduccio omnium istorum patet ex possibilitate casus et principiis opinionis. Videtur enim multis quod 201sicut Verbum¹ potest esse dominus² sibimet et minister, ac tota generis humani cognacio, sic potest esse totus ignis et quelibet eius pars quantitativa: nec credo racionem diversitatis possibiliter assignandam. 2do dicunt quod, sicut Verbum est tantum unus homo,³ sic quod non multi, ponendo quod mille vel quotlibet humanitates assumpsit sic est tantum unus ignis licet infinitas igneitates assumpserit. Quod non dicunt illi qui ponunt Verbum in casu illo⁴ esse multos homines. Et patet plane ranga⁵ inconveniencium supradicta, cum omnis substancia per se in genere foret Pater, Filius, vel Spiritus sanctus: et sic utrobique illa tria⁶ supposita simul omnes substancie et omnia accidentibus informata sic quod, ubicunque est unus ignis, sunt tres ignes solummodo, qui sunt omnes. Infinitatem autem inconveniencium que secuntur videtur michi stultum deducere, cum gignit sollicitudinem apparencie sine fructu.

And such vain slips, feigned from the breadth of the divine powerpotencia: potency / power, would be nests for heretics for the sowing of most dangerous heresies.12 And, descending to the particular, they grant that in such a case God is each quantitative partpars quantitativa: quantitative part of it, infinitely small, and infinitely long and broad; and so, as he is "the First and the Last", so he is the greatest and least possible, longest, broadest, shortest, and indivisible as to bulk. For since he is every fire and every body, homogeneous and heterogeneous, it is clear that the whole world would be multiplied dimensionally everywhere, and so nothing [that is] of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself in a genus would in any naming be greater or less than another; since every such thing is God, and consequently nothing would have more quantitative parts than three, which are the uncreated Trinity, on which all things are set.13 They add, too, that in the case supposed actions and beings-acted-onsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute and the other personal forms would be multiplied concomitantly everywhere, consequently on the immense co-existence of the Trinity; and so there is no successive motion, and consequently no time either, since before and after in position would be lacking; and so of many things to which I could not bring myself to assent.14 How, I ask, would each quantitative part of a body be essentially the same as each? since then a part would be a non-part; for every body [would be] indivisible, and no part less or greater than another; for [each would be] the divine essence and the blessed Trinity, and so the world and each quantitative part of it supremely perfect; for really God himself, and so the whole Trinity, if he were each quantitative part of a body, would differ from himself by any number of differences. The deductiondeduccio: deduction of all these is clear from the possibility of the case and the principles of the opinionopinio: opinion. For it seems to many that, 201as the Word can be lord to himself and servant, and the whole kindred of the human race, so he can be the whole fire and each quantitative part of it: nor do I believe a reason for the difference can possibly be assigned.15 Secondly, they say that, as the Word is only one man, so that [he is] not many, supposing that he assumed a thousand or any number of humanitieshumanitas: the humanity, so he is only one fire, although he assumed infinitely many firenessesigneitas: fireness. Which those do not say who hold that the Word in that case is many men.16 And the row of absurditiesinconveniencia; inconveniens: an absurdity (in argument) · troubles, ill consequences (in affairs) above is plainly clear, since every substance of itself in a genus would be Father, Son, or Holy Spirit: and so on both sides those three supposits [would be] at once all substances and all things informed by accidents, so that wherever there is one fire there are three fires only, which are all [the fires]. But to deduce the infinity of absurdities that follow seems to me foolish, since it begets anxiety for appearance without fruit.17

Notes

  1. 1 The ninth consequence has four parts, taken in turn below: God makes three eternal men; they cannot be made by God; he thereby perfects the human race as much as his absolute power allows; and he could not produce more men than those three.
  2. 2 "A trinity, three men": if the whole Trinity assumes every producible humanity, then on the moderns’ terms each person, however many humanities he assumes, is one man; so there are three men only, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and as divine persons they have no beginning: "eternal men". A B C read posito for pono (198.2); if that is right, Harris notes, assignato should be read for assigno.
  3. 3 "[There could] not [be]": the clause has no main verb; the supplied words give the sense of patet itaque quod non meliores homines … quam poterit esse aliqua creatura. A B C read naturarum "natures" for animarum "souls" (198.13) and omit homines (198.17); O reads particula for pars (198.8).
  4. 4 "Identified himself": ydemptificaverit se, made himself the same as (idem) the nature. Prime matter or a material form is no one’s nature, so it could be assumed only by identification; the same holds of every created nature, so that the Word assuming a humanity is identified with it, and is a man for each. O reads ydemptificaret (198.23).
  5. 5 "The teaching of St Thomas": sentencia (context-dependent), the position taught, that one who assumes many humanities is many men (below, 203.7–9; Scriptum super Sententiis III d. 1 q. 2 a. 5 ad 2–3: dicerentur duo homines … plures homines, et non unus homo). A B C read ponentis "who holds" for ponent (198.28): "the teaching of St Thomas, who holds …". The print is kept.
  6. 6 "What was posited fails": one of the three men, the Father, is uncausable, so no fourth man can be granted without denying the case. A B C read incommunicabilis et improductibilis (198.32); O adds mu (perhaps materia) after affirmativa and reads positivum for positum (199.2).
  7. 7 "Namings": denominaciones, the predicates that name a thing from its forms, here God named from every creature. "Possible for one who so opines": on the moderns’ principles, not Wyclif’s. O reads compossibiles (199.4).
  8. 8 "As anything can be understood or even thought" recalls Anselm, Proslogion 2, aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit, and c. 5, where God is quidquid melius est esse quam non esse (PL 158, 227C, 229B–C). The maxim’s three tests, sine repugnancia racionis, experiencie, vel scripture, stand in O and the print and are lacking in A B C (199.11–12); the next sentence ("any of these") and the three answers need them. A B C add perfecta after negari (199.7) and read ergo for enim (199.15).
  9. 9 "Any more than it would be were it posited as possible": pocius quam ipso de possibili posito repugnaret, no more against reason than any case granted as possible. "Than that he be every beast, here quantified …": the print has sit twice (quam quod sit omnis bestia hic sit quantificatus, 199.22); the second is taken as opening the list of namings. C reads sit hominis assinus for sit lapis, asinus (199.17–18).
  10. 10 2 Cor. 12:4, without the Vulgate’s verba ("heard secret words"). "Not envious": the commonplace that the good God grudges nothing (Plato, Timaeus 29e, in Calcidius’s Latin ab optimo porro invidia longe relegata est; cf. Boethius, Consolatio III m. 9, livore carens). "As might be said": ut diceretur; or "so that it might be said [that] this follows from scripture". B reads sequeretur (199.28); O contrahere for continere (199.30).
  11. 11 Wyclif’s words are Luke 11:13’s ("the good Spirit", spiritum bonum), with "the heavenly Father" (Pater celestis) for the Vulgate’s "your Father", under Matthew’s reference (Matt. 7:11, "give good things"); both Vulgate texts open Si ergo vos. A reads scitis, and B omits nostis … se (199.31–33). "A freedom from obligation": the print divides de obligacionis (200.3; so on the plate), which does not construe; it is read as one word, deobligacionis (our reading). "After the manner of God": instar Dei; A B read iusticionem, C iusta et (200.2). O reads bonum sequentis "the good of the one who follows" for hominum sequencium (200.3).
  12. 12 "Slips": dilapsus, fallings-away from the truth. Potencia (context-dependent) is here God’s power. "Nests": nidi, with O; A B C read vie "ways" (200.6).
  13. 13 "The First and the Last": Apoc. 1:17 (Harris’s margin; cf. Isa. 44:6). "Of it": eius, the created totality the Trinity has assumed. "Not more quantitative parts than three": each part of a body being God, its only parts are the three persons. A B C read vel for et (200.13).
  14. 14 Passiones, against acciones: the category of being-acted-on. "Consequently on": following upon the immensity, the presence everywhere, of the Trinity. "Could not": the print’s noc (200.24; so on the plate) is a misprint for non.
  15. 15 "Lord to himself and servant": the Word is lord of his own humanity and, as having it, servant; and on the moderns’ terms he is all the men of his kindred. O reads numeraliter "numerically" for essencialiter (200.25–26) and adds quam after maior (200.27); B adds non after Verbum, and A B C read deus "God" for dominus (201.1).
  16. 16 "Firenesses": igneitates, the forms of fire, formed as humanitates. "Which those do not say": those who hold that the Word with many humanities would be many men must say by the same token that with many firenesses he would be many fires. O omits unus homo (201.5) and reads illud for illo (201.8).
  17. 17 "Absurdities": inconveniencia (context-dependent), the logical sense. "Row": ranga (201.9), apparently "rank, row"; A has aren written above it (arenga, "harangue"), B reads arenga, C leaves a gap. "On both sides": utrobique, in substances and accidents alike. O omits tria (201.12).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Plate readings; page · reading · note):
    • 198: humanitus, (plate: print = humanitus; the transcription normalised it)
    • 198: humanitus (plate: print = humanitus; the transcription normalised it)
  • Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English (margin matter): reference 1 0 Jeree*f um" (199.10); reference Cor. xii. 4. (199.27); reference Matt. vii. u. (199.31); reference Rev. i. 17. [B152a' (200.10).