De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 12, part 3
Every animal assumed, the continuous giant, and Christ as his own parts
Harris pp. 209.27–213.28
¶1209.27–211.11
Again, supposing that every suppositsuppositum: supposit of the genus animal, with all [its] positive [features] preserved, is joined hypostaticallyypostatice: hypostatically to the WordVerbum: the Word: it is clear that the genus, species or differencedifferencia: difference (logical differentia) of animal would not perish from that; and consequently not every animal would be Christ; from which, by the topic from sufficient likenesslocus a sufficienti similitudine / a (sufficienti) divisione: the topic from sufficient likeness / from (sufficient) division, it follows that the Word, by assuming many humanitieshumanitas: the humanity, would not be only one man.1 The assumptionassumptum: the assumption is clear in that the Word is not necessitated by the hypostatic unionunio: union to corrupt anything positive; 210and, since genus, species and difference are very much positive, it is clear that there is no need to extinguish them by the assumptionassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption; and since there is no genus in act unless it has species and those supposits which are distinguished in species, it is clear from the case, possible for those whom I address, posited as fact: the consequentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent is that there are many individualsindividuum: individual distinct in species; not every individual of the genus of living things, therefore, would be Christ; for there must be greater distinction in individuals than in common forms, since all lower things are united in their more common [ones].2 Nor can it be said that the genus animal remains with its dividing differences as before, since, indifferently, every man would be an ass, a lion, a goat, and so of the others, if Christ is not many animals by reason of many animalities hypostatically conjoined. Where, then, would the genus be, distinct from the species or the individual by greater commonnesscommunioritas: greater commonness, if the same individual of every genus of animal is common to every animal? Where, too, would the difference then be between rational and irrational, able to bray and unable to bray, and so of the rest, if every rational animal is an irrational animal, the able-to-bray is the unable-to-bray, and so of all the other differences to be assigned?3 All the terms, therefore, that are of themselvesper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself in the categorypredicamentum: category of substance would be predicated neither in quidin quid (predicari in quid): in quid nor of things distinct in species, since every animal would be every animal; nor is any form a sufficient middle termmedium (logical): middle term for distinguishing one supposit even naturally from another, in that the species are predicated of one another in a mixed way; and since species differ just as the individuals of a species do, it seems that, the species being identifiedydemptificare / ydemptificacio: identify / identification, the individuals could be identified.4 Nor does it avail to say that by such an assumption the species are corrupted, because every species that was before has every singular essenceens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence that it had before; and the Word is not onlynedum: not only the supposit of man but of ox, of lion, and of every animal. Since, therefore, it suffices for the existence 211of a species that one supposit of that naturenatura: nature exist, it follows that every species remains that [was] before. For there is no fallacyfallacia: fallacy of accidentaccidens: accident here: "whatever was at the beginning of this hour is now; the species of lion is something that was at the beginning of that hour; therefore every such species is now."5 And since no things can differ now more and now less while remaining wholly unmoved, it follows that, as the natures differed in species before, so also now; and consequently species is now. This is confirmed from this, that every species is a nature; every nature of animal that was before is now; therefore every species that was before is now.6
¶2211.12–212.3
Again, God can, by way of continuationcontinuacio: continuity, make one composite out of all men, just as God can make a man infinitely great and infinitely small. This being postulated, it seems, first, that a man can be infinitely increased and at another time infinitely diminished without acquiring or losing any quantity; as, supposing that the Word assume any number of humanities separately and, while the union stands, make them all continuous, and again discontinuous, according as the conclusion to be proved requires.7 For Christ was, before the union, a man of middling quantity, and after the continuation will be a most huge and misshapen monster; and since by continuation no quantity is acquired as a whole, the proposition follows. And the same can be argued of alteration: as, by the natural powerpotencia: potency / power both of body and of soul, such a manifold body would suffice to sense however distantly, and, moderating however slowly, to describe a very long space in a short [time].8 Since, then, of each part of that body some part is a part of Christ’s body, it follows that this whole body is the body 212of Christ; and consequently Christ, after he was of common stature, is now as great as this body. From which other things are to be inferred.9
¶3212.4–213.14
Second, it seems to follow that Christ is any number of his quantitative partspars quantitativa: quantitative part. For before the continuation Christ was a composite of each of these souls and its body; from which it follows that Christ is many quantitative parts. Nor does it avail to say that the human nature, and not the man, is the part of a man; because the quantitative parts of a body are substances of themselves in a genus, which is denied of the humanity; therefore, as the monster that is a twin man, and from the diaphragm upward has a man [as] its part, so too Christ in the case supposed.10 For he does not cease to be a complete man as to that humanity on account of the continuation; just as neither would he begin to be a man as to this humanity on account of the discontinuation. And, the consequent being granted, it seems, first, if Christ is any number of his parts, that [he is] many [things] of which each is Christ; and since Christ is nothing other than a man, it follows that many men are Christ, and not on account of the continuation; therefore before the continuation Christ was many men; and not [so], if not from the assumption of many humanities; therefore, supposing that Christ assume many humanities, it follows that he is many men, which is the point intended.11 Nor does it avail to say that Christ does not have such parts, since from them he is nameddenominacio; denominare: naming; to name great, acting, blessed, and so of the other forms which are in his parts. And if it be said that all are Christ and not a part of him, but the same with the whole, then it remains to say as to which humanity Christ is made greater by God; since it is not possible for a humanity to be aggregated from many humanities unless it differs from each of them. And it is clear that he is made greater as to none of those partial humanities; therefore as to that total [one]; and consequently there is a new humanity generated without a corresponding 213soul; which is impossible; since neither could an organic body corresponding to such a humanity be feigned, nor a spirit filling the matter; nor is a body greater on account of the juxtaposition of a body that does not fall into its part.12 It is clear, therefore, to logicians, in the case supposed, that at every point of Christ there is no degree of augmentationaugmentacio: augmentation, since there is no motion unless some subject is first moved. And this is rejoinedreplicatur; replicatum: it is rejoined; rejoinder consequently against this principle of Euclid’s: "every whole is greater than its quantitative part."13 And supposing that Christ assume every nature of animal: then, after the continuation of all of them, having been made a monster, he would somewhere not be a monster, and so would be many things, and consequently many substances; because otherwise he would not be a part of himself, unless part and whole make up a number.14
¶4213.15–213.28
Third, a case can be posited from God’s omnipotence: that he fit infinite bodily natures to infinite souls, of which the first is double the second, and so to infinity; and, all of them being made continuous, assume each into hypostatic union. Then it seems that Christ is infinitely [many of] his parts, and so infinitely small, and consequently greater than himself; and since, wherever he is, he is equally great by reason of the multiplication of concomitancemultiplicacio concomitancie: multiplication of concomitance, as is clear of the eucharist, it follows that in any number of places he is less than himself.15 Indeed, since God can produce infinite souls and make them actuate matters that do not communicateincommunicans / incommunicantes (nature): that do not communicate (with one another), it follows that it is possible for each quantitative part of Christ to be Christ; which is impossible, since then there would not be many quantitative parts of him, as was touched on above in the preceding chapter.16
Notes
- 1 "The topic from sufficient likeness": if the Word, joined to every animal, does not make every animal Christ, then by like reasoning many humanities do not make him only one man. "Preserved": servatis; B reads sequitur, and A first wrote seiuat (209.28).
- 2 "The assumption": assumptum, the logician’s premiss (that the union destroys nothing positive), not the assumption of a nature; assumpcio in the next clause is the assumption of the nature. A B C omit non (209.33), which the argument needs; O with the print. "Possible for those whom I address": the case is possible on the adversaries’ terms; O reads alloquitur (210.5). A B C read specificate for specifice (210.4); O omits distincta … individuum (210.6–7).
- 3 "By greater commonness": secundum communioritatem, the genus’s being more common than its species. "Able to bray": rudibile, the stock difference of the ass; A B C read hinibile "able to neigh" for irrudibile (210.18), and omit ceteris … de (210.18–20) and aliis (210.20). A B read tunc ergo, O insuper, for tunc (210.17).
- 4 In quid: predicated as what a thing is, as against in quale. "Even naturally": vel naturaliter; M reads numeraliter "numerically" (210.24), the print stands. "Species differ just as the individuals of a species do": cum tam species differant quam individua, or "as much as"; O reads cum species plus differant "since species differ more" (210.26), which would run against "greater distinction in individuals than in common forms" (210.8). The print stands.
- 5 The syllogism shows the species persist through the assumption: the major is about things, the minor puts the species under it, and the conclusion is drawn without the fallacy of accident. B reads speciei for nature (211.1), A B C existit (211.1); O illius for huius (211.3), eciam fuit for est and omits in principio (211.4–5).
- 6 O omits natura omnis (211.10); A B omit the conclusion ergo … est (211.11). C reads tamen, O tunc, for cum (211.6).
- 7 "This being postulated": petito, with C O, against the print’s posito "supposed" (211.15). A B C read perdat for deperdat (211.17) and ut for et (211.19). "Continuation": making the bodies one continuous body.
- 8 Potencia (context-dependent) is "power" here, the natural capacity of body and soul. "Moderating however slowly … a very long space": the line is uncertain in the witnesses: A B C omit tarde (211.27), O omits moderando … brevi (211.27–28), and for longissimum, Harris’s own word, A B C read longis, which does not construe; he thinks longissimum or longum necessary (211.28). The English follows the print. O reads poñ for potencia (211.25).
- 9 A reads preterquam "except" for postquam (212.1).
- 10 "Substances of themselves in a genus": a quantitative part (a hand, a half) is a substance in the category; a humanity is not, so the part of a man must be a man. The twin monster: one body from the diaphragm down, two men above, each a part of the whole. B omits corporis (212.9).
- 11 "[He is] many [things] of which each is Christ": the clause has no verb; perhaps a word is lost. "Not [so], if not from": he was many men only by the assumption of many humanities.
- 12 "Humanities": the print’s humatatum (212.32–33) for humanitatum. A B C read species for spiritus (213.3). A body set beside another does not enlarge it unless it becomes its part.
- 13 Euclid, Elements I, common notion 5, in Campanus’s Latin the ninth communis animi conceptio, omne totum est maius sua parte (Harris: i. axiom 9), "the whole is greater than the part"; Wyclif adds "quantitative". "Rejoined": replicatur, raised against an answer; continuation would make the whole no greater than its part.
- 14 "Make up a number": ponant in numerum, count as two. O reads proposito for posito (213.9) and assumendo for assumat (213.10).
- 15 "Double the second": the parts diminish by halves to infinity, as the proportional parts of a continuum. B C read duplam (213.17). "Multiplication of concomitance": as Christ’s whole body is under each part of the host. "Infinitely small": infinitum parvus, the print’s paradox, as at 207.31.
- 16 "The preceding chapter": chapter 11, p. 200.24–30, where a body each of whose quantitative parts were the same as every other would make the part a non-part. O reads communicantes "that communicate" for incommunicantes (213.24); B adds creature after materias (213.25); A reads impossibile for possibile (213.25).