Wyclif’s Latin works

De potestate pape, chapter 1, part 2

Spiritual and secular power, after Hugh of St Victor

Loserth pp. 5.22–9.10

¶15.22–8.2

5Quamvis autem nesciam fundare efficaciter ex scriptura, quod aliqua sit potestas nisi racionalis potencia, tamen quia videtur Aristotelem et doctores nostros loqui extensius, et nomen est vox sensitiva ad placitum, satis possunt admitti omnes significaciones termini supradicte, nam beatus Johannes intelligit in primo libro prophetico homines bestialiter conversantes. In cuius signum Apocal. IX describit bestias descripcionibus, quales non possunt corporaliter competere animali. Ut patet de locustis, quas dicit habere caudas similes scorpionum, et aculei erant in caudis earum. 6Et sic intelligitur de potestate equorum, qui post tubacionem sexti angeli exierunt, et conformiter intelligitur capitulo XIII, 4 de potestate, quam draco dedit bestie. Unde propter defectum auctoris non audeo dicere quod Deus habet potestatem producendi quicquam ad intra sed solum ad extra, licet habeat potenciam ad omnia producibilia sui intrinseca producendum, nec personam aut actum in Deo sue dicimus subici potestati. Omnes tamen actus nostri liberi arbitrii, sicut opera extrinseca per hos facta, dicuntur nostre subici potestati, ut patet I. Retractacionum XXXII, III De libero arbitrio et in De spiritu et anima XXVI. Unde non sequitur: si unum convertibilium non sit in potestate nostra, tunc nec reliquum vel e contra; antecedens non est in potestate nostra, igitur nec consequens vel e contra. Et sic argumentando affirmative ex opposito: in potestate, inquit Augustinus, nostra non est, nisi quod nostram sequitur voluntatem. Sequitur enim: Deus predestinavit me igitur habeo virtutem finalis perseverancie et e contra. Sequitur eciam: placet mihi de hoc quod digero alimentum, igitur sic digero; antecedens est in potestate mea et consequens non, quia ex II. Ethicorum propter illa que non sunt in potestate nostra non sumus laudandi moraliter nec culpandi. Supposito igitur, quod fiat restriccio potestatis a racionalem potenciam liberam accidentalem homini, patet quod tales potestates habent subdivisionem 7multiplicem et terminos magistrales, ut alia est potestas ordinis, alia regiminis vel iurisdiccionis, alia potestas autentica, et alia vicaria vel commissa. Et breviter secundum distinccionem operum est distinccio potestatum. Famosior autem distinccio potestatis pertinens huic proposito est illa quam tangit Hugo II De Sacramentis, parte II capitulo IV, dicens quod sicut duplex est vita hominis; vita terrena corporalis vel naturalis, alia celestis spiritualis vel supernaturalis, sic duplex est potestas. Prima vita corpus vivit ex anima, secunda vero vita anima vivit ex Deo illapso per graciam, et utraque vita suum bonum habet quo vegetatur et nutritur, ut possit subsistere; ut autem in utraque vita iusticia servetur, est dare secundum duos populos, scilicet clerum et laicos, duplicem potestatem, scilicet spiritualem et secularem; et in utraque diversi sunt gradus et ordines potestatum, sub uno tamen capite ecclesie utrimque distributi, et quasi ab uno principio deducti et ad unum relati. Terrena potestas caput habet regem in terris, sicut spiritualis potestas summum pontificem, Sed difficultas scolastica est quomodo iste potestates due describi debeant; et videtur Hugonem innuere quod spiritualis potestas sit potestas clerici ad dirigendum ecclesiam, ut bene vivat vita spirituali. Potestas autem secularis vel terrena sit potestas laici ad dirigendum ecclesiam, ut bene vivat vita naturali. Et habent iste potestates suas leges ac bona sua, de quibus principaliter intromittunt, ut laicus 8bona nature et fortune, sed clericus bona gracie et virtutis.

But although I cannot ground effectively from scripture that there is any powerpotestas: power other than a rational potencypotencia: potency / power,1 yet because Aristotle and our doctors seem to speak more broadly, and a name is a perceptible sound by convention,2 all the significations of the term set out above can well be admitted; for blessed John, in the first prophetic book, understands men who live like beasts.3 In sign of this, Apocalypse 9 describes beasts in terms such as cannot bodily fit an animal, as is clear of the locusts, which he says have "tails like to scorpions: and there were stings in their tails". 6And so it is understood of the power of the horses which went out after the sixth angel sounded his trumpet, and in like manner it is understood, in chapter 13:4, of the "power which the dragon gave to the beast".4 Hence, for want of an authority, I do not dare to say that God has power of producing anything within [himself], but only outside; although he has power to produce all the producibles intrinsic to himself, nor do we say that a person or an act in God is subject to his power.5 Yet all the acts of our free choiceliberum arbitrium: free choice, like the extrinsic works done through them, are said to be subject to our power, as is clear in Retractations I.32, On Free Choice III, and On the Spirit and the Soul 26.6 Hence it does not follow: if one of two convertibles is not in our power, then neither is the other, or conversely; the antecedentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent is not in our power, therefore neither is the consequentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent, or conversely. And so, arguing affirmatively from the opposite: "there is nothing in our power", says Augustine, "but what follows our will". For it followssequitur: it follows: God has predestined me, therefore I have the virtuemotrix (anima, virtus): moving of final perseverance, and conversely. It also follows: it pleases me that I digest food, therefore I so digest; the antecedent is in my power and the consequent not, because, from Ethics II, "on account of those things which are not in our power we are not to be praised morally nor blamed".7 Supposing therefore that the restriction of power be made to a free rational potency accidental to man,8 it is clear that such powers have a manifold subdivision 7and masters’ termstermini magistrales: masters' terms, as one is the power of orderpotestas ordinis: power of order, another of rule or jurisdictionpotestas iurisdiccionis: power of jurisdiction, one authenticautenticus / autenticacio: authentic / authentication power and another vicarious or committed. And, briefly, according to the distinction of works is the distinction of powers.9 And the best-knownfamosior: best-known [sense] distinction of power pertaining to this purpose is the one Hugh touches on, On the Sacraments II, part 2, chapter 4, saying that "as the life of man is twofold, the earthly, bodily or natural life, the other heavenly, spiritual or supernatural, so power is twofold. By the first life the body lives from the soul, but by the second life the soul lives from God, who flows into it by grace; and each life has its own good by which it is quickened and nourished, so that it may subsist; and so that justice may be kept in each life, there is, according to the two peoples, namely the clergyclerus; clericus: the clergy; cleric and the laity, a twofold power, namely spiritual and secular; and in each there are different grades and orders of powers, yet distributed on both sides under one headcaput: head of the churchecclesia: church, and as it were drawn from one principle and referred to one. The earthly power has as its head the king on earth, as the spiritual power has the highest pontiff."10 But the scholastic difficulty is how these two powers ought to be defined; and Hugh seems to hint that spiritual power is the power of a cleric to direct the church so that it lives well by the spiritual life, and secular or earthly power the power of a layman to direct the church so that it lives well by the natural life. And these powers have their own laws and their own goods, with which they chiefly concern themselves, as the layman 8with the goods of nature and fortune, but the cleric with the goods of grace and virtue.

¶28.3–8.17

8Iste autem descripciones videntur perplexe, cum clerici nostri videntur habere potestatem secularem concessam eis a regibus. Sicut ad reges pertinet subditos suos in virtute instruere, specialiter cum per se finis vite naturalis sit ut ornetur virtutibus, nec aliter est regnum vel populus, nec aliter vivit legaliter. Cum igitur quicquid potestas potest inferior, potest superior, non e contra, potestas autem spiritualis excedit aliam ut anima corpus, patet secundum doctorem quod potestas spiritualis habet aliam instruere, et quando deviat iudicare; spiritualis, inquit, potestas a solo Deo debet iudicari iuxta illud I. Corinth. II, 15: Spiritualis iudicat omnia, et ipse a nemine iudicatur.

But these definitionsdescripcio: definition seem perplexed, since our clerics seem to have secular power granted to them by kings. So too it belongs to kings to instruct their subjects in virtue,11 especially since the end of natural life, of itself, is that it be adorned with virtues, and not otherwise is there a kingdomregnum: kingdom or a people, nor does it otherwise live lawfully. Since, therefore, whatever a lower power can do a higher can, and not conversely, and since now "the spiritual power exceeds the other as the soul the body", it is clear according to the doctor that the spiritual power is to instruct the other, and to judge it when it goes astray; "the spiritual power", he says, "ought to be judged by God alone, according to that of 1 Corinthians 2:15: 'the spiritual man judgeth all things: and he himself is judged of no man.'"12

¶38.18–8.28

8Unde spiritualis potestas excedit aliam in antiquitate in dignitate et in utilitate. In antiquitate, quia prius iubente Deo sacerdocium institutum est, ut patet Exod. XXVIII, postea per sacerdocium iubente Deo instituta est regalis potestas, ut patet Deuter. XVIII et I. Regum XII. Ex quo videtur quod ista potestas excedit aliam in dignitate, quia, cum secundum Apostolum Heb. VII: Maior est qui benedicit, et minor qui benedicitur, videtur quod potestas consecrandi et instituendi regem excedit regiam potestatem.

Hence spiritual power exceeds the other in antiquity, in dignity and in usefulness. In antiquity, because "first, at God’s command, the priesthood was instituted", as is clear in Exodus 28; afterwards, "through the priesthood, at God’s command, royal power was instituted", as is clear in Deuteronomy 18 and 1 Kings 12.13 From which it appears that this power exceeds the other in dignity, because, since according to the Apostle, Hebrews 7, "greater is he who blesses, and less he who is blessed",14 it appears that the power of consecrating and instituting the king exceeds the royal power.

¶48.29–9.5

8Utilitas maioritatis eius ex hoc evidet, quod Potestas spiritualis per se sufficit ad regimen populi, ut patet de Israhele usque ad tempora Saul sine potestate regia salubriter regulato. 9Potestas igitur spiritualis cum sit de bonis optimis et per se sufficientibus, excedit potestatem terrenam, cum illa nichil valet sine potestate spirituali principaliter regulante. Sed e contra ista per se sufficit sine illa.

The usefulness of its greatnessprioritas; majoritas: priority; greatness is evident from this15, that spiritual power by itself suffices for the rule of the people, as is clear of Israel, governed to its health without royal power until the times of Saul.16 9Spiritual power, therefore, since it concerns the best goods and those sufficient of themselves, exceeds earthly power, since that is worth nothing without spiritual power principally governing it. But, conversely, this suffices by itself without that.

¶59.6–9.10

9In ista utique materia tenendum est pro constanti quod potestas spiritualis quoad dignitatem excedit aliam, ut testatur doctor et quotlibet leges hominum fundate racionibus et scripturis, ut patet capitulo V huius.

In this matter, at any rate, it must be held as constant that spiritual power, as regards dignity, exceeds the other, as the doctor testifies, and any number of human laws grounded in reasons and scriptures, as is clear in chapter 5 of this [treatise].17

Notes

  1. 1 racionalis potencia: the first potencia in this part, here "potency", the rational potency of the analysis of dynamis. Wyclif uses potestas and potencia interchangeably (potestas vel potencia, 4.7); outside that analysis both are "power" (6.5–6).
  2. 2 vox sensitiva ad placitum: so the print. The logicians’ definition of a name is vox significativa ad placitum, "a sound significant by convention" (Aristotle, De interpretatione 2; 16a19; Boethius, vox significativa ad placitum); sensitiva may stand for significativa. Translated as printed.
  3. 3 in primo libro prophetico: Loserth’s foot to 5.28 notes primo and offers a better reading (rectius: in illo …) that the scan of the foot does not let us recover. The book meant is the Apocalypse.
  4. 4 Apocalypse 9:10 (Loserth 5.32), the locusts; 9:17 (Loserth 6.2), the horses, loosed at the sixth angel’s trumpet; 13:4, "the dragon which gave power to the beast". The italic words of 13:4 are quoted within Wyclif’s own syntax. Descripcionibus (5.31) has its ordinary sense here, not the logical "definition" of 7.15 and 8.3.
  5. 5 potestatem … potenciam: both "power". The scruple is over the word: Wyclif knows no authority (auctor) for saying that God has potestas to produce ad intra, within the Godhead, though he grants him potencia for "all the producibles intrinsic to himself". The licet clause runs on into nec … dicimus; the stops are the print’s.
  6. 6 Augustine, Retractationes I.32 (so the text; Book I has 27 chapters, and the words Loserth’s foot quotes, sponte homo, id est libero arbitrio, cadere potuit, are I.9.6, PL 32, 598); De libero arbitrio III.3.7 (nihil tam in nostra potestate, quam ipsa voluntas est); De spiritu et anima 26 (so the text; the matter is ch. 48, PL 40, 814, ch. 26 being on apparitions), a pseudo-Augustinian work printed among Augustine’s spuria and received in Wyclif’s day as his.
  7. 7 Augustine, Retractationes I.22.4 (PL 32, 620), word for word: in potestate nostra non est, nisi quod nostram sequitur voluntatem; Loserth’s II.2–3 is wrong. Aristotle: Loserth gives Nic. Eth. II.9 with a query; the place is Eth. II.5, 1105b28–1106a10 (we are neither praised nor blamed for what we have by nature), and the doctrine that praise and blame attach to the voluntary opens book III. The two non-sequiturs state one rule: of two convertibles, or of antecedent and consequent, one may be in our power and the other not, as the two examples show.
  8. 8 a racionalem potenciam: so the print; the sense wants ad, translated "to". AB in the margin (6.29): Potestas multiplex libera. Hus repeats 6.31–7.4 (Loserth: "Hussii Opp." 213b), as he does Wyclif’s account of power at 5.11–19 (Hus, De ecclesia fol. 217b, "verbotenus").
  9. 9 secundum distinccionem operum est distinccio potestatum: powers are told apart by the works they are for; the definition Wyclif gives at 10.25 builds on this.
  10. 10 Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis II.2.4 (PL 176, 418), "loosely quoted" (Loserth). Loserth’s italics carry the quotation to summum pontificem. "Who flows into it" renders illapso. AB in the margin: Vita hominis duplex, naturalis et spiritualis (7.9), Potestas duplex (7.11).
  11. 11 perplexe: here of the definitions, "tangled", not the moral-theology sense of perplexus. Sicut ad reges pertinet: the sicut clause has no main clause to answer it; taken as a second ground of the objection, "so too". It may instead hang on the cum clause before it ("as it belongs to kings …").
  12. 12 Hugh again: Loserth (8.12) marks what follows as excerpted from him. 1 Corinthians 2:15 (Vulgate spiritualis autem). Loserth’s italics give the two Hugh clauses, quoted here.
  13. 13 iubente Deo (8.22): the manuscripts lack Deo; Loserth supplied it from Hugh’s text (translated). Exodus 28, the institution of Aaron’s priesthood; Deuter. XVIII and I. Regum XII (1 Samuel 12) as printed. The two clauses in quotation marks follow Loserth’s italics (Hugh).
  14. 14 Hebrews 7:7, Vulgate quod minus est, a meliore benedicitur, DR "that which is less is blessed by the better". The text’s wording (Hugh’s) is a paraphrase; translated as it stands.
  15. 15 evidet (p. 8): so the print, read on the plate; taken as evidet[ur] ("is evident"), our emendation. The sense is not in doubt.
  16. 16 Utilitas maioritatis eius: "the usefulness of its greatness", the third head (usefulness) of the comparison; the sense is "its superiority in usefulness".
  17. 17 "The doctor" is Hugh. capitulo V huius: chapter 5 of this treatise. AB in the margin (9.6): Potestas spiritualis est dignior potestate regia. Hus repeats 9.1–5 (Loserth: "Hussii Opp." 213b).
How the Latin of this chapter was established
  • Plate readings; page · reading · note):
    • 6: illa
    • 6: ∅ (English side-note word)
    • 7: multiplicem
    • 7: terminos
    • 7: magistrales
    • 7: illa
    • 7: deducti
    • 7: relati
    • 8: antiquitate (hyphenated antiqui-tate; main token covers whole word)
    • 8: in
    • 8: dignitate
    • 8: prius
    • 9: illa
    • 9: illa
    • 7: possit (LEFT-nw: italic; print = possit)
    • 8: Maior (LEFT-nw: italic, capital M)