De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 7, part 3
The form of a servant: the immovable nature and the movable supposit
Harris pp. 113.30–117.27
¶1113.30–115.21
And so the sense of the Apostle, Philippians 2, is to be understood: that Christ, "being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: But emptiedexinanicio / exinanire / inanicio: emptying / empty himself, taking the form of a servant." For the understanding of which it is to be noted that as the form 114of God is the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity,1 so the form of man is the humanityhumanitas: the humanity. For each is a substantial formforma substancialis: substantial form; since each divine personpersona: person is that which is God, because [it is] God formally by the Godhead; as each person of man is that which is man, because he is man formally by the humanity.2 And he has each of these forms as their subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute, formally; yet the one he has absolutely, of necessity, and the other he received in time. And this most lofty metaphysics of forms I would wish our theologians to learn compendiously, if not in the Metaphysics of Aristotle, at least in the words of the Apostle. From which it is clear that it was not from his own estimationreputacio: estimation, or his own judgement, without truth beneath it, that he claimed himself to be equal to the Father, as if he were seizing for himself the honour due to the Father, as Satan does; since to be God belongs to him naturally and in common with the Father and the Holy Spirit. That it belongs jointly to him and to the Father he had shown when he said, "I and the Father are one." And Augustine frames such an argument:3 "Nothing that is natural and essential to a suppositsuppositum: supposit is robbery: now for Christ to be equal to God is natural and belongs of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself to the WordVerbum: the Word: therefore this is not robbery.4 But by making himself to be a visible naturenatura: nature he mercifully emptied himself: 'himself', it says, on account of the identity of the person who is the son of man and the Son of God: 'emptied', it says, because he made himself to be, outwardly, a corporeal nature, which in the beginning of the world, being prior in origin to its having form, is empty."5 To which sense, as Augustine expounds in Confessions 12, scripture says in the beginning of Genesis, "the earth was void and empty".6 Nor do I see how emptyingexinanicio / exinanire / inanicio: emptying / empty can be better understood than as a thing made outwardly empty, essentially, so that it is emptied. And this is true of Christ to the letter, since he is each one of three 115natures.7 And hence the Truth truly says, John 14, "the Father is greater than I": for, since Christ is so equivocallyequivoce: equivocally the divinitydeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity and the humanity, he can, with respect to an absolute predicate, be understood according to the aspectracio (against substancia): aspect of divinity or according to the aspect of humanity, as the predicate requires. And it is clear from what was said above that there is no incompatibilityrepugnare; repugnancia: to be incompatible; incompatibility [between] "the Father is greater than Christ" and "the same Father is without qualificationsimpliciter / secundum quid: without qualification / in a certain respect equal to Christ": indeed, understanding the person of Christ equivocally as to two natures, there is no incompatibility between these: "the Father is greater than Christ" and "the same Father is not greater than Christ"; nor ought such predicationsposicio / proposicio / predicacio: position / proposition / predication to be rejected, in the proper sense of the wordsde virtute sermonis: in the proper sense of the words, as being figurative,8 for by the same token this would be denied, "I and the Father are one", [and] "the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God", etc., since in the first there is equivocationequivocacio: equivocation, and in the second a conception of persons. Indeed, if I am not mistaken, all our speech about God is figurative, as whenever it is said "God is movable, born, has suffered", etc., it is not a synecdochic constructionconstruccio synecdochica: synecdochic construction but the figure that is called antropospatos, namely when a human passion is attributed to God; from antropos, man, and patos, passion.9 For we have no names that signify God without figure.
¶2115.22–116.6
Returning, then, to the matter in hand, it is granted that some thing, because [it is] the divine nature, is altogether immovableimmobilis / immobilitas: immovable / immovability, so that it can in no way be moved, although it is a movablemobile (noun) / primum mobile: a movable / the first movable supposit, as, for instance, Christ who suffered. This logic is clear in an example. For the divine nature is the Word, begotten both eternally and temporally, and yet it is not begotten; and such an essenceens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence of prime mattermateria prima: prime matter is the supposit of fire, composed of matter and form: and yet that matter cannot be so composed. Peter eats, dies, or is otherwise changed; and yet the nature of the speciesnatura specifica: the nature of the species, which is Peter, cannot be so changed. Therefore in all these and like [cases] one must attend diligently to predication by essence and to formal [predication].10 And it is clear that it does not follow, "God is movable, and everything other 116than God is movable: therefore every thing is movable", because some thing is not movable. And if it is asked, "What is not movable?", it can be said, equivocating, that nothing is not movable, because the divine nature is a movable: and so, understanding predication by essence, not formal, everything that is, is a movable.11
¶3116.7–117.9
And if it is said that this response, since it savours of contradiction, destroys theological disputations, since it falls into refutationredarguere / redargucio: refute / refutation, which is the vilest goal of the respondent, the answer is that it would profit much that the sophistical manner of disputing, introduced from the sin of Lucifer chiefly for the sake of the arguer’s show and the respondent’s open refutation, be left aside in the schools of theology.12 In sign of which, the first question that scripture mentions was introduced by the devil: "Why," says the serpent, "hath God commanded you, that you should not eat of every tree of paradise?" Gen. 3. Hence every question bears witness, without doubt, to ignorance or sin. Yet it is not to be denied that theological questions can be treated meritoriously, since the Truth asked very many questions of sinners. Yet it is necessary that on both sides there be intended the glory of God, to be increased, the pride of the sophists, to be destroyed, and unknown truth, to be exposeddetegere: to expose: and whatever is more than this in theological disputation "is of evil":13 therefore the question, like the oath, was introduced by occasion of sin or as its penalty. And this is the teachingsentencia: teaching / sentence of Augustine, De doctrina christiana 2, [chapter] 31, where he teaches that in disputations one should beware of the lust for wrangling and frivolous, childish display.14 Nor do the quibblesargucie; argucia: stratagems, quibbles; a quibble of the sophists lead theologians to any other goal, but [the theologian] exposes their reedy cunning, in which they had before boastedpompare; pompacio; pompa: boast; boasting; boasting;15 and this from their own principles. Hence frequently, so that the colourscolor (non est color): colour (a plausible ground)16 of sophistical wisdom may appear less, I meet them by denying negatives that, in an equivocal sense, could quite catholicly have been granted; as, in giving the exclusive of this 117universal, "every thing is movable", I form the exclusive thus, so that the sophistical appearance may be less evident: "only a movable thing is a thing", which is false for eternal things. Yet it could be granted that nothing other than a movable is a thing, taking "movable" essentially, as a substantive; and yet that something other than a movable is a thing, supposing that "movable" is predicated formally, as an adjective. But Augustine and the other saintssancti: the saints did not care about these appearances of the sophists. Hence in the Dialogue to Felicianus: "Mary," he says, "bore and did not bear the Son of God."17
¶4117.10–117.27
But further it is argued that the Word of God is not movable without qualification by reason of the assumed manhomo assumptus: the assumed man. For no person is moved on account of a habit or accident essentially separate: now the humanity of Christ is a habit accidentally joined to the Word of God: therefore on account of its laceration or passion the passion of the Word of God does not follow.18 This is confirmed by a threefold example. First from this, that a man is not torn or burned, even if his garments suffer so. Secondly from this, that the humanity is granted not to have been for a notable time, while yet it is not granted, correspondingly, that the Word of God was not: it does not, then, follow, "if this humanity was moved afterwards from not-being, acquiring the term of being, then the Word [was moved] too". Thirdly, this is confirmed from the figure of the patriarch Abraham, who, when he willed, Gen. 22, to sacrifice his son Isaac, did not kill him but the ram which he saw behind his back, sticking fast by the horns.19 Since, then, the passion of Christ was allegorically figured by Isaac, it seems that not the person of Christ, but his humanity, suffered.
Notes
- 1 O reads divinitas and divinitate for deitas and deitate (p. 114), against A B C; the print stands, and the two words are kept apart in English.
- 2 Quod est Deus, quod est homo ("that which is God", "that which is man") with O, against the print’s quo ("that by which", 114.3, 114.4), with A B C. The print makes the person the form by which it is God, while the sentence goes on to make the person the subject that has both forms (114.5) and gives the Godhead as that by which it is God formally; the argument fails without O’s reading.
- 3 Augustine on Phil. 2:6, non rapinam; the syllogism is not found in this form; perhaps Ep. 140.12 (PL 33, 543), neque enim usurpationis erat, ut rapina diceretur, sed naturae inerat, ut esset aequalis, recast, with Tract. in Ioh. 67.1 (cui natura est, non rapina) and, for matter prior origine to form, Confessions XII.29.40.
- 4 The minor premiss and conclusion, sed Christum ... non est rapina, are O’s alone (A B C omit them), as are hominis et Dei Filius; A B C also omit semetipsum and dicit (p. 114).
- 5 Origine, with C O, against the print’s originem (A B); the editor’s bracketed [cum] (114.24), his own supplement, falls with it. With origine the clause construes: matter is "prior in origin" to having form.
- 6 Gen. 1:2, where Douay’s "void" renders inanis, the adjective in exinanivit. Augustine, Confessions XII, who reads the verse as terra erat invisibilis et incomposita (XII.3.3) and expounds it of formless matter, prior to form origine (XII.29.40, PL 32, 842–43) (verified).
- 7 Trium naturarum quelibet: "each one of three natures", predicated of Christ, as at the end of the preceding chapter, Christus est tres nature (105.6).
- 8 De virtute sermonis taken with abici: such predications are not to be shut out of the literal sense on the ground that they are figurative.
- 9 Concepcio is the grammarians’ figure (syllepsis) by which one plural verb gathers several persons (sunt unus Deus), as antropospatos is the figure that ascribes a human passion to God; Wyclif’s spelling of the Greek is kept.
- 10 The pair, predication by essence and formal predication, answers the argument of 105.11 ff.: "God is movable" holds by essence, since the divine nature is the movable supposit Christ, not formally.
- 11 Mobile, neuter with natura divina and omne, is substantive, "a movable", as on p. 107. O omits quod est, est mobile; C reads quod est mobile (p. 116).
- 12 Redargucio is the respondent’s being brought to contradiction in the disputation, his defeat. The subject of proficeret is the accusative and infinitive modum disputandi sophisticum ... esse ... pretermissum.
- 13 Matt. 5:37, Douay "that which is over and above these, is of evil", the verse on oaths, hence "like the oath".
- 14 Augustine, De doctrina christiana II.31.48 (PL 34, 58), cavenda est libido rixandi, et puerilis quaedam ostentatio (verified).
- 15 Detegit has no expressed subject; taken as the theologian (O reads theologum for theologos). Versucia arundinea: a cunning as frail as a reed.
- 16 Color: a plausible ground, as in "colour of title", here the sophists’ semblance of wisdom.
- 17 Pseudo-Augustine (Vigilius of Thapsus), Contra Felicianum Arianum 12 (PL 42, 1167), Genuit ergo Maria et non genuit Filium Dei (verified).
- 18 Habitus is the "habit" of Phil. 2:7 (habitu inventus), a thing had as a garment is had; the objection treats the humanity so, as the Lombard’s third opinion does, Sent. III d. 6 c. 6 (PL 192, 769–70), velut indumento … secundum habitum (verified). M reads accionem for laceracionem (p. 117).
- 19 Gen. 22:13, in Douay’s words "behind his back ... sticking fast by the horns".
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- Plate readings; page · reading · note):
- 115: sumus—Pater (print as transcribed (next line)) [SUB]
- Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English (margin matter): reference ; as aiso John xiv. 24. 1 1 ° in (113.4); reference l Tim. vi. 16. (113.26); reference John x. 30. (114.16); reference Gen. i. (114.27); reference 30 Petrus (115.29); reference Gen. iii. l. (116.15); reference Matth.v.37. (116.24); reference : 73b] Gen- xxii- 13- (117.26).