De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 8, part 4
Christ a person from the Godhead; the matter of his conception
Harris pp. 134.4–138.22
¶1134.4–135.15
Here the answer isdicitur (opening an answer): the answer is that the antecedentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent of the first argument is true and the consequentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent impossible.1 Nor is it true that any creature besides Christ is first and of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself a suppositsuppositum: supposit or personpersona: person; since in every created person accidental properties individuate it; and so personality and the singularity which follows on it are the same for it, as an attributesubiectum / passio: subject / attribute [follows] on its subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute: but Christ is made a person, first and of itself, only from the divinitydeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity, and not from accidental properties like other singulars. So no wonder if his personality receives the singularities of persons as accidents to it, and not as personalities.2 Therefore the two created natures, even on the holy Sabbath, are, each of them together, the same person of the WordVerbum: the Word.3 If, therefore, person were of itself superior to this naturenatura: nature, as something is to man, then it would follow — "if Christ is this created singular, then he is this created person" —; as it follows that Christ is something created from the fact that he is a created nature; and then there would be a twofold created person, as there is a twofold created nature, each of which is a person. But as it is, both those natures, and each of them, are, even when separated for the three daystriduum (in triduo): the three days, the same individualindividuum: individual, supposit, and person: for although they are two singular essencesens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence, yet they are a united individual substance of human nature. And a sophistsophista: sophist would grant, with colour enoughcolorate: with colour enough, that that person — pointing to Christ’s humanityhumanitas: the humanity — is a person and an eternal nature. So in such matters one must, beyond pronouns signifying pure essences, make explicit the things one speaks of by terms specifying the forms. But if it is argued:4 by the very fact that some cause, of itself and complete, of a causable thing is posited, 135that causable thing follows: now the singular nature in Christ, with the common created substance, suffices of itself and completely to cause a created supposit: therefore, those being posited and united, as is the case in Christ, it follows that one must posit a created person resulting from those principles: for the created nature and substance in Christ is of the same most special speciesspecies specialissima: most special species as that in each of his brothers. As, therefore, Christ is univocally with Peter an individual substance of rational nature, so he is univocally a person with him: for to whatever the definitiondiffinicio: definition belongs univocally, the thing defined also belongs univocallyunivoce: univocally. This is confirmed from this, that those dealing civilly with Christ would accept his person, univocally with others, in testimony and judgment and in any other perceptiblesensibilis (in the definition of animal): sentient work or any personal one.5 Nor can it be feigned that the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity impedes these principles from causing a person.
¶2135.16–136.7
Here the answer is that the minor is false, since no creature causes naturally except insofar as it is subjected a posteriori to the divine will, which causes first. Now the divine will cannot cause a created person out of these: for the assumptionassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption impedes, or more truly helps [to bring it about] that the created nature be an increate supposit. For since every recipient is stripped of the nature of the thing received,6 it would be necessary for the Word either to be two persons, as Nestorius said, or, by receiving created personality, to lay asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside the increate personality; and since each of these is supremely impossible, it follows that the nature of the exalting thing, as it were absorbing the assumed nature, does not permit it to have a created personality. And this is what they maintainintendere (a thesis): maintain who speak of "alien suppositationsuppositacio: suppositation". And it is said that this nature is a most glorious person, but the definition of a created person does not belong to it. For which it is to be noted that "substance" is common in Greek to ypostasis, usiosis, and usion: and when person is defined by the name "substance", hypostasisypostasis: hypostasis is understood, which others explain differently by the name "subsistence". And so Christ is not an individual subsistence of rational nature, or a supposit, 136except the supposit of the increate nature. So the assumed nature is not formally a person but identically or hypostaticallyypostatice: hypostatically. For it is not formally hypostasis or subsistence, but substance or usion. So in Christ there are formally three substances, but a single subsistence; but those two created natures make one complete nature, which is the humanity, but not a person, since the completion on the part of the final cause is lacking.7
¶3136.8–136.27
Further, it is granted that those living their lifeconversari: live one's life (among men) with Christ, thinking him to be univocally a person with other men out of ignorance of his divinity, [would accept] his person univocally in testimony.8 So he cannot judge or live his life civilly, as is clear elsewhere, but all his judgment would be of infinitely greater authorityauctoritas: authority than the judgment of a created person. And so it seems of every personal act that he did humanlyhumanitus: humanly: for authority follows the person in dignity, and not the nature of the action purely. And it is clear that the definitiondescripcio: definition of person here signified is convertibleconvertibilis / converti: convertible / be convertible with this: "incommunicable existence of rational nature".9 Incommunicable, I say, as to supposits, not natures; and so subsistence is narrower than substance, as [substance] is taken with respect to these three. And so the Trinity, common principle and common principality,10 is not a person or subsistence, but persons or subsistences. Nor is there colourcolor (non est color): colour (a plausible ground) in that equivocation, that riches are "substance" of a rational nature,11 but substance restricted to subsistence is consequent on every substantial supposit. Of this kind are many quibblesargucie; argucia: stratagems, quibbles; a quibble by which the unwary are deceived, made for establishing the opinionopinio: opinion of Nestorius.
¶4136.28–137.8
But fourth, as a main headprincipaliter; principalitas (of the body's presence): principally; principality, it is argued against Christ’s identity of speciesydemptitas specifica: identity of species with the others on the part of matter. For seed cut off from diverse sexes and mingled is of another species than the simple seed of the female sex: now Christ was conceived purely from the seed of the female sex,12 but all the others from the mingled seeds of male and female: therefore the matter from which 137Christ was made is of another species than the proximatemateria proxima / remota: proximate / remote matter matters of the others: and since an agent always gives a form according to the condignity of the matter, as is clear to the philosophers, it follows that Christ is of another species than the others, procreated univocally according to the common course of nature. This is confirmed by the Commentator, Physics 8, comment 46,13 who holds against Avicenna that if a man were generated from earth, he would be a man equivocally on account of the estrangementextraneare / extraneacio (supposicionis): estrange / estrangement (of supposition) of the matter.
¶5137.9–137.21
Here the answer is that that argument fails in several respects. First in the assumptionassumptum: the assumption, since female seed, which differs from the menstrual blood, does not differ from male seed except according to more and less;14 so that male seed, in the common course of nature, is thicker in substance, hotter in complexioncomplexio: complexion, and more powerful in informing. But what feat of mastery [was it] for God to cut from the blessed virgin, of most pure complexion, seed or blood according to the measure of her most humble delight from the joy of the angelic salutation, such as would exceed in goodness of complexion, in proportion of quantity and in limitation of power, every other matter from which a person of a man was procreated?15 And since this was done, why would a spirit of like species not be given to that head, the organ?16
¶6137.22–137.32
It fails, second, in what followssequela: what follows / following,17 when it infers that the proximate matter of which Christ was made is of another species than the proximate matters of the others. For if, as is supremely possible, God had cut matter from stones18 or from any other mixed or simple body, and, by mingling atoms in the virgin’s womb, had given, after a suitable mixture, the complexional form of human seed; still the proximate matter from which such a man would be made would be of the same kind as the others, although the remote matter is diverse: for otherwise the seeds of men generated from foods distinct in species would by that very fact be of disparate species.
¶7137.33–138.22
From these, third, it is gathered that it does not matter from what matter God 138adapts the proximate matter for producing a man; provided only that he brings it to the temperament of the complexion of seed, and limits [it],19 infusing the human spirit, successively or suddenly, into a duly limited body. Nor does it matter what agent God uses as an instrument for that office: for otherwise the first parents, who are the principles of the human race, would not agree with their generations in species or nature: yet such an error of the author at the beginning †caret† [becomes] the greatest in the course.20 The deductiondeduccio: deduction is clear from this, that Adam was formed of the slime of the earth, perhaps without the ministry of a creature, and Eve was formed from the rib of the man by the same craftsman. As, therefore, it does not matter whether fire is produced by fire or without intermediaryimmediate: without intermediary by light, for it to be univocally of the nature of fire, and so of other effects of whatever species or genus; so, [the body] having been made from any matter whatever with a first complexion and limitation sufficient to be the subject of a soul,21 it does not matter for the union of the composite by the ministry of what secondary agent this was done — as whether without intermediary by God, or by the ministry of angels, or of itself by a heavenly constellation, or by whatever secondary agent the human body was produced; it does not matter, the soul being given, for the being of man, just as it does not matter by what created craftsman an image or other artefact was fabricated.
Notes
- 1 Primi argumenti: the first inference of the fourth objection (133.29–31). Its antecedent is true because body and soul are each the person of the Word (134.14–15); its consequent, "Christ recently is a supposit", is impossible.
- 2 Divinitate "the divinity" (134.11), the print, with O; A B C read deitate "the Godhead", a pair the the glossary keeps apart. Personarum "of persons" (134.13), the print, with O; A B C read naturarum, "the singularities of the natures".
- 3 In sancto sabato: Holy Saturday, in the three days when body and soul were separated; even then each is the person of the Word (simul utraque).
- 4 From Quod si (134.31) to Tales (136.25) O omits the passage, which Harris marks with asterisks; O reads specificantes formas sunt multe argucie, and a later hand in its margin noted deficit multum "much is lacking" (134 n. 8; 136 n. 3). Here A B C are the only witnesses.
- 5 Pollitice: A’s spelling of politice, which Harris glosses civiliter "civilly" (cf. 136.12); B pollce, C polletice.
- 6 The principle that what receives lacks the nature of what it receives: the schools’ maxim from Aristotle, De anima III.4, 429a13–24, where the mind, to receive all forms, must be none of them, since the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance (verified). A permittant, B permittunt (135.26).
- 7 Boethius, Contra Eutychen 3, PL 64, 1344C–1345B, on ousia, ousiosis and hypostasis (essentiam quidem οὐσίαν, subsistentiam vero οὐσίωσιν, substantiam ὑπόστασιν; verified); Wyclif’s Latinised Greek is kept, in italic as Harris prints it. The "three substances" are the Godhead, the body and the soul.
- 8 Acceptarent "would accept" is Harris’s supplement (cf. 135.12): A B leave a gap of twelve letters, C omits from divinitatis to testimonium, and O lacks the passage (n. 4).
- 9 The definition is Richard of St Victor’s, as at 131.24–26; Richard says it of the divine person only, divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia (De Trinitate IV.22, PL 196, 945C–D; verified). Signata: the definition just signified.
- 10 Commune principatum: neuter after commune; translated as printed ("principality", rule). Principiatum "what proceeds from a principle" is a possible reading, not adopted.
- 11 Substancia also means a man’s goods ("his substance"); no plausible ground (color, a plausible ground, the the glossary’s period sense) comes from that equivocation. So too satis colorate (134.26), "with colour enough".
- 12 The minor premiss sed … feminei (136.31–32) is omitted by A B C; the print has it with O, and the syllogism needs it.
- 13 Averroes, In Physicorum VIII, comm. 46, against Avicenna on the generation of animals from earth (not read here; Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 2 p. 2 q. 4, cites the same comment against Avicenna as VIII Physicorum commento 49, so the number varies with the division). The print’s "9." is probably the manuscripts’ sign for com-, so "comment".
- 14 In assumpto quod: the quod clause is Wyclif’s ground for rejecting the assumption, not its content; assumptum is the logician’s sense, not the assumption of the nature. A B C read commixione "mixture" for complexione (137.13, 137.15).
- 15 Quale magisterium: a rhetorical question, implying that it is no great feat for God; magisterium here is neither "rule" nor "the teaching office".
- 16 Capiti "head", with C O, against the print’s capaci "capable" (137.20): agreement across the families, and the reading construes (the head, as organ, receives the spirit). As printed: "to that capable organ".
- 17 Sequela: the logical sense of the glossary entry, "what follows", the step from the premisses to the conclusion about the matter.
- 18 Cf. Matt 3:9, "God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham".
- 19 Limitet … limitatum (138.3–4), the print, with O; A B C read liniet … liniatum.
- 20 Caret is O’s alone (A B C omit it); Harris daggers it and suggests cresceret "would grow" or foret "would be". The English supplies "becomes", after the saying that a small error at the beginning is great at the end (Aristotle, De caelo I.5, 271b8–9, "the least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold"; verified). Auctoris: the author of the argument.
- 21 Prima is taken with complexione ("a first complexion"), not as materia prima "prime matter"; facta is referred to the body. Adesse (138.21), one word in the print, is ad esse "for the being". A B C read suppositi for compositi (138.17).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- Plate readings; page · reading · note):
- 136: argucie (bt arguncie; print argucie)