Wyclif’s Latin works

De potestate pape, chapter 1, part 1

What power is, and the senses of the word

Loserth pp. 1.1–5.21

About this chapter

Occasion. The Tractatus de potestate pape is a treatise in twelve chapters, written in 1379 on Loserth’s dating (intro. §4: not before 1379, at the latest early 1380), after De ecclesia and *De veritate sacre scripture*, which precede it in Wyclif’s Summa theologie; its first sentence cites chapter 14 of "the book next before", De veritate. It opens with Iam ultimo restat, "it remains, last of all", and so presents itself as the closing stage of a larger inquiry into the church: having treated the church, Wyclif now asks how Christ ordered its hierarchy. It is the ninth of the twelve books of his Summa theologie. Wyclif speaks in the first person, states conclusions, raises objections and answers them.

The text. Johann Loserth’s edition for the Wyclif Society (1907) rests on Prague, Metropolitan Chapter C 73 (A), his base, with Prague, University Library III F 11 (B, early fifteenth century), which he judges a copy of A (B omits words that A has); Prague, University Library XI E 3 (C) supplies variants only near the end (pp. 395–397). Loserth prints the marginal notes of A and B; A’s copyist was no friend to Wyclif and annotates against him (cave foveam, hic contradicit sibi). Our copy-text is Loserth’s printed text, read against the plates. In the scripture references the chapter numbers are Wyclif’s, the verse numbers Loserth’s. The side-notes are Loserth’s own English, printed verbatim. Pages 398–406 of the edition print a medieval summary of the chapters (*Sentencia libri … in compendio*) that came down with the work as the index in A and B, incomplete in both and breaking off at the same words; it is translated here like the text.

The move. Before the pope, power. Proceeding, as he says, from what is prior after the manner of nature, Wyclif first settles what power (potestas) is and in how many ways the word is said: the active and passive potencies of Metaphysics V, rational potency and Anselm’s free choice, the acquired habit, and from it the twofold power in man, supernatural and civil; then, from scripture, the angelic order of "powers", sovereign authority, and the pretended power of darkness. Only then does he turn to Peter’s primacy, the pope as vicar of Christ, papal election, the "caesarean" pope and the endowment, and Antichrist. Richard FitzRalph, archbishop of Armagh (dominus Ardmacanus), and his Summa in quaestionibus Armenorum are quoted and answered at length. Potestas is always "power". Potencia is "potency" where Wyclif works Aristotle’s analysis of power, and "power" elsewhere. Wyclif himself treats the two words as interchangeable (potestas vel potencia).

Where it is answered. Loserth’s foot-notes mark the passages that Hus took over into his own *De ecclesia* ("but an echo" of Wyclif’s two treatises, intro. p. i). A direct answer to the treatise has not yet been traced.

¶11.1–1.14

1Iam ultimo restat videre quomodo Christus, dominus noster, caput universalis ecclesie, ordinavit sponsam suam secundum gradus ecclesiastice hierarchie. Pro cuius declaracione necesse est primo supponere stabilimentum autoritatis scripture, de quo patet capitulo XIV libri proximi. Secundo suppono vulgatas significaciones terminorum questionis, quas alibi expono diffusius. Quibus suppositis superest tractare de partibus, de quantitate, de qualitate et habitudine moderne ecclesie ad priorem. Et cum innata sit nobis via instar nature a priori procedere, necessarium videtur scholasticum stabiliri in materia de quidditate et accidentibus potestatis.

It remains, last of all, to see how Christ our Lord, headcaput: head of the universal churchecclesia: church, ordered his bridesponsa / sponsus: bride / bridegroom according to the grades of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. To make this clear it is necessary, first, to presuppose the establishment of the authority of scripture, as is clear from chapter 14 of the nearest book.1 Second, I presuppose the common significationssignacio / significacio: signification of the terms of the question, which I expound more fully elsewhere. These being presupposed, it remains to treat of the parts, of the quantity, of the quality and of the condition towardhabitudo: condition / respect the earlier [church] of the modern church. And since the way innate to us is, after the manner of nature, to proceed from what is prior, it seems necessary that the student be grounded in the matter of the quiddityquiditas: quiddity and accidents of powerpotestas: power.2

¶21.15–2.22

1Potestas enim est universale instrumentum operandi et communicandi in ista materia. Describitur autem potestas ab Aristotele V Metaphysice quod est principium motus vel mutacionis aut in altero aut in quantum alterum. Et 2sic est communis ad omnem activam potestatem; quo modo videtur scripturam loqui Apocalypsis IX, 3 dicente: Quod data est potestas locustis, sicut habent potestatem scorpiones terre; racione cuius potestatis tenet dominus Ardmacanus II de questionibus Armenorum, capitulo IV, quod potestas est extensior quam nature racionalis potencia. Sed quia iuxta Aristotelem (ubi supra) potestas equivocatur ad quatuor, scilicet generaliter ad activam potenciam iam descriptam, que est vis transmutandi aliquid motu proprie dicto vel mutacione quantumlibet extensiva; et sic est vis generandi atque corrumpendi. Nec solum dicitur respectu essencie extra potens sed eadem essencia, in quantum activa, dicitur habere potenciam agendi intra se ipsam, in quantum est passiva, vel racione indisposicionis contrarie aut racione terminandi quomodolibet faccionem propriam ut passiva. Sic enim est potestas rectificandi se in virga, potestas frigefaciendi se in aqua, et potestas intelligendi se in anima; et sic de similibus.

For power is the universal instrument of working and of communicating in this matter. And power is defined by Aristotle, Metaphysics V, as that which "is the principle of motion or change either in another or in so far as [it is] other".3 And 2so it is common to every active power; and in this way scripture seems to speak in Apocalypse 9:3, saying "that power was given to the locusts, as the scorpions of the earth have power";4 by reason of which power the lord of Armagh holds, in book II of the Questions of the Armenians, chapter 4, that "power is wider than the powerpotencia: potency / power of rational nature".5 But since, according to Aristotle (in the place cited), power is said equivocally in four ways: namely, generally, of the active potency already defined, which is the force of transforming something by motion properly so called, or by change however extended; and so it is the force of generating and corrupting.6 Nor is it said only with respect to an essence outside the one that has the power; but the same essence, in so far as it is active, is said to have a potency of acting within itself, in so far as it is passive, either by reason of a contrary unfitnessindisposicio: unfitness or by reason of terminating in any way its own making, as passive.7 For in this way there is a power of straightening itself in a rod, a power of cooling itself in water, and a power of understanding itself in the soul; and so of like cases.

¶32.23–3.2

2Quamvis autem transmutatum in istis non sit aliud quam ipsum transmutans, tamen vel est alterum, vel ut terminans potenciam est alterius racionis. Et sic intelligendo potenciam patens est eius divisio, cum aliqua sit increata, et aliqua potencia est creata. Increata potencia potest intelligi dupliciter, vel personaliter ut pro patre in divinis, cuius actum terminat Verbum suum, qui non est aliud sed alter, et alius quam dicta potencia, quia genitus et causatus; vel essencialiter 3ut tota trinitas est una potencia intelligendi ac volendi se ipsam.

And although what is transformed in these cases is not another thing than the transformer itself, yet either it is other,8 or, as terminating the potency, it is of another aspectracio (against substancia): aspect. And understanding potency in this way, its division is plain, since some is uncreated, and some potency is created.9 Uncreated potency can be understood in two ways: either personally, as [it is taken] for the Father in divine matters, whose act is terminated by his Word, who is not another thing but another, and other than the said potency, because begotten and caused; or essentially, 3as the whole Trinity is one potency of understanding and of willing itself.10

¶43.3–3.10

3Et sic potest vocari potestas illa solum ad actus intrinsecos vel ad extra, ut est effectus extrinseci productiva. Que potestas licet non sit dispar essencia, tamen dicit disparem relacionem racionis hic et ibi. Et omnis talis potestas est increata, immensa et eterna, sicut natura divina, que est illa potencia; et sic loquitur scriptura Danielis VI, 26: Potestas eius usque in eternum.

And so that [potency] can be called power, either with respect to intrinsic acts alone or with respect to what is outside, as it is productive of an extrinsic effect.11 And though this power is not a different essence, yet it implies a different relation of reason here and there. And every such power is uncreated, immense and eternal, as is the divine nature, which is that potency; and so scripture speaks in Daniel 6:26: "His power shall be for ever."

¶53.11–3.23

3Potestas autem creata vel est corporalis vel spiritualis, et sic subdividendo secundum differencias activorum, in quibus sunt multe differencie, quia spiritualis potestas racionalis creature est perpetua indelebilis sed restringibilis in effectu, corporalis autem potestas est delebilis et acquiribilis, cum sit qualitas de secunda specie qualitatis non inseparabiliter connaturalis substancie cui inest. Secundo vero modo sumitur potestas in textu Aristotelis, pro passiva potencia creature, secundum quam dicitur recipere congrue activi extrinseci accionem.

And created power is either corporeal or spiritual, and so [one goes on] subdividing according to the differencesdifferencia: difference (logical differentia) of active things, among which there are many differences; for the spiritual power of a rational creature is perpetual, indelible, but restrictable in effect, while corporeal power is delible and acquirable, since it is a quality of the second species of quality, not inseparably connatural to the substance in which it is.12 And in the second way power is takensumitur pro: is taken for in Aristotle’s text for the passive potency of a creature, according to which it is said to receive fittingly the action of an extrinsic agent.

¶63.24–5.21

3Sed tercio pertinencius accipitur potestas pro principio faciendi aliquid, non quocunque modo, sed bene, quod Aristoteles dicit fieri secundum voluntatem. Et ista videtur mihi potencia rationalis; de qua nono Methaphisice 30 et 10. Et illa subdividitur secundum homines et angelos bonos vel malos; et illa potestas dicitur vel intrinsece vel extrinsece, proporcionaliter ut dictum est de potencia divina; unde potencia racionalis inseparabilis 4a creatura racionali servandi rectitudinem vocatur a venerabili Anshelmo, liberum arbitrium, ut patet in libello suo De Libero Arbitrio. Liberum, inquit, arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem; tales autem potenciae impediri potuerunt sed non extingui. Verumtamen potestas vel potencia sumitur quandoque pro sufficiencia meritorie operandi, vel incitantibus resistendi, et talis per peccatum potest diminui atque tolli. Quarto vero modo accipit Aristoteles potestatem sive potenciam pro habitu accidenter aquisito, secundum quod eius subiectum potens est alterius mutatum, ut ars medicinalis vel alii habitus operandi. Nec distat multum sufficiencia iam dicta ab ista potencia. Secundum hoc itaque inest homini duplex maneries potestatis, scilicet supernaturalis et civilis. Supernaturalis est potestas, quam Deus dat homini ad spiritualiter proficiendum ecclesie, cuiusmodi est potestas sacerdotalis in conficiendo vel ministrando sacramenta aut alia spiritualia bona ecclesie. Potestas autem civilis est potestas dominativa ad cohercendum rebelles ecclesie secundum penam sensibilem et dicit libertatem in potentatu et subdicione in extrinseco terminante. Et isto modo videtur Salvator dicere Math. XX, 25: Principes gencium dominantur eorum; et qui maiores sunt potestatem exercent in eos. Et Jeremie XXXIV, 9 refert Propheta quomodo Judei dimiserant servos suos et ancillas, ut essent liberi sue potestatis; quando 5enim homo habet libertatem sine coactivo preposito ad faciendum cum suis quod foret sibi expedicius, tunc dicitur sub nullius redigi potestate, ut loquitur Apostolus I. Corinth. VI, 12; et sic videtur Apostolum loqui I. Corinth. VII, 4 quando dicit quod coniuges non habent sui corporis potestatem, eo quod oportet eos ex debito servire sibi reciproce in actibus carnalibus, quando esset utilius contemplari. Et sic servitus et obligacio ad carnalem copulam in coniugio sunt status imperfecti quodammodo. Preter istas significaciones sumitur potestas in scriptura nunc pro sexto ordine angelorum, ut Colos. I, 16 et aliquando pro ipso potentatu, ut Rom. XIII, Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. Et quandoque sumitur equivoce pro potestate pretensa vel false palliata, ut Luce XXII, 53 dicit Christus suis captoribus: Hec est hora vestra et potestas tenebrarum. Et istas equivocaciones potestatum oportet diligenter notare secundum pertinencia materie ventilate.

But in the third way, and more pertinently, power is taken for the principle of doing something, not in any manner whatever, but well, which Aristotle says "comes about according to will".13 And this seems to me to be rational potency, of which [he treats in] Metaphysics IX, 3 and 1.14 And it is subdivided according to men and angels, good or evil; and that power is spoken of either intrinsically or extrinsically, proportionally as was said of the divine potency; hence the rational potency of keeping rectitude, inseparable 4from a rational creature, is called by the venerable Anselm free choiceliberum arbitrium: free choice, as is clear in his little book On Free Choice. "Free choice," he says, "is the power of keeping rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself";15 and such powers could be hindered but not extinguished. Nevertheless, power or potency16 is sometimes taken for the sufficiency to work meritoriously, or to resist those who incite [to sin], and such [power] can be diminished and taken away through sin. And in the fourth way Aristotle takes power or potency for a habit accidentally acquired, according to which its subject, [itself] changed, is capable of [changing] another, as the art of medicine or other habits of working.17 And the sufficiency just mentioned differs little from this potency. Accordingly, then, there is in man a twofold kind of power, namely supernatural and civil. Supernatural power is the power which God gives a man for profiting the church spiritually, of which kind is priestly power in confecting or ministering the sacraments or other spiritual goods of the church. And civil power is lordly power for coercingcoactivus; cohercere, cohersitivus: coactive; coerce, coercive rebels against the church by perceptiblesensibilis (in the definition of animal): sentient penalty, and it implies freedom in the one who holds sovereignty and subjection in the extrinsic party in which it terminates.18 And in this way the Saviour seems to speak in Matthew 20:25: "The princes of the Gentiles lord it overdominus; dominari: lord; to exercise lordship / to lord it them; and they that are the greater, exercise power upon them." And in Jeremiah 34:9 the prophet relates how the Jews had let their menservants and maidservants go, "that they might be free, in their own power"; for 5when a man has freedom, without a coactivecoactivus; cohercere, cohersitivus: coactive; coerce, coercive superior, to do with his own what would be more expedient to him, then he is said to be "brought under the power of none", as the Apostle speaks in 1 Corinthians 6:12; and so the Apostle seems to speak in 1 Corinthians 7:4 when he says that "spouses have not power of their own body", because they must, out of the marriage debtdebitum (coniugale), ex debito: the (marriage) debt, serve one another in carnal acts when it would be more profitable to contemplate. And so servitude and obligation to carnal union in marriage are in a certain way imperfect states.19 Besides these significations, power is taken in scripture at one time for the sixth order of angels, as in Colossians 1:16, and at another for sovereignty itself, as in Romans 13[:1], "Let every soul be subject to higher powers."20 And sometimes it is taken equivocallyequivoce: equivocally for a power pretended or falsely cloakedpalliacio; palliare: cloaking; to cloak, as in Luke 22:53 Christ says to his captors: "This is your hour and the power of darkness." And these equivocations of powers must be carefully noted, according to what pertains to the matter under discussion.

Notes

  1. 1 capitulo XIV libri proximi, "chapter 14 of the nearest book". Loserth takes libri proximi for a scribal error: the nearest book is De officio regis, which treats only royal power, while the establishing of scripture’s authority runs through De veritate sacre scripture (ed. Buddensieg). De officio regis has only twelve chapters, and chapter 14 of De veritate (on keeping silent about the truth) does not treat the point; the chapter meant is untraced.
  2. 2 Quiditas, "quiddity", is what a thing is; its accidents are what belong to it beyond that. A priori procedere is "to proceed from what is prior", not the modern epistemic sense. The phrase innata … nobis via recalls Aristotle, Physics I.1 (innata autem est nobis via ex notioribus nobis), 184a16.
  3. 3 Aristotle, Metaphysics Δ 12 (Wyclif’s book V). Loserth: "rectius Metaph. IV, 12, ed. acad. Borussica" (principium motus aut transmutacionis in altero aut prout alterum est); the modern form Δ 12, 1019a15–20 is ours.
  4. 4 Wyclif has data est potestas locustis; the Vulgate data est illis potestas (DR "power was given to them").
  5. 5 FitzRalph, Summa in quaestionibus Armenorum II.4, as Wyclif cites it; Loserth could not check it ("mihi ad manum non est"); in the Paris 1512 print, book II is on Old Testament proofs that the Messiah is God (II.4 is on Ps. 109), so Wyclif’s numbering does not match the print, and the words were not found in XI.1–7 either. The Latin is potestas est extensior quam nature racionalis potencia. The comparison is of extent (power in general, which the locusts have, against the power of rational nature), not of two concepts, so potencia is "power" here. Wyclif treats potestas and potencia as interchangeable in this chapter (see n. 16).
  6. 6 Sed quia … potestas equivocatur ad quatuor has no main clause: the period breaks off after the first sense, and the count resumes at 3.20 (Secundo), 3.24 (tercio) and 4.11 (Quarto). The English keeps the break.
  7. 7 extra potens, "outside the one that has the power": the patient distinct from the agent, as against the self-acting case that follows. Loserth refers this line (2.16) to Aristotle, Metaph. VIII, 1, 2 (= Θ 1, 1046a, our modern form).
  8. 8 aliud … alterum: "another thing" (a different nature) as against "other" (the same thing taken otherwise), the distinction applied to the Trinity at 2.29–3.1.
  9. 9 B lacks et aliqua potencia est creata (2.27–28); the print is translated.
  10. 10 qui non est aliud sed alter: the Son is "not another thing but another", i.e. not a different nature but a different person. Causatus, "caused", is Wyclif’s word for the Son and is kept.
  11. 11 Et sic potest vocari potestas illa: we take illa (the uncreated potencia of 2.26–3.2) as the subject and potestas as the predicate, so that Wyclif says the potency just divided may be called power. The alternative takes potestas illa together as the subject ("that power can be called [so]"). In God the "potency" of this analysis is active power, terminated by the Word, not unrealised potentiality; it stays "potency" (here and at 3.9, 3.31) because Wyclif is carrying Aristotle’s division into the Trinity.
  12. 12 The second species of quality is natural capacity or incapacity (Aristotle, Categories 8, 9a14). Indelebilis is Loserth’s form (codd. indelibilis); for delebilis (3.16) B reads debilis, "weak".
  13. 13 Aristotle, Metaph. Δ 12, 1019a23–26 (kata proairesin); Loserth refers 3.26 to Metaph. VIII, 1. B lacks tercio (3.24).
  14. 14 The print has nono Methaphisice 30 et 10 (checked on the plate); we take 30 and 10 for the ordinals 3° and 1°, the ° printed as a zero, chapters. Loserth: "Rectius Metaph. VIII, 2" (= Θ 2, 1046b, on rational potencies; our modern form).
  15. 15 Anselm, De libertate arbitrii 3 (PL 158, 494B: libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem); Loserth gives Anselm, Opera (Paris, 1721), p. 118.
  16. 16 potestas vel potencia, "power or potency" (so potestatem sive potenciam, 4.11): Wyclif doubles the two words as synonyms, as he calls the uncreated potencia potestas (3.3) and says every such potestas "is the divine nature, which is that potencia" (3.9). Potestas is always "power"; potencia is "potency" inside Aristotle’s analysis and "power" elsewhere (Anselm’s tales potencie just above, "such powers").
  17. 17 potens est alterius mutatum does not construe cleanly: "its subject, changed, is capable of another". The bracketed words give the likelier sense (Aristotle’s potency in another); mutativum, "capable of changing", may have been intended. Loserth records no variant.
  18. 18 Loserth prints et subdicione; the manuscripts read subdicionem (4.27). The English follows the manuscripts: the print’s ablative does not construe (it would put "subjection" under in beside "freedom", "freedom in sovereignty and in subjection"), while the accusative makes subjection a second thing that civil power implies, lodged in the party subjected. Potentatus is therefore concrete here, "the one who holds sovereignty", in parallel with in extrinseco terminante. Loserth also reports Codd.: vel ut at 4.21, where his print has vel (conficiendo vel ministrando).
  19. 19 Jeremiah 34:9 tells of the release; the phrase ut essent liberi et suae potestatis is from 34:16 (DR "let go free, and set at liberty"), here without et. 1 Corinthians 6:12 Vg sed ego sub nullis redigar potestate (DR "I will not be brought under the power of any"); 7:4 is paraphrased.
  20. 20 Loserth notes that Hus’s De ecclesia (fol. 217b) gives 5.11–19 word for word. Potentatus is rendered "sovereignty" (5.13) and, of its holder, "the one who holds sovereignty" (4.27).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Plate readings; page · reading · note):
    • 1: ∅ (print has nothing between Iam and ultimo; scans’ text is English preface) [GAP]
    • 1: V
    • 1: aut
    • 2: sicut
    • 3: illa
    • 3: est perpetua indelebilis (one token covers three printed words)
    • 3: sed restringibilis (one token covers two printed words)
    • 3: illa
    • 3: illa
    • 4: pote- (hyphenated pote-/statem; main token holds first half)
    • 4: statem (second half of pote-statem)
    • 5: coactivo (print has v) [NW]
    • 5: ∅ (15 is the line number)
    • 3: principio (25 is the line number)
  • 3.28 30 et 10: as printed (plate n0064 read this session); see n. 12.
  • Omitted per: line numbers and the MS folio marker 162ª (3.21).