Wyclif’s Latin works

De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 9, part 1

The position recapitulated; the three roots of the moderns’ variation; the first objection

Harris pp. 142.0–146.24

¶1142.0–142.0

142[Epilogat posicionem de humanitate; et, narrando tres radices causantes modernorum discrepancias, dissolvit tres obiectus eorum per ordinem. I. Gives a summary of the author’s position concerning the humanity of Christ. II. Explains the three sources from which the modern divsrsities of opinion have arisen. III. Deals with three principal objections to the author’s position.]

[It recapitulatesepilogus / epilogare: recapitulation / recapitulate the positionposicio / proposicio / predicacio: position / proposition / predication on the humanityhumanitas: the humanity; and, by recounting three roots that cause the disagreements of the modernsmoderni (bare): the moderns, it resolves their three objectionsinstancia; objectum: objection in order.]

¶2142.10–142.12

142Consequens est iuxta ponere sentenciam illam sentenciis modernorum, ut diversitas summe veritatis magis appareat et obiectus, quos adversantes invehunt, planius dissolvantur.

The next thing is to set that teachingsentencia: teaching / sentence beside the teachings of the moderns, so that the difference of the highest truth may appear the more, and the objections which the adversaries bring in may be more plainly resolved.

¶3142.13–142.13

142Primo ergo danda est posicio in quodam compendio.

First, then, the position is to be given in a kind of compendium.

¶4142.14–142.15

1422°. declarende sunt radices ex quibus oritur discrepancia modernorum.

Second, the roots from which the discrepancy of the moderns arises are to be made cleardeclarare / ostendere: make clear / show.

¶5142.16–142.16

142Et 3°. commixtim solventur instancie.

And third, the objectionsinstancia; objectum: objection will be resolved, intermingled [with these].

¶6142.17–143.8

142Stat itaque posicio in hoc—Quod humanitas assumpta a Verbo sit perfectus homo ex corpore et anima racionali compositus, et per ypostaticam unionem ydemptificatus Verbo in persona non natura—.Et sic non est aliud suppositum, individuum, ypostasis, vel persona in Christo ydemptice³ quam persona eterna Dominus Iesus Christus; 143cum tam corpus, quam anima, quam¹ eciam¹ humanitas completa sit persona eterna, quamvis sint inter² se nature solummodo temporales distincte plurimum ab invicem,³ et a divinitate⁴ a natura, et a substancia vel essencia divina. Et sic⁵ cavendum est specialiter de his tribus. Primo ne credatur aliquam illarum naturarum esse aliud suppositum a Verbo, quod est simul Filius Dei eternus et filius hominis temporalis.

The position therefore stands in this: that the humanity assumedassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption by the WordVerbum: the Word is a perfect man, composed of body and rational soul, and by hypostatic unionunio: union identifiedydemptificare / ydemptificacio: identify / identification with the Word in personpersona: person, not in naturenatura: nature. And so there is in Christ no other suppositsuppositum: supposit, individualindividuum: individual, hypostasisypostasis: hypostasis or person by identity than the eternal person, the Lord Jesus Christ;1 143since the body, the soul, and also the complete humanity, each is the eternal person, although among themselves they are natures, only temporal, very much distinct from one another, and from the divinitydeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity, from the [divine] nature, and from the divine substance or essenceens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence.2 And so one must specially beware of these three [errors]. First, lest any of those natures be believed to be another supposit from the Word, who is at once the eternal Son of God and the temporal son of man.

¶7143.9–143.23

1432°. oportet cavere ne credatur conversio⁶ vel confusio naturarum; cum manet plene natura divina⁷ cum duabus naturis incommunicantibus sed creatis constituentibus humanitatem perfectam, omnes⁸ et singule eadem persona in numero. Si autem esset conversio tunc natura conversa pro mensura conversionis⁹ non maneret; ut lignum conversum in ignem pro mensura conversionis desinit, nova forma inducta et veteri desinente; quod non potest esse de tribus formis incommunicantibus¹⁰ supra dictis. Si autem esset confusio naturarum, tunc forent reciproce quelibet eadem cuilibet, vel omnis vel aliqua incompleta, sicut est de elementis et¹¹ mixtis integraliter componentibus ipsum mixtum.¹² Modo autem manent tres incommunicantes nature, quelibet plene incommunicans cuilibet; sed utraque creatura per unionem personalem idem ypostatice Verbo Dei.

Second, one must beware lest a conversion or confusion of the naturesconversio naturarum / confusio naturarum: conversion of the natures / confusion of the natures be believed;3 since the divine nature remains fully, with two natures that do not communicateincommunicans / incommunicantes (nature): that do not communicate (with one another) but are createdcreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created, constituting the perfect humanity, all and each the same person in number. And if there were conversion, then the converted nature would not remain, to the measure of the conversion; as wood converted into fire ceases to the measure of the conversion, a new form being induced and the old ceasing; which cannot be the case with the three forms, that do not communicate, spoken of above.4 And if there were confusion of the natures, then any would be reciprocally the same as any, or all or some incomplete, as is the case with elements and mixed bodies integrally composing the mixed body itself.5 But as it is, three natures remain that do not communicate, each fully not communicating with each; but each of the two creatures is, through the personal union, the same hypostaticallyypostatice: hypostatically with the Word of God.

¶8143.24–144.24

1433°. oportet cavere ne¹³ credatur ex humanitate et deitate fieri unum aggregative, ut est cumulus lapidum, vel accidens et subiectum. Nam unio ypostatica, que est ydemptitas¹⁴ personalis facit quod quelibet istarum trium incommunicancium naturarum est plene eadem communis persona; licet inter se naturaliter distinguantur per totum ex multis sanctorum testimoniis supradictis, ut Augustini, Gregorii, et Anselmi. Unde istam sentenciam colligit¹⁵ venerabilis Anselmus in De Incarnacione Verbi ca°. 7. sub his verbis: 144‘Sicut, inquit, in Deo una natura est plures persone, et plures persone sunt una natura; sic in Christo una persona est plures nature, et plures nature sunt una persona. “Quemadmodum enim¹ Pater est Deus, Filius Deus et Spiritus sanctus Deus; et² non tamen tres dii, sed unus Deus;”² ita in Christo Deus est persona, et homo est persona, non tamen due persone sed una persona.’ Intelligit autem iste doctor per Deum et hominem deitatem et humanitatem, quia aliter esset similitudo impertinens, et verba sequencia nimis falsa. ‘Non, inquit, alius Deus alius homo in Christo, quamvis aliud sit Deus, aliud homo, sed idem ipse Deus qui et homo.’ Quando ergo dicit cum beato Augustino, Ieronimo, Gregorio et aliis quod aliud Deus in Christo et aliud homo, intelligit quod alia natura est deitas et alia humanitas, sed utraque non alia sed eadem persona; quia homo, ut dicit, solum naturam significat, et illum assumptum hominem dicit postea esse Iesum, et eandem personam cum Verbo. Unde non dubium quin per assumptum hominem intelligit naturam humanam assumptam. ‘Verbum, inquit, naturam aliam assumpsit, non aliam personam.’ Et ita generaliter intendunt sancti quando dicunt ‘aliud Deus, aliud homo; sed non alius,’ quod alia natura sit deitas et alia natura³ humanitas, non autem persona alia sed eadem.

Third, one must beware lest it be believed that from the humanity and the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity there comes to be one thing aggregativelyaggregative: aggregatively, as a heap of stones is, or an accidentaccidens: accident and its subjectsubiectum / passio: subject / attribute. For the hypostatic union, which is personal identity, makes each of these three natures that do not communicate to be fully the same common person; although among themselves they are naturally distinguished throughout, [as appears] from the many testimonies of the saintssancti: the saints cited above, as of Augustine, Gregory and Anselm. Hence the venerable Anselm gathers this teaching in On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 7, in these words: 144"As," he says, "in God one nature is several persons, and several persons are one nature, so in Christ one person is several natures, and several natures are one person. 'For as the Father is God, the Son God and the Holy Spirit God, and yet not three gods but one God,' so in Christ God is a person and man is a person, yet not two persons but one person."6 And this doctor understands by "God" and "man" the Godhead and the humanity, since otherwise the likeness would be irrelevantimpertinens; impertinencia: irrelevant; irrelevance, and the words that follow exceedinglynimis: exceedingly false. "There is not," he says, "another one who is God and another one who is man in Christ, although God is one thing and man another; but the very same is God who is also man."7 When therefore he says, with the blessed Augustine, Jerome, Gregory and others, that God in Christ is one thing and man another, he understands that the Godhead is one nature and the humanity another, but each is not another but the same person;8 since "man", as he says, signifies only the nature, and he says afterwards that that assumed manhomo assumptus: the assumed man is Jesus, and the same person with the Word. Hence there is no doubt that by "the assumed man" he understands the assumed human nature. "The Word," he says, "assumed another nature, not another person." And so the saints generally maintainintendere (a thesis): maintain, when they say "God is one thing, man another, but not another one", that the Godhead is one nature and the humanity another nature, but not another person but the same.

¶9144.25–145.3

144Pro 2°.⁴ notandum quod in tribus radicibus stat modernorum variacio ab antiquis. Primo in hoc quod non concipiunt res communes. Noticia quidem⁵ universalium secundum Anselmum in De Incarnacione ca° 1°. est medium ad cognoscendum misterium Trinitatis, misterium incarnacionis, et multa alia fidei sacramenta. Sicut enim natura vel forma⁶ divina est communis ad tria supposita, sic omnis natura vel forma specifica universalis in actu est communis ad omnia eius singularia; et persona Verbi⁷ communis ad 145naturam divinam et alias duas contingenter extranee ypostatice copulatas: et tolluntur¹ hinc inde¹ sophistica argumenta conformiter.

For the second [point], it is to be noted that the variation of the moderns from the ancients stands in three roots. First in this, that they do not conceive common thingsres communis / res communes: the common thing / common things.9 The knowledge of universalsuniversale; ydea: universal; idea, indeed, according to Anselm in On the Incarnation, chapter 1, is the means to knowing the mysterymisterium: mystery of the Trinity, the mystery of the incarnation, and many other sacramentssacramentum (the Eucharist); sacramentum altaris: sacrament; the sacrament of the altar of the faith.10 For as the divine nature or form is common to three supposits, so every specific nature or form, universal in act, is common to all its singulars; and the person of the Word [is] common to 145the divine nature and to the two others, joined hypostatically, contingently and extraneously: and on this side and that the sophistical arguments are disposed oftollere (instanciam, argumentum): to dispose of, demolish in conformity.

¶10145.4–145.15

1452ª radix est methaphisica de forma substanciali compositi. Quelibet enim talis forma substancialis compositi est eius² quiditas, idem essencialiter vel personaliter cum formato; ut quelibet anima animati, cum sit ipsum vivere et per consequens ipsum esse; et eius essencia, ex 2° De Anima, est idem essencialiter vel personaliter cum composito et subiecto; ut anima intellectiva hominis, que est eius humanitas, est eadem persona cum homine sic formato; igneitas est idem suppositum cum igne, et ita de ceteris: et per consequens, cum alique forme sint separabiles a materia que non accidentaliter³ sunt persone, patet⁴ quod personalitas manet cum forma a materia separata.

The second root is a metaphysical one, about the substantial formforma substancialis: substantial form of a composite. For every such substantial form of a composite is its quiddityquiditas: quiddity, the same essentially or personally with what is formed; as every soul of an animateanimare: animate thing, since it is its very living and consequently its very beingens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence, and its essence, from De anima II, is the same essentially or personally with the composite and subject;11 as the intellective soul of man, which is his humanity, is the same person with the man so formed; fireness is the same supposit with fire; and so of the rest: and consequently, since some forms which are persons, and not accidentally, are separable from matter, it is clear that personality remains with the form separated from matter.

¶11145.16–146.16

1453ª radix est abieccio predicacionis secundum essenciam, ut⁵ recte admittentes predicacionem secundum essenciam concedunt cum Anselmo De Incarnacione 7 quod quelibet universalis forma est idem cum omnibus et singulis eius suppositis, et correspondenter de aliis rebus communibus: concedunt eciam quod tam in creatore quam eciam⁶ in qualibet creatura omne esse est essencia et e contra, licet in omnibus istis sit formalis differencia vel distinccio racionis. Cum ergo moderniores variant in istis tribus radicibus, non mirum si variant in germine consequente. Ponunt enim quod non est possibile⁷ plures naturas vel res alias⁸ singulas esse unam. Ponunt 2° quod omnis forma substancialis compositi est distincta essencialiter a subiecto, in tantum quod aliqui dicunt omnem formam materialem substancie posse a natura separari. Et 3° dicunt⁹ quod in omni creatura est dare essenciam, que non est esse, sed eius causa, sicut lux luminis vel¹⁰ lucere. Ex istis dicunt consequenter 146quod non est possibile multas naturas esse personam Verbi. Dicunt eciam quod in quolibet homine esse suum et essencia et per consequens ipse homo ac sua humanitas distinguantur, sic quod omnis homo vel non est humanitas, vel humanitas solum est homo per accidens: unde Christus ut dicunt non suscepit hominem, sed humanitatem, que non potest esse idem ypostatice Verbo Dei. In istis ergo tribus radicibus et aliis ex eis consequentibus stat modernorum variacio ab antiquis. Magnam¹ quidem vim habent principia, cum eorum variacio dilatat distinccionem multiplicem posterius dicendorum. Oportet igitur supponere res communes: quod idem est forma substancialis cuiuslibet et formatum; ac demum, admittendo² predicacionem secundum essenciam, quod sicut in omni creato vel increato omne esse est essencia et e contra; sic omnis humanitas vel³ esse hominis est homo sive assumpta sive suppositacione propria terminata.

The third root is the rejection of predication by essencepredicacio secundum essenciam / formalis: predication by essence / formal predication; as those who rightly admit predication by essence grant, with Anselm, On the Incarnation 7, that every universal form is the same with all and each of its supposits, and correspondingly of other common things:12 they grant also that both in the creator and in every creature all being is essence and conversely, although in all these there is a formal differencedifferencia: difference (logical differentia) or distinction of reasondistinccio racionis: distinction of reason. Since therefore the more modernmoderni doctores / moderniores doctores: the modern doctors / the more modern doctors [doctors] vary in these three roots, it is no wonder if they vary in the shoot that follows. For they posit that it is not possible for several natures or other singular things to be one. They posit, second, that every substantial form of a composite is essentially distinct from the subject, so far that some say that every material form of a substance can be separated by nature. And third they say that in every creature one may positest dare: one may posit an essence which is not being but its cause, as light [is the cause] of radiance, or of shining.13 From these they say consequently 146that it is not possible for many natures to be the person of the Word. They say also that in every man his being and essence, and consequently the man himself and his humanity, are distinguished, so that every man either is not humanity, or humanity is man only by accidentper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself: hence Christ, as they say, did not take up a man but a humanity, which cannot be the same hypostatically with the Word of God. In these three roots, therefore, and in others following from them, stands the variation of the moderns from the ancients. Great indeed is the force that principles have, since their variation widens the manifold distinction of what is to be said afterwards. We must therefore suppose common things; that the substantial form of anything and what is formed are the same; and finally, admitting predication by essence, that as in everything created or uncreated all being is essence and conversely, so every humanity, or being of a man, is man, whether assumed or terminated by its own suppositationsuppositacio: suppositation.14

¶12146.17–146.24

146Quibus suppositis restat 3° tollere evidencias ex adverso. Videtur enim primo quod Verbum personam assumpsit, quia humanitatem assumpsit, que quidem humanitas est persona. Nec valet nude negare consequenciam, cum arguitur ordinate ab inferiori ad suum superius. Et talis deduccio a Deo approbatur quod conceditur exinde Verbum sumpsisse aliquid quod prius non fuerat. Et istam racionem Nestorianorum recitat Anselmus in De Incarnacione in principio ca° 7.

These being supposed, it remains, third, to dispose of the evidencesevidencia: evidence from the opposing side. For it seems, first, that the Word assumed a person, since he assumed a humanity, which humanity is a person. Nor does it avail barely to deny the inferenceconsequencia: inference, since it is argued in order from the inferior to its superior. And such a deductiondeduccio: deduction is approved by God, in that it is granted from it that the Word took something which had not been before.15 And this argument of the Nestorians Anselm recites in On the Incarnation, at the beginning of chapter 7.16

Notes

  1. 1 Ydemptice "by identity" (142.22), the print; O reads ydemptite, for which Harris asks whether Christi ydemptitate "in the identity of Christ" should be read. Ydemptificatus "identified": made the same (idem) with the Word.
  2. 2 A divinitate, a natura, et a substancia vel essencia divina is taken as a list of three, divina reaching back over the whole; "[divine]" is supplied once. A B C read directe for divinitate (143.4), "directly from the nature and from the divine substance or essence"; the print, with O, is kept. O omits sic (143.5) and reads quantum vel for quam eciam (143.1).
  3. 3 Conversio (143.9), the print, with O; A B C omit it, though the next sentence argues against conversion (Si autem esset conversio). Conversion of one nature into another, not the logical conversion of a proposition.
  4. 4 Incommunicantibus (143.17), the print, with B C; A reads communicantibus, O et communicantibus. A and O agree across the families against the print, which by this edition’s rule (see the headnote) would outrank it; the print is kept because the argument fails without it: supra dictis points back to the naturis incommunicantibus of 143.11, and 143.21–22 restate them as tres incommunicantes nature. O reads conversacionis for conversionis (143.14).
  5. 5 Et mixtis (143.20), the print, with O; A B C read in mixtis, "elements in mixed bodies, integrally composing the mixed body itself". A B C are one family against the print and O, so the print stands (see the headnote); read with the print, the mixed bodies are partial mixtures composing the whole. C omits mixtum.
  6. 6 Anselm, Epistola de incarnatione Verbi, "c. 7" in Wyclif’s division, which is c. 11 in Schmitt (II, 28.23–29.1) and c. VI in Migne (PL 158, 278B–C). Wyclif’s chapter numbers for this work run one above Migne’s (his "6" is Migne’s V) (verified). The inner quotation follows the Quicunque vult, vv. 15–16, PL 88, 585B: Ita Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus sanctus; et tamen non tres dii, sed unus Deus (verified). A B C omit enim, B et non … Deus (144.4–6).
  7. 7 Alius … alius (masculine: another one, a person) against aliud … aliud (neuter: another thing, a nature): the formula on which the paragraph turns.
  8. 8 The formula "one thing and another, not one and another" (aliud et aliud, non alius et alius) goes back to Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep. 101 (to Cledonius), known in Latin, e.g. in Rusticus, Contra Acephalos, PL 67, 1226C (Non alius vero et alius: absit … illic enim alius et alius … non aliud vero et aliud). Wyclif’s wording is Anselm’s, just quoted (non alius deus, alius homo … quamvis aliud sit deus, aliud homo); the Augustine and Jerome he names are not checked (verified). O reads et alia sit humanitas (144.23).
  9. 9 Res communes: common things, the universals as realities outside the mind; the first root is the moderns’ denial of them. A B C read Pro quo for Pro 2° (144.25).
  10. 10 Sacramenta: "sacraments" in the Augustinian sense, "mysteries" (1 Tim 3:16), beside misterium in the same sentence. Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi 1, on the dialecticians who cannot understand universal substance: who does not grasp quomodo plures homines in specie sint unus homo cannot grasp three persons one God, nor a man assumed non personam (Schmitt II, 10; PL 158, 265A–C, Migne’s c. II; verified). A B C omit vel forma; A reads videtur for Verbi (144.31–33).
  11. 11 "For living things, to live is to be": Aristotle, De anima II.4, 415b13, where the soul is the essence of the living body, vivere viventibus est esse (verified). A B C omit eius (145.6).
  12. 12 Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi "7" (Schmitt c. 11, II, 29.3–4; PL 158, 278C, Migne’s c. VI), where homo signifies natura tantum quae communis est omnibus hominibus. The formula that every universal form is the same as its supposits is Wyclif’s, as Harris notes (on 145.19), not Anselm’s words (verified). O reads nec for ut (145.17).
  13. 13 Lux luminis: lux, light at its source, against lumen, the light it gives off; the moderns’ essence is to being as light to its radiance. A B C read et lucere (145.33). O reads impossibile (145.27), which would invert the moderns’ first thesis.
  14. 14 Vel esse hominis (146.15), the print, with O; A B C read est esse hominis. A B read dimitendo "setting aside" for admittendo (146.13), which inverts the sense.
  15. 15 A Deo is taken as the agent, "approved by God"; it could mean "a deduction from [the term] 'God'". The objection’s step: the humanity is "something", and the Word took something new.
  16. 16 Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi, beginning of "c. 7" in Wyclif’s division, which is the opening of Schmitt’s c. 11 (II, 28.14–22; PL 158, 278B, Migne’s c. VI): homo assumptus persona est, quia omnis homo individuus esse persona cognoscitur. Anselm says only quidam; the label "Nestorians" is Wyclif’s (verified).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Plate readings; page · reading · note):
    • 144: in Christo (print as transcribed) [SUB]
    • 144: Iesum, (print as transcribed) [SUB]
    • 144: ‘Verbum, (print as transcribed) [SUB]
  • Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English (margin matter): reference Augustine, Jeroine, o Gregory; (144.12).