De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 7, part 4
The Word suffers, and the six senses of "habit"
Harris pp. 117.28–121.7
¶1117.28–118.8
Here the answer isdicitur (opening an answer): the answer is that it would not be granted that the WordVerbum: the Word suffers because of the suffering of his humanityhumanitas: the humanity, unless the Word were personally that humanity. Now since the Word is wholly that humanity, as much as to the body as as to the soul, and actions and being-acted-onsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute belong first to suppositssuppositum: supposit;1 it is clear that that humanity would not suffer or act, unless 118because the Word, who is the same hypostasisypostasis: hypostasis or personpersona: person, so acts or suffers. So it must be firmly held that the Word of God, and in consequence God himself, hung grieving and suffering on the cross; and so of the other human acts which the gospel recounts of Jesus. And so, although the humanity of Christ is an essenceens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence, substance, or naturenatura: nature separate from the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity, which Christ is, not as to conservation but essentially, yet it is not so separated that it is not the person of Christ.2
¶2118.9–118.30
But concerning the name "habithabitus (of the humanity): habit" it is to be noted that "habit" is taken in four ways, as Augustine expounds in the Eighty-Three Questions, question 73, expounding that word of the Apostle to the Philippians 2, "in habit he was found as a man" (Phil 2:7).3 First, for wisdom, which is the truth that we learn, which, remaining unmoved, moves the soul that it informs. Second, for the foods we have, which change the body they nourish and are changed by digestion. Indeed every substantial thing lying beside us which changes and is changed by lying beside its subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute is called a "habit" of this kind: a "habit", that is, because it namesdenominacio; denominare: naming; to name the subject as having what lies beside it accidentally. The third genus is when the things worn are formed by the subjects that wear them, †more perfectly than when, fitted to the limbs, they are put on.†4 The fourth genus of habit, as a ring on the finger. And all these four, since they name a substance as being habited or as having, are said in predication by essencepredicacio secundum essenciam / formalis: predication by essence / formal predication to be "habits"; as "motion" is said, taken materially, to be the thing which is acquired by motion taken formally, as is clear from Physics III, 9, 4.5 And the sufficiency of those four is taken according to this: that the first habit changes the substance to which it comes and is not changed; the second changes and is changed; the third is changed and does not change; the fourth neither necessarily changes nor is changed.
¶3118.31–119.10
But besides these four, which in themselves are substances, "habit" is taken among the philosophers formally in two 119equivocal senses. First, for a preternatural quality of the first species of quality;6 whether it is a habit of the body, as health, or a habit of the soul, as an intellectual or moral virtuemotrix (anima, virtus): moving; and the spiritual habit is generated materially from habit said in the first way, as the bodily habit is produced from the second. But in the second way "habit" is taken for a relationalrespectus; respectivus: relation; relational form of the tenth genus, which is having, possession, or holdinghabicio: holding;7 and such a habit is caused by habit in the third and fourth ways, understood materially: for "riches" name men rich, possessionedpossessionatus (adj.): possessioned, or having, formally.
¶4119.11–119.27
And it is clear that those six kindsmaneries: kind of habit are quite equivocallyequivoce: equivocally so called. So the answer is that the humanity assumedassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption by the Word is a habit of the third mode, since it befalls a beingens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence in act, not changing it or making it another person than it was before.8 So the saintssancti: the saints say that the humanity is as it were a garment exposing the Godhead; and the religiousreligiosi: the religious, who put on Christ, have habits of the body;9 noting this: the humanity befalls God, but inseparably.10 So Augustine says in the Dialogue to Felicianus that the humanity is an accident to the Word: not that it is a thing inhering like the accidents of the nine genera, since it is the foremost created substance; nor that it is coeval with the Word, or like an attribute naturally following on its subject;11 but contingently, from time, in a way ineffable to us, it is in the Word, not by changing the nature to which it comes, but formed wonderfully, because identified with the Word of God or hypostaticallyypostatice: hypostatically joined to him: since, according to Augustine, On the Trinity book 1, "such was the unionunio: union of the incarnation, that it would make God man and man God."12
¶5119.28–120.18
And it is clear that the said humanity is a form agreeingconveniencia / convenire (in): agreement / agree in three things with forms that are of themselvesper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself in the genus of accident. First, in this, that it presupposes the nature to which it contingently comes, by nature far prior to it, [more] than an accident presupposes the created substance which it informs.13 Second, in this, that it does not make 120the nature to which it comes be something, or other than it absolutely necessarily always was. And third, that it cannot be without the supposit of the Word of God, to which it adheres inseparably but contingently. And it is evident that proportional properties agree analogically with the genus of accident: and it is likened to the attributes, which are said to issue of themselves from the proper principles of their subjects; since it cannot be absent after it has been present, since it follows inseparably on the Word, as an attribute on its subject; but, like separable accidents, it could be lacking from the subject.14 It agrees, second, with absolute accidents that are of themselves in the genus, since it is of itself a substance motive and movablemobilis / mobilitas: movable / movability, naming the subject properly and of itself as moved formally. Third, it agrees with relational accidents. For, as relations, habitationshabitacio: habitation, and like respects do not thereby move the nature to which they come by inhering; so without doubt "the form of a servant" (Phil 2:7), which is the humanity, cannot move the divine nature, since the Godhead is named only by a relational namingdenominacio respectiva: relational naming from its most wonderful lying-beside.
¶6120.19–121.7
And it agrees with the other substantial formsforma substancialis: substantial form in these three things. First, that it makes the supposit to which it comes be something other than it was before; since, after the Word was purely Godhead, now he is man. Second, in this, that it is the same hypostatically with the subject to which it comes. As in general every substantial form is the same essentially or personally with the subject of the form and with the composite of the two; so, I say, is this humanity; since it is of the same kind as the others and the same personally as the Word of God, although the Word [taken as] common is the divine nature, which cannot be that humanity;15 but since the man Jesus Christ is an individualindividuum: individual of human nature, he takes upsuscipere / suscepcio (of the soul, the nature): take up / taking-up, at least in predication and by essence, the temporal predicates which the gospel history has woven together about Christ, as will be made cleardeclarare / ostendere: make clear / show later. And a wonderful subtlety is clear in the words of the Apostle when he says "in habit found as a man" (Phil 2:7): for I do not see another term by which 121he could express the humanity of Christ more aptly as to the understanding of his hearers, more copiously as to philosophical consideration, or more expressly as to the explanation of the faith. So, with respect to the teachingsentencia: teaching / sentence of the Apostle, who was the most prudent preacher, and of Augustine his disciple, who was the subtlest explainer of holy scripture, we ignorant ones must bow the necks of the mind.
Notes
- 1 Acciones ac passiones sunt primo suppositorum: the schools’ maxim that acting and being acted on belong to the supposit, not to its nature; cf. Aristotle, Metaph. I.1, 981a16–17, and Aquinas, ST III q. 20 a. 1 ad 2, actus enim suppositorum sunt et singularium; FitzRalph, De pauperie Salvatoris, has secundum philosophos, acciones sunt suppositorum … ita sunt similiter passiones (verified). Passio here is the category set against accio; the "suffering" of 117.29 is the same word, of the passion.
- 2 Non conservative sed essencialiter (118.6–7): the humanity is distinct from the Godhead in essence, not in being kept in being apart from it. Que Christus est is taken with deitate, the nearer noun; with humanitas it would say the humanity is Christ, which Wyclif also holds (120.25–26).
- 3 Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 73.1, on Phil 2:7, PL 40, 84–85, Multis modis habitum dicimus (verified). Wyclif adds est to the Vulgate’s habitu inventus ut homo (DR "in habit found as a man"), which he quotes exactly at 120.32–33.
- 4 The words between daggers are Harris’s conjecture, made "not without doubt": A B C read habituatis quam quando membrum aptata induitur, O habituatis proficitur quam quando membris aptata induitur. Neither construes (quam has no comparative), so the conjecture is translated. Augustine’s third habit is the garment, which takes its form from the body it is put on (q. 73.1, PL 40, 84: formantur ab eis quibus habitum faciunt, sicuti est vestis). Of the incarnation he says (73.2, PL 40, 85) that the man was assumed ut … ab eo formaretur ineffabiliter excellentius atque conjunctius quam vestis, cum ab homine induitur, and this supports the sense of the conjecture’s perfeccius quam. Harris quotes both passages in his note to 118.20 (verified).
- 5 3°. Physicorum 9°· 4°: Aristotle on motion, Physics III; the figures 9 and 4 are not identified (perhaps chapters or texts of a medieval division, or perhaps Averroes’s comments on book III; Harris’s index gives 3 Phys. 9, 4 with no locus) (untraced).
- 6 Preternaturali (119.1) is the print’s, from O’s abbreviation (pr̈ n̈li); A B C read passionali, which would put habit in the third species of quality (passions and passible qualities) instead of the first (habit and disposition). At 119.3–4 A B C read moralis aut habitus specialis. Et ille ex habitu primo dicto; the print follows O.
- 7 De 10°. genere, quod est habere: the tenth category in the schools’ order, which ends with habitus (eighth in Aristotle’s own list, Categories 4, 2a3; its senses, from a habit of soul to a cloak and a ring, are Categories 15, 15b17–33): "having" (verified). Habicio is rendered "holding".
- 8 Ipsam is feminine with no feminine antecedent but humanitas; taken as the person of the Word implied in aliam personam ("making it another person").
- 9 Detegens is "exposing" (the glossary): the garment that shows the Godhead, not one that hides it. Qui Christum induunt: Gal 3:27, "have put on Christ"; the religious habit is read as the figure.
- 10 Hoc notantes, accidit: quod is omitted, with C O, against the print’s hoc notantes, quod accidit (A B); the English is the same. Sed inseparabiliter, with A B C, against the print’s sed non inseparabiliter (O): the argument requires it, since at 120.3 and 120.8 the humanity adheres to the Word inseparabiliter, and at 120.8 A B C have non inseparabiliter where the print and O have none: the two recensions carry the negative in opposite places.
- 11 The Dialogue to Felicianus is Vigilius of Thapsus, Contra Felicianum Arianum, transmitted among Augustine’s works: c. 9, PL 42, 1163, where the Son’s birth as man is not common to Father and Son but accidens speciale, what per accidens uni noscitur evenisse personae. Harris points to c. 12 and says Wyclif gives the substance … but adds the logical technicalities; the distinctions that follow are Wyclif’s (verified). Passio here is the proper attribute that follows on a subject (subiectum / passio), not the category of 117.32.
- 12 Augustine, De Trinitate I.13.28, PL 42, 840, Talis enim erat illa susceptio, quae Deum hominem faceret, et hominem Deum: the word is susceptio, not unio (verified).
- 13 Longe priorem ... quam: quam taken as the comparative after priorem (the divine nature is prior to the humanity by far more than substance is to accident); read as "as", it states a likeness instead.
- 14 Abesse / deesse: once present, the humanity cannot be absent from the Word, as an attribute from its subject; it is like a separable accident in that it could have been lacking, since it comes contingently.
- 15 Verbum commune: commune is taken with Verbum, the Word as what he has in common with the Father and the Spirit, the divine nature; it could be read "although what is common in the Word is the divine nature".
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English (margin matter): reference : 73b] Gen- xxii- 13- (117.26); reference Augustinum (119.29).