Wyclif’s Latin works

De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 9, part 2

The Word assumed a nature, not a person

Harris pp. 146.25–150.24

¶1146.25–147.18

146Hic dicitur quod consequencia non valet, cum idem sit ac si sic argueretur—Verbum fecit se esse hominem, et esse hominem est esse personam: ergo Verbum fecit se esse personam—ubi constat quod antecedente existente necessario consequens est impossibile; cum tantum⁴ una persona, que absolute necessario est Verbum, poterit esse Verbum, et per consequens cum Verbum non potest se facere illam personam, patet quod Verbum non potest facere se personam. Sed pro ulteriori declaracione notandum quod assumere personale, de quo scriptura cum sanctis doctoribus in proposito loquitur, 147est duas naturas personaliter unire, id est,¹ duas naturas facere esse unum suppositum vel² personam, et ideo vocatur² unio personalis. Et potest secundum³ tres gradus active intelligi. Primo pro active principiare unionem huiusmodi: et sic tota Trinitas assumpsit naturam humanam de quanto univit⁴ eam ypostatice Verbo Dei. 2° striccius pro activa⁵ causancia principali unientis, ut ipsum fiat eadem persona cum natura unita; et sic natura divina univit vel assumpsit in supposito Verbi⁶ naturam hominis; quia fecit naturam hominis esse eandem personam non eandem naturam cum persona divina. 3° strictissime dicitur assumere personale pro causancia persone quia fecit⁷ naturam creatam⁸ esse idem personaliter sibi ipsi. Et illo modo solum Verbum assumpsit hominem. Ex istis patet, cum⁹ nulla assumpcio ypostatica sit eterna, quod oportet assumptum esse solummodo creaturam, quia nec alia persona, nec alia natura est Christi humanitas; licet sit creator, quia persona Verbi, que secundum deitatem non secundum ipsam creat omnia.

Here the answer isdicitur (opening an answer): the answer is that the inferenceconsequencia: inference is not valid, since it is the same as if it were argued thus: "The WordVerbum: the Word made himself to be a man, and to be a man is to be a personpersona: person: therefore the Word made himself to be a person"; where it is evident that, the antecedentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent being necessarily [true], the consequentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent is impossible;1 since only one person, which absolutely of necessity is the Word, could be the Word; and consequently, since the Word cannot make himself that person, it is clear that the Word cannot make himself a person. But for further clarification it is to be noted that personal assumingassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption, of which scripture with the holy doctors speaks in the matter in hand, 147is to unite two naturesnatura: nature personally, that is, to make two natures to be one suppositsuppositum: supposit or person; and therefore it is called personal unionunio: union. And it can be understood actively in three degrees. First, for actively being the principle ofprincipiare (active): be the principle of such a union: and so the whole Trinity assumed the human nature, inasmuch as it united it hypostatically to the Word of God.2 Second, more strictly, for the active principal causing of the one uniting, so that it becomes the same person with the nature united; and so the divine nature united or assumed in the supposit of the Word the nature of man; since it made the nature of man to be the same person, not the same nature, with the divine person. Third, most strictly, personal assumingassumere personale: personal assuming is said for the causing [proper] to the person, since it made the created nature to be the same personally with itself. And in that way the Word alone assumed man.3 From these it is clear, since no hypostatic assumptionassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption is eternal, that what is assumed must be only a creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created, since Christ’s humanityhumanitas: the humanity is neither another person nor another nature; although it is creator, since [it is] the person of the Word, which as to the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity, not as to it, creates all things.4

¶2147.19–148.2

1472° patet, quod non potest esse personalis assumpcio nisi persona naturam assumpserit non personam.¹⁰ Oportet enim personam assumere, quia aliter non esset unio personalis, nisi persona ydemptificaret sibi naturam. Et quod oportet personam assumentem naturam assumere non personam, patet ex hoc quod personarum personalis¹¹ ydemptificacio vel naturarum essencialis ydemptificacio est impossibilis, ut nullum unum suppositum potest esse aliud, nec una natura fieri potest alia. Sed sicut persone maxime entitatis uniuntur in suprema essencia vel natura, sic nature maxime distantes ydemptificantur in eodem supposito vel persona. Et patet quod natura divina non potest primo sibi assumere naturam aliam vel personam. Patet ex hoc quod non potest esse alia natura vel persona quam est ab intrinseco necessario absolute, et nullius talis potest esse assumpcio. Oportet 148ergo naturam divinam unire¹ Verbo non nature primo quam sumpsit.²

Second, it is clear that there cannot be a personal assumption unless a person has assumed a nature, not a person. For a person must assume, since otherwise there would not be a personal union, unless a person identified a nature with itself. And that the person assuming must assume a nature, not a person, is clear from this, that the personal identification of persons, or the essential identification of natures, is impossible, as no one supposit can be another, nor can one nature become another. But as the persons of the greatest entity are united in the supreme essenceens / esse / essencia: a being / being (existence) / essence or nature, so the most distant natures are identified in the same supposit or person. And it is clear that the divine nature cannot primarily assume to itself another nature or person. It is clear from this, that it cannot be another nature or person than it is, from within, necessarily and absolutely; and of no such thing can there be assumption. 148Therefore the divine nature must unite [the nature] which it took to the Word, not primarily to a nature.5

¶3148.3–149.9

1483° patet quod assumpcio ypostatica, unio, vel incarnacio, aut quomodocunque³ aliter nominetur,³ nec est generacio, nec conversio, nec alteracio, sed ydemptificacio; et si est mutacio, tunc est potissima mutacio dextere excelsi. Non enim est generacio, licet⁴ generacio⁴ ad ipsam consequatur:⁵ sicut motus localis ad motum augmentacionis, cum omnis generacio temporalis sit a non-esse ad esse produccio: assumpcio⁶ autem⁶ videtur esse subsistencie⁷ summe minoracio, cum Verbum ex incarnacione minoratum est paulo minus ab angelis, ut exponit Apostolus ad Hebre. 2° illud Psalmi 8ⁱ; ‘minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis.’ Nec est conversio, cum subsistencia Verbi manet summa secundum omnes eius proprietates non composita⁸ cum aliquo. Nec est alteracio, tum quia humanitas assumpta non est inherens accidens; tum eciam quia persona secundum naturam precedentem humanitatem assumptam est omnino immobilis eo quod illi nature non potest accidens, ad quod est motus, formaliter inherere. Ex istis colligitur⁹ racio quare sequitur quod Verbum assumendo humanitatem assumpsit essenciam, substanciam, aliquid, et naturam; et non assumendo illam humanitatem assumpsit individuum, suppositum, vel personam. Nam¹⁰ illa¹⁰ humanitas est per se inferius ad aliquid, essenciam, vel naturam; cum sit per se quiditas singularis in specie humana; persona autem¹¹ cum sit extra racionem generis creati est solum accidentaliter superius ad substanciam, aliquid et¹² quodcunque genus creatum. Cum ergo persona Verbi sit equivoce Verbum respectu humanitatis, patet quod non sequitur, si Verbum illam humanitatem assumpsit, que non primo per 149se sed a Deo equivoce est persona, quod exinde assumpsit personam: ut in exemplo non sequitur—Petrus fecit se septipedalem, album, patrem, et sic de ceteris generibus accidencium: ergo Petrus fecit se esse aliquid—; quia est aliquid extra racionem quanti, vel qualis etc. Correspondenter Verbum esse personam est tanquam longe prius extra racionem humanitatis, sed esse aliquid est racio per se humanitatis; cum Christus, in quantum homo, est aliquid eciam quod prius non fuerat: ideo assumendo hominem assumpsit aliquid non personam.

Third, it is clear that hypostatic assumption, union or incarnation, or however else it may be named, is neither generation, nor conversion, nor alteration, but identification; and if it is a change, then it is the mightiest "change of the right hand of the most High".6 For it is not generation, although generation follows upon it, as local motion [follows] upon the motion of augmentation; since every temporal generation is a production from not-being to being: but assumption seems to be a loweringminoracio: lowering of the highest subsistencesubsistencia: subsistence, since the Word through the incarnation was made a little lower than the angels, as the Apostle, Hebrews 2, expounds that [verse] of Psalm 8, "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels."7 Nor is it conversion, since the subsistence of the Word remains highest according to all its properties, not composed with anything.8 Nor is it alteration, both because the assumed humanity is not an inhering accidentaccidens: accident, and also because the person, according to the nature preceding the assumed humanity, is altogether immovableimmobilis / immobilitas: immovable / immovability, since no accident, to which motion tends, can inhere formally in that nature. From these the reason is gathered why it followssequitur: it follows that the Word, by assuming the humanity, assumed an essence, a substance, something and a nature; and [why it does] not [follow that], by assuming that humanity, he assumed an individualindividuum: individual, a supposit or a person. For that humanity is of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself an inferior to "something", "essence" or "nature", since it is of itself a singular quiddityquiditas: quiddity in the human species; but "person", since it is outside the account of the created genus, is only accidentally a superior to "substance", "something" and any created genus whatever. Since therefore the person of the Word is equivocallyequivoce: equivocally the Word with respect to the humanity,9 it is clear that it does not follow, if the Word assumed that humanity, which is a person not first of 149itself but from God, equivocally, that he thereby assumed a person: as in the example it does not follow: "Peter made himself seven feet tall, white, a father, and so of the other genera of accidents: therefore Peter made himself to be something"; since he is something outside the account of the quantifiedquantus: quantified or the qualified, etc. Correspondingly, the Word’s being a person is, as something long prior, outside the account of the humanity; now being something is of itself the account of the humanity; since Christ, insofar asin quantum (reduplicative): insofar as he is man, is something also which he had not been before: therefore by assuming man he assumed something, not a person.

¶4149.10–149.28

149Et si arguatur ex illo sequi quod Christus assumpsit personam hominis, sicut fecit se esse personam hominis: dicitur quod non hoc sed oppositum sequitur ex predictis; cum assumpcio non sit nisi nature per se possibilis, et, nulla¹ inherente accidente,¹ mutacio est assumpcio. Non enim quelibet faccio, sed solum faccio, qua natura racionalis fit Deus, est assumpcio vel ypostatica unio; et per conquens solum ydemptificacio est assumpcio.² Et patet quod sicut Christus fecit se esse hominem, animal, corpus, substanciam, et aliquid; sic assumpsit hec omnia in illa substancia singulari. Unde idem aliquid, quod fuit eternaliter est equivoce ad³ illud aliquid quod³ assumpsit. Ideo sicut albefactum sit⁴ ut sic⁴ coloratum et quale, licet perante fuerat coloratum, quia aliter non esset alteracio possibilis: sic in proposito per incarnacionem Christus fit aliquid licet prius fuit aliquid. Sicut enim sufficit ad alteratum, quod ipsum sit alterum secundum gradum quam prius; sic sufficit ad alietatem Christi quod aliquid aliud sit Christus quam prius fuerat.

And if it is argued that from that it follows that Christ assumed the person of a man, as he made himself to be the person of a man: the answer is that not this but the opposite follows from what has been said; since assumption is only of a nature possible of itself, and, with no accident inhering, the change is assumption.10 For not every makingfaccio: making whatever, but only the making by which a rational nature becomes God, is assumption or hypostatic union; and consequently only identification is assumption. And it is clear that, as Christ made himself to be man, animal, body, substance and something, so he assumed all these in that singular substance. Hence the same something which was eternally is equivocally [something] with respect to that something which he assumed. Therefore, as what is whitened becomes, as such, coloured and qualified, although it had been coloured before, since otherwise alteration would not be possible:11 so in the matter in hand, through the incarnation Christ becomes something, although before he was something. For as it suffices for what is altered that it be other in degree than before, so it suffices for Christ’s othernessalietas: otherness that something other is Christ than he had been before.

¶5149.29–150.16

149Et patet quod non est assumpcio nisi substancie; et per consequens nullius forme inherentis est assumpcio: ut Christus non assumpsit ypostatice se pati, mori, vel ascendere, quamvis se fecit huiusmodi; quia tunc ydemptificasset passionem, mortem, et ascensionem ypostasi Verbi, sicut fecit 150humanitatem; quod est impossibile. Et sic quelibet nature racionalis accidentalis transmutacio esset assumpcio; quod repugnat supradictis. Persona ergo Verbi accidentaliter est persona hominis. Ergo sicut non assumpsit dominium¹ in mundi principio, nec filium hominis pro instanti incarnacionis; sic nec personam hominis, cum non assumpsit personam. Sed assumendo ‘formam servi’ fecit se esse personam hominis; licet nullam personam se fecerit, sed illam naturam, quam assumpsit, se fecerit:² cum sophisma illud non habet hic locum—Christus fecit se esse hominem, sed nullum hominem—; cum illam³ humanitatem, et per consequens hoc aliquid se fecit, quod prius non fuerat. Unde si correspondenter esset persona hominis, que tunc et non prius⁴ fuit Verbum Dei; tunc concedendum esset quod personam hominis assumpsit: sed assumptum est impossibile.

And it is clear that there is no assumption except of substance; and consequently there is no assumption of any inhering form: as Christ did not assume hypostaticallyypostatice: hypostatically his suffering, dying or ascending, although he made himself such; since then he would have identified the passion, death and ascension with the hypostasisypostasis: hypostasis of the Word, as he did 150the humanity; which is impossible. And so every accidental transmutation of a rational nature would be assumption; which is incompatiblerepugnare; repugnancia: to be incompatible; incompatibility with what was said above. The person of the Word, therefore, is accidentally the person of a man. Therefore, as he did not assume lordshipdominium: lordship in the beginning of the world, nor [the] son of man at the instant of the incarnation, so neither [the] person of a man, since he did not assume a person.12 But by assuming "the form of a servant" he made himself to be the person of a man;13 although he made himself no person, but made himself that nature which he assumed: since that sophismsophisma: sophism has no place here: "Christ made himself to be man, but no man"; since he made himself that humanity, and consequently this something, which had not been before. Hence, if correspondingly there were a person of a man which then and not before was the Word of God, then it would have to be granted that he assumed the person of a man: but the assumptionassumptum: the assumption is impossible.14

¶6150.17–150.24

1502° principaliter obicitur per hoc quod videtur esse distinccio inter humanitatem, naturam, vel formam hominis et personam hominis; cum humanitatem, naturam, et formam hominis Verbum assumpsit,⁵ non personam: et hoc sufficit ad inferendum distinccionem. Oppositum tamen dicit posicio, cum dicit naturam assumptam esse personam Verbi; et sic non videtur quod Verbum hominem assumpsit,⁶ cum omnis homo sit persona, et nullam personam assumpserit.⁶

Second, as a main headprincipaliter; principalitas (of the body's presence): principally; principality, it is objected, by appeal toobicitur per: it is objected, by appeal to this, that there seems to be a distinction between the humanity, nature or form of man and the person of man; since the humanity, nature and form of man the Word assumed, not the person: and this suffices for inferring a distinction. Yet the positionposicio / proposicio / predicacio: position / proposition / predication says the opposite, since it says that the assumed nature is the person of the Word; and so it does not seem that the Word assumed a man, since every man is a person, and he assumed no person.15

Notes

  1. 1 Antecedente existente necessario: the antecedent ("the Word made himself to be a man") is necessarily true once the incarnation is supposed, while the consequent ("the Word made himself to be a person") is impossible; so the form of the objection’s inference fails. O reads tamen for tantum (146.29).
  2. 2 Principiare (147.4): to be the principle of, active, not the the glossary’s passive principiari. De quanto: "inasmuch as". The whole Trinity works the union, the Word alone assumes (cf. the Lombard, Sent. III d. 1 c. 4, PL 192, 758–759: Trinitas ergo carnis assumptionem fecit, sed Verbo, non Patri vel Spiritui sancto; verified). O reads vincit, corrected in the margin by another hand to univit (147.6).
  3. 3 In the second degree ipsum (neuter) is the uniting principle, the divine nature; in the third, sibi ipsi is the person, the Word. O adds causa after activa (147.6); C reads facit for fecit, O creata for creatam (147.12).
  4. 4 Secundum ipsam: "as to it", the humanity. The humanity is creator because it is the person of the Word, who creates as to the Godhead, not as to the humanity. A B read quod for cum (147.14).
  5. 5 Unire Verbo non nature primo quam sumpsit (148.1–2): quam sumpsit is taken as a relative with its antecedent understood, "[the nature] which it took", the object of unire; O makes it explicit, naturam quam sumpsit. A reads unisi (sic), B uniri "be united"; A reads sumpserit, B M assumpsit.
  6. 6 Ps 76:11 (Vulgate numbering), "this is the change of the right hand of the most High".
  7. 7 Ps 8:6 (DR "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels"), as Heb 2:7 cites it; minoratum est is Heb 2:9, "who was made a little lower than the angels". A B read assumpcio enim, O assumptum autem (148.10).
  8. 8 Subsistencie (148.10), the print; O substancie. Composita (148.15), the print, with O (which writes compos- at the line’s end and omits -ita); A B C read componens "not composing with anything". A B C read tollitur for colligitur (148.21).
  9. 9 Equivoce Verbum: construed as printed, "is equivocally the Word with respect to the humanity": the humanity is a person, and the Word, only from God and not first of itself (148.31–149.1). O reads naturaliter for Nam illa (148.24–25).
  10. 10 Nulla inherente accidente (149.14), the print, with O (which adds in); A B read natura inherente accidente, C natura [?]ente accidente. The sense: assumption is a change in which no accident comes to inhere. Nature per se possibilis, "of a nature possible of itself", is construed as printed and is doubtful.
  11. 11 Fit "becomes", with M (and O’s tit, a slip for the same word), against the print’s sit (149.22): Wyclif’s own parallel, Christus fit aliquid licet prius fuit aliquid, needs "becomes". As printed: "as what is whitened is, as such, coloured". C reads sit ut sit. A B C vary at ad illud aliquid quod (149.21): A ab illo quod, corrected in the margin to ob illud; B ab illo quod.
  12. 12 God is called Lord only from the time there was a creature to serve him: Augustine, De Trinitate V.16.17, the relation that comes to God in time without change in him, PL 42, 921–922: si dominus non dicitur, nisi cum habere incipit servum, etiam ista appellatio relativa ex tempore est Deo (verified). O reads donum "gift" for dominium (150.4).
  13. 13 Phil 2:7, "taking the form of a servant". A B C read fecerat for fecerit (150.9).
  14. 14 Assumptum: the logician’s sense, "the assumption" (the premiss supposed: that there was such a person of a man), not the assumption of the nature. C reads plus for prius (150.14).
  15. 15 A B C read assumpserit (150.20); O reads assumpserat at the second figure 6 (150.24).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English (margin matter): reference Heb. ii. (148.12); reference Ps.Tiii. (148.13).