De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 8, part 3
Whether Christ is univocally a person with other men
Harris pp. 130.8–134.3
¶1130.8–132.9
Third, as a main headprincipaliter; principalitas (of the body's presence): principally; principality, it is argued that Christ is not univocally man with the others, because he is not univocallyunivoce: univocally an individualindividuum: individual or personpersona: person with another man. For he is a person only by the eternal personality; and that agrees in nothing univocally with created personality: therefore Christ is not univocally a person with another creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created. The major is clear from this, that otherwise, as Nestorius said, there would be in him a doubleness of persons, since one personality [would be] eternal and the other temporal: nor is there doubt that, if personal accounts are multiplied, persons too will be multiplied; since of one person there is only one personal account.1 And the minor of the argument is clear from this, that there is no greater agreementconveniencia / convenire (in): agreement / agree, indeed as great a difference, between the eternal personality and any other, temporal one as also between the eternal essenceens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence and any other, temporal one:2 now any eternal essence does not agree even in univocal beingens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence with another, temporal one: therefore by the same token neither does personality. Here it seems probable to me that Christ’s personality is equivocal or analogical with the personality of any other brother of his; and yet they agree supremely univocally in species or naturenatura: nature. So it does not follow, if Christ is not univocally an individual or person with another man, that he is not therefore univocally species or nature with him: for it is known that univocationunivocacio: univocation in the higher does not argue univocation in the lower; nor does equivocationequivocacio: equivocation of the lower argue 131equivocation of the more common, as is evident in an example. For all created things that are of themselvesper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself in a genus divided3 by opposite differencesdifferencia: difference (logical differentia) are univocal in the genus and not below it; as substance and accidentaccidens: accident are univocal in a certain way in a transcendent analogue, man and ass in the genus of animal, and so of the others: an image4 and Hercules, too, are equivocal in the signsignum / signatum: sign / thing signified "man", and yet are univocal in the genus of body or substance: correspondingly Jesus and Peter are equivocal in the sign of personality and yet are univocal in the species of man, and in any created genus more common: since correspondingly, the more common something is, the more it makes univocal; and the more particular, so much the less: so much so that a person or individual cannot make another person univocal with itself; as the person of the WordVerbum: the Word cannot assumeassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption every person of a man, as it cannot any, since then the person would be supremely communicable. For real univocation, of which the discussion now is, is when some things communicate or agree according to the same account in something common; as each person of a man is the same common species that is man, under that common account — "a rational creature made to the image of God" —; but the person of a man is communicated equivocally to opposite natures, since one is the account or individuating condition which is this body, and another the account or individuating condition which is this spirit. And so those understand it who say that a person, by way of definition, is a rational nature of incommunicable essence or existence.5 Nor is it to be denied that under the same signs, although equivocally, both increate and created personality are said analogically; as each divine person is an individual substance of rational nature, and each person of a man is an individual substance of rational nature;6 but the natures are very equivocally both rational and essences or natures: 132Peter too is very equivocally a substance or individual with respect to another, increate person. But on both sides there is a created account exemplified analogically in the higher, increate account of the same name. So the earlier doctors laboured to have in their definitionsdescripcio: definition names signifying at once, though equivocally, both the eternal exemplars and the things exemplifiedexemplaria / exemplata: exemplars / things exemplified; as truth, justice, free choiceliberum arbitrium: free choice; and person is said analogically, according to Anselm and Boethius, under those names.7
¶2132.10–132.12
But first it is objected, by appeal toobicitur per: it is objected, by appeal to this, that Christ is an individual of the human species, and besides this is an individual of the divine nature: therefore he is a twofold individual, as there is a twofold nature.
¶3132.13–132.18
Here the answer isdicitur (opening an answer): the answer is: by denying the inferenceconsequencia: inference, as it does not follow, if Christ is the Son of God and the Son of man, that he is a twofold son; for the same is the individual of the human nature and of the divine nature, but an individual of the human nature by accidentper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself, since [it is] as to the assumed nature, but of itself the individual, person, or suppositsuppositum: supposit of the divine nature.
¶4132.19–132.23
Second, it is objected, by appeal to this, that universaluniversale; ydea: universal; idea and singular are said relatively and consequently are simultaneous by nature:8 now Christ is universal only temporally: therefore he is singular only temporally; and consequently some individuation is in Christ only temporally.
¶5132.24–133.5
Here the first conclusionconclusio: conclusion is granted. For singular and universal are things of second intentionres secunde intencionis: things of second intention which regard one another relatively, in such a way that the singular, as such, is an individual or supposit of a species. So no divine person is in that sense, as to the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity, universal or singular, as is clear in De quaestionibus Veteris et Novae Legis, question 122;9 but he is an individual, supposit or person, since these are names signifying analogically outside the genus, as is clear of the name "individual" in Boethius’s definition, De persona. Nor is there any weight in why the philosophers use the 133names so variously. As, therefore, Christ is singular only from time, so that singularity befalls his individuality or personality a posteriori, as it befalls him that he is a person of the human species: so individuality or personality in Christ is not the singularity that stands as supposit under the species.10
¶6133.6–133.12
Third, it is objectedinstatur; obicitur: it is objected, by appeal to this, that Christ, because [he is] this man, or insofar asin quantum (reduplicative): insofar as [he is] this man, is a supposit, individual or person; therefore this singular humanityhumanitas: the humanity is the cause of personality in Christ, as it is in his brothers, and it is not the cause of the eternal personality: therefore it is the cause of a temporal personality: therefore in Christ there is a twofold personality, as [there is] a twofold birth.
¶7133.13–133.28
Here the causal [proposition] assumed is denied,11 because it signifies the circumstance of a cause. It is granted, however, of Christ or of the others that, because he is this man, therefore he is a person of a man: but not that, because [he is] a person of a man, therefore he is a person; since he has the personality of a nature higher than his humanity is, which can belong to no other man; since he alone is man by accident and with this supremely univocally.12 And there is in Christ a twofold birth, one eternal as to the divine nature, which eternally, absolutely, necessarily, personally is born and has been born; and to it there befalls another, temporal, not at an interval but coming at once,13 according to which he was another nature and newly a person of a man. For it does not followsequitur: it follows — "Christ only temporally or newly is a person, individual, or human supposit: therefore he is so a supposit" — since it is argued from the lower to its higher with an impediment having the force of negation.14
¶8133.29–134.3
Fourth, it is objected, by appeal to this, that Christ recently is both body and soul, and each of them is a supposit and a person: therefore Christ recently is a supposit or person: for thus Christ is body and created spirit: 134now each of those is of itself an individual and person: therefore Christ is a created person: and since he is also an increate person, it follows that a twofold personality is in Christ.
Notes
- 1 Racio personalis: "personal account"; racio through this chunk is the account (the species-sense of racio speciei), not the row’s "aspect" (against substancia). A B C read personalitas for personalitate and add Christi (130.10–11): "only the eternal personality is Christ’s person".
- 2 The comparison sicut et … temporalem (130.20–21) is in O alone (A B C omit it), and O omits argumenti … maior (130.18–19); the print joins the two.
- 3 Diviso "divided", with O, against the print’s diverso "diverse" (131.2). With diverso the sentence says that things in a diverse genus are univocal in the genus; the example (man and ass in the genus animal) needs one genus divided by opposite differences.
- 4 Ydolum "an image", with A B O (C ydioles), against the print’s ydiotes "the unlettered man" (131.6). The real man and the image of a man are the stock case of things equivocal in a name (Aristotle, Categories 1, 1a1–3, in Boethius’s Latin ut animal, homo et quod pingitur, PL 64, 163C; verified), and they are one in genus as bodies; cf. ydolum vel aliud artificiale (138.22).
- 5 The definition by "incommunicable existence" is Richard of St Victor’s, De Trinitate IV.22, PL 196, 945C–D, said there of the divine person only (persona divina sit divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia); IV.23, 945D–946A, sets it beside Boethius (rationalis naturae individua existentia for the uncreated person). The form with "rational nature" is not Richard’s wording (verified). Descriptive: "by way of definition" (from descripcio). O reads naturalem racionalem and omits essencie vel.
- 6 Boethius’s definition of person, "an individual substance of rational nature", Contra Eutychen 3, PL 64, 1343C–D: Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia (verified).
- 7 Anselm, De veritate and De libertate arbitrii, whose definitions of truth, justice and free choice hold of God and creature: truth is rectitudo mente sola perceptibilis (De veritate 11, Schmitt I, 191), justice rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata (12, I, 194), and the definition of free choice in utrisque secundum hoc nomen eadem debet esse, for God and the good angels and for men (De libertate arbitrii 1, I, 208; verified). Anselmum: the print, with O (añs & boym); A B C Augustinum.
- 8 Dicuntur ad aliquid: they are relatives, in the category of relation; relatives are "simultaneous by nature" (Aristotle, Categories 7, 7b15, in Boethius’s Latin Videntur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura, PL 64, 228B; verified).
- 9 Pseudo-Augustine (Ambrosiaster), Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti, q. 122, PL 35, 2367, where God is called one but not solitarius; q. 87, PL 35, 2280, has the word, Unus quidem est Deus, sed non singularis est (verified). "Boethius’s definition, De persona" is the same Contra Eutychen 3, PL 64, 1343C–D, printed in Migne as De persona et duabus naturis; individua is in the definition because there is person only in singularibus … atque in individuis (verified).
- 10 Prima conclusio: the objection’s first inference, "he is singular only temporally". Nec est vis: "it carries no weight". Supponitur speciei: stands as supposit under the species, not the formula "it is supposed".
- 11 Causalis assumpta: the causal proposition the objection took as premiss ("because he is this man, he is a person"); assumpta in the logician’s sense, not the assumption of the nature. O omits cause.
- 12 Eius humanitas: the print, with A B C; O reads communis, "higher than the common humanity" (133.17). A B C read solum for solus (133.18).
- 13 Non interpellatim (A B C interpolatim): not after an interval; the temporal birth supervenes on the eternal without a gap. In Christi (133.19): the print’s genitive after in, rendered "in Christ".
- 14 The impediment is the exclusive solum "only", which contains a negation; with it the step from the lower term ("human supposit") to the higher ("supposit") fails. A B C read ergo sic (A) or ergo sit (B C) suppositum.