De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 9, part 3
A distinction of reason, and in what sense the Word assumed man
Harris pp. 150.25–154.21
¶1150.25–151.16
Here the answer isdicitur (opening an answer): the answer is, as in the matter of the Trinity,1 that distinction is manifold: one essential, another personal, and another of reason. Hence a distinction of reasondistinccio racionis: distinction of reason does not destroy the mutual predicationposicio / proposicio / predicacio: position / proposition / predication of the things distinguished; as the nature of the speciesnatura specifica: the nature of the species of man, although it is distinguished from Peter by reason, since it is communicable to every man, but Peter is not, yet Peter is that nature of the species, and conversely, but not on equal terms.2 And the divine naturenatura: nature or essence is distinguished by reason from a personpersona: person, since it is communicated to the three persons, producing or 151produced; but no person could be so communicated, just as the divine nature withinadintra: within could not produce or be produced.3 And yet, notwithstanding the distinction of this reason, every divine person is the divine nature, and the converse. Correspondingly, since the person of the WordVerbum: the Word is communicated to the humanityhumanitas: the humanity and to the divinitydeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity, it is clear that there is a distinction of reason between that person and the humanity; since that person is the Godheaddeitas / divinitas: the Godhead / divinity, that person is eternal, absolutely necessary, equal without qualificationsimpliciter / secundum quid: without qualification / in a certain respect to God the Father. That humanity indeed cannot be the Godhead; but it is necessarily temporal, contingent, and less without qualification than God the Father, although it is personally that which is the Godhead, absolutely necessary and equal without qualification to God the Father. And it is clear [that] that distinction does not take away the mutual predication of the form of man and the person. And it is clear that the assumptionassumptum: the assumption in the argument is true, but the minor is denied, since no one rightly says the opposite.4
¶2151.17–152.23
Hence, if the more modernmoderniores (bare): the more modern had admitted predication by essencepredicacio secundum essenciam / formalis: predication by essence / formal predication or by person, though not formal [predication], granting nevertheless with Anselm, in De incarnatione chapter 7, that the nature of the species is each one of men, as the divine nature is each one of its suppositssuppositum: supposit;5 and correspondingly that the person of any man is both the body and the soul, although those natures are essentially distinguished; and that between any person of a man and those natures there is, with mutual predication, a distinction of reason: then, I say, it would savour to them that the divine nature and the human nature are each the person of the Word, although those natures are essentially distinguished, and between the Word and each nature there is a distinction of reason; and then that philosophical example of the faith in the creed of Athanasius, which Augustine so often recites, would savour to them: "as the rational soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ."6 Therefore the turning aside from these principles makes, no wonder, the greatest variation in what follows.7 152Further, it is to be granted, in the proper sense of the wordsde virtute sermonis: in the proper sense of the words, that the Word assumed man, as Augustine, Jerome and Anselm very often say, and the ancients who were rightly wise in logic.8 For since "man" is the concreteconcretum / abstractum: concrete [term] / abstract [term] [term] of the humanity, as "God" of the Godhead, it is clear that it can stand indifferently, with simple supposition, for the nature, or with personal supposition for the person; so that, as God is communicated to all three divine persons, because the Godhead is so common, and yet the same God is uncommunicated, since he is the begetting person; so man is communicated to every person of a man, since it is the form of the species; and yet man cannot be so communicated, since it is the person of a man; and correspondingly of other [terms] varied equivocallyequivoce: equivocally according to simple and personal supposition. Hence whenever it is said that the Word assumed man, it is to be understood with simple supposition, for the nature; so that he assumedassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption the humanity not onlynedum: not only of the species but singular, which Anselm names Jesus Christ.9 Indeed, if we attend diligently to how "man" primarily signifies a what-of-a-kind or substantial quality, as Aristotle and Anselm say, such a propositionposicio / proposicio / predicacio: position / proposition / predication (the Word assumed man) would signify that he had assumed the human nature before [it would signify] that he had assumed the person of a man.10 Therefore such a proposition is to be granted in its primary sense, and the other sense is to be denied.
¶3152.24–153.9
And if the difference is asked between those terms "humanity" and "man" as to the mode of signifying, since, although they are predicated of each other, yet it matters in many places to put the one or the other: the answer is that, in the manner of other terms of which one is concrete and the other abstract, the concrete stands indifferently, with personal supposition for the person or with simple supposition for the nature; and hence it receives formal predication of any kind of accident: but the abstract, taken abstractivelyabstractive: abstractively, does not formally take up any predication but predication of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself and predication by respecthabitudo: condition / respect,11 rejecting all formal 153suppositional predication; so that the humanity is not qualified or quantifiedquantus: quantified by accident, nor acts, nor is acted on, sits or is enriched,12 but it receives relationalrespectus; respectivus: relation; relational predications in the way that was said of universalsuniversale; ydea: universal; idea; so that, if the humanity were white, since the humanity is to be a man, then to be a man would be formally to be white; and consequently, as Aristotle argues, man would then be whiteness.13 And it is clear that the Word assumed only the humanity or human nature, not the person of a man; although in another sense every humanity is a person.
¶4153.10–154.11
Nevertheless it is to be noted that in the matter of the incarnation the holy doctors use this term "humanity" as a mean between abstract and concrete: as Augustine says in homily 19 on John, that "Mary bore the humanity, which also suffered on the cross"; and Enchiridion 29: "that creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created," he says, "which the virgin conceived and bore, although belonging to the person of the Son alone, the whole Trinity made." For the works of the Trinity are inseparable, and undoubtedly by "that creature" he understands the human substance, which is the humanity, since a little before he says that each substance, namely the divine and the human, is the only Son of God the Father.14 And so of many like [sayings], all of which, with those like them, are to be understood [to mean] that predicates of this kind are in the person of the Word of God insofar assecundum quod (reduplicative): insofar as [he is] man; that is, the humanity is the means or cause according to which predicates of this kind are in [him]; so that he would not have whence to be tempted, to be begotten, or meritoriously to suffer, and so of the other communications of idiomscommunicacio ydiomatum: communication of idioms, except by assuming the nature of man. Nor is this uneven transumptiontranssumpcio: transumption in that matter a wonder, since only the Word of God is man by accident, being person before man;15 since only that personality draws to itself a singular nature into its hypostasisypostasis: hypostasis; but the other persons of like nature are [persons] with other singular forms. 154Therefore thus, when I say this, "he suffered on the cross", many of the faithful are indifferent to understanding that passion as to the Godheadsecundum deitatem / secundum humanitatem: as to the Godhead / as to the humanity or as to the humanity; but many are more inclined to understand it as to that nature according to which he has subsistencesubsistencia: subsistence and person.16 Therefore the saintssancti: the saints reasonably ordained, especially in that matter, for the destruction of ambiguity of this kind and the making certain of the pertinent teachingsentencia: teaching / sentence, that the abstract should limit to the sense expounded. Whenever, therefore, it is said that the humanity of Christ took up predications of this kind, it is to be understood that Christ as to it so takes them up.17
¶5154.12–154.21
Third, as a main headprincipaliter; principalitas (of the body's presence): principally; principality, it is argued by deducing many absurditiesinconveniencia; inconveniens: an absurdity (in argument) · troubles, ill consequences (in affairs) that follow.18 For first it seems that not only is the same thing assuming and also assumed, but that the assuming is the assumed, the creating is the createdcreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created, the cause its caused; indeed, if the Lord Jesus Christ is assumed, then God too is assumed, as the humanity is humbledhumiliacio: humbling:19 and consequently, according to the twofold nature, there was a twofold assumptionassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption of Christ: indeed, if natures so distant could be identifiedydemptificare / ydemptificacio: identify / identification, much more evidently could hypostases, which agree more in nature, be united by so great an identity.
Notes
- 1 In materia De Trinitate: Harris italicises De Trinitate as a title; but the phrase names the topic, the doctrine of the Trinity, as in materia de incarnacione does at 153.10. O reads quod for sicut (150.25).
- 2 "Yet", without "and": A C O omit et before tamen (150.30), against the print’s et tamen; agreement across the families outranks the print. A B C read distinguitur for distinguatur (150.29).
- 3 O omits sicut … poterit (151.1–2), by eye-skip from poterit to poterit; O reads communicati et for communicatur (151.5) and quieta for quidem (151.9).
- 4 Assumptum is the logician’s premiss, not the assumption of a nature: the objection’s premiss (the Word assumed the humanity, not a person, 150.19–20) is true; the minor that would make it infer a distinction excluding mutual predication is denied.
- 5 Anselm, Epistola de incarnatione Verbi, c. 7 in Wyclif’s numbering (Schmitt c. 11; PL 158, c. VI, 278B–D): in Deo una natura est plures personae, and the person has the collectionem … proprietatum, quibus homo communis sit singulus. Singulus hominum "each one of men" (151.20) is the print; A B C read an abbreviated sing…s, O singulis. Predicacio secundum personam is set beside the ruled predicacio secundum essenciam.
- 6 The Quicumque (Athanasian Creed), v. 37 (PL 88, 586B). Augustine uses the likeness at In Iohannis evangelium tr. 78.3 (PL 35, 1836), Epistula 137.3.11 (PL 33, 520) and Enchiridion 11.36. Saperet illis "it would savour to them", i.e. they would grasp it; Wyclif plays on sapuerunt in logica (152.3). A B C omit illud (151.29); O reads et for quod (151.30).
- 7 "Therefore" with C (ergo) and O (igitur), against the print’s autem (151.32, with A B): agreement across the families. As printed: "And the turning aside …".
- 8 That the Word assumed man (hominem): Augustine, Enchiridion 11.36 (suscepit hominem) and De Trinitate XIII.18.23; Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi (PL 158, 275C, 278B). For Jerome the phrase is found in the Breviarium in Psalmos (PL 26, 877C), which went under his name. A’s text was erased and corrected in the margin to de vi vocis "by the force of the words" (152.1).
- 9 Simpliciter here is the supposition term (simple supposition, the term standing for the common nature), set against personaliter (personal supposition), not "without qualification". Anselm names the singular assumed man Jesus: Verbum, et illum assumptum hominem, id est Jesum (De incarnatione Verbi, PL 158, 279B, c. VI = Wyclif’s 7). Wyclif takes this as a name of the singular humanity.
- 10 "Man" signifies quale quid, a substance of a kind: Aristotle, Categories 5, 3b13–21, and Anselm, De grammatico c. 19 (PL 158, 578B–C), where homo signifies ut unum substantiam et qualitates and is non qualitas, sed quale. Prius … quam "before … rather than". O omits quam … assumpserat (152.21).
- 11 Habitudo here in its "respect" sense: predication under a relation, as of a universal. Per se: predication of the essence itself. O reads queretur (152.24); A B C read multicubi for multibi "in many places" (152.26), the same word.
- 12 The categories in turn: quality, quantity, action, being-acted-on, position (sedet), having (ditatur "is enriched"). C O read dicatur "is said" for ditatur (153.2); it fits no category in the list, and the print is kept.
- 13 Aristotle’s argument, Metaphysics VII.6, 1031a19–28: if an accidental unity were the same as its essence, the essence of man and of white man would be the same. Wyclif’s conclusion that man would be whiteness is his own application. Naturam humanum (153.8) is the print’s form for humanam.
- 14 Augustine, Tractatus in Iohannem 119.1 (PL 35, 1950; Wyclif’s "19" probably drops a C): quod Maria pepererat, pendebat in cruce, cf. tr. 8.9 (PL 35, 1455), genuisti infirmitatem meam … cum ipsa infirmitas pendebit in cruce. Wyclif’s sentence paraphrases this and puts humanitas for Augustine’s infirmitas; Enchiridion 12.38 (PL 40, 251), where the paulo ante is earlier in the same section: utraque substantia, divina scilicet atque humana, Filius est unicus Dei Patris. O reads totum for tota (153.16), non for enim (153.17), omits scilicet (153.20).
- 15 "Only", with C O, which read solum (153.29); Harris brackets it as corrupted from the next line’s cum solum and would omit it, an emendation against every manuscript that has the clause (A B omit cum … homo, 153.29–30). O reads quod homo est quod for quod homo; hoc est (153.23), coicantibus for communicacionibus (153.26–27), transit for trahit (153.30); A B C read simul nature sunt cum illis (153.32).
- 16 Ideo sic cum dico hoc is O’s reading (154.1); A B C read ideo cum sic dico homo, "when I say thus, 'man suffered on the cross'"; Harris thinks sic or hoc superfluous. The nature by which he has subsistence and person is the divine nature: hence the saints’ use of the abstract "humanity" to fix the predicate to the other.
- 17 Suscepit "took up" (154.9) stands in the print beside the foot’s "suscepit O"; the print’s own form here is in doubt. C omits specialiter (154.6) and reads abstractis (154.8).
- 18 Inconveniencia in its logical sense: absurd consequences. A B read deducendo ad multiplicia inconveniencia, O deducenda (154.12–13).
- 19 Humiliatur (154.17), the print, with O, read on the plate; A B C read humanitas humanatur "the humanity is humanated". O omits the final potuerunt (154.21).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- Plate readings; page · reading · note):
- 154: hoc—‘passus (print as transcribed) [SUB]
- 154: humanitas (print as transcribed (humanitas humiliatur)) [SUB]