De benedicta incarnacione, chapter 5, part 1
That God could not lay aside the assumed nature: the argument from damage
Harris pp. 65.0–68.4
¶165.0–65.0
[Supposing that the WordVerbum: the Word did not lay asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside the humanityhumanitas: the humanity for the three daystriduum (in triduo): the three days, it proves that he could not lay aside the naturenatura: nature that he assumedassumere / assumpcio (naturam): assume / assumption either.]
¶265.18–65.20
Since it has been seen that the Word did not in fact, in the holy three days, lay aside body or soul, it remains to showdeclarare / ostendere: make clear / show that God could not lay aside the nature of man that he assumed.
¶365.21–68.4
It is proved in three ways. First thus. God cannot damagedampnificare / dampnificacio: damage / damaging any nature without its own preceding demerit: now, 66if he were to lay aside the assumed nature, he would thus damage it: therefore etc.1 The major is clear from this, that damagingdampnificare / dampnificacio: damage / damaging is, for a rational creaturecreatura / creator / creatus: creature / creator / created, the useless bringing-onillacio (mali): bringing-on of evil, which cannot be present in it unless it arises principally from itself, according to the teachingsentencia: teaching / sentence of blessed John Chrysostom and of the other doctors commonly.2 This is confirmed. If God takes away some good from a rational creature, it is just and beautiful that it be taken away, and consequently it does not amount to useless evil: and so, immunity from sin being preserved, it is no loss. For if God damages a man because he makes him justly lack a possible good, then he would damage every beatifiable creature infinitely much; and, as is commonly deduced, he would infinitely hinder each of his works. Second, this is confirmed from this, that the infliction of perpetual punishment for sin does not damage but betters the damned man, to such a degree that, if it were in his choice to be thus damned after sin or to remain unpunished, he would reasonably choose to be thus damned: therefore, from the greater or from the equal, if God takes away any good whatever from anyone without his demerit, since it is beautiful and good that he so act, not onlynedum: not only for the whole universe but for the person, who otherwise would hold [it] to no purpose, it followssequitur: it follows that such a taking-awayablacio: taking-away is not damaging, since neither for that taking-away nor for its cause is one reasonably to grieve.3 From which, third, it seems that an innocent seeing this would reasonably choose to be thus deprived: and since no one can reasonably choose to be damaged, it follows that God does not damage a creature, but only [the creature] itself [damages] itself, or another enticing [it] to sin.4 Indeed, if it is well considered, all damaging savours of wronging, which cannot of itselfper se / per accidens: of itself / by accident; (spatial) apart, by itself belong to one who is good and just, but rather to make goodbonificare: make good and to correct. Now the minor of the argument is 67proved thus. The humanity assumed by the Word cannot demeritdemereri: to demerit its laying-asidedimittere / dimissio (naturam): lay aside / the laying-aside beforehand: therefore, were it laid aside, this would befall it without its demerit. The antecedentconsequens / antecedens: consequent / antecedent is clear by this, that it cannot demerit while the unionunio: union stands, for then the Word would sin: and if it sinned at the instant of the dissolution or after, it is clear that the demerit will follow [the laying-aside]; and consequently it would not be damaged from its own preceding demerit.5 And that the laying-aside would be damaging to the humanity of Christ is evident from this, that the loss of the grace of uniongracia unionis: the grace of union would be the loss of the greatest possible good intrinsic to a creature: and consequently no so great a good would then succeed in its place: it follows that the humanity losing it would be notably made worse, and consequently damaged.6 And the worth of the hypostatic union I suppose from what has been said and is to be said: for through it the assumed manhomo assumptus: the assumed man was personally the same as the Word of God. Great, therefore, would be its worseningpeiorare / peioracio: make worse / worsening, that it should be laid aside without its demerit as a stranger. For it does not belong to the said Caesar ever August thus to make worse, without its demerit, his dearest creature: for undoubtedly the creature laid aside could, at the instant of the laying-aside, reasonably complain of the ingratitudeingratitudo: ingratitude of its God, since continually before it did whatever it ought, and at the last would receive, for "recompense of reward", so great a loss.7 There would therefore be no beauty in such a God.8 And hence, no wonder, Augustine says, Homily 47: "Far be it that Christ for the three days laid aside his soul: for he had it inseparably":9 hence undoubtedly, if it sinned afterward, the laying-aside of the grace of union, which preserves [it] from sinning, would be the principal cause of the sin: for if an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation, a negation is the cause of a negation, as the absence of the first draft is the cause of the ship’s peril, from the second [book] of the Physics.10 That sin, therefore, originating from the laying-aside, would be principally imputable to God, since such an absence is caused not on the creature’s side but on God’s: such a 68God, therefore, would exceed in malice the god of the Manichees, who without the demerit of his servant would absent himself for the time of temptation, not helping. Hence St Thomas also touches that argument, On Christ, article 50.11
Notes
- 1 65.21–22 dampnificare: "damage", to do harm to; kept apart from dampnum "loss" (66.9), dampnosa "damaging" (67.8) and dampnari "be damned" (66.16). The argument: God harms no nature without its prior demerit; laying aside the assumed nature would harm it; so he cannot lay it aside. B merito for demerito (65.22).
- 2 Chrysostom: the teaching that no one is harmed except by himself, the treatise Quod nemo laeditur nisi a seipso, whose thesis (§1, restated in §17) is that no one who is wronged is wronged by another, only by himself (verified in sense, in the NPNF translation; the work circulated in Latin). At 66.3 O reads inutilis illacio and omits mali.
- 3 66.17–23: a maiori vel pari, the topic from the greater or the equal: if punishment betters even the damned man, who deserved it, the taking-away of a good from one who did not deserve it is still less a damaging. Frustratorie occuparet: the person would hold the good to no purpose; "[it]" is supplied. Sine suo demerito (66.18–19) is wanting in A B C; O universo for universitati (66.20).
- 4 66.27 ipsamet seipsam: the creature itself is the only one that harms itself, or another (the devil, or a fellow) who entices it to sin. A B C ipsam for ipsamet; O omits seipsam. At 66.25 A B C read sic (sit B) racionabiliter eligeret for potest racionabiliter eligere.
- 5 67.6 "[the laying-aside]": Harris’s own bracket [dimissionem], from A’s margin (suple dimissione); O sequitur for sequetur. A sin at or after the dissolution would follow the laying-aside, and so could not be the demerit that preceded it.
- 6 67.9 evidet, as printed, "is evident". 67.11 tum, wanting in O, is taken as "then"; it may stand for cum, which would make the clause a reason ("since no so great a good would succeed"); the sense is the same. O a creatura for creature (67.10).
- 7 67.22 "recompense of reward": Heb. 2:2 (DR "received a just recompense of reward"), Harris’s margin. A B C read mercedis tantum premium ("so great a prize") and O mercedem; the foot does not make plain whether O keeps tantum dampnum, and the print is kept. 67.17–18 Cesarem semper Augustum, the imperial style "Caesar ever August", is given to God; O augustutum. Carissimam: B and O abbreviate, O’s read by Harris as beatissimam (67.18).
- 8 67.23 species "beauty", with B O, against the print’s spes "hope": "there would be no hope in such a God". B and O agree across the families, and their reading construes: such a God would lack the beauty claimed for his acts (pulcrum, 66.7, 66.19). The two words share an abbreviation, so the print’s word may be Harris’s expansion.
- 9 Augustine, "Homily 47": Tract. in Ioh. 47 (on John 10:17–18), the place Wyclif cites by homily throughout; 47.10, PL 35, 1738: Fidelem latronis animam non deserebat, et deserebat suam? Absit: sed illius ut Dominus custodivit, suam vero inseparabiliter habuit (verified). Here Wyclif’s number is the received one; pro triduo is his. A mimirum; O omits absit and reads dimiseret.
- 10 Aristotle, Physics II.3 (195a11–14): the same thing is cause of contraries, the first draft’s presence of the ship’s safety and his absence of its wreck (verified; Harris quotes the Greek).
- 11 68.3–4 Thomas, "De Christo, article 50", with O and the source, against the print’s 70. The question whether the Godhead was parted from Christ’s flesh and soul in death is ST III q. 50 aa. 2–3, which bears out O’s number: a. 2 co., id quod per gratiam Dei conceditur, nunquam absque culpa revocatur … Cum igitur in Christo nullum fuerit peccatum, impossibile fuit quod solveretur unio divinitatis a carne ipsius (verified). Harris quotes the same sentence in his note but prints 70. C Aquino for Christo.
How the Latin of this chapter was established
- Plate readings; page · reading · note):
- 67: ‘retribucione mercedis’ (bt ran the words together; print has two words (footnote 8 between)) [SUB]
- Omitted per §3.5 / kept in the English (margin matter): reference 5 Augustinus, (65.5); reference Heb. ii. 2. (67.22); reference Augustine shud- (67.23).