Wyclif’s Latin works

De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 12, part 4

Thomas’s argument from the name "man", and what "man" would signify

Harris pp. 213.29–216.7

¶1213.29–216.7

213Item ex evidencia sancti Thome videtur quod Christus assumendo multas humanitates sit multi homines. Nam omne nomen appellativum, cuius principalia significata⁸ multiplicantur, predicatur⁹ vere⁹ pluraliter de eisdem. Sed hoc nomen homo primo et principaliter significat qualitatem 214substancialem ut humanitatem: ergo multiplicatis humanitatibus in Christo, et¹ homo vere predicatur pluraliter de eodem.¹ Maior ex hoc est evidens quod multiplicatis significatis multiplicanda sunt nomina significatorum; ut si tres persone divine haberent multas divinitates, tunc essent multi dii;² et sic de similibus quibuscunque. Minor autem patet ex hoc quod substancia secunda secundum Aristotelem in Predicamentis capitulo De Substancia significat quale-quid hoc est, substancialem³ qualitatem.³ Ut patet in methaphisica; homo enim principaliter significat humanitatem, album albedinem. Concesso ergo consequente et posito quod Verbum assumat omnes humanitates; consequens est quod sint multi homines ex assumpto; et cum Verbum sit omnis homo, sequitur quod Verbum sit multi homines. Negato vero assumpto de talibus concretis, sed concesso quod principaliter significant talia supposita, oportet dicere consequenter quod iste terminus homo⁴ omne quod est de sua primaria imposicione significat; et per idem quodlibet nomen appellativum vel concretum quodcunque significat.⁵ Nam omnem personam divinam homo de imposicione sua primaria significat, et cum hoc singulas creaturas; ergo conclusio. Maior patet ex hoc quod omne suppositum quod potest esse homo, signum significat; omnis persona divina potest esse homo; ergo etc. Et per idem bovem, asinum, leonem, et quamlibet speciem creature; cum omnis natura singularis huiusmodi potest a Verbo assumi stante unione personali ad hominem; quo posito de facto omnem talem naturam significaret, quia omnem hominem significaret;⁶ omnis talis species foret homo;⁶ ergo omnem talem speciem significaret; et cum nullum nomen significat universaliter formas specificas nisi eo ipso significaverit omnes formas individuas sub eis contentas, sequitur conclusio. Certum est tamen quod non fuit de intencione imponencium terminos ad significandum, 215quod iste terminus homo significaret deitatem; et ita de quolibet designando, quia tunc essent omnes tales termini analogi¹ et equivoci. Perirent eciam superioritas et inferioritas terminorum, et multi sillogismi in terminis substancialibus per fallaciam accidentis; ut sic arguendo— quicquid nascetur ex homine non eternaliter existebat; iste² homo nascetur ex homine; ergo non eternaliter existebat²; et sic de similibus. Ymo non est verisimile terminum significare philosopho illud quod nescit sibi significare, ymo quod credit non posse esse hominem. Sed constat quod gentiles philosophi assererent³ Deum non directe significari per terminos tales specificos, quia tunc concederent Deum posse⁴ esse hominem; ergo⁵ non significaverat illis Deum; et per idem nec nobis; cum univoce nobis significaret sicut illis nisi⁶ per accidens, quia contingit humanitatem esse Deum. Aliter enim cognoscerent et crederent omnes philosophi in confuso Deum fore hominem in hoc universali—omnis homo erit homo—et nunquam negarent differencias divisivas generi de se invicem predicari, ut sic—omnis homo est racionalis; asinus est homo; ergo est racionalis—. Sic enim concedunt theologi quod homo creavit mundum, quia persona Verbi, que est homo, creavit mundum. Pono itaque quod in mente philosophi ignorantis incarnacionem sit ista intencio specifica ‘homo’ naturaliter significans hominem et solum hominem. Et pono quod stante illa unione Deus assumat quamcunque naturam specificam animalis; et patet ex dictis et dicendis quod homo foret in qualibet specie animalis; et sic cum veris⁷ sequitur quod ista intencio homo continue naturaliter significans significaret asinum, leonem etc, sicut modo significat; et ita, ut arguitur in materia de ydemptificacione, quilibet terminus eque indifferenter significaret quidlibet. Quo dato non foret negandum quod homo est asinus; et sic quandocumque 216predicatur positivum de aliquo positivo, quod idem est directe significatum per predicatum et subiectum, quod sufficit ad verificandum enunciaciones huiusmodi cum paribus que ponuntur. Nec valet dicere quod nullus talis terminus naturam significat; cum sic iste terminus deus de sua intencione primaria hominem et omne assertibile significat.

Again, from the evidenceevidencia: evidence of St Thomas it seems that Christ, by assumingassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption many humanitieshumanitas: the humanity, is many men. For every appellative namenomen appellativum: appellative name whose principal significatessignificatum: significate are multiplied is truly predicated in the plural of them. Now this name "man" first and principally signifies a substantial quality, 214as humanity: therefore, when the humanities are multiplied in Christ, "man" is truly [said] in the plural of him.1 The major is evident from this, that when the significates are multiplied, the names of the significates are to be multiplied; as, if the three divine personspersona: person had many divinities, they would then be many gods; and so of any like [cases]. And the minor is clear from this, that second substancesubstancia prima / substancia secunda: first substance / second substance, according to Aristotle in the Categories, the chapter On Substance, signifies a "what-of-a-sort" (quale quid), that is, a substantial quality; as is clear in the Metaphysics; for "man" principally signifies humanity, [as] "white" whiteness.2 The consequentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent being granted, then, and supposing that the WordVerbum: the Word assume all humanities, the consequent is that there are many men from what is assumed; and since the Word is every man, it follows that the Word is many men.3 But if the assumptionassumptum: the assumption is denied of such concreteconcretum / abstractum: concrete [term] / abstract [term] [terms], but it is granted that they principally signify such suppositssuppositum: supposit, one must say consequently that this term "man" signifies, by its primary impositionimposicio primaria: primary imposition, everything that is; and by the same token that any appellative or concrete name whatever [so] signifies. For "man", by its primary imposition, signifies every divine person, and with this the single creaturescreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created; therefore the conclusion. The major is clear from this, that the signsignum / signatum: sign / thing signified signifies every supposit that can be a man; every divine person can be a man; therefore etc.4 And by the same token [it signifies] ox, ass, lion and every species of creature; since every such singular naturenatura: nature can be assumed by the Word while the personal unionunio: union to the man stands; and, this being posited in fact, it would signify every such nature, because it would signify every man; every such species would be a man; therefore it would signify every such species; and since no name signifies the forms of species universally unless by that very fact it has signified all the individual forms contained under them, the conclusion follows. Yet it is certain that it was not of the intention of those who imposed terms to signify 215that this term "man" should signify the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity; and so of any [term] designating, because then all such terms would be analogous and equivocal.5 There would perish too the superiority and inferiority of terms, and many syllogisms in substantial terms [would fail] by the fallacyfallacia: fallacy of accidentaccidens: accident, as by arguing thus: "whatever will be born of man did not exist eternally; this man will be born of man; therefore he did not exist eternally"; and so of like [ones].6 Indeed, it is not likely that a term signifies to a philosopher what he does not know it signifies to him, indeed what he believes cannot be a man. Now it is evident that the pagan philosophers would assert that God is not directly signified by such terms of species, because then they would grant "God can be a man"; therefore it had not signified God to them; and by the same token not to us; since it would signify to us univocally as to them, except by accident, because it happens that the humanity is God.7 For otherwise all the philosophers would know and believe indistinctlyconfuse / confusus (fides, noticia): indistinct(ly) "God will be a man" in this universal, "every man will be a man", and would never deny that the differences dividing a genus are predicated of one another, thus: "every man is rational; an ass is a man; therefore it is rational." For so the theologians grant "man created the world", because the person of the Word, which is man, created the world.8 I posit, then, that in the mind of a philosopher ignorant of the incarnation there is this intention of the species, "man", naturally signifying man and only man. And I posit that, while that union stands, God assume any nature of the speciesnatura specifica: the nature of the species of animal whatever; and it is clear from what has been said and is to be said that man would be in every species of animal; and so, with true [premisses], it follows that this intention "man", continuing to signify naturally, would signify ass, lion, etc., as it signifies now; and so, as is argued in the matter of identificationydemptificare / ydemptificacio: identify / identification, any term would signify anything equally indifferently.9 Which being given, it would not be to be denied that a man is an ass; and so, whenever a positive is predicated of some positive, [it would not be to be denied] 216that the same thing is directly signified by predicate and subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute, which suffices for making such statements true, with the like [conditions] that are posited. Nor does it avail to say that no such term signifies a nature; since in that way this term "god", by its primary intention, signifies man and every assertibleassertibile: assertible.10

Notes

  1. 1 Thomas’s argument from the signification of names, as in his Scriptum super Sententiis III d. 1 q. 2 a. 5 ad 2, where the number of a substantive term follows the plurality of the nature it signifies, not of the supposits. "Now this name": sed, the minor, closed by ergo. "'Man' is truly [said] in the plural of him": est homo vere pluraliter de eodem, with O, against the print’s et homo vere predicatur pluraliter de eodem (214.2–3), which no manuscript has: A B C O all read est homo, and none predicatur (A B est homo nature personalis personaliter, C est homo vere personalis personaliter). O reads significancia for significata (213.31); A B C vere probatur for predicatur vere (213.32).
  2. 2 Aristotle, Categories 5 (3b13–21): second substance signifies "a certain qualification" of substance (while white signifies quality only, 3b19). "As is clear in the Metaphysics": the reference is not identified; Wyclif states the same doctrine in De compositione hominis 2 (ed. Beer, p. 23), album solam qualitatem significat, sicut homo humanitatem, but refers it there to the Categories. O reads substanciale qualitate (214.9); B omits dii "gods" (214.6).
  3. 3 "From what is assumed": ex assumpto, from the humanities assumed; or "from the assumption", the premiss just granted. "The Word is every man": on the case that he assumes all humanities.
  4. 4 "The assumption": assumptum, the logician’s premiss (the minor, that "man" principally signifies a substantial quality), not the assumption of a nature. The adversary who denies it of concrete terms, and makes them signify supposits, must grant that "man" signifies every divine person and every creature. A B C omit homo (214.17); B reads signat (214.19).
  5. 5 "Of the intention of those who imposed terms": the first imposition of a name, by those who fixed its sense. B omits omnis … homo (214.28–29).
  6. 6 The sample syllogism is valid on the adversaries’ terms only if "man" does not signify the eternal Word; if it did, the minor "this man will be born of man" would fail of the Word and the conclusion would be the fallacy of accident.
  7. 7 "Would assert": assererent; A B C read asseruerunt "asserted" (215.11). "Now it is evident": sed, the minor, closed by ergo. "Except by accident, because it happens that the humanity is God": the term would signify God to us only by an accident of fact (the union), not by its imposition. B omits posse (215.13) and reads non for nisi (215.15); A B omit ergo (215.13).
  8. 8 "Which is man": que est homo, bare predication of the person of the Word; the theologians’ "man created the world" is true of the person, not by the term’s imposition.
  9. 9 "This intention of the species, 'man'": intencio specifica, the concept of the species in the philosopher’s mind. "With true [premisses]": cum veris; A B C read viris "men" (215.28). "The matter of identification": probably the arguments, reported and rejected in chapter 9 (p. 158.10–23), that anything can be identified with anything, quidlibet potest ydemptificari cuilibet.
  10. 10 "[It would not be to be denied] that the same thing": the clause quod idem est … depends on non foret negandum; or, "whenever a positive is predicated of a positive, [it is because] the same thing is directly signified". "Assertible": what a proposition asserts.